It was April last year war. She was nearing completion. Nazi Germany was in agony, but Hitler and his entourage were not going to stop fighting, hoping until last minutes to split the anti-Hitler coalition. They put up with the loss of the western regions of Germany and threw the main forces of the Wehrmacht against the Red Army, trying to prevent the capture of the central regions of the Reich, primarily Berlin, by the Red Army. The Nazi leadership put forward the slogan: "It is better to surrender Berlin to the Anglo-Saxons than to let the Russians into it."

By the beginning of the Berlin operation, 214 enemy divisions were operating on the Soviet-German front, including 34 tank and 15 motorized and 14 brigades. Against the Anglo-American troops, 60 divisions remained, including 5 tank divisions. At that time, the Nazis still had certain stocks of weapons and ammunition, which made it possible for the fascist command to put up stubborn resistance on the Soviet-German front in the last month of the war.

Stalin was well aware of the complexity of the military-political situation on the horseback of the end of the war and knew about the intention of the fascist elite to surrender Berlin to the Anglo-American troops, therefore, as soon as the preparations for the decisive blow were completed, he ordered the Berlin operation to begin.

Large forces were allocated for the attack on Berlin. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (Marshal G.K. Zhukov) numbered 2,500,000 people, 6,250 tanks and self-propelled guns, 41,600 guns and mortars, 7,500 combat aircraft.

They are at the front with a length of 385 km. the troops of Army Group Center (Field Marshal F. Scherner) opposed. It consisted of 48 infantry divisions, 9 tank divisions, 6 motorized divisions, 37 separate infantry regiments, 98 separate infantry battalions, as well as a large number of artillery and special units and formations, numbering 1,000,000 people, 1,519 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10,400 guns and mortars, 3,300 combat aircraft, including 120 Me.262 jet fighters. Of these, 2.000 in the Berlin area.

The Vistula Army Group, which defended Berlin from the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, who occupied the Kustrinsky bridgehead, was commanded by Colonel General G. Heintsiri. As part of the Kustrinsky grouping, which numbered 14 divisions, were: the 11th SS Panzer Corps, the 56th Panzer Corps, the 101st Army Corps, the 9th Parachute Division, the 169th, 286th, 303rd "Deberitz", 309 -I "Berlin", 712th Infantry Division, 606th Division special purpose, 391st security division, 5th light infantry division, 18th, 20th motorized divisions, 11th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Nordland", 23rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Netherland", 25- 1st tank division, 5th and 408th artillery corps of the RGK, 292nd and 770th anti-tank artillery divisions, 3rd, 405th, 732nd artillery brigades, 909th brigade of assault guns, 303rd and 1170th assault gun battalions, 18th engineer brigade, 22 spare artillery battalions (3117-3126th, 3134-33139th, 3177th, 3184th, 3163-3166th), 3086th, 3087th artillery battalions and other parts. At the front, 44 km. 512 tanks and 236 assault guns were concentrated, a total of 748 tanks and self-propelled guns, 744 field guns, 600 anti-aircraft guns, a total of 2,640 (or 2,753) guns and mortars.

There were 8 divisions in reserve in the Berlin direction: tank-grenadier divisions "Müncheberg", "Kurmark" infantry divisions 2nd "Friedrich Ludwig Jahn", "Theodor Kerner", "Scharnhorst", 1st training parachute division, 1st motorized division, the Hitler Youth tank destroyer brigade, the 243rd and 404th assault gun brigades.

Nearby, on the right flank, in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they occupied positions, the 21st Panzer Division, the Bohemia Panzer Division, the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", the 13th Motorized Division, the 32nd SS Infantry Division " January 30th, 35th SS Police Division, 8th, 245th, 275th Infantry Divisions, Saxony Infantry Division, Burg Infantry Brigade.

In the Berlin direction, a defense in depth was prepared, the construction of which began as early as January 1945. It was based on the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive area. The Oder-Neisen defensive line consisted of three lanes, between which the most important directions there were intermediate and cut-off positions. The total depth of this boundary reached 20-40 km. The forward edge of the main line of defense ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers, with the exception of the bridgeheads at Frankfurt, Guben, Forst and Muskau.

Settlements were turned into powerful strongholds. The Nazis prepared to open the floodgates on the Oder in order to flood a number of areas if necessary. A second line of defense was created 10-20 km from the front line. The most equipped in engineering terms, it was on the Seelow Heights - in front of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead. The third lane was located at a distance of 20-40 km from the leading edge of the main lane. Like the second, it consisted of powerful knots of resistance, interconnected by communication passages.

During the construction of defensive lines, the fascist command paid special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense, which was based on a combination of artillery fire, assault guns and tanks with engineering barriers, dense mining of tank-accessible areas and the mandatory use of rivers, canals and lakes. In addition, Berlin's anti-aircraft artillery was aimed to fight the tanks. In front of the first trench, and in the depths of defense at the intersection of roads and along their sides, there were tank destroyers armed with faustpatrons.

In Berlin itself, 200 Volkssturm battalions were formed, and the total strength of the garrison exceeded 200,000 people. The garrison included: 1st, 10th, 17th, 23rd anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 81st, 149th, 151st, 154th, 404th reserve infantry divisions, 458- I am a reserve grenadier brigade, 687th sapper brigade, SS motorized brigade "Führerbegleit", security regiment "Grossdeutschland", 62nd fortress regiment, 503rd separate heavy tank battalion, 123rd, 513th anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 116th fortress machine gun battalion, 301st, 303rd, 305th, 306th, 307th, 308th battalions marines, 539th security battalion, 630th, 968th engineer battalions, 103rd, 107th, 109th, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 301st, 308th, 313 th, 318th, 320th, 509th, 617th, 705th, 707th, 713th, 803rd, 811th "Rolland", 911th Volkssturm battalions, 185- 1st Construction Battalion, 4th Air Force Training Battalion, 74th Air Force Marching Battalion, 614th Tank Destroyer Company, 76th Signal Training Company, 778th Assault Company, 101st, 102nd Companies of the Spanish Legion, 253 th, 255th police units and other units. (On the defense of the motherland, p. 148 (TsAMO, f. 1185, op. 1, d. 3, l. 221), 266th Artyomovsko-Berlinskaya st. 131, 139 (TsAMO, f. 1556, op. 1, d .8, l.160) (TsAMO, f.1556, op.1, d.33, l.219))

The Berlin defensive area included three ring bypass. The outer bypass passed along rivers, canals and lakes 25-40 km from the center of the capital. The internal defensive bypass ran along the outskirts of the suburbs. All strongholds and positions were interconnected in terms of fire. Numerous anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire were installed on the streets. Its total depth was 6 km. The third - the city bypass passed along the district railway. All streets leading to the center of Berlin were blocked by barricades, bridges were prepared to be blown up.

The city was divided into 9 defensive sectors, the central sector was the most fortified. The streets and squares were open to artillery and tanks. DOTs were built. All defensive positions were interconnected by a network of communication passages. For covert maneuvers, forces widely used the metro, the length of which reached 80 km. The Nazi leadership ordered: "hold Berlin to the last bullet."

Two days before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the bands of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. On April 14, after a 15-20 minute fire raid, reinforced rifle battalions began to operate in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front. Then, in a number of sectors, regiments of the first echelons were also brought into battle. During the two-day battles, they managed to penetrate the enemy defenses and capture certain sections of the first and second trenches, and advance up to 5 km in some directions. The integrity of the enemy defense was broken.

Reconnaissance in combat in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front was carried out on the night of April 16 by reinforced rifle companies.

