A small German heavy self-propelled gun Panzerjäger Tiger (P), better known asFerdinand, left a noticeable mark on historical memory and in Soviet tank building. In itself, the word "Ferdinand" became a household word: the Red Army men "noticed" these self-propelled guns in various sectors of the Soviet-German front, and right up to the end of the war. In practice, only 91 such machines were built, but in a truly massiveFerdinand were used only in the summer of 1943 during Operation Citadel on the Kursk Bulge. In this battle, the Germans lost more than a third of all vehicles of this type.
Despite the fact that SAUFerdinand (later known asElefant) were used rather limitedly, they proved to be a very effective anti-tank weapon. The command of the Red Army to the brainchildPorsche K. G. AndAlkett taken very seriously. AppearanceFerdinand at the front directly affected the development of Soviet tanks, tank guns and anti-tank artillery.
Impact force on the northern face
The fact that the German industry created such an impressive combat vehicle was not even suspected in the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA) until its appearance at the front. The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition did not know about it either. The explanation is simple: the fact is that the Panzerjäger Tiger (P) were built in the spring of 1943, and went into battle in early July. In the short time that preparations were underway for Operation Citadel, information about Ferdinand did not have time to leak through the front line. At the same time, even about the Panther, for which the battle on the Kursk Bulge also became a combat debut, at least some information was received by the allies, albeit inaccurate.
The study of the German novelty began on July 15, that is, even during Battle of Kursk. A group of officers from the NIBT Polygon arrived at the Central Front, consisting of engineer-colonel Kalidov, senior technician-lieutenant Kzhak and technician-lieutenant Serov. By that time, the fighting in the area of the Ponyri station and the state farm on May 1 had died down. In addition to a direct inspection of German vehicles, German prisoners of war were interrogated by specialists. Information was also shared by Soviet soldiers and officers who took part in the battles against German combat vehicles. Finally, German instructions for Ferdinand fell into the hands of the Soviet military.
A survey of prisoners made it possible to obtain a large amount of information, including on the organization of anti-tank divisions, which were armed with Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Additionally, specialists from the NIBT Polygon received information on other units that participated in the battles together with the 653rd and 654th divisions, which were armed with heavy tank destroyers.
Ferdinand with tail number 501, which was delivered to the NIBT Polygon in September 1943
The information received made it possible to reconstruct the picture of the combat use of divisions with Ferdinands and their neighbors, who used StuH 42 and Sturmpanzer IV self-propelled guns. The Ferdinands, which had thick armor, acted as a ram, moving at the head of the combat formations of the strike group. According to the information collected, the cars were moving in a line. Thanks to powerful weapons capable of hitting Soviet tanks at long distances, the crews of the Ferdinands could open fire at a distance of up to 3 kilometers. If necessary, German vehicles retreated backwards, leaving thick frontal armor under enemy fire. So they could, retreating, continue to fire on Soviet tanks. Shooting was carried out from short stops.
The shell mark on the left side is clearly visible. The same mark is also on board the car in Patriot Park.
Against well-protected German self-propelled guns, Soviet tank guns were almost useless. Of the 21 vehicles examined by GBTU specialists, only one, with onboard 602, had a hole in the port side. The hit fell on the gas tank area, a fire broke out, and the self-propelled unit burned down. The tactics of the German self-propelled gunners could well have worked if not for one “but”: they had to attack an echeloned defense line, in which there were far from only tanks. The most terrible enemy of the Ferdinand was the Soviet sappers. 10 vehicles were blown up by mines and land mines, including self-propelled guns with tail number 501. This self-propelled gun with serial number 150072 turned out to be the vehicle of Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Wilde, commander of the 1st battery (5./654) of the 654th heavy division tank destroyers.
5 "Ferdinands" were hit by shells in the undercarriage and were put out of action. 2 more vehicles received hits both in the chassis and in the guns. The car with tail number 701 became a victim of Soviet artillery. The projectile, which hit the roof of the cabin along a hinged trajectory, pierced the hatch and exploded inside the fighting compartment. Another car was hit by an aerial bomb, which completely destroyed the wheelhouse. Finally, the vehicle with tail number II-01 from the headquarters of the 654th division was destroyed by the Soviet infantry. A well-aimed hit with a Molotov cocktail caused a fire, the crew burned inside.
The letter N indicates that it was a vehicle from the 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Major Karl-Hans Noack
In fact, the losses of the divisions that were armed with the Ferdinands turned out to be even higher. In total, during the operation "Citadel" 39 self-propelled units of this type were irretrievably lost. The results of the battle near Ponyry clearly showed that the Red Army had learned to fight with significantly superior enemy forces, because there was an undeniable advantage on the side of the German tank forces in this battle. The Soviet tank industry was able to give a full answer to the new generation of German tanks and self-propelled guns only in the spring of 1944, when the T-34-85 and IS-2 entered the troops. However, the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk. As the Ponyri battles showed, the advantage in tanks was far from always the most important factor. "Ferdinands" could not break through the northern face of the Kursk salient.
