There is between Kursk and Orel
Train station and one station.
In the distant past
There was silence here.

And finally July came
And the fifth at dawn
Shells thunder and squeals of bullets
And the tanks rushed at us.

But still no one ran
The orders of the mouth did not flinch.
And every dead person lay here
Facing the enemy, facing forward.

There were guns on the hills
Almost at the Ponyri.
Remain in their places
Lying battery calculations.

Evgeny Dolmatovsky.

In times of great wars, it often happens that some previously unremarkable place becomes a key point for the fate of the world and the course of history. This will be the small railway station Ponyri in the battles of the Battle of Kursk. Today this station has been forgotten, but in 1943 the whole world knew about it.

After successful battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, Soviet troops made a breakthrough in the Kursk direction. A giant ledge 550 km long was formed, which later became known as the Kursk Bulge.

German group the army "Center" was opposed by the central front under the command of Rokossovsky. On the way of the army "South" stood the Voronezh front under the command of Vatutin. The Germans, holding the occupied territories, were preparing the decisive operation "Citadel". Its essence was a simultaneous strike from the north and south, getting the opportunity to unite in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, striving to break up our troops and move on Moscow. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough at all costs and correctly calculate the probability of the main blow of the German armies.

Spring 1943. A strategic pause arose in the Kursk direction - 100 days of silence. The reports of the Sovinformburo invariably contained the phrase: "Nothing significant happened at the front." Intelligence worked carefully, our troops were preparing, the Germans were preparing. The success of the future operation these days was decided by providing the front with ammunition, equipment and new reinforcements. The main burden in this difficult matter fell on the shoulders of the railroad. 100 days of silence for them were 100 days of fierce battle. On June 2, 1943, the most powerful Nazi air raid was carried out on the Kursk railway junction. It continued without interruption for exactly 22 hours. 453 aircraft dropped 2,600 bombs on the Kursk station, practically destroying it. Perhaps it was easier at the front than here in the rear. And people worked, restored steam locomotives, did not leave the depot for weeks in order to provide military cargo transportation.

On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War— Battle of Kursk. Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main blow. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. It was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the central front took a big risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - such a density of artillery was not in any defensive operation throughout the history of the Great Patriotic War. And if there was the greatest tank battle near Prokhorovka, where iron fought with iron, then here, in Ponyri, about the same number of tanks moved to Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by PEOPLE. The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460,000 soldiers. It was a fierce battle. "Both sides seem to be aware of the meaning that history will give her in the future," writes Paul Carrel in Scorched Earth. Only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk, they did not trust anything to others. They didn't have 17 year olds. 20-22 years old - these were experienced and trained personnel officers. Fierce fighting continued near Ponyri on 6 and 7 July. On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made the last attempt to push our troops and was able to advance 12 kilometers in 5 days of fighting. But this time, the Nazi offensive bogged down. One of the German generals later said that the key to our victory was forever buried under Ponyri. On July 12, when a fierce battle was going on near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, the front line would return to its positions on the northern front, and already on July 15 Rokossovsky's army would go on the offensive on Orel.

The whole world knows about the tank battle near Prokhorovka - the largest in the history of the war. But few people wondered how the Soviet troops managed to quickly transfer such a mass of tanks near Kursk. From March to August, only 1410 echelons with military equipment were delivered to the Kursk Bulge. This is seven times more than near Moscow in 1941. Tanks went straight from the platforms into battle.

The battle of Kursk ended with the complete defeat of the enemy, access to the Dnieper and the capture of Kharkov. The first train arrived there already on the 5th day after the liberation of the city. The main task now, having secured the offensive, is to keep up with the advancing units. After leaving, the Germans left a scorched desert behind them. Behind the locomotive, a heavy hook caught on one of the sleepers, it goes and tears all the sleepers in half. That's it, the path has become disconnected, you can't go along the path. There is a track destroyer, tearing sleepers. A joint, a link is undermined. The rails at that time were 12.5 meters long. At each junction and in the middle of the junction, after 6 meters, a stick of dynamite was placed, blown up and the rails all failed. So there are no sleepers and no rails. All this created a general background when it was almost impossible to work. But everything was done.

There was a victory. The commander of the central front, General of the Army Rokossovsky, wrote: “The railroad workers of the Kursk Knot showed exceptional heroism, restoring the destruction under the explosions of enemy bombs. Remember railroad! A Russian soldier will go everywhere if every 20 minutes we ensure the delivery of 30 wagons with troops, ammunition, weapons and food to the front. One hundred thousand soldiers of the Red Army will pass where the deer will not pass.” Our railroad workers did not leave a single locomotive, not a single wagon, not a single railroad switch to the invaders. Everything that could not be evacuated was blown up and destroyed. It was very scary to drive on this section of the train because of the constant air bombing. Railroad workers are very modest, simple toiling soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. Without them, there would have been no victory, not only at Stalingrad, not only on the Kursk Bulge, there would have been no victory at all.

Every old soldier has a secret dream to once again visit those places where the war threw him. What do they want to see, what else to remember, what to experience? They know that there are no frames in any newsreel of the world that their memory keeps. No one can ever measure their pain. No one but them will smell gunpowder, sweat, dry dust and warm blood. And so they come back.

Go ahead, fight, burn
Ever after the war
Come back to your native Ponyri,
Where did the victorious path begin?

Thundered in the valleys and forests
Fighting from dawn to dusk.
Eagle and Kursk, as on the scales,
And in the middle - Ponyri.

Evgeny Dolmatovsky.

Based on the films The Trains That Won the War (written and directed by Valery Shatin) and The Kursk Bulge. Iron Frontier (author and director Daria Romanova).

June 3rd, 2017, 11:41 am

Speaking of the Battle of Kursk, today, first of all, they recall the tank battle near Prokhorovka on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge on July 12. However, the events on the northern face were of no less important strategic importance - in particular, the defense of the Ponyri station on July 5-11, 1943.




After the disaster at Stalingrad, the Germans were eager for revenge, and the Kursk ledge, created as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1943, geographically seemed quite convenient for the formation of a "cauldron". Although among the German command there were doubts about the advisability of such an operation - and very justified. The fact is that for a total offensive, a tangible superiority in manpower and equipment was needed. Statistics, however, testify to something else - to the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops.
But on the other hand, the most important task of the Germans at that time was to seize the strategic initiative - and the Battle of Kursk became athe last attempt of the enemy to go on a strategic offensive.
The bet was made not on the quantitative, but on the qualitative factor. It was here, near Kursk, that the latest German tanks "tiger" and "panther", as well as tank destroyers - "fortress on wheels" - self-propelled artillery installations "Ferdinand" were first en masse involved.The German generals were going to act in the old fashioned way - they wanted to break into our defenses with tank wedges. “Tanks move in a rhombus” - as the writer Anatoly Ananyev titled his novel dedicated to those events.

people vs tanks

The essence of the operation "Citadel" was a simultaneous strike from the north and south, getting the opportunity to connect in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, as a result of which the path to Moscow was opened. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough by correctly calculating the probability of the main attack of the German armies.
Several defensive lines were built along the entire front line on the Kursk Bulge. Each of them is hundreds of kilometers of trenches, minefields and anti-tank ditches. The time spent by the enemy to overcome them should have allowed the Soviet command to transfer additional reserves here and stop the enemy attack.
On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, the Battle of Kursk, began on the northern face. The German army grouping "Center", led by General von Kluge, was opposed by the central front under the command of General Rokossovsky. General Model was at the head of the shock German units.
Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main blow. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. It was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the Central Front took a big risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - there was no such density of artillery in any defensive operation in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. And if there was the greatest tank battle near Prokhorovka, where "iron fought with iron", then here, in Ponyri, about the same number of tanks moved to Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by people.
The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460,000 soldiers. It was a fierce battle, the meaning of which was understood by both sides. It is characteristic that only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk, since they could not entrust the fate of such a fateful battle to their satellites.

PZO and "impudent mining"

The strategic importance of the Ponyri station was determined by the fact that it gave control over the Orel-Kursk railway. The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by guided and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells converted into high-explosive bombs were installed. The defense was strengthened by tanks buried in the ground and a large number of anti-tank artillery.
On July 6, against the village of 1st Ponyri, the Germans attacked up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as two infantry divisions. Having broken through our defenses, they quickly moved south to the second line of defense in the area of ​​2 Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but were repulsed. With the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps, ours organized a counterattack, which won a day to regroup forces.
The next daythe Germans could no longer advance on a wide front, and they threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks, supported by assault guns, advanced to the defense zone and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri were attacked from the air by German dive bombers. About half an hour later, the "tigers" began to approach our forward trenches, covering medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry.
Five times it was possible to throw German tanks back to their original position by means of dense PZO (moving barrage fire) of large-caliber artillery, as well as actions of Soviet sappers unexpected for the enemy.Where the "tigers" and "panthers" managed to break through the first defensive line, mobile groups of armor-piercers and sappers entered the battle. Near Kursk, the enemy first became acquainted with a new way of fighting tanks. In their memoirs, German generals would later call it "the impudent method of mining," when the mines were not buried in the ground, but were often thrown right under the tanks. Every third of the four hundred German tanks destroyed north of Kursk is on the account of our sappers.
However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of 2 Ponyri. The reserve of the commander of the 307th division, brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri from the northeast. By 15 o'clock they took possession of the state farm named after the First of May and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and the station were unsuccessful. This day - July 7 - was critical on the northern front, when the Germans managed to achieve the greatest success.

Fire bag near the village of Goreloye

On the morning of July 8, when repulsing another German attack, 24 tanks were destroyed, including 7 "tigers". And on July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group from the most powerful equipment, followed by medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the State Farm named after the First of May to the village of Goreloye.
In these fights German troops a new tactical formation was used, when in the forefront of the strike group, a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in two echelons, followed by "tigers" covering assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village of Goreloye, our artillerymen and infantrymen let the German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared fire bag, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Caught under cross artillery fire, having also hit a powerful minefield and subjected to raids by Petlyakov dive bombers, the German tanks stopped.
On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made a last attempt to push our troops back, but this time toofailed to break through to Ponyri station. A large role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO, set up by the Special Purpose Artillery Division. By noon, the Germans withdrew, leaving seven tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. It was the last day when the German troops came close to the outskirts of the Ponyri station.In just 5 days of fighting, the enemy was able to advance only 12 kilometers.
On July 12, when a fierce battle was going on near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, on the northern front, the front line returned to its original positions, and already on July 15, Rokossovsky's army went on the offensive on Orel. One of the German generals later said that the key to their victory was forever buried under Ponyri.

A small German heavy self-propelled gun Panzerjäger Tiger (P), better known asFerdinand, left a noticeable mark on historical memory and in Soviet tank building. In itself, the word "Ferdinand" became a household word: the Red Army men "noticed" these self-propelled guns in various sectors of the Soviet-German front, and right up to the end of the war. In practice, only 91 such machines were built, but in a truly massiveFerdinand were used only in the summer of 1943 during Operation Citadel on the Kursk Bulge. In this battle, the Germans lost more than a third of all vehicles of this type.

Despite the fact that SAUFerdinand (later known asElefant) were used rather limitedly, they proved to be a very effective anti-tank weapon. The command of the Red Army to the brainchildPorsche K. G. AndAlkett taken very seriously. AppearanceFerdinand at the front directly affected the development of Soviet tanks, tank guns and anti-tank artillery.

Impact force on the northern face

The fact that the German industry created such an impressive combat vehicle was not even suspected in the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA) until its appearance at the front. The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition did not know about it either. The explanation is simple: the fact is that the Panzerjäger Tiger (P) were built in the spring of 1943, and went into battle in early July. In the short time that preparations were underway for Operation Citadel, information about Ferdinand did not have time to leak through the front line. At the same time, even about the Panther, for which the battle on the Kursk Bulge also became a combat debut, at least some information was received by the allies, albeit inaccurate.

The study of the German novelty began on July 15, that is, even during the Battle of Kursk. A group of officers from the NIBT Polygon arrived at the Central Front, consisting of engineer-colonel Kalidov, senior technician-lieutenant Kzhak and technician-lieutenant Serov. By that time, the fighting in the area of ​​the Ponyri station and the state farm on May 1 had died down. In addition to a direct inspection of German vehicles, German prisoners of war were interrogated by specialists. Information was also shared by Soviet soldiers and officers who took part in the battles against German combat vehicles. Finally, German instructions for Ferdinand fell into the hands of the Soviet military.

A survey of prisoners made it possible to obtain a large amount of information, including on the organization of anti-tank divisions, which were armed with Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Additionally, specialists from the NIBT Polygon received information on other units that participated in the battles together with the 653rd and 654th divisions, which were armed with heavy tank destroyers.

Ferdinand with tail number 501, which was delivered to the NIBT Polygon in September 1943

The information obtained made it possible to reconstruct the picture of the combat use of divisions with Ferdinands and their neighbors, who used StuH 42 and Sturmpanzer IV self-propelled guns. The Ferdinands, which had thick armor, acted as a ram, moving at the head of the combat formations of the strike group. According to the information collected, the cars were moving in a line. Thanks to powerful weapons capable of hitting Soviet tanks at long distances, the crews of the Ferdinands could open fire at a distance of up to 3 kilometers. If necessary, German vehicles retreated backwards, leaving thick frontal armor under enemy fire. So they could, retreating, continue to fire on Soviet tanks. Shooting was carried out from short stops.

The shell mark on the left side is clearly visible. The same mark is also on board the car in Patriot Park.

Against well-protected German self-propelled guns, Soviet tank guns were almost useless. Of the 21 vehicles examined by GBTU specialists, only one, with onboard 602, had a hole in the port side. The hit fell on the gas tank area, a fire broke out, and the self-propelled unit burned down. The tactics of the German self-propelled gunners could well have worked if not for one “but”: they had to attack an echeloned defense line, in which there were far from only tanks. The most terrible enemy of the Ferdinand was the Soviet sappers. 10 vehicles were blown up by mines and land mines, including self-propelled guns with tail number 501. This self-propelled gun with serial number 150072 turned out to be the vehicle of Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Wilde, commander of the 1st battery (5./654) of the 654th heavy division tank destroyers.

5 "Ferdinands" were hit by shells in the undercarriage and were put out of action. 2 more vehicles received hits both in the chassis and in the guns. The car with tail number 701 became a victim of Soviet artillery. The projectile, which hit the roof of the cabin along a hinged trajectory, pierced the hatch and exploded inside the fighting compartment. Another car was hit by an aerial bomb, which completely destroyed the wheelhouse. Finally, the vehicle with tail number II-01 from the headquarters of the 654th division was destroyed by the Soviet infantry. A well-aimed hit with a Molotov cocktail caused a fire, the crew burned inside.

The letter N indicates that it was a vehicle from the 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Major Karl-Hans Noack

In fact, the losses of the divisions that were armed with the Ferdinands turned out to be even higher. In total, during the operation "Citadel" 39 self-propelled units of this type were irretrievably lost. The results of the battle near Ponyry clearly showed that the Red Army had learned to fight with significantly superior enemy forces, because there was an undeniable advantage on the side of the German tank forces in this battle. The Soviet tank industry was able to give a full answer to the new generation of German tanks and self-propelled guns only in the spring of 1944, when the T-34-85 and IS-2 entered the troops. However, the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk. As the Ponyri battles showed, the advantage in tanks was far from always the most important factor. "Ferdinands" could not break through the northern face of the Kursk salient.

To Kubinka for experiments

The first group of specialists from the NIBT Polygon left the combat area on August 4th. On August 24, the second group arrived here, consisting of Major Engineer Khinsky, Senior Technician Lieutenant Ilyin and Lieutenant Burlakov. The task of the group, which operated on the Central Front until September 8, was the selection of the most complete captured German vehicles and their delivery to the NIBT Polygon. Two cars were selected. In addition to the already mentioned self-propelled guns with tail number 501, it was also a self-propelled gun with serial number 15090. It also blew up on a mine. One machine was used for direct study and fire tests, the second was fired from domestic and foreign guns.

On the right side, damage was minimal.

The study of captured vehicles began even before they were at the NIBT Test Site. The first firing tests of the wrecked Ferdinand were carried out on July 20-21, 1943. It turned out that the side of the German vehicle was being penetrated by a 45-mm anti-tank gun at a distance of 200 meters. It pierced the German armor at a distance of 400 meters and the 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon with a sub-caliber projectile. For the 85 mm 52-K gun and the 122 mm A-19 hull gun, the side armor of the German self-propelled guns was also not a serious problem. It is worth noting that the armor of the Ferdinands, especially for vehicles with serial numbers up to 150060, was worse than that of the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E. For this reason, in the future, the firing tests of the vehicle with serial number 150090 differed somewhat in results.

"Ferdinand" with tail number 501 was a victim of Soviet sappers

The trophy documents were also studied. By July 21, the Red Army had accurate data on the performance characteristics of the German self-propelled gun. Moreover, it was known exactly how many Ferdinands were built. The data was gleaned from a summary instruction for the armament of the German army, captured among other documents:

“In terms of its armor and armament, it is an exceptionally strong weapon for fighting tanks and for supporting an offensive in the face of strong enemy resistance. Heavy weight, low speed on the battlefield, low cross-country ability limit the possibilities of combat use and require especially careful reconnaissance before entering into battle.

90 pieces were produced, consolidated into a heavy anti-tank regiment consisting of two divisions of 45 guns each.

Selected by a group of specialists from the NIBT Polygon, self-propelled guns arrived in Kubinka in September 1943. Immediately after arrival, the study of the sample with tail number 501 began. There was no talk of sea trials at that time, there was not enough time. Instead, the testers made short description German self-propelled gun, which they called "Ferdinand (Tiger P)". Thanks to the already available materials, it was possible to accurately indicate the characteristics of the machine.