Berlin offensive began April 16, 1945. The attack of tanks and infantry began at night. At 05-00, Soviet artillery opened the most powerful fire in the entire war. 22,000 guns and mortars participated in the artillery preparation. The density of artillery reached 300 barrels per 1 km of the front. Immediately after this, the German positions were suddenly illuminated by 143 anti-aircraft searchlights. At the same time, hundreds of tanks with lit headlights and infantry of the 3rd, 5th shock, 8th guards, 69th armies moved towards the blinded Nazis. The advanced positions of the enemy were soon broken through. The enemy was heavily damaged, and therefore his resistance for the first two hours was disorganized. The advancing troops wedged by noon into the depth of the enemy defense for 5 km. The greatest success in the center was achieved by the 32nd Rifle Corps of General D.S. Zherebin of the 3rd shock army. He advanced 8 km and went to the second line of defense. On the left flank of the army, the 301st Rifle Division took an important stronghold - the Verbig railway station. The 1054th Infantry Regiment distinguished itself in battles for it. The 16th Air Army provided great assistance to the advancing troops. During the day, its aircraft made 5.342 sorties and shot down 165 German aircraft.

However, at the second line of defense, the key to which was the Seelow Heights, the enemy was able to delay the advance of our troops. The troops of the 8th Guards Army and the 1st Guards Army brought into battle suffered significant losses. The Germans, fighting off unprepared attacks, destroyed 150 tanks and 132 aircraft. The Seelow Heights dominated the area. They opened a view for many kilometers to the east. The slopes were very steep. The tanks could not climb them to the top and were forced to move along the only road, which was under fire from all sides. The Spreewald forest prevented the Seelow Heights from being bypassed.

The battles for the Seelow Heights were extremely stubborn. The 172nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 57th Guards Rifle Division was able to occupy the outskirts of the city of Zeelov after fierce battles, but the troops could not advance further.

The enemy hastily transferred reserves to the heights and during the second day several times launched strong counterattacks. The advance of the troops was insignificant. By the end of April 17, the troops reached the second line of defense, units of the 4th Rifle and 11th Tank Guards Corps took Zeelov in bloody battles, but failed to capture the heights.

Marshal Zhukov ordered the attacks to stop. The troops were regrouped. The artillery of the front was brought up, which began processing enemy positions. On the third day, heavy fighting continued in the depths of the enemy's defenses. The Nazis brought into battle almost all of their operational reserves. Soviet troops slowly, in bloody battles, moved forward. By the end of April 18, they had covered 3-6 km. and went to the approaches to the third defensive strip. Progress was still slow. In the strip of the 8th Guards Army along the highway going to the west, the Nazis installed 200 anti-aircraft guns. Here their resistance was most fierce.

In the end, the pulled up artillery and aviation crushed the enemy forces, and by the end of April 19, the troops of the shock group broke through the third defensive zone and advanced to a depth of 30 km in four days, having the opportunity to develop an offensive against Berlin and bypassing it from the north. The battles for the Seelow Heights were bloody for both sides. The Germans lost up to 15,000 killed and 7,000 captured on them.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed more successfully. On April 16, at 06:15, artillery preparation began, during which the reinforced battalions of the divisions of the first echelon advanced to the Neisse and, after shifting artillery fire under the cover of a smoke screen placed on a 390-kilometer front, began crossing the river. The first echelon of the attackers crossed Neisse for an hour, while artillery preparation was underway.

At 0840, the troops of the 3rd, 5th Guards and 13th armies began to break through the main defensive line. The fighting took on a fierce character. The Nazis launched powerful counterattacks, but by the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the shock group had broken through the main line of defense on the front of 26 km and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

The next day, the forces of both tank armies of the front were introduced into the battle. Soviet troops repulsed all enemy counterattacks and completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense. In two days, the troops of the shock group of the front advanced 15-20 km. The enemy began to retreat behind the Spree.

In the Dresden direction, the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army, after entering the battle of the 1st Polish and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, also completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and advanced in some areas up to 20 km in two days of hostilities.

On the morning of April 18, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies reached the Spree and crossed it on the move, broke through the third defensive line on a 10-kilometer stretch and captured a bridgehead north and south of Spremberg.

In three days, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 30 km in the direction of the main attack. Significant assistance to the attackers was provided by the 2nd Air Army, which made 7,517 sorties during these days and shot down 155 enemy aircraft. Front troops bypassed Berlin from the south. The tank armies of the front broke into the operational space.

On April 18, units of the 65th, 70th, 49th armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front began forcing the Ost-Oder. Having overcome the resistance of the enemy, the troops captured bridgeheads on the opposite bank. On April 19, the units that crossed over continued to destroy enemy units in the interfluve, concentrating on dams on the right bank of the river. Having overcome the swampy floodplain of the Oder, the troops of the front occupied on April 20 an advantageous position for forcing the West-Oder.

On April 19, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced 30-50 km to the north-west, reached the Lübbenau, Luckau area and cut the communications of the 9th Field Army. All attempts by the enemy's 4th Panzer Army to break through to the crossings from the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg failed. Troops of the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies moving to the west reliably covered the communications of the tank armies, which allowed the tankmen to advance another 45-60 km the next day. And go to the approaches to Berlin. The 13th Army advanced 30 km.

The rapid advance of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies led to the cutting off of the Vistula Army Group from the Center Army Group, the enemy troops in the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg were in a semi-encirclement.

On the morning of April 22, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, having deployed all three corps in the first echelon, began an attack on enemy fortifications. Army troops broke through the outer defensive bypass of the Berlin region and by the end of the day started fighting on the southern outskirts of the German capital. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front broke into its northeastern outskirts the day before.

On April 22, the 4th Guards Tank Army of General Lelyushenko, operating to the left, broke through the outer defenses of Berlin and reached the Zarmund-Belitz line.

While the formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were rapidly bypassing the German capital from the south, the shock group of the 1st Belorussian Front was advancing on Berlin directly on Berlin from the east. After breaking through the Oder line, the troops of the front, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, moved forward. April 20 at 13-50 long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps opened fire on Berlin. By the end of April 21, the 3rd and 5th shock and 2nd guards tank armies overcame resistance on the outer contour of the Berlin defensive area and reached its northeastern outskirts. The first to break into Berlin were the 26th Guards and 32nd Rifle Corps, the 60th, 89th, 94th Guards, 266th, 295th, 416th Rifle Divisions. By the morning of April 22, the 9th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Havel River, on the northwestern outskirts of the capital, and, together with units of the 47th Army, began to force it.

The Nazis made desperate efforts to prevent the encirclement of Berlin. On April 22, at the last operational meeting, Hitler agreed with the proposal of General A. Jodl to remove all troops from the western front and throw them into the battle for Berlin. The 12th field army of General W. Wenck was ordered to leave their positions on the Elbe and break through to Berlin and join the 9th field army. At the same time, the army group of SS General F. Steiner received an order to strike at the flank of the grouping of Soviet troops, which bypassed Berlin from the north and northwest. The 9th Army was ordered to withdraw to the west to link up with the 12th Army.

The 12th Army, on April 24, turning its front to the east, attacked units of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies occupying the defenses at the Belitz-Treuenbritzen line.

On April 23 and 24, fighting in all directions took on a particularly fierce character. The pace of advancement of the Soviet troops slowed down, but the Germans did not succeed in stopping our troops. Already on April 24, the troops of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front joined with units of the 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front southeast of Berlin. As a result, the main forces of the 9th Field and part of the forces of the 4th Tank Army were cut off from the city and surrounded. The next day, after joining west of Berlin, in the Ketzin area, the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front was surrounded by the actual Berlin enemy grouping.

On April 25, Soviet and American troops met on the Elbe. In the Torgau area, units of the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army crossed the Elbe and established contact with the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st US Army. Germany was divided into two parts.

