The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky, decided to destroy the German groups, starting with the largest one, concentrated around the Heilsberg fortified area.

On February 10, 1945, the 3rd Belorussian Front, without an operational pause, began an operation to destroy German troops southwest of Koenigsberg. The campaign was called the Hejlsberg front-line operation.

The general idea of ​​the operation was as follows. The 5th Guards Tank Army was to advance along the Frisch gaff in order to prevent the retreat of the Heilsber group to the Frische-Nerung Spit (Baltic / Vistula Spit), and also to exclude the evacuation of German troops by sea. The main forces of the front were to advance in the general direction of Heiligenbeil (Mamonovo) and the city of Deutsch-Thirau.

From the very first days of the operation, the offensive developed extremely slowly.. The reason for this was immediately many factors: the stretching of the rear, the short time for preparing the offensive, the extremely dense defense of the enemy, besides, bad weather did not allow the use of aviation. About 20 German divisions resisted our troops here, gradually squeezing the encirclement. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were supported by the aviation of the 1st Air Army.

The 28th Army achieved the greatest success, which, in cooperation with the 2nd Guards Army, was able to capture a large defensive stronghold and an important transport hub - the city of Preussish-Eylau (Bagrationovskoye). But this did not change the overall picture. The pace of advance did not exceed 2 kilometers per day.

The troops of the front, breaking open one defensive line, immediately stumbled upon the next. The Heilsberg fortified area had only more than 900 reinforced concrete firing points.

Particularly fierce battles unfolded for the transport hub and the powerful stronghold of the defense of the city of Melzak (Penenzhno). The assault on the city lasted four days. It was only on February 17 that Melzak was captured..

The difficult situation and the heavily developing offensive required the front commander to be continuously at the forefront. On February 18, 1945, Chernyakhovsky, following from the headquarters of the 5th Army to the 3rd Army, came under artillery fire and was mortally wounded. The country has lost one of the most talented commanders of its time. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky was only 38 years old.

The commander was buried in Vilnius. On the same day, 24 artillery volleys from 124 guns thundered over Moscow, giving the last military honor to Ivan Danilovich. In memory of the famous general, the city of Insterburg was later renamed Chernyakhovsk.

Vasilevsky replaced Chernyakhovsky as front commander.

No less difficult was the development of events in the zone of action of the 1st Baltic Front. Bagramyan's troops were preparing to begin an operation to destroy the Zemland and Koenigsberg enemy groups, but about a day before the start of the operation, the Germans delivered a powerful deblocking blow and restored the connection between the Koenigsberg garrison and the Zemland group. All this, together with the ensuing mudslide and extremely bad weather, forced Vasilevsky to suspend the offensive. It was also decided to dissolve the 1st Baltic Front and reassign its armies to the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Careful preparations began for the operation to completely defeat the troops in East Prussia.

On March 13, the 3rd Belorussian Front resumed offensive operations against enemy troops blockaded southwest of Koenigsberg. The operation was resumed after a 40-minute artillery preparation, at the initial stage it was not possible to connect aircraft, the weather did not allow it. But, despite all the difficulties and the stubborn resistance of the German troops, the defense was broken through.

By mid-March, our troops came close to the city of Deutsch-Thirau. The enemy desperately resisted, the battles were stubborn. Ahead of the advancing troops was a tank company of the Guard Lieutenant Ivan Ladushkin.

On the approach to the city, the enemy organized a well-planned defense: to the right of the road at a dominant height were four anti-tank defense batteries on direct fire, to the left in the forest three self-propelled guns and two anti-tank guns were camouflaged. It was impossible to get around the height because of the heavily swampy terrain around it. It remained only to knock the enemy out of the forest and from a height. The outcome of the subsequent operation depended on how Ladushkin's company would solve this problem. The lieutenant decided to take advantage of the predawn darkness in order to get as close as possible to the German positions and hit for sure. At dawn on March 16, the company went on a breakthrough. The commander's tank went ahead. An armor-piercing shell set fire to his car, but the lieutenant moved into another car and moved further into the depths of the enemy defenses. His tank at full speed ironed the positions of the Germans, crushing two guns with their tracks along with the calculations, but this tank was also hit and Lieutenant Ladushkin died a heroic death in a burning car.

The death of the commander did not stop the tanks of his company moving behind. In this battle, they destroyed 70 enemy soldiers, one self-propelled and 15 anti-tank guns. About a hundred Nazis stood in different places on the battlefield with their hands up. A few days later, another city was taken - Ludwigsort. In 1946, the city of Ludwigsort was renamed the city of Ladushkin in honor of the Hero Soviet Union Guard Lieutenant Ivan Martynovich Ladushkin.

In the winter of 1945, a large-scale offensive of the Soviet Union was carried out along the entire front. The troops delivered powerful blows in all directions. The command was carried out by Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Chernyakhovsky, as well as Ivan Bagramyan and Vladimir Tributs. Their armies faced the most important tactical and strategic task.

On January 13, the famous East Prussian operation of 1945 began. The goal was simple - to suppress and destroy the remaining German groups in and northern Poland in order to open the road to Berlin. In general, the task was extremely important, not only in the light of the liquidation of the remnants of resistance. Today it is generally accepted that the Germans had already been practically defeated by that time. This is not true.

Important prerequisites for the operation

Firstly, East Prussia was a powerful defensive line, which could quite successfully fight back for many months, giving the Germans time to lick their wounds. Secondly, high-ranking German officers could use any respite to physically eliminate Hitler and start negotiations with our "allies" (there is a lot of evidence of such plans). None of these scenarios could be allowed. The enemy had to be dealt with quickly and decisively.

Region Features

The very eastern tip of Prussia was a very dangerous region, which had a developed network highways and many airfields, which made it possible to transfer a huge number of troops and heavy weapons through it in the shortest possible time. This area seems to have been created by nature itself for a long defense. There are many lakes, rivers and marshes here, which greatly complicate offensive operations and force the enemy to follow the targeted and fortified "corridors".

Perhaps the offensive operations of the Red Army outside the Soviet Union have not yet been so complicated. Since the time of the Teutonic Order, this territory has been full of many of which were very powerful. Immediately after 1943, when the course of the war of 1941-1945 was turned at Kursk, the Germans for the first time felt the possibility of their defeat. The entire able-bodied population and a huge number of prisoners were thrown to work to strengthen these lines. In a word, the Nazis prepared well.

Failure is the harbinger of victory

In general, the winter offensive was not the first, just as the East Prussian operation itself was not the first. 1945 only continued what was started by the troops in October 1944, when Soviet soldiers were able to advance about a hundred kilometers deep into the fortified areas. Due to the strong resistance of the Germans, it was not possible to go further.

However, it is difficult to consider it a failure. First, a reliable foothold was created. Secondly, the armies and commanders gained invaluable experience and were able to feel some of the weaknesses of the enemy. In addition, the very fact that the seizure of German lands had begun had an extremely depressing effect on the Nazis (although not always).

Wehrmacht forces

The defense was held by Army Group Center, commanded by Georg Reinhardt. In service there were: the entire third tank army of Erhard Raus, the formations of Friedrich Hossbach, as well as Walter Weiss.

Our troops were opposed immediately by 41 divisions, as well as a large number of detachments recruited from the most defensively capable members of the local Volkssturm. In total, the Germans had at least 580,000 regular soldiers, as well as about 200,000 Volkssturm troops. The Nazis pulled up 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 500 combat aircraft and about 8.5 thousand large-caliber mortars to the defensive lines.

Of course history Patriotic War 1941-1945 she also knew more combat-ready German formations, but the area was extremely convenient for defense, and therefore such forces were quite enough.

The German command decided that the region should be held, regardless of the number of losses. This was fully justified, since Prussia was an ideal springboard for the further offensive of the Soviet troops. On the contrary, if the Germans managed to retake the previously captured areas, this would allow them to attempt a counteroffensive. In any case, the resources of this area would make it possible to prolong the agony of Germany.

What kind of forces did the Soviet command, which planned the East Prussian operation of 1945, have at its disposal?

Forces of the USSR

However, military historians of all countries believe that the Nazis, battered in battles, had no chance. The Soviet military leaders fully took into account the failures of the first assault, in which the forces of the Third Belorussian Front alone took part. In this case, it was decided to use the forces of an entire tank army, five tank corps, two air armies, which, in addition, were strengthened by the 2nd Belorussian Front.

In addition, the offensive was to be supported by the aviation of the First Baltic Front. In total, more than one and a half million people, more than 20 thousand guns and large-caliber mortars, about four thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as at least three thousand aircraft were involved in the operation. If we recall the events of the Great Patriotic War, then the assault on East Prussia will be among the most significant.

Thus, our troops (excluding the militia) outnumbered the Germans three times in terms of people, 2.5 times in artillery, and almost 4.5 times in tanks and aircraft. In the breakthrough areas, the advantage was even more overwhelming. In addition, Soviet soldiers were fired upon, powerful IS-2 tanks, self-propelled guns ISU-152/122/100 appeared in the troops, so there was no doubt about victory. However, as in high losses, since the natives of Prussia were specially sent to the ranks of the Wehrmacht in this area, who fought desperately to the last.

The main course of the operation

So how did the East Prussian operation of 1945 begin? On January 13, an offensive was launched, which was supported by tank and air strikes. Other troops supported the attack. It should be noted that the beginning was not the most inspiring, quick success did not happen.

Firstly, D-Day could not be kept secret. The Germans managed to take pre-emptive measures, pulling the maximum possible number of troops to the proposed breakthrough site. Secondly, the weather failed, which did not contribute to the use of aviation and artillery. Rokossovsky later recalled that the weather resembled a solid piece of damp fog, sprinkled with thick snow. Air sorties were only targeted: full support for the advancing troops did not work. Even the bombers sat idle all day, as it was simply impossible to see the positions of the enemy.

Such events of the Great Patriotic War were not uncommon. They often broke carefully thought-out staff directives and promised additional losses.

"General Mist"

The gunners also had a hard time: visibility was so poor that it was impossible to adjust the fire, and therefore they had to shoot exclusively with direct fire at 150-200 meters. The fog was so thick that even the sounds of explosions were lost in this "porridge", and the targets being hit were not visible at all.

Of course, all this had a negative impact on the pace of the offensive. The German infantry on the second and third lines of defense did not suffer serious losses and continued to fiercely snarl with fire. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out in many places, and in a number of cases the enemy went over to the counteroffensive. Many settlements changed hands ten times a day. Extremely bad weather lasted for several days, during which the Soviet infantrymen continued to methodically break the German defenses.

In general, Soviet offensive operations during this period were already characterized by careful artillery preparation and extensive use of aviation and armored vehicles. The events of those days were in no way inferior to the battles of 1942-1943, when the brunt of the fighting was borne by ordinary infantry.

The Soviet Army acted successfully: on January 18, Chernyakhovsky's troops were able to break through the defenses and create a corridor 65 kilometers wide, deepening into enemy positions immediately for 40 kilometers. By this time, the weather had stabilized, and therefore heavy armored vehicles poured into the gap, supported from the air by attack aircraft and fighters. Thus began a large-scale offensive of the (Soviet) troops.

Consolidation of success

On January 19, Tilsit was taken. To do this, we had to cross the Neman. Until January 22, the Instersburg grouping was completely blocked. Despite this, the Germans fiercely resisted, the fighting was protracted. Only on the outskirts of Gumbinnen our fighters immediately repulsed ten massive counterattacks of the enemy. Ours survived, and the city fell. Already on January 22, Insterburg was taken.

The next two days brought new successes: it was possible to break through the defensive fortifications of the Hejlsberg region. By January 26, our troops approached the northern tip of Königsberg. But the assault on Koenigsberg then failed, because a strong German garrison and five of their relatively fresh divisions settled in the city.

The first stage of the hardest offensive was successfully completed. However, the success was partial, because our troops failed to encircle and destroy two tank corps: the enemy armored vehicles retreated to pre-prepared defensive lines.

Civilians

At first, our soldiers did not meet civilians here at all. The Germans hastily fled, as those who remained were declared traitors and often shot by their own. The evacuation was so poorly organized that almost all the property was left in abandoned houses. Our veterans recall that East Prussia in 1945 was more like an extinct desert: they had a chance to relax in fully furnished houses, where there were still dishes and food on the tables, but the Germans themselves were no longer there.

Ultimately, the tales of "wild and bloodthirsty barbarians from the East" played a bad joke on Goebbels: the civilian population left their homes in such a panic that they completely loaded all rail and road traffic, as a result of which the German troops were constrained and could not quickly change their positions.

Offensive development

The troops commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky were preparing to reach the Vistula. At the same time, an order came from the Headquarters to change the vector of attack and shift the main efforts to the speedy finishing off of the East Prussian enemy grouping. The troops had to turn north. But even without support, the remaining groups of troops successfully cleared enemy cities.

