Part two. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive

The situation was becoming serious, and after much deliberation, Fedyuninsky sent a telegram to Headquarters, in which he described the situation near Volkhov and asked that the retreating troops of the right flank of the 4th Army be subordinated to him. "If this is done today, then the situation can be saved. If it happens tomorrow, it will be too late. Volkhov will fall."

November 12th. THE STAFF OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND ORDERED THE GROUP OF TROOPS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, OPERATING IN THE VOLKHOV DIRECTION ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN BANK OF THE VOLKHOV RIVER, TO BE REASSIGNED TO COMRADE FEDYUNINSKY AND INCLUDED INTO THE FIFTY-FOURTH ARMY...

Let's move on to the situation on the front of the 54th Army. Fedyuninsky took command of the so-called Volkhov group of troops transferred to him, consisting of 285, 311, 310 rifle divisions, 6th sea. brigades. The condition of these troops is very unimportant, and besides, [they] are extremely few in number. To date, units are holding the Bolshaya Bloy front (map 100000), Maryino, Kotovskaya Gorka, the Siglinka stream to its mouth into the Volkhov River, on the right bank of the river. Volkhov - Ulyashevo, Lynna, Sorokin, Kukol, battalion of the 3rd Guards. sd - Zvyagino, 82nd armored train - Valya junction. Transferred 3 Guards. SD with artillery is concentrated in the area of ​​Khalturin, Veretye, the 16th tank brigade without a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company - in the area of ​​Siretskaya Luka, Lkzhora, Pogorelets. The enemy attacked today from 11 am along the railway in the direction of Lyubyn, Vyndin Ostrov (16 km south of Volkhov) and forced the 311th Rifle Division to withdraw beyond the Siglinka Creek.
In other areas of the 54th Army, the enemy did not show any activity. The task was set for the Military Council of the 54th Army:
1. Put the units fighting in the Volkhov direction in order, strengthen their replenishment at the expense of the rear, all kinds of detachments, units of security troops, which are located in the Volkhov, Novaya Ladoga, Syas-stroy regions. We are transferring 3000 people, 400 mortars and 100 RPMs from Leningrad by warships.
2. Stop the withdrawal and the forces of 310 sd, 3 guards. sd and the 16th tank brigade to strike at the enemy occupying Sorokino, Yeloshnya, art. Myelin, push him south of the railroad. After the arrival of replenishment, a task will be set for more active actions of the Volkhov group.
Please:
1. Return from com. Meretskov Aviation of the 54th Army.
2. Allocated "Douglases" in the amount of 24 units have not yet arrived in Leningrad.
3. There are 12 bombers left. Please reinforce [us] with bombers. Everything.
MALENKOV. What aircraft did Meretskov take from the Volkhov group? How many and which planes, can you tell?
ZHDANOV. Aviation, which was part of the 54th Army, and was assigned to the destruction of Tikhvin, a group of comrade. Kholzakova - 3 RAG: fighters, bombers and attack aircraft.(Record of negotiations on a direct wire by G.M. Malenkov with the command of the Leningrad Front.)

The situation in the combat zone of the 310th Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel N.M. Zamirovsky, was exceptionally acute. Here, at the Zelenets junction, the enemy had the greatest success. The advance of enemy units in the northern and northwestern directions from the siding gave them the opportunity to capture Volkhov from the east. However, the 310th Rifle Division frustrated all enemy attempts to develop the offensive in these directions and threw it back to the south-west of the Zelenets junction.

The situation east of Tikhvin also changed for the better. General Ivanov P.A. united under his command scattered units of the 44th Infantry Division, the 48th Reserve Rifle Regiment, units of the 305th Infantry Regiment and some units of the 60th Tank Division operating in this direction. His detachment moved from defense to offensive. First, he stopped the tanks and motorized infantry of the 18th motorized division of the enemy, and then forced them to turn back. The fighting was extremely fierce. The enemy clung to every house, every barn. With unrelenting tenacity, the battles were fought until November 19. By this time, the detachment of General Ivanov, reinforced by the 191st Infantry Division and two newly arrived tank battalions, approached Tikhvin at 5-6 km and, having no forces to develop the offensive, entrenched themselves at the line: northeastern outskirts of Pagold, forest 2 km east of the May 1 state farm. The enemy hastily fortified.

