Hot August 96th

The history of mankind is the history of betrayal. From the creation of the world and the first people of Adam and his son Cain to the present day, little has changed. This is especially noticeable in war, when the human spirit is subjected to special tests.

As once in the 41st ...

It all started in the early morning of August 6th. The militants, numbering about 1,000 people, who had accumulated in advance and concentrated in the city, suddenly attacked the railway station, the commandant's offices of Grozny, the Government House, the building of the FSB of the republic, the Coordination Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and almost all checkpoints.

The militants are firing

At the same time, hundreds of armed people gathered in advance in the suburban villages began to arrive in the city in an organized manner, safely bypassing the posts, some of which had been liquidated the day before as part of the Moscow and Nazran agreements. For the sake of truth, we must admit the fact: more than 130 roads lead to Grozny. Only 33 were directly under the control of the federal forces at that time, it is believed that there were not enough people for more.

Grozny Map

Subsequently, the total number of militants in Grozny reached 4-6 thousand people. They were led by the most experienced commanders headed by Maskhadov: Basaev, Gelaev, Israpilov, Khattab. A very serious "mess" was being brewed (the separatists gave it a loud name - operation "Jihad"), which could have been avoided, but, unfortunately, our guys had to clear up. How could this happen?

A long time later, a document prepared in the bowels of the headquarters of Alexander Lebed, who in 1996 was the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, caught my eye. It contains, in my opinion, wording that reflects the essence of the current situation, to which not only the soldiers and officers of the group of forces in Chechnya, its commander, but, perhaps, the president himself have become hostages. I will quote a few paragraphs from the document: “The tension in Grozny did not decrease. The significant forces of law and order concentrated here provided only the appearance of maintaining public safety and protecting citizens from criminal encroachments. At night, the city, in fact, passed under the control of criminal elements and militants who penetrated into residential areas, since the patrol service and visits to the scene of incidents by the internal affairs bodies were not carried out during this period. So the "suddenness" was quite predictable. In addition, military intelligence reported on the impending attack, sparingly shared information from the FSB, and the information received through its channels was reported to the top by the MVD opera.

It is difficult, and hardly appropriate, to cite the chronology of those tragic days. Events developed on the rise, with kaleidoscopic diversity and speed. Today they are quite honestly and clearly recorded and reflected in a variety of documents: from summaries and reports, to documentaries and memoirs. At the same time, there are still “white spots” in this dark story, which is yet to be shed light on. I will try to supplement this very colorful picture with my modest strokes of what I saw, heard, experienced, and thought about.

Leave to return

According to the plan of the command of the United Group, the defense of Grozny was entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was believed that there were about 12,000 law enforcement officers in the city (of which no more than 6,000 were servicemen of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Troops, mainly units of the 101st and 34th separate brigades operational purpose(obron), located in the former 15th military camp, guarded 22 checkpoints, 5 commandant's offices and 2 commandant's stations; several detachments of OMON and SOBR reinforced the commandant's offices and administrative buildings. There were also several formations of the Zavgaev militia in the city. True, even the day before, just for August 6, an operation was planned in the suburbs of the Chechen capital, and part of these forces was withdrawn from Grozny. Army units with heavy equipment and weapons, for the most part, according to the orders of the command, were in the south of the republic.

101st defense

In the film of the famous TV journalist Alexander Sladkov “Shooting August”, the then acting commander of the United Group, Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovsky (instead of Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, who had gone on vacation), admitted that he did not have enough to figure out the fidelity of such a decision on the alignment of forces. time, no authority - such a disposition was approved at the very top. I have not been able to determine the author of such a plan with absolute accuracy. Let the late Boris Nikolayevich, who approved such a decision, most likely without reading it, be the “extreme” one.

We, the officers of the 8th detachment of the special forces of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia "Rus", in which I was in Chechnya at that time, did not have the opportunity to master all the information, although our intelligence officers, wandering around the republic daily, brought news, the essence of which was reduced to the next - the silence that was established at the beginning of the summer, after the declarative statement of Boris Nikolayevich that, they say, "the war is over, that's enough, we've fought enough," was deceptive. By the way, our detachment is directly related to this propaganda and political action. During the famous May visit of President Yeltsin to the republic, a column of our armored personnel carriers “accidentally” caught the eye of the Supreme Commander, imitating the withdrawal of troops. Yeltsin, it seems, really believed then that "the process has begun", signing on the armor of one of our "boxes" a decree on reducing the service life of soldiers who served in Chechnya. And then the column, having made a detour, returned to the base - the war continued for us.

Yeltsin in Chechnya

The very beginning of this last operation the first Chechen campaign caught me in Rostov-on-Don, where I had flown on a business trip from the still “peaceful” Chechnya just the day before. I returned a couple of days later in a completely different environment. The first thing I saw on the take-off of the Severny airport was cars standing in a row, from where they carried out a stretcher wrapped in foil. There were many. Somebody's legs, shod in sneakers of the 45th size, ran into my memory, going beyond the dimensions of the stretcher. I confess I was scared...

There is nothing to counterattack

We know the results of those heavy battles, which, however, we do not like to remember, but we must learn to face the truth: an almost complete loss of control over the city, big number killed and wounded, a blow to the prestige of the state and its security forces. However, this formal truth also has a kind of lining, consisting of thousands of "truths" of direct participants in the defense of Grozny.

One of the groups of our detachment, led by Captain Alexander Iglin in the amount of no more than 20 people, on August 6 was in the Coordination Center (CC) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was located next to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB near the Dynamo stadium. The place is not the best even for conducting active defense, and even more so for deploying almost a counteroffensive, which General Pulikovsky blamed the policemen in the mentioned film. The KC itself is a closed building with “checkpoints”, a building surrounded by houses with an adjacent territory, surrounded by a concrete fence and the only entrance gate. From equipment - a pair of detachment BTR-80 - and that's it! True, as expected in large headquarters, there were many generals and officers who knew how to hold weapons in their hands.

The senior chief at the facility was the First Deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Militia Colonel-General Pavel Golubets. Later, he was accused of having removed himself from management, did not lead the defense of the city, and the forces entrusted to him. There were objective reasons for this: shortly after the start of intense fighting, the government communications line failed, which disrupted the unit control system. And what could be done when the enemy simultaneously attacked almost all the facilities where military personnel of the Internal Troops and police were serving, and the air was filled with pleas for help, screams of the wounded, curses against the militants and higher leadership, and squabbles.

In addition, outright “disinformation” was also broadcast on the radio channels, alternating with Maskhadov's appeal to the federal forces and Chechen policemen demanding to lay down their arms. For example, there was information that the latter fled or completely went over to the side of the militants, which was not true: there were traitors and cowards among them, but those who remained faithful to the oath steadfastly defended the railway station, the base of the Chechen OMON, the location of the 2nd regiment of the PPSM of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Russia in the Czech Republic. At the same time, it is worth recognizing that the bandits managed, especially at first, to disorganize the work of managing units. However, it is, of course, impossible to talk about widespread panic, manifestations of cowardice or wholesale drunkenness of military personnel and employees who suddenly found themselves surrounded. My archive contains footage of video chronicles, audio recordings of radio conversations, from which it becomes clear with impartial accuracy who was doing what, including the leadership.

KC Ministry of Internal Affairs and the entire so-called. the government quarter came under intense attack. Using 100% knowledge of the area, having studied all the approaches and weak points of the defense, the militants cut communications that were under fire, made several attempts to break into the territory of the KC. This was prevented by the competent actions of his defenders. Captain Iglin, as soon as it became known what was happening in the city, put a secret of two fighters on the roof of a nearby building. Their task was to monitor the situation around and, most importantly, the approaches to the KC and inform the commander by radio station.

The militants made their first serious attack around 6 p.m. on August 6. Prior to that, the bandits fired at the special forces from sniper rifles all day long. A group of militants, advanced from the side of the furniture factory, noticed the secret in time. They were fired from underbarrel grenade launchers, the fire was successfully corrected by fighters who were in secret. Several attackers were wounded, the assault organized by them was thwarted. By 23.00, when it was already dark, the militants again tried to attack the positions of the special forces. And again they ran into competent resistance. Underbarrel grenade launchers were used, and at the windows of the main post office, from where they were shooting especially densely, a detachment armored personnel carrier fired several long bursts. The attack was repulsed. But confident in their numerical and moral superiority, the militants launched a third assault around one in the morning. Radio interception showed: the bandits believed that there was almost no one to defend the object, everyone fled and therefore attacked furiously, went into the open. And again they stumbled upon an organized rebuff. No more assault attempts were made, but all the defenders were kept under the supervision of a sniper and machine gunners. By the way, the object was never handed over to the enemy.