So, Oslikovsky's cavalry managed to break into Allenstein and completely defeated the enemy garrison. The city fell on January 22, and all the fortified areas in its suburbs were destroyed. Immediately after that, large German groups were under the threat of encirclement, and therefore began to hastily retreat. At the same time, their retreat went at a snail's pace, since all roads were blocked by refugees. Because of this, the Germans suffered heavy losses and were massively captured. By January 26, Soviet armored vehicles completely blocked Elbing.

At this time, Fedyuninsky's troops broke through to Elbing itself, and also reached the approaches to Marienburg, capturing a large bridgehead on the right bank of the Vistula for the subsequent decisive thrust. On January 26, after a powerful artillery strike, Marienburg fell.

The flank detachments of the troops also successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them. The region of the Masurian swamps was quickly overcome, it was possible to cross the Vistula on the move, after which the 70th Army broke into Bydgoszcz on January 23, blocking Torun along the way.

German throws

As a result of all this, Army Group Center was completely cut off from supplies and lost contact with German territory. Hitler was furious, after which he replaced the commander of the group. Lothar Rendulic was appointed to this position. Soon the same fate befell the commander of the fourth army, Hossbach, who was changed to Müller.

In an effort to break the blockade and restore land supplies, the Germans organized a counteroffensive in the Hejlsberg area, trying to get into Marienburg. In total, eight divisions participated in this operation at once, and one of them was tank. On the night of January 27, they succeeded in significantly pressing the forces of our 48th Army. A stubborn battle ensued, lasting four days in a row. As a result, the enemy managed to break through 50 kilometers deep into our positions. But then Marshal Rokossovsky came: after a massive blow, the Germans faltered and rolled back to their previous positions.

Finally, by January 28, the Baltic Front completely took Klaipeda, finally liberating Lithuania from the Nazi troops.

The main results of the offensive

By the end of January, most of the Zemland Peninsula was completely occupied, as a result of which the future Kaliningrad ended up in a semicircle. The disparate parts of the third and fourth armies were completely surrounded, which turned out to be doomed. They had to fight simultaneously on several fronts, with all their might defending the last strongholds on the coast, through which the German command still somehow brought supplies and carried out the evacuation.

The position of the remaining forces was greatly complicated by the fact that all the groupings of the Wehrmacht's armies were cut into three parts at once. On the Zemland Peninsula were the remnants of four divisions, in Königsberg there was a powerful garrison and an additional five divisions. At least five almost defeated divisions were on the Braunsberg-Hejlsberg line, and they were pressed to the sea and did not have the opportunity to attack. However, they had nothing to lose and they were not going to give up.

Long-term plans of the enemy

You should not consider them devoted fanatics of Hitler: they had a plan providing for the defense of Königsberg, followed by pulling all the surviving units to the city. If successful, they would be able to restore land communication along the Königsberg-Brandenburg line. In general, the battle was far from over, the tired Soviet armies needed a breather and replenishment of supplies. The degree of their exhaustion in fierce battles is evidenced by at least the fact that the final assault on Koenigsberg began only on April 8-9.

The main task of our soldiers was completed: they were able to defeat the powerful central enemy grouping. All powerful German defensive lines were broken and captured, Königsberg was in a dead siege without the supply of ammunition and food, and all the remaining Nazi troops in the area were completely isolated from each other and severely exhausted in battles. Most of East Prussia, with its most powerful defensive lines, was captured. Along the way, the soldiers of the Soviet Army liberated the regions of Northern Poland.

Other operations to eliminate the remnants of the Nazis were assigned to the armies of the Third Belorussian and First Baltic Fronts. Note that the 2 Belorussian Front was concentrated in the Pomeranian direction. The fact is that during the offensive between the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky a wide gap was formed, into which they could strike from Eastern Pomerania. Therefore, all subsequent efforts were aimed at coordinating their joint strikes.

Abandoned in East Prussia self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshyuts".

The new tactics, of course, did not cancel the traditional means of defense. These included, in particular, mobile reserves. However, East Prussia did not escape the general trend towards the withdrawal of tank formations to fight for Hungary. Since Christmas 1944, Hungary has become just the Fuhrer's "fixed idea". The 4th SS Panzer Corps Gille was sent there from Warsaw, and the 20th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the 3rd Panzer Army of Raus. At the same time, it should be noted that Routh exaggerates somewhat, assessing the capabilities of his troops. Thus, he states: "In East Prussia in January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Army had only 50 tanks and about 400 artillery pieces with a complete lack of air support." At 50 tanks, he estimates the number of vehicles transferred to him shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive by the 5th Panzer Division. In fact, on January 1, 1945, the 5th Panzer Division consisted of 32 Pz.IV (+1 in short-term repairs), 40 Pz.V "Panther" (+7), 25 Pz.Jag.IV (+7), 310 APC (+25) and 9 self-propelled anti-tank guns. The number of personnel of the division (more than 15 thousand people) almost completely corresponded to the state. The combat readiness of the 5th Panzer Division was rated at the highest score - "I". This meant that it was suitable for any offensive action, not to mention defense. Prior to that, it was in the reserve of the 4th Army, and it is not clear why its combat effectiveness should have noticeably decreased during the period of an obvious lull on the front in early January 1945. The 20th Panzer Division, previously listed in the Routh reserve, had a combat capability rating of "II / I ”, i.e. slightly below the newly arrived replacement.

Routh's groans about the "total absence" of air support are also not very convincing. The German 6th Air Fleet, responsible for East Prussia and Poland, had 822 combat-ready aircraft on January 10, 1945, more than any other air fleet in Eastern Front. Directly in the strip of the 3rd tank army of Raus in Insterburg, the III group of the 51st fighter squadron "Melders" was stationed - 38 (29 combat-ready) Bf109G on January 10, 1945. Also in East Prussia in January, units of the 3rd squadron of attack aircraft SchG3 were based.

In general, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army is very disingenuous in assessing the real defensive capabilities of his troops. In addition to the 5th Panzer Division, the 2nd Parachute Panzergrenadier Division "Hermann Goering" with 29 "Sturmgeshyuts" was subordinate to him. In general, in contrast to the beginning of the war, when the bulk of armored vehicles were concentrated in tank divisions, the final period of the war was characterized by its distribution among formations of all types. That is, tanks and self-propelled guns were distributed in 1945 among infantry, tank and motorized divisions, as well as individual units and formations. The “separate units and formations” primarily include the brigades of the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns (see table). These brigades were attached to infantry divisions operating in key areas of defense and offensive. Unlike the most common Soviet SU-76 self-propelled guns, the German Sturmgeshütz were a dangerous opponent for any Soviet tank. Basically, in 1945, in the ranks of the Shtug brigades and divisions, there were self-propelled guns with a 48-caliber 75-mm gun.

table

As we can see, accounting for assault gun brigades immediately gives us more than 100 armored units in the 3rd Panzer Army. In addition, since 1944, the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns were included in the Wehrmacht infantry divisions. So, in the 1st Infantry Division, which was in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd Belorussian Front, there were 9 combat-ready StuGIIIs and another self-propelled guns were under repair. In total, in the formations subordinate to Raus, 213 Sturmgenshütz self-propelled guns of all types (StuGIII, StuGIV and StuH) were listed as combat-ready on 12/30/44 or 01/15/45. In a word, the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Army frankly comes down when he talks about the means he had to counter the Soviet offensive. The defending German units had quite numerous, strong and hardly vulnerable to artillery anti-tank weapons.

2nd Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, consisting of seven combined arms armies, one tank army, one mechanized, two tank and one cavalry corps and one air army, received the task by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944. - On the 11th day of the offensive, take control of the Myshinets, Willenberg, Naydenburg, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Bielsk, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg.

The front delivered the main blow from the Rozhany bridgehead with the forces of four combined arms armies, one tank army, one tank and one mechanized corps in the general direction to Pshasnysh, Mlava, Lidzbark. The supply of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front from the north was supposed to be carried out by the offensive of one combined arms army on Myshinets.

The front was to strike the second blow with the forces of two combined arms armies and one tank corps from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In order to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping, the 2nd Belorussian Front was tasked with part of its forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

In eight armies and front-line units of the 2nd Belorussian Front, there were 665,340 people by the beginning of the operation. Taking into account the rear units and institutions, as well as the Air Force, the number of Rokossovsky's troops was 881,500 people. 1186 tanks and 789 self-propelled guns were subordinate to the front, including 257 tanks and 19 ° self-propelled guns in the 5th Guards Tank Army and 607 tanks and 151 self-propelled guns in tank, mechanized and cavalry corps of front subordination. The 2nd Belorussian Front had 6,051 guns of 76.2 mm and above, 2,088 anti-tank guns, 970 rocket artillery installations, and 5,911 mortars of 82 mm and 120 mm caliber.

The enemy of the 3rd Belorussian Front was the 2nd Army. Although it did not have the portly name "tank", its capabilities were quite comparable to the Routh army. Its mobile reserve was the 7th Panzer Division. It was not the strongest tank formation at that time. On January 1, it consisted of 27 PzIV, 28 Pz.V "Panther" and 249 armored personnel carriers. Also in the zone of the 2nd Army, the tank corps "Grossdeutschland" could be involved. His fate will be discussed below.

Traditionally for the Wehrmacht in 1945, a considerable amount of armored vehicles was concentrated in separate parts (see table).

table

In addition, Sturmgeshyuts self-propelled guns were in abundance in the composition of the infantry formations of the 2nd Army. So, in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 7th Infantry Division had 13 StuGIV. In total, the 2nd Army had 149 Sturmgeshuts self-propelled guns (in brigades and divisions of infantry divisions).

The operation began on January 13 with the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The next day, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive. Low cloud cover and dense fog in the first days of the operation did not allow the use of aircraft and reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire, which could not but affect the rate of penetration of the enemy's tactical defense zone. This was already almost commonplace for the operations of the Red Army in winter campaigns. With poor visibility, both the brilliant "Uranus" and the unsuccessful "Mars" began. However, in East Prussia the situation was almost the worst. According to the figurative expression of the commander of the 39th Army, I.I. Lyudnikov, then it was "nothing is visible beyond the gun barrel." The weather was favorable in only one respect - the frost-bound ground provided complete cross-country ability for tanks in almost any off-road terrain.

The assault on East Prussia by Chernyakhovsky's troops was preceded by several days of war of nerves. Raus recalled: “From Lvov’s experience, I knew that strong nerves and cold calculation were required in order not to tire our small troops with premature retreats and not suffer heavy losses from artillery fire if such an order was late. On January 11, we noticed a clear decrease in Russian combat activity, and troop movements were noticeably reduced. The soldiers of the 3rd Panzer Army were nervous, waiting for the order to withdraw, which would save them from the furious fire of enemy artillery, but I did not give this order.

The next day, January 12, seemed even more peaceful and calm. The war of nerves has reached its climax. Raus later wrote: “Our observers did not notice any signs that would allow us to determine the day the Red Army offensive began. On the other hand, radio interception data and reports from night reconnaissance aircraft left no doubt that large columns of Russian troops were moving towards concentration points, artillery batteries had taken up their positions, and tank units had advanced to their starting lines. Therefore, I decided on January 12 at 20.00 to transmit the code order "Winter Solstice", according to which the retreat began. The evacuation of the first two lines went quietly, and our troops took up combat positions. After 3 hours, General Mautsky (commander of the XXVI Corps) informed me that the movement was completed, he was at the new command post and the communication system was working normally. Information about the upcoming offensive and the time of its start also came from several defectors from the Soviet side. It is difficult to say what motivated these people in January 1945, when they moved towards the German trenches, but there were indeed such cases.

Tanks T-34-85 on the street of one of the cities of East Prussia.

Being almost certain that the Soviet offensive was about to begin, the Germans also carried out artillery counter-preparation. It was one of the few cases of counter-training during the entire war. Raus recalled: "I immediately gave the order to the artillery of the 3rd Panzer Army at 05.30 to open fire, concentrating it on the two main collection areas of the Soviet infantry." Soviet sources confirm this event. Commander of the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky recalled: “I hear the growing rumble of frequent artillery fire and the roar of close explosions. He looked at the dial - the fourth hour. Really preempted?! Some projectiles burst very close. This is guessed not only by the sounds, but also by the crimson flashes on the gray waves of fog. According to Galitsky, "as a result of a preemptive fire strike by the Germans, units of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army suffered some losses in the area of ​​Schilleningken, Schvirgallen."

The experience of the war was tracked on both sides of the front. The Soviet command knew about the possible withdrawal of the Germans from the advanced positions. Therefore, the offensive of the first echelons of the rifle corps of the 39th and 5th armies was preceded by the actions of the forward battalions. The battle of the advanced battalions, which began at 6.00 am on January 13, managed to establish that only insignificant enemy forces occupied the first trench, and its main forces were withdrawn to the second and third trenches. This information made it possible to make some amendments to the artillery preparation plan.

