After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress Chechen people(OKChN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of an independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet army Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons Soviet troops in Chechnya, up to aviation. Russia declared the illegality of the “Dudaev regime”.

Soon, among the Chechens themselves, a struggle for spheres of influence began, which, with the intervention of the federal authorities and law enforcement agencies, resulted in a semblance of a civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of the federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Russian servicemen, was a disaster.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the combat equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely out of order, 40% - partially out of order. Surprise for Russian politicians and the military, it turned out that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as an enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to attract the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev has become a national hero. Most of the Chechens perceived the introduction of federal troops as an invasion of the enemy army, seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show state wisdom, patience, diplomatic skill, understanding of the historical and cultural traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the "independence" of General Dudayev, wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Reduced oil exports.

3. The unleashing of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for money laundering.

Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin authorities. The negative attitude rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of those polled supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against it. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% favored an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely high level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of the Russians polled had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically spoke out from anti-war positions, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many social and political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of the military way of solving the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and to resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations have begun between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement "On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya" and "Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic." An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed formations. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, having suffered significant human losses and huge material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. There was a problem of refugees. Among those leaving there were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the coming to power of A. Maskhadov, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short time, the Chechen Republic was given over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be valid, legal proceedings were liquidated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the autumn of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future, and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic together with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia faced the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From late 1996 to 1999 criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily passed the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with the federal authorities, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia were subjected to persecution. All educational institutions came under the strict control of self-proclaimed Sharia courts and various Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policy.

Under the flag of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was discontinued both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and wearing a veil was required in high school. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There was a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most of the Chechen children did not go to school during the war years. Uneducated youth can only replenish criminal groups. The illiterate are always easy to manipulate, playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: hostage-taking, blowing up houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buynaksk, attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government, headed by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The second Chechen war began in September 1999.

She was completely different in all the main indicators:

By the nature and method of conducting;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to the citizens to the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the population of Russia was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The second Chechen war caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries about the second Chechen war was at odds with the general Russian opinion. It is typical for a Western layman to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia's suppression of the uprising of a small nation, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations, that there were "ethnic cleansing" in Chechnya.

At the same time, the Western media concealed the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and human trafficking, the cultivation of slavery, medieval customs and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed primarily at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. Entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the US and NATO pursue their own interests in this region.

The grouping of federal forces in Chechnya consisted of 90,000 people, of which about 70,000 were in active service, the rest served under a contract. According to the press, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov turned out to be on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By the middle of 2000, the federal troops had defeated most of the separatists' organized military formations and taken control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant's offices to the Administration of Chechnya, created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, and its local bodies. They were led by the Chechens. Huge work began on the revival of the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to interfere with the remnants of gangs of militants who took refuge in the hard-to-reach mountainous places of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorist struggle, systematically arranging explosions on the roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. more than 230 terrorist attacks were committed, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

AT early XXI century, the leadership of Russia continued the policy of establishing a peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya as soon as possible. On the whole, this task is successfully carried out.

Causes are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. A variety of things are usually cited as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya, which had to be urgently prevented; a terrible amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which a terrible amount of oil from the Caspian had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And many other things. But upon closer examination, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

The rights of the Russian-speaking population were taken care of only when they got involved in the war in full. Nobody thought about it before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of operation of the field, now about 2 million tons are mined there a year, this is complete nonsense. Yes, there was a large oil refinery in Chechnya, powerful factories, but nothing was left of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian was not particularly popular. As for Chechen crime, this is a myth built from our modern far away. The fact is that the Chechens were incapable of fighting the mafia. Or rather, they are capable to the same extent as they are capable of statehood. The Chechen, anarchist structure of society (from about the 16th century) did not involve building hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-1993, Chechnya suited everyone in Russia in many respects. She arranged the special services as a kind of offshore, where through the Northern Airport it was possible to transport weapons to third world countries; as an offshore, where it was possible to hire militants to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought with Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but the detachments of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya, as an offshore, suited large oil (then still state-owned) companies, because it was possible to drive oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that suits everyone, but what happened? And what happened to us at that time was a completely intra-Moscow event. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, escalated. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it already happened, was Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But here's what to do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is a Chechen. And then the whole propaganda machine, as part of the confrontation with the Parliament, is being rebuilt on “atu of this Chechen Khasbulatov!”