Fighting in Grozny

According to eyewitnesses, the situation in the neighboring buildings of the FSB and the Department for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was worse. There, the bandits even managed to capture the lower floors, and the fighting went on inside the buildings. I had to call in aviation, which also suffered heavy losses: in the very first hours of the attack, militants shot down three helicopters.

Prolonged "Minute"

Another facet of the truth, its separate page, is the feat of soldiers and officers of the 34th Armored Forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who defended two GPs in the area of ​​Minutka Square and the so-called. "Romanovsky bridge". They fought for two weeks in complete encirclement, suffering losses (only 10 people died and died from wounds), experiencing serious problems due to lack of ammunition, medicines, food and water. The militants several times offered them to leave the buildings they held, guaranteeing safety, but the officers refused, hoping that they had not been forgotten, that the situation would soon be reversed and the victims they had suffered would not be in vain.

Soldiers of the 34th defense are fighting in the area of ​​Minutka Square

And only when the defenders heard on the TV, reanimated with the help of tank batteries, that the main news of the day was the inauguration of the president, and “the situation in the Chechen capital is normalizing and being under control,” the defenders began to doubt that they were right. As a participant in those battles, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Polyakov later recalled: “Something inside us broke then, I won’t hide it. There were questions that had not arisen before. Why do we put boys? ... In general, the day after that “political information”, those who led the defense of the VOP began negotiations with Khunkar Israpilov, who got in touch, the field commander, who was in charge of the general leadership of the actions of the militants in the Minutka area ... It was not about surrender, but about our ability to freely go to our own, along with weapons, the wounded and the bodies of the fallen. Which ultimately happened on August 19th.”

The language does not turn to accuse these soldiers and officers of treason or cowardice (although such attempts were later made by the competent authorities). They did more than was required of them, because some other defended objects fell much earlier. And the will of the defenders was broken by the indifference to their destinies, shown on the “box” of the country; the confusion of the command, the lack of will of the top leadership of the state and the clearly treacherous position of the media. It's no secret that during the attack on the city, journalists from the leading Russian TV channels found themselves in one of the basements of the attacked government buildings, from where, without sticking their noses out, they broadcast panic messages about the surrender of the city. I myself remember this moment very well: the commandant's offices, including the KC MVD, are fighting with might and main, and the journalists have already “surrendered” them! It is hard to imagine a better service rendered to the enemy, because the panic, reflected like an echo in the thousand-voiced crooked mirrors of the media, is capable of bringing down even a stronger defense!

Keyword - betrayal

And then the chief peacemaker of the country, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Alexander Lebed, arrived in Chechnya, with the wish of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, tired of the war, to stop it and with great authority. I personally didn’t have any objections to this then, much less now, and I didn’t really believe in the effectiveness of the ultimatum of generals Pulikovsky-Tikhomirov, announced to Maskhadov the day before: to leave the encircled city within 48 hours. There were good reasons to doubt. Until very recently, the bandits managed to leave the encirclement more than once. Yes, and in other cases, when the militants were strongly pressed, the command “cease fire” and “enter into negotiations” immediately came, so I did not flatter myself with illusions that this time it would be somehow different.

Tikhomirov and Kulikov in Khankala. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko

But what price the next storming of the city would have cost, I soon became convinced, having left with one of the groups of the detachment for negotiations, which were actively conducted between the parties to the conflict from the second half of August. On one of the streets of Grozny along the route of movement (in my opinion, Gudermesskaya) we came across a broken military column: gnawed skeletons of infantry troops with burnt-out wombs of airborne squads; unwound spools of caterpillars resembling the tails of dead alligators; spent shell casings, a helmet pierced by a bullet ...

The streets are deserted, there is dead silence, and on both sides of the road there are five-story buildings, from which, it seemed, death was watching us. One after another, the commands were passed: “do not open fire” and “do not jump onto the roadside”, which turned out to be mined. And then, as if from under the ground, armed people appeared, shaking their machine guns and greeting us with a victorious cry: “Allahu Akbar!”. Personally, I had a depressing feeling of moral superiority over us by the enemy, who was not at all going to capitulate.

During the negotiations, in which the well-known field commander Aslanbek Ismailov participated on the part of the militants, I managed to talk with some Chechens from his external guard. They celebrated victory and did not hide it. Barely restrained gloating and feigned nobility of "real warriors" is a typical appearance of the Chechen militia of that period.

I remember several episodes. I, not forgetting about the machine gun, tried to capture on photo and video cameras historical event. Many bandits posed, making characteristic gestures. One of them showed a cockade with a wolf on a cap and added that they were made in Russia, naming a specific factory. Another showed us a “Chechen body armor”, shouting “Allahu Akbar!” three times, assuring us that he was not afraid to die. There was one among them who, sincerely rejoicing at the victory, invited me to visit him. Just like Hasek: "at 6 pm after the war." It is impossible not to mention the children scurrying around everywhere, harassing us with chants on the theme “Allahu Akbar”.

I’ll be lying if, for the sake of completeness, I don’t mention the Chechen woman, who treated both us and the militants with homemade pies, which we unanimously refused (we don’t sell for gingerbread), gloomily remaining faithful to the oath. However, we had no reason to have fun: in addition to everything else, yesterday, in the area of ​​​​the 13th checkpoint, our comrade - scout, Sergeant Andrei Vasilenko, died in an ambush, on whom I had written a submission for awarding him the medal "For Courage" the day before.

Soldiers with the body of the deceased A. Vasilenko. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko

Another characteristic picture of those days that remains in my memory is the eyes of Chechen policemen who remained loyal to Russia. They were taken with their families and miserable belongings to Khankala. They wandered around the base lost, not knowing where to put themselves, because they could not return home. When I caught their distant gaze, I could not endure it for a long time, because we once again betrayed them. But they betrayed us in turn.

betrayal in general keyword to understand this war , the script of which, it seems to me, was written in advance, in the silence of high offices far from here. It seemed that the very hot to the limit, all-penetrating air of the Chechen capital was saturated with betrayal, dooming all our victories to defeat in advance. They betrayed and sold (it’s not for nothing that these words are so similar in Russian) not only defense plans or weapons, but also the soldiers themselves, officers, simple people, interests of the state... Wholesale and retail.

The late Alexander Lebed has been appointed to the role of one of the main traitors to the interests of the country. But I believe that he himself was sincere in his desire to bring peace to a weary country. The trouble with Alexander Ivanovich was that he was “drifted” in order, and he did not want to share the laurels of a peacemaker with anyone else, opening (as he really wanted) the way to the presidency. And in order to achieve this goal, he was ready for a lot. As time has shown - a lot. The victims of the ambitious Secretary of the Security Council were not only the army put on a short leash, and then actually expelled from Chechnya, but also Russia itself, its international prestige, which suffered as a result of the shameful Khasavyurt Treaty, is akin to obscene Brest. I am sure that even by negotiating with the separatists, it was possible to beautifully get out of a difficult situation without losing face, while maintaining the status of a great power. Unfortunately, General Lebed, who fought well in Afghanistan and stopped the bloodshed in Transnistria, was much better than Lebed, a diplomat.

Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed

The signing of the Khasavyurt peace

Subsequent events showed that it is impossible to solve the "Chechen question" without taking into account the opinion of the Chechens and at the expense of the Chechens themselves . The times when Russian generals such as Alexei Yermolov, Yakov Baklanov or soviet marshals like Lavrenty Beria, irrevocably gone. This was quickly understood when the new leader of Russia came to power (I remind you, a retired FSB colonel), who, having shown outstanding diplomatic skills, managed to find the right and, probably, the only right solution.

Minutka Square area today

To judge who, in the end, was a hero, and who was a traitor; who is right and who is not, there will be God and descendants . But even repeatedly betrayed, Russian soldiers and officers continued to demonstrate high morale, believing in the coming victory. In confirmation, I will give a few known fact: the last to leave Chechnya were the soldiers of the 101st armored troops of the Russian Interior Ministry (brigade commander - Colonel Yuri Zavizionov), whose losses were the largest - over 80 people, took with them the symbol of Victory, the T-tank, standing on a pedestal in a former military town of a tank division 34. And on the armor of their "boxes" leaving Chechnya under the hooting of the crowd, these people, deadly tired of the war, hiding their resentment deep in their hearts, wrote: "Let her be wrong, but this is our Motherland!"