This self-propelled gun had an escape hatch dropped. On a museum car, it was welded to the roof so that it would not get lost.

The assessment of the German novelty was, to put it mildly, ambiguous. The obvious advantages of the car were armor protection, as well as powerful weapons. At the same time, even the armament of the tank raised questions. A study of the 88 mm Pak 43 gun showed that the aiming speed with the help of its rotary mechanism is low. Conducting aimed fire was possible only from a place or from short stops. The visibility of the car was recognized by Soviet experts as poor. These conclusions were indirectly confirmed by German designers. During the modernization of Ferdinand, which began in the fall of 1943 (at about the same time the vehicle changed its designation to Elefant), the vehicles received a commander's cupola. True, this did not improve the situation much.

Another significant drawback of the German self-propelled guns was a small ammunition load, consisting of only 38 rounds. The crews independently corrected the situation: in self-propelled units they found wooden stacks, handicraft built in the field.

Dismantled installation during the shelling. NIBT Polygon, December 1943

Compiling a description, however, was not the most important task for the specialists of the NIBT Polygon. It was much more important to determine where and how the German novelty could be hit. After the battle of Ponyry, the threat posed by the Ferdinand was taken very seriously. The car made an indelible impression on the Soviet infantry and tankers. The steel colossus, which is almost impossible to penetrate into the frontal projection, seemed to be in different parts of the front. For this reason, it was necessary to know exactly which systems and at what distance were capable of hitting a heavy German tank destroyer.

For a sub-caliber projectile of a 45-mm anti-tank gun, the sides of the German self-propelled gun turned out to be completely pierced

The shelling test program for the Ferdinand hull was signed on September 29, 1943. But it was possible to start the tests themselves only on December 1. During this time, the range of weapons that were planned to fire at the trophy was expanded. In addition to domestic, German artillery systems and allied guns, the NII-6 anti-tank grenade was also used, later adopted as the RPG-6. As tests showed, the cumulative grenade confidently pierced the side of the self-propelled gun, after which the jet pierced the shield of inch boards installed inside the hull.

The next on the list was the 45-mm gun installed in the T-70 tank. Her armor-piercing projectile did not penetrate the German car at a distance of 100 meters, which turned out to be quite expected. But the sub-caliber projectile at the same distance coped with both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse. At a distance of 200 meters, a sub-caliber projectile managed to break through the side, the cabin turned out to be stronger.

The results of shelling a car from a 6-pounder tank gun

The 57-mm tank gun installed in the Churchill tank turned out to be able to break through the side of the German self-propelled gun. From a distance of 500 meters, armor 80 (85) mm thick made its way confidently. Fire was fired from the 43-caliber version of the gun, the Valentine XI/X and Churchill III/IV of 1943 deliveries had longer guns.

For tank guns of 75 and 76 mm caliber, the side of the German vehicle turned out to be a difficult obstacle

Things were worse with the shelling of a German self-propelled gun from a 75-mm M3 cannon mounted in an American M4A2 medium tank. The M61 armor-piercing projectile could not penetrate the side of the cabin even from a distance of 100 meters. True, two hits on the weld connecting the frontal and left side cutting sheet led to its cracking. However, the same projectile pierced the side of the Ferdinand hull already at a distance of 500 meters. The armor-piercing projectile of the Soviet 76-mm F-34 tank gun behaved even worse, which, however, was not news.

D-5S board "Ferdinand" broke through at a distance of almost a kilometer

The results of firing at the side of the German self-propelled gun from the D-5S gun installed in the SU-85 were not surprised either. At a distance of 900 meters, she confidently pierced both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse. When a shell hit from the inside of the sheet, the armor broke off, the fragments left no chance for survival for the crew of the fighting compartment. However, by the time the SU-85 appeared on the front, and then other Soviet combat vehicles equipped with 85-mm guns, the chances of meeting the Ferdinand on the battlefield had noticeably decreased.

This penetration from the D-25T was not counted. But if it happened in a real situation, the Ferdinand calculation would not care

All of the systems listed above were not used to shell a self-propelled gun from the frontal part, which is understandable: it would hardly have been possible to break through 200 mm armor with their help. The first gun that was used to fire at the front of the hull was the 122-mm D-25 gun installed in the prototype of the IS-2 tank. The first projectile, fired from a distance of 1400 meters on the frontal hull plate, pierced the screen and ricocheted. The second projectile, fired at the same distance into the cabin, left a dent 100 mm deep and 210 × 200 mm in size. The third shell was stuck in the armor, but still partially entered it. The penetration was not counted, but in practice such a defeat would have put the gun's crew out of action. At shorter distances, shooting was not carried out this time, but, as subsequent events showed, hits at a distance of 1200 meters or less ended in penetration. The testers considered the distance of 1000 meters as the maximum distance for penetration.

The Panther's cannon pierced the self-propelled unit in the forehead of the hull from 100 meters

This was followed by shelling from the 75-mm KwK 42 L / 71 cannon mounted on the German tank Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D. At a distance of 100 meters, the forehead of the hull was pierced. But the cabin from 200 meters failed to break through.

These results were affected by damage from previous hits. But the meeting with the ML-20 did not bode well for Ferdinand

The most terrible test was the shelling from the 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20, installed in the prototype ISU-152. The second hit in the frontal part of the hull led to the fact that both the screen and the sheet were broken in half. Last but not least, this result was obtained due to the unwelded embrasure of the course machine gun, which was again installed on the Elefant.

A clear demonstration of why another car was sent to the trophy exhibition in Moscow

At this test shelling, it was decided to stop. ML-20 turned the Ferdinand into a pile of rubble. It was supposed to send the shot car to a trophy exhibition in Moscow, but later the decision was changed. Another car was taken for the demonstration, which was also fired upon (it was most likely the Ferdinand, which was fired upon in the summer of 1943). Together with her, a whole self-propelled unit went to the exhibition. The car with tail number 501 remained at the NIBT Polygon.

Catalyst for an arms race

The appearance of a new German self-propelled gun on the Kursk Bulge was taken very seriously by the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA). In part, the start of new developments provoked the combat debut of the Panthers. Of course, with the activity that began after the appearance of the "Tiger", what happened cannot be compared. Nevertheless, already at the beginning of September 1943, a letter was sent to Stalin signed by the head of the GBTU KA, Lieutenant General Fedorenko. In connection with the appearance of new models of German armored vehicles, he proposed to begin the development of promising tanks and self-propelled guns.

A direct consequence of the appearance of the Ferdinand was the start of the development of the Object 701 heavy tank, the future IS-4. In addition, work on the 122-mm D-25T gun, which had begun as early as May 1943, accelerated. Moreover, it was supposed to replace it with an even more powerful gun with an initial projectile velocity of up to 1000 m/s. Work began on the creation of more powerful 85 and 152 mm caliber guns. Finally, the issue of developing a 100-mm gun with naval gun ballistics appeared again on the agenda. Thus began the history of the D-10S, the main armament of the SU-100 self-propelled gun.

Schematic of the cooling system prepared by NIBT Polygon

All this is just a part of the activities that were launched or restarted in connection with the appearance of the Ferdinand. Thanks to the German heavy self-propelled guns, it was "resurrected" and Soviet program for the development of electric transmission. They have been engaged in it in the USSR since the beginning of the 30s, it was supposed to use such a transmission on the KV-3. A serial German heavy machine with electric transmission forced Soviet specialists to return to this work again. However, our engineers did not copy German developments. The program, which was related to the famous science fiction writer Kazantsev (and part-time military engineer of the 3rd rank and chief engineer of plant No. 627), developed independently.

Specification for the armor plates of the Ferdinand chassis, prepared by NII-48 in 1944

The design of the German car aroused great interest in the USSR. The hull and cabin were studied at NII-48, the leading enterprise dealing with armor issues. As a result of the study, several reports were prepared. NII-48 engineers created the armor and hull of the optimal shape - with good protection and relatively low weight. The result of these works was a more rational form of hulls and turrets, which began to be introduced from the second half of 1944, first on heavy, and later on medium tanks.

Influenced these developments and the study of the guns installed on the Ferdinand. In 1944, the creation of armor protection capable of withstanding this gun became a priority for Soviet designers. And they coped with it much better than their German counterparts. By the end of 1944, the first experimental tanks appeared, the protection of which made it possible to confidently resist the German gun. Tanks IS-3 and T-54 "grew" just from such developments.

Other elements of the Ferdinand were also studied, for example, the suspension. In the Soviet industry, this development did not find application, but aroused some interest. A report on the study of the Porsche suspension was compiled at the request of the British.

Suspension scheme "Ferdinand" from the album of torsion bar suspensions prepared by NIBT Polygon in 1945

The most important result of the study of the German machine was the emergence of means for effectively combating it. The IS-2 heavy tank and the ISU-122 self-propelled gun were adopted by the Red Army. There are at least two cases of collision between the IS-2 and the Elefant in the summer of 1944. In both cases, the crew of the IS-2 under the command of Lieutenant B.N. Slyunyaeva came out the winner. The most remarkable was the battle on July 22, 1944: a column of the 71st Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was moving towards Magerov, when fire was opened on heavy tanks from an ambush. Slyunyaev's tank, under the cover of a second car, advanced to the crossroads. After observing the ambush for 10-15 minutes, the IS-2 approached it at a distance of 1000 meters and returned fire. As a result, the "Elephant", 2 anti-tank guns and an armored personnel carrier were destroyed.

Three weeks later, the same regiment was the first to fight the latest German heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw. Tiger Ausf.B. It was then that it turned out that the measures taken by the Soviet designers turned out to be very helpful. The "Royal Tiger" had more resistant frontal armor than the "Ferdinand", which did not prevent the Soviet tankers from winning a duel with the latest German tanks dry. Preparing to fight the Ferdinands, the Soviet tank industry also prepared for the emergence of a new generation of German heavy tanks. As a result of such a powerful qualitative superiority in tanks, which the Wehrmacht received on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, the summer of 1944 did not happen. And for other serious attempts to change the existing balance of power, the German tank industry did not have time.

(eng. FAS, free sheep alongside - free along the ship) front

one of the basic conditions that determine the procedure for the delivery and payment of goods in international trade. Under this condition, the seller is obliged to deliver the goods to the ship, and the recipient bears the costs of loading the goods onto the ship.

Glossary of financial terms

FAS

commercial conditions that determine the procedure for the delivery and payment of goods in international trade. The term is formed from initial letters English words"Free Along Ship" (free along the ship). The purchase and sale of goods on the terms of the FAS means the obligation of the seller to deliver the goods to the ship's board at the expense of his own forces and means. The buyer is obliged to timely charter the vessel, he bears all the costs of loading the goods on board. The risk of accidental loss or damage passes from the seller to the buyer at the time of the actual delivery of the goods alongside the vessel. When goods are delivered on FAS terms, the selling price includes the price of the goods itself, as well as transportation and other costs.

Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language, Vladimir Dal

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. D.N. Ushakov

face

face, m. (French face - face).

The front side of something. (book). The front of our corps ... overlooked the Neva. Leskov.

A straight section of a fortress fence or field fortification with a certain direction of fire (military).

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. S.I. Ozhegov, N.Yu. Shvedova.

face

A, m. (special) Front view, from linden, full face. Take a photo in f.iv profile. Turn face.

adj. face, th, th.

New explanatory and derivational dictionary of the Russian language, T. F. Efremova.

Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1998

face

FAS (from the French face - face) in fortification - a straight section of a trench, communication, non-explosive anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers.

face

FAS (eng. fas, abbr. from free alongside ship - freely along the side of the ship) is a type of foreign trade contract of sale associated with the delivery of goods by water, when the price of the goods includes the cost of delivering it to the ship.

Big Law Dictionary

face

international trade term, one of the free delivery terms in commercial transactions (remained unchanged in the 1990 edition of Incoterms). Literally means "free along the side of the ship". According to this condition, the seller is deemed to have fulfilled his obligations when the goods are placed along the side of the ship on the berth or on lighters. From this point on, all costs and risks of loss of or damage to the goods must be borne by the buyer. As with the ex-factory condition, the buyer clears the goods from export duties and customs formalities - in contrast to the FOB condition, where this operation is entrusted to the seller. The FAS condition is applicable only for transportation by sea or river transport.

Fas (face)

face- the side of something facing the viewer (see full face). In military affairs: the front is the side of the fortification facing the enemy.

Faces are also called straight sections of wire obstacles, trenches and anti-tank ditches.

Fas (disambiguation)

• face- front side.
• face- dog training team.

FAS

FAS (football club)

"FAS"- Salvadoran football club from the city of Santa Ana. Plays in the El Salvador Premiere, the strongest division in El Salvador. The club was founded on February 16, 1947, and plays home matches at the Estadio Oscar Cuiteno, which can accommodate 15,000 spectators. " FAS» The most titled club in El Salvador, and one of the most titled clubs in CONCACAF.

Examples of the use of the word face in the literature.

With such large forces in front of the southern face Barvenkovsky bridgehead, the Nazi command intended them to deliver two strikes - on Barvenkovo ​​and in the direction of Dolgenkaya, where the auxiliary command post of the 9th Army was located.

Most importantly, Bayazet was taken, the Russian flag fluttered over faces ancient fortress.

The height and width of the nose, the length of the back of the nose, the depth of the bridge of the nose, the protrusion of the nose, the contour of the back in profile, the width and shape of the back in face, the position of the base of the nose in profile, the position and shape of the tip of the nose, and the shape of the alae.

Let's try to develop a mysterious phenomenon - domestication, but not in face, but in profile.

Approaching the police station house, which overlooked face out into the street, Turkevich winked merrily at his companions, threw up his cap and announced loudly that it was not the chief who lived here, but his own, Turkevich's father and benefactor.

Push the cigarat to the brim, to the very mouth, opari behold face and send two terns to kill.

From high face the redifs, trained by British instructors, could be seen digging trenches: the earth flew up from their shovels high above the parapet, and the rifle fire threatened to become especially dense and dangerous.

First of all, it represents the reverse side of the large canvas depicted on the left, rather, not even the reverse side, but the front side, since it shows in face what is hidden by the position of this canvas.

This was the southern face Kursk ledge, where the defense was headed by the field administration of the Voronezh Front.

Meanwhile, during November 12 and 13, the front commander, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters, assigned the troops the task of defending the southern face bridgehead on the front of Zhytomyr, Fastov, Tripoli.

She occupied part of the western face Kursk ledge - to the junction with the troops of the Central Front.

By this time we had moved our headquarters to the northern outskirts of Oboyan, deep into the southern face arcs.

On the evening of the same day he left for Peterhof, in order to congratulate those lined up at three face midshipmen with the production of midshipmen.

This is confirmed by the fact that in the southern facet On the first day of the Kursk Bulge, the enemy struck with the forces of five corps, and on the northern one - three.

Suddenly the girl turned her head to the window, and Sergei simultaneously saw her profile and face already from the depths of the dark running pool of wagon glass, and her face now looked at Sergei from there attentively and sadly.

To establish the exact time of the start of the German offensive on the entire Central Front, the actions of intelligence groups were intensified, however, despite the efforts made, it was possible to capture the "language" only on the night immediately before the start of Operation Citadel. In a short battle in no man's land, Bruno Formel, a sapper of the 6th Infantry Division, was captured, testifying during interrogation at the headquarters of the 13th Army that his group had the task of clearing passages in the Soviet barriers on the front line and that the German offensive should begin at 3 o'clock in the morning 5'th of July.

According to the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, when these data were received at the headquarters of the front, there was practically no time left to discuss possible solutions. After a short consultation with Marshal G.K. Zhukov, a representative of the Stavka, at 2:20 am, an order was given to begin counter-training. However, having achieved a certain surprise, the Soviet side nevertheless failed to thwart the plans of the enemy. The darkness not only limited the possibility of observing and correcting artillery fire, but also excluded the anticipated actions of aviation.

Meanwhile, already at 2:30 the headquarters of the 16th Air Army sent out a directive to the corps and divisions, which determined the actions of the aviators for the next few hours. The order of the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General S. I. Rudenko, for July 5 read: “One third of the fighters should be ready at dawn to repulse possible enemy air raids. The rest of the fighters to be in thirty-minute readiness to carry out combat order No. 0048 - by special order. One third of the attack aircraft and bombers to be ready from 6:00, and the rest in thirty minutes ready to carry out combat order No. 0048 - by special order ". For the first flight to the front line, it was planned to use three groups of the 6th IAC with a total number of 40 fighters.

To understand the logic of the events that took place in the first half of July 5, it is necessary to dwell on the consideration of the decision of General S. I. Rudenko in somewhat more detail. Order No. 0048, mentioned above, determined the actions of aviation in the event of an enemy going on the offensive, contained a schedule of sorties for fighter and ground attack aircraft. Putting it into action was especially relevant for the command of the 6th Jacob and the 1st Guards. iad, whose main task was to gain air supremacy. According to order No. 0048, the headquarters of these formations were to ensure continuous patrols of at least 30 fighters from the first hours of the battle. However, the commander of the 16th Air Army considered it premature to put into effect a busy patrol schedule, limiting himself to sending strong groups of fighters to the front line. This decision was justified, based on the uncertainty of the situation that had developed by that time, but later, when the actions of German aviation acquired a large scale, it also largely disorganized the work of fighter formations.

We now turn to the description of the beginning of the air battle. The first groups of German aircraft were noted by Soviet observers as early as 4 o'clock in the morning. Around 4:40, with the start of German artillery preparation, the actions of the bombers of the 1st Air Division received an additional impetus - the positions of Soviet troops and artillery in the Maloarkhangelsk region became the objects of their attacks. In response to the increased activity of the enemy, the command of the 16th Air Army raised fighters of the 6th Iak.

