81st Guards Motorized Rifle Petrokovsky Twice Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment - Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Battles and Operations: Operation Danube. First Chechen War.
History of the regiment
In accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense Russian Federation No. 036 of June 15, 1994, the regiment stationed on the territory of the Volga Cossack army was given the traditional Cossack name "Volga Cossack" B - as part of the "North" grouping, the regiment took part in the assault on Grozny.
Awards and titles
| Awards inherited by part | Year, month, date, numbers of decrees |
|---|---|
| For mastering Art. Dorohovo and the city of Mozhaisk The 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner | Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of May 3, 1942 |
| For the liberation of the city Lviv The 17th Guards Mechanized Red Banner Brigade was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd class | Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of August 10, 1944 |
| For the capture of the cities of Ratibor, Biskau, the 17th Guards Mechanized Red Banner, Order of the Suvorov Brigade was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree | Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of April 26, 1945 |
| For the capture of the cities of Cottbus, Lübben, Zossen, Beelitz, Luckenwalde, Trebbin, Treyenbritzen, Tsana, Marienfelde, Rangsdorf, Diedersdorf, Teltov, the 17th Guards Mechanized Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Brigade was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 2nd degree | Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of May 26, 1945 |
| For taking over the city Berlin The 17th Guards Mechanized Red Banner Brigade, Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner | Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 4, 1945 |
Command
Regiment commanders
- 03/19/1958 - 10/1960 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov Ivan Vasilyevich
- 08.10.1960 - 09.1964 Guards Colonel Alexey Trofimovich Rozantsev
- 09/16/1964 - 1968 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Ryzhkov Nikolai Mikhailovich
- 1969-1971 - Guard Lieutenant Colonel Komarov Vladimir Ivanovich
- 1969-1969 - Guard Lieutenant Colonel Antonov Anatoly Petrovich
- 06/28/1971 - 08.1976 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Galiev Rifkhat Nurmukhametovich
- 08/13/1976 - 1979 Guard Major Sergey Pokopyevich Rogushin
- 1979 - 07.1981 Major Kruglov Gennady Alekseevich
- 07/10/1981 - 11.1983 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Vasilievich Stepanov
- 11/15/1983 - 07/1985 Guard Major Bespalov Boris Georgievich
- 07/13/1985 - 07.1988 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Makadzeev Oleg Borisovich
- 07/03/1988 - 1990 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Alekseevich Negovora
- 1990 - 05.1991 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Vladimirovich Borisenok
- 05/17/1991 - 01.1995 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslavtsev, Alexander Alekseevich
- 01/17/1995 - 11.1997 Guards Colonel Aidarov Vladimir Anatolyevich
- 11/29/1997 - 1998 Guard Colonel Yury Yuryevich Stoderevsky
- 1998-2000 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko Alexander Vladimirovich
- 09/30/2000 - 01/01/2004 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Kovalenko, Dmitry Ivanovich, Major General Deputy Commander of the 49th Army
- 01/10/2004 - 12.2005 Guard Colonel Andrey Ivanovich Yankovsky
- 20.12.2005 - 02.2008 Guard Lieutenant Colonel Shkatov Evgeny Evgenievich
- 02/13/2008 - 08.2009 Guards Colonel Milchakov Sergey Vitalievich
Commanders of the 23rd Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
- 08/03/2009 - 2011 Guards Colonel Yankovsky Andrey Ivanovich
- 2011-2011 Guards Colonel Ignatenko Alexander Nikolaevich
- from 2012 - 11.2013 Guards Colonel Tubol Evgeny Viktorovich
- 11.2013 and up to the present. Colonel Stepanishchev Konstantin Vladimirovich
Chiefs of Staff - First Deputy Regimental Commanders
- 1957-1958 Guards lieutenant colonel Tsivenko Nikolai Mikhailovich
- 1959-1960 Guards lieutenant colonel Rozantsev Alexey Timofeevich
- 1961-1962 Guards lieutenant colonel Lakeev Mikhail Ivanovich
- 1963-1967 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Efankin Boris Fedoseevich
- 1968-1970 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Berdnikov Evgeny Sergeevich
- 1971-1972 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Gubanov Nikolay Ivanovich
- 1973-1974 Guards major Yachmenev Evgeny Alekseevich
- 1974-1975 Guards Major Kalinin Vitaly Vasilyevich
- 1975-1977 Guards Captain Shtogrin Zinovy Ivanovich
- 1977-1979 Guards Major Dryapachenko Nikolai Alekseevich
- 1980-1983 Guards Major Bespalov Boris Georgievich
- 1983-1984 Guards Major Shirshov Alexander Nikolaevich
- 1984-1987 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov Valery Georgievich
- 1995 Acting kmsp guards. lieutenant colonel Stankevich, Igor Valentinovich
- 1987-1991 Guards Major Egamberdiev Bahadir Abdumannabovich
- 1991-1992 Guards Major Samolkin Alexey Nikolaevich
- 1994 - Guards. Lieutenant Colonel Zyablitsev Alexander Perfirevich
- 1994 - Guards. Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov Semyon Borisovich
- 1995 - Guards. Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandrenko Igor Anatolyevich
- 1996-1997 Guards Major Vechkov Kirill Vladimirovich
- 1998 - Guards. Major Kuzkin Vladimir Alexandrovich
- 1999-2001 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Medvedev Valery Nikolaevich
- 2002 - Guards. Lieutenant Colonel Minnullin Nail Raufovich
- 2003-2004 Guards lieutenant colonel Yarovitsky Yuri Davydovich
- 2005-2006 Guards Lieutenant Colonel Stepanishchev Konstantin Vladimirovich
- 2007-2008 Guards lieutenant colonel Zakharov Sergey Vladimirovich
23rd Guards Separate motorized rifle brigade
| Heroes of the Russian Federation | ||
|---|---|---|
| p/n | Full Name | Title, position(s) for awards. Dates of Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation. |
| 1. | Kirichenko, Grigory Sergeevich | guards senior warrant officer, senior technician of the 1st company of the 81st guards. SME (06/21/1995, Medal No. 173) |
| 2. | Stankevich, Igor Valentinovich | guard lieutenant colonel, assistant commander of the 81st guards. SME for educational work (10/19/1995, Medal No. 238) |
Memory
Lists of dead and missing soldiers
The list of the dead of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Guards TD) is given on the website "Dedicated to the memory of military personnel ..."
Links to materials about the participation of the regiment in the first Chechen war
March 81 Guards. SME
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Notes
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brigadesAn excerpt characterizing the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment
"That's it," said Dolokhov. “And then like this,” he said, and lifted the collar near her head, leaving it just a little open in front of her face. “Then like this, you see? - and he moved Anatole's head to the hole left by the collar, from which Matryosha's brilliant smile could be seen.
“Well, goodbye, Matryosh,” said Anatole, kissing her. - Oh, my spree is over here! Bow down to Steshka. Well, goodbye! Farewell, Matryosh; you wish me happiness.
“Well, God grant you, prince, great happiness,” said Matrona, with her gypsy accent.
Two troikas were standing at the porch, two young coachmen were holding them. Balaga sat on the front three, and, raising his elbows high, slowly dismantled the reins. Anatole and Dolokhov sat down beside him. Makarin, Khvostikov and the lackey sat in another three.
- Ready, huh? Balaga asked.
- Let go! he shouted, wrapping the reins around his hands, and the troika carried the beat down Nikitsky Boulevard.
- Whoa! Go, hey! ... Shh, - only the cry of Balaga and the young man sitting on the goats could be heard. On Arbat Square, the troika hit the carriage, something crackled, a scream was heard, and the troika flew along the Arbat.
Having given two ends along Podnovinsky, Balaga began to hold back and, returning back, stopped the horses at the intersection of Staraya Konyushennaya.
The good fellow jumped down to hold the horses by the bridle, Anatole and Dolokhov went along the sidewalk. Approaching the gate, Dolokhov whistled. The whistle answered him, and after that the maid ran out.
“Come into the yard, otherwise you can see it, it will come out right now,” she said.
Dolokhov remained at the gate. Anatole followed the maid into the yard, turned the corner, and ran out onto the porch.
Gavrilo, Marya Dmitrievna's huge traveling footman, met Anatole.
“Come to the mistress, please,” the footman said in a bass voice, blocking the way from the door.
- To what lady? Who are you? Anatole asked in a breathless whisper.
- Please, ordered to bring.
- Kuragin! back,” shouted Dolokhov. - Treason! Back!
Dolokhov at the gate, at which he stopped, fought with the janitor, who was trying to lock the gate after Anatole had entered. With a last effort, Dolokhov pushed the janitor away and, grabbing Anatole, who had run out, by the arm, pulled him by the gate and ran with him back to the troika.Marya Dmitrievna, finding the weeping Sonya in the corridor, forced her to confess everything. Intercepting Natasha's note and reading it, Marya Dmitrievna went up to Natasha with the note in her hand.
“You bastard, shameless,” she told her. - I don't want to hear anything! - Pushing away Natasha, who was looking at her with surprised, but dry eyes, she locked her with a key and ordered the janitor to let through the gate those people who would come that evening, but not to let them out, and ordered the footman to bring these people to her, sat down in the living room, waiting kidnappers.
When Gavrilo came to report to Marya Dmitrievna that the people who had come had run away, she got up with a frown, and with her hands folded back, paced the rooms for a long time, pondering what she should do. At 12 o'clock in the morning, feeling the key in her pocket, she went to Natasha's room. Sonya, sobbing, sat in the corridor.
- Marya Dmitrievna, let me go to her for God's sake! - she said. Marya Dmitrievna, without answering her, unlocked the door and went in. “Disgusting, nasty ... In my house ... A scoundrel, a girl ... Only I feel sorry for my father!” thought Marya Dmitrievna, trying to appease her anger. “No matter how hard it is, I’ll order everyone to be silent and hide it from the count.” Marya Dmitrievna entered the room with resolute steps. Natasha lay on the couch, covering her head with her hands, and did not move. She lay in the very position in which Marya Dmitrievna had left her.
- Good, very good! said Marya Dmitrievna. - In my house, make dates for lovers! There is nothing to pretend. You listen when I talk to you. Marya Dmitrievna touched her hand. - You listen when I speak. You disgraced yourself like the last girl. I would have done something to you, but I feel sorry for your father. I will hide. - Natasha did not change her position, but only her whole body began to rise from soundless, convulsive sobs that choked her. Marya Dmitrievna looked round at Sonya and sat down on the sofa beside Natasha.
- It is his happiness that he left me; Yes, I will find him,” she said in her rough voice; Do you hear what I am saying? She put her big hand under Natasha's face and turned her towards her. Both Marya Dmitrievna and Sonya were surprised to see Natasha's face. Her eyes were bright and dry, her lips pursed, her cheeks drooping.
“Leave ... those ... that I ... I ... die ...” she said, with an evil effort she tore herself away from Marya Dmitrievna and lay down in her former position.
"Natalia!..." said Marya Dmitrievna. - I wish you well. You lie down, well, lie down like that, I won't touch you, and listen... I won't say how guilty you are. You yourself know. Well, now your father will arrive tomorrow, what will I tell him? BUT?
Again Natasha's body shook with sobs.
- Well, he will know, well, your brother, the groom!
“I don’t have a fiancé, I refused,” Natasha shouted.
“It doesn’t matter,” continued Marya Dmitrievna. - Well, they will find out, what will they leave like that? After all, he, your father, I know him, after all, if he challenges him to a duel, will it be good? BUT?
“Ah, leave me, why did you interfere with everything!” What for? why? who asked you? shouted Natasha, sitting up on the sofa and looking angrily at Marya Dmitrievna.
- What did you want? cried Marya Dmitrievna again, excitedly, “why were you locked up or what?” Well, who prevented him from going to the house? Why take you away like a gypsy?... Well, if he had taken you away, what do you think, they wouldn't have found him? Your father, or brother, or fiancé. And he's a scoundrel, a scoundrel, that's what!
“He is better than all of you,” Natasha cried, rising. “If you hadn’t interfered… Oh, my God, what is it, what is it!” Sonya why? Go away! ... - And she sobbed with such despair with which people mourn only such grief, of which they feel themselves the cause. Marya Dmitrievna began to speak again; but Natasha screamed: “Go away, go away, you all hate me, despise me. - And again threw herself on the sofa.