And while the feeling of faith in Russia among its defenders is indestructible, we cannot be defeated.

P.S. As a result of the fighting in Grozny from August 6 to August 23, 1996, according to generalized data obtained from various sources, we lost up to 2080 people (almost 500 killed, over 1400 wounded, more than 180 missing). On the streets of the city, up to 18 tanks, 61 infantry fighting vehicles, 8 armored personnel carriers, 30 vehicles were burned, 4 helicopters were shot down. The losses of militants in manpower exceeded ours by 2-3 times.

Eternal memory to the soldiers of the Fatherland who fell in those battles!

Roman Ilyushchenko - reserve lieutenant colonel, combat veteran

The first Russian general to be awarded the title of Hero of Russia even before the end of the First Chechen War was Colonel General Anatoly Romanov. In July 1995, he, being the commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, headed the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in Chechen Republic.
Anatoly Alexandrovich served in this position for less than three months - in October 1995, the convoy, which included the general's car, was blown up in Grozny by a radio-controlled landmine. Romanov survived, having received severe injuries. He is still undergoing treatment in a military hospital. Anatoly Alexandrovich, in addition to the medical staff themselves, is supported by relatives, all these years his wife Larisa has always been there.
Anatoly Alexandrovich was a brilliant negotiator who worked hard and fruitfully to peacefully resolve the military conflict in Chechnya.
A. A. Romanov received the highest title of Russia a month after the assassination attempt. Earlier, in 1994, he was awarded the Order of Military Merit. Anatoly Alexandrovich has the “Krapovy Beret” (April 1995, for the development of special forces of the explosives). These are only the awards that General Romanov received during the First Chechen War. Previously, there were the Orders of the Red Star (1988) and For Personal Courage (1993), the medal For Impeccable Service, and commemorative medals.
For the heroism shown in the First Chechen campaign, the Star of the Hero was received by another general of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation - Major General Nikolai Skrypnik, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasian District VV. Nikolai Vasilyevich replaced his seriously wounded predecessor at his post, Skrypnik led the tactical grouping of the Internal Troops in Chechnya.
In the summer of 1996, in the area of ​​one of the Chechen villages, under the direct supervision of N.V. Skrypnik, units of Russian troops carried out an operation to destroy a large gang of militants led by field commander Doku Makhaev. Skrypnik's armored personnel carrier, just like General Romanov's UAZ, was blown up by a radio-controlled landmine. The mortally wounded general did not live even an hour, dying without regaining consciousness.
The title of Hero of Russia was posthumously awarded to him after the formal end of the First Chechen campaign, in November 1996.

On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Accords were signed, ending the First Chechen War. Journalist Olesya Yemelyanova found the participants in the First Chechen campaign and talked to them about the war, their life after the war, Akhmat Kadyrov and much more.

Dmitry Belousov, St. Petersburg, senior warrant officer of OMON

In Chechnya, there was always a feeling: “What am I doing here? Why is all this necessary? ”, But there was no other work in the 90s. My wife was the first to say to me after the first business trip: “Either me, or the war.” Where will I go? We tried not to get out of business trips, at least there we paid our salaries on time - 314 thousand. There were benefits, "combat" paid - it was a penny, I don’t remember exactly how much. And they gave me a bottle of vodka, it was sickening without it, in such situations you don’t get drunk from it, but it helped to cope with stress. I fought for a paycheck. The family is at home, it was necessary to feed it with something. I did not know any background of the conflict, I did not read anything.
Young conscripts had to be slowly soldered with alcohol. They are only after training, it is easier for them to die than to fight. Eyes run wide, heads are pulled out, they do not understand anything. They will see the blood, they will see the dead - they cannot sleep.
Murder is unnatural for a person, although he gets used to everything. When the head does not think, the body does everything on autopilot. Fighting Chechens was not as scary as fighting Arab mercenaries. They are much more dangerous, they know how to fight very well.

We were prepared for the assault on Grozny for about a week. We - 80 riot police - were supposed to storm the village of Katayama. Later we learned that there were 240 militants there. Our tasks included reconnaissance in force, and then the internal troops were supposed to replace us. But nothing happened. Ours also hit us. There was no connection. We have our own police radio, tankers have their own wave, helicopter pilots have their own. We pass the line, artillery strikes, aircraft strikes. The Chechens got scared, they thought they were some kind of fools. According to rumors, the Novosibirsk OMON was originally supposed to storm Katayama, but their commander refused. Therefore, we were thrown from the reserve to storm.
Among the Chechens, I had friends in the opposition areas. In Shali, for example, in Urus-Martan.
After the fighting, someone drank himself, someone ended up in a madhouse - some were taken directly from Chechnya to a psychiatric hospital. There was no adaptation. The wife left immediately. I can't remember a good one. Sometimes it seems that it is better to erase all this from memory in order to live on and move forward. And sometimes you want to speak up.
Benefits seem to be, but everything is only on paper. There are no levers on how to get them. I still live in the city, it’s easier for me, but it’s impossible for rural residents. There are arms and legs - and that's good. The main trouble is that you are counting on the state, which promises you everything, and then it turns out that no one needs you. I felt like a hero, received the Order of Courage. It was my pride. Now I look at everything differently.
If I were now offered to go to war, I would probably go. It's easier there. There is an enemy and there is a friend, black and white - you stop seeing shades. And in a peaceful life, you need to twist and bend. It's tiresome. When Ukraine began, I wanted to go, but my current wife dissuaded me.

Vladimir Bykov, Moscow, infantry sergeant

When I got to Chechnya, I was 20 years old. It was a conscious choice, I applied to the military registration and enlistment office and in May 1996 I left as a contract soldier. Before that, I studied at a military school for two years, at school I was engaged in bullet shooting.
In Mozdok we were loaded onto a Mi-26 helicopter. There was a feeling that you see footage from an American movie. When we arrived in Khankala, the fighters, who had already served for some time, offered me a drink. They gave me a glass of water. I took a sip, and my first thought was: “Where would I throw it out?”. The taste of "military water" with bleach and pantocide is a kind of point of no return and understanding that there is no turning back.
I didn't feel like a hero, and I don't. To become a hero in a war, one must either die, or commit an act that has become public knowledge, or be close to the commander. And commanders, as a rule, are far away.
My goal in the war was minimal casualties. I didn't fight for the Reds or the Whites, I fought for my guys. In war there is a reassessment of values, you begin to look at life differently.
The feeling of fear begins to disappear after about a month, and this is very bad, indifference to everything appears. Each of them came out in their own way. Some smoked, some drank. I wrote letters. Described mountains, weather, local people and their customs. Then I tore these letters. Sending was still not possible.

Psychologically, it was difficult, because it is often not clear whether you are a friend or an enemy. It seems that during the day a person calmly goes to work, and at night he comes out with a machine gun and fires at roadblocks. During the day you are on good terms with him, and in the evening he shoots you.
For ourselves, we divided the Chechens into lowland and mountainous. Plain more intelligent people more integrated into our society. And those who live in the mountains have a completely different mentality, a woman is nobody for them. You ask the lady for documents for verification - and this can be perceived as a personal insult to her husband. We came across women from mountain villages who didn't even have passports.
Once, at the checkpoint at the intersection with Serzhen-Yurt, we stopped the car. A man came out of it, who had a yellow ID in English and Arabic. It turned out to be Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov. We talked quite peacefully on everyday topics. He asked if there was anything he could do to help. We then had difficulty with food, there was no bread. Then he brought two trays of loaves to us at the checkpoint. They wanted to give him money, but he did not take it.
I think that we could end the war in such a way that there would be no second Chechen war. It was necessary to go to the end, and not conclude a peace agreement on shameful terms. Many soldiers and officers then felt that the state had betrayed them.
When I returned home, I threw myself into my studies. I studied at one institute, at the same time at another, and also worked to keep my brain occupied. Then he defended his PhD thesis.
When I was a student, I was sent to a course in psychosocial care for survivors of hot spots organized by a Dutch university. I then thought that Holland did not fight with anyone in recent times. But I was told that Holland participated in the Indonesian war in the late 40s - as many as two thousand people. I offered to show them as educational material videocassette from Chechnya. But their psychologists turned out to be mentally unprepared and asked not to show the recording to the audience.