Thus, having received a rebuff in both directions, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive. To continue the offensive, they clearly did not have enough strength. They could not count on the rapid receipt of large reinforcements in connection with the unfolding events near Moscow and Rostov. However, in order to strengthen the blockade of Leningrad, the enemy, by all means, tried to keep Tikhvin.

The liberation of the Tikhvin region at that time acquired exclusively importance. It was a matter of life in Leningrad and the Leningrad Front. This circumstance obliged the army command to take measures for the speedy release of the railway line connecting the center of the country with Nov. Ladoga, from where Leningrad was supplied along Lake Ladoga. And measures were taken. Along with the defense, which was by no means passive, but was characterized by the active actions of individual detachments in order to wear down the enemy, the troops of the army accumulated forces and means, regrouped and prepared for a counteroffensive. First of all, with the arrival of reserves and replacements, the existing detachments were reorganized into operational groups. So, the 46th Tank Brigade, the 1061st and 48th Rifle Regiments, together with units of the 44th and 191st Rifle Divisions, were united into the “Northern Operational Group” under the command of General Ivanov P.A., which surrounded Tikhvin from the north -west, north and east.

To the left of the operational group of General Ivanov, the 65th Rifle Division, newly arrived from the Stavka reserve, under the command of Colonel Koshevoy P.K., deployed and occupied the southeastern approaches to Tikhvin. The most difficult task fell on this division - to capture the city. And she fulfilled it. From the units of the 27th cavalry and 60th tank divisions operating in the area of ​​​​the May 1 state farm, Gorodishche, an operational group was formed under the command of General Pavlovich. From the units of the 93rd Rifle Division, units of the 4th Guards Rifle Division and the tank regiment of the 60th Tank Division, located on the left flank of the army, the “Southern Operational Group” was created under the command of the Deputy Commander of the 4th Army, General V. Yakovlev General Yakovlev VF, - combat commander, with extensive experience in driving troops. At the same time, he led the "Southern Operational Group" and sent it to defeat the enemy's 20th motorized division. Somewhat later, with the formation of the Volkhov Front, General Yakovlev was appointed commander of the 57th Army.

As soon as the enemy felt the increased activity of the Soviet troops and he became aware of the arrival of reserves, he began to take measures to strengthen his grouping. In the twentieth of November, the 61st Infantry Division, which arrived from France and unloaded at the Lyuban-Chudovo railway section, the German command began to hastily transfer vehicles to the Tikhvin region. Under the influence of Soviet artillery and aviation, the enemy's 61st Infantry Division arrived in Tikhvin very late and very thin. However, the enemy's Tikhvin grouping had intensified, and now consisted of five divisions. In addition, the Germans managed at different times to pull up to the city two road battalions, a transport battalion, the 136th infantry regiment of one of the divisions operating in the area of ​​the Volkhov River, and some other units. Thus, the enemy, trying to keep Tikhvin, strengthened the Tikhvin group.

The article is completely taken from the site 1941 .

Sources:
Platonov. Battle for Leningrad.
RUSSIA AND THE USSR IN THE WARS OF THE XX CENTURY. LOSS OF ARMED FORCES. Statistical research. Under the general editorship of G. F. Krivosheev. MOSCOW "OLMA-PRESS" 2001.
http://mechcorps.chat.ru
Alexander Chakovsky. Blockade. Book four. (from the site http://militera.lib.ru)
Military Literature Memoirs Meretskov K. A. In the service of the people. (from the site http://militera.lib.ru)

Tikhvin strategic offensive operation (November 10 - December 30, 1941)

The fighting by the parties during the operation was carried out in the east Leningrad region. From the north, the border of the operation was limited by the beginning of the operation to the south of the railway line Sinyavino - Voybokalo - Volkhov, the southern approaches to Volkhov, then along the railway line (cut in places German troops) to Tikhvin, the area north, east and south of Tikhvin, surrounding it, then passed southwest through the station Taltsy, Berezhok, through the area somewhat east and southeast of Malaya Vishera, it came out on the Volkhov somewhat north of Dubrovka. The western border of the operation passed along the Volkhov to Kirishi, at Kirishi it turned to the north-west through Voronovo again to the railway line. By the end of the operation, the front line generally ran along the eastern bank of the Volkhov, with bridgeheads of both Soviet troops on the western bank of the river and German troops on the eastern (Kirishsky bridgehead). From Kirishi, the front line turned to the north-west, passing in general along the Kirishi-Mga railway, before reaching Mgi it turned north to Lake Ladoga.