To Kubinka for experiments
The first group of specialists from the NIBT Polygon left the combat area on August 4th. On August 24, the second group arrived here, consisting of Major Engineer Khinsky, Senior Technician Lieutenant Ilyin and Lieutenant Burlakov. The task of the group, which operated on the Central Front until September 8, was the selection of the most complete captured German vehicles and their delivery to the NIBT Polygon. Two cars were selected. In addition to the already mentioned self-propelled guns with tail number 501, it was also a self-propelled gun with serial number 15090. It also blew up on a mine. One machine was used for direct study and fire tests, the second was fired from domestic and foreign guns.
On the right side, damage was minimal.
The study of captured vehicles began even before they were at the NIBT Test Site. The first firing tests of the wrecked Ferdinand were carried out on July 20-21, 1943. It turned out that the side of the German vehicle was being penetrated by a 45-mm anti-tank gun at a distance of 200 meters. It pierced the German armor at a distance of 400 meters and the 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon with a sub-caliber projectile. For the 85 mm 52-K gun and the 122 mm A-19 hull gun, the side armor of the German self-propelled guns was also not a serious problem. It is worth noting that the armor of the Ferdinands, especially for vehicles with serial numbers up to 150060, was worse than that of the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E. For this reason, in the future, the firing tests of the vehicle with serial number 150090 differed somewhat in results.
"Ferdinand" with tail number 501 was a victim of Soviet sappers
The trophy documents were also studied. By July 21, the Red Army had accurate data on the performance characteristics of the German self-propelled gun. Furthermore, it was known exactly how many Ferdinands were built. The data was gleaned from a summary instruction for the armament of the German army, captured among other documents:
“In terms of its armor and armament, it is an exceptionally strong weapon for fighting tanks and for supporting an offensive in the face of strong enemy resistance. Heavy weight, low speed on the battlefield, low cross-country ability limit the possibilities of combat use and require especially careful reconnaissance before entering into battle.
90 pieces were produced, consolidated into a heavy anti-tank regiment consisting of two divisions of 45 guns each.
Selected by a group of specialists from the NIBT Polygon, self-propelled guns arrived in Kubinka in September 1943. Immediately after arrival, the study of the sample with tail number 501 began. There was no talk of sea trials at that time, there was not enough time. Instead, the testers compiled a brief description of the German self-propelled gun, which they called "Ferdinand (Tiger P)". Thanks to the already available materials, it was possible to accurately indicate the characteristics of the machine.
This self-propelled gun had an escape hatch dropped. On a museum car, it was welded to the roof so that it would not get lost.
The assessment of the German novelty was, to put it mildly, ambiguous. The obvious advantages of the car were armor protection, as well as powerful weapons. At the same time, even the armament of the tank raised questions. A study of the 88 mm Pak 43 gun showed that the aiming speed with the help of its rotary mechanism is low. Conducting aimed fire was possible only from a place or from short stops. The visibility of the car was recognized by Soviet experts as poor. These conclusions were indirectly confirmed by German designers. During the modernization of Ferdinand, which began in the fall of 1943 (at about the same time the vehicle changed its designation to Elefant), the vehicles received a commander's cupola. True, this did not improve the situation much.
Another significant drawback of the German self-propelled guns was a small ammunition load, consisting of only 38 rounds. The crews independently corrected the situation: in self-propelled units they found wooden stacks, handicraft built in the field.
Dismantled installation during the shelling. NIBT Polygon, December 1943
Compiling a description, however, was not the most important task for the specialists of the NIBT Polygon. It was much more important to determine where and how the German novelty could be hit. After the battle of Ponyry, the threat posed by the Ferdinand was taken very seriously. The car made an indelible impression on the Soviet infantry and tankers. The steel colossus, which is almost impossible to penetrate into the frontal projection, seemed to be in different parts of the front. For this reason, it was necessary to know exactly which systems and at what distance were capable of hitting a heavy German tank destroyer.
For a sub-caliber projectile of a 45-mm anti-tank gun, the sides of the German self-propelled gun turned out to be completely pierced
The shelling test program for the Ferdinand hull was signed on September 29, 1943. But it was possible to start the tests themselves only on December 1. During this time, the range of weapons that were planned to fire at the trophy was expanded. In addition to domestic, German artillery systems and allied guns, the NII-6 anti-tank grenade was also used, later adopted as the RPG-6. As tests showed, the cumulative grenade confidently pierced the side of the self-propelled gun, after which the jet pierced the shield of inch boards installed inside the hull.