Marya Dmitrievna went on admonishing Natasha for some more time and suggesting to her that all this must be hidden from the count, that no one would know anything if only Natasha took it upon herself to forget everything and not to show to anyone that something had happened. Natasha didn't answer. She did not sob anymore, but chills and trembling became with her. Marya Dmitrievna put a pillow for her, covered her with two blankets, and herself brought her a lime blossom, but Natasha did not answer her. “Well, let her sleep,” said Marya Dmitrievna, leaving the room, thinking that she was sleeping. But Natasha did not sleep, and with fixed open eyes from her pale face looked straight ahead of her. All that night Natasha did not sleep, and did not cry, and did not speak to Sonya, who got up several times and approached her.
The next day, for breakfast, as Count Ilya Andreich had promised, he arrived from Moscow Region. He was very cheerful: business with the bidder was going well, and nothing now delayed him now in Moscow and in separation from the countess, whom he missed. Marya Dmitrievna met him and announced to him that Natasha had become very unwell yesterday, that they had sent for a doctor, but that she was better now. Natasha did not leave her room that morning. With pursed, cracked lips, and dry, fixed eyes, she sat at the window and peered uneasily at those passing along the street and hurriedly looked back at those who entered the room. She was obviously waiting for news of him, waiting for him to come himself or write to her.
When the count went up to her, she turned uneasily at the sound of his manly steps, and her face assumed its former cold and even angry expression. She didn't even get up to meet him.
- What is the matter with you, my angel, are you sick? asked the Count. Natasha was silent.
“Yes, she is sick,” she answered.
In response to the count's restless questions about why she was so dead and whether something had happened to her fiancé, she assured him that it was nothing and asked him not to worry. Marya Dmitrievna confirmed Natasha's assurances to the count that nothing had happened. The count, judging by the imaginary illness, by the disorder of his daughter, by the embarrassed faces of Sonya and Marya Dmitrievna, clearly saw that something must have happened in his absence: but he was so afraid to think that something shameful had happened to his beloved daughter, he he loved his cheerful calmness so much that he avoided questioning and kept trying to convince himself that there was nothing special and only grieved that, on the occasion of her illness, their departure to the country was being postponed.From the day his wife arrived in Moscow, Pierre was going to go somewhere, just so as not to be with her. Shortly after the arrival of the Rostovs in Moscow, the impression that Natasha made on him made him hurry to fulfill his intention. He went to Tver to the widow of Iosif Alekseevich, who had long promised to give him the papers of the deceased.
When Pierre returned to Moscow, he received a letter from Marya Dmitrievna, who called him to her on a very important matter concerning Andrei Bolkonsky and his bride. Pierre avoided Natasha. It seemed to him that he had a stronger feeling for her than a married man should have for his friend's fiancee. And some kind of fate constantly brought him together with her.
"What happened? And what do they care about me? he thought as he dressed to go to Marya Dmitrievna's. Prince Andrei would have come as soon as possible and would have married her!” Pierre thought on his way to Akhrosimova.
On Tverskoy Boulevard someone called out to him.
- Pierre! Have you arrived long time ago? a familiar voice called out to him. Pierre raised his head. In a double sleigh, on two gray trotters throwing snow at the heads of the sleigh, Anatole flashed by with his constant comrade Makarin. Anatole sat straight, in the classic pose of military dandies, wrapping the bottom of his face with a beaver collar and bending his head slightly. His face was ruddy and fresh, his hat with a white plume was put on sideways, revealing his curled, oiled and finely snowed hair.
“And right, here is a real sage! thought Pierre, he sees nothing further than a real moment of pleasure, nothing disturbs him, and therefore he is always cheerful, contented and calm. What would I give to be like him!” Pierre thought enviously.
In the hall, Akhrosimova, the footman, taking off his fur coat from Pierre, said that Marya Dmitrievna was asked to go to her bedroom.
Opening the door to the hall, Pierre saw Natasha sitting by the window with a thin, pale and angry face. She looked back at him, frowned, and with an expression of cold dignity went out of the room.
- What's happened? asked Pierre, going in to Marya Dmitrievna.
“Good deeds,” replied Marya Dmitrievna, “I have lived in the world for fifty-eight years, I have never seen such shame. - And taking Pierre's word of honor to remain silent about everything that he learns, Marya Dmitrievna told him that Natasha had refused her fiancé without the knowledge of her parents, that the reason for this refusal was Anatole Kuragin, with whom her wife Pierre had taken, and with whom she wanted to run away in the absence of his father, in order to secretly marry.
Pierre, raising his shoulders and opening his mouth, listened to what Marya Dmitrievna was telling him, not believing his ears. To the bride of Prince Andrei, so much loved, this formerly sweet Natasha Rostova, to exchange Bolkonsky for the fool Anatole, already married (Pierre knew the secret of his marriage), and fall in love with him so much as to agree to run away with him! - This Pierre could not understand and could not imagine.
The sweet impression of Natasha, whom he had known since childhood, could not unite in his soul with a new idea of her baseness, stupidity and cruelty. He remembered his wife. “They are all the same,” he said to himself, thinking that he was not the only one who had the sad fate of being associated with a nasty woman. But he still felt sorry for Prince Andrei to tears, it was a pity for his pride. And the more he felt sorry for his friend, the more contempt and even disgust he thought about this Natasha, with such an expression of cold dignity, who now passed him along the hall. He did not know that Natasha's soul was filled with despair, shame, humiliation, and that it was not her fault that her face inadvertently expressed calm dignity and severity.
- Yes, how to get married! - Pierre said to the words of Marya Dmitrievna. - He could not get married: he is married.
“It doesn’t get any easier from hour to hour,” said Marya Dmitrievna. - Good boy! That's a scoundrel! And she waits, the second day she waits. At least she won't wait, I should tell her.
Having learned from Pierre the details of Anatole's marriage, pouring out her anger on him with abusive words, Marya Dmitrievna told him what she had called him for. Marya Dmitrievna was afraid that the count or Bolkonsky, who could arrive at any moment, having learned the matter that she intended to hide from them, would not challenge Kuragin to a duel, and therefore asked him to order his brother-in-law to leave Moscow on her behalf and not dare to appear to her on the eyes. Pierre promised her to fulfill her desire, only now realizing the danger that threatened the old count, and Nikolai, and Prince Andrei. Briefly and accurately setting out her demands to him, she let him into the living room. “Look, the Count knows nothing. You act as if you know nothing,” she told him. “And I’ll go tell her that there’s nothing to wait for!” Yes, stay to dinner, if you want, - Marya Dmitrievna shouted to Pierre.
Pierre met the old count. He was embarrassed and upset. That morning, Natasha told him that she had refused Bolkonsky.
“Trouble, trouble, mon cher,” he said to Pierre, “trouble with these girls without a mother; I'm so sad that I came. I will be frank with you. They heard that she refused the groom, without asking anyone for anything. Let's face it, I've never been very happy about this marriage. Let's suppose he good man, but well, there would be no happiness against the will of the father, and Natasha will not be left without suitors. Yes, all the same, this has been going on for a long time, and how could it be without a father, without a mother, such a step! And now she's sick, and God knows what! It’s bad, count, it’s bad with daughters without a mother ... - Pierre saw that the count was very upset, tried to turn the conversation to another subject, but the count again returned to his grief.
Sonya entered the living room with a worried face.
– Natasha is not quite healthy; she is in her room and would like to see you. Marya Dmitrievna is at her place and asks you too.
“But you are very friendly with Bolkonsky, it’s true that he wants to convey something,” said the count. - Oh, my God, my God! How good it was! - And taking hold of the rare temples of gray hair, the count left the room.
Marya Dmitrievna announced to Natasha that Anatole was married. Natasha did not want to believe her and demanded confirmation of this from Pierre himself. Sonya told this to Pierre while she was escorting him through the corridor to Natasha's room.
Natasha, pale and stern, sat beside Marya Dmitrievna, and from the very door met Pierre with a feverishly brilliant, inquiring look. She did not smile, did not nod her head at him, she only looked stubbornly at him, and her glance only asked him whether he was a friend or an enemy like everyone else in relation to Anatole. Pierre himself obviously did not exist for her.
“He knows everything,” said Marya Dmitrievna, pointing to Pierre and turning to Natasha. "He'll tell you if I told the truth."
Natasha, like a wounded, hunted animal, looks at the approaching dogs and hunters, looked first at one, then at the other.
“Natalya Ilyinichna,” Pierre began, lowering his eyes and feeling a sense of pity for her and disgust for the operation that he was supposed to do, “whether it’s true or not, it should be all the same to you, because ...
So it's not true that he's married!
- No, its true.
Has he been married for a long time? she asked, “honestly?”
Pierre gave her his word of honor.
– Is he still here? she asked quickly.
Yes, I saw him just now.
She was obviously unable to speak and made signs with her hands to leave her.Pierre did not stay to dine, but immediately left the room and left. He went to look for Anatole Kuragin in the city, at the thought of which now all his blood rushed to his heart and he experienced difficulty in taking breath. On the mountains, among the gypsies, at the Comoneno - he was not there. Pierre went to the club.
Everything in the club went on in its usual order: the guests who had gathered for dinner sat in groups and greeted Pierre and talked about the city news. The footman, having greeted him, reported to him, knowing his acquaintance and habits, that a place had been left for him in a small dining room, that Prince Mikhail Zakharych was in the library, and Pavel Timofeich had not yet arrived. One of Pierre's acquaintances, between a conversation about the weather, asked him if he had heard about the kidnapping of Rostova by Kuragin, which they were talking about in the city, was it true? Pierre, laughing, said that this was nonsense, because now he was only from the Rostovs. He asked everyone about Anatole; he was told by one that he had not yet come, the other that he would dine to-day. It was strange for Pierre to look at this calm, indifferent crowd of people who did not know what was going on in his soul. He walked around the hall, waited until everyone had gathered, and without waiting for Anatole, he did not dine and went home.
Anatole, whom he was looking for, dined with Dolokhov that day and consulted with him about how to fix the spoiled case. It seemed to him necessary to see Rostova. In the evening he went to his sister's to talk with her about the means of arranging this meeting. When Pierre, having traveled all over Moscow in vain, returned home, the valet reported to him that Prince Anatol Vasilyich was with the countess. The drawing room of the Countess was full of guests.
Pierre did not greet his wife, whom he did not see after his arrival (she was more than ever hated by him at that moment), entered the living room and, seeing Anatole, went up to him.
“Ah, Pierre,” said the countess, going up to her husband. “You don’t know what position our Anatole is in ...” She stopped, seeing in her husband’s head lowered, in his shining eyes, in his resolute gait, that terrible expression of fury and strength, which she knew and experienced on herself after the duel with Dolokhov.
December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995. "New Year's assault" on Grozny. 81st Guards motorized rifle regiment(GvMSP) from Samara. This year is 20 years old. Dedicated to the heroes.....
“Yes, our regiment suffered tangible losses in Grozny: both in personnel and in equipment,” says Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation." "But we were at the forefront of the main blow, and the first, as you know, is always the hardest. In all battles, those who are put in the vanguard risk more than others. I responsibly declare: our regiment has completed the task assigned to it. And I will say more: the general plan of the entire operation in Grozny was realized, among other things, thanks to the courage and courage of our soldiers and officers, who were the first to enter the battle and fought heroically all these difficult January days. "(Igor Stankevich, former deputy commander of the 81st Guards motorized rifle regiment, Hero of the Russian Federation)
On the last photo - CHECHNYA, 1995. SOLDIERS OF THE 81st REGIMENT IN THE AREA OF THE COUNTRY CHERVLENAYA.
The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was formed in 1939 in the Perm Region. The baptism of fire for his personnel was participation in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River from June 7 to September 15, 1939. During the Great Patriotic War, the regiment took part in the battles near Moscow, took part in the Orel, Kamyanets-Podolsk, Lvov, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague operations, finishing fighting in Czechoslovakia. 29 of its servicemen during the war years were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.
For merits in battles during the Great Patriotic War, the regiment was awarded awards and distinctions: the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree, for the capture of the city of Petrakow (Poland), gratitude was announced and the honorary name "Petrakowsky" was given, for the capture of the cities of Ratibor and Biskau awarded the order Kutuzov 2nd degree, for mastering the cities of Cottbus, Luben, Ussen, Beshtlin, Lukenwalde was awarded the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 2nd degree, for mastering the capital of Germany, the city of Berlin, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
In the post-war period, the regiment was stationed in the German Democratic Republic in the city of Karlhorst. In 1993, the regiment was withdrawn from Germany to the territory of the Russian Federation and deployed in the village of Roshchinsky Samara region.