The width of the combat front was 300-350 kilometers, the depth of advance of the Soviet troops was 100-120 kilometers, with an average daily advance rate of 2-2.5 kilometers.

The operation was carried out from November 10 to December 30, 1941. The start date of the operation is indicated as it is determined by official Soviet historiography, but it is very conditional. Soviet troops in the southern part of the territory covered by the operation, in the region of Malaya Vishera, went on the offensive already on November 12, and parts of the Novgorod Army Operational Group even on November 10 (from where it was taken and the start date of the operation), but at the same time, in the northern part of the territory, fighting during the Tikhvin defensive operation with enemy units that did not leave attempts to break through to Lake Ladoga, they continued near Volkhov until November 25, and at Voybokalo in the first decade of December 1941. The end date of the operation is also rather arbitrary and is determined by the restoration of the positions of the Soviet troops (with some exceptions) along the Volkhov River, which were lost during the retreat. The operation was immediately preceded in time and space by the Tikhvin defensive operation. The continuation of the operation in the same region by the Soviet troops was the Luban offensive operation.

Luban offensive operation

During the operation, the parties fought in a relatively small area of ​​the Leningrad Region (now partially Novgorod Region), bounded from the east by the Volkhov River. From Volkhov, the border of the operation, starting from the southern flank, eventually passed approximately from the village of Lyubtsy to the west of the river, passing the settlements of Glukhaya Kerest, Pyatilipy, Voloskovo, then turned north, passing Donets, Ostrov, Eglino, then east to Vorony Ostrov, and then, in a broken line, it descended to the southeast through Apraksin Bor, Krivino, Priyutino, returning almost again to Lyubtsy. Thus, the main events of the operation unfolded practically in a "bag", with a small neck at Myasny Bor. From there, to the north, the front line passed along the Volkhov River (behind slight deviations in the form of German bridgeheads on the east bank and Soviet ones on the west), and bypassing Kirishi - where in particular there was one of the German bridgeheads - from the east, went to the Kirishi railway line - Mga, where the Soviet troops also carried out a small wedging between the stations of Pogostye and Posadnikov Ostrov.

Operation start

The operation was carried out from January 7 to April 30, 1942. The start date of the operation was determined by the start of an active, relatively massive offensive with the crossing of the Volkhov and from the bridgeheads, which by that time had already been captured on the western bank of the river. At the same time, the 54th Army went on the offensive already on January 4, and for it the Tikhvin offensive operation, without any regrouping, went over to Lubanskaya. The end date of the operation was determined by the moment the order was issued to transfer the troops of the 2nd shock army to the defense (April 30), approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 2. The operation in time and space was preceded by the Tikhvin offensive operation (the operation, which later became known as Lyubanskaya, was a continuation of the Tikhvin offensive operation). The next operation in the same area by the Soviet troops was the Operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement, carried out in May-July 1942. The Volkhov Front began the operation on January 7, 1942, despite the fact that by this time the troops had not been fully concentrated (for example, in the 59th Army, five divisions managed to deploy by the aforementioned date, three more were on the way, in the 2nd slightly more than half of the formations were deployed), and those troops that were at the disposal of the 52nd Army and the 4th Army suffered losses and were exhausted by previous battles during the Tikhvin offensive operation. Army artillery did not arrive in the 2nd shock army, even the aviation that was available at the front did not concentrate (118 combat aircraft, the vast majority of them fighters, not counting almost a hundred more U-2 and R-5), were not stockpiled ammunition. Moreover, those units that arrived experienced a significant shortage of weapons, communications, transport, food and fodder. Nevertheless, the offensive began in the entire 150-kilometer front, and everywhere unsuccessfully, developing almost according to the same scenario.

In the zone of the 52nd Army, only two battalions from the 305th Rifle Division managed to occupy a small bridgehead, which was even held until January 10. In the zone of the 2nd shock army, it was not possible to cross the Volkhov at all, while the army lost about 3,000 people killed and wounded in the first half hour of the battle. Two divisions from the 59th Army (376th and 378th) also managed to capture small bridgeheads, the first left the bridgehead north of the village of Pertechno after several days of fighting on orders, the second was driven back, but on January 8 again captured a small piece of the coast .4 -I army, firmly stuck in the battles for Kirishi, did not achieve any success. In the zone of this army there were bridgeheads on the western bank of the Volkhov in the Lezno region, captured in December 1941, but it was not possible to develop the offensive from them either. The German command assessed this attempt at a large-scale offensive only as reconnaissance in force.