That is, if we return to the texts of 1993, it will turn out that we do not have a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad, and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that it was the White House security department that guarded about 70 more objects, but at the same time they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this intensified to such an extent that if you listen to the radio communications on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the policemen preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune to be captured in Afghanistan, and for some reason he was charged with this). Somehow, the campaign was raised. And it was then that the talk began about the Chechen mafia. Then a surprise happens: we took a little of the White House and burned it a little on October 4, and on the 12th - bang! - and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Many seats in parliament were occupied by communists and Zhirinovites. And then the political technologists (who were not called that at that time) had a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, to return a fallen province to the bosom of the Empire. Nothing raises the rating.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai's plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and shelved) was suddenly taken out of the shed: a plan of negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure, which should ensure the solution of the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that it was very bad with negotiations, but very good with forceful pressure. All sorts of political technologists and analysts from this project were cut off after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Ministry of Nationalities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB). This project was partly supervised by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give money to the anti-Dudaev opposition, they take the money, but Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons - also Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons with crews - on November 26, 1994, Grozny is stormed (supposedly by the opposition, but in fact there were officers hired by the FSK in the Moscow Region units in the tanks). Hybrid fight. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, power can be granted to him! ”, Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But unexpectedly, non-natives crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Further, as always, foxes are hidden in the forest, and small blood can only be washed away with big blood. No one addressed the analysis of errors and return to the previous stage during the year. Then the war starts. What's funny, the war did not raise this rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at a background level. And the elections were won in part, because it was then that his team said: “Peace!”, “Peace!”. Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev flies to Moscow to talk, he is taken away at the ABC special facility in warm camp. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya, says: "That's it, peace has come." Yeltsin was elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took a third to his team (and the third was then Lebed), appointed him Secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) gave carte blanche to win his former deputy for Transnistria. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. I must say that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin's inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that they were superior in strength, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master's mood with bad news. Therefore, during three days paralysis reigned, during this time the Chechens were surprised to fortify themselves in the city and it was already impossible to kick them out. After that, Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the place, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, simple: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

It must be said that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, as about a nightmare. We did not pull out our prisoners, although in the autumn of 1996 this could well have been done. Hostage-taking began, the situation was in shambles, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we come to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya, a year later his remains will be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we would use force. spun war machine. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade in Dagestan began (this is not funny, at that time the marines were the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south began. And here, even against someone's will, we irresistibly marched towards war, because the car started spinning from the other side. Why? We go over to the other side and notice that in 1997 Maskhadov won in our elections in Chechnya (convincingly won), and Shamil Basayev took the second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not exactly big ones, but he knew how to unite very restless local comrades under him. At some point, Maskhadov let him steer, for half a year (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant successes: the budget filling rate fell 20 times. After that, it seemed his career was over. Resigning, as promised, six months later from this post, he immediately spoke at the congress of the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring powerful expansion goals. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, having turned out to be a political marginal, found himself on the verge of death, not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the beginning of a war, which would inevitably lead to the rallying of everyone and save him from death (at least postpone this death). And so it happened.

In 1999, during the summer, Basayev was already building up his forces in the Tsumadinsky district of Dagestan. And the fact that at the turn of July-August 1999 there bang, could bang a little earlier, could a little later. One way or another, a war began, which was declared a counter-terrorist operation (although there were no explosions in cities yet). I do not want to say that these explosions were staged by the special services, apart from the "Ryazan exercises" the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But it's different. In that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin's rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant, background values. Every week, some kind of brutal statement like "wet in the toilet." And the rating of hop - 7% jumped up until it went to sky-high heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we do not know who arranged all this, but we know exactly who used it.

Ironically, what failed in the first war (using it as an electoral tool) succeeded perfectly in the second. Further war, of course, was not needed by anyone. For example, already before Putin was elected president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! Everything, already a victory! There - in the Komsomol battles. However, the attacks in every possible way reminded of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen power. But attempts to assert that subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by the special services, they, in my opinion, are also untenable. Nevertheless, we see that here the cause is a thing much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. An uncontrolled power that does not stop at playing with fire in order to maintain this power.