By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed by the state of the so-called mobile forces. Then in the Armed Forces they just began to create such units. It was assumed that they could be deployed at the first command to any region of the country to solve various problems - from the elimination of consequences natural Disasters before repulsing the attack of gangs.
With the special status given to the regiment, combat training became noticeably more active, and recruitment issues began to be resolved more efficiently. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town built at the expense of the German authorities in Chernorechye. In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the inspection of the Ministry of Defense. For the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and arrangement in a new place, the 81st showed that it had become a full-blooded part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks.
A number of servicemen who received good training became eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are drivers, gunners, snipers.
In the 81st, they believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people could be trained ...
In early December 1994, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on official business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army, - recalls Igor Stankevich. Someone from high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general answered the subscriber to one of his questions, “the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment is just with me. I'll get the information to them right now."
After the general hung up the phone, he asked everyone present to leave. In a tete-a-tete atmosphere, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that “we had to prepare.” The region of application is the North Caucasus. Everything else - later.
In the photo Igor Stankevich (January 1995, Grozny)
According to the then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, the meeting of the Russian Security Council on November 29, 1994 was decisive. The speaker was the late Minister for Nationalities Nikolai Yegorov. According to Grachev, “he said that 70 percent of Chechens are just waiting for the Russian army to enter them. And they will be happy, as he put it, to sprinkle our soldiers with flour. The remaining 30 percent of Chechens, according to Yegorov, were neutral.” And at five o'clock in the morning on December 11, our troops moved to Chechnya in three large groups.
Someone at the top confused flour with gunpowder ....
The 81st motorized rifle regiment of the PriVO, which was to go to war in December 1994, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 parts of the district. For all fees - a week. I had to select commanders. A third of the primary-level officers were "two-year students", they had behind them only the military departments of civilian universities.
On December 14, 1994, the regiment was alerted and began to be transferred to Mozdok. The transfer was carried out by six echelons. By December 20, the regiment was fully concentrated on the training ground in Mozdok. In the regiment, by the time they arrived at the Mozdok station, out of 54 platoon commanders, 49 had just graduated from civilian universities. Most of them did not fire a single shot from a machine gun, let alone fire a standard projectile from their tanks. In total, 31 tanks arrived in Mozdok (of which 7 were out of order), 96 infantry fighting vehicles (out of 27 out of order), 24 armored personnel carriers (5 out of order), 38 self-propelled guns (12 out of order), 159 vehicles (28 out of order). In addition, there were no elements of dynamic protection on the tanks. More than half of the batteries were discharged (cars were started from a tow). Faulty means of communication were stored literally in piles.
The task of the commanders of the troops of the groupings for operations in the city and the preparation of assault detachments was set on December 25. The regiment, which was partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range, and partly (by one battalion) was located in the area of a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, was assigned two tasks: the immediate and subsequent. The nearest one was planned to occupy the Severny airport by 10 am on December 31. The next - by 16 o'clock to take possession of the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. Personally, the commander of the United Group, Lieutenant General A. Kvashnin, with the commander, chief of staff and battalion commanders of the 81st Guards. SMEs operating in the main direction, classes were held on the organization of interaction in the performance of a combat mission in Grozny.
On December 27, the regiment began to advance and settled on the northern outskirts of Grozny, not far from the airport ...
From an investigation by journalist Vladimir Voronov ("Top Secret", No.12/247, 2009):
“But the parents are firmly convinced that no one was engaged in combat training in the regiment. Because from March to December 1994, Andrei held a machine gun in his hands only three times: on the oath and twice more at the shooting range - the father commanders became generous as much as nine rounds And in the sergeant's training, in fact, they didn’t teach him anything, although they gave him badges. The son honestly told his parents what he was doing in Chernorechye: from morning till night he built cottages and garages for gentlemen officers, nothing more. He described in detail how they equipped some kind of dacha, general's or colonel's: the boards were polished to a mirror shine, one to the other was adjusted to a seventh sweat.Already after, I met with Andrey's colleagues in Chernorech: they confirm, it was so, all the "combat" training - the construction of dachas and maintenance officers' families. A week before they were sent to Chechnya, the radio was turned off in the barracks, the TVs were taken out. Parents who managed to attend the dispatch of their children claimed that military tickets were taken away from the soldiers. The guards saw Andrey just before the regiment was sent to Chechnya. Everyone already knew that they were going to war, but they drove gloomy thoughts away from themselves.
By the beginning of the war in Chechnya, the once elite regiment was a pitiful sight. Almost none of the regular officers who served in Germany remained, and 66 officers of the regiment were not regular officers at all - “two-year students” from civilian universities with military departments! For example, Lieutenant Valery Gubarev, commander of a motorized rifle platoon, a graduate of the Novosibirsk Metallurgical Institute: he was drafted into the army in the spring of 1994. He was already in the hospital telling how grenade launchers and a sniper were sent to him at the last moment before the battle. "The sniper says, 'Show me how to shoot.' And grenade launchers - about the same ... Already build a column, and I train all grenade launchers ... "
The commander of the 81st regiment, Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later admitted: “To be honest, people were poorly trained, who drove the BMP a little, who shot a little. And from such specific types of weapons as an underbarrel grenade launcher and a flamethrower, the soldiers did not shoot at all. Lieutenant Sergei Terekhin, commander of a tank platoon, wounded during the assault, claimed that only two weeks before the first (and last) battle, his platoon was completed with people. And in the 81st regiment itself, half of the personnel were missing. This was confirmed by the chief of staff of the regiment Semyon Burlakov: “We concentrated in Mozdok. We were given two days to regroup, after which we marched under Grozny. At all levels, we reported that the regiment in this composition is not ready for combat operations. We were considered a mobile unit, but we were staffed according to the state of peace: we had only 50 percent of the personnel. But the most important thing is that there were no infantry in the motorized rifle squads, only the crews of combat vehicles. There were no direct shooters, those who should ensure the safety of combat vehicles. Therefore, we walked, as they say, "bare armor." And, again, the vast majority of the platoons were two-year-old guys who had no idea about the conduct of hostilities. Drivers only knew how to start the car and move off. Gunners-operators could not shoot from combat vehicles at all.
Neither the battalion commanders, nor the company and platoon commanders had maps of Grozny: they did not know how to navigate in a foreign city! The commander of the communications company of the regiment .. Captain Stanislav Spiridonov said in an interview with Samara journalists: “Maps? There were maps, but everyone had different ones, different years, they didn’t fit together, even the street names are different.” However, the two-year-old platoon officers could not read maps at all. “Then the chief of staff of the division himself got in touch with us,” Gubarev recalled, “and personally set the task: the 5th company along Chekhov - to the left, and to us, the 6th company, to the right. That's what he said, to the right. Just to the right." When the offensive began, the regiment's combat mission changed every three hours, so we can safely assume that it did not exist.
Later, the regiment commander .. could not .. explain who set him the task and what. First they had to take the airport, moved out - a new order, turned around - again an order to go to the airport, then another introductory one. And on the morning of December 31, 1995, about 200 combat vehicles of the 81st regiment (according to other sources - about 150) moved to Grozny: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles ... They didn’t know anything about the enemy: no one provided the regiment with intelligence, and they themselves did not conduct reconnaissance. The 1st battalion, marching in the first echelon, entered the city .., and the 2nd battalion entered the city with a gap of five hours ..! By this time, little was left of the first battalion, the second was going to its death ... "
The driver of the T-80 tank, junior sergeant Andrey Yurin, when he was in the Samara hospital, recalled: “No, no one set a task, they just stood in a column and went. True, the company commander warned: “Just a little - shoot! Child on the road - push.
In the photo, Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin
Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. Here is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Before the storming of the city," says Rokhlin, "I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern group, to command which it was suggested that I should be headed by another general. And it would be expedient to appoint me to command the Northern grouping. On this topic, I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern grouping. "Who will command the Northern one?" - I ask. Kvashnin answers: "I . We will set up a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (Then there were almost no such people in the troops.) "-" And what is my task? "- I ask. "Go to the palace, take it, and we will come up." I say: "Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that the city is not attacked by tanks. "This task was removed from me. But I insist:" What is my task anyway? "-" You will be in the reserve, - they answer. - You will cover the left flank of the main grouping. And they assigned a route of movement. After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom. At the same time, the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.
Secrecy was held by Colonel General Anatoly Kvashnin as a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of Kvashnin's "know-how", everything was hidden, and the task was set directly in the direction of movement of the units, the trouble is that the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of interconnection - this is another distinguishing feature of this operation. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the belief that there would be no resistance. It only says that the leadership of the operation was out of touch with reality.
Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know either about their routes or about the tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky crossroads. Before the regiment entered the city, its command was asked how long it would take to bring it to combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because. the regiment is now "naked armor". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 replenishment people, for the BMP landing, as well as 2 regiments Internal Troops to clear the quarters passed by the regiment.
Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin assigned us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he didn’t say anything specific. I tell him, wait, what is the northwest, southeast, I’m drawing a route for you, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there.He answers me, here, according to our data, there are sandbags in windows, here there may or may not be a strong point. He didn’t even know if the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 "Meteorite") to blow up the barricades, but nothing is blocked there In short, there was no intelligence, either in terms of the number or location of the militants."
After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather, people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing force, the chief of the regiment Martynychev was sent for them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the infantry fighting vehicle, and often not having it at all!
At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Resk, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to block Resk, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. Why the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".
The regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in the following way: “I ... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, it’s supposed to, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, let's go, the first battalion ... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion advance and surround Dudayev's palace ... they didn’t paint where and what, the battalion commander already made the decision where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was get to the crossroads ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one - the station, the other - Dudayev's palace ... but it was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory each platoon needs to be painted where it should approximately become, where to get out, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought like this: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will pull some about there a negotiating team, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!
Chronology last day 1994: at 7 am on December 31, the forward detachment of the 81st regiment, which included a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st, Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, having captured the airport and cleared two bridges across the Neftyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin moved in a column. To the west, through the state farm "Rodina", was the 2nd MSB. Fighting vehicles moved in columns: tanks were ahead, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.
From the Severny airport, the 81st MSP went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 09:17, motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from the Dudayev detachment with attached tanks, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the Urals, but the scouts also lost one BMP and several people were wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and stop the advance for a while.
Then the advance resumed. Already by 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. The advance of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to block the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began advancing to Dzerzhinsky Square. By 12.30, the advanced units were already near the station, and the headquarters of the group confirmed the previously given order to surround the presidential palace.
All parts were controlled by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: "everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...". As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, to his request regarding the position of the neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received an answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have occurred to him that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the consolidated detachment 8 Corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. On Mayakovsky Street, judging by the map, this regiment could only be bypassing the city center and passing by the presidential palace.
On the photo is a RETIRED COLONEL, PARTICIPANT IN COMBAT ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRA AND CHR, BEHAVIOR OF SEVERAL BATTLE ORDERS, COMMANDER OF 81 SMES IN THE EARLY 90s - YAROSLAVTSEV ALEKSANDR ALEKSEEVICH.
From the memoirs of a tanker: "I was in front with the tanks of the company, our infantry retreated back. The regiment commander gives the command -" forward!
I clarified - where to go, the task of the day is completed, there is no infantry to cover the tanks ...
He says - "Rink", this is Pulikovsky's order, understand correctly, you go to the station ...
The premonition of an unkind adventure did not deceive me. In the observation devices, I saw tightly "stoned" militants who slowly moved along the houses, but did not enter into confrontation. Even then I realized that they were letting us into the "New Year's carousel". I understood that if something went wrong, it would be difficult to get out of the station. But it never occurred to me that there would be no our posts on the entry route after the passage of the assault groups .... "
At 13.00, the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings. And then the Dudaevites began a powerful fire resistance. A fierce battle broke out near the palace. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and transferred command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
At 16.10, the chief of staff received confirmation of the task of blockading the palace. But the motorized riflemen were given the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed throughout the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The columns of the regiment began to gradually break up into separate groups. By 5 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, and about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were out of action. The intensity of the fire impact can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!
Units of the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudaevites unleashed a flurry of fire on them. The fighters under the cover of the BMP took up all-round defense. The main part of the personnel and equipment was concentrated on the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st MSB of the 81st Regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd MSB - at the station's goods yard.
The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were placed in the yard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railway track. At dusk, the onslaught of the enemy intensified. Losses have increased. Especially in equipment that was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.
Relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the shooting continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Savin, asked for permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where units of the 693rd MSP of the West group were defending. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade began to break through from the railway station and the goods station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.