Forcing the Volkhov, the struggle for bridgeheads and the breakthrough of defense

The offensive resumed on January 13, 1942, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation. "Four armies under continuous machine-gun fire, covering the Volkhov with corpses, rushed to the western coast."

The 4th Army again attacked Kirishi and tried to expand its bridgeheads, but again to no avail; moreover, near Kirishi, army formations were thrown back 1.5-2 kilometers and went on the defensive on January 14. including therefore did not achieve more or less significant success in forcing the river. The failure was due, in particular, to the lack of artillery support. So, in the 59th Army, only 0.25 ammunition was available.

Success was indicated in the sector of the 2nd shock army, the front of which was sufficiently saturated with artillery. The army also received air support. The 327th Rifle Division, together with the 44th Separate Ski Battalion attached to it, with the support of the 839th Howitzer Regiment, completely crossed the Volkhov by the evening of January 13 and entrenched itself on the bridgehead near the villages of Krasny Poselok, Bor, Kostylevo. Also, by the evening of the first day of the offensive near Novaya Bystrica, the 24th rifle brigade achieved success. enemy points, in particular, in Yamno.

In the early morning of January 15, the 59th Rifle Brigade was brought into battle in the sector of the 327th Rifle Division, but it suffered losses on the march, lost control, and, having somewhat managed to push the enemy in the direction of Myasny Bor, failed to force the offensive. Together with her, two more brigades from the second echelon were put into battle: the 22nd and 53rd. But the 327th Rifle Division remained the main active force and on January 15-16 broke the enemy defenses at the junction of the 126th and 215th infantry divisions, freeing the villages of Bor, Kostylevo, Arefino and Krasny Poselok and expanding the bridgehead along the river bank. However, the offensive did not develop in depth, and the rifle brigades brought into battle were forced to fight for the expansion of the bridgehead and the strongholds of the enemy's first line of defense until the beginning of the third decade of January.

On the site of the 52nd army, the crossing was also succeeded. On the very first day, first the 305th, and after it the 46th and 267th rifle divisions crossed the Volkhov and started fighting for the strongholds of Gorka and Lelyavino. On January 15, units of the 305th and 46th divisions captured the village of Zapolye and started fighting for the villages of Lelyavino and Teremets, reaching the second line of defense of the enemy, and then began an attack on the village of Tyutitsy. The neighboring 267th Rifle Division started fighting for the village of Koptsy on the same day. In front of this line of defense, the advance of the troops of the 52nd Army in depth stalled. Along with attempts to break through the enemy's defenses along the second line, passing along the Novgorod-Chudovo highway, the army troops expanded their bridgehead along the western bank of the Volkhov.

The relatively successful actions of the 52nd and 2nd shock armies allowed the troops of the 59th army to cross the Volkhov. With four divisions (111th, 372nd, 376th, 378th), the army crossed the river north of Gruzino and south of Lezno and captured bridgeheads there with the aim of advancing to the villages of Vodose and Pertechno and with the prospect of bypassing Chudovo from the north and northwest, thus cutting off the retreat of the enemy, but could not advance further. However, on the southern flank, bordering the troops of the 2nd shock army, on January 17 Volkhov was forced south of the Selishchensky village by the forces of two regiments of the 382nd rifle division (subsequently the regiments were transferred to the 2nd shock army), which began advancing to Spasskaya Polist. At the same time, north of the Selishchensky settlement, the 59th Army was not able to force the river until the end of January.

Due to the fact that the 59th and 4th armies did not have significant success in the offensive, the command shifted the main efforts to the zone of the 2nd shock army. To do this, the offensive zone of the 59th Army was shifted to the south, and part of its formations were transferred to the 2nd Shock Army. At the same time, the front of the 4th Army expanded to the south, which began to be assigned only an auxiliary role. The idea of ​​the operation has changed dramatically, the operation itself has become less large-scale. Now the Soviet troops (52nd, 2nd shock and 59th armies) were to break through the enemy defenses in the sector south of Chudovo and almost to Novgorod, and then advance on Lyuban, thereby cutting off all enemy troops in Chudovo, Kirishi, in in the near future - in Mge and the coast of Ladoga and lifting the blockade of Leningrad.