The counterattack of the Görlitz grouping of the enemy, launched on April 18, by April 25 was finally thwarted by the stubborn defense of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army.

The offensive of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began on the morning of April 20 with the crossing of the West Oder River. The 65th Army achieved the greatest success on the first day of the operation. By evening, she captured several small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. By the end of April 25, the troops of the 65th and 70th armies completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense, advancing 20-22 km. Using the success of the neighbors on the crossings in the zone of the 65th Army, the 49th Army crossed and launched an offensive, followed by the 2nd Shock Army. As a result of the actions of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 3rd German Panzer Army was pinned down and could not take part in the battles in the Berlin direction.

On the morning of April 26 Soviet troops launched an offensive against the encircled Frankfurt-Guben group, trying to cut and destroy it piece by piece. The enemy offered stubborn resistance and tried to break through to the west. Two infantry, two motorized and tank divisions of the enemy struck at the junction of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies. The Nazis broke through the defenses in a narrow area and began to move west. During fierce battles, our troops closed the neck of the breakthrough, and the group that broke through was surrounded in the Barut region and almost completely destroyed.

In the following days, the encircled units of the 9th Army again tried to connect with the 12th Army, which was breaking through the defenses of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies on the outer front of the encirclement. However, all enemy attacks were repelled on April 27-28.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front at the same time continued to push the encircled grouping from the east. On the night of April 29, the Nazis again attempted a breakthrough. At the cost of heavy losses, they managed to break through the main line of defense of the Soviet troops at the junction of two fronts in the area of ​​Wendisch-Buchholz. In the second half of April 29, they managed to break through the second line of defense in the sector of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army. A corridor 2 km wide was formed. Through it, the encircled began to leave for Luckenwalde. By the end of April 29, Soviet troops stopped the Shperenberg and Kummersdorf who had broken through at the line and divided them into three groups.

Especially intense battles unfolded on April 30. The Germans rushed to the west, regardless of the losses, but were defeated. Only one group of 20,000 people managed to break into the Belitsa area. It was separated from the 12th Army by 3-4 km. But during fierce battles, this group was defeated on the night of May 1. Separate small groups managed to seep to the west. By the end of the day on April 30, the Frankfurt-Guben grouping of the enemy was eliminated. 60,000 of its number were killed in battle, more than 120,000 people were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners were the deputy commander of the 9th Field Army, Lieutenant General Bernhardt, the commander of the 5th SS Corps, Lieutenant General Eckel, the commanders of the 21st SS Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Marks, the 169th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Radchiy, commandant Fortress Frankfurt an der Oder, Major General Biel, Chief of Artillery of the 11th SS Panzer Corps Major General Strammer, Aviation General Zander. During the period from April 24 to May 2, 500 guns were destroyed. 304 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1,500 guns, 2,180 machine guns, 17,600 vehicles were captured as trophies. (Sovinformburo messages T / 8, p. 199).

Meanwhile, the fighting in Berlin reached its climax. The garrison, continuously increasing due to retreating units, already numbered more than 300,000 people. The 56th Panzer Corps, the 11th and 23rd SS Panzer-Grenadier Divisions, the Müncheberg and Kurmark Panzer-Grenadier Divisions, the 18th, 20th, 25th Motorized Divisions, infantry divisions 303 withdrew to the city -I "Deberitz", 2nd "Friedrich Ludwig Jahn" and many other parts. It was armed with 250 tanks and assault guns, 3,000 guns and mortars. By the end of April 25, the enemy occupied the territory of the capital with an area of ​​325 square meters. km.

By April 26, the troops of the 8th Guards, 3rd, 5th shock and 47th combined arms armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, 3rd and 4th -Guards tank armies and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. They consisted of 464,000 people, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12,700 guns and mortars, 2,100 rocket launchers.

The troops conducted the assault as part of battalion and company assault detachments, which, in addition to infantry, had tanks, self-propelled guns, sappers, and often flamethrowers. Each detachment was intended to act in its own direction. Usually it was one or two streets. To capture individual objects from the detachment, a group was allocated as part of a platoon or squad, reinforced by 1-2 tanks, sappers and flamethrowers.

During the assault, Berlin was shrouded in smoke, so the use of attack aircraft and bombers was difficult, they acted mainly against the 9th Army surrounded in the Guben area, and fighters carried out an air blockade. The three most powerful air strikes were carried out by the 16th and 18th air armies on the night of April 25-26. 2,049 aircraft took part in them.

The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. By the end of April 26, Soviet troops had cut off the Potsdam grouping of the enemy from Berlin. The next day, formations of both fronts penetrated deeply into the enemy's defenses and began hostilities in the central sector of the capital. As a result of the concentric offensive of the Soviet troops, by the end of April 27, the enemy grouping was compressed in a narrow, completely shot through zone. From east to west, it was 16 km, and its width did not exceed 2-3 km. The Nazis fiercely resisted, but by the end of April 28, the encircled group was divided into three parts. By that time, all attempts by the Wehrmacht command to help the Berlin group had failed. After April 28, the struggle continued with unrelenting force. Now it has flared up in the Reichstag area.

The task of mastering the Reichstag was assigned to the 79th Rifle Corps, Major General S.N. Perevertkin of the 3rd shock army of General Gorbatov. Having captured the Moltke Bridge on the night of April 29, parts of the corps on April 30 by 4 o'clock captured a large resistance center - the house where the German Ministry of the Interior was located, and went directly to the Reichstag.

On this day, Hitler, who remained in an underground bunker near the Reich Chancellery, committed suicide. Following him, on May 1, his closest henchman J. Goebbels committed suicide. M. Bormann, who was trying to escape from Berlin with a detachment of tanks, was killed on the night of May 2 on one of the streets of the city.

On April 30, the 171st and 150th rifle divisions of Colonel A.I. Resentment and Major General V.M. Shatilova and 23rd tank brigade began the assault on the Reichstag. To support the attackers for direct fire, 135 guns were allocated. Its garrison, numbering 5,000 soldiers and officers of the SS troops, put up desperate resistance, but by the evening of April 30, battalions of the 756th, 674th, 380th rifle regiments, commanded by captains S.A., broke into the Reichstag. Neustroev, V.I. Davydov and Senior Lieutenant K.Ya. Samsonov. In the fiercest battle, constantly turning into hand-to-hand combat, Soviet soldiers captured room after room. Early in the morning of May 1, 1945, the 171st and 150th rifle divisions broke his resistance and captured the Reichstag. A little earlier, on the night of May 1, scouts of the 756th Infantry Regiment, Sergeant M.A. Egorov, junior sergeant M.V. Kantaria hoisted the Banner of Victory on the dome of the Reichstag. Their group was headed by the political officer of the battalion, Lieutenant A.P. Berest, was supported by a company of machine gunners of Lieutenant I.Ya. Syanova.

Separate groups of SS men who were hiding in the cellars laid down their arms only on the night of May 2. In a fierce battle that lasted two days, 2,396 SS men were destroyed, 2,604 were taken prisoner. 28 guns destroyed. Captured 15 tanks, 59 guns, 1,800 rifles and machine guns.

On the evening of May 1, the 248th and 301st rifle divisions of the 5th shock army, after a long fierce battle, took the imperial office. This was the last major fight in Berlin. On the night of May 2, a group of 20 tanks broke out of the city. On the morning of May 2, she was intercepted 15 km northwest of Berlin and completely destroyed. It was assumed that one of the Nazi leaders was fleeing from the capital of the Reich, but none of the Reich bosses were among those killed.