By the beginning of the operation, the combined grouping of federal forces numbered over 16.5 thousand people. Since most of the motorized rifle units and formations had a reduced composition, consolidated detachments were created on the basis of them. The united group did not have a single command and control body, a common system of logistic and technical support for the troops. Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin was appointed commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV) in the Chechen Republic.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, on the orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

After that, the Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the United Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

On February 3, 1995, the Yug grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce was violated by both sides.

At the end of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

On March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed formations in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

On March 12-23, the troops of the United Forces carried out a successful operation to eliminate the enemy's Argun grouping and capture the city of Argun. On March 22-31, the Gudermes grouping was liquidated, on March 31, after heavy fighting, Shali was occupied.

Having suffered a number of major defeats, the militants began to change the organization and tactics of their units, illegal armed formations united into small, highly maneuverable units and groups focused on sabotage, raids, and ambushes.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium was implemented on the use of armed force in Chechnya.

In June 1995, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov was appointed commander of the OGV.

On June 3, after heavy fighting, federal forces entered Vedeno; on June 12, the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken. By mid-June 1995, 85% of the territory of the Chechen Republic was under the control of federal forces.

Illegal armed groups carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from the mountainous regions to the locations of the Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist attacks on an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996) .

On October 6, 1995, the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Romanov, was seriously wounded in a tunnel near Minutka Square in Grozny as a result of a well-planned terrorist act - the detonation of a radio-controlled land mine.

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, the federal troops left Grozny, having suffered heavy losses. The illegal armed formations also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed in Khasavyurt, which put an end to the first Chechen campaign. The signatures under the Khasavyurt peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the signing ceremony was attended by the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman. The decision on the status of the Chechen Republic was postponed until 2001.

After the conclusion of the agreement, the federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya within the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

According to data released by the headquarters of the United Forces immediately after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing / deserted / captured, 19,794 wounded.

According to the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century" under the general editorship of G.V. Krivosheeva (2001), Armed Forces Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in the hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic, lost 5042 people killed and dead, 510 people missing and captured. Sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including: wounded, shell-shocked, injured 16,098 people.

The irretrievable losses of the personnel of the illegal armed formations of Chechnya are estimated at 2500-2700 people.

According to expert assessments of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations, total number casualties among the civilian population amounted to 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, Ingushetia.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

(Additional

First Chechen War
	Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory
	Khasavyurt agreements, the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya.
Territorial changes:	The actual independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Opponents
Russian Armed Forces	Chechen separatists
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
Commanders
Boris Yeltsin Pavel Grachev Anatoly Kvashnin Anatoly Kulikov Victor Erin Anatoly Romanov Lev Rokhlin Gennady Troshev Vladimir Shamanov Ivan Babichev Konstantin Pulikovsky Bislan Gantamirov Said-Magomed Kakiev	Dzhokhar Dudayev † Aslan Maskhadov Ahmed Zakaev Zelimkhan Yandarbiev Shamil Basaev Ruslan Gelaev Salman Raduev Turpal-Ali Atgeriev Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov Vakha Arsanov Arbi Baraev Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev Apti Batalov Aslanbek Ismailov Ruslan Alikhadzhiev Ruslan Khaykhoroev Khizir Khachukaev
Side forces
95,000 troops (February 1995)	3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia)
Military casualties
About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures)	17,391 dead and captured (Russian data)

First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - military operations between the Russian government forces (Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus in order to take control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often referred to as the "first Chechen war", although officially the conflict was referred to as "measures to maintain constitutional order". The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya before the second Chechen conflict, and a wave of terror that swept through Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of "perestroika" in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements became more active. One such organization was the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, established in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by the former General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen revolution" of 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power developed in the republic.

During the "August coup" in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of a "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov then sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the Republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree declaring a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions of the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply escalated - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which finally ended by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 rocket launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand automatic small arms weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic be transferred to the Dudaevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.

The collapse of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the disintegration of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former CHIASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia as part of the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not been defined to date (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992 in the Prigorodny district North Ossetia Russian troops were brought in. Relations between Russia and Chechnya deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time to solve the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, emblem and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was supposed to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of their own state currency - nahara. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal treaty with the Russian Federation.

In fact, state system CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and in the period 1991-1994 it was rapidly criminalized.

In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993 at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian railway 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers in the amount of 11.5 billion rubles. For 8 months in 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed in armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special craft was the manufacture of false advice notes, on which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992 a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.

Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and forbade employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer money from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being expelled from their homes, leaving or selling apartments to Chechens at a low price. Only in 1992, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, 300 were missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was kindled by relevant literature, direct insults and appeals from government stands, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.

Political crisis of 1993

In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply escalated in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, in which meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; thus, a coup d'état took place in CRI. The constitution, adopted last year, was amended, and Dudayev's regime of personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After coup d'état On June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which held several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

Beginning of the civil war (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them could win the fight.

Only in Urus-Martan in October 1994, the Dudaevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces CRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan B. Gantamirov lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, on September 12 and October 15, 1994, carried out offensive actions in Grozny, but every time they retreated without achieving decisive success, although they did not suffer heavy losses.

On November 26, the oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with Federal Service counterintelligence.

The course of the war

The entry of troops (December 1994)

Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic."

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides- from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), north-west (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering on Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen Grad rocket artillery installation and then entered the battle for this settlement.

The new offensive of the units of the OGV began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne division blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny was still not blocked from the south side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. The Russian troops were poorly trained, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city and normal communications.

The western grouping of troops was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, who were under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - losses Maykop brigade 85 people were killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander, Colonel Savin, was killed, and more than 100 servicemen were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West group.

The Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aircraft. Fierce street fighting ensued in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists withdrew across the Sunzha River and took up defense on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV had been increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, persuading local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.

Despite this, local battles were going on in the western regions of Chechnya. March 10 began fighting for the village of Bamut. April 7-8 consolidated detachment MIA, consisting of Sofrino brigade internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people dead, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians were killed, and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since now the militants occupied the dominant heights above the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed to conduct nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.

Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The blows of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in Argun Gorge and on June 3, Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12, the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Also, as in the plains, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist act in Budyonnovsk (14 - 19 June 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, drove trucks into the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The building of the GOVD became the first object of attack, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, about 2,000 hostages were in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiating with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Because of the leak of information, the terrorists had time to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; as a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except the main one), releasing 95 hostages. Spetsnaz losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees of law enforcement agencies) and 415 wounded, the losses of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to June 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but not as participants in illegal armed formations, but as "self-defense units". There were local battles throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions could be resolved through negotiations. So, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militants were in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their positions, because, according to them, these were "self-defense units" that had the right to stay in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he was in a coma. In turn, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was launched on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to change the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov to former leader Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Dokku Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, it took Russian troops about a week of “cleansing operations” to finally take Gudermes under their control.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, having received over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all military personnel of the UGV participated in the elections.

Terrorist act in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). Initially, the goal of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the soldiers guarding the base. The Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to pull up to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiment in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations were held from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship with threats to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 78 people dead and several hundred wounded.

Attack of militants on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when withdrawing, took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing column of the car, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment was installed for the bearing of a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev's motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the aircraft reached the target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of upcoming presidential elections Russian leadership decided once again to negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the abolition of military duty.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaykhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.

Operation Jihad (August 6-22, 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2,000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not set out to capture the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at roadblocks and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.

Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the building of the commandant's office).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of “Memorial” (later called the “Mission of public organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”) . The Kovalev Mission did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial Human Rights Center.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen fighters and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn on the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being at the headquarters of Dzhokhar Dudayev among the militants, “almost all the time was in the basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tankmen “a way out of the city without firing if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute of Human Rights headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as the entire human rights and anti-war position of Kovalev, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, representatives state power, as well as numerous supporters of the "state" approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, "because of his "one-sided position" aimed at justifying illegal armed groups."

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, "for his statements against the war in Chechnya."

Representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone as part of the Kovalev Mission. The mission was engaged in collecting information about what was happening in the Chechen war, was engaged in the search for missing persons and prisoners, and facilitated the release of Russian servicemen who were captured by Chechen fighters. So, for example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, Khaikharoev, who commanded militant detachments, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with field commanders , Khaykharoev abandoned these intentions.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched a massive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic covers in the first months. In February 1995, out of the 120,000 inhabitants remaining in Grozny, 70,000 thousand were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water and sewerage systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily set about organizing the supply of the city drinking water. In the summer of 1995, about 750,000 liters of chlorinated water per day, to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents, was delivered by tank trucks to 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for the inhabitants of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food daily. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and stationery from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to help victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters on Red Cross letterhead, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contact with each other, so as all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the rehabilitation and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoi, provided regular assistance to nursing homes and orphanages shelters.