On January 19, the 366th Rifle Division, reinforced with tanks of the 160th and 162nd battalions, crossed to the western bank of the Volkhov, in the area of ​​​​the village of Yamno, where the battles for expanding the bridgehead continued. The German troops left Yamno, and the division began to advance towards Myasny Bor. The rest of the army also continued the offensive and by January 20 expanded the bridgehead to 25 kilometers along the front and 5 kilometers in depth. Part of the formations of the 59th Army crossed to the bridgehead. On January 20-24, the 366th Rifle Division fought the hardest battles, advancing towards Myasnoy Bor, broke through the defenses north of the village several times and rolled back under counterattacks. Meanwhile, 2.5 kilometers south of Myasny Bor, the 23rd, 24th and 58th rifle brigades were fighting for the village of Lyubtsy. Even further south, they tried to break through the second line of defense of the 52nd Army. On January 24, Myasnoy Bor and Teremets-Kurlyandsky were taken. Thus, the breakthrough of the main line of defense took place.

Tikhvin offensive operation (November 10 - December 30, 1941).

Tikhvin is being evacuated.

The last of the armies along the perimeter of the ledge with a peak in Tikhvin crossed the 54th Army. This happened because the offensive of the Nazi troops in the Volkhov direction was stopped only on November 25, 6 km south and southeast of Volkhov. By the beginning of December, the troops of the 54th Army were reinforced by the 80th Rifle Division, transferred from Leningrad. In the Voybokalo area from units of the 311th Infantry Division, 6th Brigade marines transferred from the right bank of the river. Volkhov, and parts of the 80th Infantry Division, an attack group was formed, which on December 3 went on the offensive and began to push the enemy in a southerly direction.
In the first half of December, the 115th and 198th Rifle Divisions were additionally transferred from Leningrad to the 54th Army. Also, KB tanks were deployed from Leningrad over the ice of Lake Ladoga. Under the conditions of the transition of the battles near Leningrad to the phase of positional warfare, the need for tanks was significantly reduced, and they were used to save the city. indirectly, near Volkhov.
With the introduction of the 115th and 198th rifle divisions into battle on December 15, the offensive on the left bank of the river. Volkhov began to develop more successfully. In two days of stubborn battles, the 54th Army advanced 20 km and on December 17 reached the Olomna area, covering the left flank of the main enemy forces operating on the right bank of the river. Volkhov. At the same time, part of the troops of the 4th Army, pursuing the enemy along the Tikhvin-Volkhov railway, reached the river. Lynn and captured the right flank of the Volkhov grouping of the enemy. Fearing encirclement, this group began to retreat. By December 28, she was driven back behind the Mga-Kirishi railway. Our troops began fighting for Pogostye, Posadnikov Ostrov, Larionov Ostrov and Kirishi. In order to stop the offensive in this direction, the German command was forced to withdraw two more infantry divisions (291st and 269th) from near Leningrad and transfer them to the Kirishi area.
In December, near Tikhvin, as in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, freshly formed formations went into battle. To unify the management of the increased number of armies and formations, the Volkhov Front was formed on November 17 under the command of K. A. Meretskov. It was considered inexpedient to manage the 4th and 52nd armies, together with the newly emerging formations. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 005581 of December 11, 1941 read:

"2. The composition of the Volkhov Front include:

A) 4th Army, Commander Major General Ivanov P.A., as part of the 4th Guards. pp. div., 44, 65, 191 and 377th pp. div., 27th and 80 kav. div., 1st Grenada. brigades, 60th tank, div., 46th tank, brigades, 883 artillery regiment and six ski battalions operating in the Tikhvin-Volkhovstroy direction. Sharm 4 - Tikhvin area;
b) the 59th Army, Commander Major General Galanin, consisting of 92, 372, 374, 376, 378, 382 rifle divisions, 78, 87 cavalry divisions, 827 artillery regiments and three PC divisions deployed in the Vyazishche, V. Zaozerye, pltf. Mordvinovo, Babchitsy, Nebolchi. Sharm 59 - area of ​​​​st. Nebolchi;
c) 26th Army, Commander Lieutenant General Sokolov, consisting of 327th [rifle] divisions], 53rd, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 57th, 58th and 59th divisions of brigades, 18th artillery division [olka] and three divisions of the PC, deployed in the Zelenshchina - Mala[aya] Vishera - Novaya - Posad - Vycherema - Moschanitsa area. Shtarm 26 - Falkov;
d) the 52nd Army, Commander Lieutenant General Klykov, consisting of 46, 111, 259, 267 and 288 [rifle] divisions], 442 and 561 a [artillery] regiments, operating in the direction of Selishchenskiye Barracks — Volkhov. Shtarm 52 - Verebye;
e) front reserve - 366 rifle divisions in the area of ​​st. Terebutinets".
The 59th Army was born in November 1941 and consisted of formations formed in the autumn of 1941. It was headed by the commander of the Novgorod army group I. V. Galanin. The 26th Army, like the 1st Shock and 20th Armies near Moscow, was entirely the brainchild of "permanent mobilization" and came from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Soon it will be named the 2nd Shock and as such will become one of the most famous (unfortunately notorious) formations of the Red Army. However, the arrival of the formations of these two armies began only at the end of December 1941.
The newly formed Volkhov Front in December successfully developed the pursuit of the enemy. By December 27, the troops of the 4th and 52nd armies reached the Volkhov River on the Kirishi-Novgorod front, captured bridgeheads on the left bank in the Lezno-Khmelishchi region, north of Gruzino, and continued fighting to expand them.
The German command, trying to keep in their hands the left bank of the river. Volkhov, reinforced the retreating troops with a security division, removed from the protection of the rear, and parts of the 81st Infantry Division, transferred from France. By the end of December, the enemy was driven back to his original position, from which on October 16 he launched an attack on Tikhvin. The lines reached in October 1941 were lost, never again to be in the hands of the invaders.
The success achieved has not been developed. Stretched for 350 km along the perimeter of the front stretched towards Tikhvin, the front again “collapsed” into a 70-kilometer line, based on a large water barrier. In this regard, as well as with the stretching of communications and the lack of sufficient means of transportation, the attempts of the Soviet troops to continue the offensive were not successful. The troops of the 54th, 4th and 52nd armies, holding the bridgeheads they occupied on the left bank of the river. Volkhov, at the end of December, they began to consolidate their positions. The continuation of the offensive was expected after the arrival of the 2nd shock and 59th armies at the front in early January 1942.
In total, 192,950 people participated in the offensive phase of the operation. Irretrievable losses amounted to 17,924 people, sanitary - 30,977 people, in total - 48,901 people.
The results of the battle for Tikhvin. From the point of view of strategy, both sides in the battle for Tikhvin could report mainly on the achievement of negative (violation of the enemy's plans) goals. As a result of the battle that lasted two and a half months, neither side made any noticeable seizures of territory. Everything returned to the status quo at the time the operation began. The German command could take credit for the violation of the Soviet plan for the release of Leningrad in the planned Sinyavin operation by the forces of the 54th Army. The Soviet command, in turn, prevented a deep bypass of Leningrad and the connection of German and Finnish troops to the west of Lake Ladoga. Thus, the supply line connecting Leningrad with the mainland was preserved. The missed opportunities of the Army Group "North" should also include some delay with the moment of transition to the offensive on Tikhvin, which allowed the Soviet command to freely withdraw three rifle divisions and one tank brigade. These formations became a shield on the way to the capital of the advanced units of Army Group Center in October 1941. It would have been much more difficult to withdraw them from the battle. At the same time, after its start, the offensive of the 1st Army and XXXIX Motorized Corps began to attract forces that could be used near Moscow. In particular, the 60th Panzer Division was redirected at the last moment to Tikhvin instead of Moscow. At the same time, not a single formation from Army Group North was transferred to Army Group Center after the start of the operation. Moreover, after the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive, a fresh 203rd army was sent to the 18th army. tank regiment(45 Pz.II, 71 Pz.III, 20 Pz.IV and 6 command tanks). In fact, this was the core of a tank division, which the German command was forced to use in the Volkhov direction as a means of direct infantry support. On December 25, it had 136 tanks, and on January 10 - only 50. The introduction of a full-blooded tank regiment into one of the tank divisions of the Army Group Center or South that had lost their materiel could lead to fatal consequences. Instead, the tanks were wasted in the dense forests near Leningrad. In the same way, the first division transferred from the West, the 215th Infantry Division, was sent to the Volkhov Front. Already at the beginning of January 1942, she took up defensive positions on the Volkhov.