At 15:00 on May 1, Colonel General Krebs, Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, crossed the front line. He was received by the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General Chuikov, and announced Hitler's suicide, the formation of the government of Admiral Dönitz, and also handed over a list of the new government and a proposal for a temporary cessation of hostilities. The Soviet command demanded unconditional surrender. By 18 o'clock it became known that the proposal was rejected. The fighting in the city continued all this time. When the garrison was divided into isolated groups, the Nazis began to surrender. On the morning of May 2 at 6 o'clock, the commander of the defense of Berlin, the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, General G. Weidling surrendered and signed the order of surrender.

By 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison capitulated. During the assault, the garrison lost 150,000 soldiers and officers killed. On May 2, 134,700 people surrendered, including 33,000 officers and 12,000 wounded.

(IVMV, V.10, p.310-344; G.K. Zhukov Memories and reflections / M, 1971, p. 610-635)

In total, during the Berlin operation, only 218,691 soldiers and officers were killed and 250,534 soldiers and officers were captured in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, and a total of 480,000 people were captured. 1132 aircraft shot down. Captured as trophies were 4,510 aircraft, 1,550 tanks and self-propelled guns, 565 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 8,613 guns, 2,304 mortars, 876 tractors and tractors (35,797 cars), 9,340 motorcycles, 25,289 bicycles, 19,393 machine guns, 189,26 rifles and , 363 steam locomotives, 22.659 wagons, 34.886 faustpatrons, 3.400.000 shells, 360.000.000 cartridges (TsAMO USSR f.67, op.23686, d.27, l.28).

According to the head of the logistics of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General N.A. Antipenko captured even more trophies. The 1st Ukrainian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts captured 5,995 aircraft, 4,183 tanks and assault guns, 1,856 armored personnel carriers, 15,069 guns, 5,607 mortars, 36,386 machine guns, 216,604 rifles and machine guns, 84,738 vehicles, 2,199 warehouses.

(On the main line, p.261)

The losses of the Soviet troops and the Polish Army amounted to 81.116 people killed and missing, 280.251 wounded (of which 2.825 Poles were killed and missing, 6.067 were wounded). 1,997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,108 guns and mortars, 917 combat aircraft, 215,900 small arms were lost (The classification was removed, p.219,220, 372).

"Damned questions" of the Great Patriotic War. Lost victories, missed opportunities Alexander Gennadievich Patients

STORM OF BERLIN

STORM OF BERLIN

The last operation of the Great Patriotic War, upon closer examination, turns into a real tangle of mysteries and contradictions, and the threads from this tangle stretch both into the distant future and into the past. In terms of historical alternatives, we need to consider several basic questions. Was it necessary to storm Berlin at all? If it is necessary, then when and how should it be done? To find answers to these questions, we will have to consider the prehistory of the assault, and this consideration will begin not at Stalin's Headquarters, but at the headquarters of General Eisenhower.

The fact is that out of all the Big Three, Winston Churchill thought more about politics and about the post-war structure of Europe than Roosevelt and Stalin put together. It was he who constantly rushed about with various ideas that contradicted preliminary agreements. Either he wanted to land in the Balkans to cut off the Red Army's path to Central Europe, or he wanted to capture Berlin ... That's what it's worth talking about. At the suggestion of Churchill, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, began to consider

options for a rapid throw of British troops to Berlin, although plans for such operations were not seriously developed. And there was no one to command a swift throw. The British commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, was known for his pathological methodicalness and utter incapacity for swift decisions and actions. Now, if Churchill decided to talk to American general Patton, then, you see, history could have taken a different course. By the way, here's another possible alternative for you - an attempt by the allies to capture Berlin.

However, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, refused to even consider such adventures. However, rumors about the intentions of the British could well reach Stalin, and then it was not difficult to predict his reaction. Let's take Berlin! Alas, the former seminarian was organically capable of nothing more reasonable. After that, the next question inevitably arose: how to take it? And here we are simply forced to consider in more detail the events that immediately preceded the Berlin operation, more precisely, the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army.

This operation is remarkable in many respects. First of all, few people thought about it, but it is completely possible that it was the course of the fighting in the interfluve of the Vistula and the Oder and their results that once and for all discouraged the Allies from wanting to contact the Soviet Union. It is not for nothing that the Anglo-American warriors built all their subsequent calculations solely on the use of some kind of miracle weapon that would help them defeat the damned Bolsheviks, but at the same time they did not even stutter about unleashing a conventional war. The Vistula-Oder operation showed in all its brilliance the real power of the Red Army and its main striking force - the tank troops. Moreover, the fact that in the course of the operation the commanders, let's say delicately, did not shine with fresh ideas, gave its results a special persuasiveness. It was a monstrous force that crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht like a rag doll on a road roller.

Since the events of 1945 had several opportunities to turn onto an alternative track, we will simply be forced to abandon the usual scheme for constructing a chapter: an introduction and then an alternative. Now we will highlight alternative scenarios in italics, as we will have to return to reality again and again.

The strategic situation before the start of the Vistula-Oder operation was crystal clear. The Red Army had three bridgeheads across the Vistula, and strikes were to be expected from them. In any case, the well-known German historian and former General Tippelskirch writes that the German command foresaw this, but simply did not have enough strength to parry these blows. I don’t know, I don’t know ... If we recall the Battle of Stalingrad, the places where decisive blows were delivered and the prospect of encircling Paulus’s army were also quite obvious, but for some reason none of the German generals had an insight. As for “not enough,” Tippelskirch is absolutely right. Although here, too, he cannot refrain from telling a fable about the "tenfold" superiority of the Red Army in manpower. Apparently, the general had certain problems with arithmetic - a common illness of beaten commanders. If our generals in 1941 counted “three times as many tanks” among the Germans, now it is the turn of the Germans to deal with multiplication and division. The number of German troops Tippel-skirch was well aware, and if you believe his calculations, it turns out that everything that the Red Army had on the Eastern Front was assembled against the unfortunate Army Group A. Between Tippelskirch and General von Butlar even a heated scientific dispute flared up: was our army 10 or 11 times superior to theirs?

In tanks, we had a sevenfold superiority, what happened, it happened. But who is to blame for this? Who prevented the Germans from spinning their industry to full speed? I have already written more than once that such excuses are simply pathetic evasions. This is the art of the commander, in order to concentrate superior forces at a decisive moment in a decisive place. And if the state and industry can give it these superior forces, this fact only speaks of the advantages of this state and that one should not try to fight with it.

However, not everything is clean with our history. What is the value of the statement alone? Military Encyclopedia» about the 500-kilometer depth of the German defenses between the Vistula and the Oder. It immediately becomes clear why they did not have enough tanks: all of Germany was digging trenches and trenches day and night. True, if you believe the map placed in the same second volume of the SVE, with all the diligence between the Vistula and the Oder, it is impossible to measure more than 350 kilometers of distance. Maybe our General Staff measured the distance from the lower reaches of the Oder to the upper reaches of the Vistula? Then it might get even bigger.

But distance played a part in this operation. During the Second World War, the maximum depth of operations was determined by the presence or absence of a supply system for the advancing troops. But even the Americans, who had just a fantastic amount of vehicles, could not afford to go beyond certain limits. For example, the Germans wrote more than once that it was supply problems that eventually killed Paulus's army near Stalingrad and German troops in the North Caucasus. The most curious thing is that in this case they are not so wrong. It was the Americans who could afford to throw supplies for XIV air army to China on a perilous route across the Himalayas, spending four tons of gasoline to deliver a fifth to General Chennault's planes. But not more! Even they could not supply the advancing armies of Patton and Bradley in this way. Therefore, almost all armies, after a breakthrough of about 500 kilometers, were forced to stop to regroup and pull up the rear, even if there was no enemy resistance in principle.