28 people from the 1st MSR of the 81st MRR broke through on three infantry fighting vehicles along railway. Having reached the Press House, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by militants. As a result, two BMPs were shot down. Only one vehicle under the command of Captain Arkhangelov made it to the location of the federal troops.
... Today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st SME and 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost their commanders, equipment (only in one day on December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), dispersed around the city and went out to their own - one at a time or in small groups.
The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in fact on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.
From the recollections of an eyewitness: "And then it began ... From the basements and from the upper floors of buildings, grenade launchers and machine guns hit columns of Russian armored vehicles squeezed in narrow streets. The militants fought as if they, and not our generals, studied at military academies. The rest, without haste, were shot as if in a shooting range. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that managed to break out of the traps by breaking fences, without the cover of motorized riflemen, also became easy prey for the enemy. By 18.00, the 693rd motorized rifle regiment was surrounded in the Lenin Park area "Zapad" grouping. We lost contact with it. Dense fire stopped on the southern outskirts of the combined parachute regiments of the 76th division and the 21st separate airborne brigades. At nightfall, 3,500 militants with 50 guns and tanks in the area of the railway station suddenly attacked the 81st Regiment and the 131st Brigade, which were carelessly standing in columns along the streets. Around midnight, the remnants of these units, supported by the two surviving tanks, began to withdraw, but were surrounded and almost completely destroyed.
And at the same time, champagne corks clapped all over the country at New Year's tables and Alla Pugacheva sang from the TV screen: “Hey, you are up there! Again, there is no escape from you ... "
Neither on December 31, nor on January 1, nor in the following days did the 81st Regiment leave the cities, remained at the forefront and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were led by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, who was in the hospital complex.
For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from the headquarters of General Rokhlin, it kept nearby.
The former commander of the North-East grouping, Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, eloquently recalled the morale of our troops these days: “I set the commanders the task of holding the most important objects, promised to present them for awards and higher positions. In response, the deputy brigade commander replies that he is ready to quit, but will not command. And then he writes a report. I propose to the battalion commander: “Come on…” “No,” he answers, “I also refuse.” It was the hardest blow for me.”
Mikryakov brothers.
By the end of December 1994, according to intelligence data, Dudayev concentrated in Grozny up to 40 thousand militants, up to 60 guns and mortars, 50 tanks, about 100 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 150 anti-aircraft weapons.
Initially, the assault on Grozny was scheduled for January 5, but on December 30 at 19-00 an order was received to be ready to leave at 5 am on December 31 according to the combat plan. The federal forces set out at dawn, around 7 am. The scouts went first. There was no resistance. But the closer to the center, the more often mines, obstacles and fire resistance were encountered. By 14-00 the railway station was taken, units of the 131st motorized rifle battalion were pulled up. At 15:00, the first and second battalions of the 81st motorized rifle regiment and the combined detachment of the 201st MSD blocked the presidential palace, Dudayev threw his best forces. The shelling stopped only at 12 o'clock at night. The new year 1995 has come. For many 18, 19-year-olds, it has not yet arrived.
Our Togliatti compatriots also took part in these battles: guards junior sergeant, commander of the BMP of the first battalion of the 81st Petrakovskiy twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexander Valerievich and guard private, gunner-operator of the BMP of the first battalion of Petrakovskiy twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexey Valerievich.
It seemed to me that I said everything
But never cry my heart out...
And the boys, tormented by death,
From someone else's war go to heaven,
And I can’t shout a song to them ...
O my inescapable memory!
Oh Lord, there are only crosses around!
But how many new stars you light up.
Calling them names of the fallen
And you will never forget them
Forgive them, God, my boys,
Without defiling their souls with someone else's sin ...
(Marianna Zakharova)
Sasha and Alyosha were born on the same day, June 24, 1975. Sasha was born a little earlier and was almost a kilogram heavier than his brother. Doctors seriously feared for the life of the weaker Alyosha for a long time. But he survived, and since then the boys have been inseparable. They were not twins, but twins. They could not live without each other. Always and everywhere were together. Sasha was fair-haired, kind and silent by nature, almost a head taller than Alexei. The brother is dark-haired and has a different character - “groovy” and cheerful. He was restless. His beautiful laughter was constantly heard at home. Only Alyosha could laugh like that. His playful eyes always betrayed his kind and cheerful nature. To be able to stand up for themselves. To be strong.
Sometimes my boys would fight with someone, - recalls Iraida Alekseevna, - they will come home scratched, covered in blood, and I will put them out the door and say: “Go and be able to stand up for yourself.” I’ll cry myself, I feel sorry for them, but I don’t show them the look. In general, the guys were not spoiled, did not cause much trouble.
All household chores were assigned in advance. To whom to go for groceries, to whom to tidy up the house. At the family council, all financial issues were resolved - to whom and what to buy first of all. And Iraida Alekseevna also tried to make her sons trust her in everything. And they shared all their problems. It so happened that the boys had no secrets from them. The guys even told about their first cigarette smoked to their mother. True, at the same time, sixth-graders Sasha and Alyosha added that they didn’t like smoking very much. The brothers had in common that they could not live without each other. get in.
I remember, - says Iraida Alekseevna, - in the fifth grade, the boys went to the pioneer camp. As luck would have it, they were separated. The difference in height was too great, no one took them for twins. The next day, the counselors called and asked Alyosha to pick him up, because he had been crying all day. I went and got it sorted. They were together again, and everything fell into place. In a word, it was impossible to separate them.
Their paths parted only after the ninth grade. After graduating from the ninth grade of school No. 37, Alexei entered the Automotive College, where he studied in the specialty “material processing on machine tools and automatic lines” as a technician-technologist. After the technical school, he got a job at the VAZ Milling and Exhibition Center as a milling worker. And Alexander graduated from 11 classes high school, and from September 1992 he began to master the profession of a car repairman at vocational school-36. After vocational school-36, he worked at the SME VAZ as an operator of automatic lines. He completed his studies at the lyceum earlier than Alexey, so Sasha was drafted into the army also earlier, but their mother Iraida Alekseevna with difficulty, but nevertheless, begged to wait with the call of one of the brothers and not to separate them even in the army. Until the beginning of December 1994, Alexander and Alexei managed to serve 9 months near Samara, in Chernorechye, in the 81st regiment. Both brothers served on the same BMP (infantry fighting vehicle). True, Sasha was in the position of a vehicle commander and in the rank of sergeant, and Alexei was a gunner-gunner. On December 12, Iraida Alekseevna visited them in the unit. Nobody thought it was theirs last meeting . On the 13th they were sent to Mozdok. And on the 29th they were already near Grozny. A few days before that, a letter had been sent home from the guys. As it turned out - the latter. Iraida Alekseevna was excited by Sasha’s strange words in the letter “... I don’t know, to be honest, I’ll have to see you again or not, well, don’t worry, take care of yourself, don’t get sick ...”, as well as footage from Grozny, shown on television in the first days of the new 1995 She called the information center in the PriVO, where she was told that her children were not on the lists of those killed, and a few days later, they were told that they were not on the lists of the living either. She called all the authorities, up to Moscow, but no one could give her the exact information about her children. By hook or by crook, Iraida Alekseevna flew to Mozdok. At departure, they tried to remove her from the plane. The pilot helped, having already seen enough of the tears of mothers and hid her in a safe place. Iraida Alekseevna did not have a pass, and this made the search very difficult. In Mozdok, I had to conduct a real investigation of my own. There was a rumor that one nurse was bandaging some guy, and he kept saying that he needed to go back, and not to the hospital. It's like he had a brother. According to the description, the guy looked like Sasha ... They didn’t let her in Mozdok. At the next post, kneeling in sticky mud, she begged the colonel to let her go further. The power of maternal love won - and the search for sons continued. Continued, despite the fact that the commandant of Mozdok wanted to force her out of the city. Iraida Alekseevna bit by bit collected information about her sons. Then a nurse was found who was bandaging the boy. But it turned out not to be Sasha. Iraida Alekseevna left with nothing. Only the tents standing in the mud, and the mutilated soldiers groaning in pain, remained in my memory. Later, in the February truce, colleagues from the first company, who came to the Rostov hospital for identification, first found Sasha, then Alyosha. On February 12, it became known about the death of Sasha, and she immediately flew to Rostov. Alexander was buried on February 18. Soon Alyosha was also brought from the Rostov hospital. Mothers reported this on February 22. Aleshun was buried the next day - February 23. Only God knows how Iraida Alekseevna was able to endure the death of her sons and not go crazy. Life faded for her. The sun stopped shining for her. She simply did not notice him. Yes, she didn't notice anything. A deadly cold blew over her from everywhere. Her sons are not. They are not at all. No, and it won't. No one will ever laugh so loudly and beautifully in her house, as Alyosha did. No one else will play the guitar and sing like Sasha loved to do. Your heart “sets” and “takes your breath away” when you unravel this tangle of pain for a thin thread of narrative, continuing the story of two brothers who died honestly fulfilling their military duty, defending the constitutional rights of Russia, and remaining faithful to this oath to the end.
Information about the last hours of Sasha and Alyosha's life was collected by Iraida Alekseevna from eyewitnesses of those events, from witnesses of random meetings and from fellow soldiers, from those who were shoulder to shoulder with her sons in those tragic events that unfolded on the eve of the new year 1995 in the city of Grozny. One of them were Ivoshin Igor and Kuptsov Sergey from Tolyatti. And here's what she found out. At the entrance to Grozny, the brothers were separated. Sasha with an infantry platoon went to capture the railway station and railway station. And Alyosha on his BMP, consisting of assault group , advanced towards the presidential palace. Thrown by staff generals into an unprepared attack, 18-year-olds fell into a real hell. Without maps, reconnaissance, combat training, medical support, heavy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles drove into the streets and cramped quarters of a completely unfamiliar city. And the tanks in the city were completely deprived of the ability to maneuver. According to them they beat me point-blank - from basements, entrances, from windows. Deadly fire seemed to be "spewing" from everywhere. Hell began: tanks were burning, there were only explosions all around, cries for help, groans of the wounded, blood and more and more shooting at the “targets” put up on the streets. , in which Alyosha was, was hit and caught fire. One of the crew members died. Alexei himself, who was wounded in the thigh, was pulled out of the burning car by his countryman Igor Ivoshin. He gave Alexei an injection and, having bandaged the wounded man, carried him to the fountain. Immediately after that, it was muffled by the explosion. He woke up already among the militants, as he was captured. It was released from captivity only after 9 months. At that time, Alexander fought at the railway station. The guys stayed for a day surrounded by "Dudaevites". When the militants began to throw grenades and mines at their vehicles, Captain D. Arkhangelov made a decision: to break through the encirclement on the three remaining "on the go" infantry fighting vehicles and withdraw the remaining soldiers, among whom there were many wounded. Standing under cover of the wall of the building, with their backs to each other, Sergeant Alexander Mikryakov and Captain Arkhangelov covered the loading of the wounded on armor with their fire. When the encirclement broke through, one of the vehicles was hit. According to those who were in those three cars, Sasha was not among them. Someone said that he was told by radio that Alexei was wounded. Of course, Sasha could not leave his brother. He, having sent cars with the wounded, went to look for his brother. Most likely, he ran into an ambush and was killed point-blank. According to the assumptions of Iraida Alekseevna, Alexei, who remained lying by the fountain, most likely was finished off by militants, and possibly even blown up. Because there is such information that the militants dragged the wounded soldiers into a pile and threw a grenade at them. Apparently this was the case, because there were many bullet and shrapnel wounds on Alexei's body. And Sasha's body was pierced through with bullets. Vidnov fired the entire clip at point-blank range. His military ID was also broken. Now this document is stored in the museum of the engineering college. And mother Iraida Alekseevna keeps two Orders of Courage, which Sasha and Alyosha were awarded posthumously, their letters, tender letters that the brothers sent home, and the memory of almost two inseparable bloods.
A letter-memo from the Mikryakov brothers dated July 9, 1995 (handed over by one of the Togliatti residents who were demobilized on that day):
“Mom, come July 9 for us. We're fine, we're not sick. We were transferred to the 90th division in the 81st regiment in the 1st battalion, 1st company. You can come a little later, as we will speak at this oath. Come see us and pick us up."