From an operational point of view, the battle for Tikhvin shows how the German shock groups near Moscow, Tula and Rostov were defeated. In all cases, the situation developed in a similar way. Developing the offensive deep into the formation of the Soviet troops, the German motorized corps stretched their flanks and increased the front of the offensive, while at the same time suffering significant losses in people and equipment. This initially led to a decrease in the pace of the offensive, its halt, and then to effective counterattacks by the Red Army on the flanks. What distinguishes the counteroffensive near Tikhvin from other successful counterattacks is that it did not use the fruits of "permanent mobilization", that is, the divisions and armies of the autumn 1941 formation. The counteroffensive was carried out for the most part by forces that were already available and were in contact with the enemy from the beginning november. That is why the counter-offensive near Tikhvin began much earlier than the general counter-offensive of the Red Army in the winter campaign.
A major shortcoming in the actions of the Soviet troops was the lack of a massive use of tanks and artillery in the directions of the main attacks of the army. Thus, the tank units that were part of the 4th Army were evenly distributed among infantry support groups. Instead of using the 60th Panzer Division as a single unit and forming a powerful strike group to attack in the direction of the main attack and organize pursuit, the mobile unit was pulled apart between several rifle divisions. To some extent, this can be justified by the nature of the area. Artillery resources were also distributed evenly between formations without emphasizing artillery strikes in one direction or another. In the 52nd Army, the 259th and 111th Rifle Divisions delivered the main blow around the city of Malaya Vishera from the north and south. However, all the artillery of the reserve of the Supreme High Command was evenly distributed among all divisions of the army, and the 111th division, which operated in the direction of the main attack, was without reinforcement.
A weak point in the preparation and conduct of the operation was also the lack of reserves among the commanders of the armies and the commanders of the troops of the operational groups, capable of developing the success of the first echelon formations. In the offensive zone of the 4th Army, the lack of reserves led to the fact that the formations of the army, having gone on the offensive on November 19 and by November 23, having intercepted the main roads from Tikhvin to the west, could not complete the encirclement of the enemy in the Tikhvin area.
From a tactical point of view, the Red Army, during the counter-offensive near Tikhvin, encountered a defense system with strong points, with the overcoming of which serious problems arose. In the first days of the counteroffensive, the efforts of the troops were directed mainly to capturing individual disputed points and nodes of resistance on the front line of the enemy's defense. Rifle divisions did not receive tasks for a deep bypass of these points and nodes. All this led to a loss in the pace of the offensive and allowed the German command to bring up reserves with impunity from the depths, withdraw units from unattacked sectors of the front, and thus put up stubborn resistance to our troops.
Infiltration tactics were not widely used during the offensive. The gaps between the strongholds were not occupied by the German troops, but were shot through with artillery and mortar fire. The advancing rifle divisions did not try to use the unoccupied gaps in the enemy's defenses to bypass and envelop strongpoints in order to strike at the flank and rear of the garrisons defending in them. Therefore, the struggle for these points dragged on.
But, despite all the above mistakes and shortcomings, the struggle for Tikhvin became an important link in a qualitative change in the situation in favor of the Red Army. Colonel Hartwig Polman, commander of the 284th regiment of the 96th Infantry Division, later stated:

“The end of 1941 brought serious crises and worries to the German command. The offensive impulse, which had transferred the divisions of the Volkhov Front far beyond the Volkhov to Tikhvin and to the lower reaches of the river almost to its confluence with Lake Ladoga, had exhausted its striking power, and they rolled back to their original positions in October. In vain were all the losses in people and equipment, in vain was the high morale of the soldiers. Their forces were exhausted to the limit, but they remained true to their command. There also remained the consciousness that the enemy, having far superior forces, had seized the initiative. Between the lake Ilmen and the Karelian Isthmus stood one-fifth of the entire Red Army. What, however, no one knew at that moment was that here, in the Volkhov region, the Russians would not let go of this initiative.”

The counteroffensive near Tikhvin became a milestone both in the long and short term. Together with the counteroffensive near Rostov, it marked the beginning of the interception of the strategic initiative by the Red Army in the winter campaign of 1941-1942. In the long term, the troops of Army Group Center thrown back behind the Volkhov lost the initiative on this sector of the front forever. Despite a number of attempts to regain the initiative, including the injection of large reserves, the 16th and 18th armies were forced to fight bloody battles with the front to the east. The assault on Leningrad was postponed forever.
A source
Isaev A. V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 400 p.