However, let us return to January 1945 on the banks of the Vistula. For one reason or another, the Soviet offensive began on 12 January. The 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov struck from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads, and the 1st Ukrainian Marshal Konev - one, but much more powerful, from the Sandomierz bridgehead. The strength of this strike can be easily imagined if we remember that 8 combined arms and 2 tank armies, as well as 3 separate tank corps, took part in it. Nice and easy to describe such operations. There are no sophisticated maneuvers in them, no subtle designs. The main idea can be characterized in two words: pace and power!

The troops of Marshal Konev were the first to go on the offensive, the Sandomierz-Silesian operation began. The breakthrough was carried out within a strip 40 kilometers long by the forces of three armies. The troops of the front had a deep operational formation, but at the same time, in the breakthrough sector, even in the first lane, Konev created an overwhelming superiority over the enemy. In total, almost 12,000 guns and more than 1,400 tanks were concentrated on the Sandomierz bridgehead, and all this force fell upon the German XLVIII tank corps. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry went on the attack, and after a couple of hours the enemy's main line of defense was broken through. In the afternoon, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle, and the German defense simply fell apart.

And where were the German reserves at that time? Here we have to thank Hitler. Almost all the generals write that, at his request, the reserves were located close to the front line, so they came under artillery fire and bombing attacks and were pretty battered by the time they should have joined the battle. But only Guderian reveals another little secret. Army Group A had only 12 tank and mechanized divisions at its disposal. However, they were all evenly distributed along the front line. The Germans did not create a single shock fist. Who ordered it? Not known. However, Guderian, apparently retaining some scraps of honesty, in this case does not try to put the blame on Hitler, from which we can conclude that he tried either German General Staff, or someone in the High Command.

Two days later, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. And here we are faced with the first of the mysteries of the Vistula-Oder operation. The configuration of the front simply suggested the idea of ​​encircling the LVI tank and XL1I army corps of the Germans, who were already in the bag, with simultaneous strikes from the Magnushevsky and Sandomierz bridgeheads. Another small alternative. However, this did not happen. Why? Maybe, after all, the stories about, to put it mildly, not the best relationship between Zhukov and Konev are not without foundation? After all, both fronts did not even try to create another cauldron, but rushed together to the west, as if not noticing each other. Moreover, Zhukov's 69th army, with a blow from the Pulawy bridgehead, threw the Germans out of the cauldron, which could have arisen by itself, even against the will of the commanders. What was the meaning of the offensive from the tiny patch of the Puławy bridgehead is not clear, because this offensive had no tactical or operational significance. Although, on the other hand, both commanders were not seen in brilliant decisions, and no matter how hard A. Isaev tries to promote Zhukov, if you carefully read everything he wrote, Isaev’s books prove precisely the complete mediocrity of the marshals.

Organized German resistance ceased on the second day of the fighting, and the offensive moved into the stage of pursuit. This may partly explain the abandonment of attempts to create an encirclement ring. Why waste time on cunning maneuvers if you can use the second advantage of tank troops - striking power? But even she had to use it skillfully. The heavy skating rink of a tank army may well turn into a thin pancake all the divisions that are in its path, you just need to aim it correctly and ensure the possibility of straight and non-stop movement. But with this, our generals constantly had problems. By the way, straightforwardness still had the right to exist. If we compare the composition of the German 9th Army, which took the main blow, at the beginning of January and the end of the same month, it turns out that none of the original divisions remained in it. Everything that fell under the frontal impact of Zhukov and Konev died.

Hitler naturally blamed his generals for everything and began feverishly shuffling the commanders of the armies and corps. The first to fly from his post was the commander of Army Group A, Oberst General Harpe, followed by other generals. It seems that in January 1945 all the commanders of the army groups and armies operating in Poland were replaced, but the situation could not be corrected by this.

The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on January 14 and at first developed not so successfully. The advance on the first day of the offensive was no more than 3 kilometers, but then the Germans simply could not stand it. As we have already mentioned, they did not have enough forces on the front line or reserves. After the destruction of the main forces of the 9th Army, Zhukov's tanks also rushed further. Finally, our tankers stopped being equal to the infantry divisions and began to act independently. They were ahead of the infantry divisions by 30-50 kilometers, at times this gap could reach 100 kilometers, and then the actions of Guderian and Rommel immediately come to mind.

Our historians somehow do not notice this, but the same Guderian admits that around September 19, the German front in Poland ceased to exist, as it was last year in Belarus. The task set by the operation plan to reach the Zhychlin - Lodz - Radomsko - Czestochowa - Mechow line was completed on the sixth day instead of the twelfth according to the plan. At the same time, the offensive line of both fronts gradually deviated northward into Pomerania. If you look at the map, you can see some parallels with the operation "Gelb". In the same way, a large grouping of enemy troops, which was in East Prussia. The only difference was that the Germans did not line up on the parade ground to lay down their arms in an organized manner, but tried to fight back.

But here begins a new portion of incomprehensible moments. The 1st Belorussian Front finally turns north and, instead of moving towards Berlin, breaks into Pomerania. There is a formal explanation for this. The Germans created a shock (supposedly) grouping here that threatened the flank of the front, and it was necessary to defeat it first. But even General Routh himself, who commanded this parodic offensive, honestly writes that he did not have any forces. Do you get the subtlety? Not "not enough", but in general "none". In his own words: "10 divisions with 70 tanks." Against such a background, even the freshly formed Clausewitz Panzer Division looks menacing, which had, scary to think, as many as 12 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns. There is one good example of the effectiveness of such counterattacks. Tippelskirch and von Butlar write about the attempt of the German 4th Army to jump out of East Prussia. But look carefully at all our publications, starting with the same old SVE and ending with completely modern issues of Frontline Illustration. Nowhere is there a word about this "breakthrough". It is not shown on any map. History, as we have said more than once, loves evil things. In 1941, the Germans did not even suspect that they had taken part in the great tank battle near Rovno and Brody, and in 1945 Zhukov and Rokossovsky, without noticing it themselves, repulsed the attack of the divisions of General Hossbach. So such an explanation should be regarded precisely as a formal one.

As a final measure, the German command renamed Army Group Center into Army Group North, and Army Group A was given the name Army Group Center. But even this did not help stop the Soviet tanks.

Meanwhile, the all-destroying shaft Soviet tanks continued to roll towards the Oder. The 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Warta River, bypassed the city of Poznan, declared another "festung", and continued the offensive, although now only the 1st Guards Tank Army remained its vanguard. By the way, here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which best characterizes the change in views Soviet commanders and the doctrine of the Red Army: “On the fifth day of the offensive, the 11th Guards Corps of A. Kh. Babajanyan, having overcome about 200 kilometers with battles, approached the Warta River - the sixth line of German defense. In the place where the forward brigade of Gusakovsky went, the Warta flowed strictly to the north. Then, near the city of Kolo, it turned sharply to the west and, having reached the Poznań meridian, again headed north. I ordered Babadzhanyan and Dremov to bypass the enemy reserves concentrated in the eastern bend of the river and pincer the Poznan-Warsaw motorway. Having crossed the Warta and left the German grouping on the flank across the river, both corps rushed to Poznan. The enemy grouping under these conditions was doomed to inaction. She could no longer prevent the further advance of our troops.

Pay attention to the end of the quote. If only our tank generals acted like this in 1944, without getting involved in the destruction of every isolated stronghold!

Already on January 22-23, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder and crossed it in a number of sectors. But this front also lost one of its tank armies, which had to turn south to decide the outcome of the fighting in Silesia and around Krakow. By February 3, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front also reached the Oder in the Kustrin area. They also crossed the river and created a small foothold. The Oder also did not become a serious obstacle for Katukov's tankers.

