Berlin, Germany
	Decisive Soviet victory
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
G. K. Zhukov	G. Weidling
I. S. Konev
Side forces
Approximately 1,500,000 troops	About 45,000 Wehrmacht soldiers, as well as police forces, the Hitler Youth and 40,000 Volkssturm militia
75,000 military dead and 300,000 wounded.	100,000 military dead and 175,000 civilian dead.

The final part of the Berlin offensive operation of 1945, during which the Red Army captured the capital of Nazi Germany and victoriously ended the Great Patriotic War and World War II in Europe. The operation lasted from April 25 to May 2.

At 12 noon on April 25, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front forced the Havel River and connected with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thus closing the encirclement around Berlin.

By the end of April 25, the Berlin garrison was defending on an area of ​​approx. 325 km². The total length of the front of Soviet troops in Berlin was approx. 100 km.

The Berlin group, according to the Soviet command, consisted of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks, including the Volkssturm - the people's militia. The defense of the city was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and centers of resistance. Nine defense sectors were created in Berlin - eight around the circumference and one in the center. The closer to the city center, the tighter the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it special strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were closed up and turned into loopholes for firing. In total, the city had up to 400 reinforced concrete long-term structures - multi-storey bunkers (up to 6 floors) and pillboxes equipped with guns (including anti-aircraft guns) and machine guns. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the conditions of street fighting turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the German defense system were underground structures, including the metro, which were widely used by the enemy for covert maneuver of troops, as well as for sheltering them from artillery and bomb attacks.

A network of radar observation posts was deployed around the city. Berlin had a strong anti-aircraft defense provided by the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. Its main forces were located on three huge concrete structures - Zoobunker in the Tiergarten, Humboldthain and Friedrichshain. The division was armed with 128-, 88- and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The center of Berlin, cut by canals, with the Spree River, was especially strongly fortified, which in fact became one huge fortress. Having superiority in people and technology, the Red Army could not fully use its advantages in urban areas. First of all, it concerned aviation. The ram force of any offensive - tanks, once on the narrow city streets, became an excellent target. Therefore, in street battles, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov used the experience of assault groups, proven back in the Battle of Stalingrad: 2-3 tanks, a self-propelled gun, a sapper unit, signalmen and artillery were attached to a rifle platoon or company. The actions of the assault detachments, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47 A; 3.5 Ud. A; 8 Guards A; 1.2 Guards TA) and three armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front (28.3 , 4 Guards TA).

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of two fronts that had deeply advanced towards the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide.

The fighting went on day and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers broke through the houses on tanks, knocking out the Nazis from the ruins. By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the defenders of the city, which was shot through by Soviet artillery from all sides.

Allied refusal to storm Berlin

Roosevelt and Churchill, Eisenhower and Montgomery believed that they, as the Western allies of the USSR, had the opportunity to take Berlin.

At the end of 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt, aboard the battleship Iowa, set the task for the military:

Winston Churchill also considered Berlin a primary target:

And back in late March - early April 1945, he insisted:

According to Field Marshal Montgomery, Berlin could have been captured in the early autumn of 1944. Trying to convince the commander in chief of the need to storm Berlin, Montgomery wrote to him on September 18, 1944:

However, after the unsuccessful landing operation of September 1944, called the "Market Garden", in which, in addition to the British, American and Polish airborne formations and units also participated, Montgomery admitted:

Subsequently, the allies of the USSR abandoned their plans to storm and capture Berlin. Historian John Fuller calls Eisenhower's decision to abandon the capture of Berlin one of the strangest in military history. Despite a large number of guesses, the exact reasons for the refusal of the assault have not yet been clarified.

Capture of the Reichstag

By the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area. On the same night, to support the Reichstag garrison, an assault force consisting of cadets from the Rostock Naval School was dropped by parachute. This was the last visible operation of the Luftwaffe in the skies over Berlin.

On the night of April 29, the actions of the forward battalions of the 150th and 171st rifle divisions under the command of Captain S. A. Neustroev and senior lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov captured the Moltke bridge across the Spree River. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of the Interior was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The way to the Reichstag was open.

An attempt to take the Reichstag on the move was unsuccessful. The building was defended by a 5,000-strong garrison. An anti-tank ditch filled with water was dug in front of the building, making it difficult to attack frontally. On Royal Square there was no large-caliber artillery capable of making breaches in its powerful walls. Despite heavy losses, all capable of attacking were assembled into consolidated battalions on the first line for the last decisive push.

Basically, the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery were defended by SS troops: units of the SS division "Nordland", SS French battalion Fene from the division "Charlemagne" and the Latvian battalion of the 15th SS Grenadier Division (Latvian SS division), as well as SS security units of the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler (their was, according to some sources, about 600-900 people).

On the evening of April 30, through a breach in the northwestern wall of the Reichstag, made by sappers of the 171st division, a group of Soviet soldiers broke into the building. Almost simultaneously, soldiers of the 150th Infantry Division stormed it from the main entrance. This passage to the infantry was pierced by the cannons of Alexander Bessarab.

The tanks of the 23rd Tank Brigade, 85th tank regiment and the 88th Heavy Tank Regiment. So, for example, in the morning, several tanks of the 88th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, having crossed the Spree along the surviving Moltke bridge, took up firing positions on the Kronprinzenufer embankment. At 13:00, the tanks opened direct fire on the Reichstag, participating in the general artillery preparation that preceded the assault. At 18:30, the tanks also supported the second assault on the Reichstag with their fire, and only with the start of fighting inside the building did they stop shelling it.

On April 30, 1945, at 9:45 pm, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V. M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A. I. Negoda captured the first floor of the Reichstag building.

Having lost the upper floors, the Nazis took refuge in the basement and continued to resist. They hoped to break out of the encirclement, cutting off the Soviet soldiers who were in the Reichstag from the main forces.

In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

Chuikov's negotiations with Krebs

Late in the evening of April 30, the German side requested a ceasefire for negotiations. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army of General Chuikov, who announced Hitler's suicide and read out his will. Krebs conveyed to Chuikov the proposal of the new German government to conclude a truce. The message was immediately passed on to Zhukov, who called Moscow himself. Stalin confirmed the categorical demand for unconditional surrender. At 18:00 on May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed the assault on the city with renewed vigor.

End of battles and surrender

By May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial office was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters.

On May 1, units of the 1st Shock Army, advancing from the north, south of the Reichstag, connected with units of the 8th Guards Army, advancing from the south. On the same day, two important defense nodes of Berlin surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the anti-aircraft tower of the Zoo (“Zoobunker” is a huge reinforced concrete fortress with anti-aircraft batteries on the towers and an extensive underground bomb shelter).

Early in the morning of May 2, the Berlin metro was flooded - a group of sappers from the SS division "Nordland" blew up a tunnel passing under the Landwehr Canal in the Trebbiner Strasse area. The explosion led to the destruction of the tunnel and filling it with water at a 25-km section. Water rushed into the tunnels, where a large number of civilians and the wounded were hiding. The number of victims is still unknown.

Information about the number of victims ... is different - from fifty to fifteen thousand people ... The data that about a hundred people died under water look more reliable. Of course, there were many thousands of people in the tunnels, among whom were the wounded, children, women and the elderly, but the water did not spread through the underground communications too quickly. Moreover, it spread underground in various directions. Of course, the picture of the advancing water caused genuine horror in people. And some of the wounded, as well as drunken soldiers, as well as civilians, became its inevitable victims. But talking about thousands of dead would be a strong exaggeration. In most places, the water barely reached a depth of one and a half meters, and the inhabitants of the tunnels had enough time to evacuate themselves and save the many wounded who were in the "hospital cars" near the Stadtmitte station. It is likely that many of the dead, whose bodies were subsequently brought to the surface, actually died not from water, but from wounds and diseases even before the destruction of the tunnel. Anthony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin. 1945". Ch. 25

In the first hour of the night on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “Please cease fire. We are sending parliamentarians to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 am on May 2, Artillery General Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote a surrender order, which was reproduced and, using loud-speaking installations and radio, brought to the enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was brought to the attention of the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy.

Separate units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but for the most part were destroyed or dispersed. The main direction of the breakthrough was the western suburb of Berlin, Spandau, where two bridges over the Havel River remained intact. They were defended by members of the Hitler Youth, who were able to sit on the bridges until the surrender on May 2. The breakthrough began on the night of May 2. Parts of the Berlin garrison and civilian refugees who did not want to surrender, frightened by Goebbels' propaganda about the atrocities of the Red Army, went into the breakthrough. One of the groups under the command of the commander of the 1st (Berlin) anti-aircraft division, Major General Otto Sydow, was able to seep to Spandau through the metro tunnels from the Zoo area. In the area of ​​​​the exhibition hall on the Masurenallee, she connected with the German units retreating from the Kurfürstendamm. The units of the Red Army and the Polish Army stationed in this area did not engage in battle with the retreating units of the Nazis, apparently due to the exhaustion of the troops in previous battles. The systematic destruction of the retreating units began in the area of ​​​​the bridges over the Havel and continued throughout the flight towards the Elbe.

The last remnants of the German units were destroyed or captured by May 7th. The units managed to break into the area of ​​the Elbe crossings, which until May 7 held the units of the 12th army of General Wenck and join the German units and refugees who managed to cross into the zone of occupation of the American army.

Part of the surviving SS units defending the Reich Chancellery, led by SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, attempted to break through to the north on the night of May 2, but were destroyed or captured in the afternoon of May 2. Mohnke himself was captured by the Soviets, from which he was released as an unamnestied war criminal in 1955.

Operation results

Soviet troops defeated the Berlin grouping of enemy troops and stormed the capital of Germany - Berlin. Developing a further offensive, they reached the Elbe River, where they joined up with American and British troops. With the fall of Berlin and the loss of vital areas, Germany lost the opportunity for organized resistance and soon capitulated. With the completion of the Berlin operation, favorable conditions were created for the encirclement and destruction of the last large enemy groupings on the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The losses of the German armed forces in killed and wounded are unknown. Of the approximately 2 million Berliners, about 125,000 perished. The city was badly damaged by bombing even before the arrival of Soviet troops. The bombing continued during the battles near Berlin - the last bombing of the Americans on April 20 (Adolf Hitler's birthday) led to food problems. The destruction intensified as a result of the actions of Soviet artillery.