At 11.00, after artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks of the shock group of the front went on the offensive. It immediately became clear that the artillery did not decide the course of the battle. A significant part of the enemy's firepower remained unsuppressed. They had to be knocked out by means of the advancing infantry. Therefore, the offensive of the shock group of the front on the first day of the operation developed extremely slowly. By the end of the day, the troops of the 39th and 5th armies had captured only the second and partly the third trenches, wedged into the enemy defenses for 2–3 km. The offensive developed more successfully in the zone of the 28th Army. By the end of the day, the troops of General Luchinsky advanced up to 7 km, and only the 54th Guards Rifle Division broke through the main line of defense, although it did not complete the task of the day. On the first day of the offensive, not a single formation of the front's shock group completed the tasks laid down in the operation plan.

In positional battles, the causes of failure are most often hidden at the tactical level, in the plane of action of small subunits. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the events of the first day of fighting, descending to the tactical level. The 144th Rifle Division of the 5th Army received a breakthrough section 2 km wide. The depth of the task of the day for the division was six times greater - 12 km. The total number of personnel of the division on January 13 was 6545 people. The divisions were attached to the 81st separate heavy tank regiment(16 IS tanks) and the 953rd self-propelled artillery regiment (15 SU-76). The division was also assigned a company of minesweeper tanks. The average density of artillery in the breakthrough areas reached 225 guns and mortars and 18 NPP tanks per 1 km of the front.

The offensive of the division began on the morning of 13 January. After artillery preparation, which lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, the 81st tank and 953rd self-propelled artillery regiments began to attack from their original positions. With the approach of tanks and self-propelled guns to the advanced trenches, the 612th and 449th rifle regiments of the division went on the offensive. The 785th Rifle Regiment was in the second echelon.

At 11.00 battalions of the first echelon broke into the first trench on the move. Moving forward, parts of the division reached the second trench. It was covered from the front with barbed wire on low steel stakes, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. Here they met organized resistance from enemy infantry, as well as heavy artillery and mortar fire. The division's advance was delayed. During the battle, it was found that the enemy in the first trench had only cover (up to 1/3 of the forces), and on the night of January 13 he withdrew the main forces to the second trench. At the same time, it turned out that during the artillery preparation, manpower and firepower in the second trench were not sufficiently suppressed.

Raus wrote about these events: “Only at 10.00 (Berlin time) advanced enemy units approached the main combat position. All the guns of General Matzka fell upon them, as well as the Nebelwerfer brigade, and the Russian infantry lay down. Strictly speaking, "lay down" did not last long. The commander of the 144th division reported the situation to the corps commander and asked him to suppress enemy artillery in the zone and on the flanks of the division with the fire of the corps artillery group. Artillery was also ordered to unleash its power on enemy firing points in the second trench and the nearest depth. After artillery treatment of enemy firing points at the encountered enemy positions, the regiments of the first echelon resumed the offensive and broke into the second trench. Soon the third trench succumbed to the onslaught of the infantry. However, further artillery had to change positions and by 17.00 the advance stopped. The regiments of the first echelon of the 144th division, having prepared an attack in a limited time, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, attacked the second position of the enemy. However, they no longer had success, retreated to their original position and began to gain a foothold, conducting a firefight and reconnaissance of the enemy.

During the day, the 144th division managed to advance only 3 km in depth. The reason for the failure to complete the tasks was simple. The reconnaissance failed to reveal the withdrawal of the main enemy forces from the first trench, as a result of which the main efforts of the artillery were concentrated on the first trench. The commission of the headquarters of the 5th Army, which tested the effectiveness of artillery and mortar fire during the period of artillery preparation, established that the first trench of the enemy was subjected to the greatest fire impact. So, direct hits in the first trench fell through 50–70 m, and in the second trench they were noted as an exception - out of 14 targets to be destroyed (observation posts, dugouts, etc.), only four had one direct hit each.

From the very beginning, the operation plan provided for the continuation of hostilities at night. Long winter nights gave the Germans the opportunity to organize defense at a new frontier. In this regard, the corps commander ordered the commander of the 144th Infantry Division to capture the city of Kattenau during the night, located at a height dominating the surrounding area. This would set the stage for the second echelon of the corps to be brought into action the next morning. To capture Kattenau, the division commander decided to introduce his second echelon - the 785th rifle regiment. Preparations for a night attack were carried out in a hurry, tasks for units and subunits were set in the dark, mainly on the map. The interaction of infantry with artillery and neighbors was not clearly organized. The regiment of the second echelon did not reconnoiter the routes to the initial area for the attack in advance. The units of the regiment reached their starting positions late. Here they came under enemy artillery fire. Under fire, some commanders, including the regimental commander, were wounded and out of action. As a result, the attack of the 785th Infantry Regiment failed, and the regiment was withdrawn to the rear to be put in order. The division did not fulfill the task of capturing Kattenau.

Similar shortcomings were in other armies. The commander of the 39th Army, Lyudnikov, noted in his order: “Combat control in formations was organized according to a template, without taking into account the changed weather. In conditions of fog, instead of the maximum approach to the forward units, the controls broke away from them, there was no observation of the battlefield. Tanks and self-propelled artillery lagged behind the infantry and were not pushed through. Companies and battalions were not given the necessary amount of artillery for direct fire. As a result, firing points that interfered with movement were not suppressed.

Considering all this, the front commander demanded: “By the morning of January 14, 1945, to establish clear control at all levels and the interaction of all branches of the military. Command and observation posts of divisional and regimental commanders should be brought as close as possible to combat formations. Reinforce companies as much as possible with direct-fire escort guns. Have all sapper equipment in infantry combat formations and ensure proper guidance for them to quickly clear minefields.

Surrender of the remnants of the Allenstein garrison.

On the morning of January 14, the mobile reserve of the German 3rd Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Division, pulled up from the depths. Its units launched a series of strong counterattacks. As a result, the shock grouping of the front resumed the offensive only at 12.30. The intensified enemy fire and frequent counterattacks delayed the advance of the infantry, which led to its lagging behind the tanks and the slow pace of the offensive. Therefore, during the day of January 14, the strike force of the front advanced only 1–2 km.

The slow advance deprived the Soviet troops of the main advantage of the side with the initiative - the uncertainty of its plans for the defender. Having determined the direction of the main attack of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the German command began to withdraw its units from passive sectors and transfer them to the breakthrough sector. So, for example, units of the 56th Infantry Division were pulled up to the breakthrough site from the Schillenen area. During the preparation of the offensive, units of the 152nd UR covered themselves from it. Now the passivity of the UR allowed the Germans to freely withdraw troops from this area. From the Gumbinnen area, units of the 61st Infantry Division were brought up to the breakthrough site. In addition, brigades of assault guns and anti-tank artillery were traditionally transferred for the Germans.

Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and the experience gained by 1945 and the technique of warfare did their job. Overcoming enemy resistance, the front's strike force broke through the main line of defense by the end of January 15. During the three days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front only managed to break through the enemy's main line of defense and advance in depth from 6 to 10 km. At the same time, the enemy, at the expense of his reserves and units that had withdrawn from the main line of defense, managed to occupy the second line of defense (the Gumbinnen defensive line).

At 11.40 on January 16, the troops of the front resumed the offensive, but this time the enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. The progress was extremely slow. Fierce battles ensued for every house, for every section of the trench and strong point. Only by 13.00 the troops of the 5th Army captured the first trench of the Gumbinnen defensive line, but again met stubborn enemy resistance in front of the second trench. The Soviet infantry and tanks, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles and repulsing counterattacks, hardly moved forward. There was a clear threat that the offensive might stop, despite the fact that the enemy defenses were already thoroughly shaken. A new strong push was required, which would ensure a breakthrough of the weakened, but still retaining the ability to resist defense and would allow the second echelon (11th Guards Army and 1st Tank Corps) to be brought into battle. Chernyakhovsky decided to use the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeyny. It was a strong connection with strong traditions, a veteran of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration. General Burdeyny received an order to strike in the zone of the 5th Army. However, the advancing tanks met strong fire resistance from the enemy and started protracted battles with him, while suffering heavy losses. By the end of the day tank brigades the corps advanced only 1–1.5 km.

During the four days of the Soviet offensive, although the enemy's tactical defense zone was not broken through, the defenders suffered significant losses and exhausted their reserves. This circumstance forced the German command to decide on the withdrawal of the left wing of the XXVI Army Corps, which was defending the line south of the river. Neman. Thus, the length of the defensive line was reduced, and infantry units were released. They were supposed to be used against the shock group of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In addition, this section of the German defense was deeply outflanked by the penetration of the troops of the Soviet 39th Army.

The withdrawal of troops from a well-established line of defense is a complex maneuver that requires a lot of organizational work. Noticing the retreat of the enemy, the 39th Army immediately began to pursue. Also, the direction of introducing another reserve of Chernyakhovsky into battle was changed - the 1st tank corps of General V.V. Butkov. At first, they planned to throw him against the same line as Burdeiny's corps, that is, in the zone of the 5th army. Most likely, this would lead to senseless losses. Despite the often arising desire of commanders and commanders to bring into battle "one more battalion", after the impact of which the enemy's defense should collapse, most often these inputs resembled throwing fresh firewood into the stove. Instead, Butkov's tanks were brought into the flank and rear of the retreating XXVI German Corps in the zone of the 39th Army on the morning of January 18. The offensive developed successfully. A few hours later, the tanks crossed the Inster River and cut the Tilsit-Insterburg railway. On the night of January 19, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was deployed in the same direction.

The 39th Army, using the success of the 1st Tank Corps, accelerated its advance on January 18th. Having fought up to 20 km, she also went out with her main forces to the river. Inter. The troops of the 5th and 28th armies on that day advanced to a depth of 3 to 8 km. Aviation played its role in undermining the enemy's defenses. Since January 16, the weather has improved significantly. This made it possible to actively use the aviation of the 1st Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin, which made 3468 sorties on January 16 and 17. Routh noted with annoyance: “The threat became even more serious, as Russian aircraft appeared, and immediately in large quantities. They bombed cities, roads, command posts, artillery positions - in general, everything that only moved.

By the end of January 18, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as a result of six days of intense fighting, broke through the enemy defenses in the Königsberg direction north of Gumbinnen to a depth of 20-30 km and along the front up to 65 km. This created the conditions for the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army and the development of an offensive on Königsberg. This result was achieved only on the sixth day of the operation, while according to the plan of the front, the withdrawal of troops on the river. Inster was envisaged on the third day of the offensive.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive on January 14, a day later than their neighbor. Here the Germans could also use the above technique with a retreat to the second trench (position) described above. However, Rokossovsky had reason to believe that this would not happen. Later in his memoirs, he described the course of his thoughts as follows:

“It happened more than once before that the enemy, even before our artillery preparation, withdrew his troops into the depths so that we would use up ammunition in an empty place. Now he is unlikely to go for it. He has a strong position, replete with strongholds and permanent fortifications with forts, it is true, of the old type, but well adapted for defense. A voluntary withdrawal of the enemy from these positions would only make our task easier. And he, of course, will not dare to leave them. Well, we will pick out the Nazis from their concrete holes. We have enough strength."

However, the process of "picking out" was not easy. The reason for this, as on the 3rd Belorussian Front, was the fog brought from the Baltic. Front commander K.K. Rokossovsky recalled:

“On January 14, a few hours before the start of artillery preparation, I, members of the Military Council, commanders of artillery, armored forces, air army, and the head of the engineering troops of the front arrived at the observation post. It has already dawned, but nothing is visible: everything is hidden by a veil of fog and wet snow. The weather is disgusting, and the forecasters did not promise any improvement. And the time was approaching for the departure of bombers to strike at the enemy's defenses. After consulting with K.A. Vershinin (commander of the air army. - A.I.), I give the order to cancel all actions of aviation. Let the weather down! It’s good that we didn’t particularly count on it, although until the last hour we cherished the hope of using aviation.

At 10:00 a.m. artillery preparation began. Due to the thick fog, which limited visibility to 150-200 m, the results of artillery fire were not observed, and from aviation training the attack had to be abandoned. After a fifteen-minute fire raid on the forward edge and the most important objects in the tactical depth of the enemy's defense, the advanced battalions went on the attack. They quickly overcame the minefields and barbed wire of the enemy and broke into his first trench. By 1100 hours, the advanced battalions had captured the second line of trenches, and in some areas even the third.

At 11.25 am, the first-echelon rifle divisions, supported by artillery and in cooperation with tanks, went on the offensive. Due to poor observation conditions, a significant part of the enemy artillery and mortars was not suppressed. The advancing troops, overcoming the strong fire resistance of the enemy and suffering heavy losses, slowly moved forward. By the end of the day, the troops of the 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies, advancing from the Rozhany bridgehead, wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 to 6 km. The troops of the 65th and 70th armies, advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead, fought all day in the enemy's main line of defense. The advance of their troops into the depth of the enemy's defense did not exceed 3-5 km.