The first to approach the front line were 18 "yaks", which were led by the commander of the 157th IAP, Major V.F. Volkov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 1.7.44). Among other parts of the 6th Jacob regiment, it was notable for its well-knit and well-trained flight personnel. While still in the 3rd Air Army, he was staffed by the best fighter pilots of the Kalinin Front. Approaching the patrol area with a formation of pairs deployed along the front, the Yak pilots discovered about 25 Ju-88s in the Maloarkhangelsk-Verkhnyaya Sosna area, bombing the location of Soviet troops. The entire area of ​​​​action of enemy bombers was blocked by numerous "Focke-Wulfs" from the III / JG51, which operated at altitudes from 2000 to 7000 meters.

The shock eight of the squadron commander of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain V.N. Zalevsky, tried to break through the FW-190 barrier to the bombers. Only four "yaks" managed to do this, attacking the "Junkers" from behind from below, while the rest of the group was connected by air combat with German fighters. According to the reports of the pilots, two bombers were shot down by Captain V.N. Zalevsky. Two more Junkers were set on fire by Lieutenant Anufriev and Sergeant G. Kh. Kargaev. However, at the exit from the attack, the planes of V.N. Zalevsky and Anufriev themselves became victims of Focke-Wulf attacks. Both pilots, having received injuries, jumped out of the burning cars on parachutes. Captain VN Zalevsky, who was wounded in the leg, later died in the hospital.

At this time, ten "yaks" of Major V.F. Volkov were engaged in a tense air battle with a whole flock of "Focke-Wulfs". According to the data recorded by the regimental headquarters, at the cost of damaging four of their vehicles, they managed to shoot down 9 FW-190s. The future Heroes of the Soviet Union A.E. Borovoykh and I.V. Maslov distinguished themselves in battle. However, the command of the 6th IAC assessed the results of the battle in a different way, counting the pilots as victories over 3 Ju-88s and 2 FW-190s. The air battle aroused great enthusiasm among the ground troops watching it. The documents of the 6th Army Corps testify that the infantrymen and tankers greeted the appearance and attack of the red-star fighters with shouts of "Hurrah!"

On the German side, III/JG51 fighters participating in the battle reported five downed Soviet aircraft, identified by German pilots as MiG-3 and LaGG. The first two victories at two-minute intervals (at 4:45 and 4:50) were won by Sergeant Major Strassl Hubert of 8./JG51. We will mention the name of this pilot more than once, but for now we will point out that, perhaps, it was his attack that became fatal for Captain V.N. Zalevsky and Lieutenant Anufriev. The losses of the German side amounted to 1 FW-190 from 9./JG51, which was considered missing, and also, probably, the Ju-88A-14 of the commander of 8./KG1 (posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross of Hermann Michael (Michael Hermann), who, according to German Only one aviator managed to escape from the Junkers crew.

In addition to the 6th IAC, other fighter divisions of the 16th Air Army were also involved in patrolling the front line. Among them, in particular, was the 286th IAD, the main task of which was to escort the attack aircraft of the 299th regiment. However, while the "silts" were forced to stand idle on the ground, the "shops" of the 286th IAD made several sorties to cover ground troops. Around 06:00, a group of 8 La-5s of the 721st IAP, led by Captain N. M. Tregubov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 13.4.44), attacked about 50 bombers, identified as Ju-88 and Do-215 (all over apparently, these were Bf-110s from the I / ZG1), which were covered by up to 50 FW-190s. Despite the inequality of forces, the pilots of the 721st IAP managed to carry out an attack in which Captain N. M. Tregubov recorded two victories over Do-215 and FW-190.

One of the victims of the 16th Air Army fighter attacks was a Ju-87D-3 from the 7./StG1 detachment, the crew of which, consisting of the pilot of non-commissioned officer Heinz Heil (Heil Heinz) and gunner-radio operator Gerhardt Schramm (Schramm Gerhard), was captured by the Red Army at the location of the 70th Army. Sharing during the interrogation their impressions of the strength of the resistance of Russian fighter aircraft, the German aviators showed: “We arrived at the Soviet-German front on July 3 from Yugoslavia. On July 5, at 02:15, our squadron received an order to bomb the Russian fortifications. We had not yet had time to drop our bombs when our Junkers-87 bomber was set on fire by a Soviet fighter. Frankly, we expected strong opposition from Soviet aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. However, the fierce rebuff of the Russian pilots exceeded all expectations and stunned us.. Such a flattering description of the actions of Soviet fighters could not pass by Soviet propaganda. The testimonies of the downed crew were quoted in one of the issues of the Soviet Information Bureau. Noteworthy is the fact that in the lists of losses StG1 Hale's crew is listed as a victim of anti-aircraft artillery.

The events of the first hours of the unfolding battle inspired optimism in the Soviet command. Ground attacks, which gave the impression of being poorly organized, were almost everywhere repulsed, and German air raids received a decisive rebuff from the fighters of the 16th Air Army. Everything changed at 7:30, when units of the 47th and 46th Tank Corps, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, again went on the offensive against the center and left flank of the 13th Army, as well as the right flank of the 70th Army. This time there was no doubt about the seriousness of the enemy's intentions. The actions of the crews of the 1st Air Division of the 6th Air Fleet against the positions of the Soviet infantry and artillery began to be continuous.

On the first and second lines of defense, large groups of German aircraft dropped a lot of high-explosive bombs, as well as mini-bombs, designed primarily to knock out artillery crews.

Unfortunately, the command of the 16th Air Army missed the moment of concentrating fighter forces to fight enemy bomber aircraft. Contrary to the developed plan for combat use, groups of 6-8 fighters continued to rise into the air, which were not only unable to prevent massive raids on the battle formations of ground troops, but already on the way to the front line they themselves became the object of fierce attacks of the Focke-Wulfs ". The documents of the 6th Jacob testify: “The first battles immediately brought news that the enemy was appearing in massive groups and the nature of the air battles was taking on a fierce form” .

The main tension of the morning battles on July 5 fell on the aviators of the 273rd IAD and the 1st Guards. jad. A group of 6 Yak-9 and 2 Yak-7b of the 163rd IAP under the command of Major N. E. Morozov in the area of ​​Maloarkhangelsk was suddenly attacked from behind by twenty FW-190s from above. German fighters, echeloning along the heights, conducted almost continuous attacks on the "yaks". In 40 minutes of the battle, five Soviet aircraft were shot down, while three pilots were killed. The losses of the German side amounted to two cars. One of the downed FW-190 pilots parachuted out and was captured.

The flight of 10 Yak-9s from the 2nd Squadron of the 347th IAP also turned out to be unsuccessful. Acting next to the group of the 163rd IAP, the fighters of Major A. M. Baranov attacked large groups of He-111 and Ju-87 around 8:00, while at the cost of losing four and damaging one Yak-9, only one Heinkel was shot down and damage the Bf-110 twin-engine fighter. The second sortie was even more tragic - the commander of the regiment, Major V. L. Plotnikov, died in an air battle. During the attack, his group broke up into separate pairs and cars. As a result, V. L. Plotnikov's plane was hit by a pair of FW-190s and did not return to its airfield.

Among the successful battles on the morning of July 5, one can only note the attack at the ninth hour of a large group of German bombers by the eight Yak-1 of the 53rd Guards. IAP under the command of Senior Lieutenant P.P. Ratnikov. By that time, German bombers had arranged a real "conveyor line" over the front line of the Soviet units. Approaching from different directions, they lay down on a combat course, following along the front line. Having discovered up to 70 He-111 and Ju-88, marching at an altitude of 3200 meters, a group of the 53rd Guards. IAP began to gain altitude, bypassing the barrier of enemy fighters. Hiding in the rays of the sun, the Soviet pilots soon found themselves in the tail of the enemy column, which in the Ponyri area began to turn to a combat course. At that moment, the group of P. P. Ratnikov, at the command of his leader, attacked the He-111, and from the very first attack they managed to hit 2 He-111 and 2 Ju-88. These aircraft were counted as shot down. Note that most likely the crews of the 53rd Guards. IAP attacked a group of Heinkels from III / KG53, shooting down one or two bombers.

After a swift first attack, a group of Soviet fighters divided into two fours, one of which, led by Senior Lieutenant P.P. Ratnikov, continued to attack the Heinkel compound. The leader, together with his wingman, Lieutenant A.F. Tselkovikov, managed to damage another He-111, but the plane of the latter was also seriously damaged by return fire from the gunners. Having received burns, Lieutenant A.F. Tselkovikov made an emergency landing at the location of his troops. The same fate befell junior lieutenant Khomich, who crashed his "yak" while landing on the fuselage.

Despite the courage and selflessness of the aircrew, the general situation in the air by noon remained not only difficult, but in many respects tragic. In the first seven hours of the battle alone, the Soviet side noted over 1,000 sorties by German aviation, of which about 850 were bombers. Tangible losses forced General S.I. Rudenko to send a telegram to the fighter formations at 8:30, stating that starting from 9:30, army units were to act in accordance with order No. “Clarified the deployment and use of the fighter forces of the corps. Further work was reduced to the release of groups on schedule ". However, as practice has shown, the blind execution of orders and the lack of initiative actually gave air supremacy into the hands of the enemy.

The sensitive losses of the first hours of the battle led to the fact that the headquarters of the 6th Iak and 1st Guards met the patrol schedule in accordance with order No. 0048. iad became more and more difficult. Documents of the 163rd IAP testify: “At the same time, there were so many pockets of attacks on our facilities that it was not possible to send more than four to fight them. For each of our fighters, there were 6-8 enemy fighters " .

Assessing the events of the morning of July 5, it must be remembered that relatively small forces of fighter aircraft were involved in the struggle for air supremacy. So, only two regiments of the 273rd Iad were active from the 6th Iac in the morning hours, while the 157th Iap, already mentioned by us, consisting of 16 fighters, after conducting the battle we mentioned above, was in the reserve of the commander of the 6th go jak. The combat strength of the 1st Guards was also far from the regular strength. jad. The four regiments of the formation of Lieutenant Colonel I. V. Krupenin, there were only 67 aircraft, of which 56 were serviceable. Thus, the average strength of a formation regiment ranged from 12 to 16 fighters. Only the 67th Guards stood out for the better. IAP, which included 27 Airacobras. However, this regiment was in the personal reserve of the commander of the 16th Air Army and did not take part in the defensive battle of early July. However, the reasons for the current difficult air situation were not exhausted by the insufficient number of fighter groups sent out. Unfortunately, the commanders of units and formations did not take the necessary measures to improve control and guidance from the ground. The group of officers permanently attached to the headquarters of the 13th Army, headed by the deputy commander of the 16th Air Army, could not change the situation either.

The difficult situation that developed in the first hours of the battle forced the command of the 16th Air Army to involve the 279th Iad of the 6th Jacob in the struggle for air supremacy. Unlike the neighboring 273rd IAD, the command of this division sent groups of 16-18 fighters to the front line. However, the first fights also brought only disappointment and bitterness to the subordinates of Colonel F.N. Dementyev. Only during the first three sorties, the 279th IAD lost 15 aircraft.

One of the first battles of 16 La-5s of the 192nd IAP with six FW-190s was indicative, in which, with the loss of two of their vehicles, only one Focke-Wulf was shot down. In addition, another "Lavochkin" was hit by anti-aircraft artillery fire. Soon 18 La-5s of the 92nd IAP in the Ponyri-Buzuluk area attacked up to 50 Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers. The success achieved can be considered very relative - having shot down 2 Junkers, the group lost 5 of its aircraft. However, the most unsuccessful battle was 18 La-5 of the 486th IAP, led by the regiment commander, Major K. A. Pelipts. At twelve o'clock in the afternoon, this group tried to attack nine Ju-88s in the Ponyri area, covered by 12 FW-190s. The fighters of the 486th IAP were echeloned in altitudes from 3000 to 4000 meters, as prescribed by combat experience. However, the presence of clouds and poor flying did not allow using the numerical advantage. After the attack of the shock six "shops", its leading captain A. M. Ovsienko abruptly went up, as a result of which the group broke up. The fettering group of K. A. Pelipts, walking with an excess of 500 meters, also noticed the Junkers and tried to attack them. However, on the second approach, the plane of the commander of the 486th IAP was set on fire by the Focke-Wulfs who came to the rescue. At this time, a group of 4 La-5 Lieutenant I. G. Menshov, walking at an altitude of 4000 meters, did not see the battle because of the cloudiness and did not take part in it. As a result, 6 La-5s did not return to their airfield, and, according to various sources, one or two enemy fighters were recorded at the expense of the pilots of the group.

Apparently, the opponents of the pilots of the 486th IAP in this battle were pilots from the detachments of 8. and 9./JG51. According to German data, in eight minutes of air combat they shot down 8 Soviet fighters, identified as LaGG-3 and LaGG-5. At the same time, Hubert Strassl, already mentioned by us, won his sixth and seventh victory in a day. Already seven minutes after the end of the battle with Soviet fighters, the Focke-Wulf crews attacked bombers and attack aircraft that appeared over the front line. In this battle, 4 more victories were recorded on Strassl's account - 2 La-5, IL-2 and Boston.

As can be seen, the fighters from the III / JG51 were above the front line just at the moment when the strike aviation was put into action by the command of the 16th Air Army. The ground situation that had developed by that moment in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army took a turn threatening for the Soviet side. By 10:30, units of the 47th Panzer Corps managed to break through the defenses of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions, part of whose forces were surrounded. The settlements of Ozerki and Yasnaya Polyana were captured.

Another powerful blow was delivered by the forces of the 46th Panzer Corps on the right flank of the 70th Army. German bombers, without encountering serious resistance in the air, provided very effective support to their infantry and tanks, helping to break through the defensive lines in this sector. So, for example, the 132nd Rifle Division of the 70th Army, having entrenched itself at the Gnilets - Krasny Corner line and repulsed three attacks on its positions, was forced to retreat after a massive strike of up to eighty Ju-87s from StG1. The report of the operational department of the 70th Army on the hostilities noted that German aviation "Waves of 20-25 aircraft bombed the combat formations of the 28th Rifle Corps all day." In total, about 1,600 enemy aircraft sorties were recorded over the positions of the 70th Army on the first day of the battle. According to the army headquarters, 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. According to the operational reports of the 70th Army, 3 German aviators were captured during the day of fighting at the location of the association.

During the battle, a dangerous crisis ensued. Large groups of tanks and infantry of the 47th Panzer Corps began to break through to the settlements of Ponyri, Again, Podolyan. The reserves at hand were abandoned by the command of the Central Front. At the same time, at 10:30, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant-General A. G. Rodin, received an order to start advancing the 3rd and 16th Tank Corps to the breakthrough site, which was supposed to ensure the stability of the defense of the 13th Army. Tankers were covered from the air by specially designated groups of fighters of the 16th Air Army, but the German front-line aviation was so busy attacking the front line that the movement of large masses of armored vehicles of the 2nd Tank Army passed with little or no impact on its part.

The attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army continued to be a strong trump card of the command of the Central Front in the current situation, which had been waiting for the signal to take off since the very morning. The calculation of Lieutenant-General S. I. Rudenko, who abandoned raids on enemy airfields that were dubious in their effectiveness, turned out to be correct. Having received a very figurative order from General K.K. Rokossovsky to “straighten his shoulders”, the commander of the 16th Air Army lifted into the air to localize the breakthrough in the 13th Army’s zone of the 221st, 241st Bad, and also the 2nd Guards. and 299th shad. At the same time, part of the forces of the 283rd and 286th IADs were also connected to the struggle for air supremacy. The measures taken by the Soviet side did not go unnoticed by the enemy. The headquarters of Army Group Center noted the increased activity of red-star aircraft in the final reconnaissance report for July 5: “Enemy aviation, after initial confusion, moved to planned actions” .

Speaking about the participation in the battles on July 5 of the bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army, we note that the main burden fell on the crews of the Boston bombers of the 221st bad, who made 89 sorties in a day. To escort them, the fighters of the 282nd Iad, which was also part of the 6th Sak, took to the air 103 times. Despite the opposition of German fighters and strong anti-aircraft fire from the ground, the losses of the 221st bad were relatively small - only 4 aircraft did not return to their airfields, and two more bombers made emergency landings. The German data are not very different from the Soviet ones. According to them, 7 American-made bombers were shot down by JG51 and JG54 fighters per day.

The Pe-2 crews of the 241st bad air force flew out with the forces of only two groups, consisting of 5 and 8 Pe-2s, respectively.

The eight "pawns" were forced, due to the lack of enemy troops in the designated strike area, to bombard an alternate target - accumulations of German tanks in a grove 2 kilometers east of Nizhny Tagino. But the crews of 5 Pe-2s covered up to an infantry battalion, 6 tanks and about 40 wagons with troops and cargo in the Yasnaya Polyana - Novy Khutor area. As one of the captured German soldiers of the 292nd Infantry Division later testified, bomb explosions covered the German positions for about two kilometers, with some fragmentation bombs hitting either the trenches or their parapets. As a result, only one battalion lost 23 people killed; and another 56 servicemen were injured.

It should be noted that during 13 sorties, the crews of the 241st battalion dropped 66 FAB-100s, 32 AO-15s, 40 AO-10s, 38 AO-8s and 120 ZAB-2.5s. All Pe-2s that returned from a combat mission had a lot of damage. On one of the "pawns" mechanics counted up to 40 fragmentation holes. At the same time, the losses of the 241st battalion were minimal. Attacked by a dozen German fighters, the Pe-2 eight lost only one car, which made an emergency landing. Another "pawn" already had landing gear on the run - as a result, the broken bomber had to be written off.