Three heavy guards took part in the battles in Berlin. tank brigades IS-2, the 88th separate guards heavy tank regiment and at least nine guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiments of self-propelled guns, including:

tank losses

According to the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army under the command of Colonel General S. I. Bogdanov during the street fighting in Berlin from April 22 to May 2, 1945 irrevocably lost 52 T-34s, 31 M4A2 Sherman, 4 IS- 2, 4 ISU-122, 5 SU-100, 2 SU-85, 6 SU-76, which accounted for 16% of the total number of combat vehicles before the start of the Berlin operation. It should be taken into account that the tankers of the 2nd Army acted without sufficient rifle cover and, according to combat reports, in some cases, tank crews were engaged in combing houses. The 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.S. Rybalko during the fighting in Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945 irretrievably lost 99 tanks and 15 self-propelled guns, which amounted to 23% of the combat vehicles available at the beginning of the Berlin operation. The 4th Guards Tank Army under the command of General D. D. Lelyushenko was involved in street fighting on the outskirts of Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945, only partially and irretrievably lost 46 combat vehicles. At the same time, a significant part of the armored vehicles was lost after the defeat from faustpatrons.

On the eve of the Berlin operation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army tested various anti-cumulative screens, both solid and made of steel rod. In all cases, they ended with the destruction of the screen and burning through the armor. As A. V. Isaev notes:

Criticism of the operation

In the years of perestroika and after, critics (for example, B. V. Sokolov) repeatedly expressed the opinion that the siege of the city, doomed to inevitable defeat, instead of storming it, would save many lives and military equipment. The assault on a well-fortified city was more of a political decision than a strategic one. However, this opinion does not take into account that the siege of Berlin would delay the end of the war, as a result of which the cumulative loss of life (including the civilian population) on all fronts would possibly exceed the losses actually incurred during the assault.

The situation of the civilian population

Fear and despair

A significant part of Berlin, even before the assault, was destroyed as a result of Anglo-American air raids, from which the population hid in basements and bomb shelters. There were not enough bomb shelters and therefore they were constantly overcrowded. By that time, in Berlin, in addition to the three million local population (which consisted mainly of women, the elderly and children), there were up to three hundred thousand foreign workers, including Ostarbeiters, most of whom were forcibly deported to Germany. They were forbidden from entering bomb shelters and cellars.

Although the war for Germany had long been lost, Hitler ordered to resist to the last. Thousands of teenagers and old people were drafted into the Volkssturm. From the beginning of March, on the orders of the Reichskommissar Goebbels, responsible for the defense of Berlin, tens of thousands of civilians, mostly women, were sent to dig anti-tank ditches around the German capital. Civilians who violated the orders of the authorities, even in the last days of the war, were threatened with execution.

There is no exact information on the number of civilian casualties. Various sources indicate different number persons who died directly during the Battle of Berlin. Even decades after the war construction works ah find previously unknown mass graves.

After the capture of Berlin, the civilian population faced the threat of starvation, but the Soviet command organized the distribution of rations to civilians, which saved many Berliners from starvation.

Violence against civilians

After the occupation of Berlin, cases of violence against civilians were noted, the extent of this phenomenon is the subject of debate. According to a number of sources, as the Red Army advanced through the city, a wave of looting and rape of the civilian population, including group rapes, began. According to data provided by German researchers sander And Johr In total, from 95 to 130 thousand women were raped by Soviet soldiers in Berlin, of which approximately one in ten committed suicide. Irish journalist Cornelius Ryan writes in his book The Last Battle that doctors he spoke to estimate that between 20,000 and 100,000 women have been raped.

The English historian Anthony Beevor, referring to Professor Norman Nyman, notes that with the advent of Soviet troops, a wave of violence against women rose, which then subsided rather quickly; however, everything was repeated after the approach of new parts.

According to the witness and participant in the battles, philosopher and culturologist Grigory Pomerants, “At the end of the war, the masses were seized by the idea that German women from 15 to 60 years old were the legitimate prey of the winner”. Pomeranz recounts a number of Berlin episodes illustrating the impunity of rapists in April 1945: for example, a drunken sergeant handed over to counterintelligence for attempted rape did not receive “even three days of arrest for outrageous behavior.” The chief of Pomerants, a major, could only "try to persuade" the lieutenant, who found a beautiful film actress in a bomb shelter and took all his friends to rape her.

According to Anthony Beevor:

German women soon realized that in the evenings, during the so-called "hunting hours", it was better not to appear on the streets of the city. Mothers hid young daughters in attics and cellars. They themselves dared to go for water only in the early morning, when the Soviet soldiers were still sleeping off after a night of drinking. When caught, they often gave away the places where their neighbors were hiding, thereby trying to save their own offspring (...) Berliners remember the piercing screams at night that were heard in houses with broken windows. (...) A friend of Ursula von Kardorf and the Soviet spy Schulze-Boysen was raped "in turn by twenty-three soldiers" (...) Later, while already in the hospital, she threw a noose over herself.

Beevor also notes that in order to avoid constant, and even more so group rapes, German women often tried to find a “patron” among Soviet soldiers, who, while disposing of a woman, at the same time protected her from other rapists.

In view of cases of violence against the civilian population, the Directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 20 and the Military Council of the Front of April 22, 1945 followed. According to Pomeranets, at first they “spit on” the directives, but “after two weeks, the soldiers and officers cooled off.” On May 2, the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front wrote in a report that after the issuance of the Stavka directive “In relation to the German population on the part of our military personnel, of course, a significant turning point has been achieved. The facts of aimless and [unfounded] executions of Germans, looting and rape of German women have significantly decreased”, although still fixed

On April 29, the report of the head of the political department of the 8th Guards Army (of the same front) also states a decrease in the number of excesses, but not in Berlin, where “In the location of formations and units engaged in hostilities, there are still cases of exceptionally bad behavior by military personnel. (...) Some military personnel have gone so far as to turn into bandits ". (Following is a list of more than fifty looted items confiscated during the arrest from Private Popov).

According to E. Beevor, “the change in political line came too late: on the eve of the big offensive it was no longer possible to direct in the right direction that hatred for the enemy that had been propagated in the Red Army for many years”

In the Russian media and historiography, the topic of mass crimes and violence by the Red Army was banned for a long time, and now a number of historians of the older generation tend to hush up or downplay this issue. Russian historian, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, disagrees with the statements about the mass nature of the atrocities:

Reflection in art

The storming of Berlin is the central theme or background of the action of the characters in the following films:

• The Storming of Berlin, 1945, dir. Y. Raizman, documentary (USSR)
• The Fall of Berlin, 1949, dir. M. Chiaureli (USSR)
• 5 series (“The Last Storm”, 1971) of the epic film “Liberation” by Y. Ozerov (USSR)
• Der Untergang (in Russian box office - "Bunker" or "Fall"), 2004 (Germany-Russia)

Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich (1896-1974)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He was in a difficult relationship with Marshal Konev, whom he perceived during the Berlin operation as a competitor in the "race for Berlin".

“A stern, tough business man,” characterizes Zhukov sergeant. “Eighty kilograms of trained muscles and nerves. A clot of energy. An ideal, brilliantly debugged mechanism of military thought! Thousands of unmistakable strategic decisions circulated with lightning speed in his brain. "Forward march! 1,500 tanks to the right! 2,000 planes to the left! To take the city, 200,000 soldiers must be 'activated!' He was a new type of commander: he killed countless people, but almost always achieved victorious results. Our great commanders of the old type were even better able to ruin millions, but they didn’t really think about what would come of it, so how simply they were not very good at thinking. Zhukov is full of energy, he is charged with it, like Leyden jar as if electric sparks were pouring out of him."

After the end of the war, Zhukov headed the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (into which the troops of the 1st BF were transformed), as well as the Soviet military administration in Germany. In March 1946, Stalin appointed him to the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense (Stalin himself was the minister). However, already in the summer of 1946, Zhukov was accused of misappropriating a large number of trophies, as well as exaggerating his own merits. He was removed from his posts and sent to command the troops of the Odessa Military District. After Stalin's death, he was returned to Moscow. From February 1955 to October 1957 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. He exercised military leadership in the suppression of the anti-communist uprising in Hungary in 1956. At the end of 1957, at the initiative of Khrushchev, he was expelled from the party's Central Committee, removed from his posts and dismissed.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich (1897-1973)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

He dreamed of taking Berlin, ahead of Marshal Zhukov, which he openly admitted: “while approving the composition of the groupings and the direction of attacks, Stalin began to mark with a pencil on the map the dividing line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. In the draft directives, this line went through Lubben and further south of Berlin.While drawing this line with a pencil, Stahl suddenly cut it off at the city of Lübben, located about 60 kilometers southeast of Berlin.<…>Was there an unspoken call for a competition of fronts in this cliff of the dividing line on Lübben? I accept this possibility. In any case, I do not exclude it. This is all the more possible if we mentally go back to that time and imagine what Berlin was for us then and what a passionate desire everyone, from a soldier to a general, experienced, to see this city with their own eyes, to master it with the power of their weapons. Of course, this was also my passionate desire. I'm not afraid to admit it even now. It would be strange to portray oneself in the last months of the war as a person devoid of passions. On the contrary, we were all filled with them then."

After the completion of the Berlin operation, Konev deployed the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to attack Prague, where he ended the war.

After the end of the war in 1945-1946. - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Austria and Hungary. In 1946, he replaced Zhukov, who had fallen into disgrace, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. In 1957, he supported the exclusion of Zhukov from the Central Committee of the party. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961 - Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 5th shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front. The first Soviet commandant of Berlin.

On April 21, Berzarin's army crossed the Berliner Ring and approached the eastern outskirts of the Reich's capital. With battles, it moved towards the city center through the districts of Lichtenberg and Friedrichshain. On May 1, the forward detachments of the 5th UA were the first of the Soviet units to reach the building of the Reich Chancellery, located on Fossstrasse, and stormed it.

Marshal Zhukov appointed Berzarin commandant of Berlin on April 24. And already on April 28, when the fighting was still in full swing in the city, the general set about creating a new administration, issuing order No. 1 "On the transfer of all power in Berlin into the hands of the Soviet military commandant's office." Berzarin did not stay as commandant for long. On June 16, 1945, he died in a car accident. Nevertheless, in less than 2 months of his administration of the city, he managed to leave a good memory of himself with the Germans. Mainly because he managed to restore public order on the streets and provide the population with food. A square (Bersarinplatz) and a bridge (Nikolai-Bersarin-Brucke) are named in his honor in Berlin.