Despite the fact that at one time the Chechen war did not leave the TV screens and newspaper pages, the military operations of the Russian army, internal troops and special forces in the Caucasus still remain largely unknown, a “secret” war. Its main operations are still waiting for serious research, its analytical history has not been written to this day. By the end of 1994, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who imagined himself the president of a large Islamic state in the North Caucasus, managed to create his own fairly combat-ready armed forces numbering up to 40 thousand people, some of whose personnel underwent not only military training in specially created camps, but also fought in Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria. Among the Chechen soldiers there were a large number of mercenaries and repeat offenders hiding from Russian justice. The republic was well-armed, only after the Soviet Army, more than 40 thousand small arms were captured, in addition, there were many foreign-made weapons, hunting rifles. In Grozny, the production of the Boriz (Wolf) machine gun was launched. There were 130 units of armored vehicles, about 200 artillery systems, including 18 Grad installations. This weapon could stop an army of up to 60 thousand people. Its formation was located not only in Grozny, but also in Shali, Argun, Gudermes, Petropavlovsk. In other settlements, there were local armed groups, which were created under the guise of self-defense units. Thus, the Chechen Republic was ready for resistance and a long guerrilla war, which the Russian command did not take into account in their plans. Therefore, first-hand information, unique photos and diagrams of combat clashes are invaluable material for history.
From a letter from the captain of the 81st regiment D. Arkhangelov:
“Dear Iraida Alekseevna! The former deputy commander of the first company, Captain Arkhangelov, is writing to you. I personally knew and served with Alexei and Alexander. I would like to say a lot of warm words of gratitude to you for your sons.
I was in battle at the railway station in Grozny with Sasha on December 31, January 1 and 2, when we broke through the encirclement. You can be proud of your sons. They did not hide behind other people's backs. Yalichno with Sasha bandaged the wounded in the station building.
The last two of us left the building, covering the landing of fighters, including the wounded, on the BMP. Those were the last minutes when I saw Sasha. We stood under the wall of the station building - back to back. I covered his back, he - mine. When they put all the wounded, Sasha ran to get on one BMP, and I on another. Then we went on a breakthrough ...
He was a great man. There would be more of these on earth! Of course, nothing can calm your aching mother's heart. I understand all your pain. Thank you for the wonderful guys and courageous soldiers. May the earth rest in peace for them!
Sorry if that's not right. With great respect for you, Captain D. Arkhangelov, 81st Regiment.
the Russian Federation
City Hall of Togliatti
Department of Education
07/08/2002 No. 1739
Committee Chairman
Togliatti city
whose children died in
Chechen Republic
R.N. Shalyganova
Dear Raisa Nikolaevna!
The answer to your appeal about naming professional lyceum No. 36 after the brothers Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov, who died in the Chechen Republic, the Department of Education of the Mayor's Office of Togliatti reports the following.
Collaboration teaching staff of this lyceum and the Togliatti city public organization of parents whose children died in the Chechen Republic, on the patriotic education of youth deserves attention.
Taking into account the opinion of the administration of professional lyceum No. 36 and the consent of I.A. Mikryakova, the mother of the Mikryakov brothers, the Department of Education of the Mayor's Office of Togliatti supports the initiative to assign the name of Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov to the Togliatti professional lyceum No. 36.
Deputy director S.A. Punchenko
Samara Region
81 motorized rifle regiment, military unit 465349
The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment, was formed in 1939. He began his combat biography at Khalkin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War, he participated in the defense of Moscow, liberated Orel, Lvov, cities of Eastern Europe. During the existence of the unit, 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 2 Heroes of Russia. On the battle banner of the unit there are 5 orders - two Red Banners, the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the Great Patriotic War, the regiment was stationed on the territory of the GDR (GSVG), and in 1993, in connection with the liquidation of the GSVG, it was withdrawn to the territory of the Russian Federation and deployed in the village of Roshinsky, Volzhsky district, Samara region, becoming part of the Second Guards Tank Army.
From December 14, 1994 to April 9, 1995, the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment took part in fulfilling the task of the Government of the Russian Federation to disarm illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The personnel of the regiment participated in military operation on the capture of the city of Grozny from December 31, 1994. to January 20, 1995
Materials from the press based on the stories of Alexander Yaroslavtsev, commander of the 81st regiment, about the regiment's combat operations in Grozny from 12/31/1994 to 01/01/1995.
... Events unfolded like this. On December 8, the regiment was alerted and began to urgently recruit in order to complete the recruitment by December 15, and then begin combat training. Of the 1,300 people, about half came from the "schools". The regiment arrived in Mozdok on 20 December. On December 21, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev began to lead the battalions to firing. By December 24, everyone had shot back. It turned out that some of the guns on the armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were out of order. From Mozdok, the regiment advanced to the Grozny airport area. Here the regimental commander ordered once again to shoot five or six shells and not to discharge the guns, only to put the safety on. “We thought that they would not send us further than the airport,” says the regiment commander. “We thought that we would stand behind the airport on the defensive ... But things turned out quite differently.”
On December 30, 1994, the regiment was given the task of entering Grozny on the morning of December 31. The day before, the commander of the regiment, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was asked how much time he needed to prepare the regiment for the assault. He replied that 10-15 days were needed. They didn’t give time for preparation. They didn’t even give a written order for the assault (general Kvashnin gave the oral order ...).
The regiment was supposed to go to Grozny in the flank of the federal forces. They promised to give infantry, but they never did. Intelligence was very bad. However, with the tactics of the “Dudaevites”, which they then used, no intelligence would have helped.
At dawn on December 31, the regiment began to move from the airport towards Grozny. When 81 SMEs approached Mayakovsky Street, tanks appeared ahead. It turned out that these were “Rokhlintsy.” We agreed on interaction - they went to the left of Pervomaiskaya so as not to interfere with the advance of the regiment. The real battle began on Ordzhonikidze Square, but not immediately. it turned out later - he got into a "mousetrap".
From the story of A. Yaroslavtsev: “Now, I think, I will move closer and pull the second battalion on myself. Well, then I will surround the palace. They were already hitting thoroughly ... It was difficult to figure out where how much, where they were hitting from? .. It was impossible to calculate the options, because there was no infantry. until they burn you…”
At the corner of Pobeda and Ordzhonikidze avenues, the regiment commander, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was seriously wounded ... A radio operator and communications chief turned out to be next to him. He asked the radio operator to bandage him, he was scared, but ... they provided first aid to the commander. Yaroslavtsev told the fighter: "Come on, tell me that I'm wounded ... Burlakov's command."
Burlakov will again have to transfer command, this time to Lieutenant Colonel Aidarov, the future commander of 81 SMEs. First, Semyon Burlakov is wounded in the leg at the station, and then, during the evacuation of the wounded on the BMP, the Chechens will shoot everyone, but Burlakov will be mistaken for the deceased ...
On the morning of January 1, 1995, regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev was transferred to a hospital in Vladikavkaz ...
Captain Arkhangelov's group. Little is known about this group, it is only clear that they covered the evacuation from the station to the last, after which they went to the freight station, where they found 3 surviving infantry fighting vehicles 81 MSP. Of the three cars, only one got out. And one of the wrecked could be BMP No. 61822.
Assigning the name of the brothers Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov to the engineering college
February 18, 2004 Mechanical Engineering College. Time: 14-00. The assembly hall is full to capacity. Chairs are lined up along the aisles. In the gallery are graduate students. There are many of them. They also came to the event, but there were not enough seats in the hall for them. Flashlights. Carnations. Tears of mothers whose children died in hot spots. On the stage are portraits of Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov. The solemn part of the event on the occasion of conferring the title of the Mikryakov brothers to the educational institution where Sasha studied is coming. The twins Alexander and Alexei died in the New Year's assault on the city of Grozny in the first Chechen campaign. They were always together: in life and in death. Only they were buried at different times: Sasha was buried on February 18, Alyosha was buried on February 23. Exactly 9 years have passed. The memory of brother soldiers immortalized their "alma mater".
Friends spoke: some studied with their brothers at school, others at a technical school. The soul of the company, a good athlete, a person with a twist - these were the brothers in the memory of friends. Fellow soldiers said that on December 14, 1994, the 81st regiment, where the brothers served, was sent to Chechnya. There were 1,300 soldiers in the echelon. All of them took part in the storming of Grozny. On the first day of the battle, more than 100 people died. There were 7 times more defending militants than Russian soldiers. This is contrary to any rules of military science. There were many wounded, killed and missing. The most difficult thing was to remove the bodies of Russian soldiers from the basements with signs of torture. But ... there is such a profession - to defend the Motherland ...
In the opinion of the military who spoke, history will judge who became a hero in the Chechen company, and who - quite the contrary. The Russian state has always had two pillars - the army and the navy. Dmitry Chugunkov, commander of the reconnaissance platoon, fellow soldier of the Mikryakov brothers, was laconic. He said that the guys were on the most dangerous part of the New Year's assault on Grozny. Whatever trials befall the current recruits, they must be worthy of the memory of their countrymen.
Then they talked about the importance of patriotic education and the basic educational institution of AvtoVAZ. The mother of the brothers, Iraida Alekseevna, cried, giving to the museum educational institution for eternal storage of Sasha's military ID. I read a poem of my own.
With the kind permission of the authors, I am posting the article in my journal. For the first time the article was published in the newspaper "Tomorrow", in N5 for 2010. Despite the already long time since its publication, the article has not lost its factual value, and, against the background of the works of other authors on the same topic, it looks more than worthy. Illustrative material added by me.THE MYSTERY OF THE DEATH OF THE MAYKOP BRIGADE
15 years ago, the "New Year's assault" on Grozny ended. And in these battles, the Russian army suffered the biggest losses since the end of the Great Patriotic War. One of the mysteries of these battles was the dramatic fate of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, stationed before this war in Maykop. In this article, we will try to deal with the myths that have developed around these events. We will try, based on facts, to present our version of the actions of the Sever group and about 2 days of fighting: December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995, the most difficult two days in recent history Russian army.
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STORM- the capture of the "Presidential Palace of Dudayev" (the former Republican Committee of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR) went to the "North" group. The general command of the "North" group was carried out by Major General K.B. Pulikovsky. The number of personnel of the units is not clear for certain, most likely, it differs from the official one in a smaller direction, but since there are no other data at the moment, we will take the official data from the site "chechnya.genstab.ru" as a basis. In total, the group consisted of 4097 people, 82 tanks, 211 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 64 guns and mortars. The group included the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMBR), the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GvMSP) and the 276th GvMSP, as well as attached and auxiliary units and units of the Internal Troops. The consolidated detachment of the 131st brigade under the command of Colonel I. Savin consisted of 1469 personnel, 42 BMP-2s, 26 T-72A tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The 81st regiment under the command of Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev consisted of 1331 people (including 157 officers, it is characteristic that 66 officers in the platoon-company link and had only a military department of a civilian university behind them), 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks (T-80BV and several T-80Bs) and 24 artillery pieces (self-propelled guns "Gvozdika"). The 276th regiment under the command of Colonel A. Bunin consisted of 1297 people, 73 BMP-1s, 31 tanks (T-72B1) and 24 artillery pieces (it must be said that at one time as many as 120 BMPs were attributed to the brigade, but the refutation of this is below).
Hero of Russia (posthumously) Colonel I.A. Savin.
131st brigade - 1 battalion on the southern slopes of the Tersky ridge in the area 3 km north of Sadovoye, 2 battalions concentrated in the MTF area 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky;
81st regiment - from 12/27/94, 3 km south of the lane. Kolodezny with the main forces, since the morning of December 28, 1994, 1.5 km north of Grozny;
276th regiment - on the northern slopes of the Tersky Range.
At least 400 people entered Grozny from the 276th regiment, 426 people entered the city from the 81st regiment, including a tank battalion. From the brigade - 446, including the "help column".
On December 30, at a meeting, the units received orders. The brigade was to advance on the morning of the 31st to the area of the old airfield and take up defense there. The 81st Regiment's primary task was to take the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection by 16-00, the next task was to block the building of the Republican Committee and occupy the station. The 276th regiment was to take up positions on the outskirts of Sadovoye on the 31st until further notice.
The introduction of troops into the city, scheduled for the 31st, was unexpected for everyone, because. not all parts have yet been replenished with people, not all have properly coordinated.