Andrey Amosov, St. Petersburg, SOBR major

That I would be an officer, I knew from the third or fourth grade. My dad is a policeman, now retired, my grandfather is an officer, my brother is also an officer, my great-grandfather died in Finnish war. On the genetic level this has borne fruit. At school I went in for sports, then there was an army, a group special purpose. I always had a desire to repay my homeland, and when I was offered to go to a special detachment rapid response, I agreed. There was no doubt whether to go or not, I took an oath. During the military service, I was in Ingushetia, it was clear to me what kind of mentality awaits me. I understood where I was going.
When you go to SOBR, it's stupid not to think that you can lose your life. But my choice was conscious. I am ready to give my life for my country and for my friends. What are the doubts? Politics should be done by politicians, and combat structures must follow orders. I believe that the entry of troops into Chechnya both under Yeltsin and under Putin was correct so that the radical theme would not spread further into Russia.
For me, the Chechens have never been enemies. My first friend in the technical school was a Chechen, his name was Khamzat. In Chechnya, we gave them rice and buckwheat, we had good food, but they were in need.
We worked on the leaders of gangs. We captured one of them with a fight at four o'clock in the morning and destroyed it. For this I received the medal "For Courage".

On special assignments, we acted in a coordinated manner, as a single team. Tasks were set different, sometimes difficult. And it's not just combat missions. It was necessary to survive in the mountains, to freeze, to sleep in turns near the potbelly stove and to warm each other with hugs when there was no firewood. All boys are heroes to me. The team helped to overcome fear when the militants were 50 meters away and shouted "Surrender!". When I remember Chechnya, I imagine the faces of my friends more, as we joked, our unity. The humor was specific, on the verge of sarcasm. I think I underestimated it before.
It was easier for us to adapt, because we worked in the same unit and went on business trips together. Time passed, and we ourselves expressed a desire to go to the North Caucasus again. The physical factor worked. The feeling of fear that adrenaline gives had a strong influence. I regarded combat missions as both a duty and a rest.
It would be interesting to look at modern Grozny. When I saw him, he looked like Stalingrad. Now the war is periodically dreaming, there are disturbing dreams.

Alexander Podskrebaev, Moscow, GRU special forces sergeant

I ended up in Chechnya in 1996. We did not have a single conscript, only officers and contractors. I went because the homeland should be defended by adults, and not by young puppies. We didn’t have travel allowances in the battalion, only combat ones, we received 100 dollars a month. I did not go for money, but to fight for my country. “If the homeland is in danger, then everyone should go to the front,” Vysotsky also sang.
The war in Chechnya did not appear out of the blue, it is Yeltsin's fault. He armed Dudayev himself - when our units were withdrawn from there, all the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District were left to him. I talked with ordinary Chechens, they saw this war in the coffin. They lived normally, life suited everyone. Not the Chechens started the war and not Dudayev, but Yeltsin. One solid base.
Chechens fought some for money, some for their homeland. They had their own truth. I didn't feel like they were absolute evil. But there is no truth in war.
In war, you are obliged to follow orders, there is no getting around, even criminal orders. After you have the right to appeal them, but first you must comply. And we carried out criminal orders. That's when, for example, the Maykop brigade was brought into Grozny under New Year. The scouts knew that this could not be done, but the order was from above. How many boys were driven to death. It was betrayal in its purest form.

Take, for example, the cash-in-transit KamAZ with money, which was standing near the headquarters of the 205th brigade when the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Bearded guys came and loaded bags of money. The FSB members allegedly gave money to the militants for the restoration of Chechnya. And we didn’t get paid, but Yeltsin gave us Zippo lighters.
For me, the real heroes are Budanov and Shamanov. My chief of staff is a hero. While in Chechnya, he managed to write scientific work about the rupture of an artillery barrel. This is a man due to whom the power of Russian weapons will become stronger. The Chechens also had heroism. They were characterized by both fearlessness and self-sacrifice. They defended their land, they were told that they were attacked.
I believe that the emergence of post-traumatic syndrome is highly dependent on the attitude of society. If they say “Yes, you are a killer!” in your eyes all the time, it can injure someone. There were no syndromes in the Great Patriotic War, because the homeland of the heroes met.
It is necessary to talk about the war from a certain angle so that people do not engage in nonsense. There will still be peace, only part of the people will be killed. And not the worst part. There is no sense from this.

Alexander Chernov, Moscow, retired colonel, internal troops

In Chechnya, I worked as the head of a computer center. We left on July 25, 1995. There were four of us: I, as the head of the computer center, and three of my employees. We flew to Mozdok, got off the plane. The first impression is wild heat. We were taken by turntable to Khankala. By tradition, in all hot spots, the first day is non-working. I brought with me two liter bottles of White Eagle vodka, two loaves of Finnish sausage. The men put out Kizlyar cognac and sturgeon.
The camp of internal troops in Khankala was a quadrangle surrounded by barbed wire. A rail hung at the entrance in case of artillery raids to raise the alarm. The four of us lived in a trailer. It was quite convenient, we even had a refrigerator. The freezer was full of water bottles because the heat was unbearable.
Our computer center was engaged in the collection and processing of all information, primarily operational. Previously, all information was transmitted via ZAS (classifying communications equipment). And six months before Chechnya, we had a device called RAMS - I don’t know how it stands for. This device made it possible to connect a computer to ZAS, and we could transmit secret information to Moscow. In addition to internal work such as all sorts of information, twice a day - at 6 am and 12 midnight - we sent an operational report to Moscow. Despite the fact that the volume of files was small, the connection was sometimes bad, and the process dragged on for a long time.
We had a video camera and we filmed everything. The most important filming is the negotiations between Romanov (deputy minister of internal affairs of Russia, commander of internal troops Anatoly Romanov) and Maskhadov (one of the separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov). There were two operators at the talks: from their side and from our side. The secretaries took the cassette from us, and I do not know its further fate. Or, for example, a new howitzer appeared. Romanov told us: "Go and film how it works." Our cameraman also filmed how the heads of three foreign journalists were found. We sent the film to Moscow, where it was processed and shown on television.

May 1996, airfield military base in Khankala

The war was very unprepared. Drunken Grachev and Yegorov sent tankers to Grozny on New Year's Eve, and they were all burned there. Sending tanks to the city is not quite the right decision. And the staff was not prepared. It got to the point that the Marines were removed from Far East and threw it there. People should be run in, and then the boys were almost immediately thrown into battle from training. Losses could have been avoided, in the second campaign they were an order of magnitude smaller. The truce gave a little respite.
I am sure that the first Chechen one could have been avoided. I believe that the main culprits of this war are Yeltsin, Grachev and Yegorov, they unleashed it. If Yeltsin had appointed Dudayev as Deputy Minister of the Interior, entrusted him with the North Caucasus, he would have put things in order there. The civilian population suffered from the militants. But when we bombed their villages, they rose up against us. Intelligence in the first Chechen worked very poorly. There were no agents, they lost all agents. Whether there were militants in the destroyed villages or not, it is impossible to say for sure.
My friend, a military officer, his entire chest in orders, took off his shoulder straps and refused to go to Chechnya. Said it was the wrong war. He even refused to issue a pension. Proud.
My sores worsened in Chechnya. It got to the point where I couldn't work on the computer. Another such mode of operation was that he slept only four hours, plus a glass of cognac at night to fall asleep.

Ruslan Savitsky, St. Petersburg, Private of Internal Troops

In December 1995, I arrived in Chechnya from the Perm region, where I had training in an operational battalion. We studied for six months and went to Grozny by train. We all wrote petitions to be sent to the war zone, not to be forced. If there is only one child in the family, then in general he could easily refuse.
We were lucky with the staff. They were young guys, only two or three years older than us. They always ran ahead of us, they felt responsible. Of the entire battalion, we had only one officer with combat experience who had gone through Afghanistan. Only riot police directly participated in the cleansings, we, as a rule, held the perimeter.
In Grozny, we lived in a school for half a year. Part of it was occupied by the OMON unit, about two floors - by us. Cars were parked around, the windows were covered with bricks. In the classroom where we lived, there were potbelly stoves, stoked with firewood. Bathed once a month, lived with lice. It was undesirable to go beyond the perimeter. I was taken out of there earlier than the others for two weeks for disciplinary violations.
Hanging around at school was boring, although the food was normal. Over time, out of boredom, we began to drink. There were no shops, we bought vodka from Chechens. It was necessary to go beyond the perimeter, walk about a kilometer around the city, come to the usual private house and say you need alcohol. There was a high probability that you would not return. I went unarmed. For one machine gun alone, they could kill.