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 2nd GvTA crossed the Berliner Ring and broke into the northern outskirts of the city. On April 22, the advanced units of the army, bypassing Berlin from the north, reached the Havel River and crossed it. On April 25, units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) joined west of Berlin with the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement around the city. Other formations of the 2nd GvTA approached the Berlin-Spandauer-Schiffarts canal on April 23 and crossed it the next day. On April 27, the main forces of the army crossed the Spree, entered the Charlottenburg region and moved southeast in the direction of the Tiergarten. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, units of the 2nd GvTA united with units of the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov).

After the end of the war, Bogdanov commanded the armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and from December 1948 - the armored and mechanized troops of the entire USSR. In 1956 he was dismissed.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Katukov's army attacked Berlin from the southeast, supporting the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov). She fought in the area of ​​Neukölln and Tempelchow. It advanced in a fairly narrow band, limited by several streets.

Therefore, it suffered significant losses from artillery and faustpatrons of the enemy. On April 28, units of the 1st GvTA went to the Potsdam station area. From April 29, they fought in the Tiergarten park. On May 2, it connected there with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Vasily Kuznetsov).

After the war, Katukov continued to command his army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 3rd shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 3rd UA crossed the Berliner Ring and entered the northern and northeastern outskirts of Berlin. Passed through the districts of Pankow, Siemensstadt, Charlottenburg, Moabit. Starting on April 29, units of the 3rd UA stormed the area of ​​​​government buildings on Koenigsplatz,. On the morning of May 2, they joined in the Tiergarten with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov).

At the end of the war, Kuznetsov continued to command the 3rd shock army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The 4th GvTA advanced in the direction of Potsdam, covering Berlin from the southwest. On April 23, the army reached the Havel River and captured the southeastern region of Potsdam - Babelsberg. On April 25, units of the 4th GvTA crossed the Havel and west of Berlin joined with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing from the north.

Thus, the encirclement ring around the capital of Germany closed. On April 27, the 4th GvTA took Potsdam, and on April 29, Peacock Island on the Havel River. In addition, Lelyushenko's army had to repel the counterattack of the 12th army of Walter Wenck on the outskirts of Potsdam. In areas of Berlin with dense buildings, Lelyushenko's army did not have a chance to fight, so her losses were lower than those of other armies. On May 4, after the end of the battle for Berlin, she was sent to Prague.

After the war, Lelyushenko commanded various military districts. Then he was retired. In 1960-1964 headed DOSAAF.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990)

In April-May 1945 - lieutenant general, commander of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Luchinsky's army was advancing on Berlin from the south. On April 23, she approached the Teltow Canal, and then, together with the 3rd GvTA (Pavel Rybalko), fought in the western part of Berlin.

After the end of World War II in Europe, Luchinsky was sent to Far East. There he commanded the 36th Army during the war with Japan in August 1945.

Perkhorovich Franz Iosifovich (1894-1961)

In April-May 1945 - Lieutenant General, Commander of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

During the Berlin operation, the 47th Army captured Berlin from the northwest, occupied the urban area of ​​Spandau. On April 25, west of Berlin, together with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov), it connected with the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement around the German capital. On April 30, in front of the forces of the 47th Army, the citadel of Spandau.

After the war, Perkhorovich continued to command his army. Since 1947, he headed the department at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In 1951 he was dismissed.

Rybalko Pavel Semyonovich (1894-1948)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Rybalko's army was advancing on Berlin from the south. By April 22, she reached the Teltow Canal. On April 24, she crossed it and entered the areas of Zehlendorf and Dahlem. Then she fought in Schöneberg and Wilmensdorf.

After the war, Rybalko continued to command his army. In 1947 he was appointed commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the USSR.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Received wide popularity during the Battle of Stalingrad. His 62nd Army (renamed the 8th Guards after the Stalingrad battles) fought fierce street battles in the city for several months. The experience of such battles was very useful to her during the storming of Berlin.

The 8th Guards Army attacked the capital of the Reich from the east and southeast with the support of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Mikhail Katukov). With battles, she occupied the Neukölln and Tempelhof districts of Berlin. On April 28, the 8th Guards Armed Forces reached the southern bank of the Landwehr Canal and reached the Anhalt Station. On April 30, the advanced units of Chuikov were at a distance of 800 meters from the Reich Chancellery. On May 1, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Hans Krebs, came to Chuikov's headquarters, who announced Hitler's suicide and conveyed Goebbels and Bormann's proposal for a temporary ceasefire. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, the 8th Guards Army united with units of the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov) and the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov). On the same morning, at Chuikov's headquarters, General Helmut Weidling wrote an order for the surrender of the Berlin garrison.

After the war, Chuikov continued to command his army. In 1949-1953. was the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. Under Khrushchev, he became a marshal (1955), and in 1960-1964. served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (1960-1964).

Disputes continue between Russian and foreign historians about when the war with Nazi Germany ended de jure and de facto. On May 2, 1945, Soviet troops took Berlin. This was a major success in military and ideological terms, but the fall of the German capital did not mean the final destruction of the Nazis and their accomplices.

Achieve surrender

In early May, the leadership of the USSR set out to achieve the adoption of the act of surrender of Germany. To do this, it was necessary to negotiate with the Anglo-American command and deliver an ultimatum to the representatives of the Nazi government, which from April 30, 1945 (after the suicide of Adolf Hitler) was headed by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz.

The positions of Moscow and the West diverged quite strongly. Stalin insisted on the unconditional surrender of all German troops and pro-Nazi formations. The Soviet leader was aware of the desire of the allies to keep part of the Wehrmacht military machine in a combat-ready state. Such a scenario was absolutely unacceptable for the USSR.

In the spring of 1945, the Nazis and collaborators massively left their positions on the Eastern Front in order to surrender to the Anglo-American troops. The war criminals were counting on leniency, and the allies were considering using the Nazis in a potential confrontation with the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). The USSR made concessions, but in the end achieved its goal.

On May 7, in the French Reims, where the headquarters of General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower was located, the first act of surrender was concluded. Alfred Jodl, chief of the operational headquarters of the Wehrmacht, put his signature under the document. Moscow's representative was Major General Ivan Susloparov. The document came into force on May 8 at 23:01 (May 9 at 01:01 Moscow time).

The act was drawn up in English and assumed the unconditional surrender of only the German armies. On May 7, Susloparov, without receiving instructions from the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, signed a document with the proviso that any ally country could demand another similar act.

• Signing of the act of surrender of Germany in Reims

After signing the act, Karl Dönitz ordered all German formations to break through to the west with a fight. Moscow took advantage of this and demanded the immediate conclusion of a new act of comprehensive surrender.

On the night of May 8-9, in the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst, the second act of surrender was signed in a solemn atmosphere. The signatories agreed that the Reims document was of a preliminary nature, while the Berlin document was final. The representative of the USSR in Karlshorst was Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Georgy Zhukov.

Act proactively

Some historians consider the liberation of Europe by the Soviet troops from the Nazi occupiers to be a "light walk" compared to the battles that were fought on the territory of the USSR.

In 1943, the Soviet Union solved all the main problems in the field of the military-industrial complex, received thousands of modern tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces. The command staff of the army gained the necessary experience and already knew how to outmaneuver the Nazi generals.

In the middle of 1944, the Red Army, which was part of Europe, was perhaps the most effective land military machine in the world. However, politics began to actively interfere in the campaign for the liberation of the European peoples.

The Anglo-American troops that landed in Normandy sought not so much to help the USSR defeat Nazism as to prevent the "communist occupation" of the Old World. Moscow could no longer trust its allies with its plans and therefore acted ahead of schedule.

In the summer of 1944, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief determined two strategic directions for the offensive against the Nazis: northern (Warsaw-Berlin) and southern (Bucharest-Budapest-Vienna). The regions between the main wedges remained under Nazi control until mid-May 1945.

In particular, Czechoslovakia turned out to be such a territory. The liberation of the eastern part of the country - Slovakia - began with the Red Army crossing the Carpathians in September 1944 and ended only eight months later.

In Moravia (the historical part of the Czech Republic), Soviet soldiers appeared on May 2-3, 1945, and on May 6, the Prague strategic operation began, as a result of which the capital of the state and almost the entire territory of Czechoslovakia was liberated. Large-scale hostilities continued until May 11-12.

• Soviet troops cross the border of Austria during the Great Patriotic War
• RIA News

Rush to Prague

Prague was liberated later than Budapest (February 13), Vienna (April 13) and Berlin. The Soviet command was in a hurry to capture the key cities of Eastern Europe and the German capital and thus move as deep as possible to the west, realizing that the current allies could soon turn into ill-wishers.

The advance in Czechoslovakia was of no strategic importance until May 1945. In addition, the offensive of the Red Army was hampered by two factors. The first is mountainous terrain, which sometimes nullified the effect of the use of artillery, aircraft and tanks. The second is that the partisan movement in the republic was less massive than, for example, in neighboring Poland.

At the end of April 1945, the Red Army needed to finish off the Nazis in the Czech Republic as soon as possible. Near Prague, the Germans took care of the Army Groups "Center" and "Austria" in the amount of 62 divisions (more than 900 thousand people, 9700 guns and mortars, over 2200 tanks).

The German government, headed by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, hoped to save the "Center" and "Austria" by surrendering to the Anglo-American troops. In Moscow, they were aware of the preparation by the allies of a secret plan for a war with the USSR in the summer of 1945 called "Unthinkable".

To this end, Britain and the United States hoped to spare as many Nazi formations as possible. Naturally, in the interests of the Soviet Union was the lightning defeat of the enemy grouping. After the regrouping of forces and means, which was not without difficulty, the Red Army launched several massive attacks on the "Center" and "Austria".

In the early morning of May 9, the 10th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army was the first to enter Prague. On May 10-11, Soviet troops completed the destruction of the main centers of resistance. In total, for almost a year of fighting in Czechoslovakia, 858 thousand enemy soldiers surrendered to the Red Army. The losses of the USSR amounted to 144 thousand people.

• A Soviet tank is fighting in Prague. 1st Belorussian Front. 1945
• RIA News

"Defense against the Russians"

Czechoslovakia was not the only country where hostilities continued after 9 May. In April 1945, Soviet and Yugoslav troops were able to clear most of the territory of Yugoslavia from the Nazis and collaborators. However, the remnants of Army Group E (part of the Wehrmacht) managed to escape from the Balkan Peninsula.