In the autumn of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. Over the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was made on the hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After that, the ICRC was forced to recall foreign employees from Chechnya.

In April 1995, Frederick Cuney, an American humanitarian operations specialist, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and an interpreter. Kewney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Kewney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen fighters and shot on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of Dzhokhar Dudayev's counterintelligence chiefs, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, which in this way dealt with Kewni at the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldier's Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with servicemen - participants in military operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during hostilities.

Results

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya has again become de facto independent, but de jure unrecognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to the former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the amount of the contract. Due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the growth of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to data released by the headquarters of the United Forces, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing / deserted / captured, 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented cases of death according to the mothers of dead soldiers). However, it should be borne in mind that the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers include only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract servicemen, fighters special units etc. The losses of militants, according to the data of the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen divisions (later President of the CRI) A. Maskhadov, the loss of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the HRC "Memorial", the losses of militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

Commanders

Commanders of the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
2. Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilyevich (December 1994 - February 1995)
3. Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
4. Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
5. Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
6. Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
7. Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Films

• "Cursed and Forgotten" (1997) - a feature film by Sergei Govorukhin.
• "60 hours of the Maikop brigade" (1995) - documentary Mikhail Polunin about the "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
• Checkpoint (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
• Purgatory (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
• "Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1996) - a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
• DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

• "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about the "New Year's" assault on Grozny by Yuri Shevchuk.
• The first Chechen war is dedicated to the song by Yuri Shevchuk Boys were dying.
• The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Father Kombat” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step march” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
• Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is devoted to the First Chechen War.
• Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
• The first Chechen war is dedicated to the song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City.
• Blue berets - " New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the phone hotline"," Two turntables on Mozdok.

Books

• "Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
• "Chechen Blues" (1998) - a novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
• May Day (2000) - a story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
• "Pathologies" (novel) (2004) - a novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
• I was in this war (2001) - a novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

1. The First Chechen War (the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, the First Chechen campaign, the Restoration of the constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - hostilities between the troops of Russia (AF and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, in order to take control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.

2. Officially, the conflict was defined as "measures to maintain constitutional order", military operations were called the "first Chechen war", less often the "Russian-Chechen" or "Russian-Caucasian war". The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, there were facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya.

3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War, and a wave of terror that swept through Russia.

4. With the beginning of perestroika, various nationalist movements became more active in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia. One of these organizations was the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OKCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by the former General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.

5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKChN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power developed in the republic.

6. During the "August coup" in Moscow, the leadership of the CHIASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of a "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. On this occasion, the head of the Chechen Republic Zavgaev D. G. spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma "

Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided), the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against the multinational people, when the criminal criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation here, filled this people with blood. The first victim of what is happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens in the first place. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny city council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the republic's Supreme Council. When Besliev, vice rector, was shot dead in the street state university. When Kankalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, Grozny's morgues were packed to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television asking them to pick them up, find out who was there, and so on.

8. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov then sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Republic's Armed Forces." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the Republic. These elections were recognized by the Russian Federation as illegal

9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)". After these actions of the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply escalated - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was frustrated, the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)" was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots.

10. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 training aircraft, converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60s; about 7 thousand GSh-23 air shells. 42 T-62 and T-72 tanks; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 MLRS Grad and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 memory devices of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. ZUR S-75. 590 units of anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGMs, 51 Metis ATGMs, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuel and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing items, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.

12. In June 1992, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Pavel Grachev, ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic be transferred to the Dudaevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.

13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former CHIASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia as part of the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not been defined to date (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops entered the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time to solve the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

16. As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, as a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, emblem and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was supposed to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of their own state currency - nahara. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal treaty with the Russian Federation.

17. In reality, the state system of the CRI proved to be extremely inefficient and in the period 1991-1994 was rapidly criminalized. In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders took place on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers in the amount of 11.5 billion rubles. For 8 months in 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed in armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994

18. A special trade was the manufacture of false advice notes, on which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992 a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.

19. Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and forbade employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and resold abroad.