The next on the list was the 45-mm gun installed in the T-70 tank. Her armor-piercing projectile did not penetrate the German car at a distance of 100 meters, which turned out to be quite expected. But the sub-caliber projectile at the same distance coped with both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse. At a distance of 200 meters, a sub-caliber projectile managed to break through the side, the cabin turned out to be stronger.
The results of shelling a car from a 6-pounder tank gun
The 57-mm tank gun installed in the Churchill tank turned out to be able to break through the side of the German self-propelled gun. From a distance of 500 meters, armor 80 (85) mm thick made its way confidently. Fire was fired from the 43-caliber version of the gun, the Valentine XI/X and Churchill III/IV of 1943 deliveries had longer guns.
For tank guns of 75 and 76 mm caliber, the side of the German vehicle turned out to be a difficult obstacle
Things were worse with the shelling of a German self-propelled gun from a 75-mm M3 cannon mounted in an American M4A2 medium tank. The M61 armor-piercing projectile could not penetrate the side of the cabin even from a distance of 100 meters. True, two hits on the weld connecting the frontal and left side cutting sheet led to its cracking. However, the same projectile pierced the side of the Ferdinand hull already at a distance of 500 meters. The armor-piercing projectile of the Soviet 76-mm F-34 tank gun behaved even worse, which, however, was not news.
D-5S board "Ferdinand" broke through at a distance of almost a kilometer
The results of firing at the side of the German self-propelled gun from the D-5S gun installed in the SU-85 were not surprised either. At a distance of 900 meters, she confidently pierced both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse. When a shell hit from the inside of the sheet, the armor broke off, the fragments did not leave the calculation of the fighting compartment a chance of survival. However, by the time the SU-85 appeared on the front, and then other Soviet combat vehicles equipped with 85-mm guns, the chances of meeting the Ferdinand on the battlefield had noticeably decreased.
This penetration from the D-25T was not counted. But if it happened in a real situation, the Ferdinand calculation would not care
All of the systems listed above were not used to shell a self-propelled gun from the frontal part, which is understandable: it would hardly have been possible to break through 200 mm armor with their help. The first gun that was used to fire at the front of the hull was the 122-mm D-25 gun installed in the prototype of the IS-2 tank. The first projectile, fired from a distance of 1400 meters on the frontal hull plate, pierced the screen and ricocheted. The second projectile, fired at the same distance into the cabin, left a dent 100 mm deep and 210 × 200 mm in size. The third shell was stuck in the armor, but still partially entered it. The penetration was not counted, but in practice such a defeat would have put the gun's crew out of action. At shorter distances, shooting was not carried out this time, but, as subsequent events showed, hits at a distance of 1200 meters or less ended in penetration. The testers considered the distance of 1000 meters as the maximum distance for penetration.
The Panther's cannon pierced the self-propelled unit in the forehead of the hull from 100 meters
This was followed by shelling from the 75-mm KwK 42 L / 71 cannon mounted on the German tank Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D. At a distance of 100 meters, the forehead of the hull was pierced. But the cabin from 200 meters failed to break through.
These results were affected by damage from previous hits. But the meeting with the ML-20 did not bode well for Ferdinand
The most terrible test was the shelling from the 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20, installed in the prototype ISU-152. The second hit in the frontal part of the hull led to the fact that both the screen and the sheet were broken in half. Last but not least, this result was obtained due to the unwelded embrasure of the course machine gun, which was again installed on the Elefant.
A clear demonstration of why another car was sent to the trophy exhibition in Moscow
At this test shelling, it was decided to stop. ML-20 turned the Ferdinand into a pile of rubble. It was supposed to send the shot car to a trophy exhibition in Moscow, but later the decision was changed. Another car was taken for the demonstration, which was also fired upon (it was most likely the Ferdinand, which was fired upon in the summer of 1943). Together with her, a whole self-propelled unit went to the exhibition. The car with tail number 501 remained at the NIBT Polygon.
Catalyst for an arms race
The appearance of a new German self-propelled gun on the Kursk Bulge was taken very seriously by the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA). In part, the start of new developments provoked the combat debut of the Panthers. Of course, with the activity that began after the appearance of the "Tiger", what happened cannot be compared. Nevertheless, already at the beginning of September 1943, a letter was sent to Stalin signed by the head of the GBTU KA, Lieutenant General Fedorenko. In connection with the appearance of new models of German armored vehicles, he proposed to begin the development of promising tanks and self-propelled guns.
A direct consequence of the appearance of the Ferdinand was the start of the development of the Object 701 heavy tank, the future IS-4. In addition, work on the 122-mm D-25T gun, which had begun as early as May 1943, accelerated. Moreover, it was supposed to replace it with an even more powerful gun with an initial projectile velocity of up to 1000 m/s. Work began on the creation of more powerful 85 and 152 mm caliber guns. Finally, the issue of developing a 100-mm gun with naval gun ballistics appeared again on the agenda. Thus began the history of the D-10S, the main armament of the SU-100 self-propelled gun.