Destroyed Grozny, 1995

Local banditry is a strange thing. It seems like a normal person during the day, but in the evening he dug up a machine gun and went to shoot. In the morning I buried the weapon - and again normal.
The first contact with death was when our sniper was killed. He fired back, he wanted to take the weapon from the dead, he stepped on the stretch and blew himself up. In my opinion, this is a complete lack of brains. I had no sense of the value of my own life. I was not afraid of death, I was afraid of stupidity. There were a lot of idiots around.
When I returned, I went to work in the police, but I did not have a secondary education. I passed the exams externally and came again, but they gave me a ride again, because I got tuberculosis in Chechnya. Also because I drank a lot. I can’t say that the army is to blame for my alcoholism. Alcohol in my life and before it was present. When the second Chechen war began, I wanted to go. I came to the military registration and enlistment office, they gave me a bunch of documents, it discouraged my desire a little. Then another conviction for some garbage appeared, and my service in the army was covered. I wanted courage and buzz, but it did not work out.

Daniil Gvozdev, Helsinki, special forces

I ended up in Chechnya on a conscription. When it came time to join the army, I asked my coach to get me into good troops- We had a special-purpose company in Petrozavodsk. But at the assembly point, my surname sounded with those who go to Sertolovo to become grenade launchers. It turned out that the day before, my coach had left for Chechnya as part of a combined SOBR detachment. I, along with the whole “herd”, got up, went to the train, spent three months in the training unit. Nearby was a part of the paratroopers in Pesochnoye, he repeatedly wrote applications there to be accepted, he came. Then I realized that everything was useless, I passed the exams for the radio operator of the command and staff vehicle of the 142nd. At night, our captain and officers got us up. One walked with tears, said how he respects and loves all of us, the second tried to warn. They said we were all leaving tomorrow. The next night it was so interesting to look at this officer, I did not understand why he shed tears in front of us, he was less than I am now. He cried: “Guys, I will worry about you so much!” One of the guys said to him: "So get ready and go with us."
We flew to Vladikavkaz via Mozdok. For three months we had active studies, they gave me the 159th radio station behind my back. Then they sent me to Chechnya. I stayed there for nine months, I was the only signalman in our company who more or less understood something in communication. Six months later, I managed to knock out an assistant - a guy from Stavropol, who did not understand anything, but smoked a lot, and for him Chechnya was a paradise in general.
We performed different tasks there. Of the simple ones - they can dig up oil there with a shovel and they put such devices: a barrel, under it a gas or diesel heater, they drive the oil to a state where gasoline is obtained at the end. They sell gasoline. They drove huge convoys with trucks. ISIS, banned in Russia, is doing the same in Syria. Some won't come to an agreement, they hand over their own - and their barrels burn, and some calmly does what is needed. Permanent job was also - we guarded the entire leadership of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, guarded Shamanov. Well, reconnaissance missions.
We had a task to capture a militant, some language. We went out into the night to search on the outskirts of the village, saw that cars were coming there, pouring gasoline. We noticed one comrade there, he constantly walked around, changed the heating under the barrels, he has a machine gun, well, if a machine gun means a militant. He had a bottle; The task of capturing the language has gone by the wayside, you must first capture vodka. They crawled through, found a bottle, and there was water! This made us angry, we took him prisoner. This guy, a militant, so thin, after interrogation in the intelligence department, was sent back to us. He said that he used to do Greco-Roman wrestling and did a handstand with a broken rib, I respected him greatly for this. He turned out cousin field commander, because he was exchanged for two of our soldiers. You should have seen these soldiers: 18-year-old guys, I don’t know, the psyche is clearly broken. We wrote this guy on a green handkerchief: "Nothing personal, we do not want war."
He asks, "Why didn't you kill me?" We explained that we were wondering what he was drinking. And he said that they had one Russian left in the village, they didn’t touch her, because she was a sorceress, everyone went to her. Two months ago, she gave him a bottle of water and said: "You can be killed, drink this water and stay alive."

We were constantly located in Khankala, and worked everywhere. The last we had was a demobilization chord, they released Bamut. Have you seen Nevzorov's film " Mad Company"? So we went along with them, we were on the one hand along the pass, they were on the other. They had one conscript in the company and it was he who was killed, and all the contract soldiers are alive. Once I look through binoculars, and there are some bearded people running around. The commander says: "Let's give them a couple of cucumbers." They asked me on the radio station, they tell me the coordinates, I look - they ran in, waving their hands. Then they show a white whale - what they wore under camouflage. And we realized that it was ours. It turned out that their batteries did not work for transmission and he could not transmit, but he heard me, so they began to wave.
You don't remember anything in combat. Someone says: “When I saw the eyes of this man ...” But I don’t remember this. The battle has passed, I see that everything is fine, everyone is alive. There was a situation when we got into the ring and caused fire on ourselves, it turns out that if I lie down, there is no connection, and I need to correct so that they don’t hit us. I wake up. The guys shout: “Good! Lie down." And I understand that if there is no connection, they will cover their own.
Who came up with the idea of ​​giving children weapons at the age of 18, giving them the right to kill? If they gave it, then make sure that when people return, they will be heroes, and now Kadyrov's bridges. I understand that they want to reconcile the two nations, everything will be erased in a few generations, but how can these generations live?
When I returned, it was the dashing nineties, and almost all my friends were busy with something illegal. I came under investigation, a criminal record... At some point, when my head began to move away from the military fog, I waved my hand at this romance. With the guys veterans opened public organization support for combat veterans. We work, we help ourselves, others. I also paint icons.

Igor Prokopenko in his book cites previously unknown documentary facts and testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen war. The author makes you take a fresh look at the tragic events of that war. Why has such a terrible tragedy happened to our country? Why did the government make so many mistakes? Why, in terms of the scale of stupidity, betrayal, corruption and cynicism, this war was unparalleled? The main characters in that war, according to the author, were ordinary soldiers and officers who took responsibility for the decisions made, violating the charter, and sometimes even the orders of higher military officials. A military journalist reveals the secret springs of the tragedy in which leading role played the betrayal of the "Kremlin nobility", illiteracy and cowardice of the highest echelon. Why is it so important to know the truth about the Chechen war? You will find the answer in this book...

A series: Military secret with Igor Prokopenko

* * *

by the LitRes company.

Generals and their army

November 29, 1994. Tuesday. Members of the Russian Security Council gather in the Kremlin for an emergency meeting: President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, State Duma head Ivan Rybkin and Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeiko. In addition to them, the meeting is attended by the heads of all power departments and special services. There is only one question on the agenda: to start a war in Chechnya or not. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is delivering a report on this topic.

I met with some of the participants in that meeting, as well as with the people who were to implement the decisions taken at it. That's what he told me Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semyonov:

“This decision was made behind the scenes. Grachev spoke at the Security Council, convinced the president that we are ready, that we will put things in order there.”

Pavel Grachev himself has his own version of events. After his report, the members of the Security Council started voting. All those present voted for the introduction of troops into Chechnya. Everyone except him.

In conversation with me Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated:

“I was the only one who spoke out at that ill-fated Security Council against military operations in Chechnya. I remember Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, once we were in a very good relations, said: “Boris Nikolaevich, we don’t need such a minister, let’s quickly change him. He is afraid to go to Chechnya.” Then Boris Nikolayevich announced a ten-minute break, invited Chernomyrdin, Lobov, and Secretary of the Security Council Shumeiko to his office. 10 minutes passed, we sat down again, and Boris Nikolaevich announced: “Pavel Sergeevich, we have decided not to dismiss you, but within two weeks you must draw up a plan for bringing troops into Chechnya and lead the leadership at first.” That's how it happened."

Grachev probably could have refused and left. But... it meant betraying Yeltsin, who made him Minister of Defense. Therefore, Grachev accepted the rules of the game: he remained in the chair of the Minister of Defense, but for this he shouldered all the responsibility for the war.

A day after the secret meeting of the Security Council, President Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to strengthen law and order in the North Caucasus", in which he invited all militants to hand over their weapons. Until December 15... This "two-week ultimatum", as historians would later call it, had the effect of an exploding bomb on the territory of Chechnya and forced the militants not to surrender, but, on the contrary, to purchase weapons. On December 11, 1994, Russian troops received an order, without waiting for the end of the ultimatum, to enter the territory of Chechnya.

1994 Grozny. Every day from here, from the city's railway station, passenger trains take away thousands of hastily assembled and poorly dressed people. All of them are Russians, residents of the city who will never be able to return to it.