The liquidation of Nazi formations on the territory of Slovenia and Austria was carried out by the Red Army from May 8 to 15. In Yugoslavia itself, battles with Hitler's accomplices took place until about the end of May. The scattered resistance of the Germans and collaborators in liberated Eastern Europe continued for about a month after the surrender.

The Nazis put up stubborn resistance to the Red Army on the Danish island of Bornholm, where infantrymen of the 2nd Belorussian Front landed on May 9 with fire support from the Baltic Fleet. The garrison, which, according to various sources, numbered from 15 thousand to 25 thousand people, hoped to hold out and surrender to the allies.

The commandant of the garrison, Captain 1st Rank Gerhard von Kampz, sent a letter to the British command, which was stationed in Hamburg, with a request to land on Bornholm. Von Kampz stressed that "until that time, he is ready to hold the line against the Russians."

On May 11, almost all Germans capitulated, but 4,000 people fought with the Red Army until May 19. The exact number of dead Soviet soldiers on the Danish island is unknown. You can find data on tens and hundreds of those killed. Some historians say that the British nevertheless landed on the island and fought with the Red Army.

This was not the first time the Allies had conducted joint operations with the Nazis. On May 9, 1945, the German units stationed in Greece, under the leadership of Major General Georg Bentak, surrendered to the 28th Infantry Brigade of General Preston, without waiting for the main British forces to approach.

The British were stuck in battles with the Greek communists, who united in the people's liberation army ELAS. On May 12, the Nazis and the British launched an offensive against the positions of the partisans. It is known that German soldiers participated in the battles until June 28, 1945.

• British soldiers in Athens. December 1944

Pockets of resistance

Thus, Moscow had every reason to doubt that the allies would not support the Wehrmacht fighters, who ended up both on the front line and in the rear of the Red Army.

Military publicist, historian Yuri Melkonov noted that powerful Nazi groups in May 1945 were concentrated not only in the Prague region. A certain danger was represented by the 300,000-strong German troops in Courland (western Latvia and part of East Prussia).

“Groups of Germans were scattered throughout Eastern Europe. In particular, large formations were located in Pomerania, Königsberg, Courland. They tried to unite, taking advantage of the fact that the USSR sent the main forces to Berlin. However, despite the difficulties in supply, the Soviet troops defeated them one by one, ”RT Melkonov told RT.

According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in the period from May 9 to May 17, the Red Army captured about 1.5 million enemy soldiers and officers and 101 generals.

Of these, 200 thousand people were Hitler's accomplices - mostly Cossack formations and soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) of the former Soviet military leader Andrei Vlasov. However, not all collaborators were captured or destroyed in May 1945.

Sufficiently intense fighting in the Baltic States went on until 1948. The resistance of the Red Army was not provided by the Nazis, but by the Forest Brothers, an anti-Soviet partisan movement that arose in 1940.

Another large-scale center of resistance was Western Ukraine, where anti-Soviet sentiments were strong. From February 1944, when the liberation of Ukraine was completed, and until the end of 1945, the nationalists carried out about 7,000 attacks and sabotage against the Red Army.

The combat experience gained while serving in various German formations allowed the Ukrainian militants to actively resist the Soviet troops until 1953.

author
Vadim Ninov

The main staircase to the Reichstag. There are 15 victory rings on the barrel of a broken anti-aircraft gun. In 1954, the damaged dome of the Reichstag was demolished because it could spontaneously collapse. In 1995, work began on the construction of a new dome. Today, to take a walk in the new glass dome, tourists line up no less than the one that once was at the Lenin Mausoleum.

In February 1945, Hitler declared Berlin a fortress, and in April, Nazi propaganda stated that Festung Berlin was the culmination of the battles on eastern front and should become a mighty bastion against which the furious wave of Soviet troops will break. Soviet historiography liked this statement about "Fortress Berlin" so much that it enthusiastically picked it up, multiplied it and put it as the basis for the official version of the assault on the capital of the Third Reich. But this is propaganda and pathos, and the real picture looked somewhat different.

Theoretically, the assault on Berlin could take place from two opposite directions: from the West - by the forces of the Allies and from the east - by the Red Army. This option was the most inconvenient for the Germans, because it would require the troops to be dispersed in different directions. However, in the hands of the German leadership there was a top secret plan of the Allies - "Eclipse" ("Eclipse" - an eclipse). According to this plan, all of Germany had already been divided in advance by the leadership of the USSR, England and the USA into zones of occupation. Clear boundaries on the map indicated that Berlin was withdrawing into the Soviet zone and that the Americans were to stop on the Elbe. Based on the captured plan, the German command could have strengthened its positions on the Oder at the expense of troops from the west, but this was not done in due measure. Contrary to the popular version, the troops of the 12th A Wenck did not actually turn their backs on the Americans and did not completely expose their defenses in the west, until the order of the Führer on April 22, 1945. Keitel recalled: "For several days in a row, Heinrici insistently demanded that Steiner's SS Panzer Group, and especially the Holste Corps, be subordinated to him to cover the southern flank. Jodl was categorically opposed, rightly objecting to Heinrici that he could not protect his flanks due to the rear cover of the Wenck army." But these are particulars, and the most blatant example of Hitler's tactical recklessness is the transfer of the bulk of the troops from the Ardennes not to the Oder, where the fate of Berlin and Germany was decided, but to a secondary sector in Hungary. The looming threat to Berlin was simply ignored.

The total area of ​​Berlin was 88,000 hectares. The length from west to east is up to 45 km, from north to south - more than 38 km. Only 15 percent were built up, the rest of the space was occupied by parks and gardens. The city was divided into 20 districts, of which 14 were external. The inner part of the capital was most densely built up. The districts were divided among themselves by large parks (Tiergarten, Jungfernheide, Treptow Park and others) with a total area of ​​131.2 hectares. The Spree flows through Berlin from southeast to northwest. There was a developed network of canals, especially in the northwestern and southern parts of the city, often with stone banks.

The general layout of the city was characterized by straight lines. The streets, intersecting at right angles, formed many squares. The average width of the streets is 20-30 m. The buildings are stone and concrete, the average height is 4-5 floors. By the beginning of the storm, a significant part of the buildings had been destroyed by bombardments. The city had up to 30 stations and dozens of factories. The largest industrial enterprises were located in the outer regions. The district railway passed through the city.

The length of metro lines is up to 80 km. The subway lines were shallow, often going outside and walking along flyovers. Berlin had a population of 4.5 million at the start of the war, but massive Allied bombing raids in 1943 forced an evacuation, reducing the population to 2.5 million. The exact number of civilians in the capital at the start of urban fighting is impossible to ascertain. Many Berliners evacuated east of the city returned home as the Soviet army approached, and there were also many refugees in the capital. On the eve of the battle for Berlin, the authorities did not call on the local population to evacuate, since the country was already overcrowded with millions of refugees. Nevertheless, everyone who was not employed in production or in the Volkssturm was free to leave. The number of civilians in different sources ranges from 1.2 million to 3.5 million people. Probably the most accurate figure is about 3 million.

Commandant of the Berlin Defense Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (in a trench)

In the winter of 1945, the tasks of the Berlin defense headquarters were concurrently performed by the headquarters of Wehrkeis III - the 3rd Corps District, and only in March did Berlin finally have its own defense headquarters. General Bruno Ritter von Haonschild was replaced as commander of the defense of the capital by Lieutenant General Helmut Reiman, Oberst Hans Refior became his chief of staff, Major Sprotte became the head of the operations department, Major Weiss was the head of supply, Oberstleutnat Plateau was the chief of artillery, Oberstleutnant Erike became his chief of communications, chief of engineering support - Oberst Lobek. Propaganda Minister Goebbels received the post of Imperial Defense Commissioner of Berlin. Relations between Goebbels and Reimann immediately developed a strained relationship, because Dr. Joseph unsuccessfully tried to subdue the military command. General Reiman repulsed the encroachments of a civil minister to command, but he made himself an influential enemy. On March 9, 1945, the plan for the defense of Berlin finally appeared. The author of a very vague 35-page plan was Major Sprotte. It was envisaged that the city would be divided into 9 sectors named from "A" to "H" and diverging clockwise from the ninth, central sector "Citadel", where government buildings were located. The citadel was supposed to be covered by two defense areas "Ost" - around Alexanderplatz and "West" - around the so-called Knee (Ernst-Reuther-Platz area). Oberst Lobeck was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying out defensive engineering work under the direction of the Reich Defense Commissioner. Quickly realizing that you couldn’t build much with one engineering battalion, the command consulted with Goebbels and received 2 Volkssturm battalions specially trained for construction work, and most importantly, workers from the civil construction organization Todt and Reichsarneitsdienst (Labor Services). The latter turned out to be the most valuable help, because they were the only ones who had the required equipment. Military engineers and engineering units were sent by sector commanders for specific jobs.

Fortification work on the Berlin direction began as early as February 1945, when a Soviet breakthrough to the capital was looming. However, contrary to all logic, fortification activities were soon curtailed! Hitler decided that since the Red Army did not dare to go to the weakly defended capital, the Soviet troops were completely exhausted and would not be able to conduct large-scale operations in the near future. While the Soviets were intensively building up their forces for the strike, the leadership of the OKW and OKH remained in blissful inactivity expressing solidarity with the Fuhrer. Engineering and defense work was restarted only at the very end of March, when the main human and material potential was already involved in the battle on the Oder, where the German front in the east finally collapsed.