Be that as it may, but on the morning of the 31st, the units began to move. The Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky crossroads was already occupied by 11 a.m., the second battalion could not pass through the Rodina state farm due to heavy fire from the militants and was ordered by General Pulikovsky to turn back and proceed to the next task, which was done after the artillery had processed the houses of the Ippodromny microdistrict, from where dense fire of militants. At the same time
The 131st brigade completed the task and took up positions on the outskirts of the city, moving on to equipping the defense area. But unexpectedly, she withdrew and went with one battalion to the station, and the second to the market. The regiment reached the square. Ordzhonikidze, where a "traffic jam" was formed, leaving one company to cover. But soon the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, ordered the chief of staff of the regiment, Burlakov, to bring everything that could be pulled out to the station. While the regiment was moving towards Ordzhonikidze Square, they were overtaken by the equipment of the 131st brigade. As a result, both the regiment and the brigade reached the station almost simultaneously, where the regiment occupied the freight station, and the first battalion of the brigade - the station, the second rolled back to the freight station after being attacked by militants. After occupying the defense, the brigade and regiment at the station were attacked. The attacks continued until the very exit of the units from the station. Part of the equipment was burned, part was damaged, but fought as long as there was ammunition. Losses at this point were small. But the situation worsened sharply because other units did not fulfill their tasks.
Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin, February 1995
The units of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin that came out to the hospital were very few in number, because. part of the forces were forced to leave at checkpoints along the route of movement, the Internal Troops did not approach. On New Year's Eve, one battalion of the 276th regiment began to change the 33rd regiment at checkpoints. The assembled column has arrived. But having lost a lot of equipment, she could only go to the freight station. It became clear that the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment needed to leave the city, but the brigade's exit turned out to be unsuccessful: the column was ambushed at the motor depot. Two infantry fighting vehicles were lost, most of the wounded died with them, the brigade commander died, when the main part of the regiment left, the battalion commander Perepelkin and the commander of the third company Prokhorenko were killed. The total losses at the end of January 2 were:
In the 131st brigade, 142 people were lost alone, how many were wounded, missing - there are no exact data (according to other sources, 167 people died, including the brigade commander Colonel A. Savin, deputy brigade commanders for armament and educational work, in addition, 60 soldiers and sergeants died, 72 people were missing). Those. out of 446 people who entered the city, 289 remained in the ranks, or 65%;
In the 81st regiment (possibly for the entire period of hostilities): 134 killed, 160 wounded, 56 missing, according to the report of the chief of staff of the regiment Burlakov, 56 people died (of which 8 officers), 146 were wounded (of which 31 officer, 6 warrant officers), 28 people were missing (of which 2 officers), 87 people were sick (of which 8 officers and 3 warrant officers) - these data are more accurate. According to official data, on January 10, the regiment lost 63 servicemen killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded;
In the 276th regiment: at least 42 people were killed, at least 2 of them were missing, there are no data on the wounded.
Losses of equipment amounted to:
The 131st brigade lost, according to A. Sapronov, 15 tanks and 47 infantry fighting vehicles, military journalist Viktor Litovkin gives other figures: "20 out of 26 tanks were lost, 18 out of 120 infantry fighting vehicles were evacuated from Grozny, all 6 Tunguskas were destroyed";
81st regiment - 23 tanks, 32 - BMP-2, 4 - armored personnel carriers, 2 tractors - 2, 1 "Tunguska" 1 MTLB;
276th Regiment - at least 15 BMP-1s, at least 5 T-72B1 tanks.
SEVERAL VERSIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED what happened to the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, the versions were both official and journalistic, but mostly with a negative connotation that discredits the personnel of the units. Here are some of them: "The brigade missed the right turn and went to the station, where, without reconnaissance, they became columns along the streets", "The columns stood along the streets and froze. The brigade commander did not organize security, did not take up defense, did not conduct reconnaissance. The brigade simply stood and seemed to be waiting for the "Cheches" to finally come to their senses and start burning it. Dudayev sent intelligence three times (!!!) to clarify the actions of the Russians, and three times the intelligence reported that Russian columns were standing on Pervomaiskaya and Privokzalnaya without movement, without guards, and that part of the soldiers and officers roam the neighborhood in search of working shops ( New Year on the nose!). And then Maskhadov ordered to gather all the grenade launchers who were in the city and pull them to the station, "the brigade entered the city under steam", "Savin died in captivity, he was shot", "everyone was drunk", etc.
Let's try to deal with these myths and tell how things really were.
Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. Here is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Before the storming of the city," says Rokhlin, "I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern group, to command which it was suggested that I should be headed by another general. And it would be expedient to appoint me to command the Northern grouping. On this topic, I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern grouping. "Who will command the Northern one?" - I ask. Kvashnin answers: "I . We will set up a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (Then there were almost no such people in the troops.) "-" And what is my task? "- I ask. "Go to the palace, take it, and we will come up." I say: "Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that the city is not attacked by tanks. "This task was removed from me. But I insist:" What is my task anyway? "-" You will be in the reserve, - they answer. - You will cover the left flank of the main grouping. And they assigned a route of movement. After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom, while the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.
Secrecy was held by Colonel General Anatoly Kvashnin as a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of Kvashnin's "know-how", everything was hidden, and the task was set directly in the direction of movement of the units, the trouble is that the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of interconnection - this is another distinguishing feature of this operation. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the belief that there would be no resistance. It only says that the leadership of the operation was out of touch with reality.
Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know either about their routes or about the tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky crossroads. Before the regiment entered the city, its command was asked how long it would take to bring it to combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because. the regiment is now "naked armor". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the landing of infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters passed by the regiment.
After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather, people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing force, the chief of the regiment Martynychev was sent for them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the infantry fighting vehicle, and often not having it at all!
At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Resk, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to block Resk, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. Why the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".
Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, December 1994
The regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in the following way: “I ... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, it’s supposed to, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, let's go, the first battalion ... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion advance and surround Dudayev's palace ... they didn’t paint where and what, the battalion commander already made the decision where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was get to the crossroads ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one - the station, the other - Dudayev's palace ... but it was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory each platoon needs to be painted where it should approximately become, where to get out, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought like this: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will pull some about there a negotiating group, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!
We could still suppress a small center of resistance, and with organized mass resistance, they began to crush us. At the same time, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Many died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers."
Hero of Russia R.M. Klupov, 2014
Major Rustem Klupov, Assistant Chief of Intelligence of the 131st Brigade: “I didn’t know where we were going, I didn’t know our task. I found out that we were going to the station at the intersection where we met with the 81st Regiment, I’m Savin on the radio maybe he was afraid that we were being tapped, because he had a closed channel, and I didn’t have a closed channel. 2:00 p.m.) An incomplete battalion of the 81st regiment under the command of S. Burlakov is already stationed here.
Parts of the brigade exactly went to the station and the goods station, so G. Troshev's conclusions that "the combined detachment of the brigade slipped through the desired intersection, got lost and eventually went to the railway station" (see Troshev G. "My War" ) are unfounded. In fact, Colonel Savin fulfilled the task of command exactly. 3 MSR has become a front to the piece of iron, disperses and takes up defense. There was only 1 BMP on the platform. The rest are near the platform, but are hidden either behind stalls or behind buildings. That is, there can be no talk about how they came out somehow carelessly. The equipment was hidden as best they could, but there is actually nowhere to hide it.
I would like to say a separate word about the instructions received by the units before leaving for the city. Units were forbidden to occupy buildings, excluding administrative ones, to break benches, trash cans, etc., to check documents from people they met with weapons, to confiscate weapons, to shoot only as a last resort. What the command was counting on was clear, blind confidence in the absence of resistance from the militants. They learned nothing from the storming of Grozny by the opposition on 26 November.
Station area. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
Station building. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
ALL PARTS CONTROL was carried out by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: "everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...". As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, to his request regarding the position of the neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received an answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have occurred to him that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the consolidated detachment 8 Corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. On Mayakovsky Street, judging by the map, this regiment could only be bypassing the city center and passing by the presidential palace. Therefore, it is not clear whether the command of the group did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking about, or the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or, perhaps, the journalists who interviewed Yaroslavtsev , all mixed up?
In any case, this suggests that no one really imagined the picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their course ... ".
Misunderstanding of the situation leads to the fact that on the morning of January 1, two mutually exclusive orders are issued one after the other:
"7.15 - combat order of O.G.V. No. ... 1.00 h. 01.01.95 map. 50 thousand edition 1985.
The commander ordered:
3/276 SMEs by Z.00 today withdraw to the location of 1/33 SMEs (square on Kruglov St.), where to transfer the commander of the operational group of 8 AK to operational subordination.
Subdivisions of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1/81 SMEs from the occupied areas to organize close fire and tactical interaction between themselves and the subunits consolidated detachment 19th Motor Rifle Division, as they enter the area of the loading area of the Grozny station. Replenishment of materiel is to be carried out from imported stocks and a consolidated detachment.
By 06:00 today, take at your disposal the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 28th Army Corps of the Siberian Military District in the area of the Grozny airfield and subsequently use it to carry out combat missions in the northern and northwestern directions.
In the morning today, after the transfer of the occupied lines of 503 SMEs to 19 Motor Rifle Division, carry out the disarmament or destruction of bandit formations in the area of the station, the presidential palace, the intersection of Griboedov St. and Pobedy Avenue by the end of the day with the forces of 131 Omsbr, part of the forces of 81 SMEs. and 81 SMEs to capture the presidential palace.
"01.01.95, resolution (to the head of the operational department of the corps, room 81 SMEs, 206 SMEs; 131 Omsbr).
Execute the order.
81 SMEs block the area near the palace.
131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, after concentrating at the station, advance north to the palace area along the street. Komsomolskaya, 74 omsbr go to the square. Friendship of Peoples on Mayakovsky Street and block the intersection of st. Griboyedov - Pobedy Ave. part of the forces, along Mayakovsky Street. Subdivisions of the 131st Omsbr to operate in a northerly direction along the street. Chernyshevsky to the palace.
Pulikovsky".
These documents very clearly testify to the dramatic conditions in which the command of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment found themselves, how difficult it was to make decisions in these circumstances and under what psychological pressure they acted.
Separately, I want to talk about intelligence:
Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin assigned us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he didn’t say anything specific. I tell him, wait, what is the northwest, southeast, I’m drawing a route for you, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there.He answers me, here, according to our data, there are sandbags in windows, here there may or may not be a strong point. He didn’t even know if the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 "Meteorite") to blow up the barricades, but nothing is blocked there In short, there was no intelligence, either in terms of the number or location of the militants."
Maps were a rarity, no one saw the plans of the city at all. Ensign of the 131st brigade Vadim Shibkov, a participant in the battles, recalls this, for example: “There was a map, but the scale was 1:50,000 and the old one, from the 70s, it was impossible to correct it and direct it in the city, because of this, the artillery of the brigade beat not very accurate." There were no topographical plans for Grozny in the company-platoon link. The battalion commanders had maps at a scale of 1:50,000. The same was true for the 131st brigade and the 276th regiment.
Because of the maps in Sadovoe, the 276th regiment suffered losses. On the map, the bridge where they were supposed to stop looked large, in fact, no one even noticed this bridge, it was so small, and the BRD moved on, stopping at the next one. Resembling the one on the map, the bridge came under fire.
While the regiment was marching towards Resky and the railway station, the 131st brigade was to take up positions on the outskirts of the city, two kilometers east of Sadovaya, in order to ensure the passage of other troops to the city of Grozny, which was exactly done by 11 o'clock in the morning. There was practically no resistance, only intelligence destroyed the forward patrol of the militants. At 12 noon, on the radio, Lieutenant-General Pulikovsky K. B., commander of the North group at that time, gave the order for the brigade to enter the city of Grozny. The battalions received this order from Colonel Durnev, who came directly to the location of the battalions. At the same time, the brigade did not receive written combat and graphic documents with an order to enter the city of Grozny. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters unexpectedly gave the brigade the command to take the railway station, which was not originally planned at all.
Who gave the order to the brigade to go to the station?
Lev Rokhlin says (based on the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Pulikovsky says that he did not give the command to the 131st brigade to capture the station. The advanced command post of the Northern group was never deployed. They commanded directly from Mozdok. Therefore, find out who gave the command, it's difficult ... I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all in this operation. After all, Kvashnin himself declared himself the commander of everything and everything. Pulikovsky could not draw up a detailed plan of action and give the necessary orders. Kvashnin decided everything."
Retired Lieutenant General K.B. Pulikovsky, 2014.
In the "Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards Army Corps" the words of the commander are recorded: "General. Shevtsov at 16 o'clock had to set them (the brigade and regiment) the task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace." The general received no information. Three years later, on December 28, 1997, Mikhail Leontyev, host of the TV Center TV program "Actually" will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave her that ill-fated order - go to the railway station ... So Pulikovsky's words in the film "Operation without a name" that "I don't know how the brigade ended up at the station" are most likely true.
From the same book ("The Life and Death of a General"):
FROM THE "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":
2 SMEs 81 SMEs - around the palace.
1 msb... (inaudible).