Here is what the army commander wrote: “The brigade commanders decided to cross the river together. They brought self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and all the rest of the artillery to the shore. After a massive fire strike on enemy positions on the opposite bank, chains of motorized riflemen descended onto the ice. Having quickly crossed the river, they, with the support of artillery from the eastern bank, shot down the small barriers of the Nazis and captured a bridgehead 5 kilometers along the front and 4 kilometers in depth. Motorized rifle battalions reached the Reitwein-Woden line.

Having received the message that Gusakovsky and Fedorovich had crossed the Oder, I ordered A. Kh. But only seven tanks from Gusakovsky's brigade managed to cross the ferry crossing to the bridgehead. The fact is that I received a new order: the army was transferred to Eastern Pomerania, to the area north of the city of Landsberg (Gurovo-Ilavetske). She was given a new task.

This ended the Vistula-Oder operation, which became one of the largest in scope in the entire war. As we have already said, it fully manifested the qualities of tank troops that Fuller, Liddell Hart, Tukhachevsky and others dreamed about before the war. Mobility allowed tanks to overcome distances unthinkable for foot armies, and firepower and armor made it senseless to resist attempts by rear units and modest reserves gathered from the pine forest. The steel skating rink crushed under itself everything that met on its way. The infantry could only reap the fruits of the victories of the tankers and deal with the elimination of scattered pockets of resistance such as Poznan, Schneidemühl and the like. The main issue remained to provide the advancing tank corps with all the necessary supplies and, above all, fuel.

Here we come to the most interesting issue of the Vistula-Oder operation, its alternative version. But was it possible, without stopping, to continue the offensive further directly to Berlin? After all, this would make it possible to avoid bloody battles for the Seelow Heights and protracted battles in the city itself. Alas, a rather categorical answer should be given here: “No!” First of all, during the operation, Soviet troops advanced deep into the enemy’s territory to a distance of about 400 kilometers, which was the limit for army supply systems of that time. Even the Wehrmacht, in the ideal conditions of the 1940-1941 blitzkriegs, made stops in such cases to put the troops in order and tighten up the rear. And the rear services of the Red Army, unfortunately, even at the very end of the war did not at all resemble a well-oiled machine. In addition, as we have seen, the offensive has lost its penetrating power. Two tank armies were diverted to other directions, and the two that reached the Oder suffered some losses and, accordingly, did not have the same power. Therefore, to make a breakthrough of another 100 kilometers and start fighting in Berlin itself - this clearly exceeded their capabilities.

And yet there is one "but". Reading the memoirs of Katukov, it is impossible to get rid of the impression that his army and the army of General Badanov, after forcing the Oder, could move a little further. After all, the width of the Seelow Heights is small, no more than 10 kilometers. At that time, there was simply no one to defend this line. Let me remind you that the Germans had to re-form the 9th Army, which occupied this sector of the front, all its divisions to the last fell on the Vistula, and it could not offer any serious resistance. In fact, it is impossible to find anything like this in the history of the war: in three weeks, the composition of the whole army has completely changed!

Therefore, if Generals Katukov and Badanov advanced only 15-20 kilometers further, even if they later transferred their areas to the approaching infantry armies, we would have a full-fledged bridgehead at our disposal, and not the Kustrinsky Piglet, and the Germans would have lost their main line of defense. By the way, Zhukov understood all this, because in an order dated February 4, he demanded that the 5th shock army expand the bridgehead to 20 kilometers along the front and up to 10 kilometers in depth. The task was facilitated by the fact that the command of the German troops on the line of the Oder was entrusted to the great commander Heinrich Himmler. In addition, it was during these days that Hitler started the Balaton operation, after which the Panzerwaffe finally ceased to exist. But the main thing was done - the last remnants of the German tank units and formations turned out to be connected in another sector of the front, and the Germans could not oppose anything to the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies.

If the Seelow Heights were occupied by a strike on the move, the Germans simply had nothing to beat them off. The state of the German troops at that moment is best described by the same Guderian: “On January 26, Hitler ordered the formation of a tank destroyer division. The name of this new compound sounded beautiful and promising. But there was nothing else. In reality, this formation should have consisted of companies of cyclists under the command of brave lieutenants; the crews of these companies armed with faustpatrons were supposed to destroy the G-34 and heavy Russian tanks. The division entered the battle as a squadron. It was a pity for the brave soldiers! Apparently, the Führer was greatly impressed by the actions of the Soviet tank armies if he gave such an order. But such impromptu formations were for the Soviet armies, as they say, "on one tooth." We will not even consider the attempts of the Germans to recapture the Seelow Heights, we will simply give a short excerpt from the payroll of the 9th Army on January 26, that is, after the end of the Vistula-Oder operation: the 608th special headquarters of the division; remnants of the 19th Panzer Division; remnants of the 25th Panzer Division; Well, there is something else on the little things.

That is, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to occupy the Seelow Heights and for nothing get an excellent starting position for the subsequent assault on Berlin and avoid the colossal problems and losses that took place in reality. In addition, it became possible, after regrouping, to strike directly at Berlin instead of a large-scale operation to encircle the capital of the Reich. Probably, in this case, the war would have ended a month and a half earlier. It seems to be a little, but still - these are thousands of soldiers' lives.

After that, we come to the second fork in the spring of 1945 - the Berlin offensive operation of the Red Army. What was she? A golden exclamation mark that crowned the most difficult war in the history of our country? Or a bloody blot that casts a gloomy shadow over the entire victory as a whole? Like any great historical event, the assault and capture of Berlin cannot be unambiguously assessed.

The importance of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead was understood by everyone, even the Fuhrer. Therefore, he ordered the revived 9th Army of General Busse to liquidate it. In February and March, Busse carried out a whole series of attacks, but their only result was the loss of 35,000 people, whom he no longer received. During these attacks, one of the Vlasov divisions especially distinguished itself, and Heinrich Himmler handed the Iron Crosses to these warriors. Of course, it was not worth counting on Hitler himself to reward the traitors. So, even before the start of the decisive battles, the German forces in the main direction were weakened. After that, Busse decided at all costs to keep the city of Kustrin itself, which blocked the direct road to Berlin. It separated two Soviet bridgeheads, at Reitwein and Kinitz, and was a real bone in the throat of the 1st Belorussian Front. However, the Germans did not succeed either, on March 30 the city fell. The Soviet armies consolidated the bridgehead and could calmly prepare a decisive offensive.

But it did not work out calmly. Here we absolutely involuntarily have to enter into a small controversy with A. Isaev, more precisely, with his book “Georgy Zhukov. The last argument of the king. By the way, a very interesting name. Undoubtedly, the enlightened public knows the historical roots of this curious phrase, although for some reason the author did not consider it possible to decipher them even in the preface. But I do not at all rule out the possibility that he also knows the beautiful-sounding Latin original "Ultima ratio regis", and he may well know that this inscription was emblazoned on the barrels of the cannons of the most Christian kings of France, Louis with rather large numbers. So whose cannon should we consider Marshal Zhukov?

However, certain doubts still arise. When you criticize and expose others, you should be more precise yourself. The simplest example. Isaev writes that Zhukov's troops were the first to reach the Oder, although in fact Konev was ahead of him by a couple of days. Etc. By the way, Zhukov himself was never an artilleryman, so where is the connection here? On the other hand, this motto perfectly describes Zhukov's manner of communicating with the outside world, so the name is quite appropriate.