Unlike the Vistula bridgeheads, which were quickly "opened" on the same days by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, East Prussia stubbornly resisted the onslaught of the Soviet troops. In the front line of Rokossovsky, the strike groups did not fulfill the tasks set on the first day of the offensive, just like in his neighbor Chernyakhovsky. Instead of the advance rate of 10–12 km planned on the first day of the operation, the troops advanced only to a depth of 3–6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was not broken through in any of the offensive sectors. The slow pace of the offensive, as in the 3rd Belorussian Front, was due to a number of subjective and objective reasons. First of all, due to poor meteorological conditions, the front could not use its advantage in aviation, which on that day was completely inactive. Meteorological conditions also significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. The strengthening of the German defense with heavy tanks also played a role. At the junction of the 2nd shock and 48th armies, the fresh 507th battalion of heavy tanks operated, numbering 51 combat-ready "tigers" by the start of the fighting (namely, "tiger", not "King Tiger"). Two companies of this battalion supported the 7th Infantry Division, another company supported the 299th Infantry Division. The tankers of the 507th "tiger" battalion announced the destruction of 66 Soviet tanks in the first two days of fighting, without their losses. Knowing about the presence of "tigers" in the defending 507th battalion, to read the words in Rokossovsky's memoirs "strongly helped her (infantry. - A.I.) SU-76 self-propelled guns”, frankly, creepy. Also in the zone of the Soviet offensive, three brigades of "Sturmgeshyutsev" (190, 276 and 209th) operated.

The SU-76 convoy enters the streets of Mühlhausen. Only a few kilometers are left to the Frisch Gaff Bay.

The not too high rate of penetration of the defense forced Rokossovsky to resort to a tried and tested method - "breaking through" the enemy's defense with tank formations. The question of whether or not to use the success development echelon to break the defense was discussed at a meeting of the command staff of the Red Army in December 1940. It caused a lively discussion. During the war, each commander decided what to do according to the situation. I.S. Konev. In January, Rokossovsky followed his path. In order to speed up the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, by order of the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, on January 15, the 8th Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army) and the 1st Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone 65 th army). This was only the first step: from the morning of the next day, that is, on January 16, the 8th mechanized corps was brought into battle in the 48th Army zone. The corps were introduced into battle at a depth of about 5 km from the former front line in stripes up to 6 km wide.

The large mass of tanks was a strong argument. Overcoming enemy resistance, the 8th and 1st Guards Tank Corps, with their forward detachments, together with the infantry, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main line of defense on January 15, advancing to a depth of 5 to 8 km during the day of the battle.

However, by and large, the use of tank and mechanized corps was justified. The fact is that January 15 was also marked by the introduction of mobile defense reserves into battle. Fighting them only with close infantry support tanks would not be the best solution. More precisely, the German command launched its first reserve, the 7th Panzer Division, into counterattacks on January 14th. To the east of the city of Pshasnysh, on January 15, the German command used another of its mobile reserves - the tank-grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". It was an elite formation of the Wehrmacht, on January 10, the division consisted of 60 Panthers, 19 Tigers, 36 light and 189 medium armored personnel carriers. "Grossdeutschland" was also subordinated to a battalion of radio-controlled tankettes with 26 "Sturmgeshütz" as control vehicles. This division was the first of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps, the reserve of Army Group Centre. The introduction of other divisions of the corps could significantly complicate the conditions of the Soviet offensive.

However, the success of the 1st Belorussian Front still influenced its northern neighbor. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General Otto Heidkemper, wrote in his diary:

"January 15. At 3:00 am, General Wenck, by telephone from the army headquarters in Zossen, ordered me to immediately send the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps to Army Group A. I informed Wenck that the transfer of our last reserves would spell disaster. This means a breakthrough by the Russians of the defense of the 2nd Army, to which we will not be able to oppose anything. Wenk replied that a breakthrough had already taken place south of the Vistula and that this rapid release of reserves was more relevant there. I objected that in that case we should hold out here and the enemy would soon be bogged down in the south. But Wenck only became more restless and impatient. He said that there was no need to wake the commander (Army Group Center. - A.I. ), protests are meaningless, the movement is carried out on the personal orders of the Führer.

In the end, a compromise was made. As part of the Great Germany tank corps, two divisions went to the Lodz region to rescue the collapsed front. These were the Brandenburg Panzergrenadier Division (formed in the autumn of 1944) and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. Already involved in the battle, the division "Grossdeutschland" remained in East Prussia. However, in any case, the withdrawal of two mobile formations from the defenders of East Prussia was a serious blow to the defensive capabilities of Army Group Center. The counterattack of the “Great Germany” that was left alone was not successful, and in the future the division retreated to the north, conducting containment battles. The counterattacks of the 7th Panzer Division in the Ciechanów area were also unsuccessful.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front achieved their greatest success during January 16. On this day, they advanced 10–25 km, completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone. Moreover, the troops of the 2nd shock army captured a large enemy stronghold on the right bank of the river. Narew - the city of Pultusk, and the 65th Army captured the stronghold of Naselsk and cut the Ciechanow-Modlin railway.

The successful offensive of the ground forces on January 16 was facilitated by massive strikes by assault and bomber aircraft of the 4th Air Army of Colonel General of Aviation K.A. Vershinin. In connection with the improvement of the weather, the aviation of the front carried out more than 2,500 sorties that day and dropped about 1,800 tons of bombs.

Thus, as a result of three days of fighting, the troops of the front broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy on the front of 60 km and advanced to a depth of 30 km. The nearest operational reserves of the enemy were destroyed. All this created favorable conditions for the introduction of a tank army into the breakthrough and the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

By the time the enemy's tactical defense zone was breached, the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in a waiting area north of Vyshkow, having made a 150-kilometer march in two nights (January 14 and 15). Prior to that, she was quite far from the front, on the Bialystok meridian. This both kept its very presence secret, and misled the enemy as to the direction of its use. On the afternoon of January 16, Rokossovsky ordered the commander of the tank army, Colonel General of the Tank Forces V.T. Volsky to be ready on the morning of January 17 to send troops into a breakthrough in the 48th Army zone. The task of Volsky's army was to develop the offensive in the general direction of Mlawa, Lidzbark approximately along the axis of the Warsaw-Marienburg railway. The main forces of the tank army were supposed to reach the Mlawa region by the morning of January 18, and by the morning of January 19 to capture Naidenburg, Dzialdov.

At 12.00 on January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army began to enter the gap and at 15.00 at the turn of Zalese, Paluki passed the battle formations of the troops of the first echelon of the 48th Army. The entry of the tank army into the gap was provided by the assault aviation corps and artillery of the 48th army. From the point of view of the use of tank armies in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, this was an almost unprecedented move. Most often, tank armies were introduced not even into a breakthrough, but into battle. When entering the breakthrough, this happened on the second day of the operation at most. Here the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap only on the fourth day of the offensive.

Self-propelled guns SU-85 on the shore of the Frisch-Gaff Bay in Tolkemite. East Prussia is cut off.

Late entry into battle at the same time gave undoubted advantages. By the time the tank army advanced to the line of entry into the breakthrough, the 8th mechanized corps captured the Grudusk road junction and entrenched itself on it. The 8th Guards Tank Corps captured a large road junction Ciechanów and, in cooperation with the aviation division that supported it, tied up the enemy's 7th tank division in battle. Combined-arms formations of the 48th and 3rd armies advancing behind the 8th mechanized corps tied up "Great Germany" in battle. All this provided very favorable conditions for the actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which, without encountering serious resistance, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, advancing up to 60 km in the first day.

The powerful tank fist naturally created the conditions for the rapid advance of the combined arms armies of the Rokossovsky shock group. Having traveled 15 km in a day of fighting, the troops of the front captured large enemy points - the cities of Ciechanow and Nowe Miasto (15 km northwest of Nasielsk).

On January 18, continuing to develop the offensive in the Mlava direction, the main grouping of the front bypassed the Mlava fortified area from the north and south, and by the morning of January 19, tank troops, in cooperation with formations of the 48th Army, captured the city of Mlava. It was a city whose name is associated with one of the first battles of World War II. Long before the events described, in the first days of September 1939, German tank units suffered heavy losses in battles with Polish units that had settled in the fortifications of the Mlavsky UR. The Germans failed to repeat this battle, turning it 180 degrees. Mlava was taken quickly enough, and the German 2nd Army failed to cling to its fortifications.

Thus, by the end of January 18, the strike groups of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts completely broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and created conditions for the development of success in the directions of Königsberg and Marienburg. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 20 to 30 km and along the front up to 65 km, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - to a depth of 30 to 60 km and along the front up to 110 km. The average rate of breaking through the enemy defenses was: for the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - 3-5 km per day, and for the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - from 6 to 12 km per day. As we can see, the difference in rates is quite noticeable.

The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer fires a salvo with her main caliber.

The difficult conditions of the situation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who relied on heavily fortified terrain, caused relatively high losses among the advancing troops. So, for example, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front during the period of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy lost over 37 thousand killed and wounded; troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - more than 27,200 people. Absolute numbers should not be misleading. The average daily loss of people in the 2nd Belorussian Front reached almost 1.3% of the combat strength of the front. On the 3rd Belorussian Front, the situation was noticeably worse. Of the six combined arms armies, three armies (39th, 5th and 28th) advanced in the direction of the main attack. The average daily losses in these armies amounted to over 1.5% of their combat strength. The 5th Army suffered the greatest losses (12,769 men). Its average daily losses reached 2.2%.

Nevertheless, the defense of the German 2nd and 3rd tank armies was broken through. The enemy, having been defeated in the tactical defense zone in the directions of the main attacks of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts and having committed all available reserves into battle, began to withdraw. The commanders of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts took measures to organize and pursue the enemy in the Koenigsberg and Marienburg directions. The second stage of the operation began. The flight weather that had settled since January 19 allowed the aviation of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts to deploy more active fighting.

On the morning of January 19, the troops of the center and left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front proceeded to pursue the defeated 2nd German Army. The tanks and motorized infantry of the 5th Guards Tank Army, rushing north, reached Neidenburg by the end of the day and thus crossed the border of East Prussia. The troops of the 48th and 2nd shock armies also successfully pursued the enemy. On this day, their main forces advanced up to 30 km and reached the line of Dzyaldovo, Bezhun.

The situation was so favorable that opportunities opened up not only for tanks, but also for cavalry. Rokossovsky decided to use the success in the 48th Army's zone and introduce Oslikovsky's 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps into the gap in this direction. Based on the plan of the operation and the current situation, the corps was given the task of reaching the line of Willenberg, Neidenburg by January 20 and subsequently advancing on Allenstein. On the morning of January 19, the corps was introduced into the breakthrough. At 17.00 he captured Yanov and led the attack on Allenstein. Breaking away from the advanced units of the 3rd and 48th armies by 20-25 km, the corps significantly contributed to the success of these armies.

The 4th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. During January 19, she flew 1,820 bomber and attack aircraft sorties.

A particularly important role at this stage of operations was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. She was to be the first to go to the Frisch-Gaff Bay in the Elbing area and cut off all land communications of the East Prussian enemy grouping.

Fulfilling the assigned tasks, on January 20, the troops of the front seized the nodes of the highway and railways Niedenburg and Lidzbark. The 5th Guards Tank Army, after capturing Naidenburg, developed an offensive on Osterode. The troops of the left wing of the front advanced more than 40 km in a day, capturing the cities of Serpts, Belsk, Vyshogrud. The rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front led to the loss of the last trump cards by the Germans. From the composition of the 507th battalion of "tigers" during the retreat, 19 tanks were lost or even simply blown up by the crews due to breakdowns or lack of fuel. By January 21, out of 51 "tigers" by the beginning of the Soviet offensive, 29 vehicles remained in service. Soon, they also melted away in the chaos of the retreat - on January 30, only 7 tanks remained in service. Most of the lost tanks were abandoned or blown up during the withdrawal by their own crews.

Aviation of the 2nd Belorussian Front on January 20 also successfully supported the troops, making 1744 sorties per day.

As a result of the rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Elbing, and the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Koenigsberg directions, a situation was created in which the German 4th Army, which had previously operated in the Masurian Lakes region, was deeply engulfed from the flanks. The position of the 4th Army caused a heated discussion between the command of Army Group Center and the High Command. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center Geidkemper wrote in his diary:

"January 20th. The situation in which the 4th Army holds its forward position now looks completely absurd. At 8.30 pm the chief (commander of Army Group Center Georg Reinhardt. - A.I.) again explained to the Fuhrer the reasons that make the retreat of the 4th Army an urgent necessity. “My Fuhrer,” the chief began, “serious concern for East Prussia compels me to turn to you personally again. In my judgment, we must reckon with a large-scale attack on East Prussia. The captured map of the enemy shows that the Russian 5th Guards Tank Army with four tank corps is marching on Danzig. The forces of the 2nd Army that we can oppose to this are so weak that they cannot hold out. The second danger now is an enemy breakthrough in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army. If the Russian Guards Tank Army breaks through, we will be attacked in the rear, where there are no troops at all. Hitler's reply was lightning fast: "It is a long discussion whether the waste of power is released or not." He stayed with his mind."