The actions of attack aircraft from the 2nd Guards turned out to be very effective. and 299th shad. The more united and experienced flight crew of the 2nd Guards differed for the better. shad, who went through the harsh school of fighting near Stalingrad. Of the four assault regiments in the division, three were involved in the battles of the first day (59th, 78th and 79th Guards Cap). At the cost of losing 4 attack aircraft, according to the reports of the crews of the formation, 31 tanks, 30 cars, 3 armored vehicles, and other equipment were destroyed. Many attack aircraft were damaged, and the plane of Junior Lieutenant Popov from the 78th Guards. the cap, which suffered from both anti-aircraft fire and Focke-Wulf attacks, landed on its fuselage at its airfield.

The personnel of the 299th division had a much harder time, which suffered heavy losses in a number of air battles. So, the eight Il-2 under the command of Lieutenant Mitusov lost six cars in one sortie. In another group of the 217th cap, three Il-2s were shot down at once after a sudden attack by the Focke-Wulfs. Saved only by the excellent survivability of the "silt" - one plane made an emergency landing, and the rest still made it to their airfield. But all the gunners-radio operators on the planes were wounded, and one of them later died in the hospital.

By 12:00, the number of sorties carried out by the subordinates of General S. I. Rudenko had exceeded 500. increased the consumption of fighter sorties for escort. It is not surprising that, covering the actions of attack aircraft, German sources emphasized: "Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield around noon, but they failed to seriously interfere with the actions of our ground forces". Be that as it may, by the second half of the day the situation in the zone of the 13th Army was somewhat stabilized. Air strikes, as well as destructive artillery fire, made it possible to neutralize the enemy's emerging success in a short time. German tanks stopped, turning into fixed firing points, and the infantry was forced to lie low.

Eloquent testimony about the first day of the fighting was also given by the captured chief corporal of the 5th company of the 167th regiment Baumhof: “I will never forget the first day of our offensive. I had no hope of getting out of the fight alive. Our regiment suffered very heavy losses. Other regiments of the division suffered even more. Already by noon 5 On July 216, the regiment, thrown to break through the Russian defenses, lost two-thirds of its personnel, but did not achieve any result. The miserable remnants of the regiment were withdrawn to the second echelon. The paramedics could not bear the wounded. One medical non-commissioned officer told me that the dressing station resembled a slaughterhouse yard.

By the second half of the day, the intensity of fighting on the front of the 13th and 70th armies reached its climax. According to eyewitnesses, by this time the enemy had ensured the simultaneous presence of up to 300 bombers and about 100 fighters over the front line of the Soviet defense. In addition, observation posts located in the zone of the neighboring Bryansk Front repeatedly reported the passage of groups of up to 150 bombers.

The second half of the day also passed under the dominance of German aviation in the air. Despite the fierce resistance of units of the 13th and 70th armies, the German troops managed to advance into the depths of the Soviet defense by about 4–5 kilometers. Summing up the outcome of the hostilities of the 13th Army, the front commander, General K.K. Rokossovsky, noted in his report to the Headquarters: “Parts of the army, repelling the continuous attacks of enemy tanks and infantry, supported by large groups of aviation, held their positions for three hours. Only after re-art. air training, by introducing up to 400 tanks into battle, the enemy managed to push back parts of the army " .

The command of Army Group Center stressed the special role of the aviation of the 1st Air Division in achieving this success, noting that large forces of bomber, attack and fighter aircraft supported the offensive operation of the ground forces in successive waves. Numerous direct hits on artillery batteries, field positions and transport columns were noted.

The intensity of the air battles remained almost until dusk. During the day, guidance from the ground improved somewhat, but even it did not guarantee the disruption of enemy bombing. So, a large group of 19 La-5s of the 92nd IAP, which flew out to complete the mission at 12:30, was directed by the Shtyk-2 station in the Podolian-Tagino area to a mixed group of bombers, consisting of 15 Ju-87, 7 Ju-88 and 6 He-111s, covered by a dozen Focke-Wulfs. Divided into two groups of 12 and 7 aircraft, Soviet pilots attacked by enemy bombers and fighters. The analysis carried out by the employees of the headquarters of the 6th Jacob following the results of the last fight showed that the actions of the pilots of both groups, led by Major D. A. Medvedev and Senior Lieutenant N. G. Butoma, were scattered. As a result, although the crews were credited with three downed bombers and four fighters, with the loss of two La-5s, the overall result of the battle was considered unsuccessful.

Note that the groups of the 279th IAD continued to suffer heavy losses in air battles until the very end of the day. A group of 16 La-5s of the 486th IAP that took off from their airfield at 15:15 in an air battle over the Ponyri area with 30 Ju-88s and Bf-110s, covered by a large number of fighters, lost 4 vehicles, shooting down only one Ju-88. Even more tragic was the departure of a group of the neighboring 192nd IAP at 19:15–20:40. Led by the commander of the regiment, Major Kizilov, 15 La-5s in the area of ​​Maloarkhangelsk - Ponyri attacked Ju-88 bombers, covered by FW-190 fighters. As a result of the battle, 6 La-5s were lost, plus one more of our aircraft made an emergency landing in the field with the landing gear retracted, while only four downed German fighters were recorded on the pilots' accounts.

It was in the evening hours, crowning the bloody day of July 5, that the only ram for the whole day was made. The pilot of the 54th Guards distinguished himself. IAP junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov, who, as part of the Yak-1 four, took off from the Fatezh airfield at 18:53 to repel an enemy raid in the 2nd Ponyri - Nikolskoye area. During the air battle, two "yaks" were connected by escort fighters, and the plane of the group commander Kalmykov was damaged and left the battlefield. Then junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov attacked the He-111 compound on his own. Having approached one of the bombers at a distance of about 20 meters, the Soviet pilot opened fire and achieved hits. However, the return fire of the air gunner was also accurate. In the car of V.K. Polyakov, the gas tank was pierced, the water was drained, the right plane caught fire, and the pilot himself received a face burn and was wounded in right hand. Realizing that the fighter would not last long, the brave aviator decided to ram the Heinkel. With a blow of a screw and the right plane, he demolished the tail of a German bomber, and he himself, thrown out of the burning wreckage of a fighter, bloody, with burns to his face, but still alive, landed safely at the location of his troops. The rammed He-111, apparently belonging to the KG53 squadron, crashed in the Voza area. It was the twenty-fourth dogfight and the pilot's fourth victory. For ramming over the Kursk Bulge, Vitaly Konstantinovich Polyakov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union on September 2, 1943.

So, the first day of the battle - the most difficult and rich in losses for the 16th Air Army - ended. Having made 1,720 sorties per day (1,232 of them during the day), its crews conducted 76 air battles, in which, according to the army headquarters, 106 enemy aircraft were shot down. At the same time, the losses of the association of General S.I. Rudenko were truly devastating: 98 aircraft did not return to their airfields in a day.

The lion's share of the losses of the 16th Air Army, about 75%, were aircraft from the fighter aviation formations. Suffice it to say that only the 6th Jacob lost 45 cars in a day. The combat composition of his regiments was greatly thinned. Some of them by the end of the day were, at best, reinforced squadrons. So, for example, in the 273rd IAD in the 157th IAP there were 16, and in the 163rd and 347th IAP, respectively, 6 and 7 serviceable "yaks" of various modifications. The combat strength of the 279th IAP was significantly reduced, where the number of La-5 fighters per day decreased in the 92nd IAP from 27 to 19, in the 192nd IAP and 486th IAP from 24 to 13 each. Nine aircraft were lost by the aviators of the 1st Guards, who fought shoulder to shoulder with the pilots of the 6th Iak. jad. Despite the relatively small number of losses, due to the large number of damaged vehicles, the combat effectiveness of some regiments fell sharply. In particular, this applied to the 54th Guards. iap. The data submitted to the division headquarters, apparently even before the ramming committed by junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov, testified that out of 13 fighters (12 serviceable) available at the beginning of the day, only 3 Yak-1 and 2 Yak-9, while 7 vehicles were under repair. The 286th IAD was also badly damaged during the first day of fighting, all day busy escorting attack aircraft and fighting for air supremacy. During the fighting, she lost 14 fighters, 8 of which belonged to the 721st IAP.

The reasons for such heavy losses were obvious. Describing the first day of the Battle of Kursk, the headquarters of the 6th Jacob noted: “This was the first baptism of fire for the young pilots of the corps, who could not stay in the group and on combat figures”. Indeed, the basis of most formations (not only the 6th Iac) were young pilots who underwent accelerated training in flight schools and reserve regiments. According to the 6th Jacob, a fighter pilot arriving at the front in the summer of 1943 had only 2-3 training air battles behind him. Not bad piloting the aircraft individually, yesterday's cadets nevertheless could hardly operate in a group, which was especially noticeable in the example of the combat work of the 92nd, 192nd and 163rd IAP. The actions of the pilots of the 163rd IAP were considered especially unsuccessful. Part history says: “The first day in this grandiose battle was unsuccessful for the regiment, which caused the issuance of a special order for 16 VA, accusing our pilots of indecision bordering on cowardice” .

Shortcomings in the flight and fire training of young pilots were exacerbated by organizational turmoil. When taking off for a combat mission, on alarm, the groups often did not gather over the airfield, the leaders did not wait for the followers. As a result, the fighters entered the battle separately, without building up their forces. Calls of groups to the areas of extermination were late in most cases. Guidance officers incorrectly assessed the air situation, not helping the pilots in its coverage. Noting shortcomings in the fighter guidance system, documents from the headquarters of the 16th Air Army testify: “In the first days of combat work, our fighters failed to paralyze the enemy. The fighters went to the rear, did not see the enemy, sometimes fought with barriers, acted sluggishly and reluctantly, due to which the losses in the first days were large. This happened because the guidance radio stations were placed 4-5 km from the front line, observation was difficult due to inclement weather, smoke from fires, artillery and bombing " .

Another major shortcoming in the actions of the Soviet fighter aviation was the desire of the crews to fight over their territory, as a result of which, as the documents of the 6th Iak note, "the arrival of the bombers became known to the corps command at the time of the bombing itself" .

The current situation is most accurately characterized by the lines from the report on the combat operations of the 486th IAP, which can be attributed to many Soviet air units: “Air battles from the first days of the enemy offensive in most cases proceeded unorganized, there was no interaction between the covering and holding down groups. Leading groups made little use of radio to direct group air battles. A weak flight of crews in pairs and groups was revealed. The leading pairs lost their senior groups in a group air battle, and the trailing pairs lost their leading ones, which was the result of losses from enemy fighters of the leading groups.. Note that only in the 6th Iac during the first day of fighting, three group commanders were killed, including the commanders of the 347th and 486th IAP, which was largely due to the lack of flight and mutual assistance.

In contrast to the Soviet side, the German command at all levels praised the actions of their aviators. During the day, 2088 sorties were made, during which “The 1st Aviation Division brilliantly supported the troops of the 9th Army that went on the offensive. Only 9 A supported 1909 bombers and fighters(meaning sorties. - Note. ed.),which had a decisive influence on the success of the offensive" .

The greatest activity was developed by the crews of "pieces" and twin-engine bombers, which made 647 and 582 sorties, respectively. The fighter squadrons JG51 and JG54 practically did not lag behind them, destroying 158 Soviet aircraft in the course of 533 sorties. Another 11 victories were attributed to anti-aircraft artillery. As you can see, the successes of the German side were overestimated by about 1.5 times. Among the fighters, the pilots of I / JG54 achieved the greatest success, having at least 59 victories to their credit. Group III/JG51 was in second place with 45 victories.

The pilot of the 8./JG51 detachment, Hubert Strassl, already mentioned by us, achieved a phenomenal result by the end of the day, bringing the score of his victories to 15 aircraft shot down, 9 of which were fighters. The second most successful pilot among the pilots of the 6th Air Fleet was Gunther Schell (Scheel Gunther) from the detachment 2./JG54, who shot down 8 Soviet vehicles. 7 victories each were recorded in the battle accounts of Rudolf Rademacher (Rademacher Rudolf) and Hermann Lucke (Lucke Hermann) from 1./JG54 and 9./JG51. Luke won all his victories during 3 sorties. At least three more pilots scored 5 victories each. Among them, we note the chief sergeant major Anton Hafner (Hafner Anton), who by July 11 won his 50th victory. Hafner, who reached the time of his death, October 17, 1944, 204 victories, became the most productive pilot of the JG51 squadron.

It is important to emphasize that the actions of the German fighters were aimed primarily at the destruction of Soviet aviation. Repeatedly during the day, there were cases when large groups of "Focke-Wulfs", numbering 30-40 vehicles, attacked Soviet patrols even on the way to the front line, thereby providing their bombers with the opportunity to "work" on ground targets almost unhindered. It is not surprising that, describing the events of the tragic day of July 5 in his memoirs, the former commander of the 16th Air Army, S. I. Rudenko, was forced to diplomatically remark: “The first day did not bring us satisfaction”. The statements of German military leaders regarding the actions of Soviet aviation are much more specific. So, the former chief of staff of the 6th Air Fleet, Friedrich Kless, summing up the results on July 5, noted: “Undoubtedly, on July 5, the Luftwaffe turned out to be the master of the battlefield. The breakthrough occurred without any significant intervention from the Air Force." .

What were the losses of German air formations during the first day of fighting? According to the reports of the headquarters of the 6th Air Fleet, the losses of the association of General von Greim amounted to only 7 vehicles (1 Ju-88, 2 Ju-87, 1 Bf-110 and 2 FW-190). Note that these same figures were later duplicated in the diary of the military operations of the OKW. Meanwhile, the list of losses of the 6th Air Fleet, compiled on the basis of the reports of the Quartermaster General, gives us a somewhat different picture. According to him, at least 33 aircraft were lost and damaged. At the same time, referring to decommissioned vehicles those whose damage percentage exceeded or was equal to 40%, we get that the irretrievable losses of the 1st Air Division on July 5 amounted to 21 aircraft (3 Ju-88, 8 Ju-87, 1 He-111 , 7 FW-190, 1 Bf-110, 1 Bf-109). Thus, the losses of the Red Army Air Force were slightly less than 5 times higher than the losses of the 6th Air Fleet, and the Soviet pilots overestimated their successes by at least the same 5 times. For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that part of the German aircraft fell victim to anti-aircraft artillery, and were also defeated in accidents and disasters.

According to the author, the loss ratio of 1:5 is an adequate expression of the level of combat training, the tactics used and the quantitative ratio of the opposing sides. An interesting fact is also the fact that in his report to the Headquarters on the results of the battles on July 5, the commander of the Central Front reported only 45 enemy aircraft shot down in air battles. Probably, General K.K. Rokossovsky operated on preliminary data from the headquarters of the 16th Air Army. However, one cannot but be surprised that as a result of the subsequent "clarification" the number of downed aircraft more than doubled.

So, the first day of the battle on the northern face of the Kursk salient ended. The actions of the crews of the 6th Air Fleet made it possible to inflict heavy losses on Soviet aviation in air battles, as well as to provide effective support to ground forces. At the same time, units of General Model's 9th Army failed to build on their initial success. The loss of the element of surprise, the lack of infantry formations, as well as the staunch resistance of units of the 13th and 70th armies and massive Soviet air strikes, made the prospects for a further attack on Kursk from the north very uncertain. A rapid breakthrough in the style of a "tank raid" was out of the question. The intelligence data was also alarming for the command of the 9th Army, according to which: “6.7 should be expected, first of all, to the west of the Orel-Kursk railway, as well as to the north-west of Maloarkhangelsk, counterattacks by enemy tank formations”. And indeed, already at dawn the next day, the fresh reserves of the 13th Army, supported by the tanks of the army of General A. G. Rodin, launched a powerful counterattack on the advanced German units.

2.2. Unstable equilibrium

The results of the first day of the battle in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge became the subject of close attention of the Headquarters. According to the memoirs of S. I. Rudenko, during the evening report of K. K. Rokossovsky, Stalin was especially interested in the question of gaining air supremacy. It can be assumed that the heavy losses suffered by units of the 16th Air Army seriously alarmed the Supreme. The report of the front commander, who referred to the fierce fighting and mutual heavy losses, obviously did not satisfy the leader. From the rather streamlined lines of the memoirs of the former commander of the 16th Air Army, one can conclude that Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that aviation did not have a noticeable influence on the course of events. In addition, he also asked if the commander of the 16th Air Army was able to rectify the situation. Nevertheless, K.K. Rokossovsky managed to convince the Supreme Commander that the next day the issue of air supremacy would be “positively resolved.” Despite the assurances of the commander, the Stavka took its own measures to strengthen aviation leadership. The first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, Colonel-General G. A. Vorozheykin, urgently flew to the Central Front, having received Stalin’s categorical order: “So that air supremacy is won tomorrow!”

In the current difficult situation, the command of the 16th Air Army urgently needed to take decisive measures to eliminate the failures in the organization of hostilities that led to a fiasco on the first day of the defensive battle. Priority attention was required to improve the guidance of fighters from the ground, for which additional officers from the headquarters of the formations left for the troops. The second most important task was air support for the counterattack of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, as well as units of the 2nd Tank Army, designed to restore the situation in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Obviously, it was impossible to make any significant changes in the organization of combat work during the short summer night. Planning air support for the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps, the commander of the air army decided to separate the echelons of actions of attack aircraft and bombers of the 221st bad with altitudes of 1000 and 2000 meters, respectively. As you can see, the bomber aviation forces involved in this operation were represented by only one division, while the most powerful bomber formation of the 16th Air Army - the 3rd tank (as well as several fighter and assault air regiments) remained in the reserve of General S. And Rudenko. In order to give the enemy the impression of a larger number of vehicles participating in the raid, groups of attack aircraft had to make several approaches to the target from different directions and heights.