131st brigade - with two battalions takes up defense near the railway. station".
This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.
The 131st brigade had no mission,” says Rokhlin. She was in reserve. Who ordered her to seize the railway station - one can only guess.
Shots taken by militants from the film "Operation without a name" by A. Sladkov.
So who set the tasks and directly developed this "operation"?
IN THE FILM "NEW YEAR'S EVE OF THE 81st REGIMENT" regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev claimed that Kvashnin personally set the task for him, "drawing and erasing arrows." We find confirmation of this in the above passage from the book:
Rokhlin: And who will command the "Northern" (grouping)?
Kvashnin: I..."
Later, Kvashnin and Shevtsov would step into the shadows, leaving Pulikovsky to deal with everything. Kvashnin will generally be called a "representative of the General Staff", no written orders given to them were found and he did not bear any responsibility for these events. However, like all the other participants in this story.
FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION YU.I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G.N.
"In accordance with the Decree of the State Duma dated December 25, 1996 No. 971-11 GD "On the consideration of the circumstances and causes of the mass death of military personnel of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and measures to strengthen defense country and state security" I inform: ... the circumstances of the death of the personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, are being checked, during which 25 officers and ensigns were killed , 60 soldiers and sergeants, and 72 servicemen of the brigade were missing.
From the explanations of the participants in these events, the documents seized during the inspection, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the RF Ministry of Defense set the general task of liberating the city of Grozny. Colonel-General A. V. Kvashnin (at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) set the specific task of bringing troops into the city, movement routes and interaction.
The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to ensure the passage of other troops to the city of Grozny. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Neftyanka River and was on it until 11 o'clock on December 31, after which, by radio, Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K. B., who commanded the North group at that time, gave the order to enter the city of Grozny. The brigade received no written combat and graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the brigade was ordered to take the railway station by the headquarters of the corps, which was not originally planned.
Having seized the station, the brigade fell into a dense fiery ring of illegal armed formations and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.
As seen from the materials of the check, Pulikovsky had to decide the issues of careful preparation of the operation, but this was not fully done, which was one of the reasons for the death a large number personnel of the 131st brigade.
The actions of Pulikovsky are seen as signs of a crime under Art. 260-1 at paragraph "c" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely, the negligent attitude of an official to the service, which entailed grave consequences.
However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since on April 19, 1995, the State Duma declared an amnesty in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its action.
I would like to end the article with an excerpt from the same book "The Life and Death of a General":
“The operation plan developed by Grachev and Kvashnin became in fact a plan for the death of troops,” says General Rokhlin. “Today I can say with full confidence that it was not substantiated by any operational-tactical calculations. Such a plan has a quite definite name - an adventure. And given that hundreds of people died as a result of its implementation - a criminal adventure ... "
Full version - on the site
“Grachev said that we are mercenaries, right? Why don't we serve in the army?! Bastard! We were just following orders!” - Nikolai Potekhin from the Guards Kantemirovskaya tank division he tried in vain to hide the tears on his burned face with his bandaged hands. He, the driver of the T-72 tank, was betrayed not only by his own Minister of Defense: when the tank was knocked out, he, wounded, was left there to burn alive by the officer - the commander of the vehicle. The ensign was pulled out of the burning tank by the Chechens, it was November 26, 1994. Formally, the Chekists sent the military on an adventure: people were recruited by special departments. Then the names of Colonel-General Alexei Molyakov, head of the Military Counterintelligence Department, were heard throughout the country. Federal Service counterintelligence of the Russian Federation (FSK, as the FSB was called from 1993 to 1995) - and a certain lieutenant colonel with a sonorous surname Dubin - head of a special department of the 18th separate motorized rifle brigade. Ensign Potekhin was immediately given a million rubles - at the exchange rate of that month, about $ 300. They promised two or three more...
“We were told that we need to protect the Russian-speaking population,” the ensign said. - Delivered by plane from Chkalovsky to Mozdok, where we began to prepare tanks. And on the morning of November 26, they received an order: to move on Grozny. There was no clearly defined task: if you enter, they say, the Dudaevites themselves will scatter. And the militants of Labazanov, who went over to the opposition to Dudayev, worked as infantry escorts. As the participants of that “operation” said, the militants did not know how to handle weapons, and in general they quickly dispersed to rob the surrounding stalls. And then grenade launchers suddenly hit the sides ... Out of about 80 Russian servicemen, about 50 were captured then, six died.
On December 9, 1994, Nikolai Potekhin and Alexei Chikin, among other prisoners, were returned Russian side. Then it seemed to many that these were the last prisoners of that war. The State Duma was talking about the coming truce, and I was in the Beslan airport in Vladikavkaz watching the troops arriving plane after plane, how the airborne battalions were deployed near the airfield, putting up outfits, sentries, digging in and settling right in the snow. And this deployment - from the side into the field - said better than any words that the real war was just beginning, and just about, because the paratroopers could not and would not stand in the snowy field for a long time, no matter what the minister said. Then he will say that his boy soldiers "died with a smile on their lips." But it will be after the "winter" assault.
"Mom, take me away from captivity"
The very beginning of January 1995. The assault is in full swing, and a person who has wandered into Grozny on business or out of stupidity is greeted by dozens of gas torches: communications are interrupted, and now almost every house in the battle area can boast of its own “eternal fire”. In the evenings, bluish-red flames give the sky an unprecedented crimson hue, but it is better to stay away from these places: they are well targeted by Russian artillery. And at night it is a landmark, if not a target, for a missile and bomb "pinpoint" strike from the air. The closer to the center, the more residential areas look like a monument to a bygone civilization: dead city, what looks like life - underground, in basements. The square in front of the Reskom (as Dudayev's palace is called) resembles a dump: stone chips, broken glass, torn cars, heaps of shells, unexploded tank shells, tail stabilizers for mines and aircraft missiles. From time to time, militants jump out of the shelters and ruins of the building of the Council of Ministers and dashes, one at a time, dodging like hares, rush across the square to the palace ... And here is a boy rushing back with empty canisters; followed by three more. And so all the time. This is how the fighters change, deliver water and ammunition. The wounded are taken out by "stalkers" - these usually break through the bridge and the square at full speed in their "Zhiguli" or "Moskvich". Although more often they are evacuated at night by an armored personnel carrier, on which the federal troops are beating from all possible trunks. A phantasmagorical spectacle, I watched: an armored car rushes from the palace along Lenin Avenue, and behind its stern, about five meters away, mines are exploding, accompanying it in a chain. One of the mines intended for the armored car hit the fence of the Orthodox Church ...With my colleague Sasha Kolpakov, I make my way into the ruins of the building of the Council of Ministers, in the basement we stumble upon a room: again prisoners,
19 guys. Mostly soldiers from the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade: blockaded at the railway station on January 1, left without support and ammunition, they were forced to surrender. We peer into the grubby faces of guys in army jackets: Lord, these are children, not warriors! “Mom, come soon, take me out of captivity ...” - this is how almost all the letters that they passed on to their parents through journalists began. To paraphrase the name of the famous film, "only boys go into battle." In the barracks, they were taught to scrub the toilet with a toothbrush, paint the lawns green and march on the parade ground. The guys honestly admitted: rarely one of them fired more than two times from a machine gun at the training ground. The guys are mostly from the Russian hinterland, many do not have fathers, only single mothers. The perfect cannon fodder… But the militants didn’t let them talk properly, they demanded permission from Dudayev himself.
The crew of the combat vehicle
The places of the New Year's battles are marked by the skeletons of burned-out armored vehicles, around which the bodies of Russian soldiers are lying, although the time was already approaching the Orthodox Christmas. Birds pecked out eyes, dogs ate many corpses to the bone...
I came across this group of wrecked armored vehicles in early January 1995, when I was making my way to the bridge over the Sunzha, behind which were the buildings of the Council of Ministers and the Reskom. A terrifying sight: the sides stitched with cumulative grenades, torn tracks, red, even rusty towers from fire. On the aft hatch of one BMP, the tail number - 684 is clearly visible, and from the upper hatch, the charred remains of what was quite recently a living person, a split skull, hang like a crooked mannequin ... Lord, how infernal was this flame that swallowed up human life! In the back of the car, burnt ammunition is visible: a pile of calcined machine-gun belts, burst cartridges, charred shells, blackened bullets with leaking lead ...
Near this wrecked infantry fighting vehicle - another one, through the open aft hatch I see a thick layer of gray ash, and something small and charred in it. Looked closer - like a baby curled up. Also human! Not far away, near some garages, the bodies of three very young guys in greasy army padded jackets, and all of them had their hands behind their backs, as if they were tied. And on the walls of garages - traces of bullets. Surely these were soldiers who managed to jump out of the wrecked cars, and they were against the wall ... As in a dream, I raise the camera with cotton hands, take a few pictures. A series of mines rushing near makes you dive behind a padded infantry fighting vehicle. Unable to save her crew, she nevertheless shielded me from fragments.
Who knew that fate would later again confront me with the victims of that drama - the crew of the wrecked armored car: the living, the dead and the missing. “Three tankers, three cheerful friends, the crew of a combat vehicle,” was sung in a Soviet song of the 1930s. And it was not a tank - an infantry fighting vehicle: BMP-2 tail number 684 from the second motorized rifle battalion of the 81st motorized rifle regiment. The crew - four people: Major Artur Valentinovich Belov - the chief of staff of the battalion, his deputy captain Viktor Vyacheslavovich Mychko, driver-mechanic private Dmitry Gennadievich Kazakov and signalman senior sergeant Andrey Anatolyevich Mikhailov. You can say, my Samara compatriots: after the withdrawal from Germany, the 81st Guards motorized rifle Petrakuvsky twice Red Banner, orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky regiment was stationed in the Samara region, in Chernorechye. Shortly before Chechen war according to the order of the Minister of Defense, the regiment began to be called the Volga Cossack Guards, but the new name did not take root.
This infantry fighting vehicle was knocked out on the afternoon of December 31, 1994, and it was possible to find out about those who were in it later, when, after the first publication of the pictures, I was found by the parents of a soldier from Tolyatti. Nadezhda and Anatoly Mikhailov were looking for their missing son Andrei: on December 31, 1994, he was in this car ... What could I say then to the soldier's parents, what hope to give them? We called up again and again, I tried to accurately describe everything that I saw with my own eyes, and only later, at a meeting, I handed over the pictures. From Andrei's parents, I learned that there were four people in the car, only one survived - Captain Mychko. I ran into the captain quite by chance in the summer of 1995 in Samara in the district military hospital. I talked with the wounded man, began to show pictures, and he literally dug into one of them: “This is my car! And this is Major Belov, there is no one else ... "
Fifteen years have passed since then, but I know for certain the fate of only two, Belov and Mychko. Major Arthur Belov is that charred man on the armor. He fought in Afghanistan, was awarded an order. Not so long ago I read the words of the commander of the 2nd battalion Ivan Shilovsky about him: Major Belov shot perfectly with any weapon, neat - even in Mozdok on the eve of the campaign against Grozny he always went with a white collar and with arrows on his trousers made with a coin, he also let go of a neat a beard, because of which he ran into a remark by the commander of the 90th Panzer Division, Major General Nikolai Suryadny, although the charter allows him to wear a beard during hostilities. The division commander was not too lazy to call Samara by satellite phone in order to give the order: to deprive Major Belov of the thirteenth salary ...
How Arthur Belov died is not known for certain. It seems that when the car was hit, the major tried to jump out through the top hatch and was killed. Yes, and remained on the armor. At least, this is what Viktor Mychko claims: “No one set us any combat mission, only an order by radio: enter the city. Kazakov sat behind the levers, Mikhailov in the aft, next to the radio station - provided communication. Well, I'm with Belov. At the twelfth hour of the day ... We didn’t really understand anything, we didn’t even have time to fire a single shot - neither from a cannon, nor from a machine gun, nor from machine guns. It was pure hell. We did not see anything or anyone, the side of the car was shaking from hits. Everything was shooting from everywhere, we no longer had any other thoughts, except for one thing - to get out. The radio was disabled by the first hits. They just shot us like a range target. We didn’t even try to shoot back: where to shoot if you don’t see the enemy, but you yourself are in full view? Everything was like in a nightmare, when it seems that an eternity lasts, but only a few minutes have passed. We are hit, the car is on fire. Belov rushed into the upper hatch, and blood immediately gushed over me - he was cut off by a bullet, and he hung on the tower. I rushed out of the car myself ... "
However, some colleagues - but not eyewitnesses! - later they began to claim that the major was burned alive: he fired from a machine gun until he was wounded, tried to get out of the hatch, but the militants doused him with gasoline and set it on fire, and the BMP itself, they say, did not burn at all and its ammunition did not explode. Others agreed to the point that Captain Mychko abandoned Belov and the soldiers, even "surrendered" them to Afghan mercenaries. And the Afghans, they say, to the veteran afghan war and took revenge. But there were no Afghan mercenaries in Grozny - the origins of this legend, as well as the myth of "white tights", must be sought, apparently, in the basements of the Lubyaninformburo. And the investigators were able to examine the BMP No. 684 not earlier than February 1995, when they began to evacuate the damaged equipment from the streets of Grozny. Arthur Belov was identified first by the watch on his arm and waist belt (he was some kind of special one, bought back in Germany), then by his teeth and a plate in his spine. The Order of Courage posthumously, according to Shilovsky, was knocked out of bureaucrats only on the third attempt.