The construction of a massive system of fortifications around and inside one of the largest cities in Europe required a clear organization and understanding of who is in charge of construction, who is responsible for planning and who is building. There was complete chaos in this matter. Formally, the Reich Defense Commissioner and part-time Berlin Defense Commissioner and at the same time the Minister of Information and Propaganda, a civilian, Dr. Goebbels, were responsible for the defense of Berlin, but it was really up to the military to defend the capital, which was represented by the military commandant of Berlin, General Reiman. The general rightly believed that since it was he who would lead the defense, it was he who should be responsible for the construction of fortifications, on which he would have to fight tomorrow. Goebbels was of a different opinion. Here a dangerous dualism of influences arose. The ambitious Goebbels was too zealous about his position and tried too actively to subdue the army. The army men, seeing the complete incompetence of the Minister of Propaganda, tried to protect their independence from civilian encroachments. They already had a gloomy example when SS Reichsführer Himmler decided on January 24, 1945 to command the Vistula Army Group, and this despite the fact that Reichsfuehrer cannot be called civil. When the collapse was ripe, on March 20, 1945, Himmler urgently handed over the reins of command of the army group to Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici and joyfully washed his hands. In Berlin, the stakes were higher. There was a paradoxical situation - 10 kilometers from Berlin, the military could build anything for themselves, but mostly on their own. And inside the 10-kilometer zone and in the capital itself, construction was subordinated to Goebbels. The irony is that Goebbels had to build spare positions just for the military, with whom he was not particularly willing to consult. As a result, fortifications around and in the capital itself were built completely mediocre, without the slightest understanding of tactical requirements, and their wretched quality deserves special mention. Moreover, materials and personnel of combat units were taken for useless construction, however, the military was involved as workers, and not as the main customer. For example, many anti-tank obstacles were erected around the city, from which there was little use or they generally interfered with the movement of their own troops, and therefore it was required to destroy them.

The Nazis optimistically planned to recruit up to 100,000 people for defensive work, but in reality the daily number barely reached 30,000 and only once reached 70,000. In Berlin, until the last moment, enterprises continued to operate, where workers were also required. In addition, it was necessary to ensure the daily transportation of tens of thousands of workers involved in the construction of defensive contours. The railway around the capital was overloaded, subjected to heavy air raids and worked intermittently. When the place of work was away from the railroad tracks, people had to be transported by buses and trucks, but there was no gasoline for this. To get out of the situation, local residents of nearby settlements were involved in the construction of remote frontiers, but they could not always provide the required number of workers for large-scale work. At the beginning, excavators were used for earthmoving work, but fuel shortages quickly forced mechanized labor to be abandoned. Most workers generally had to come with their tools. The shortage of entrenching tools forced the authorities to publish in the newspapers desperate appeals to the population to help with shovels and picks. And the population showed amazing affection for their shovels and did not want to give them away. Desperate haste and a shortage of building materials soon led to the abandonment of the construction of reinforced concrete structures. Mines and barbed wire were very limited. In any case, there was no time or energy left for large-scale work.

The defenders of Berlin also did not work out with ammunition. By the beginning of the urban battles in Berlin, there were three large ammunition depots - Martha's warehouse in the People's Park Hasenheide (southern sector of Berlin), the Mars warehouse in the Grunewald park on Teufelssee (western sector) and the Monica warehouse in the People's Park Jungfernheide (north-western sector). When the fighting began, these warehouses were 80% full. A small amount of ammunition was stored in a warehouse near the Tiergarten park. When the threat of a Soviet breakthrough from the north arose, two-thirds of Monica's stockpiles were transported by horse-drawn transport to the Mars warehouse. However, on April 25, a catastrophe happened - the warehouses of Martha and Mars went to Soviet troops. The defense leadership was initially confused with the warehouses, for example, the chief of artillery at Reiman's headquarters did not even hear about them. Reiman's main mistake was that instead of many small warehouses in the city itself, they organized three large warehouses in the outer sectors, where they quickly fell into the hands of the enemy. Perhaps Reiman was afraid that the authorities would not take away ammunition from him in favor of other troops and therefore did not advertise this issue even in his headquarters, preferring to stock up outside the city, away from the authorities' eyes. Reiman had something to fear - he was already deprived of troops and robbed like sticky. Later, the warehouses were probably to go to the 56th Panzer Corps when it withdrew to the city. On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Reimann from the post of commander of the Berlin Defense Region, which added to the general confusion. As a result, the entire defense of Berlin took place in the conditions of a severe shortage of ammunition among its defenders.

The defenders also could not boast of food. In the Berlin area there were civilian food warehouses and warehouses of the Wehrmacht. However, set up correct distribution The command could not stockpile under the prevailing conditions. This once again confirms the very low level organizing and planning the defense of Berlin. For example, on the south bank of the Teltow Canal there was a large food warehouse near Klein Machnow, behind the outer defensive line. When the first Soviet tank broke into the warehouse area and stopped just a few hundred meters away, Volksturmists from the opposite northern shore immediately visited the guards. Even under the noses of the enemy, the warehouse guards vigilantly and fearlessly drove away the ever-hungry Volkssturmists, because they did not have the appropriate waybill. However, the enemy did not get a crumb - at the last moment the warehouse was set on fire.

A sufficient supply of food was accumulated in civilian warehouses so that the population could eat autonomously for several months. However, the supply of the population was quickly disrupted, since most of the food depots were located outside the city and quickly fell into the hands of the Soviet troops. However, the distribution of the meager food that remained within the city continued even during urban battles. It got to the point that in the last days of the defense of Berlin, the defenders were starving.

On April 2, 1945, the head of the OKH, Jodl, ordered General Max Pemsel to urgently fly to Berlin. However, due to bad weather, he arrived only on April 12 and found out that it was on the eve of him, they wanted to appoint him commander of the defense of Berlin, but he was late. And Pemsel was happy. In Normandy, he headed the headquarters of the 7th Army and was well versed in fortification. Leaving the capital, the general assessed the Berlin fortifications simply: "extremely useless and ridiculous!" The same is said in the report of General Serov dated April 23, 1945, prepared for Stalin. Soviet experts stated that within a radius of 10-15 km from Berlin there are no serious fortifications, but in general, they are incomparably weaker than those that the Red Army had to overcome when storming other cities. It was under these conditions that the German garrison needed to repel the attack of two Soviet fronts ...

However, what was the Berlin garrison that stood guard over the capital of the Reich and Adolf Hitler personally? And he didn't represent anything. Prior to the departure of 56 TK to Berlin from the Seelow Heights, there was practically no organized defense of the city. The commander of the 56th TK, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling, saw the following: “Already on April 24, I was convinced that it was impossible to defend Berlin and from a military point of view it was pointless, since the German command did not have sufficient forces for this, moreover, by April 24 there was not a single regular formation at the disposal of the German command in Berlin, for with the exception of the security regiment "Gross Deutschland" and the SS brigade guarding the imperial office.

The entire defense was entrusted to the units of the Volkssturm, the police, the personnel of the fire brigade, the personnel of various rear units and service authorities.

Moreover, the defense was impossible not only numerically, but also organizationally: "It was clear to me that the current organization, i.e., the breakdown into 9 sections, was unsuitable for a long period of time, since all nine commanders of the sections (sectors) did not even have staffed and knocked together headquarters"(Weidling).

The Berlin Volksstrum is learning how to deal with faustpatrons. Not every Volkssturmist has undergone such training, and the majority saw how this weapon shoots only in a battle with Soviet tanks.

In fact, the entire defense structure of more than two million Berlin rested on the miserable remnants of the 56th Panzer Corps. On April 16, 1945, on the eve of the Berlin operation, the entire corps numbered up to 50,000 people, including the rear. As a result of bloody battles on the suburban defensive lines, the corps suffered huge losses and retreated to the capital, greatly weakened.

By the beginning of the fighting in the city itself, the 56th TC had:

18.Panzergrenadier-Division - 4000 people

"Muncheberg" Panzer Division - up to 200 people, artillery and 4 tanks

9. Fallschimjager Division - 4000 people (having entered Berlin, the division numbered about 500 people, and was replenished to 4000)

20. Panzergrenadier Division - 800-1200 human

11. SS "Nordland" Panzergrenadier Division - 3500-4000 people

Total: 13.000 - 15.000 people.

Armored personnel carrier SdKfz 250/1 of the company commander of the Swedish volunteers of the SS division Nordland Hauptsturmführer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson (Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson). The car was hit on the night of May 1-2, 1945, when it participated in an attempt to escape from Berlin through the Weidendamer Bridge and further along the Friedrichstrasse, on which it got into the frame. To the right of the car lies the murdered driver - Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson (Ragnar Johansson). Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson himself was wounded, but managed to escape and hide in a residential building, where he spent two days in the pantry. Then he went outside and met a woman who promised to help him with civilian clothes. However, instead of helping, she brought conscientious soldiers with her and Pehrsson was captured. Luckily for him, he had already changed his SS tunic to that of the Wehrmacht. Soon Pekhrson escaped from Soviet captivity, took refuge in a residential building and got hold of civilian clothes. After some time, he met his Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin (SS-Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin) and with him made his way to the British occupation zone, from where they got home to Sweden. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson returned to his homeland with the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class and 5 wounds.

SS Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson

Thus, at first glance, the capital was defended by 13,000-15,000 people of regular army formations. However, this is on paper, but in reality the picture was depressing. For example, the 20th Panzergrenadier Division already on April 24, 1945 consisted of 80% Volkssturmists and only 20% of the military. Can 800-1200 people be called a division? And if 80% of them are old people and children, then what kind of regular army formation is this? But in Berlin, such metamorphoses happened at every turn: formally a division is fighting, but in reality a small group of military men or a bunch of unprepared children and old people. The 20th Panzergrenadier Division, due to its weakness, was sent to the 5th sector in positions along the Teltow Canal to meet 12A Wenck.

In 9. Fallschirmjager Division the situation was no better. All over the world, airborne troops have always been considered the elite. And according to the documents, an elite division fought in Berlin airborne troops. Terrifying picture. But in reality, 500 battle-weary paratroopers were urgently diluted, not hard to guess by whom. Here is such an elite and such a division ...

The 11th Volunteer Division "Nordland" remained the most combat-ready formation. Paradoxically, it was foreigners who played a significant role in the defense of Berlin.

As part of the 56th TC, the remnants of the 408th Volks-Artillerie-Korps (408th People's Artillery Corps) also retreated to Berlin, the strength of the people who reached the capital is not exactly known, but so small that Weidling did not even mention him among his troops . 60% of the guns that ended up in Berlin had almost no ammunition. Initially, 408. Volks-Artillerie-Korps consisted of 4 light artillery battalions, two heavy artillery battalions with captured Soviet 152mm guns and one howitzer battalion with four howitzers.

In the foreground is the deceased SS Hauptsturmführer, next to him is an FG-42 Model II landing rifle and a landing helmet. The picture was taken at the intersection of Shossestrasse (in front) and Oranienburger Strasse (right), near the metro station Oranienburger Tor.