At about 4:00, after a short artillery preparation, as well as an attack by assault aircraft, units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps went on the offensive along with three divisions advancing from the Maloarkhangelsk area. Having inflicted a defeat on the enemy troops, units of the Soviet infantry already at the sixth hour reached the 1st Ponyri - Druzhovetsky - Bobrik line. It should be noted that from the memoirs of S. I. Rudenko it follows that the infantry offensive was supported by groups of Il-2 and Boston bombers that simultaneously appeared in the air. However, according to archival documents, units of the 221st bad flew out to carry out their first combat mission after 6 in the morning, that is, when the rifle units had already achieved their success. So, only at 6:08 groups of “Bostons” of the 57th bap began to rise into the air, and after another 12 minutes, the neighboring 8th guards also went on a mission. and 745th bap. Most likely, the actions of the bomber crews preceded the offensive in the direction of the Steppe by the brigades of the 16th Panzer Corps, which, despite the hopes placed on it, was not successful. The head 107th tank brigade, moving towards Butyrki, fell into an ambush organized by the enemy and was almost completely destroyed by the fire of heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, losing almost 70 T-34s and T-70s. Other parts of the corps did not achieve noticeable success either.

The crews of the 221st bad continued to make sorties until the second half of the day, bombing accumulations of enemy manpower and equipment in the areas of Senkovo, Novy Khutor, Ozerki, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan, Upper Tagino. July 6 turned out to be the most tense and rich in losses for the division of Colonel S. F. Buzylev during the entire period of the defensive battle. 16 Bostons did not return to their airfields, with most of the losses occurring in the 8th Guards. and the 745th bap, which lost 7 and 6 cars, respectively. The losses of the crews of the 282nd IAD accompanying the bombers amounted to only 5 Yak-1s.

Note that the 221st bad suffered the greatest losses from the fire of enemy anti-aircraft artillery, which shot down 10 aircraft, while only 6 Bostons fell to the share of German fighters. These data almost completely coincide with the German ones, according to which the first three bombers were shot down by the commander of 1./JG51 Oberleutnant Joachim Brendel (Brendel Joachim), as well as the pilots of the detachment 9./JG51 Hermann Luke, and sergeant major Wilhelm Kuken (Kuken Wilhelm). Until the end of the day, German fighters from III and IV / JG51 managed to shoot down three more bombers from the 221st bad.

The counterattack of the Central Front, inflicted at dawn on July 6, despite the heavy losses suffered by the tankers, nevertheless had a very noticeable effect on the evolving situation. The initiative, albeit for a short time, was wrested from the hands of the enemy. Parts of the 9th Army had, starting from noon, to launch attacks on the positions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps to restore the lost position. The ground offensive was supported by massive air raids, which played, perhaps, a decisive role in the unfolding battles. At about 15:30, between 50 and 70 Ju-87 and Ju-88 aircraft subjected to fierce bombing of the location of the Soviet troops, and the attack that followed this threw parts of the 17th Guards Corps from the positions occupied in the morning. Describing the actions of German aviation over the combat formations of the 13th Army, the commander of the Central Front, in his evening report to Headquarters, noted that enemy aviation in groups of 20–30 and 60–100 aircraft continuously affected the combat formations of army troops.

The crews of the German bombers also showed high activity in other sectors of the front. Thus, the headquarters of the 132nd Infantry Division, comparing the actions of German aviation with the previous day, noted: "On this day(July 6. - Note. ed.) the actions of enemy aircraft were even stronger and more massive. While flying in groups of 80-100 aircraft, the enemy used the tactic of continuous movement of these groups. So throughout the day there were at least 100 aircraft continuously in the air. .

It should be noted that in the second half of the day the priorities of the command of the 6th Air Fleet shifted to the zone of the 41st Tank Corps, which launched an offensive in the general direction of Ponyri. At the same time, the emerging crises in the areas of the neighboring 46th and 47th tank corps forced the German command to redirect significant aviation forces here. Thus, the strike of the 46th Panzer Corps on the heights south of Gnilets, scheduled for 19:00, did not take place, since the positions of the 31st Infantry Division, which had prepared for the offensive, were suddenly subjected to a powerful attack by the 19th Panzer Corps. It is not known how events would have developed for the German infantry if it were not for the very prompt intervention of the aviation of the 6th Air Fleet, which made it possible to repulse the Soviet tank attack. As a result, units of the 46th Panzer Corps for the whole day had an advance of only a little more than a kilometer.

Speaking about the activity of German aviation on the second day of the battle, it should be noted that it almost halved compared to July 5. During the day, 1023 sorties were made, 546 of which were Ju-87, Ju-88, He-111 and Bf-110 strike machines. At the same time, the crews of the 16th Air Army lifted their vehicles into the air 1326 times. It should be noted that the decrease in the activity of aviation of the opposing sides was not only due to a large number cars damaged the day before, but also due to weather conditions that deteriorated sharply during the day. Despite this, the intensity of the air battles, as well as their content, practically did not differ from the events of the previous day.

The most unsuccessful for the Soviet pilots was the air battle that took place at about 9:40 in the Olkhovatka area, 2nd Ponyri. The patrolling group of 17 La-5s of the 92nd IAP 279th IAD (leading Major D. A. Medvedev) was divided into two attack (5 and 6 aircraft, respectively) and shackling (6 aircraft) groups. After a relatively clear pre-dawn hours, heavy cumulus clouds appeared in the sky. The holding group, which was moving higher, received an order from the ground to gain height, soon losing visual contact with the strike groups, which, in turn, also tried to break through the clouds. Suddenly, at 3500 meters, Soviet pilots discovered 6 Ju-88s, marching under the cover of the same number of Focke-Wulfs. From the very first attack, Major D. A. Medvedev managed to hit one "eighty-eighth", which was recorded as a victory for the pilot. However, soon the group of the 92nd IAP broke up into separate pairs and machines, which, wandering in the clouds, fought with German aircraft that appeared here and there. The total number of enemy vehicles upon their return to the airfield was estimated at 40 Ju-88s and 16 FW-190s. According to the reports of the pilots, 5 bombers and 5 fighters were shot down. However, even these figures could not justify the heaviest losses suffered by the aviators of the 92nd IAP in this sortie: 8 La-5s, almost half of the group flying out on a combat mission, did not return to their airfields! Among the dead were not only young pilots, but also an experienced squadron commander, Hero of the Soviet Union I. D. Sidorov. During the air battle with the Focke-Wulfs, the ace did not notice the enemy who had entered his tail and was shot down.

On July 6, the level of fighter aviation losses slightly decreased in absolute terms, amounting, as on the eve, to a significant relative value. So, for example, the 6th Jacob lost 24 aircraft during air battles. Sensitive damage was also inflicted on the 1st Guards. iad, whose regiments missed 13 fighters per day. A significant number of damaged aircraft in the battles further affected the combat capability of the unit. By the evening of July 6, as part of the 1st Guards. IAD (excluding the 67th Guards IAP, which continued to be in reserve), there were 26 serviceable aircraft and 17 in need of repair. A sad sight was the 30th Guards. and 54th Guards. IAP, which by the end of the second day of the battle had only four and two serviceable fighters, respectively. Due to heavy losses in fighters, the command of the 16th Air Army had to actually unite groups of different regiments for patrolling. So, for example, fighters of the 163rd IAP operated in combat formations with the neighboring 347th IAP. As part of single groups, "yaks" of the 53rd Guards flew out on missions. and "cobras" of the 30th Guards. IAP, and several Yak-9T fighters from the 54th Guards. IAP reinforced groups of other regiments of the division.

July 6, except for the 1st Guards. IAD and 6th IAD, pilots of the 286th and 283rd IAD also took part in the struggle for air supremacy. The crews of the latter showed themselves especially well during air battles. The documents of the division note the actions of Lieutenant S. K. Kolesnichenko from the 519th IAP, who, leading the four "yaks", attacked Ju-88 bombers three times in the Olkhovatka area. After the first attack on the bombers, one of the Ju-88s, set on fire by S.K. Kolesnichenko, went to the ground with a large roll. Junior Lieutenant N.V. Chistyakov attacked and set fire to another German bomber. After that, S.K. Kolesnichenko, with his wingman, Lieutenant V.M. Cherednikov, entered into battle with four Focke-Wulfs pursuing them, knocking down one of them. After the end of this fight, S.K. Kolesnichenko noticed another group of enemy aircraft, consisting of 6 Ju-88s, and attacked it in the forehead. However, soon the "yaks" were again involved in a battle with German fighters, during which Junior Lieutenant I.F. Mutsenko managed to knock out S.K. Kolesnichenko FW-190, which had entered the tail of the aircraft. However, at the same time, the young pilot himself fell into a tailspin, eventually breaking away from the enemy fighters pursuing him with difficulty. During this fight, Lieutenant S. K. Kolesnichenko won his third victory.

Pilots from the 10 Yak-1 group of the neighboring 176th IAP under the command of Captain V. G. Lyalinsky were also active. At the end of the day, covering the ground forces in the Ponyri-Olkhovatka area, where the situation escalated sharply after the German tanks broke through, they entered into an air battle with three groups of bombers, each of which consisted of up to 40 Ju-88 and He-111 vehicles. According to the results of the battle, two bombers were recorded on the account of the leader of the group. One "Junkers" replenished the account of junior lieutenant D.S. Kabanov, who, having damaged one German aircraft, was able to break away from the enemy fighters pursuing him, and then, having overtaken the formation of bombers, made another attack.

An interesting example of the effective work of the fighters of the 16th Air Army was recorded by the military personnel of the 1st detachment of the 13th Army. At about 17:00, they watched how, west of Ponyri, a pair of La-5s of the 6th Yak calmly attached themselves from below to a group of 30 He-111s and shot down one of the bombers without interference. It is possible that the downed "Heinkel" became a victim of a pair of Yak-1 of the same group of V. G. Lyalinsky. During the battle, a pair of fighters broke away from her, led by junior lieutenant S. Z. Shevchenko, who at about 17:00 shot down a He-111 in the Ponyri area.

Despite the examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of the pilots, the air situation by the end of the second day of the battle continued to be difficult. The level of losses of the association of General S. I. Rudenko exceeded all reasonable limits. During the battle on July 6, the 16th Air Army lost 91 aircraft. Compared to the previous day, when the greatest losses fell on fighter aircraft, on the second day of the fighting, a significant proportion of the lost vehicles were Il-2 attack aircraft. For example, in the 2nd Guards. Shad missed 17 "silt", 9 of which were lost forever, and another 8 made emergency landings, having received damage of varying severity. Even more sensitive losses were accompanied by the combat work of the 299th division, in which 4 attack aircraft became victims of fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, and 25 did not return from combat missions.

The reports of the 6th Air Fleet, according to which 118 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and another 12 were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, correspond relatively exactly to the figures of Soviet losses. Among the most distinguished pilots one can again find the names of Hermann Lücke from 9./JG51 and Hubert Strassl from 8./JG51, who scored 4 and 6 victories respectively. On the account of the commander of 9./JG51 Oberleutnant Maximilian Mayerl (Mayerl Maximilian) for July 6, there are also 4 downed aircraft, which brought the pilot's combat score to 50 victories. In the category of achievements of the crews of strike aircraft, primarily dive bombers from the StG1 and III / StG3, there are 29 destroyed and 12 damaged Soviet tanks. The command of the Army Group "Center" noted the role of the crews of the bomber aircraft, which was especially good at destroying the initial positions of the tanks and at times gave a significant relief to the ground units.

Documents of the 2nd Panzer Army note that throughout the day, enemy aircraft in groups of 60-80 aircraft continuously hung in the air and processed every hundred square meters of the area, paving the way for tanks and infantry. At the same time, according to Soviet data, the effectiveness of enemy raids had little effect on the combat effectiveness of tank units and formations. Thus, during the entire period of the defensive battle, the 2nd Panzer Army lost only 9 tanks from the actions of German aviation. For comparison, we point out that over the same period, the total losses of the army amounted to 214 tanks, of which 138 were irretrievably lost.

The losses of the 6th Air Fleet, according to the combat diary of the formation, on July 6 amounted to only 6 aircraft (3 Ju-88s, 1 Ju-87, 1 Bf-110 and 1 FW-190), although the reports of the quartermaster general contain mention of 13 machines, 8 of which were lost forever. One of the three Focke-Wulfs lost during the day was piloted by the commander of group I / JG 54, Major Reinhard Seiler (Seiler Reinhard), who opened an impressive list of losses of Luftwaffe aviation commanders during the Battle of Kursk. A veteran of the fighting in Spain, where he shot down 9 Republican aircraft, Seiler commanded the 1st group of the famous Green Hearts from mid-April, replacing the legendary Hans Philipp (Philipp Hans) in this position. On July 5, 5 victories were recorded on the account of the group commander (4 fighters and an attack aircraft), the next day two more victories. However, in an air battle, the ace, who reached the mark of 109 victories, was seriously wounded, jumped out of the plane on a parachute and no longer participated in air battles.

The results of the two-day air battle over the northern face of the Kursk Bulge could not but cause concern both among the leadership of the Central Front and at Headquarters. In two days of fighting, the composition of the 16th Air Army was reduced by almost 190 aircraft. Particularly sensitive losses fell on fighter aircraft. So, in the 6th Iac, which lost 81 aircraft and 58 pilots in two days of fighting, by the end of July 6, only 48 serviceable machines remained in service. A similar picture was in the 1st Guards. iad, where there were 28 serviceable "yaks" and "Aerocobras". The crisis in the fighter aviation of the 16th Air Army was so obvious that, after a conversation with General S.I. Rudenko, Marshal G.K. . This division, despite being staffed with young flight personnel, was in good standing with the command of the Red Army Air Force according to the results of the June inspection. Unfortunately, the path of the 234th IAD to the Central Front was somewhat delayed. The order of Marshal A. A. Novikov followed on July 7, the next day the regiments of the division flew to the airfields of the 16th Air Army, joining combat work only on July 9.

According to Soviet historiography, July 7 was a turning point in the course of the battle on the northern face of the Kursk salient. In the morning, the 9th Army launched an offensive on the heights north of Olkhovatka and in the Ponyri region, directing its main efforts along the Orel-Kursk railway. Parts of the 4th Panzer Division were introduced into the battle. The 41st Panzer Corps, after the initial success associated with the capture of the settlement on May 1 and access to the northern outskirts of Ponyri, carried out several fruitless attacks on the positions of the 307th Infantry Division during the day. In these battles, the crews of the 16th Air Army provided significant support to the infantrymen, whose actions became more and more massive and purposeful.

For the first time since the beginning of the battle in the battles in in full force All three bomber divisions of General S. I. Rudenko took part, who in his order especially drew the attention of the crews to the accuracy of bombing. “I demand bombardment not just of a given area, but of finding the most important targets in a given area, especially to follow the signals of my troops ...”- the commander wrote in his order for July 7.

Bomber operations began at dawn, when about 45 Pe-2s of the 3rd tank bombarded the concentration of German troops in front of the 13th Army front. Above the target, the crews noted the great activity of German anti-aircraft artillery. At the same time, from 30 to 50 anti-aircraft shells exploded in the air. The same “hot reception” was given by the enemy in the second half of the day. However, despite this, the aviators of Major General A. Z. Karavatsky, consisting of 30 Pe-2s, supported by attack aircraft, achieved impressive success. By this time, the rifle units had already beaten off two fierce attacks on Ponyri. Organizing a new attack, the enemy concentrated up to 150 armored vehicles in the Rzhavets-Druzhovets area, as well as large infantry forces. This accumulation of equipment was soon discovered by aerial reconnaissance. Up to 120 strike aircraft were lifted into the air. According to the commander of the Central Front, the German units suffered serious losses, and their attack was thwarted.

Kurt Blume, a captured non-commissioned officer of the 2nd company of the 35th tank regiment of the 4th tank division, told about the difficulties that the German tankers had to face when breaking into the Soviet defense: “On the night of July 5, Hitler's order was read to us. The order stated that tomorrow the German army would launch a new offensive, which was destined to decide the outcome of the war. The 35th regiment was tasked with breaking through the Russian defenses. Up to 100 tanks of the regiment went to their original positions. At this time, Russian aircraft attacked us and disabled several aircraft. At 5 o'clock our battalion deployed in a wedge along the road and went on the attack. Having reached the crest of the height, we were caught in the crossfire of anti-tank guns and Russian anti-tank rifles. The line was immediately broken, the movement slowed down. The adjacent tank began to smoke. The lead tank of the company commander stopped and then backed away. Everything we were taught has lost its meaning. Actions did not unfold the way we were pictured at school. The tactics of a tank breakthrough, which we were taught, turned out to be unsuitable. Soon my tank was hit, and a fire broke out inside the car. I hastened to jump out of the burning tank. There were at least 40 wrecked tanks on the battlefield, many of which were on fire.

Il-2 of the 299th division, which actively used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs, played a special role in delivering strikes against German tanks. Only at the time of concentration of about two hundred tanks to attack Ponyri, attack aircraft pilots made about 120 sorties, achieving excellent results. The group of the 431st cap of senior lieutenant D. I. Smirnov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 4.2.44.) Destroyed and damaged twelve enemy tanks in the Buzuluk area, for which they received gratitude from the command of the 13th army. Eight of Captain K. E. Terrible in one run destroyed and damaged eleven enemy tanks. Pilots of the 874th Shap, operating in the Maloarkhangelsk area, used up 980 cumulative bombs on July 7 and 8, declaring the defeat of over forty German tanks with the loss of six crews.