As a result, the withdrawal of the 4th Army was again prohibited. In compensation, Hitler promised the command of Army Group Center the 4th Panzer Division, transported by sea from Courland. It was difficult to object to such a proposal - the mobile unit was obviously better than the infantry divisions released as a result of the withdrawal of the 4th Army. Later that day, Reinhardt approached Guderian with the same question of recusal, but was again refused. On January 21, everything happened again. This time, only Guderian fought off Reinhardt's insistent requests, persuading the commander of Army Group Center to follow Hitler's orders. The promised 4th Panzer Division had not yet arrived. However, her arrival could not radically change the situation. Only on the morning of January 22, during another conversation with Hitler, did Reinhardt manage to snatch permission to withdraw the 4th Army. From the lips of the Fuhrer, finally, the words "I give permission to withdraw ..." sounded.

According to Soviet data, the withdrawal of the 4th Army from the line of Gumbinnen, Augustow, Lomzha began already on the night of January 22. Perhaps the army commander Hossbach began to withdraw on his own initiative. The retreat of the enemy in a northwestern direction was timely detected by the reconnaissance of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Rokossovsky, with undisguised annoyance, wrote in his memoirs: “The command of the 50th Army did not notice this maneuver in time and continued to report to the front headquarters that the enemy was holding on tight. Only two days later, reconnaissance in force showed that there was an empty place in front of the army. The last small groups of Nazis hurriedly left to the north. Such an omission could not be forgiven the commander. The chief of staff, General F.P., took command of the 50th Army. Ozerov".

So he lost the post of commander I.V. Boldin, who in June 1941 was deputy commander of the Western Front. The exit from the Minsk "cauldron" made it a kind of "unsinkable" for a long time. Despite serious claims, in particular, from G.K. Zhukov, he retained his position. The omission with the withdrawal of Hossbach's army was the last straw. The untimely transition to persecution was not an empty formality. The stretching of the no longer existing front made Rokossovsky not use the 49th Army very rationally.

To ensure the withdrawal of the 4th Army, the enemy increased resistance on the offensive front of the Soviet 49th and 3rd armies. The troops of these two armies, overcoming the increased resistance of the enemy, advanced in a northerly direction. At the same time, on January 22, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the important Allenstein railway and highway junction. Rokossovsky wrote about this episode: “Our cavalry corps N.S. Oslikovsky, breaking ahead, flew into Allenstein (Olshtyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry formation!), Having stunned the enemy with the fire of guns and machine guns, the cavalrymen captured the echelons. It turns out that the German units were relocated from the east to close the gap made by our troops. Such use of the cavalry was possible due to the exit of the front's mobile formations from the web of the enemy's defensive positions into the operational space.

During January 23 and 24, the troops of the shock group of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued the rapid pursuit of the retreating enemy units. During these two days they moved forward 50–60 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army captured Mühlhausen and started fighting on the southwestern and southeastern outskirts of Elbing. Regarding the capture of the latter, Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs: “The troops could not capture Elbing on the move. A unit of our tanks that broke into the city was surrounded. Failed to rescue him. Tankers fought to the last shell, to the last bullet. They all died heroically. I.I. Fedyuninsky had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The fighting lasted for several days, until the 2nd shock captured the city.

On January 25, the mobile formations of the strike group of the front approached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. On the left wing of the front, the troops of the 70th Army reached the eastern outskirts of the fortress city of Thorn. The enemy acting in front of the 70th Army began to withdraw his troops behind the Vistula.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Frisch-Gaff Bay, the main communications of Army Group Center (3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army and XX Army Corps of the 2nd Army) were cut. However, the enemy still had the opportunity to communicate with his troops, who had retreated beyond the river. Vistula, by sea - through the Danzig Bay and along the Frisch-Nerung Spit.

On January 26, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front cleared the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay from the enemy, occupied the city of Marienburg, and on the left wing, blocking Thorn, crossed the Vistula and captured a bridgehead on its western bank. On January 26, Army Group Center was reorganized into two groups: Army Group North, consisting of the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army, and Army Group Vistula, which included formations of the 2nd Army. Accordingly, Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. On the same day, January 26, both the commander of the newly minted Army Group North, Reinhardt, and his chief of staff Geidgemper, received their resignations. These positions were surrendered to Colonel General Lothar Rendulic and Major General Natzmer respectively. The Austrian Rendulich was one of the generals who enjoyed Hitler's unconditional confidence. The commander of the 4th Army, General of the Infantry Hossbach, was also removed, he was replaced by General of the Infantry Wilhelm Müller. He was destined to become the last commander of the 4th Army.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the coast of the Baltic Sea, to the Vistula and the capture of the city of Marienburg, the task assigned to the troops of the front by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944 was completed. front advanced on the right wing by 50-60 km, in the center and on the left wing - by 150-170 km. In the direction of operations of the main grouping of the front, the average rate of advance per day reached 18–20 km.

While the strike force of the 2nd Belorussian Front was developing an offensive to the northwest, to the Frisch-Gaff Bay and the river. Vistula, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front continued their offensive in the Koenigsberg direction. The troops of the 39th Army had the greatest advance during January 19. The depth of advance that day reached 12–25 km. The neighbors of the 39th Army in the strike force of the front were much less successful. The troops of the 5th Army, fighting heavy battles, moved forward by 6-7 km, and the troops of the 28th Army during the day managed to push the enemy by only 1-2 km.

Despite the fact that the plan of the operation went "peddling", the situation clearly required the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky. It could be introduced according to the original plan of operation at the junction of the 5th and 28th armies and used to complete the breakthrough of the German defenses in the previously chosen direction. The second option was to use the success achieved on the left flank of the 39th Army. At first, the front commander was in favor of the first option, since Galitsky's army, in essence, had already concentrated on the previously chosen direction.

Galitsky later recalled his conversation with Chernyakhovsky:

“The situation has changed significantly over the four days of fighting,” I reported to the commander. - Where the introduction of our army was planned, the troops of the first echelon of the front achieved limited success. We'll have to break through the defense. I'm afraid we'll get bogged down, we'll waste our strength here, and the enemy, taking advantage of this, will bring up new troops and we will not achieve high rates of advance, as happened with the introduction of the 28th Army in October last year.

I proposed to introduce the army into the breakthrough according to the second option, i.e., 20–25 km to the north, at the junction between the 5th and 39th armies, especially since there was a serious success on the left flank of the latter - the enemy began to withdraw troops from Lazden ledge.

- Exactly, from the ledge, which is dangerous for him, you can end up in the "cauldron", - Chernyakhovsky remarked. - Where does he take him?

- Of course, to pre-prepared positions at the turn of the river. Inter, I replied. “But, according to some reports, these positions are much weaker than those that we will be forced to break through if we leave the task unchanged.”

The downside of this decision was the need to transfer army formations up to 50 km to the north. However, the advantages of the solution proposed by Galitsky outweighed the loss of time for this maneuver. As a result, Chernyakhovsky decided to introduce the 11th Guards Army on the left flank of the offensive zone of the 39th Army, from the turn of the river. Inter. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was also heading there. As a result, the task of the army of Galitsky became the coverage of the enemy’s still firmly held Insterburg grouping from the north and west, encirclement and destruction of it in cooperation with the rest of the forces of the front. It should be noted that at the same time, the 5th Panzer Division, which became the "reinforcement" of the German defense, was reinforced by the 505th "Tiger" battalion. It consisted of 36 combat-ready "Royal Tigers" on January 19. Their 88-mm long-barreled guns in the defense could cause a lot of trouble. On the contrary, bypassing and enveloping would cause the battalion to lose their monsters due to technical malfunctions.

The 11th Guards Army received the task of deploying to the west of the river by 0600 on January 19. Inster and by the end of January 20, take control of the Aulovenen, Neunishken line. In the future, the army had to develop an offensive on Velau.

The entry into battle of the 11th Guards Army began at 14.00 on January 20. Due to the fact that the enemy troops, shot down from the line of the river. Inster by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, continued to retreat, the divisions of the first echelon of the 11th Guards Army, without deploying their main forces, immediately began an energetic pursuit.

By the evening of January 21, the 11th Guards Army advanced up to 45 km and went out with left-flank formations to the near approaches to Insterburg, and with the troops of the right flank and center - to the Pregel River, covering the enemy's Insterburg grouping from the north and west. It should be noted that only part of the forces of Galitsky's army was deployed to Insterburg. The rest continued their advance to the west. At 23:00 on January 21, after twenty minutes of artillery preparation, the left flanks of the 11th Guards Army launched an assault on the city, and at 2:30 on January 22 broke into its streets. At the same time, the troops of the 5th Army also launched an offensive. At 04:00 they approached the city from the northeast, and then from the east, and at 06:00 on January 22, together with formations of the 11th Guards Army, captured Insterburg.

Having lost their well-established line of defense, the German command sought to delay the advance of the Soviet troops on the Daime and Alla rivers. To this end, the enemy began a general withdrawal of his forces in front of the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th, 2nd Guards armies and the 31st army went into pursuit. However, the attempts of the 3rd Panzer Army to hold on to the Daime and Alla rivers were unsuccessful. On January 23, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies crossed the river with part of the forces. Daime, captured bridgeheads on its western bank. It was not so difficult to do this - the river was ice-bound, and when bridgeheads were formed, the Soviet infantrymen simply ran across the Daime on the ice. It turned out to be more difficult to build bridges for heavy equipment. The muddy-bottomed creek proved to be a serious obstacle in itself. As the head of the engineering troops of the front, General Baranov, later reported: “When the first test tank was passed, the supports sat down due to the muddy soil, although the seven-meter piles were driven to a depth of six meters.” As a temporary solution, they even had to blow up the ice and launch ferries from the pontoon park. Nevertheless, the river was forced, and the offensive continued. In the following days, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th Armies crossed the river. Alla.

Having crossed these rivers, the troops of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive directly on Königsberg. On January 26, they approached the outer defensive contour of the fortified city. In the following days, the troops of the front fought to complete the encirclement of the Königsberg grouping of the enemy and break through the outer defensive bypass of the Königsberg fortress, after overcoming which our troops advanced to the forts of the first position, and in the south even captured one of the forts. On January 30, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, bypassing Koenigsberg from the south, cut the highway leading to Elbing.

As a result of the withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the areas northwest and south of Königsberg, the East Prussian grouping was cut into three parts. The troops of the front pressed four enemy divisions to the sea on the Zemland Peninsula, about five divisions, fortress units and big number individual units and subunits were actually cut off from the main forces and blocked in the Königsberg area, and, finally, the main forces of the East Prussian grouping in the Heilsberg fortified area south of Königsberg. The last grouping, which consisted mainly of units and formations of the 4th Army, is referred to in German sources as the Heilingibei "cauldron".

On January 28, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front captured the city of Memel, a large naval base and port in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. This made it possible to relocate part of the light forces of the Baltic Fleet here and to intensify the actions of the fleet to blockade both the Courland and East Prussian enemy groupings from the sea. However, the light forces of the fleet and submarines were involved for this. As a result, the coastal flank of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was periodically subjected to shelling from the sea. Moreover, with support from the sea, the Germans launched a counterattack to improve their position. Soviet air raids on the facilities of the Königsberg Sea Canal led to the fact that transport access to the harbor was impossible. Königsberg could only be supplied by sea through the port of Pillau on the Zemland Peninsula.

Accordingly, the German command attempted to restore communication between Pillau and Königsberg. To do this, a counterattack was launched in a south-western direction by the forces of the XXVIII Army Corps from the Kranz area. On January 29 and 30, the 2nd battle group of ships under the command of Vice Admiral A. Thiele was activated to support this counterattack. It included the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, destroyers Z25 and Paul Jacobi, destroyers T23 and T33. From the area of ​​​​the Nidden lighthouse, the Thiele group fired on the troops of the 39th Army. At the same time, German floating batteries, including SAT 15 (Polaris) and Zhost, fired at the tanks of our advanced units from the Königsberg Sea Canal.

With the support of the fleet, the Germans also carried out a second counterattack, connecting Königsberg with the Heilingibeyl "cauldron". From the direction of Königsberg, the battle group of the 5th Panzer Division attacked. From the direction of Brandenburg, units of the "Grossdeutschland" division advanced towards them. On January 31, the attackers linked up in the Heide area of ​​Waldenburg. However, this German success was fleeting. By February 6, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th armies again cut off Koenigsberg from the south, and the formations of the 43rd and 39th armies threw the enemy deep into the Zemland Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) maintained its relatively high activity off the coast of East Prussia. Non-flying weather contributed to impudence, bordering on impudence. So, on February 9, 1945, the heavy cruisers Lutzow and Admiral Scheer, escorted by destroyers Z34, Z38 and destroyers T8, T23, T28, T33, T35 and T36, fired at Soviet positions on the Zemland Peninsula. The limited space on which the German units pressed to the sea were squeezed made it possible to use the same ships in different directions. On February 9 and 10, 1945, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, the destroyer Z34 and the destroyers T23, T28 and T36 also supported the defense of the remnants of the 4th Army in the Heilingibeyl "boiler" with fire.