21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply aggravated in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, in which meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; thus, a coup d'état took place in CRI. The constitution, adopted last year, was amended, Dudayev's regime of personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament

22. After the coup d'état on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against Dudayev's regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which held several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

23. Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by the opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to prevail in the struggle.

25. Only in Urus-Martan in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, on September 12 and October 15, 1994, carried out offensive actions in Grozny, but every time they retreated without achieving decisive success, although they did not suffer heavy losses.

26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

27. Entering troops (December 1994)

At that time, the use of the expression "the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya", according to the deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.

Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government, which substantiated the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering on Chechnya and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen Grad rocket artillery installation and then entered the battle for this settlement.

The new offensive of the units of the OGV began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne regiment blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bombing of the city center was carried out. Many civilians (including ethnic Russians) were killed and wounded during artillery shelling and bombing.

Despite the fact that Grozny was still not blocked from the south side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. The Russian troops were poorly trained, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated city plans in limited quantities. The means of communication were not equipped with closed communication equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were ordered to occupy only industrial buildings, squares and inadmissibility of intrusion into the houses of the civilian population.

The western grouping of troops was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade(more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. The federal forces were surrounded - according to official data, the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin died, more than 100 servicemen were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West group.

The Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aircraft. Fierce street fighting ensued in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists withdrew across the Sunzha River and took up defense on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV had been increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the boundary of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.

29. Establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, persuading local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.

Despite this, local battles were going on in the western regions of Chechnya. March 10 began fighting for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, the combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martanovsky district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" of Shamil Basayev). After the Russian servicemen entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and skirmishes began on the streets of the village.

According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency "Chechen-Press", however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the human rights center "Memorial", these data "do not inspire confidence." According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians who died during the cleansing of the village was 112-114 people.

One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as now the militants occupied the dominant heights above the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.

30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The blows of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Also, as in the plains, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, drove trucks into the territory of the Stavropol Territory and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The building of the GOVD became the first object of attack, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, about 2,000 hostages were in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiating with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Because of the leak of information, the terrorists had time to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; as a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except the main one), releasing 95 hostages. Spetsnaz losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees of law enforcement agencies) and 415 wounded, the losses of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded

32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to June 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but not as members of illegal armed groups, but as "self-defense units." There were local battles throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions could be resolved through negotiations. So, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militants were in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their positions, because, according to them, these were "self-defense units" that had the right to be in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was launched on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, it took Russian troops about a week of “cleansing operations” to finally take Gudermes under their control.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, having received over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all military personnel of the UGV participated in the elections.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar. Initially, the goal of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the soldiers guarding the base. The Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to pull up to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiment in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations were held from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship with threats to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 78 people dead and several hundred wounded.

On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when withdrawing, took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. The losses of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing column of the vehicle, thus the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment was installed for the bearing of a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev's motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the aircraft reached the target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation

37. Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of the forthcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided once again to negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the abolition of military duty.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaykhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2,000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not set out to capture the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at roadblocks and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.

Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the building of the commandant's office).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya has again become de facto independent, but de jure unrecognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to the former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). An interwar crisis began in the republic and the growth of Wahhabism, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

43. According to data released by the headquarters of the United Forces, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing / deserted / captured, 19,794 wounded

44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of dead soldiers).

45. However, it should be taken into account that the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers include only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract servicemen, special unit soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen divisions (later the President of the CRI) A.Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the HRC "Memorial", the losses of militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

46. ​​On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of “Memorial” (later called the “Mission of public organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). The Kovalev Mission did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial Human Rights Center.

47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen fighters and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn on the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being at the headquarters of Dzhokhar Dudayev among the militants, “almost all the time was in the basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tankmen “a way out of the city without firing if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

48. According to the Institute of Human Rights headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev's entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, "because of his "one-sided position" aimed at justifying illegal armed groups." In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, "for his statements against the war in Chechnya"

49. Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothes and plastic covers in the first months. In February 1995, out of the 120,000 inhabitants remaining in Grozny, 70,000 thousand were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewerage system was completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily set about organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, about 750,000 liters of chlorinated water per day, to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents, was delivered by tank trucks to 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for the inhabitants of the North Caucasus.

51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of assistance programs for the victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters on Red Cross letterhead, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contact with each other, so as all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the rehabilitation and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoi, provided regular assistance to nursing homes and orphanages shelters.