The fact that in Chechnya almost every Chechen has a weapon, that they rob and kill Russians, was known in the Kremlin. They also knew that Chechnya was preparing to secede from Russia and that if this happened, the country would simply fall to pieces. That is why in just a couple of years almost all key politicians and prominent generals visited the republic. True, they all visited Chechnya secretly. Each of them tried to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of the air force, General of the Army Pyotr Deinekin, on whom the Kremlin placed special hopes, also tried to negotiate with him. After all, he knew Dudayev better than others: for several years, General Soviet army, the commander of the division of heavy bombers Dzhokhar Dudayev was under his direct supervision and was considered one of the best commanders.

I met with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Pyotr Deinekin. Here is what he told me:

“Well, Dudayev received me with respect, as in the past of his boss. But he categorically refused to return to the army, citing the fact that he was elected Chechen people and cannot go against his will. I flew there with Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, who was then Deputy Minister of Defense, and with Grachev Pavel Sergeevich.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also met with Dzhokhar Dudayev. And ... also secretly. He visited Grozny 6 (!) times. But... These meetings did not bring any serious results. Everyone needed a war. Compromise no longer suited anyone.

Testifies Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev:

“I say:“ Dzhokhar, stop all this business. Announce that you need to think more, find some compromises, send your political advisers to us, let them solve the issue with our Minister for National Policy.” And he says to me: "It's getting late."

This meeting was the last attempt to prevent war. It took place when the Russian General Staff had already developed a plan for bringing troops into Chechnya. Army General Vladimir Semyonov at that time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. He was supposed to be in charge of the operation. According to the plan, Russian troops were supposed to enter Chechnya on December 11. From three directions: from Mozdok through Ossetia, from Vladikavkaz through Ingushetia and from Kizlyar – from the territory of Dagestan.

In conversation with me Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Vladimir Semenov recalled:

“The plan that was developed by the General Staff was a map with three routes plotted. And there was nothing else in this regard. When I asked the district commander: “What is this, don’t you know what the plan of operation should look like?” - He told me: "I know, but look: it was signed by the Chief of the General Staff and approved by the Minister of Defense."

Why the military did not have time to prepare a plan that meets all the requirements is understandable. Nothing else could be done in two weeks. But... Pavel Grachev accepted Yeltsin's conditions and considered himself no longer entitled to break his word given to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Just 9 days before the storming of Grozny, one incredible event happened in the Ministry of Defense: the Minister of Defense fired all his deputies!

December 21, 1994. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev flew to Mozdok and held a meeting. Main question- who will lead the grouping of troops in Chechnya.

Oddly enough, the main actors who were officially considered for this position were absent from this meeting. Only today, after almost 18 years, it can be said with certainty: they were not at the meeting only because all of them, under various pretexts, REFUSED to lead the operation!

Pavel Grachev recalled how it all happened:

“All my deputies practically betrayed me. One did not want to lead the leadership due to the fact that from the first minute he did not agree with the entry of troops. Another said he was already tired. The third referred to the fact that in Afghanistan his heart became ill. The commander of the troops of the district agreed, but at the beginning of the introduction he began to shout and swear at his subordinates so much that I could not even make out half of his conversations on the "wiretap". I didn't understand what he was talking about at all. I then invited him to my place, I say - you fell ill, let's go to the hospital. There was also a general commanding the ground forces, and I, as expected, decided to appoint him, but he said that his wife was a Chechen, he could not ... He even cried ... "

According to Pavel Grachev, this general is the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semyonov. He really was married to a Chechen woman and was himself a native of Karachay-Cherkessia. It is not known how much Pavel Grachev exaggerates, but something else is known for sure: Semyonov was relieved of his post "for actions discrediting the honor and dignity of a serviceman, incompatible with his position." The President of Russia released him.

What the “discrediting” and “incompatible” actions of the commander-in-chief consisted of is still unknown. Vladimir Semenov himself speaks reluctantly on this subject.

In conversation with me Vladimir Semenov uttered only one sentence on this occasion:

"I have not been to Chechnya, here is my personal attitude to these events."

None of the leaders of the military department wanted to take responsibility for the implementation of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Each refused under different pretexts. So, in fact, he violated the Oath. It is easy to imagine what would have happened to a general who dared not follow the order of the Supreme, for example, in the harsh thirties, and even in the stagnant seventies. But in 1994 new Russia everything was different. And every owner of the general's office understood: by refusing to go to war, in the worst case, he risks being dismissed. With a general's pension, a general's apartment and a dacha.

Perhaps that is why the "unenviable" post was abandoned: the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, General of the Army Vladimir Semenov, and Pavel Grachev's deputies - Valery Mironov, Georgy Kondratyev. According to Anatoly Shkirko, having commanded a little, Colonel-General Aleksey Mityukhin, Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, also refused.

In conversation with me Anatoly Shkirko recalled:

“He refused to act, that's all. For a week, maybe. Then he said: "I will not command." During this time, he did not sign a single document. Legally, not a single combat order. He was then the commander of the North Caucasian district.

The last person that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev tried to appoint to the post of commander of the operation to storm Grozny was Eduard Vorobyov, the first deputy commander of the ground forces. Pavel Grachev regarded his refusal as a betrayal.

During our meeting Pavel Grachev He described the course of his conversation with General Vorobyov in the following way:

“Then I suggested to Vorobyov, I say: “Here, Eduard Arkadyevich, please lead the group. You are an experienced comrade and can lead. And he tells me: "I will not lead." I asked why? “Because the troops are not prepared.” I say: “How are you not prepared, dear? How many days have you been reporting to me that the troops are ready, but the troops, it turns out, are not prepared!

Today Colonel General Vorobyov asserts: Pavel Grachev has no right to such words. The former deputy commander of the ground forces is absolutely convinced that the responsibility for training troops has nothing to do with him.

Here is what he told me Colonel General Vorobyov:

"What can I say? Of course, this is not true. The real lie. No Vorobyov was involved in the preparation of the operation. I can prove that a week before that I had been studying in the Leningrad Military District. And before that, the Commander-in-Chief (Vladimir Semenov) told us that there are recommendations not to meddle in the North Caucasian Military District.”

It turns out that on the eve of the war no one was involved in anything and no one was responsible for anything. But the army ALWAYS lived under the command of these generals. It was they who reported on exercises and firing, on "combat coordination, on successful combat and political training" ... A week before the storming of Grozny, all these reports turned out to be many years of fiction.

I bring comments General Konstantin Pulikovsky:

“I will give you an example. On command to open fire, the artillery opened fire on an unplanned target in 40 minutes! The first shot was fired when the target was already leaving. And according to all standards, it is necessary to fit in a minute, at most - in two ... "

The army was not ready for war. That's just her generals could refuse to go to war, but ordinary soldiers and officers - no. As a result, on the eve of a serious test Russian army was practically decapitated. But even despite this, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had to pretend that everything was going according to plan.

December 30 at the Mozdok airfield for me personally Pavel Grachev said the following words. Here's a verbatim transcript:

“Although we do not force our actions, because we still hope for prudence, that they will raise White flag. Even we, the military, do not want too much blood. Although we could have completed this task a few days ago.”

Defense Minister Grachev uttered these words exactly one day before the start of the assault on Grozny. Although he certainly knew that the well-armed and determined militants were not going to surrender.

December 31, 1994. 6 a.m. Columns of federal troops began to move towards Grozny. According to the plan, troops should enter the city in four directions: east, west, northeast and north. It was in this grouping of troops "North" that the 81st Samara regiment marched.

Testifies Chief of Staff of the 81st Regiment Semyon Burlakov:

“The task was the following. The first assault detachment was to take control of the railway station. And the second assault detachment was supposed to take control of the square, take Dudayev's palace and, as Kvashnin said, hoist a banner on the ruins of Dudayev's palace, present orders and medals to distinguished fighters.

Burlakov himself walked along with the first assault detachment. By 7 o'clock in the morning, the detachment managed to occupy the Severny airport and, having cleared several bridges near the Neftyanka River, began moving towards the city center. But unexpectedly, the detachment came under heavy fire from the militants. To break their resistance, the command made a decision: to process the quarter with artillery. But for this you need to pull the entire column back. The first assault detachment received an order: full back.

About what happened after that Semyon Burlakov remembered as a terrible dream:

“During the understaffing, we received absolutely untrained driver-mechanics, who for the entire summer period training, one might say, walked around the BMP, and did not ride them. They could only start the car and move off, they could not do anything else. And when the regiment began to take back, it turned out a terrible crush. Cars ran over, literally piled one on top of the other.