It should not be thought that the Baltic Fleet was simply idle. However, the losses of submarines in 1941-1942. and the lack of their full-fledged construction in besieged Leningrad significantly limited the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. What could the KBF oppose to German surface ships? On January 22, 1945, submarines L-3 (3rd rank captain V.K. Konovalov) and K-51 left Khanko. The second went to the area of ​​the Pomeranian Bay, and its actions are of no interest for our narrative. On January 31, L-3 received an order to take up a position at Cape Brewsterort, from where enemy ships had been shelling Soviet troops since January 29. The mobility of submarines of those years, frankly, left much to be desired. L-3 entered the new area only on February 2, after successfully breaking through the corridor between Königsberg and Zemland. The next day, the boat found the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer guarding the destroyer. However, shallow depths did not allow him to attack. Captain 3rd rank V.K. Konovalov decided to place mines on the probable withdrawal route of enemy ships, but only two mines came out of the mine tube. On February 4, the destroyers T28, T35 and T36 were discovered, which were firing along the coast. L-3 attacked them, but the fired torpedoes missed the target. Since the torpedoes were used up, the submarine headed for the base.

In fairness, it must be said that not all participants in the shelling from the sea could go unpunished. The floating battery "SAT 15" ("Polaris") was launched to the bottom by attack aircraft and bombers during a raid on February 5, 1945. A submarine, a patrol boat and a number of small ships were sunk by aviation in Pillau. It should also be noted that another submarine that was at sea at that time - S-13 of captain 3rd rank A.I. Marinesko - just on January 30, Wilhelm Gustlov successfully attacked. Of course, an attack by the Admiral Scheer in the Pillau area would have been more useful, but that was how fate turned out. The attention of the Soviet Navy was scattered between Danzig, Pillau and Liepaja (the main supply port for Army Group Courland).

In the last days of January, German troops sharply increased resistance on the outskirts of Königsberg. At the same time, the German command decided to push back the Soviet troops from the Frisch-Gaff Bay with strong counterattacks and provide land communications for their East Prussian grouping. To this end, in the area between Frisch Gaff and Wormditt, the enemy created comparatively strong strike groups. On the night of January 27, they launched a series of counterattacks against the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Three infantry and one panzer divisions launched a counterattack from the area east of Wormditt. To be precise, it was not a full tank division that participated in the counterattack, but the so-called battle group "von Einem" from the 24th Panzer Division, in fact a reinforced motorized infantry regiment. The von Einem group included only 14 Pz.IVs, 10 Pz.V Panthers and 10 JgPzIVs. The main forces of the 24th Panzer Division were at that time in Hungary. Another counterattack was delivered by two infantry divisions from the area southeast of Brownsburg. In addition, about two divisions of the Germans counterattacked Soviet troops west and southwest of Melzak.

Tanks T-34-85 in the suburbs of Koenigsberg.

It should be noted that at first the enemy achieved very serious successes. His troops managed to break through the extended battle formations of the 48th Army and by the middle of the day on January 27, advance to a depth of 15 to 20 km.

In order to prevent further advance of enemy groupings and restore the situation, Rokossovsky decided to regroup the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 8th Mechanized Corps into the 48th Army zone. The 8th Guards Tank Corps was sent from the front reserve against the German group advancing in the Wormditt area. By the rapid advance of these forces into the zone of the 48th Army, it was possible at first to stop, and then to defeat the enemy strike groups. By January 31, enemy formations were thrown back to their original position.

At that time, Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front was divided into two groups. One of them was advancing on the front to the west, to Pomerania. The second occupied positions with the front to the east, forming the western face of the "cauldron" for Army Group North in East Prussia. Full control of the troops in two different, moreover, gradually moving away from each other, groupings was impossible.

In the current situation, on February 9, 1945, the liquidation of enemy groupings in East Prussia was entrusted to the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. For ease of control, the 50th, 3rd, 48th combined-arms and 5th guards tank armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, operating on the Heilsberg, Wormditt, Frauenburg fronts, were transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front. In order not to turn the front into an uncontrollable monster, the 43rd, 39th and 11th Guards armies of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front were included in the 1st Baltic Front. The task of defeating the German troops in the area southwest of Königsberg was assigned to the 3rd Belorussian Front, and the troops of the 1st Baltic Front destroyed the Königsberg and Zemland groupings of the enemy.

Despite the fact that the troops of the two fronts faced a long and intense struggle against the blocked, but not lost combat capability, enemy, the main task of the East Prussian operation was completed. As Marshal Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs, “the Nazi command was almost completely deprived of the opportunity to strike from East Prussia against Soviet troops advancing in the Berlin direction ".

The elimination of enemy groupings in East Prussia, taking into account operational pauses, lasted two and a half months. One of the main reasons for this was that the Soviet troops and the Baltic Fleet failed to deprive the enemy groupings of all communications. For manoeuvring, the enemy could use the Danzig Bay with its ports, the Frisch-Nerung Spit, and the seaside highway running from Königsberg to Braunsberg.

The exhaustion of the Soviet troops also had a serious impact on the delay in the liquidation of the enemy. During the previous intense battles, which lasted about a month, a large number of divisions had a significant shortage in men and military equipment. Thus, the rifle divisions of some armies lost up to half of their personnel. Tank troops lost an average of up to 50% of combat vehicles. To this should be added the fact that the beginning of the spring thaw and bad meteorological conditions made it extremely difficult to use tanks and aircraft.

The liquidation of the enemy groupings pressed to the sea by the Soviet troops was carried out sequentially: first, the largest enemy grouping, the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, was defeated. This was followed by a blow to Königsberg itself. Finally, the enemy grouping on the Zemland Peninsula remained “for a snack”. The grouping of German troops, surrounded in the area to the south and southwest of Königsberg (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"), was the strongest. It consisted of fourteen infantry, two tank and one motorized divisions, two brigades, two divisional battle groups, two separate regiments, five separate battalions and several Volkssturm battalions.

To eliminate this grouping, the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided first to cut off and destroy the enemy defending the ledge in the area of ​​Preussish Aylau, Bartenstein, Landsberg, and continue the offensive in the general direction of Heiligenbeil. In accordance with this decision, the 28th Army attacked from the northeast on Preussish Aylau with the task, together with units of the 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, to capture this stronghold. From the south, in the general direction of Landsberg, the 31st Army was advancing, which was supposed to capture this city and develop an attack on Kanditten. The 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, was to cut through the enemy forces located in the ledge, liquidate them together with the 28th and 31st armies, and then advance on Augam. The 5th Army received the task of striking in the general direction of Tsinten.

On the morning of February 11, Chernyakhovsky ordered the armies that had newly entered the front to continue the offensive, striking in the directions: the 50th Army - on Kildenen; 3rd Army - to Melzak; The 48th Army was to reach the Melzak line and to the west, the 5th Guards Tank Army was tasked with continuing the offensive in the general direction of Braunsberg, capturing this stronghold and reaching the river. Passarguet.

The combat operations of the troops of the front to liquidate the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, which began on February 10, were extremely tense. The rate of advance varied from 1.5 to 5 km per day. All attempts by the Soviet troops in the following days to split the encircled grouping into pieces were unsuccessful. The significant forces of the 4th Army concentrated on a relatively small area allowed the German command to close the breakthrough areas in a timely manner. During the twelve days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced on the right flank from 15 to 20 km and in the center up to 60 km.

Vasilevsky recalled: “On the night of February 18, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, after my report on the state of affairs in East Prussia, recommended that I go there to help the troops and command, emphasizing that the fastest liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia would allow us, at the expense of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, firstly, to strengthen the main, Berlin, direction and, secondly, to release the necessary part of the troops to prepare them for their transfer to the Far East. As we can see, it was no longer about a possible counterattack by the Germans, but about the release of forces for the decisive battle for Berlin. East Prussia has become a kind of giant "festung". To be precise, there were even three such “festungs”: on the Zemland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heiliginbeil “cauldron”.

On February 18, on the battlefield in the Melzak region, he was mortally wounded and soon died the commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. On February 21, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. In order to unify the command of all forces located in East Prussia, the 1st Baltic Front was renamed the Zemland Group on February 24, which became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

By this time, the Soviet troops operating in East Prussia, due to losses, had a large shortage, especially in people. So, for example, in the 5th Army, the strength of rifle divisions did not exceed 2,700 people, and in the 2nd Guards Army - 2,500 people. In this regard, Vasilevsky suspended the offensive in order to replenish the troops with people, equipment and ammunition, and after that proceed to the final destruction of the encircled enemy grouping.

To accomplish this task, the front commander decided, firmly covering himself with the forces of the 48th Army from the side of Braunsberg, to launch simultaneous strikes from the east and southeast in the direction of Bladiau and Heiligenbeil in order to split the enemy forces and then destroy them. To do this, the armies were given the following tasks: the 11th Guards Army to strike in the direction of Brandenburg, the 5th Army - to Wolittnikk, the 28th Army - to Bladiau, the 2nd Guards Army - to Lenhefen, the 31st Army - to Bilskhefen, 3rd Army - to Heiligenbeil.

The armies were reinforced with artillery and tanks: the 5th and 28th armies - with an artillery division and three artillery brigades, the 3rd army - with five artillery and mortar brigades and three artillery regiments. Of the 594 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts that the front had by that time, 361 armored units were concentrated in the offensive zone of the 5th and 28th armies, and 150 armored units in the 3rd army zone. This ensured the density in the penetration areas of these armies up to 36 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

Both sides tried to use the period of relative calm to solve offensive tasks of a local nature. As early as February 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Baghramyan to clear the Zemland Peninsula from the enemy. The offensive was supposed to start on February 20. However, the day before the planned offensive, the troops of the Zemland task force, which was reinforced by the 93rd Infantry Division deployed from Courland by sea, counterattacked: from the west - to Königsberg and from the east - towards Pillau. From the Königsberg area, the same 5th Panzer Division attacked, supported by 10 "tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The offensive of the German troops from the sea was supported by the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, destroyers Z38, Z43, destroyers T28, T35. They fired at the troops of the 39th Army in the areas of Paise and Gross-Heidekrug on the southern coast of the Zemland Peninsula. On February 20, destroyers fired from the Koenigsberg Sea Canal, on February 23, two destroyers and a destroyer fired again at the positions of the Soviet troops. The submarine K-52 I.V., which was at that moment on a military campaign, Travkina was quite far away - in the area of ​​​​the Danzig Bay. In addition, the bulky "Katyusha" was not very suitable for attacks in shallow water. Smaller boat, Shch-309 captain of the 3rd rank P.P. Vetchinkina, on the same days was on her way to a position in the Liepaja region. Also, mines were laid in the Pillau area, the 8th mine-torpedo air division set up 12 mines here. However, their victims were not artillery ships, but the submarine U-367 (presumably).

As a result of three days of fighting, the enemy managed to push back units of the 39th Army from the coast of the bay and restore land communication between Pillau and Königsberg.

Preparations for the new operation took about 20 days. The offensive began on 13 March. After a 40-minute artillery preparation for the attack, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. Rains, fogs and the soil turned into mud greatly complicated the actions of all branches of the armed forces. Under these conditions, aviation could not operate, the possibilities for using artillery were extremely limited, and tanks could only advance along roads. And yet, despite the unfavorable conditions and fierce resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through its defenses in all main directions and slowly but surely moved forward.

Taking advantage of some improvement in the weather, our aviation took to the air on March 18 and, having made over 2,200 sorties in a day, contributed significantly to the success of the ground forces.

By March 19, the territory occupied by the enemy was reduced to 30 km along the front and 7-10 km in depth, and by March 24 it was 13 km along the front and 2-5 km in depth.

By the end of March 26, the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay was completely cleared of the enemy, and the largest center of resistance was eliminated. Only in the area of ​​​​Cape Kalholz did the remnants of the defeated German units linger, by March 29 they were liquidated by the troops of the 5th and 28th armies. During the February-March battles southwest of Königsberg, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front captured about 50 thousand people.

The consistent defeat of the encircled groupings also made it possible to consistently create a superiority in forces and means that guarantees success. Having completed the operation to eliminate the enemy's southern grouping, the Soviet command reinforced its troops operating near Königsberg and on the Zemland Peninsula with three armies (5th, 50th and 2nd Guards). With the concentration of the main efforts of the 3rd Belorussian Front against Koenigsberg and the Samland Peninsula, the need for the existence of the Zemland Group of Forces disappeared. The armies that were part of it were directly subordinate to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The management of the group was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

After the elimination of the enemy grouping in the area southwest of Koenigsberg, large forces of Soviet troops were released to solve other problems. The 31st, 3rd and 28th armies were withdrawn to the reserve, which then took part in Berlin operation. However, these armies, transferred after the battles in East Prussia, were by and large late for the battle for Berlin. In addition, the number of their rifle divisions was already quite low. The armies left to storm Königsberg did not take part in the battle for the German capital. The assault on this fortress city was accompanied by preparations for the Berlin operation.