However, we digress a little, let's return to the events on the Seelow Heights. The roots of Zhukov's more than controversial decisions should still be sought in his hostile relations with Konev and his desire to please Stalin. Talking about some kind of socialist competition to take the Reichstag, of course, is stupid, here I am 150 percent in agreement with Isaev. But there was rivalry, and in addition to completely natural reasons (jealousy for the success of a neighbor has always been and will remain forever), there was another, artificially introduced. I do not know for what purpose Stalin tried to pit the two marshals before the start of the decisive offensive, but he did it. Let us turn to the memoirs of Zhukov himself, in which he describes the meetings at Headquarters preceding the Berlin operation:

"Here he is<Сталин>said to Marshal I.S. Konev:

“In the event of stubborn resistance by the enemy on the eastern approaches to Berlin, which will certainly happen, and a possible delay in the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front should be ready to strike with tank armies from the south to Berlin.”

There are misconceptions that

The 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were brought into the battle for Berlin allegedly not by the decision of I.V. Stalin, but at the initiative of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In order to restore the truth, I will quote the words of Marshal I. S. Konev on this issue, which he said at the gathering of the highest command staff of the central group of troops on February 18, 1946, when everything was still so fresh in my memory:

“When at about 24:00 on April 16 I reported that the offensive was proceeding successfully, Comrade Stalin gave the following instruction: “It’s going hard at Zhukov, turn Rybalko and Lelyushenko to Zehlendorf, remember how we agreed at Headquarters.”

Therefore, the maneuver that Rybalko and Lelyushenko made is a direct indication of Comrade Stalin. Therefore, all fabrications on this subject should be excluded from our literature.

That is, the notorious race was organized by order from above. What, Konev, after Stalin's direct order to turn the tank armies to Berlin, will voluntarily give up the opportunity to be the first to capture the same Reichstag? In addition, there was another race with an imaginary opponent. But the assumption that the Soviet command was in a hurry to capture Berlin before the Allies should be discarded. After all, the operation plan provided for the encirclement of Berlin. Will the British or Americans really begin to fight their way to Berlin, breaking through the positions of the Soviet troops?! Well, this is complete nonsense, you see. But we will return to the question of the storming of Berlin.

Let us recall that Stalin had every reason to expect that the storming of Berlin would not drag on. The Red Army had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment. As usual, one should not believe either the SVE, which writes about a two- or four-fold superiority, or the memoirs of German generals, where fables are told about a twenty-fold superiority. The truth, as always, lies in the middle.

But at the same time there are many nuances that are quite capable of changing these ratios. As already noted, the entire first part of the German 9th Army, which was defending in the Berlin direction, died during the Vistula-Oder operation, and in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in March were hastily gathered everywhere motley formations. By the beginning of the Berlin operation, the composition of the army changed again, and again entirely! 9th Army December 31, 1944, January 26, March 1 and April 12, 1945 - these are four completely different armies! You yourself understand that in such an environment, there can be no talk of any normal interaction of compounds. And so it happened.

The plan of operation developed by the Stavka was very optimistic. On the very first day, it was supposed to break through the German defenses on the Seelow Heights and bring the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into the gap. Berlin was scheduled to be taken on the sixth day of the operation, and by the eleventh day, the 3rd shock army went to the Elbe to meet with the Americans.

Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front struck in the direction of Brandenburg, Rathenow and Dessau. In the same way, immediately after the breakthrough of the German defenses, the 3rd and 4th tank armies entered the operational space. Moreover, it was initially assumed that one of the corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General Rybalko was to attack Berlin from the south. But there was an option according to which both tank armies of Konev could be sent to Berlin.

Moreover, this is written by the SVE, and if Isaev intended to refute a certain myth, then it was necessary to do this in more detail.

An auxiliary, but very important task was solved by

2nd Belorussian Front Marshal Rokossovsky. He was supposed to advance in the Stettin-Schwedt area and defeat the German 3rd Panzer Army, which, naturally, would not allow it to move its forces to help Berlin.

The offensive began early in the morning on 16 April. After a 30-minute artillery preparation, 140 powerful anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on, which were supposed to blind the Germans. It looked very nice in the movie Liberation, but in reality it did more harm than good. A word to Marshal Chuikov: “I must say that at the time when we admired the power and effectiveness of the searchlights at the training ground, none of us could accurately predict how it would look in a combat situation. It is difficult for me to judge the situation in other sectors of the front. But in the zone of our 8th Guards Army, I saw how powerful beams of searchlights hit a swirling curtain of burning, smoke and dust raised over enemy positions. Even searchlights could not penetrate this veil, and it was difficult for us to observe the battlefield. As a sin, even the wind was blowing towards. As a result, Hill 81.5, where the command post was located, was soon shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Then we stopped seeing anything at all, relying in command and control only on radiotelephone communications and on messengers.

The infantry and part of the tanks advanced about 2 kilometers, after which the offensive stalled. The artillery strike was delivered on the first line of defense that the Germans left, and now the Soviet troops had to storm the heights themselves, which were almost not affected by artillery preparation.

“German prisoners could also see huge columns of Soviet equipment waiting for the troops of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army and Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army to open their way to the west. However, there was very little progress that day. At his observation post, Zhukov began to lose patience. He pushed the commanders, threatened that he would remove them from their posts and send them to a penal company. General Chuikov also got it. Its parts got stuck in the swamp in front of the German positions on the hill.

And here Zhukov makes the most controversial of his decisions. Isaev is trying to present the matter as if both Zhukov and Konev made all changes in the strategic plans on their own initiative. Well, don't! All these changes were made only after consultations with the Stavka and their approval by Stalin. The front commander could decide where and how to use the corps subordinate to him, but never turn several armies to another direction! Actually, Zhukov himself writes about this, and, if you believe this passage, he misleads Stalin just in case.

Zhukov: “At 15 o’clock I called the Headquarters and reported that we had broken through the first and second positions of the enemy’s defense, the troops of the front advanced up to six kilometers, but met with serious resistance at the line of the Zeelovsky Heights, where, apparently, the enemy’s defense had mostly survived. To strengthen the blow of the combined arms armies, I brought both tank armies into battle. I believe that tomorrow by the end of the day we will break through the enemy defenses.

His troops did not advance for 6 kilometers and did not break through the second line of defense. This is where the January delay in front of the Seelow Heights backfired! Moreover, in the same conversation, Stalin ponders aloud whether it is worth turning Konev's armies to Berlin. Note that Zhukov writes about all this, not Konev. And the marshal decides to break through the defense at any cost, throwing the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov into battle. Apparently, Zhukov did not learn the lessons of the Battle of Kursk. Tank formations can break through the prepared defenses, but only at the cost of absolutely monstrous losses, especially since the German anti-tank weapon-45 was better than the Soviet weapon-43.

General Katukov writes: “The rest of the day did not bring joyful messages. With great difficulty, suffering heavy losses, the tankers bit into the enemy defenses and did not advance further than the positions occupied by the infantry. It was not easy for the rifle divisions of V.I. Chuikov, with whom the commanders of the tank corps closely cooperated.

On the same day, a second conversation with Stalin took place, in which Zhukov promised to break through the defenses at the Seelow Heights at any cost, and the Headquarters immediately encouraged him, informing Konev of the order to attack Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky from the north. I repeat once again, so as not to be biased, I state all this exclusively from the memoirs of Zhukov himself. In fact, strictly speaking, it turns out that the Stavka approved Zhukov's decision and thus removed part of the blame from him.

One way or another, but in the afternoon of April 16, a tank battle began, which continued the next day. All this very much resembled the actions of Montgomery near El Alamein, when he pushed through the German front in the same way. Didn't break through, but pushed through. Only on April 19, the Germans could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat to Berlin. During these days, according to German data, more than 700 Soviet tanks were burned. Like it or not - the question remains open. But even the book “Secrecy Removed” reports that during the Berlin operation, the Red Army lost about 2000 tanks. That is, during the assault on the Seelow Heights, Zhukov gave a textbook example of the misuse of tanks.