So right in the center of Grozny, a convoy of Russian troops got stuck in a traffic jam. Field commander Aslan Maskhadov, a former colonel in the Soviet army, immediately reacted to this. On his orders, the militants began to converge towards the center. The slightest delay for the Russian troops could lead to the fact that they would have to fight with the enemy, who had already taken advantageous combat positions. And then Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, whose car did not get into a traffic jam, offered the command the only way out of the situation: he quickly pulls the first assault detachment out of the traffic jam and, leading it, continues to advance towards the railway station.

I bring a story lieutenant colonel Burlakov:

“I went to the station, and there the Maikop brigade with brigade commander Savin was already on the defensive. And Savin told me: “Here is the order of the 1st: I occupy the station building itself, the hotel under construction, which adjoins the station, it will become our dividing line, and everything else is yours.” And we had to occupy the whole area. And we must remember that the fire was very strong. And I had to set a task for people under fire.

The first assault detachment of the 81st regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, took up defense in the forecourt buildings. Across the street from the railway station was a five-story building. The field Chechen commander Maskhadov stationed almost one and a half hundred militants in it. Having examined the positions of the defenders from the upper floors of the building, they started a fight. This battle did not stop for almost a day.

I bring memories regiment commander Yaroslavtsev:

“And my first battalion, and one battalion of the Maikop brigade with a brigade commander at the head, they were all at the station. And they were completely cut off from the rest of the parts. There was Semyon Burlakov, the chief of staff. These two battalions were completely cut off, not a single infantry fighting vehicle, not a single tank passed to them during the day "...

If on that fateful night the generals did not shift responsibility to each other, did not hide in the corners, but remembered what they were taught in the academies, there would certainly have been much fewer victims of this senseless New Year's assault. Even the fact that aviation could be used to support the bleeding advanced units was remembered when it was already too late.

Here's what he said in a conversation with me Commander of the Air Force General Pyotr Deinekin:

“Without prejudice, I’ll say that the ban on the use of aviation, although the weather was fine, WAS ... I just arrived home on the 31st, when Anatoly Vasilyevich (Kvashnin) called me and asked for help. I immediately went back to the command post, but, unfortunately, aviation was not able to help directly in combat at that time, because it came to hand-to-hand combat. For example, at the railway station ... "

There, at the station, the 81st Samara regiment and the 131st Maikop brigade and her brigade commander Ivan Savin.

The 81st Samara Regiment and the 131st Maikop Brigade, squeezed in the ring, held back the onslaught of the militants as best they could. But... the forces were unequal. Almost all equipment: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns - was burned. Hungry and exhausted soldiers collapsed from fatigue, there was not enough food and medicine, ammunition was running out ... But most importantly, the militants broke into the station building. The surviving fighters controlled only the waiting room.

Realizing that help would not come, and the militants would break in any minute, the officers decided to break through to their own. The fighters found the surviving tank, which knocked out the corner of the building. Through this hole, an urgent evacuation of the wounded began on the remaining BMPs.

The car, in which the wounded brigade commander Savin ended up, was ambushed by militants. Nobody survived. His body, mutilated by militants, with a scalpel removed, was discovered only in March.

The infantry vehicle, in which Semyon Burlakov ended up, came under fire and caught fire. Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, who was sitting at the hatch, pulled the handle, fell out of the BMP and found himself in a ravine.

In this ravine he was found by a simple Russian woman. A resident of Grozny, who on New Year's Eve 1994, like Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, found herself in the middle of nowhere. For almost two weeks, she nursed the wounded. And then she managed to bring him to the Russian checkpoint.

Semyon Burlakov was one of the few who were lucky. Those who were less fortunate were never able to get out of Grozny. As a result, in just a few days of the assault, the Russian army lost several thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded.

Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev Eighteen years after the tragic New Year's storm, he recalls those events in our conversation:

“... There were huge losses. What can I say - an oversight, a miscalculation ... You see, I took it upon myself. So I did something wrong. So, I did not disturb the commanders at that time. And it was necessary to constantly beat, beat, beat on the headset, so as not to calm down on what has been achieved. Because the first successes were very easy ... We entered the city ... Silence ... Well, we relaxed ... "

After it became clear that the assault on Grozny not only failed, but turned into a bloody massacre, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was immediately reminded of a phrase that he had uttered just a few days before the start of the operation:

"We will take Grozny with one airborne regiment in two days."

Today, 18 years later, Pavel Grachev is ready to apologize for this phrase. But... he still insists: the phrase was taken out of context.

During our meeting, he stated:

“Of course I want to apologize for this statement. They grabbed him. Well, how do they get it? Do you understand? Caught when I said there "one parachute regiment." It broke out! Well, this phrase slipped out of me! Well, let's shoot then."

But ... neither for this phrase, nor for the assault, which turned into the death of thousands of Russian soldiers, of course, no one shot Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. He was not suspended, fired, or even reprimanded. Moreover, the worse things were in the war, the more valuable the figure of Grachev himself became every day. He was fired only when it was required by the campaign headquarters. The high-profile resignation of an unpopular minister was to be Yeltsin's strongest card in the presidential election.

Here's what he told us Pavel Grachev about the events of that time:

“Boris Nikolaevich says to me: “I want to appoint Lebed as Secretary of the Security Council.” I say: "Your will, Boris Nikolaevich, but he always opposed you." And then he says: “Well, you can’t work together. How can you be relieved of your post? For what?" I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, don’t torture your head, I’ll go out and write myself why I want to leave this position.” This is how we said goodbye. I went to the reception room, asked for a sheet of paper and a fountain pen, and wrote a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: they say, I ask you to relieve me of my post in connection ... But I myself think: in connection with what? And the thought itself came somehow: "in connection with the circumstances."

Exactly one day before this conversation, on June 16, 1996, an event took place in the country that meant that a new president might appear in Russia. Alexander Lebed took third place in the first round of the presidential election. Voters cast their votes for him in the hope that this particular man, a fighting Soviet general who managed to restore order in Transnistria, will be able to restore order in the country. And order then for many was synonymous with cessation Chechen war. The pre-election logic demanded simple and understandable promises to the people. And Lebed was ready to make these simple promises. As a result, he turned out to be an ideal figure to support the weakening and ailing Yeltsin, and a bet was placed on him.

Lebed easily promised to solve the problem of the Chechen war and, as a result, easily took an honorable third place in the election race. What followed was a matter of technique. In exchange for the support given to Yeltsin in the second round, he is offered the post of secretary of the Russian Security Council with "special powers." Lebed, on the advice of Boris Berezovsky, agrees. Boris Abramovich quickly explained to the general with the profile of Napoleon the simple arithmetic of the struggle for power: before you become a ruler, you need to get power, and power in Russia is the army. General Lebed immediately began his game.

I quote the words spoken in our conversation General Konstantin Pulikovsky:

“... He (Lebed) immediately called me and in a rather friendly tone, by name and patronymic, said: here, Konstantin Borisovich, so and so, tell me how you command there, who commands you. I tell him: Alexander Ivanovich, the president is commanding me Russian Federation I am appointed by his decree. “Well, from this day on,” he replies, “I will be in charge.” I say: “Alexander Ivanovich, I will not carry out any of your commands, because you are nowhere on the list of bosses that the President of the Russian Federation has determined.” But the next day, a presidential decree arrived by fax. The swan called me again and said: did you get a fax? I say yes. Under it was Yeltsin's signature.

Alexander Lebed managed to receive this decree signed by the President in a day! And this despite the fact that Yeltsin at that time was preparing for a heart operation. The decree allowed Lebed to make ANY decisions on behalf of the President of Russia.

This meant only one thing: Alexander Lebed received practically unlimited power with Yeltsin's absolute anarchy, who at that time had another heart attack. It's time for a real fight for the presidency.

By this time, commanders who knew how to fight had already appeared in Chechnya, and the soldiers felt the taste of victory. The desire to avenge their dead comrades made them go forward. And simple conscript boys worked wonders in battle. Russian troops managed to liberate almost all the flat regions of Chechnya from the militants, and they began to withdraw into the mountains. It seemed that the end of the war was near. It is only necessary to finish off the remaining field commanders and their depleted gangs.

But here, in order to buy time, Aslan Maskhadov resorted to a trick. He proposed negotiations... Yeltsin's entourage understood that without ending the war in Chechnya, the elections could not be won. That is why the peacekeeping efforts were launched. Prominent officials frequented the militants, they began to create all sorts of concessions for the bandits.