It is important to note that the massed actions of the strike aviation of the 16th Air Army “confused the cards” for the German fighters, who were unable to disrupt these raids. Yes, 2nd Guards. shad lost only 1 IL-2 in a day, and 5 more aircraft made emergency landings. Bomber losses were also relatively light. From the composition of the 3rd tank, 4 Pe-2s did not return to their airfields for the whole day, two of which were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and one Pe-2 of the 24th bap was damaged and finished off by German fighters. Another plane made an emergency landing. A similar picture was in the 221st bad, the bombers of which made 125 sorties per day in the Steppe, Podsoborovka, Podolyan and Bobrik areas, while losing only 3 aircraft from the 745th bap. Note that on July 7, victories over the Bostons were recorded for such aces as Joachim Brendel of I./JG51, Scheel Gunther, Karl Schnorrer (Schnorrer Karl) and Hans-Joachim Happatsch (Happatsch Hans-Joachim) of I./JG51. /JG54.

The escort fighters of the 282nd Iad showed themselves in these battles from the best side, successfully interacting with the crews of the 221st bad. This was largely facilitated by the assignment of fighter regiments to the same bomber units. So, the 127th IAP was mainly accompanied by the 8th Guards. bap, 517th iap - 57th bap, and 774th iap - 745th bap. During the unfolding battles, the pilots of the 282nd IAD had to repel the attacks of groups of "Focke-Wulfs" numbering from 6 to 20 vehicles. Already in the morning flight, the eight Yak-1 of the 127th IAP captain I. I. Petrenko, covering the actions of 6 A-20B in the Podolyan - Soborovka area, counterattacked 10 FW-190, trying to attack the bombers from below. Another major battle was fought in the afternoon by the pilots of the 127th IAP, when 12 bombers of the 8th Guards. bap, when moving away from the target, were attacked from above from behind the clouds by two dozen "one hundred and ninety". Despite the suddenness of the attack, there were no losses among the Bostons, while the Soviet pilots claimed several downed FW-190s. In these battles, many aviators of the 282nd IAD distinguished themselves, including the future Heroes of the Soviet Union captains K. M. Treshchev and A. P. Savchenko (127th IAP, the title was awarded on 2.8.44 and 4.2.44) and senior lieutenant I. I. Romanenko ( 774th IAP, rank awarded 4.2.44).

The death of the hero killed the squadron commander of the 517th IAP senior lieutenant M. I. Vizhunov. The escort group, which he led, entered the battle over the location of the 13th Army with a group of FW-190s. Having used up the ammunition load of his Yak-1 and trying to prevent German fighters from reaching the bombers, Vizhunov rammed one of the Focke-Wulfs with his plane, diving at a German aircraft at an angle of 90 degrees. One of the two FW-190s from IV/JG51 that went missing on 7 July was probably the victim of the ramming.

Again, the fighters of the 283rd IAD showed themselves from the best side. In the Ponyri-Molotichi area, 12 Yak-7b of the 519th IAP under the command of Lieutenant P.I. Trubnikov attacked four groups of bombers with a total of 22 Ju-88s. The tense dogfight lasted about 25–30 minutes. As a result, at the cost of losing one Yak, 2 Ju-88s were shot down, apparently belonging to the III / KG51 group. Another Junkers was damaged. In addition, Soviet pilots claimed to destroy five German fighters.

Despite the fierce resistance of the Soviet infantry, by the evening of July 7, the German units managed to achieve some success - after a stubborn battle, the northern outskirts of Ponyri were occupied. In the Olkhovat direction, units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, after a massive attack by German bombers, were forced to retreat 2-4 kilometers to the height of 257.0. The headquarters of the 16th Air Army especially noted the organization of enemy aviation operations in this raid. Three groups of German bombers appeared over the front line around 19:00. The first two, consisting of 25–30 Ju-87s and Ju-88s, bombarded the front line of defense of the 13th Army in the area of ​​Ponyri, Again, Samodurovka, Krasavka. The bombing was carried out both from a dive and from a level flight, while the German crews built their maneuver in such a way as to get out of the attack on their territory. The third group of bombers, under a stronger escort of 20 fighters, made 3-4 approaches to the target. While the "Junkers" were busy processing the front line, four pairs of "hunters" went deep into Soviet territory to a depth of 10-12 kilometers, preventing patrols of the 16th Air Army from reaching the bombing area.

According to the headquarters of the 13th Army, the third day of the battle was the most intense throughout the entire defensive operation. During the day, parts of the army of General N.P. Pukhov set a kind of record, having spent almost 3,000 tons of ammunition. Despite some tactical successes of the enemy, the results of the battles on July 7 aroused optimism among K.K. Rokossovsky and his headquarters. In Soviet historiography devoted to the study of aviation operations, July 7 is also considered the turning point for air supremacy. Here is how they say about the events of this day in the study of M. N. Kozhevnikov: “On July 7, 1943, the main efforts of enemy aviation were concentrated against the troops of the Central Front. Here the enemy operated in groups of 80-120 aircraft, but also failed to achieve air supremacy. The 16th Air Army, with the assistance of the 15th Air Army, carried out 1,370 sorties, and the enemy somewhat more than 1,000. Starting from that day, Soviet fighters firmly seized the initiative in the air. Most of the enemy bombers were intercepted and destroyed by our fighters on the way to the covered objects.. A similar assessment can be found in the book on the combat path of the 16th Air Army. Speaking about the events of the third day of the battle, its authors report: “Starting from July 7, a turning point came in the struggle for air supremacy - Soviet fighters seized the initiative. If in the first two days of air battles our losses were somewhat less than the losses of the enemy (the ratio of losses was 1 to 1.2), then on July 7 and 8, army pilots shot down 185 enemy aircraft, while losing 89 " .

German sources do not confirm a significant drop in the activity of the association of General von Greim. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, on July 7, compared to the previous day, the number of sorties not only did not decrease, but also increased significantly, amounting to 1687. Of this number, 1159 sorties were made by attack aircraft crews - “pieces”, heavy fighters and bombers. Attention is drawn to the fact that on July 7, not only the crews of the Junkers and Heinkels were involved in attacks on the positions of the Soviet troops, but reconnaissance aircraft with fighters who took on board a bomb supply of 120 and 18 sorties, respectively. According to the reports of German aviators, during the day they managed to destroy 14 and damage 22 tanks, as well as burn 63 vehicles. The losses of the 6th air fleet on July 7 were small, amounting to 13 aircraft, of which 8 were written off.

Despite the fact that German bomber aircraft continued to dominate the air on the third day of the battle, their fierce attacks on the well-fortified defenses of the Soviet troops did not always bring results. So, for example, during heavy fighting for the settlement of Teploe, the 11th Guards Tank Brigade lost only one tank from the actions of German aviation, although groups of Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers bombed its battle formations all day. In addition, the effectiveness of German fighter aviation fell by more than half. On the one hand, this was due to the devastating losses suffered by the 16th Air Army during the first two days of the battle, on the other hand, the massive actions of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, which the German pilots could not manage to disrupt. It should be noted that the tactics of the actions of Soviet fighters gradually began to change, the failures of which in the initial stages of the battle caused a sharp reaction both in the Headquarters and in the headquarters of the Red Army Air Force.

Already on July 7, the directive of Air Marshal A. A. Novikov saw the light. Having briefly noted the positive changes that had taken place in the structure of the Red Army Air Force, which had grown significantly stronger and more numerous, the commander analyzed in more detail the major miscalculations that had been made in the use of aviation. Disadvantages, according to A. A. Novikov, took place even at the stage of setting a combat mission. Often it was set vaguely, without specifying the necessary results that had to be achieved, which led to a decrease in the commanders' sense of responsibility. The aviators, in the words of the commander-in-chief, sought more "perform the flight, not solve the problem." The planning of operations was also far from ideal. The staff members often lacked a creative approach to their work, the sorties were planned in a stereotyped way, without changing the altitude and flight routes, and also without changing the method of attacks. There was no reconnaissance of the object of attack and its air defense system immediately before the sorties. All this led to cases of missing the target. In addition, meetings with large groups of enemy fighters and powerful anti-aircraft artillery fire often came as a surprise to the flight crew, among whom, according to A. A. Novikov, broad initiative and military cunning were insufficiently cultivated.

The commander of the Air Force devoted two paragraphs of his directive to the control and use of fighters. Radio control, although actively used in all air armies, according to the marshal, did not yet meet the requirements of the modern situation, and in some units was inferior to other means of communication. The network of radio stations was not yet wide enough everywhere, and the personnel serving it often did not have the necessary qualifications. At the same time, fighter units still rarely practiced a free search on enemy territory and the destruction of enemy aircraft on the way to the front line. The rigid binding of patrolling fighters to a specific object or area deprived our pilots of the opportunity to conduct an active offensive battle.

Unit commanders were asked to pay close attention to pairing and their interaction during air combat. Pairs should, if possible, have a permanent composition, which was formalized by order for the regiment. All this, according to the commander, increased the responsibility of the pilots of the pair, especially the wingmen, for ensuring the actions of their partners. In aerial combat, it was necessary to create a numerical superiority by skillful build-up of forces, which was achieved by using tactics very similar to those used by the enemy. Patrol pairs were supposed to, on command from the ground, gather in a single group to attack detected enemy aircraft.

Another important innovation was the selection of the best pilots from the general mass and the development of the tactics of "free hunting" behind the front line. The Air Force Commander emphasized: “The practiced free flight of the best fighter pilots (aces) should be carried out mainly in those areas of the front where the main aviation forces operate, without linking them with the performance of any specific tasks. Aces always everywhere and everywhere have only one task - to destroy enemy aircraft in the air, making every possible use of the favorable conditions of the air situation " .

With regard to the command level, the requirements of the directive boiled down to the need to develop initiative among the commanders of air divisions and regiments, giving them maximum freedom in planning combat operations. The operations themselves were to be carried out not impromptu, but on the basis of a detailed plan. A special role in the current situation was acquired by the use of compact battle formations, an increase in the level of defense capability of attack aircraft groups and their interaction with cover fighters, as well as with their own anti-aircraft artillery.

As can be seen from the foregoing, for the command of the Red Army Air Force, major shortcomings in the combat work of aviation were not a secret. In fact, they were more "growing pains" than serious "chronic diseases." Figuratively speaking, by the summer of 1943, the skeleton of the Air Force was assembled, the muscle mass took shape in the muscles, which, nevertheless, still required patient “pumping”. In addition, the new fighter needed a creative spirit, quick reaction and independence. But it took time to eliminate all the shortcomings and acquire high professionalism. It is important to understand that the Battle of Kursk only highlighted the shortcomings of the new structure, allowing us to outline ways to solve them. In the meantime, combat experience was gained in heavy battles and was generously paid for with the blood of the flight crew.

The course of the battle on July 8 confirmed the correctness of the conclusions made the day before by the commander of the Central Front, K.K. In the morning, it was possible to restore the situation in the Ponyri area - the 307th rifle division returned the northern part of this settlement with a swift attack. However, heavy fighting here continued throughout the day.

Having failed in the Ponyri region, the command of the 9th Army concentrated its efforts in the afternoon on attacks in the region of height 257.0, located north of Olkhovatka. To capture the heights in the areas of Snova, Podsoborovka and Soborovka, according to Soviet estimates, up to 400 tanks and up to two infantry divisions were concentrated. Aerial reconnaissance of the 16th Air Army noted the continuous movement of vehicles and tanks from Zmievka through Glazunovka to Ponyri and from Zmievka through Glazunovka to Nizhnye Tagino, as well as the movement of groups of vehicles along field roads from the Glazunovka-Bogoroditskoye line to the south. The fighting in the area of ​​​​height 257.0, which changed hands several times, was in full swing all day. Only by 17:00 on July 8, she was captured by German units as a result of a series of attacks from different directions with the participation of approximately 60 tanks.

On July 8, the Soviet aviation command tried to make the necessary changes in the tactics of fighter aviation, sending out large groups before the raid of bombers and attack aircraft to clear the airspace. This method was first tested by the pilots of the 1st Guards. jad. 15 Yak-1s under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Captain V.N. Makarov, guided from the ground by the division commander, Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Krupenin, conducted two large air battles over the location of the 13th Army in 40 minutes. In the first of them, the combat order of the group of 40 Bf-110s from the I / ZG1 was upset, after which the group of V.N.

As a result of the air battle, the pilots reported the destruction of 5 Ju-87s, 2 Ju-88s and FW-190s. Although German sources do not confirm the numbers of Soviet claims for victories, the experience in controlling fighters from the ground was clearly a success.

At the same time, the level of losses of the 16th Air Army on July 8 increased again compared to the previous day, increasing from 37 to 47 vehicles that did not return to their airfields. Updated data indicate that in two days of fighting on July 7-8, the association of S. I. Rudenko lost 89 aircraft. The bulk of the losses on the fourth day of the battle again fell on fighter aircraft. The 739th IAP of the 286th IAD, which had been in reserve until that day, was especially affected. During the day of fierce fighting, thirteen aircraft did not return to the airfields, and eight of them were lost during one sortie to the Ponyri area. Having taken up air combat with 14 FW-190s, apparently belonging to III and IV / JG 51, the group of the 739th IAP lost six aircraft in the dogfight. Two more "Lavochkins" were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

As a result of heavy losses, the strength of many fighter formations by this time had fallen to a critical level. So, for example, only in the 1st Guards. iad at the end of the day on July 8, it was noted that four regiments had a total of 19 serviceable and 14 under repair aircraft. Despite the difficult situation that had developed, the command of the 16th Air Army nevertheless retained a reserve of two regiments (56th and 67th Guards IAP). According to the memoirs of S. I. Rudenko, who learned about this, G. K. Zhukov expressed his extreme displeasure, however, having cooled down a bit, he approved the actions of the commander-16.

Meanwhile, the issue of covering ground troops on the fourth day of the battle was so acute that it forced the crews of the 3rd Guards to be involved in this task. Iad from the 15th Air Army. The pilots of this formation made sorties in the strip of the 13th Army starting from the first day of the Battle of Kursk. So, on July 5, 10 La-5 of the 63rd Guards. IAP conducted an air battle with 20 FW-190s. According to operational reports, one Focke-Wulf was shot down, but 5 La-5s did not return to their airfields. The next day, aviators of the 15th Air Army made 72 sorties in the zone of the Central Front. During three air battles in the area of ​​Shcherbatovo, Maloarkhangelsk and Krasnaya Slobodka, 6 Bf-109 and 1 FW-190 were shot down. However, their losses were also significant - 2 La-5s were shot down, 2 Il-2s made emergency landings, and 6 La-5s were considered missing. Among those who did not return were the commander of the 32nd Guards. Major B.P. Lyubimov and his deputy for political affairs, Major N.D. Tarasov.

On July 8, out of 113 sorties made by the pilots of the formation of General N.F. Naumenko, only 14 were carried out in support of the troops of the Central Front. 8 La-5 of the 63rd Guards. IAP under the command of Captain P. E. Bundelev at about 8:46 discovered and attacked 16 Ju-87s in the Ponyri-Buzuluk area, marching under the cover of 16 fighters. According to the results of the battle, at the cost of two non-returning and one damaged fighter, the crews shot down 3 Ju-87, 2 FW-190 and 1 Bf-109. This was the end of the participation of aviators of the 15th Air Army in the defensive phase of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

The fourth day of the defensive operation was also characterized by a decrease in the activity of the attack and bomber aircraft of the 16th Air Army. So, for example, the crews of the 3rd tank only 44 times took to the air. However, even from this number, 18 bombers were forced to return due to the lack of cover fighters. One Pe-2 did not return from a combat mission. Somewhat heavy losses were suffered by units of the 221st bad, missing six crews.

According to German data, the fighters of the 1st Air Division claimed to destroy 5 "Bostons", one of which was the 27th victory of Hubert Strassl out of 30 won by him during the four-day battles near Kursk. Strassl fought with III/JG51 from the end of 1941. Having shot down his first plane in July 1942, the 24-year-old pilot did not particularly stand out among his colleagues, having 37 victories on his account by the beginning of July. Nevertheless, in the combat biography of the ace, there were frequent cases of destruction of 2–3 aircraft per day. The most productive was on June 8, when Strassl's battle account was replenished with 6 victories. With the start of Operation Citadel, the pilot immediately fell into the focus of everyone's attention, but military fortunes turned out to be changeable. Having brought his score to 67 victories by the evening of July 8, Strassl died in battle with a group of La-5 fighters (some sources mention LaGG-3 or LaGG-5). A group of "Focke-Wulfs" in the area of ​​the Orel-Kursk highway was subjected to a surprise attack by a group of Soviet fighters, which managed to damage Strassl's aircraft. Leaving for his territory, his black “four” FW-190A-4 (serial number 2351) received several more hits from the Soviet fighter pursuing him. The parachute dome of the German pilot who jumped out at an altitude of about 300 meters did not have time to fill with air, causing his death. On November 12, 1943, the pilot was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross.

It is interesting to note that Strassl's aircraft was only one of two officially recognized losses on July 8 (the other was a Ju-87 from III/StG3). According to the Quartermaster General, 4 FW-190s, 1 He-111, 1 Ju-87 were damaged in action, and a Ju-88 from III/KG1 exploded in the air with the entire crew. In addition, the commander of the 3./JG54 detachment Franz Eisenach (Eisenach Franz), who nevertheless managed to land at the Panino airfield, was wounded in an air battle.