The success of the East Prussian operation had a positive impact on the course of other operations of the 1945 campaign in Europe. In particular, cutting off the main forces of the Army Group Center from the rest of the German forces ensured the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing in the Poznan direction, and with the exit of Soviet troops to the river. The Vistula north of Thorn created conditions for the East Pomeranian operation.

One of the characteristic features of this operation was the protracted nature of the fighting to break through the enemy's tactical defense zone. So, for example, breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy took five days in the 3rd Belorussian Front and three days in the 2nd Belorussian Front. Such a long duration of the breakthrough was due to a number of reasons. One of the reasons was that the Soviet troops had to break through strong defenses with a significant number of long-term structures. It should also be noted that, due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, our troops could not use their quantitative and qualitative advantage during the period of breaking through the enemy defenses. So, for example, in the first days of the breakthrough, our aviation almost did not operate. Altogether, from January 13 to 16, the aviation of both fronts, instead of the planned 22,600 sorties, made only 6,900 sorties. Poor meteorological conditions significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire.

This trend continued in the future. During the period of persecution, from January 19 to 26, only 12.5% ​​of aviation capabilities were used. Unlike the Bagration, meteorological conditions limited the actions of aviation also during the period of destruction of encircled enemy groupings. So, for example, in the first six days of fighting south of Koenigsberg, aviation operated only one day (March 18).

However, in addition to tactical reasons, the reason for the long struggle for East Prussia was a number of operational and strategic miscalculations of the Soviet command.

Firstly, in the course of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and developing pursuit, the Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy individual groupings of the 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank armies of the enemy. Neither in the region of Tilsit, nor in the region of Insterburg, nor in the region of the Masurian lakes were there any large "boilers". Moreover, the encirclement was not even provided for by the plans of the Soviet command that were available at the beginning of the operation. They focused on cutting off the main enemy forces in East Prussia from Pomerania. Aimed at Koenigsberg, the 3rd Belorussian Front actually carried out the task of tying down German reserves. This was a kind of legacy of the experience of failure in 1914. Rennekampf-Chernyakhovsky saved Samsonov-Rokossovsky from counterattacks. No maneuvering along the internal lines in 1945, unlike 1914, was really observed. However, such a strategy, which did not provide for a strike in converging directions, had one significant drawback. The main forces of the Army Group "Center" managed to retreat to the Zemland Peninsula, to the Königsberg area and to the Heilsberg fortified area (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"). Using pre-prepared defensive positions and lines in these areas, the enemy was able to offer prolonged resistance.

Secondly, enemy groupings, isolated from land, were not firmly blocked by the Soviet fleet from the sea. As a result, enemy troops continuously received ammunition, fuel and other materiel from Germany. In the opposite direction, there was a stream of wounded and refugees, which, of course, had a positive effect on the morale of the troops locked up in East Prussia. They, at least for the time being, received a meaningful purpose for their actions. A well-known role in the protracted struggle was also played by the fact that the enemy groupings operating on the Zemland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heilingibeyl "cauldron" could communicate with each other for a long time along the highway that ran along the Frisch-Gaff Bay. This was also a consequence of the relatively low activity of the Baltic Fleet, which allowed the enemy to support the counterattacks of battered units with naval artillery.

Thirdly, in the course of a protracted breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and operations in the operational depth, the troops of both fronts suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment. So, for example, with the release of Soviet troops on the approaches to Königsberg, the average number of rifle divisions in the 5th Army did not exceed 2,700 people, in the 2nd Guards Army - 2,500 people, in the 48th Army - 3,500 people. By the beginning of March, each of the divisions of these armies had lost from 43 to 58% of its personnel. The situation with military equipment was not the best either. For example, in the 48th Army there were 127 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations by the beginning of the operation, in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 345. In early February, only 85 combat vehicles remained in service in the 48th Army, and in the 5th guards tank army - 155. In addition, most of the tank fleet of units and formations of the fronts had completely used up their motor resources by February 10 or had them running out.

In general, the successful assault on East Prussia cost the Red Army quite dearly. So, in the period from January 13 to February 10, the sanitary losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front amounted to 22% of the payroll of the front's personnel, and the average daily losses reached 0.76%. For comparison: in "Bagration" the average daily losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front did not exceed 0.4%. The 5th Army (44%) and the 28th Army (37%) had the greatest losses. In the course of further hostilities, the losses remained the same large. The losses of the 2nd Belorussian Front from January 14 to February 10 amounted to 15.4% of the front's payroll, and the average daily losses reached 0.55%. The 3rd, 48th, 65th and 70th armies suffered the greatest losses (from 19.5 to 24.3%).

The losses of armored vehicles were also high. For example, during the period from January 13 to March 29, the 3rd Belorussian Front irretrievably lost 1,189 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, which is over 93% of the presence of combat vehicles at the beginning of the operation. From January 17 to March 1, the 5th Guards Tank Army irretrievably lost about 60% of its combat vehicles.

At the same time, it must be said that the East Prussian operation can in no way be attributed to the successes achieved by "filling up with corpses." Artillery became the main tool for crushing the enemy. To some extent, this compensated for the low activity of aviation. Marshal Vasilevsky specifically noted this in his memoirs: “I will note in passing that the East Prussian operation for the consumption of ammunition was generally unparalleled among all operations in the history of wars. Two fronts received 13.3 million shells and mines, 620 million rounds of ammunition, 2.2 million hand grenades. Only on January 13-14, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front used up more than 1000 wagons of the main range of ammunition, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front only on January 14 - over 950 wagons. In total, both fronts used up more than 15 thousand wagons of ammunition. Another question is that in the conditions of the Second World War, artillery did not decide the outcome of the battle, but only created the conditions for the subsequent infantry battle.

In general, East Prussia became a kind of giant "festung", perhaps the largest in the history of the Second World War. Being surrounded and cut off from land communication with the rest of Germany, she nevertheless kept in isolation for a long time, chaining rather large forces of the Red Army to herself.

The German command attached to the retention of East Prussia importance. For a long time there were powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg.

In the course of this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlavsko-Elbing, Hejlsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal The East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops stationed there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, cut them up and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan. They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to defeat the enemy in northern Poland with strikes from bridgeheads on the Narew River. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of advancing on Koenigsberg from the east. In defeating the enemy in the Koenigsberg direction, he was assisted by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

The troops of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky, together with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, by the beginning of 1945, numbered 1669 thousand people, 25.4 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft .

In East Prussia and Northern Poland, the troops of Army Group Center under the command of General G. Reinhardt defended. The group had 580 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 8 thousand guns and mortars, 700 combat aircraft.

Thus, the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy in personnel and artillery was 2-3 times, and in tanks and aircraft - 4-5.5 times.

The 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin, chief of staff - Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov) had the task of striking from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in general in the direction of Pshasnysh, Mlawa, Lidzbark, defeat the enemy’s Mlawa grouping, no later than 10-12 days of the operation, capture the Myshinets, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg. The front was supposed to strike the second blow from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In addition, the front was supposed to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping: part of the left wing forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

Marshal Rokossovsky planned to strike from bridgeheads on the Narew River. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses in the main direction from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in a section of 18 km by forces of three armies. To develop success to the north, it was supposed to use first separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, and then a tank army. By concentrating such forces in the direction of the main attack, Rokossovsky sought to go to the sea and cut off the German troops in East Prussia. Another blow was planned by two armies in a 10 km section from the Serock bridgehead along the northern bank of the Vistula.

The 3rd Belorussian Front (commander - General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General V.Ya. Makarov, chief of staff - Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky) received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy grouping and not later than 10-12 days of the offensive, capture the line of Nemonin, Norkitten, Darkemen, Goldap; further develop the offensive against Koenigsberg along both banks of the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The main blow to the front was ordered to be delivered from the area north of Stallupenen, Gumbinnen in the general direction to Wellau, and auxiliary ones - to Tilsit and Darkemen.

The general plan of General Chernyakhovsky was to launch a frontal attack on Koenigsberg, bypassing the powerful enemy fortifications north of the Masurian Lakes. The ultimate goal of the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was to cover the main forces of the East Prussian grouping of Germans from the north and subsequently, together with the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat them. Considering the difficulty of overcoming the powerful defense of the enemy, Chernyakhovsky decided to break through the defenses in the 24 km section with the forces of three armies, after which he would bring into battle two tank corps, a second-echelon army and develop success in depth to the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs, member of the Military Council - Vice Admiral N.K. Smirnov, chief of staff - Rear Admiral A.N. Petrov) received the task of assisting them with their artillery when the Soviet troops reached the sea coast and landings, as well as to cover the coastal flanks of the fronts.

Soviet troops were preparing to go on the offensive on January 8-10, 1945. However, on December 16, 1944, an unexpected German counteroffensive began in the Ardennes, as a result of which a strong grouping of troops of Army Group B, commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, broke through the weak defenses of American troops and began to quickly move deep into Belgium. Taken by surprise, the allies were defeated. To the place of the breakthrough, which exceeded 100 km, General D. Eisenhower hastily pulled up troops. Powerful Anglo-American aviation could provide quick assistance to the withdrawing troops, but its operations were hampered by non-flying weather. A critical situation has arisen.

The January offensive of the Red Army, launched earlier than scheduled at the request of the allies, forced the German command to stop offensive operations in the West. After the Soviet troops broke through the line on the Vistula, the 6th German Panzer Army - the main striking force of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes - began to be transferred to the East. The command of the Wehrmacht finally abandoned plans for offensive operations against the American-British troops and on January 16 was forced to give the order to go over to the defensive in the West.

The powerful thrust of the Soviet troops from the Vistula to the Oder provided an opportunity for the Allied armies to recover from the blows of the German troops, and on February 8, after a six-week delay, they managed to launch an offensive.

To defeat the enemy in East Prussia, the 3rd Belorussian Front, which carried out the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, was the first to go on the offensive. The Germans were expecting a blow. Their artillery fired methodically at the combat formations of the infantry preparing for the attack. On January 13, the troops of the front began the operation. After making sure that the offensive had begun, the enemy at dawn conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation. The fire concentrated on the strike force of Chernyakhovsky's troops testified that the Germans had discovered the direction of the main attack of the front and prepared to repel it. Their batteries were suppressed by artillery return fire and night bombers raised into the air, but surprise was not achieved.

After two hours of artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the enemy. By the end of the day, the 39th and 5th armies of generals I.I. Lyudnikova and N.I. Krylova wedged into the defense, but only 2-3 km. The 28th Army of General A.A. advanced more successfully. Luchinsky, but she, having advanced 5-7 km, failed to break through the enemy's defenses. Solid fog did not allow the use of aviation. The tanks advanced by touch and suffered heavy losses. No one fulfilled the tasks of the first day of the offensive.

In six days, the strike force of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through to a depth of 45 km in a 60 km section. And although the pace of advance was 2 times slower than planned, the troops inflicted heavy losses on the German 3rd Panzer Army and created the conditions for continuing the offensive on Koenigsberg.

Due to bad weather, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky twice postponed the start of the offensive and was forced to start it on January 14th. The first two days of the Mlavsko-Elbing operation, which was carried out by the front, did not go well: the shock groups advancing from the Ruzhansky and Serotsky bridgeheads advanced only 7-8 km.

The blows from both bridgeheads combined into a common breakthrough in the 60 km section. Having advanced 30 km in three days, the shock groups of the front created the conditions for rapid development success in depth. On January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General V.T. was introduced into the gap. Volsky. Pursuing the enemy, she quickly moved north and on January 18 blocked the Mlavsky fortified area.

The pace of advancement of the rest of the troops of the front also increased. The tankers of General Volsky, bypassing the German fortifications, continued on their way to the sea. The 65th and 70th armies advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead under the command of Generals P.I. Batova and B.C. Popova rushed along the northern bank of the Vistula to the west and captured the Modlin fortress.

On the sixth day, Rokossovsky's troops took the line, which was planned to reach on the 10-11th day. On January 21, the Headquarters specified the task of the 2nd Belorussian Front. He had to continue the offensive with the main forces to the north, and part of the forces - to the west, in order to capture the Elbing, Marienburg, Torun line on February 2-4. As a result, the troops went to the sea and cut off the enemy in East Prussia from Germany.

Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front pursued the enemy. On the evening of January 23, the advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Army broke into the city of Elbing. Stunned by the sudden appearance of Soviet tanks, the garrison did not have time to prepare for battle. The detachment proceeded through the city and reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The enemy quickly organized the defense of Elbing and delayed the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps. Bypassing the city, the formations of the tank army, together with the 42nd rifle corps, went to the sea. Enemy communications were cut. The 2nd German Army under the command of General V. Weiss was thrown back to the west, beyond the Vistula.