However, in order to create the appearance of peace, it was necessary not only to enlist the support of the leaders of the militants, but also to prevent their generals, who smelled a close victory, from finishing off the enemy driven into a corner. Secret information flowed like a river to Maskhadov. As soon as the generals were planning another strike, an order followed from Moscow: back. In the spring of 1996, Alexander Lebed, the new secretary of the Security Council, became the main tool in this task. At his press conference, he announced that he would soon have a meeting with Maskhadov, after which there would be a ceasefire and an exchange of the wounded would begin.

Meanwhile, in Chechnya, assault detachments and groups of federal forces are carrying out reconnaissance and search activities. The command received reliable information about the locations of the bases of the militants, their warehouses with weapons and ammunition. Artillery works on these squares. And then ... unexpectedly a new moratorium.

In early August 1996, the situation began to get out of control altogether. Feeling that Moscow needed at least a semblance of peace, the leaders of the militants decided to strengthen their positions before the upcoming negotiations and decisively capture Grozny.

From the operational summary of the headquarters of the combined forces:

“At 5.50 am, about 200 militants seized the goods yard of the railway station and began to move towards the government house, subjecting the positions of federal forces and local authorities to a massive blow.”

They knew why they needed to capture the station. These freight wagons, stuffed with weapons and ammunition, stood on the tracks for more than one day. It is clear that they were not left here by accident. Armed, the bandits quickly dispersed throughout the city. Everything was thought out in advance.

Meanwhile, a strange decision is being made in Moscow. Instead of sending troops and regaining control of Grozny, General Lebed contacts Maskhadov and proposes a truce.

This is where the unexpected happens... The commander of the united group of troops, Konstantin Pulikovsky, realizing that Grozny, with the tacit consent of Moscow, has been given into the hands of the militants, which means that victory is almost in their hands, gets out of control, and, contrary to the statements of Lebed , and hence the Kremlin, announces an ultimatum. He offers civilians to leave the city within 48 hours, and the militants to surrender. He plans to launch a large-scale military operation.

At this time, General Lebed is negotiating with Maskhadov. The militants continue to capture Grozny, the remaining units are left to fend for themselves. At this moment, it becomes clear why all this is started! Lebed decides to seize power in the country and become president instead of Yeltsin. He immediately meets with the personnel of the federal troops and openly declares: Yeltsin is no more. He, General Lebed, future President.

Here's what he told me about how it was:

“Swan said bluntly: “I came to stop the war.” Nobody controls the country, because Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is on bypass surgery, after his inauguration, after the secondary elections. And he lied to us, of course, he said that he had already been sent to England, that the operation would be in England. And a decision has already been made, and early presidential elections have already been scheduled for October. “I came third in this election,” he said. “Now I will be president. And only this war prevents me from becoming president.”

The swan bluffed. Yeltsin was in Moscow, no one called early elections. There was only one truth in his words: he really wanted to become president and for this he was ready to agree to any conditions of the enemy. Understanding that Pulikovsky's ultimatum could result in a complete defeat of the militants in Grozny, Maskhadov calls on General Alexander Lebed to "use all his influence to stop the impending madness." Exactly two days after this appeal, Lebed met with Maskhadov in the village of Novye Atagi. With his power, he canceled Pulikovsky's ultimatum, and removed the general himself from command of the troops. Another general, Tikhomirov, took the units away, and Konstantin Pulikovsky ended up in the hospital.

I am commenting on this Konstantin Pulikovsky:

“I had a serious hypertensive crisis. My heart could not withstand this pressure, I spent two weeks in intensive care. Those who participated in the withdrawal of troops, of course, tell terrible pictures of how these militants scoffed, escorting each column, shouting, insulting, shouting “Allah Akbar”.

August 31, 1996... In Khasavyurt, a small Dagestan town on the border with Chechnya, after numerous negotiations with Maskhadov, the Khasavyurt agreements were signed, according to which Russian troops were obliged to leave the territory of the Chechen Republic. Why these agreements were signed on such unfavorable terms for Russia is still a mystery. Perhaps simply because peace in Chechnya was vital for Alexander Lebed. After all, he was preparing to become president of Russia. These dreams were not destined to come true. Not forgiving Pulikovsky obstinacy, Lebed, returning to Moscow, decided to call him for dressing right from the hospital.

Here's how he commented on this episode General Konstantin Pulikovsky:

“I say: “Well, give the command to the doctors. They will deliver me, I am lying here in the hospital, everyone knows. If you want to put handcuffs on me, then it is not necessary to put them on in Moscow. Give the command, they will put them on for me here. Why do you need me there?

He cursed, so he swore and hung up. Well, literally four days after this conversation, he was removed from his post. And he has already ceased to be the secretary of the Security Council.”

This was the beginning of the end for Alexander Lebed. Having used an ambitious general, he will be pushed out to lead the Krasnoyarsk region, where the failed general president will end his political career, and then die in a plane crash, in the accident of which many still do not believe.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev after his resignation, he will break with the president's entourage and will work for a long time in Rosvooruzhenie. They will fire him from there exactly two days after the death of Boris Yeltsin.

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semyonov, the only one, according to many, of all the generals who really had a good reason to refuse to fight in Chechnya, will be elected president of Karachay-Cherkessia.

His Deputy Eduard Vorobyov, refusing to lead the operation to storm Grozny, will become a deputy of the State Duma, where he will fiercely criticize the actions of the generals fighting the militants.

Konstantin Pulikovsky, Commander of the United Group of Forces in Chechnya, having retired from the army, he will become the presidential representative in the Far East.

Gennady Troshev, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, will fight in the second Chechen war. In 2008, he died in a plane crash.

The fate of the missing Russian soldiers and officers is still unknown.

* * *

The following excerpt from the book Chechen trap: between betrayal and heroism (I. S. Prokopenko, 2012) provided by our book partner -

Since the beginning of the first Chechen war in the North Caucasus were killed or died on combat post 14 generals. Two of them died during the first war, two - between the wars, ten - in the second Chechen campaign. Six of the dead military leaders served in the Ministry of Defense, five in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one each in the FSB, the Ministry of Justice and Glavspetsstroy.

January 7, 1995 in Chechnya, the head of the Main Directorate for Ensuring Public Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Major General Viktor Vorobyov, was killed by a mortar mine explosion.

July 11, 1996 in the area of ​​the village of Gekhi, when an armored personnel carrier was blown up by a landmine, the first deputy commander of the North Caucasian district of internal troops, Major General Nikolai Skrypnik, was mortally wounded.
April 16, 1998 On the Mozdok-Vladikavkaz highway near the village of Khurikau, during the shelling of a motorcade, Major General Viktor Prokopenko, Deputy Head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, was killed.
March 5, 1999 Plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in Chechnya, Major General Gennady Shpigun, was kidnapped at the Grozny airport. At the end of March 2000, his body was found in the Itum-Kalinsky district near the village of Duba-Yurt.
December 29, 1999 In Chechnya, the deputy head of the GUIN of the Ministry of Justice, the head of the operational group of the penitentiary system (UIS) in the Chechen Republic, Major General of the Internal Service Stanislav Korovinsky, died of a heart attack.
January 18, 2000 in the Zavodskoy district of Grozny, Major General Mikhail Malofeev, head of the combat training department of the 58th Army, deputy commander of the North group, died from a bullet wound in a battle.
On the night of March 6, 2000 in the village of Vedeno, at his command post, the head of the coastal troops of the Northern Fleet, the commander of the group, died of a heart attack marines in Chechnya, Major General Alexander Otrakovsky.
May 31, 2001 In his office in Khankala, the head of the regional headquarters for the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region, Vice Admiral German Ugryumov, died of acute heart failure.
September 17, 2001 Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, head of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, and Major General Pavel Varfolomeev, Deputy Head of the Directorate of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Russian Ministry of Defense, died in Grozny. They were in a Mi-8 helicopter shot down by militants from MANPADS near Minutka Square. Both generals arrived in Chechnya as part of the commission of the General Staff.
November 29, 2001 in Urus-Martan, the military commandant of the Urus-Martan district, Major General Gaidar Gadzhiev, was mortally wounded by a suicide bomber. He died in the hospital a few days later.
January 27, 2002 in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya, a Mi-8 helicopter was shot down, in which the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Southern Federal District, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the commander of the grouping of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai, were killed Goridov.