By July 9, the command of the 6th Air Fleet began to worry about the fate of such a successfully launched operation. Here is what the chief of staff of the association, General Friedrich Kless, writes about this: “Continuous air battles, dragging on for a long time, reduced the performance of our aircraft, temporary air supremacy of the outnumbered Soviet air force was inevitable, the enemy could act directly against our troops in between Luftwaffe sorties. Due to the fact that the ground forces of the 9th Army participated in an extremely important offensive, the inevitable tactical successes of the Soviet Air Force were extremely unpleasant for us.. Three days remained before the complete cessation of Operation Citadel on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge. For the German side, they were the final chord of their former power both on earth and in the sky.

2.3. Above the heights of Olkhovatka

It would not be an exaggeration to say that by July 9 the advance of Model's army had reached a stalemate. Having stumbled upon the fierce resistance of the troops of the 13th and 70th armies, units of the 41st and 47th tank corps on the fifth day of the offensive could achieve only minor tactical successes, expressed in another breakthrough to the northern outskirts of Ponyri, as well as in a small advance in height area 257.0. Speaking about the course of the battle, Stephen Newton aptly noted that his "hard to describe otherwise than a repeat of the battle of Verdun with a lot of noise from the tanks". Despite the difficult situation that had arisen and intelligence data about the concentration of significant Red Army forces north and east of Orel continued to arrive, the command of the 9th Army and Army Group Center did not lose hope for a successful outcome of the Citadel. To a large extent, this optimism was determined by the situation on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, where the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth reached the rear defensive line of the Voronezh Front. General Model did not abandon plans to resume the offensive. Having obtained permission from Field Marshal Kluge to transfer the 12th Panzer and 36th Infantry Divisions from the reserve to the 9th Army, he planned to regroup his forces and, shifting the direction of the strike in a south-westerly direction, complete the breakthrough of the Soviet defense on July 12 .

The plans of the command of the Central Front at this stage of the battle were determined by the need to maintain the established status quo until the moment when the troops of the Bryansk Front, as well as the left wing of the Western Front, begin an operation to encircle the enemy's Oryol grouping. In addition to a powerful anti-tank defense and swift counterattacks, the most important factor that ensured the stability of the situation was massive raids by bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army. Such a tactic in the current situation proved to be the most effective, allowing the first attempts to concentrate the enemy for an attack to inflict sensitive blows on him. At the same time, their own losses were significantly reduced, and the use of escort fighters was also optimized. The documents of the headquarters of the 16th Air Army especially emphasize: “The use of massive strikes was due to the fact that the enemy concentrated large forces of tanks, artillery and infantry on a narrow sector of the front to continue the offensive. Massive strikes were used against such targets. .

Like the previous three days of the battle, July 9 began with powerful raids by Soviet bombers and attack aircraft on the accumulation of German tanks and infantry in the area of ​​​​Kashara, Podsoborovka, Soborovka. Around 05:30-06:00, six groups of Pe-2s of the 241st and 301st bad took off, four of which delivered an effective bombardment strike on the enemy’s location, dropping a total of 366 FAB-100, 7 FAB-50, 685 AO-10, 42 AO-25. According to the crews, they managed to destroy 12 tanks and suppress the fire of 2 artillery batteries. Two more groups of 18 aircraft each were forced to return to their airfields due to the lack of escort fighters.

It should be noted that in this raid, for the first time, air clearing groups were used to ensure the actions of attack aircraft. Convinced of the effectiveness of the tactics used by the enemy, the command of the 16th Air Army decided to introduce this experience in their own units. The order to units of the 3rd tank for combat operations on July 9 said: “In addition to direct escort, 30 fighters of the 273 IAD (6 IAK) will patrol in the target area 5 minutes before the strike. During the return route of groups of bombers, eighteen Yak-1 273 Iads were cut off. .

The strike of bombers and attack aircraft was observed by the commander of the 16th Air Army, who expressed gratitude to all the aviators who participated in the sortie. Nevertheless, for the crew members of the "pawns" and "silts" this flight could hardly be classified as "easy walks". It was not possible to completely neutralize the activity of enemy fighters. Directly over the group's target, the 3rd tank was attacked by aircraft from IV/JG51, as well as Bf-110s from I/ZG1. As a result of the battle, 4 Pe-2s were shot down, one bomber fell victim to anti-aircraft artillery, and two more received significant damage and made forced landings.

The main damage fell on the 301st battalion, which lost a total of six aircraft. Pointing to the cause of the losses, the bomber crews "traditionally" laid the blame on the escort fighters from the 279th IAD, who were distracted by a group of German fighters simulating an air battle in the target area. This allowed the pilots of another group of "Focke-Wulfs" to make a surprise attack on the "pawns", as a result of which the regimental columns lost two cars. During the attacks, the bomber crews noted daring actions German aces, which, ignoring the fire of shooters and navigators, repeatedly tried to break into the group of bombers in order to split it. The Focke-Wulf pilots mainly concentrated their fire on the wing tanks of the Pe-2. Despite the attacks, the Jagdfliegers failed to disrupt the massive bombing of their troops - the large masses of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, following under a powerful escort, turned out to be a tough nut to crack for them.

The effectiveness of the strike is well evidenced only by the fact that if in the previous days after the bombing attacks the German troops, with some delay, but still went on the offensive, then after the strike on July 9, the enemy did not show activity in the Olkhovat direction for a whole day. For the disruption of the tank attack, the command of the 2nd Panzer Army sent thanks to the pilots. On July 9, the 16th Air Army delivered two more massive strikes in the area of ​​​​Soborovka, Buzuluk, Podsoborovka, Ponyri. This time, groups of "Bostons" of the 221st bad operated here, which by the end of the day made 69 sorties. Having lost only one aircraft of the 8th Guards from anti-aircraft fire. bap, the bombers successfully completed their combat mission.

Severe trials on July 9 fell to the lot of attack aircraft pilots, whose groups were repeatedly subjected to fierce attacks by enemy fighters. According to German data, the pilots of squadrons JG51 and JG54 managed to shoot down about 30 attack aircraft in a day. The 11 IL-2 of the 299th shad had a particularly hard time, which, when striking in the Shirokoye Boloto area, were attacked in the forehead by eight German fighters. The crews of the Il-2 nevertheless managed to drop the bomb load on the target, destroying and damaging up to 15 tanks and about 20 vehicles. As a result, the attack on the positions of the 3rd Panzer Corps was thwarted. However, the tests for attack pilots were just beginning.

Carried away by the battle with the "Focke-Wulfs", La-5 from the escort group left the "silt" without cover, which was not slow to take advantage of the other "one hundred and nineties". The first attack of the FW-190 did not give any result, as the attack aircraft stood in a defensive circle, supporting each other with fire. The German pilots had to simulate the exit from the battle. However, as soon as the attack aircraft began to rebuild in the wedge, the Focke-Wulfs immediately attacked them again, knocking out four "silts" at once. The remaining seven managed to stand in a circle again, being subjected to even more fierce attacks from the enemy. During the ten-minute battle, German fighters made more than thirty attacks. To avoid being hit from below, the pilots of the "silt" were forced to descend to 15-20 meters, eventually managing to break away from the enemy.

The pilots of the six IL-2s of the same 299th unit, who followed behind, were much more unlucky. All the cars included in it were either shot down or made emergency landings. The accompanying attack aircraft "yaks" of the 896th IAP were cut off from their wards by an unexpected attack by the "Focke-Wulfs". As a result, each Il-2 was attacked by three or four FW-190s, and the plane of the pilot Zadorozhny attacked as many as seven fighters.

The next day, July 10, the attack and bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army operated on the same scale and with even greater efficiency. From the very morning the enemy resumed his attacks at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. Compared with the previous day, German aviation slightly increased its activity, making 1,136 sorties before sunset. It should be noted that the increase in sorties was obtained mainly due to the crews of "pieces" and twin-engine bombers, which, supporting their ground troops, made almost 280 sorties more than the day before.

Ground battles mainly unfolded in front of the front of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. From 8:30 to 16:00, the unit's personnel repulsed three powerful enemy attacks, whose forces were estimated to be more than one infantry division and up to 250 tanks. In the heavy battle that unfolded, the aviation of the 16th Air Army also managed to say its weighty word. Around noon, a large concentration of enemy tanks and infantry was spotted in the Kashar area, which, apparently, were preparing for another attack. A powerful air formation was quickly raised into the air, consisting of 171 bombers (108 Pe-2s and 63 Bostons) and 37 attack aircraft. All these vehicles belonged to the 3rd tank, the 6th tank and the 2nd guards. shad.

Within three minutes from 12:47 to 12:50, eight groups of 17-18 Pe-2s, together with Bostons and Il-2s, delivered a concentrated attack on the accumulation of enemy equipment. Over the target, Soviet aircraft were met by powerful anti-aircraft fire - at the same time, from 80 to 100 gaps were noted in the air. Despite the active opposition of the enemy, the results of the bombardment exceeded all expectations. As noted in the operational summary of the General Staff of the Red Army: “Infantry and artillery observation established that as a result of an air raid in this area, 14 enemy tanks were burned and 30 tanks were knocked out, and his infantry suffered heavy losses”. From the 2nd Tank Army it was reported that as a result of air raids on July 10, 8 tanks were burned in the Kutyrka area, 238.1-6 tanks in the height area, and up to 40 tanks were dispersed in the Podsoborovka area. A major enemy attack that was being prepared was thwarted with great damage to him. The losses of the Soviet side amounted to 1 "Boston" and 5 Il-2.

The command of the 16th Air Army especially noted the successful actions of the crews of the 221st bad on July 10th. According to reports from the ground forces, only after the Bostons of the 745th bap hit in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 250.0, fourteen tanks were burned, the rest, apparently prepared for the offensive, turned to the rear. This success was all the more significant because the combat work of the formation from the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was not always up to par. Three times her crews mistakenly struck at their own troops. There were also cases of dropping bombs in the field and avoiding the target in all directions. And now, after a week of severe tests, yesterday's "green" pilots showed themselves to be mature fighters. The enemy also gave a high assessment to their actions. General Friedrich Kless, already mentioned by us, speaking about the actions of the crews of the Boston bombers (which he mistakenly calls "Bristol"), noted them "excellent discipline and exceptional aggressiveness" .

Do not stint on the praise of the aviators and ground commanders. Thus, in particular, the headquarters of the 2nd Tank Army sent a telegram of thanks to the commander of the 16th Air Army, which stated: “During the day of 10.7.43, aviation dealt a massive blow to the accumulation of enemy tanks and infantry north of 1st Ponyri and height 238.1. The tankers looked with admiration at the work of the Stalinist falcons and bring you a big thanks to the tankers. We are confident that our military cooperation will further intensify the blows against the enemy and hasten our final victory over the enemy. Let's remind the enemy once again STALINGRAD" .

It should be noted that the next day, July 11, the bomber and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army did not undertake massive strikes. The command of the 9th Army clearly abandoned attempts to make a hole in the Soviet defenses. In some sectors of the front, Soviet observers noted that the enemy had begun work to strengthen the defense of his front line.

From consideration of the actions of strike aircraft, let us turn to the struggle for air supremacy in the last three days of the battle. We have more than once noted the heavy damage suffered by the fighter aircraft of the 16th Air Army during the first four days of the defensive operation. Among the formations, the 273rd, 279th and 1st Guards were especially affected. IAD, which by the end of July 8 consisted of 14, 25 and 19 vehicles, respectively. By July 9, these forces were clearly not enough to fight enemy bomber and fighter aircraft, as well as to escort aircraft of the 3rd tank.

The command of the 16th Air Army associated its main hopes for stabilizing the situation with the commissioning of the 234th IAD, Lieutenant Colonel E. Z. Tatanashvili, who had relocated from the Bryansk Front. This formation, numbering 87 Yak-7b fighters, by the end of July 8, concentrated on the airfields of the 273rd IAD, occupying the airfields of Kolpna, Krasnoe, Limovoe. The division entered the operational subordination of the 6th Army Corps, having received from its commander a combat mission for July 9 to cover the battle formations of ground troops in the Soborovka, Podsoborovka, Ponyri area.

Despite the bad weather, in the morning groups of the 233rd and 248th IAP were raised into the air, while the 133rd IAP was left in reserve by the command. Of the 79 sorties made by the pilots of the formation on July 9, 22 were spent on flying around the front line and 57 on patrols. Oddly enough, no encounters with enemy aircraft were recorded. At the same time, as a result of a group loss of orientation, the pilots of the division made 8 forced landings, in which five aircraft were broken. Two pilots did not return to their airfields. It should be noted that, according to German data, on July 9, the commander of 1./JG51 Joachim Brendel achieved particular success, shooting down 3 Soviet aircraft during 4 minutes of air combat. One of the downed fighters was the 50th victory of the ace and the 400th victory of his squad.

The next day, already in full force, the crews of the 234th IAD not only provided patrols north of Olkhovatka and in the Ponyri region, but also flew out to intercept the enemy on a call from the command post of the 6th Iak. During the day, 11 air battles were carried out, in which, according to the reports of the pilots, they managed to shoot down 22 FW-190s, Bf-109s, and also knock out another Focke-Wulf. The losses of the division during the same day of fighting amounted to fifteen aircraft, of which eleven were considered not to have returned to their airfield, one was shot down in an air battle, two were hit by anti-aircraft artillery and another aircraft, shot down in battle, crashed on landing.

Despite the fact that the German bomber aircraft continued to make sorties, striking at the forward edge of the 13th Army, the vast majority of the skirmishes were carried out with German fighters. The heaviest dogfight took place around 13:50. Eight Yak-7b of the 233rd IAP, led by Senior Lieutenant A.K. Vinogradov, met 8 FW-190s. Noticing our planes, the German pilots went into the clouds. However, literally a minute later, Soviet fighters were attacked from above because of the clouds for 18 Focke-Wulfs. A vertical battle ensued between the fighters. From the command post of the 6th Iac, six Yak-7b from the 133rd IAP were called to help, which soon also entered the battle, which was extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet pilots. The losses of two groups of the 234th IAD amounted to nine aircraft, of which one was broken in an emergency landing. In fact, out of 8 Yak-7b of the 233rd IAP, only 3 aircraft returned to their airfield, and out of six fighters of the 133rd IAP flying out for reinforcement, only two survived. As a result of the battle, 9 downed FW-190s were recorded on the combat accounts of the pilots. In addition, one of the wrecked Focke-Wulfs made an emergency landing south of the village of Mokroe.

With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that the Soviet pilots in this battle were opposed by the Focke-Wulfs from IV / JG51, who shot down eight Soviet fighters identified as MiG-1 and LaGG-3. The group's own losses for the day amounted to 2 FW-190s belonging to the 12./JG51 detachment. Among the missing was Hans Pfahler (Pfahler Hans) - a 29-year-old pilot who won the 10th victory in this battle since the beginning of the Battle of Kursk and brought his account to 30 downed aircraft. Perhaps it was his forced landing that was observed by Soviet pilots. It is possible that Pfaler was shot down by the pilot of the 248th IAP, Lieutenant A. S. Ivanov, after the bursts of which the pilot of one of the Focke-Wulfs jumped out with a parachute.

The next day, July 11, the number of sorties made by the pilots of the 234th IAD decreased by almost half. In the course of seven group sorties (60 sorties), only three air battles were carried out. The balance of victories and losses, recorded by the divisional headquarters, practically converged. Nine fighters were lost, despite the fact that, according to the pilots of the formation, they managed to shoot down 2 Ju-87s and 9 FW-190s in air battles.

The main load on July 11 fell on the shoulders of the crews of the 133rd IAP. After two air battles, the regiment was missing eight aircraft by the end of the day. The first air battle was especially unsuccessful, when at about 05:20 10 Yak-7b under the command of Major T.F. I/JG54. The strike link of Captain A.I. Yeshchenko attacked dive bombers, but was counterattacked by Focke-Wulfs. From the combat mission, the entire unit did not return in full force. Another "yak" fell victim to anti-aircraft artillery fire. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, foreman N. Ya. Ilyin still managed to attack the dive bombers, shooting down 2 Ju-87s. According to German data, two victories in this battle were won by Scheel Gunther from 2./JG54, and two more Soviet aircraft were shot down by pilots of 3./JG54.

In the afternoon, pilots from the G8 of the same 133rd IAP fought an air battle in the Ponyri area with 14 FW-190s. With the loss of 3 Yak-7b, it was announced that five Focke-Wulfs were destroyed. However, as in many other cases, German sources do not confirm these claims of victory. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, only 2 aircraft were lost - FW-190 and Ju-87. The Quartermaster General's reports indicate that five aircraft were lost during the day (2 FW-190s, 2 Ju-87s and 1 Ju-88), and four more were damaged. It should be noted that in total for the period from July 9 to 11, the 6th Air Fleet in the area of ​​​​Operation Citadel irretrievably lost 20 aircraft, and another 11 aircraft were damaged.

A heavy loss for the German side was the loss on July 11 of the commander of IV / JG 51, a veteran of the fighting in Spain and a holder of the Knight's Cross, Major Rudolf Resch (Resch Rudolf). Having won his last, 94th victory over the Il-2, the German ace was shot down in an air battle and died. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish the authorship of this victory from the Soviet side.

It should be noted that despite the fact that the battle over the northern face of the Kursk Bulge had already lasted for a whole week, the fighters of the 6th Air Fleet continued to demonstrate high performance in air battles with a relatively low level of losses. In addition to well-established interaction and control in battle, the actions of the German crews were characterized by the use of various elements of military cunning. So, according to the report of the commander of the 273rd IAD, Colonel I.E. Fedorov, on the combat work of the division for the period from July 5 to 8, in order to get out of an unsuccessful battle, Focke-Wulf pilots often practiced imitation of a random fall and a breakdown in a tailspin. Often this created the illusion of destroying the enemy machine among young and inexperienced Soviet pilots, contributing to the unbridled growth of applications for victories.