It is more difficult to determine the rest of the forces in the garrison. During interrogation, Weidling testified that when his corps entered the city: "The entire defense was entrusted to the units of the Volkssturm, the police, the personnel of the fire brigade, the personnel of various rear units and service authorities". Weidling did not have an exact idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthese forces, unsuitable for battles: “I think that the Volkssturm units, police units, fire departments, anti-aircraft units numbered up to 90,000 people, in addition to the rear units serving them.

In addition, there were divisions of the Volkssturm of the second category, i.e. those who joined the ranks of the defenders already during the battles and as certain enterprises were closed".

90,000 child-aged fire-logistics troops, not counting their rear, look simply grotesque and do not fit in with other sources. And this is against the backdrop of a meager number of troops of the 56th Panzer Corps. Such a suspicious discrepancy with the rest of the assessments raises serious doubts about the authenticity of Weidling's words, or rather those who compiled the interrogation protocol. And the interrogation was conducted by Comrade Trusov, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The very front that Berlin could not take in the promised 6 days; systematically disrupted the timing of the offensive; he failed not only to capture, but even to reach the outskirts of Berlin on Lenin's birthday, and after all, on April 22, the red flag was supposed to fly over Berlin for a day; failed to crush the remnants of the garrison for the holiday of May 1. With all this, the average daily losses of the Red Army in the Berlin operation were the highest in the entire war, although Comrade Trusov said that the front command had a complete idea of ​​the enemy and his forces in advance. On May 2, Soviet troops finally captured Berlin, but three times later than promised. How to justify before Stalin? That is why, probably, the idea was born to overestimate the enemy's forces. However, by whom? Regular formations are easy to account for and verify, but the Volkssturm leaves unlimited room for maneuver - here you can attribute as much as you like and say that the civilians simply fled, not wanting to experience the hospitality of Soviet captivity. It should be especially noted that by that time the Red Army had developed a practice of colossal overestimation of German losses, which sometimes became the reason for the corresponding proceedings. In the end, Weidling did not sign the interrogation protocol with a lawyer, if he signed it at all. And Weidling did not come out of Soviet captivity alive ... Helmut Weidling died in the second building of the Vladimir prison.

defenders of Berlin...

Let's deal with the Volkssturm in more detail. Before Weidling, the defense of Berlin was commanded by Lieutenant General Helmut Reiman (not counting two precocious generals) and under him the recruitment of the militias took place. Reiman quite reasonably believed that he would need 200,000 trained military men to defend the capital, but there were only 60,000 Volkstrumists available, of which 92 battalions were formed. The Germans joked that those who already can walk and those who yet can walk. There is only a fraction of a joke in this joke (*Hitler's decree about VS). The combat value of this "army" was below any criticism. As the commander of the Bergewalde Infantry Division, Lieutenant General W. Reitel, noted: "The Volkssturm is great in its design, but its military significance is very insignificant. The age of the people, their poor military training and the almost complete absence of weapons play a role here."

Propaganda. In short pants against Soviet tanks, and grandfather will cover if he does not lose points.

Formally, General Reiman had at his disposal 42,095 rifles, 773 submachine guns, 1953 light machine guns, 263 heavy machine guns, a small number of field guns and mortars. However, the use of this motley arsenal could be very limited. Reiman stated the armament of his militia as follows: “Their weapons were produced in all the countries with which or against which Germany fought: in Italy, Russia, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway and England. It was practically impossible to find ammunition for at least fifteen different types of rifles and ten types of machine guns. hopeless business." Those who had Italian rifles were the luckiest, because they received up to 20 rounds per person. The lack of ammunition reached the point that Greek cartridges had to be fitted to Italian rifles. And going into battle with non-standard, fitted cartridges against the regular Soviet army is not the best prospect for untrained old people and children. First day Soviet offensive each Volkssturmist with a rifle had an average of five rounds of ammunition. There were enough Faustpatrons, but they could not compensate for the lack of other weapons and the lack of military training. The combat value of the Volkssturm was so low that the regular units, heavily exhausted by battles, often simply disdained to be replenished at the expense of the militias: "When the question arose of replenishing my division with the Volkssturm, I refused it. The Volkssturmists would have reduced the combat effectiveness of my division and would have made even more unpleasant diversity in its already rather motley composition"(Lieutenant General Reitel). But that's not all. Weidling testified during interrogation that the Volkssturm had to be replenished with people as various enterprises closed. At the signal of "Clausewitz Muster", 52,841 more militiamen could be called up within 6 hours. But what to equip them with and where to get cartridges for a rich collection of foreign weapons? As a result, the Volkssturm was divided into two categories: those who had at least some kind of weapon - Volkssturm I and those who did not have it at all - Volkssturm II. Of the 60,000 child and elderly militias, only one-third were considered armed - about 20.000 . The remaining 40,000 unarmed militias could not fight and seriously replenish the losses. If the Soviet army had good reserves, and, in extreme cases, could throw into battle and the guards, then the militias could not afford this. And so they went into battle with only five rounds of ammunition, with a mighty reserve of 40,000 unarmed old men and children. Having honestly shot his meager "ammunition", the Volkssturmist could not borrow cartridges from his fellow soldier - their rifles are different.

The militia battalions were formed not according to the military scheme, but according to the party districts, so the quantitative composition of the motley battalions could vary greatly. Battalions could be divided into companies. Party members or reservists who were not trained in military affairs became commanders. Not a single battalion had its own headquarters. It is noteworthy that the Volkssturm did not even stand on allowance, did not have field kitchens, and he had to find his own food on his own. Even during the battles, the Volkssturmists ate what the locals would serve them. When the fighting went away from the place of residence of the Volksturmists, they had to eat what God would send, that is, starving. They also did not have their own transport and means of communication. The situation was aggravated by the fact that formally the entire leadership of the Volkssturm was in the hands of the party, and only after the Clausewitz code signal, which meant the beginning of the assault on the city, the militias were to go directly under General Reiman.

A dead German soldier on the steps of the Reich Chancellery. Please note that he has no shoes on, and his feet are tied with a tourniquet with a stick. Boxes are scattered on the stairs. German awards. Several different Soviet propaganda pictures are known from this site. It is possible that the deceased was put there for the sake of a "successful" frame. There were practically no battles for the Reich Chancellery itself. In its cellars there was a hospital with approximately 500 seriously wounded SS soldiers, as well as a bomb shelter with many civilian women and children, who were then subjected to abuse by the Red Army. The Soviet military occupying power soon demolished the building of the Reich Chancellery, and used the stone blocks of decorative sheathing to build a monument in Berlin to itself.

The entire military training of the Volkssturmists consisted of classes on weekends from approximately 17.00 to 19.00. In the classroom, Volksturm got acquainted with the device of small arms and Panzerfausts, however, training firing was extremely rare and not for everyone. Sometimes three-day courses were practiced in SA camps. In general, the preparation of the militia left much to be desired.

Initially, it was intended to use the Volkssturm in the rear against small enemy breakthroughs or a small enemy that had leaked through the defenses, to localize paratroopers, to guard rear positions and protect fortified buildings. There was nothing for them to do on the front lines. When the fighting moved to the territory of the Reich, the Volkssturm was forced to start using it on the front line, first as auxiliary units, and then in the front line defense role that was clearly not typical for it. In Berlin, an unarmed Volkssturm II was supposed to be behind the front line occupied by a poorly armed Volkssturm I and wait for someone to be killed to take his weapon. A grim prospect for children and the elderly. However, in some sectors this was the case.

If the average militia shoots 1 time per minute, the fight will not last long. It is not difficult to imagine with what accuracy untrained children and old people shot their cartridges. At a convenient opportunity, these "soldiers for 5 minutes" simply deserted or surrendered without a fight.

April 25, 1945, providing Stalin with Serov's report of April 23, 1945, Beria made an application that demonstrated the combat capability of the Volkssturm. Thus, the German defensive line 8 km from Berlin was held by the Volkssturm, recruited in February 1945 from men aged 45 and older. For 2-3 people without military training, there was one rifle and 75 rounds of ammunition. The Germans had the dubious pleasure of watching for an hour and a half how the units of the 2nd Guards. TA prepared to attack, but the militia did not fire a single artillery or mortar shot. All that the Volkssturm opposed to the Soviet tank army was a few single rifle shots and short bursts from a machine gun.

In the Soviet 5th shock army, after the battles, they rated their opponents as follows: "In Berlin, the enemy did not have field troops, let alone full-fledged personnel divisions. The bulk of his troops were special battalions, schools, police units and Volkssturm battalions. This was reflected in the tactics of his action and significantly weakened the defense of Berlin".

The commander of the Vistula Army Group, Generaloberst Heinrici, and the Minister of Armaments, Speer, perfectly understood all the drama and hopelessness of the situation. From a military point of view, it would be much easier to defend in a large city with many canals and strong buildings than in the countryside. However, this tactic would have led to enormous, senseless suffering for the inhabitants of a capital of more than two million people. Based on this, Heinrici decided to withdraw as many troops as possible from Berlin to practically unprepared positions, even before the start of fighting in the city. This meant that the troops would have to be sacrificed, but with the same outcome of the battle, the suffering of millions of citizens could have been avoided and destruction could be minimized. The leadership of the Vistula Army Group believed that with such a game of giveaway, the first Soviet tanks would reach the Reich Chancellery by April 22. Heinrici even tried to prevent Theodore Busse's 9th Army from retreating to the capital, and ostensibly to save the LVI Panzer Corps offered to send him south. On April 22, 1945, the 56th TC received an order from the 9th Army to join it south of the capital. The German generals were clearly withdrawing their troops from Berlin. Hitler ordered Weidling to lead the corps to Berlin, nevertheless Weidling wanted to go south. Only after the Fuhrer's order was duplicated on April 23, the 56th TC began to withdraw to the capital. Soon, Field Marshal Keitel demoted Hanrici for sabotage and invited him to shoot himself as an honest general, but the traitor Heinrici met his old age safely, and Keitel was hanged by the winners.

Frey's radar in the Tiergarten. In the background is the Victory Column in honor of the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. Between this column and the Brandenburg Gate on the East-West highway there was an improvised airstrip, the construction of which was hindered by Speer.

On the afternoon of April 18, General Reimann was shocked by the order from the Reich Chancellery to transfer all available troops to Busse's 9th Army to strengthen the second line of defense of Berlin. The order was duplicated by a phone call from Goebbels. As a result, 30 militia battalions and an air defense unit left the city. Later, these formations practically did not retreat to Berlin. It was such a serious blow to the Volkssturm, which could somehow protect the capital, that Lieutenant General Reiman said: "Tell Goebbels that all the possibilities of defending the capital of the Reich have been exhausted. Berliners are defenseless". On April 19, 24,000 Volsksturms remained in Berlin with a huge shortage of weapons. Although by the beginning of the urban battles the Volkssturm could be replenished numerically, the number of armed soldiers remained unchanged.