Tomb of an unidentified soldier
A fragment pierced the chest of Captain Viktor Mychko, damaging his lung, there were still wounds in the arm and leg: “I leaned out to the waist - and suddenly the pain fell back, I don’t remember anything else, I woke up already in the bunker.” The unconscious captain was pulled out of the wrecked car, as many say, by Ukrainians who fought on the side of the Chechens. They, apparently, shot down this BMP. Something is now known about one of the Ukrainians who captured the captain: Oleksandr Muzychko, nicknamed Sashko the Bily, sort of from Kharkov, but lived in Rivne. In general, Viktor Mychko woke up in captivity - in the basement of the Dudayev Palace. Then there was an operation in the same basement, release, hospitals and a lot of problems. But more on that below.
The soldiers Dmitry Kazakov and Andrei Mikhailov were not among the survivors, their names were not among the identified dead, for a long time they were both missing. Now they are officially declared dead. However, in 1995 Andrei Mikhailov's parents told me in a conversation: yes, we received a coffin with a body, we buried him, but it was not our son.
The story is like this. In February, when the fighting in the city subsided and the damaged cars were removed from the streets, it was time for identification. Of the entire crew, only Belov was officially identified. Although, as Nadezhda Mikhailova told me, he had a tag with the number of a completely different BMP. And there were two more bodies with the tags of the 684th BMP. More precisely, not even bodies - shapeless charred remains. The epic with identification lasted four months, and on May 8, 1995, the one whom the examination identified as Andrey Mikhailov, guard senior sergeant of the signal company of the 81st regiment, found his peace in the cemetery. But for the parents of the soldier, the identification technology remained a mystery: the military refused to tell them flatly about it at that time, they definitely did not conduct genetic examinations. Maybe it would be worth sparing the reader's nerves, but you still can't do without details: the soldier was without a head, without arms, without legs, everything was burned. There was nothing with him - no documents, no personal belongings, no suicide medallion. Military medics from a hospital in Rostov-on-Don told the parents that they allegedly conducted an examination based on a chest x-ray. But then they suddenly changed the version: they determined the blood type from the bone marrow and calculated by the method of elimination that one was Kazakov. Another, that means Mikhailov... Blood type - and nothing else? But after all, the soldiers could be not only from another BMP, but also from another part! The blood type is another proof: four groups and two Rhesus, eight options for thousands of corpses ...
It is clear that the parents did not believe also because it is impossible for a mother's heart to come to terms with the loss of her son. However, there were good reasons for their doubts. In Tolyatti, not only the Mikhailovs received a funeral and a zinc coffin; in January 1995, the messengers of death knocked on many people. Then came the coffins. And one family, having mourned and buried their dead son, in the same May 1995 received a second coffin! There was a mistake, they said in the military registration and enlistment office, the first time we sent the wrong one, but this time it’s definitely yours. Who was buried first? How was it to believe after that?
Andrei Mikhailov's parents traveled to Chechnya several times in 1995, hoping for a miracle: what if they were captured? They ransacked the cellars of Grozny. They were also in Rostov-on-Don - in the infamous 124th medical forensic laboratory of the Ministry of Defense. They told how boorish, drunken "body keepers" met them there. Several times Andrei's mother examined the remains of the dead stacked in the cars, but she did not find her son. And she was amazed that for half a year no one even tried to identify these several hundred dead: “Everyone is perfectly preserved, facial features are clear, everyone can be identified. Why can't the Department of Defense take pictures by sending them out to the districts, checking them against photos from personal files? Why should we, mothers, ourselves, at our own expense, travel thousands and thousands of kilometers to find, identify and pick up our children - again, on our pennies? The state took them into the army, it threw them into the war, and then it forgot there - the living and the dead ... Why can't the army humanly at least pay the last debt to the fallen boys?
"No one set the task"
Then I learned a lot about my countryman. Andrei Mikhailov was called up in March 1994. They were sent to serve nearby, in Chernorechye, where the 81st regiment withdrawn from Germany was based. From Togliatti to Chernorechye is a stone's throw, so Andrei's parents visited Andrei often. Service as a service, there was hazing. But the parents are firmly convinced that no one was engaged in combat training in the regiment. Because from March to December 1994, Andrei held a machine gun in his hands only three times: at the oath and twice more at the shooting range - the father commanders were generous with as many as nine rounds. And in the sergeant's training, in fact, they did not teach him anything, although they gave him badges. The son honestly told his parents what he was doing in Chernorechye: from morning till night he built dachas and garages for gentlemen officers, nothing more. He described in detail how some kind of dacha, a general's or a colonel's, was equipped: boards were polished to a mirror shine with a planer, one to the other was adjusted to the seventh sweat. Later, I met with Andrey's colleagues in Chernorechye: they confirm, it was so, all the "combat" training - the construction of summer cottages and the maintenance of officer families. A week before being sent to Chechnya, the radio was turned off in the barracks, and the TVs were taken out. Parents who managed to attend the dispatch of their children claimed that military tickets were taken away from the soldiers. The last time the parents saw Andrei was literally before the regiment was sent to Chechnya. Everyone already knew that they were going to war, but they drove gloomy thoughts away from themselves. The parents filmed the last evening with their son on a video camera. They convinced me that when they look at the film, they see that already then the stamp of tragedy lay on Andrei's face: he is gloomy, does not eat anything, he gave pies to his colleagues ...
By the beginning of the war in Chechnya, the once elite regiment was a pitiful sight. Almost none of the regular officers who served in Germany remained, and 66 officers of the regiment were not regular at all - “two-year students” from civilian universities with military departments! For example, Lieutenant Valery Gubarev, commander of a motorized rifle platoon, a graduate of the Novosibirsk Metallurgical Institute: he was drafted into the army in the spring of 1994. He was already in the hospital telling how grenade launchers and a sniper were sent to him at the last moment before the battle. "The sniper says, 'Show me how to shoot.' And grenade throwers - about the same ... Already build a column, and I train all grenade throwers ... "Commander
Alexander Yaroslavtsev of the 81st Regiment later admitted: “People, to be honest, were poorly trained, who drove the BMP a little, who shot a little. And from such specific types of weapons as an underbarrel grenade launcher and a flamethrower, the soldiers did not shoot at all.
Lieutenant Sergei Terekhin, commander of a tank platoon, wounded during the assault, claimed that only two weeks before the first (and last) battle, his platoon was completed with people. And in the 81st regiment itself, half of the personnel were missing. This was confirmed by the chief of staff of the regiment Semyon Burlakov: “We concentrated in Mozdok. We were given two days to regroup, after which we marched under Grozny. At all levels, we reported that the regiment in this composition is not ready for combat operations. We were considered a mobile unit, but we were staffed according to the state of peace: we had only 50 percent of the personnel. But the most important thing is that there were no infantry in the motorized rifle squads, only the crews of combat vehicles. There were no direct shooters, those who should ensure the safety of combat vehicles. Therefore, we walked, as they say, "bare armor." And, again, the vast majority of the platoons were two-year-old guys who had no idea about the conduct of hostilities. Drivers only knew how to start the car and move off. Gunners-operators could not shoot from combat vehicles at all.
Neither the battalion commanders, nor the company and platoon commanders had maps of Grozny: they did not know how to navigate in a foreign city! The commander of the communications company of the regiment (Andrey Mikhailov served in this company), Captain Stanislav Spiridonov, in an interview with Samara journalists said: “Maps? There were maps, but everyone had different ones, different years, they didn’t fit together, even the street names are different.” However, the two-year-old platoon officers could not read maps at all. “Then the chief of staff of the division himself got in touch with us,” Gubarev recalled, “and personally set the task: the 5th company along Chekhov - to the left, and to us, the 6th company, to the right. That's what he said, to the right. Just to the right."
When the offensive began, the regiment's combat mission changed every three hours, so we can safely assume that it did not exist. Later, the regiment commander, giving numerous interviews in the hospital, could not intelligibly explain who set him the task and what. First they had to take the airport, advanced - a new order, turned around - again an order to go to the airport, then another introductory one. And on the morning of December 31, 1995, about 200 combat vehicles of the 81st regiment (according to other sources - about 150) moved to Grozny: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles ...
They did not know anything about the enemy: no one provided the regiment with intelligence, and they themselves did not conduct reconnaissance. The 1st battalion, marching in the first echelon, entered the city at 6 am, and the 2nd battalion entered the city with a gap of five hours - at 11 am! By this time, little was left of the first battalion, the second went to its death. BMP number 684 was in the second echelon.
They also claim that a day or two before the battle, many soldiers were given medals - so to speak, in advance, as an incentive. It was the same in other parts. At the beginning of January 1995, a Chechen militiaman showed me a certificate for the medal "For Distinction in Military Service", 2nd degree, which was found on the deceased soldier. The document read: Private Asvan Zazatdinovich Ragiev was awarded the order of the Minister of Defense No. 603 of December 26, 1994. The medal was awarded to the soldier on December 29, and he died on December 31 - later I will find this name in the list of the dead servicemen of the 131st Maikop motorized rifle brigade.
The regiment commander later claimed that when setting up a combat mission, “special attention was paid to the inadmissibility of destroying people, buildings, objects. We had the right to open only return fire. But the driver of the T-80 tank, junior sergeant Andrey Yurin, when he was in the Samara hospital, recalled: “No, no one set a task, they just stood in a column and went. True, the company commander warned: “Just a little - shoot! Child on the road - push. That's the whole task.
Control of the regiment was lost in the very first hours. He was wounded and out of action of the regimental commander Yaroslavtsev, he was replaced by Burlakov - also wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Aidarov took the reins of government next. Survivors almost unanimously spoke of him very unflattering. The softest of all is Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Shilovsky, commander of the 2nd battalion: "Aidarov showed obvious cowardice during the fighting." According to the battalion commander, having entered Grozny, this "regimental commander" placed his infantry fighting vehicle in the arch of a building near Ordzhonikidze Square, posted guards and sat there all the time of the battle, losing control of the people entrusted to him. And the deputy division commander, trying to restore control, flew on the air: “Aidarov [beep-beep-beep]! And you, coward, where did you hide?!” Lieutenant Colonel Shilovsky claimed: Aidarov "later ran away from the city at the first opportunity, leaving people behind." And then, when the remnants of the regiment were taken out to rest and put in order, “the regiment was ordered to re-enter the city to support the units already entrenched there. Aidarov dissuaded the officers from continuing the fighting. He persuaded them not to enter the city: “You won’t get anything for this, motivate this by saying that you don’t know people, there aren’t enough soldiers. And I will be demoted for this, so you better ... "
The losses of the regiment were terrible, the number of dead was not made public and is not known for certain to this day. According to the data former boss regimental headquarters, posted on one of the sites, died
56 people and 146 were injured. However, according to another authoritative, though far from complete list losses, the 81st regiment then lost at least 87 people killed. There is also evidence that immediately after the New Year's battles, about 150 units of "cargo 200" were delivered to the Samara airfield "Kurumoch". According to the commander of the communications company, out of 200 people of the 1st battalion of the 81st regiment, 18 survived! And out of 200 military vehicles, 17 remained in service - the rest burned down on the streets of Grozny. (The regimental chief of staff acknowledged the loss of 103 units of military equipment.) And the losses were not only from the Chechens, but also from their own artillery, which since the evening of December 31 nailed Grozny completely aimlessly, but no longer spared the shells.
When the wounded Colonel Yaroslavtsev was in the hospital, one of the Samara journalists asked him: how would the regimental commander act if he knew about the enemy and the city what he knows now? He replied: "I would report on command and act according to the order given."