We have already witnessed more than once that the numbers of victories and losses contained in the documents of the opposing sides, when compared, often drastically diverge from each other. Considering this very sensitive and painful question about the effectiveness of fighter aviation operations, it should be noted that, while recognizing many shortcomings in its work, the documents of the 16th Air Army at the same time contain practically no materials critically evaluating the number of applications for air victories. Thus, the report on the actions of the army in the defensive operation of the Central Front contains figures, the analysis of which cannot but cause surprise. According to him, the size of the German aviation group at the beginning of the operation, according to the army headquarters, was about 900 aircraft, among which there were 525 bombers and about 300 fighters. As you can see, the number of German fighter aircraft was almost doubled by the Soviet side, nevertheless, as a result of a week of combat work from July 5 to July 11, according to the same report, 425 fighters, 88 bombers and 5 enemy reconnaissance aircraft were shot down in air battles. Thus, the number of Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts destroyed, even in comparison with the inflated intelligence data at the beginning of the month, amounted to 140%!

An analysis of German sources allows us to draw the following conclusions. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, from 5 to 11 July, only 33 aircraft were lost (10 FW-190, 1 Bf-109, 4 Bf-110, 8 Ju-87, 6 Ju-88, 3 He-111 and 1 Ar-66). An analysis of the reports of the quartermaster general allows us to talk about the great losses of the association of General von Greim. According to them, the number of decommissioned aircraft is 64 aircraft (24 FW-190, 2 Bf-109, 5 Bf-110, 15 Ju-87, 11 Ju-88, 5 He-111, 1 Ar-66 and 1 Fi-156) . Another 45 aircraft were damaged. Perhaps this data is also not entirely complete. So, according to the data of the Russian historian D. B. Khazanov, by the morning of July 9, the JG51 squadron was missing 37 Focke-Wulfs. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to expect that the order of losses of the German side, when clarifying the figures of losses, will change at least by an order of magnitude.

An analysis of Soviet archival documents allows us to conclude that the failures in the work of fighters were associated not only with the level of training of the flight crew and shortcomings in the management of formations. A significant amount of clarity on this issue is brought by telegrams to the commanders of fighter formations, which are contained in the file “Correspondence on combat work” of the fund of the 486th IAP. To begin with, here is the full text of the order of the Chief of Staff of the 6th Iac N.P. Zhiltsov, sent to the unit following the results of combat work on July 10:

“For 10.7.43, the following shortcomings were established in the work of the fighters of your units.

1. Not a single group of fighters flew to the designated area to repel enemy bombers, and all went 8-9 kilometers to the south, i.e., Vozy, Stanovoye, with the exception of group 6 jak, which left at about 20-00. Enemy fighters patrol in this area in pairs and fours, tying up our fighters, and bombers without cover are calmly bombing the front line in 50–70 Yu-88s and Yu-87s.

2. Fighters in the air make unnecessary conversations, just chatting, so they do not hear the guidance station and do not say their call signs even when asked.

3. Enemy fighters move in pairs, counterattacking in fours.

I order:

1. Report to me the names of all the leading groups to be held accountable for failure to comply with my order. I demand that all leading groups and all pilots patrol over the front line and warn that for failure to comply with this order I will be held to the strictest responsibility - sent to penal battalions and even shot before formation for cowardice.

2. Establish discipline in the air. Stop chatting, and watch the air, report on the enemy, command one or two words and listen to my DUB-1 radio station, located in Olkhovatka 3 kilometers from the front line, and the Bayonet radio station. Everyone should pass through Olkhovatka and name call signs, fight with bombers, and shackle fighters. Division commanders report to me the names of the leaders of each group and the time of departure.

More sharp and specific in his message was General S. I. Rudenko, who wrote in a telegram dated July 10: “To cover your troops like that is a crime and not following my order is also a crime. For all the days of the fighting, a meager number of bombers were shot down, and according to the report of the pilots, fighters were “filled” as much as the enemy did not have, while the bombers go even without cover in the hundreds ". Threatening to send the offenders to penal battalions and even shoot them before formation for cowardice, the army commander nevertheless appealed to the sense of duty of the pilots: “It’s time to stop, comrade pilots, disgracing our fighters so that the infantry unanimously declares that the fighters do not defend it, do not fight with the bombers, but hide in the rear, while the same infantry admires the courage and courage of our attack aircraft and bombers” .

Despite the formidable warnings of the army commander, the actions of the fighters on the next day, July 11, left much to be desired. Let us turn again to the instructions of the commander of the 16th Air Army, who, characterizing the combat work of fighters, especially noted:

“The command on the radio is not carried out, so it was on 11.7, when the radio station“ Dub-1 ”ordered comrade. Vinogradov, Mishchenko, Silaev and Babenko go to the bombers. The latter accepted the command, but did not go. The air during the flight of our fighters is littered with unnecessary empty talk and other “obscene language”, they do not follow the exact commands.

I order:

1. All fighters must strictly follow the previously given numbers of instructions on patrolling in the zone, considering the front line as their main area.

2. When sorties on a call with enemy bombers, do not fly directly to the place of bombing, but bypass the enemy fighter interception area much east and northeast of the city of Maloarkhangelsk, enter the enemy’s territory from the rear and attack his bombers.

3. To the commander of the 6th [instead of] sent out in the last days to fight enemy aircraft 20 aircraft from 12.7.43 to send a group of 40 aircraft and accurately fulfill paragraph two of this instruction.

4. When flying to and from the target, bombers and attack aircraft should take into account enemy zones in the air and also bypass them.

5. Commanders of 6 iac and 1 hyades to investigate the failure to comply with the order DUB-1 and the BAYONET ... ".

The devastating characterization of the actions of the front's fighter aviation came not only from the lips of the commander, but also from other aviation commanders. So, for example, the commander of the 279th IAD, Colonel Dementiev, noted that “All our fighters patrol 10 kilometers behind the front line, stubbornly do not go to the front line, fearing anti-aircraft fire, and allow enemy bombers to stay over the target for a whole hour.” The summary of the division commander is saturated with bitterness: "I'm embarrassed to look at this" .

The author believes that the documents cited very clearly characterize not only the actual situation in the struggle for air supremacy, but also the attitude of the command of the 16th Air Army and the commanders of fighter aviation formations towards this issue. As you can see, even the introduction of the fresh 234th IAD into battle did not change the current situation. During the three days of hostilities as part of the formation of S. I. Rudenko, the pilots of Colonel E. Z. Tatanashvili shot down 36 German aircraft, 34 of which were identified as FW-190, and only 2 Ju-87 bombers. At the same time, their own losses amounted to 27 Yak-7b and 23 pilots. Needless to say, most of the claimed victories are not confirmed by German sources.

We have already pointed out the changes in the combat work of the fighters of the 16th Air Army that took place in the course of the defensive operation of the Central Front. The command of the Red Army Air Force considered it necessary to strengthen and management team connections. Already on July 10, Major General E.E. Yerlykin, who was urgently recalled from Leningrad, was appointed to the post of commander of the 6th Iac, who lost 85 aircraft and 54 pilots in six days of combat work. Until June 29, Major General A. B. Yumashev was at the head of the corps, after which, only eleven days later, a new commander took over the battle-worn unit. Thus, at the most tense moment of the Battle of Kursk, the corps did not have a commander officially appointed to this position, and, judging by the documents, his duties were performed by the chief of staff, Colonel N.P. Zhiltsov.

Having familiarized himself with the situation on the spot, General E.E. Yerlykin the very next day submitted a report to the commander of the 16th Air Army, in which he made proposals aimed at increasing the efficiency of fighter aviation, sustained mainly in the spirit of the directive of Marshal A. A. Novikov dated 7 July. The most interesting proposal was the use of the Redut radar station in the air defense system of Kursk and Shchigry in the interests of front-line aviation. The ground surveillance system of air observation posts did not allow detecting the approach to the front line of groups of enemy bombers, not to mention detecting the rise of aircraft from the airfields of the Oryol and Bryansk air hubs. The VNOS system, available at the beginning of the defensive operation of the Central Front, did not justify itself. At best, it made it possible to detect enemy bombers at the moment they approached the front line, while there was no need to talk about detecting the rise of German aircraft from the airfields of the Oryol and Bryansk hubs. According to Yerlykin's proposal, it was necessary to use two Redut installations in the work on guiding fighters, placing them near the front line and providing communication with command and control posts. Looking ahead a little, it is worth noting that the introduction of radar to ensure the combat operation of fighters began on the Central Front only after the end of the Battle of Kursk.

Another proposal, which was submitted for consideration by the commander of the 16th Air Army, the commander of the 6th IAC, was the camouflage coloring of domestic aircraft. Stating that fighters of all types are produced by the Soviet industry with bright black and green camouflage, which was suitable for camouflage on the ground, but not for air combat, E.E. Erlykin specifically noted: “In air combat, without knowing the type of aircraft, it is easy to distinguish our aircraft from the enemy aircraft by its too bright colors of the planes and fuselage, that is, the main figures of the battle.” According to the general, the camouflage of the allied and German vehicles was adapted just for air combat, making it difficult to conduct aimed fire with their colors. The commander's summary was as follows: “It is necessary to raise the question before the industry about the further production of military vehicles with camouflage not in dark color, but in light gray (bluish-steel). This will drastically reduce the endless German surprise attacks on our aircraft; will drastically reduce losses and defeats in battles and there will be no need for annual repainting for winter " .

Let's return to the events of July 11. The obvious futility of the German offensive in the zone of the Central Front by this time was no longer in doubt. Despite the maximum advance into the depth of the Soviet defense up to 10-12 kilometers, the troops of General Model failed to achieve any noticeable operational success. Beginning on July 6, the advance of the 9th Army became more and more modest. Bloody battles in the Olkhovat direction with units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps and the 2nd Tank Army, three days of fierce battles in the Ponyri area, which did not give decisive success to units of the 41st Tank Corps, and, finally, the attenuation of the offensive in the area of ​​the heights north of Olkhovatka - these are the main stages of the operation "Citadel" on the northern face of the Kursk salient. The plans of the command of the 9th Army, connected with the shift in the direction of the main attack already mentioned above, were not developed either.

On July 11, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the Bryansk and Western fronts, and the very next day, artillery salvos east and north of Orel unambiguously announced the completion of Operation Citadel north of Kursk. Now the command of the Army Group "Center" had to solve the problem of preventing the encirclement of their own troops, locked within the arc - but not the Kursk, but the Oryol.

It remains for us to sum up the results of the air battle. Having 1151 aircraft (1084 serviceable) by the beginning of the German offensive, the 16th Air Army suffered heavy losses during a week of fierce fighting - the army headquarters wrote off 439 aircraft, or almost 38% of the aircraft fleet. Of this number, 391 aircraft were lost for combat and non-combat reasons, and the rest were written off as unrecoverable. The unification of General S. I. Rudenko for a week of fighting lost 55% of fighters, 37% of attack aircraft, 8% of bombers. The number of sorties per loss in attack and fighter aircraft was almost the same, equaling 13 and 15 sorties, respectively, while for bombers this figure was 62 sorties.

Note that some of the damaged aircraft were sent to the repair authorities. So, according to the report of the 6th IAC, for the whole month of July, about 50 aircraft were evacuated from the places of forced landings, of which 30 were sent to SAM and PARM, 6 for spare parts and cutting kits, and one fighter, as indicated in the report, was blown up at the landing site.

The 16th Air Army suffered significant losses in its flight personnel - 2 regiment commanders, 2 navigators, 55 squadron commanders and their deputies, 20 flight commanders and 279 pilots died in battle.

Comparing these figures with the data of the German side, we note that during the same period, according to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, 586 aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and another 52 aircraft became victims of anti-aircraft artillery. As you can see, the German pilots and anti-aircraft gunners overestimated their successes by 1.5 times, which, given the scale of the unfolding battle, can be considered a completely acceptable value.

It is more difficult to estimate the real number of victories for the 16th Air Army due to the lack of accurate data on the losses of the 6th Air Fleet. As already indicated, according to the reports of the Quartermaster General, the formation of General von Greim irretrievably lost 64 aircraft from all causes in a week of fighting. Another 45 aircraft were damaged. At the same time, according to the report of the 16th Air Army, during 380 air battles, its pilots shot down 518 aircraft, of which 425 were fighters, 88 were bombers and 5 were reconnaissance aircraft. As you can see, our aviators overestimated their success by at least 5-8 times.

During the operation, units of the 16th Air Army made 7548 sorties, and almost 98% of them fell on the Olkhovat direction. Comparing these data with the indicators of the 6th Air Fleet, whose pilots flew 8917 sorties during the same time, and also taking into account the overall quantitative superiority of the Soviet side, one can get a clear idea of ​​the load that fell on the pilots of both opposing sides. For Soviet aviation formations, these values ​​are relatively small. So, on average, one bomber made 0.9, attack aircraft 0.6, fighter 1.1 sorties per day. Unfortunately, these figures do not reflect the dynamics of changes in the load on air units in different periods of the battle. For example, on July 5, on average, one bomber made 3.1, attack aircraft 2.2, and fighter - 4.1 sorties.

Based on the experience of the defensive battle in the Kursk region, the pilots of the active units evaluated some types of aircraft. So, for example, tested in the 1st Guards. 10 Yak-9T fighters with a 37-mm cannon (2 in the 53rd Guards, 8 in the 54th Guards IAP) made 136 sorties, conducting 15 air battles. With the loss of three aircraft of this type (one was shot down by German bombers), the pilots announced the destruction of 5 enemy aircraft (2 FW-190, 1 Bf-110, 1 Ju-88 and 1 He-111). The high efficiency of the OKB-16 11P-37 37-mm cannon was noted when working on both ground and air targets. At the same time, the significant weight of the gun, the long range of the projectile (4000 meters, while 1000-1200 meters were required), the inefficiency of the ring sight, and the slow rate of fire were indicated among the shortcomings. For air combat, the new "yak" turned out to be too heavy, "feeling" badly on the vertical. For this reason, the pilots recommended using mixed groups of Yak-1 and Yak-9T fighters in a 2:1 ratio in combat. It would not be superfluous to note that already at the end of the Battle of Kursk, part of the 1st Guards. The iad were never armed with the new fighter A. S. Yakovlev, having retrained in the fall for the well-proven Airacobra.

The Pe-2 bombers also performed well, demonstrating excellent survivability in a number of cases. So, some "pawns" returned to the airfield, having from 40 to 70 fragmentation holes, without losing control when the ailerons and elevator were damaged. The documents of the 3rd tank noted the well-thought-out arrangement and successful design of the roller guide rods, which ensures control of the aircraft's rudders when the rudder rods are damaged by projectiles and shrapnel. The crews especially liked the dual chassis control system - electric motors and emergency. In the process of combat work, there were often cases of aircraft arriving at their airfield with damaged control rods along the profile up to 70%.

However, the pilots and navigators also had enough comments about the “pawn”. The main one was the weakness of weapons and aircraft protection equipment. The small arms of the bomber, according to the aviators, were insufficient by the summer of 1943. The front firing point, which consisted of only one machine gun, was criticized. In addition, the unsuccessful and cramped turret provided only small firing angles of 50–65 degrees. The system for filling gas tanks with inert gas did not provide sufficient protection for the aircraft from fire. The M-105 engines, which had low survivability, also caused criticism.

Finishing the description of the battles on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, I would like to say a few words about the struggle for air supremacy. The question of who left the sky over Ponyri and Olkhovatka, despite the obvious outcome of the battle, does not, oddly enough, have an unambiguous answer. In the future, we will see more than once that the results and course of ground battles cannot be automatically transferred to the situation developing in the confrontation between aircraft.

With a total more highly trained In the first two days of the battle, the Luftwaffe managed to almost completely dominate the air, which was reflected not only in the suppression of Soviet fighter aircraft, but also in the practically unhindered bombers striking ground troops positions. The lack of proper flight and combat training among the majority of the young pilots of the 16th Air Army, weak cohesion within squadrons and regiments, as well as an inefficient, poorly debugged aviation control system - all this largely predetermined the tragic beginning of the battle for the Soviet side. Shortcomings in the work of fighter aviation, where the pilot was primarily required to have increased independence in decision-making and initiative, as well as good flight and fire training, could not be eliminated in full, not only during the battle, but throughout the entire summer campaign of 1943 .

Thrown into the heat of battles, the newly created formations over and over again suffered heavy losses in the very first battles, which we witnessed on the example of the 6th Jacob and the 234th Iad and we will encounter more than once in the course of the story when describing events in other parts of the Soviet-German front. Unfortunately, the implementation of the experience of combat use turned out to be a long and painful process, associated with heavy losses and bitter lessons in air combat. It was not always possible to “lower it down from above” in the form of an order or directive.

However, it would be unreasonable to see only one side of the coin. The command of the 16th Air Army convincingly demonstrated the ability to "take a hit" in an unfavorable situation, as well as an understanding and quick perception of the new realities of an air war. Starting from the third day of the battle, it embarked on the path of organizing massive strikes against accumulations of armored vehicles and enemy manpower. As it turned out, the command of the 6th Air Fleet did not have effective means of counteracting these raids by bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army, which in most cases achieved their goal. Starting from July 7, they began to directly influence the course of ground events, which was especially evident during the battles on July 9 and 10, which finally buried the hopes of the 9th Army command for the success of Operation Citadel.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th Iap. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 131.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th Iap. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 130.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th Iap. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 127.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. Op. 6476. D. 56. L. 194.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. Op. 6476. D. 54. L. 9, 10.

TsAMO RF. F. 1st Guards. jad. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 10.