Given the acute shortage of weapons and ammunition in the capital, the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition Speer tried to make his feasible contribution to the defense of the "Fortress Berlin". When Reimann tried to equip an airstrip in the city center, between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column, Speer began to put up all sorts of opposition to him. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions, as well as Speer's Berlin apartment, were located on Pariserplatz just outside the Brandenburg Gate. The Minister of Armaments summoned General Reiman to him and scolded him under the ridiculous pretext that during the construction of the runway at a distance of 30 meters on each side of the roadway, bronze street poles were being demolished and trees were being cut down. The discouraged general tried to explain that this was necessary for the landing of transport aircraft. However, Speer stated that Reiman had no right to touch the poles. The clarification of the relationship reached Hitler. The Fuhrer allowed the poles to be demolished, but forbade cutting trees so as not to get hurt appearance center of the capital. But Speer did not let up and by his efforts the pillars remained unshakably standing still. With the beginning of urban battles, the Minister of Armaments was no longer in the capital (as were the weapons of most of the militias) and the pillars were finally removed. It was on this strip that, already in the midst of street fighting, on the evening of April 27, Hana Reitsch's Fi-156 landed, delivering General Ritter von Greim. The Führer summoned von Greim to appoint Goering as commander of the Luftwaffe. At the same time, Grime was wounded in the leg, and the aircraft was badly damaged. Soon, on a specially arrived Arado-96 training aircraft, Reitsch and von Greim flew away from Berlin right before the eyes of the Red Army. On the same airstrip, besieged Berlin received meager air supplies. In addition to the epic with the runway, the architect Speer also prevented the bridges from blowing up. Of the 248 bridges in Berlin, only 120 were blown up and 9 were damaged.

One of the last photos of Hitler. To the left of the Fuhrer is the head of the Hitler Youth, Reichsugendführer Arthur Axmann, who issued the order to use children in the battles for Berlin.

After the Volkssturm, the second largest category was firefighters, guards and all kinds of official authorities and institutions. They account for about 18,000 people. On April 19, this category consisted of 1,713 policemen, 1,215 members of the Hitler Youth and workers of the RAD and Todt, about 15,000 people in the military rear. At the same time, the Hitler Youth was a different story. On April 22, 1945, Goebbels stated in his last printed address to the people: "A fourteen-year-old kid crawling with his grenade launcher behind a collapsed wall on a scorched street means more to the nation than ten intellectuals trying to prove that our chances are zero." This phrase did not go unnoticed by the head of the Hitler Youth Arthur Axmann. Under his strict leadership, this National Socialist youth organization was also preparing to go through the crucible of battles. When Axmann told Weidling that he had ordered the use of children in battles, instead of gratitude, he ran into obscene expressions that contained a semantic message to let the children go home. A shamed Axmann promised to withdraw the order, but not all the children who had already gone to the positions received it. Near the bridge in Pichelsdorf, the Hitler Youth experienced the full power of the Soviet army.

One of these Volkssturmist children in Berlin was the 15-year-old Adolf Martin Bormann, the son of Martin Bormann, Hitler's deputy for the party and personal secretary. The boy received his first name in honor of his godfather, Adolf Hitler. It is noteworthy that Martin-Adolf celebrated his fifteenth birthday just two days before the start of the battle for Berlin. When the battle for the city was coming to a tragic end, Bormann Sr. ordered the adjutant to kill his son so that he would not be captured and become the object of insults and bullying. The adjutant disobeyed his superior and after the war, Martin Adolf became a Catholic priest and then a teacher of theology.

The Berlin garrison also included the Gross Deutschland SS security regiment (9 companies). However, after the fighting near Bloomberg, in the highway area northeast of the capital, only 40 survivors from the entire regiment, that is, out of about 1000 people, returned to the city.

Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, commandant of the Citadel. On April 6, 1941, on the first day of the Yugoslav campaign, he was wounded during an air raid and lost his foot, but remained in the service. Fleeing from strong pain in his leg, he became addicted to morphine. Frequent pain and morphinism affected the character. After one heated conversation with the head of the officer department of the SS personnel service, he lost his position and was sent to the psychiatric department of a military hospital in Würzburg. Monke soon returned to the service and made a career, receiving 6 very honorable awards and becoming Brigadeführer on January 30, 1945. He spent 10 years in Soviet captivity, until 1949 he was in solitary confinement. He was released on October 10, 1955. He died at the age of 90 on August 6, 2001 in the town of Damp, near Ekenförde, Schleswig-Holstein.

And, finally, the central 9th ​​sector "Citadel", defended by SS Kampfgruppe Mohnke, numbering about 2000 people. The defense of the Citadel was led by Colonel Seifert, but the government district inside the Citadel was run by SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohncke, whom Hitler personally appointed to this position. The government area included the Reich Chancellery, the Fuhrerbunker, the Reichstag and adjacent buildings. Mohnke reported directly to Hitler and Weidling could not order him. The Kampfgruppe Mohnke was urgently created on 04/26/1945 from scattered units and rear authorities of the SS:

remnants of the security regiment of the two-battalion division of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH Wach Regiment), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula (Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula)

training battalion from the same division (Panzer-Grenadier-Ersatz- & Ausbildungs-Bataillon 1 "LSSAH" from Spreenhagenn, 25 km southeast of Berlin), commander Obersturmbannfuhrer Klingemeier. The day before, part of the 12 companies of the training base in Spreenhagen left as part of the Falke regiment in the 9th Busse Army. The rest of the personnel was sent to Berlin and included in the Anhalt regiment.

Hitler's guard company (Fuhrer-Begleit-Kompanie), commander Hitler's adjutant Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche (Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche)

Himmler's guard battalion (Reichsfuhrer SS Begleit Battalion), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle (Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle)

The scattered and small SS forces Brigadeführer Monke brought together into two regiments.

The 1st Regiment "Anhalt" of the Kampfgruppe "Monke", named after the commander of the Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt (SS-Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt). When Anhalt died, on 04/30/45 the regiment was renamed by the name of the new commander - "Wal" (SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Kurt Wahl). The regiment consisted of two battalions manned by Wachbataillon Reichskanzlei, Ersatz- und Ausbildungsbataillon "LSSAH", Fuhrerbegleit-Kompanie, Begleit-Kompanie "RFSS".

The regiment fought in positions:
1st battalion - railway railway station on Friedrichsstraße, along the line Spree, Reichstag, Siegesallee
2nd Battalion - Moltkestrasse, Tiergarten, Potsdamer Pltatz.

2nd Regiment "Falke" of the Kampfgruppe "Monke". Formed from disparate rear authorities.
Fought in positions: Potsdamer Platz, Leipzigstrasse, Ministry of the Air Force, Railway Station on Friedrichsstrasse.

Sometimes in Soviet and Western sources, the Charlemagne division is mentioned among the defenders of Berlin. The word "division" sounds proud and implies a lot of soldiers. This needs to be dealt with. After bloody battles in Pomerania, out of about 7500 people of the 33rd Grenadier Division of the French Charlemagne Volunteers (33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne (franzosische Nr. 1), approximately 1100 survived. They were gathered in Macklenburg for replenishment and reformation, but after brutal unsuccessful battles, many of the will to fight was so low that the volunteers were released from their oath. Nevertheless, about 700 people decided to fight to the end. After the reorganization, one regiment of two-battalion strength remained - the Waffen-Grenadier-Rgt. der SS "Charlemagne ". 400 people who did not want to fight anymore were brought to Baubataillon (construction battalion) and used for earthworks. On the night of April 23-24, 1945, Hitler ordered from the Reich Chancellery to use all available transport and immediately come to Berlin. The Führer's personal order addressed to such a small, weakened unit, was in itself an extremely unusual affair.The division commander, SS-Brigadeführer Krukenberg, commanded a storm battalion (Franzosisches freiwilligen-sturmbataillon der SS "Charlemagne") from combat-ready units of the 57th Grenadier Battalion and the 6th Company of the 68th Grenadier Battalion, units of the division's training school (Kampfschule) were added to them. Henri Fene became the battalion commander. The assault battalion departed on 9 trucks and two light vehicles. However, two trucks were never able to reach their destination, so only 300-330 people arrived in Berlin. This was the last replenishment to reach the capital by land before the city was surrounded by Soviet troops. At the Olympic Stadium, the assault battalion was immediately reorganized into 4 rifle companies of 60-70 people each and subordinated to the Nordland Panzer-Grenadier Division (11. SS-Frw.Panzer-Gren.Division "Nordland"). Weidling immediately removed the commander of this division, SS-Brigadeführer Ziegler, who was in no hurry to arrive at Weidling's disposal, and replaced him with the determined Krukenberg. Highly motivated French volunteers made an invaluable contribution to the defense of the city - they accounted for about 92 destroyed Soviet tanks out of 108 destroyed in the area of ​​the Nordland division. It can be said that these soldiers were in right time in the right place, despite the fact that they suffered huge losses in a hopeless battle. On May 2, 1945, about 30 surviving people from the Charlemagne were captured by the Soviets near the Potsdam railway station.

After the Charlemagne, the last meager replenishment arrived on the night of 26 April. Cadets of the naval school from Rostock were transferred to Berlin by transport aircraft, in the amount of one battalion of three companies. The battalion "Grossadmiral Donitz" of Commander Kuhlmann was placed at the disposal of Brigadeführer Mohnke. The sailors took up defense in the park near the Foreign Ministry building on Wilhelmstrasse.

On February 22, 1945, the formation began Panzer-Kompanie (bodenstandig) "Berlin"(special tank company "Berlin"). The company consisted of damaged tanks, in which the engine or running gear could not be repaired, but suitable for use as pillboxes. In two days, by February 24, 1945, the company received 10 Pz V and 12 Pz IV. The crew in fixed firing points was reduced by two people, to the commander, gunner and loader. Soon the company was reinforced with several pillboxes with turrets from Panther tanks. It was the so-called Panther Turm, which was already in service and used in the West, in particular in the Gothic Line. The bunker consisted of a tower from a Panther (sometimes specially made for such a bunker, and a turret concrete or metal section dug into the ground. The bunker was usually installed at large intersections and could be connected by an underground passage to the basement of a neighboring building.