Continuing the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front from January 19 to 26 broke through to the outer defensive contour of Koenigsberg. To the south, they immediately overcame the line of the Masurian Lakes. Bypassing Koenigsberg from the north, the 39th Army reached the sea west of the city. 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov, 11th Guards Army of General K.N. Galitsky broke through to the Frisch-Gaff Bay south of Koenigsberg. Pressed to the sea by the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, Army Group Center, renamed on January 26 into Army Group North, was cut by Chernyakhovsky’s troops into three unequal parts: four enemy divisions ended up in Zemland, about five in Koenigsberg and up to twenty divisions - in the Hejlsberg area, southwest of Koenigsberg.

On February 8, Marshal Rokossovsky received the task of turning west, defeating the enemy in Pomerania and reaching the Oder. The 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to strike at the Heilsberg grouping, and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan - on the enemy in Zemland and Koenigsberg.

As a result of the Heilsberg operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which was distinguished by an extremely fierce character, the enemy was destroyed south of Koenigsberg. Weakened by heavy fighting, the troops of the front resumed the offensive on February 11, which proceeded slowly. During the day it was possible to advance no more than 2 km. In an effort to turn the tide of the operation, the front commander was almost continuously in the army. On the way from the 5th to the 3rd Army on February 18, he was mortally wounded by a fragment of an artillery shell. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky died. The Red Army lost a talented commander who was only 38 years old. The Stavka appointed Marshal A.M. to command the front. Vasilevsky.

The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, having the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula from the Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, they themselves struck, as a result of which they restored the land connection between Zemland and Koenigsberg and disrupted the offensive.

On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A.M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows. Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the encircled groups in succession, starting with the strongest - Hejlsberg.

Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aviation. To these difficulties were added the spring thaw and high water. Despite the difficult conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Germans, on March 26, Soviet troops reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. German command in advance began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula. Of the 150,000 German soldiers and officers who defended southwest of Koenigsberg, 93,000 were destroyed and 46,000 were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Hejlsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Hejlsberg operation, six armies were liberated near the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Koenigsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve, starting to regroup in the Berlin direction.

During the destruction of the enemy pressed to the sea, the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs. The fleet attacked the enemy with aircraft, submarine and light surface forces. They violated the sea communications of the Germans. In February and March alone, the fleet destroyed 32 transports and 7 warships.

Outstanding success was achieved by the S-13 submarine under the command of Captain 3rd Rank A.I. Marinesko. On January 30, she sank the German liner Wilhelm Gustlov with a displacement of 25.5 thousand tons, on board of which more than 5 thousand people were evacuated, including 1.3 thousand submariners. On February 9, the submarine Marinesko achieved another success by sinking a German steamship with a displacement of 14.7 thousand tons. Not a single Soviet submariner achieved such brilliant results in one trip. For military merits, the S-13 boat was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Koenigsberg operation. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the positions of the Germans. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days were decisive, when flying weather settled. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, only on the evening of April 7, within 45 minutes, 3742 large-caliber bombs were dropped on the fortress. Other air armies, as well as fleet aviation, also participated in massive raids. It should be noted the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K.A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E.D. Bershanskaya, pilots from the regiment of night bombers bravely fought. Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 female pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the assault on the fortress alone, about 14,000 sorties were made (that's over 3,000 a day!). 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy. Together with the Soviet pilots, French pilots from the Normandie-Neman regiment bravely fought. During these battles the regiment was awarded the order Red Banner, and 24 pilots - orders of the USSR.

These days, the personnel of the ISU-152 battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant A.A. Kosmodemyansky. The battery supported units of the 319th Rifle Division, which stormed one of the forts of the fortress. Having fired a volley at the thick brick walls of the fort, self-propelled guns broke through them and burst into the fortification on the move. The fort's garrison of 350 capitulated. 9 tanks, 200 vehicles and a fuel depot were captured. The battery commander was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which was awarded posthumously. The brother of the famous partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who was hanged by the Germans in the Moscow region, Alexander died on April 13 during the fighting on the Zemland Peninsula.

The commandant of the Königsberg fortress, General O. Lash, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to help the garrison of Koenigsberg with a strike from the peninsula to the west, but Soviet aviation thwarted these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were squeezed into the center of the city and in the morning found themselves under crushing artillery fire. Soldiers began to surrender by the thousands. On April 9, Lash ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death by hanging. The reports of the officers, who testified to the courageous behavior of the general, did not affect the decision of the dictator.

On April 9, the garrison of Königsberg capitulated. Lash himself also surrendered, which saved him from Hitler's sentence. Together with Lash, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers of the fortress garrison died. General Müller was removed from the post of army commander, and Gauleiter of East Prussia Koch, who demanded that the troops on the Samland Peninsula fight to the last, fled by ship to Denmark.

Moscow celebrated the completion of the assault on Koenigsberg with a salute of the highest category - 24 artillery volleys from 324 guns. The medal "For the capture of Koenigsberg" was established, which was usually done only on the occasion of capturing the capitals of states. All participants in the assault received a medal.

The port of Pillau was the last point in East Prussia from which the population and troops could be evacuated. The city itself was a fortress that covered the naval base from the sea and land. The Germans defended the land approaches to the port with particular tenacity, aided by forests and bad weather.

2nd Guards Army of General P.G. Chanchibadze could not overcome the resistance of the enemy. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky brought the 11th Guards Army into battle. The defense was broken only on the third day. In fierce battles for the fortress and port, the 11th Guards Army captured Pillau on April 25.

This ended the East Prussian strategic operation. It lasted 103 days and was the longest operation of the last year of the war.

In East Prussia, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. By the end of January, in the rifle divisions of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, which by the beginning of the offensive included 6-6.5 thousand soldiers and officers, 2.5-3.5 thousand remained. By the end of January, the Guards Tank Army had only half of the tanks available at the beginning of the operation. Even more were lost during the destruction of the encircled groups. Replenishment during the operation was almost non-existent. Moreover, significant forces were transferred to the Berlin direction, which was the main one in the 1945 campaign. The weakening of the 3rd Belorussian Front led to protracted and bloody battles in East Prussia.

The total losses of the Soviet fronts and fleet from January 13 to April 25 were enormous: 126.5 thousand soldiers and officers died and went missing, more than 458 thousand soldiers were injured or out of action due to illness. The troops lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft.

In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their composition. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. About 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment became trophies. The loss of large forces and an important military-economic area hastened the defeat of Germany.

However, after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Germans began to guess that soon the rear status of East Prussia could be replaced by front-line status, and began to prepare it for defense by building fortifications. As the front approached the borders of the region, these works became more and more intensive. East Prussia was turned into a huge fortified area with a defense depth of 150-200 km. Königsberg was located behind many lines of fortifications (from three to nine in different directions).

First battles on German soil

Soviet troops represented by the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts reached the borders of East Prussia in September 1944 as a result of the triumphant operation Bagration (by far the best strategic operation of the Soviet army in the entire Great Patriotic War) and the Baltic offensive operation (also quite successful). The Germans were going to defend East Prussia to the last opportunity, not only and not so much for military reasons, but for political and psychological reasons - this region meant too much to them historically. Nevertheless, the Soviet command planned to capture East Prussia before the end of 1944.

The first offensive against East Prussia began on October 16, 1944. Two days later, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered the territory of this region for the first time, i.e. to the territory of Germany, which they have been striving for since June 41st.

However, the operation from the first moment turned into a frontal "gnawing" of a very powerful German defense. Therefore, already on October 27, the offensive was stopped. It cannot be called unsuccessful - the troops advanced deep into East Prussia by 50-100 km. However, its complete capture was out of the question, and Soviet losses turned out to be twice those of the enemy (80,000 against 40,000). But a bridgehead on enemy territory was created, important experience was gained.

On the second try

The second attempt was made already in 1945. To carry out the East Prussian operation, the Soviet army concentrated 1.7 million people, 25.4 thousand guns, 3.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 3.1 thousand aircraft against about 800 thousand people, 8.2 thousand guns, 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 800 aircraft as part of the German Army Group North (former Army Group Center).

The Soviet offensive by the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts began on January 13 in two directions - through Gumbinnen to Königsberg (from the bridgehead captured in October 1944) and from the Nareva region to the Baltic coast.

In contrast to the Vistula-Oder operation that began and triumphantly developed at the same time (on January 31, the troops crossed the Oder, only 70 km remained to Berlin), the offensive in East Prussia was extremely slow and resembled in this sense the offensive operations of the first half of the war. The reason for this was the well-prepared defense in depth of the Germans and the fire of the German ships. It was thanks to the fire of the ships ("pocket battleships" "Lützow" and "Admiral Scheer", the heavy cruiser "Prinz Eugen", about 20 destroyers, destroyers and floating batteries) that the Germans regularly launched counterattacks, which by that time was almost unthinkable in other sectors of the front . In addition, the German fleet managed to transfer as many as eight divisions from the Courland bridgehead to East Prussia, the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force could not prevent this.

By the beginning of February, despite fierce resistance, Soviet troops cut German group into three parts. However, the final victory was very far away. Thanks to the support of naval artillery, the largest of the German groups, the Heilsberg (south of Königsberg), launched a successful counterattack and rejoined the Königsberg group. During these battles, on February 18, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army Ivan Chernyakhovsky, died (he was only 38 years old).

What is happening in East Prussia led to the fact that the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Zhukov stopped the attack on Berlin and turned to the north, launching an offensive against Eastern Pomerania together with the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Thus, the defense of Koenigsberg delayed the fall of Berlin, i.e. end of the war for at least two months.

At the same time, in Eastern Pomerania, Soviet troops faced the same problem - crushing fire from German naval artillery, which made a ground offensive very difficult.

The German grouping in East Pomerania and the Heilsberg grouping in East Prussia were eliminated only by the end of March. At the same time, Danzig fell, which led to the final isolation of German troops in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German fleet was forced to shift its efforts to the west, first to the area of ​​​​the Danzig Bay, then to East Pomerania. The departure of the German ships, with which the Baltic Fleet was never able to cope, facilitated the actions of the ground forces in East Prussia.

Capture of Koenigsberg

Objectively speaking, after that, the remnants of German troops in East Prussia did not pose any threat to the Soviet army, they could simply be ignored, throwing maximum forces at Berlin. However, it was not in our rules. Now the target is the capital of the region. Ahead was the battle for Koenigsberg.

The defense of Koenigsberg consisted of three lines and included 12 large and 5 small forts, plus many other defensive structures. The city was defended by a 134,000-strong German garrison. The assault on Königsberg began on April 6. Before that, for four days, artillery and aviation training was carried out in the capital of East Prussia, in which 5 thousand guns and 1.5 thousand aircraft were involved. It was this that decided the outcome of the battle, especially since the shelling and bombardment of the city continued during the assault itself.

Even the powerful German fortification could not withstand such an amount of metal that fell upon it. Königsberg fell very quickly - already on April 9, 92 thousand German troops surrendered, including commander General Lasch.

After the capture of Koenigsberg, there was absolutely no need to fight in East Prussia, but the Soviet command did not think so. The last German grouping remained in the western part of East Prussia, on the Samland Peninsula. It was captured on April 25, at the same time Pillau fell (note that at that time there were already battles in the center of Berlin!). The remnants of the German troops (22 thousand people) retreated to the Frishe-Nerung spit, now bearing the name Baltic, where they surrendered on May 9th.

The results of the East Prussian operation

Of all the operations of the last year of the war, it was in East Prussian that the Soviet troops suffered the greatest losses - almost 127 thousand people. killed, 3.5 thousand tanks, almost 1.5 thousand aircraft. The Germans lost at least 300 thousand people killed. To Soviet losses directly in East Prussia, one must add significant additional losses during the assault on Berlin at the end of April (in early February it was quite realistic to take it on the move).

Thus, the "citadel of German militarism" cost us extremely dearly, although the assault on Koenigsberg itself was carried out almost flawlessly.

The reasons for this are indicated above - the extreme saturation of East Prussia with defensive lines and the complete inability of the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force to neutralize German ships (all of them were sunk by British aircraft in April-May 1945, but they had already done their "dirty deed" by this time).

At the same time, it is not a fact that the East Prussian operation should have been carried out at all. In fact, the Stalingrad mistake was repeated here, when, while finishing off the "cauldron", a much larger German grouping was missed from the Caucasus. Moreover, there was no need to finish off - Paulus's army was doomed to death from cold and hunger. Two years later, the German grouping in East Prussia was also doomed and no longer had any opportunity to hit the flank and rear of the Soviet troops advancing on Berlin, it could simply be restrained by fairly limited forces without any assaults. Then Berlin would have inevitably fallen in February, which would have ended the war. But alas.