Reluctantly, he is forced to admit: “The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the very first day developed at a faster pace. As expected, the enemy’s defenses were weak in the direction of his attack, which made it possible on the morning of April 17 to bring both tank armies into action there. On the very first day, they advanced 20-25 kilometers, crossed the Spree River, and on the morning of April 19 began to advance on Zossen and Luckenwalde.

And now it is simply absolutely necessary to say a few words about what Konev supposedly had to do, linking his main forces to the solution of this problem, so that, God forbid, they would not even think of advancing on Berlin. We are talking about the liquidation of the so-called Frankfurt-Guben grouping of the enemy. What was she like? These were the remnants of the once again defeated 9th Army, which was joined by individual units

4th Panzer Army. To allocate the forces of an entire front for their destruction was, to put it mildly, unreasonable. In addition, over General Busse saw a categorical order: to hold the front on the Oder. Of course, at that time Konev could not have known about this order, but he saw perfectly well that the Germans were not even trying to move towards Berlin. Busse later received a new order: to retreat west to link up with General Wenck's 12th Army in order to liberate Berlin. I strongly advise you to pay attention to such an interesting wording. That is, General Busse did not have the strength at his disposal to somehow really threaten the Konev front, and one could not even dream of a breakthrough to Berlin in such conditions. He did not have an order to retreat to Berlin, and everyone knew very well what they did with the violators of orders in the last days of the existence of the Reich. For example, General Weidling, the commander of the LVI tank corps, on which Zhukov's main blow fell, was sentenced to death for not holding his position, but, however, they managed to pardon. Did Theodor Busse need such adventures? The way to Berlin was blocked only by the 40th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Army, but that was enough. So Konev correctly decided not to fight the ghosts, allocated a couple of corps to block the German group stuck in the forests and lakes, and went to Berlin.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event took place. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

This is where we get another historical fork. There was no longer any danger of the Western allies coming out to Berlin. The breakthrough of the German troops to the capital also looked like a perfect chimera. So was it necessary to storm the city? It could well have been limited to what Hitler intended to do with Leningrad: a tight blockade, constant artillery shelling and air bombing. Well, the situation with the latter was not very good, the Soviet aviation did not have the ability to deliver powerful strikes due to the lack of strategic bombers. But on the other hand, the artillery of the Red Army has always served as the object of envy and hatred of both enemies and allies. Moreover, April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, inflicted by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. The Red Army gave the Fuhrer a birthday present.

But in this case, we will be forced to give a negative answer. It was necessary to storm Berlin, although not at all for the reasons that were voiced

Soviet historiography. It would just take too long to slowly suffocate such a huge city. Civilian casualties? Sorry, this is a war, and it was not the Soviet army that invaded Germany in 1941, but quite the opposite. In the end, the Germans themselves came up with the concept of "Kriegsraison" - "Military necessity", which always and unconditionally prevails over the "Kriegsmanier" - "Method of Warfare".

The strangulation of Berlin led to an unjustified prolongation of the war, because one should not even dream of any surrender of Hitler, unless his own guards crushed him in the bunker like a rat ... And it is likely that the Western allies would protest about "unjustified victims ". Of course, one could remind them of the bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, but it was not worth starting political discussions. Not the time and not the place. That is - assault!

But with the assault, too, not everything is clear. It began on April 20, 1945 (by the way, on Hitler's birthday), the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front opened fire on the city center. After the war, our historians claimed that our guns dropped more explosives on the city than the Allied heavy bombers. Zhukov writes: “11 thousand guns of various calibers opened simultaneous fire at certain intervals. From April 21 to May 2, one million eight hundred thousand artillery shots were fired at Berlin. And in total, more than 36 thousand tons of metal were brought down on the enemy defenses in the city.

The Germans did not have a single chance to defend the capital of the Reich. The garrison of the city at this point consisted of about 45,000 soldiers from scattered, battered units and about 40,000 of all kinds of rabble from the Volkssturm, police, and so on. The main force of the garrison was considered to be the LVI corps of General Weidling: the Münchenberg Panzer Division (formed on March 8, 1945!), the 9th Airborne Division, the 18th and 20th Panzer Grenadier, 11th Panzer SS " Norland" and the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Everything would be great if at least one of these divisions had more than 400 soldiers in its composition. By the way, it was the first two divisions that defended the Seelow Heights, so it’s not difficult to imagine their condition.

Well, purely for educational purposes, we will list others who were supposed to save the capital of the Third Reich. French volunteer assault battalion "Charlemagne"; a naval battalion sent by Grand Admiral Doenitz; 15th Lithuanian Fusilier Battalion; 57th fortress regiment; 1st Anti-Aircraft Division "Berlin", Hitler's bodyguard; the Hitler Youth regiment, hastily formed from Berlin boys and had nothing to do with the SS division of the same name. Oddly enough, Himmler's bodyguards were also immediately stuck. That's all...

They were opposed by about one and a half million hardened soldiers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. For the first time, the Germans had every right to talk about a tenfold superiority of the enemy. It probably makes no sense to describe in detail the course of the battles for the city itself, since it was done in several works

A. Isaev, although everyone preaches one simple truth: Zhukov took Berlin, once again Zhukov and again Zhukov. And the rest were just there.

In reality, of course, things were more complicated. Let's start with the fact that the race to Berlin still took place. As evidence, I will cite two orders given at an interval of two hours. Let the participants in the events speak, and the reader will be able to draw his own conclusions.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 1st UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3rd AND 4TH GUARDS TANK ARMIES ON THE NEED TO ENTER BERLIN EARLIER THE TROOPS

1st BELARUSIAN FRONT

The troops of Marshal Zhukov, 10 km from the eastern outskirts of Berlin. I order you to be the first to break into Berlin tonight. Deliver execution.

Krainyukov

RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 36. Original.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 1st BELARUSIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 2nd GUARDS TANK ARMY WITH THE DEMAND TO BREAK INTO BERLIN FIRST

The 2nd Guards Tank Army is entrusted with a historic task: to be the first to break into Berlin and hoist the Banner of Victory. I personally instruct you to organize the execution.

Send one of the best brigades from each corps to Berlin and set them the task of breaking through to the outskirts of Berlin at all costs no later than 4:00 am on April 21, 1945 and immediately reporting to Comrade Stalin and announcements in the press.

RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 193. L. 88. Original.

Moreover, mind you, Zhukov perfectly understands the significance of the report "on the authorities" and newspaper PR. It is interesting that General Lelyushenko in his memoirs slightly corrected Konev’s order, cutting out the word “first” from it, or the editors did it for him.

Meanwhile, in the German command, the fever of the change of commanders could not stop. On April 22, Hitler removes General Reimann, replacing him with Colonel Ernst Keter, in one day promoting him first to major general, and then to lieutenant general. On the same day, he orders the execution of the commander of the LVI tank corps, General Weidling, who did not hold the line of defense on the Oder, and immediately cancels his order. After that, the Fuhrer decides to personally take command of the Berlin garrison, and then appoints Weidling to this position. Such a series of events clearly shows that the Fuhrer's headquarters has turned into a madhouse. Despite the complexity of the situation in the midst of the battle for Moscow, during the panic that arose in the Soviet capital (it was, it was!), Our command did not reach such insanity.

Wadeding divided the city into eight defensive sectors to make it easier to manage the defenses. However, nothing could stop the Soviet troops. On April 23, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army crossed the Spree and, with the support of General Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army, began to advance in the direction of Neukölln. On April 24, the 5th shock army of General Berzarin also crossed the Spree in the Treptow Park area. The remnants of the LVI Panzer Corps, still under Weidling's part-time command, tried to counterattack, but were simply annihilated. On the same day, after the most powerful artillery preparation - 650 guns per kilometer! Never before in history has such a density of artillery been encountered! - Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. By evening, Treptow Park was busy.