Flakturm. In front of the tower, two twisted ISs froze surprisingly symmetrically. The three anti-aircraft towers of Berlin were powerful centers of defense.

In Berlin was the 1st air defense division "Berlin" (1. "Berlin" Flak Division), as well as units of the 17th and 23rd air defense divisions. In April 1945, anti-aircraft units consisted of 24 12.8-cm guns, 48 ​​10.5-cm guns, 270 8.8-mm guns, 249 2-cm and 3.7-cm guns. Since November 1944, in the searchlight units, all men of the rank and file were replaced by women, and prisoners of war, mostly Soviet ones, were used in auxiliary roles as ammunition carriers and loaders. At the beginning of April 1945, almost all anti-aircraft artillery was reduced to anti-aircraft strike groups and withdrawn from the city to the outer defensive bypass, where it was used mainly to combat ground targets. Three anti-aircraft towers remained in the city - in the Zoo, Humboldhain, Friedrichshain and two heavy anti-aircraft batteries in Temelhof and Eberswaldstrasse. By the end of April 25, the Germans had 17 partially combat-ready batteries left, along with turrets. By the end of April 28, 6 anti-aircraft batteries survived, with 18 guns and 3 more separate guns. By the end of April 30, there were 3 combat-ready heavy batteries (13 guns) in Berlin.

At the same time, anti-aircraft towers were bomb shelters for thousands of civilians. There were also artistic treasures, in particular the gold of Schliemann from Troy and the famous statuette of Nefertiti.

The defenders of Berlin received unexpected help already during the assault on the city. April 24-25, 1945 Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249 under the command of Hauptmann Herbert Jaschke (Herbert Jaschke), received in Spandau 31 new self-propelled guns from the Alkett Berlin plant. On the same day, the brigade was ordered to move west to the Krampnitz area to participate in the attack against the Americans on the Elbe. However, the counterattack against the Allies took place before the arrival of the Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249, so the brigade remained in Berlin, in the Brandenburg Gate area. In the capital, the brigade fought in the area of ​​Frankfurterallee, Landsbergstrasse, Alexanderplatz. On April 29, 1945, the fighting moved to the area of ​​the Higher Technical School, where the brigade's command post was located. On April 30, only 9 StuGs remained in the brigade, which retreated with fighting to Berliner Strasse. After the fall of Berlin, 3 surviving self-propelled guns and several trucks managed to escape from the city and reach Spandau, where the last self-propelled guns were hit. The rest of the brigade was divided into two groups. A group led by commander Hauptmann Yashke went out to the Americans and surrendered, and the second group was destroyed by Soviet troops.

The defense of the city was strengthened by 6 anti-tank and 15 artillery battalions.

On the issue of the number of the Berlin garrison, the testimony of the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 56th Panzer Corps, Siegfried Knappe, plays a huge role: "The report [...] states that the other units in Berlin were the equivalent of two or three divisions and that the Waffen SS were the equivalent of half a division. All together, according to the report, about four to five divisions of 60,000 men with 50-60 tanks ".

In the early 1950s, the American Command in Europe asked the former German military to compile an analysis of the defense of Berlin. This document comes to the same figures - 60,000 men and 50-60 tanks.

In general, for all the differences, the figures from most independent sources converge to a common figure. There were definitely not 200,000 defenders in Berlin, much less 300,000.

The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces P. Rybalko, stated bluntly: "If the Cottbus group [of the enemy] united with the Berlin one, it would be the second Budapest. If we had 80,000 people [of the enemy] in Berlin, then this number would then be replenished to 200,000 and we would not solve the problem of capturing Berlin for 10 days".

For comparison, the Soviet army involved in the assault directly on the city 464.000 people and 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

footnotes and comments

1 Cornelius Ryan - The Last Battle - M., Centerpolygraph, 2003

On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Lieutenant General Reimann from the post of commander of the defense of Berlin for defeatist sentiments. It was rumored that Goebbels had a hand in this, who, seeking to expand his influence, invited Reiman to move to his CP. Reimann rejected the proposal of the Reich Minister under the obviously far-fetched pretext that if two leaders of the defense of the capital were at the same command post, then there was a danger that the entire defense could be decapitated by an accidental explosion. As Reiman later noted, the anti-aircraft tower at the Zoo could actually withstand a direct hit from almost any bomb. Instead of Reimann, Hitler appointed Colonel Kiter (Ernst Kaeter), who was immediately promoted to major general. Prior to this, Kiter was the chief of staff of the political department of the army and this aroused the confidence of the leader. However, in the evening, the Fuhrer took command of the defense of Berlin, in which he was to be assisted by his adjutant Erich Berenfanger, who was urgently promoted to the rank of major general. And finally, on April 23, Hitler entrusted the defense of the capital and practically his life to the commander of the 56th TK, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling.

4 Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London-Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

5 http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm (GARF 9401/2/95 p.304-310)

6 Beevor E. - The fall of Berlin. 1945

7 Ilya Moshchansky. Tankmaster, No. 5/2000

sources

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Gottfried Tornau, Franz Kurowski -- Sturmartillerie (Gebunden Ausgabe)-- Maximilian-Verl., 1965

History of the Second World War 1939-1945-- M., Military publishing house 1975

Anthony Beevor website (http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm)

Dr. S. Hart & Dr. R. Hart- German Tanks of World War II -- ,1998

Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London-- Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

de La Maziere, Christian -- The Captive Dreamer

Littlejohn, David -- Foreign Legions of the Third Reich

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Wilhelm Willemar, Oberst a.D. -- THE GERMAN DEFENSE OF BERLIN-- Historical Division, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, 1953

Reichsgesetztblatt 1944, I / Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Documenten. 3.durchgesehene und erganzte Auflage. Wehr-und-Wissen Verlagsgesselschaft. Darmstadt, 1959 / World War II: Two Views. - M .: Thought, 1995
(http://militera.lib.ru/)

On April 23, Hitler was informed that the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, Weidling, had moved his headquarters and was already west of Berlin, although he had to defend it. Based on this rumor, Hitler ordered the general to be shot. But he came straight to the bunker where the top leadership was hiding Nazi Reich, and reported that his headquarters was almost at the forefront. Then Hitler changed his mind about shooting Weidling, and on April 24 he appointed him commander of the defense of Berlin. “It would have been better if Hitler had upheld the order to execute me,” Weidling said upon learning the news. But he accepted the appointment.

Berlin militia. (topwar.ru)

It turned out that Hitler was impressed by the courage of the general who did not run from the front line. After all, he no longer had practically a single worthy commander left to defend the city, which he planned to turn into a German version of the battle for Moscow: to defeat the Soviet army in a defensive battle and go on the counteroffensive. Hitler persisted to the last: "If Berlin falls into the hands of the enemy, then the war will be lost." Of course, the Fuhrer's crazy plans could not have been realized even by the best commander.

Day after day, the German defense forces, glued together from the remnants of broken and battered units, from the militias and teenagers of the Hitler Youth, retreated and surrendered. Every day Weidling reported to Hitler on the situation. On April 30, when it became clear even to Hitler that the fight was futile, he killed his beloved dog, and then he and his wife Eva Hitler (Brown) committed suicide. Upon learning of this, on the morning of May 2, General Weidling surrendered to the Russians, signed the act of surrender and ordered the remaining German troops in Berlin to cease resistance. The battle for Berlin is over. On May 3, 1945, Weidling was already testifying to Soviet investigators at the Intelligence Staff of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Weidling, like many officers, complained about the degradation of the German command during the war, caused by Hitler’s desire to personally control the actions of all troops: “I must note that the Russians took a long step forward in the tactical sense during the war, but our command stepped back. Our generals are "paralyzed" in their actions, the corps commander, the army commander and partially the commander of the army group did not have any independence in their actions. The commander of the army does not have the right to transfer the battalion at his own discretion from one sector to another without Hitler's sanction. Such a system of command and control of troops repeatedly led to the death of entire formations. There is no need to even talk about the commanders of divisions and corps, they were generally deprived of the opportunity to act according to the situation, to take the initiative, everything must be done according to the plan from above, and these plans often did not correspond to the situation at the front.

Weidling testified that although food and ammunition were available in Berlin for 30 days, they could not be delivered normally, and the warehouses located on the outskirts were captured by Soviet troops. 4 days after being appointed commander of the defense, Weidling's troops had practically nothing to resist.

Question: What were Hitler's orders regarding the defense of Berlin? Light up the situation in Berlin at the time of your surrender.

Answer: Having been appointed commander of the defense of Berlin, I received an order from Hitler to defend Berlin to the last man. It was clear to me from the very first moment that there was no way to defend Berlin with the hope of success. Every day the position of the defenders worsened, the Russians squeezed the ring around us more and more, every day getting closer and closer to the city center. I reported daily to Hitler in the evening the situation and the situation.

By April 29, the situation with ammunition and food became very difficult, especially with ammunition. I realized that further resistance, from a military point of view, is insane and criminal. On the evening of April 29, after an hour and a half report by me to Hitler, in which I emphasized that there was no way to continue resistance, that all hopes for air supplies had collapsed, Hitler agreed with me and told me that he had given special orders for the transfer of ammunition by aircraft, and that if on April 30 the situation with the delivery of ammunition and food by air does not improve, he will give sanction for the abandonment of Berlin, for an attempt by the troops to break through.

This was the last meeting between Weidling and Hitler. The next day, he committed suicide and gave the general freedom of action, which he immediately took advantage of: “I gave the order to the units, who can and wants to, let them break through, the rest to lay down their arms. On May 1, at 21:00, I gathered the employees of the headquarters of the 56th TK and the employees of the Berlin defense headquarters in order to decide whether the headquarters would break through or surrender to the Russians. I declared that further resistance was useless, that to break out of the cauldron means, if successful, to get from the "cauldron" to the "cauldron". All the employees of the headquarters supported me, and on the night of May 2 I sent Colonel von Dufing as a truce to the Russians with a proposal to stop the resistance by the German troops. […] Although I was the commander of the defense of Berlin, the situation in Berlin was such that after my decision, I felt safe only with the Russians.

Later, General Helmut Weidling was convicted by the Soviet investigation and confessed to war crimes committed under his command on the territory of the USSR. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He died in 1955 in the Vladimir Central and was buried there.