Schematic of the cooling system prepared by NIBT Polygon
All this is just a part of the activities that were launched or restarted in connection with the appearance of the Ferdinand. Thanks to the German heavy self-propelled guns, the Soviet program to create an electric transmission was also "resurrected". They have been engaged in it in the USSR since the beginning of the 30s, it was supposed to use such a transmission on the KV-3. A serial German heavy machine with electric transmission forced Soviet specialists to return to this work again. However, our engineers did not copy German developments. The program, which was related to the famous science fiction writer Kazantsev (and part-time military engineer of the 3rd rank and chief engineer of plant No. 627), developed independently.
Specification for the armor plates of the Ferdinand chassis, prepared by NII-48 in 1944
The design of the German car aroused great interest in the USSR. The hull and cabin were studied at NII-48, the leading enterprise dealing with armor issues. As a result of the study, several reports were prepared. NII-48 engineers created the armor and hull of the optimal shape - with good protection and relatively low weight. The result of these works was a more rational form of hulls and turrets, which began to be introduced from the second half of 1944, first on heavy, and later on medium tanks.
Influenced these developments and the study of the guns installed on the Ferdinand. In 1944, the creation of armor protection capable of withstanding this gun became a priority for Soviet designers. And they coped with it much better than their German counterparts. By the end of 1944, the first experimental tanks appeared, the protection of which made it possible to confidently resist the German gun. Tanks IS-3 and T-54 "grew" just from such developments.
Other elements of the Ferdinand were also studied, for example, the suspension. In the Soviet industry, this development did not find application, but aroused some interest. A report on the study of the Porsche suspension was compiled at the request of the British.
Suspension scheme "Ferdinand" from the album of torsion bar suspensions prepared by NIBT Polygon in 1945
The most important result of the study of the German machine was the emergence of means for effectively combating it. The IS-2 heavy tank and the ISU-122 self-propelled gun were adopted by the Red Army. There are at least two cases of collision between the IS-2 and the Elefant in the summer of 1944. In both cases, the crew of the IS-2 under the command of Lieutenant B.N. Slyunyaeva came out the winner. The most notable was the battle on July 22, 1944: a column of the 71st Guards Heavy tank regiment was walking towards Magerov when fire was opened on heavy tanks from an ambush. Slyunyaev's tank, under the cover of a second car, advanced to the crossroads. After observing the ambush for 10-15 minutes, the IS-2 approached it at a distance of 1000 meters and returned fire. As a result, the "Elephant", 2 anti-tank guns and an armored personnel carrier were destroyed.
Three weeks later, the same regiment was the first to fight the latest German heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw. Tiger Ausf.B. It was then that it turned out that the measures taken by the Soviet designers turned out to be very helpful. The "Royal Tiger" had more resistant frontal armor than the "Ferdinand", which did not prevent the Soviet tankers from winning a duel with the latest German tanks dry. Preparing to fight the Ferdinands, the Soviet tank industry also prepared for the emergence of a new generation of German heavy tanks. As a result of such a powerful qualitative superiority in tanks, which the Wehrmacht received on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, the summer of 1944 did not happen. And for other serious attempts to change the existing balance of power, the German tank industry did not have time.
The Poklonnaya Vysota 269 memorial complex is located near the village of Molotychi, Fatezhsky District, Kursk Region, where during the fighting on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, the command post of the 70th NKVD Army was located, which defended these heights in front of the advancing 9th German Army. The memorial complex was erected on the initiative and organization of the Regional Public Organization "Kurskoe Zemlyachestvo" in Moscow in order to perpetuate the feat of Soviet soldiers, who at the cost of their lives did not allow the Nazi invaders to break through to Kursk in July 1943.
The construction of the complex began on November 12, 2011, when the Poklonny Cross was erected. The inscription on it reads: “Here in July 1943, the hardest battles of the Battle of Kursk, the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day on July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants.
V.V. Pronin and S.I. Kretov with a veteran on the day of the installation of the Pokloniye Cross
Worship Cross on the opening day
Installation of the Pontifical Cross
Opening of the Pontifical Cross 11/12/2011
After the declassification of military archives and the study of documents, it became known that the facts of the courage and steadfastness of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as the civilian population on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, were kept silent, especially on the left flank of the front in the area of the Molotychevskiye - Teplovskiye - Olkhovatskiye heights.
Our soldiers fought heroically against the enemy, who had a significant technical superiority in comparison with the equipment of the Soviet troops. 34 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Most are posthumous.
The convenient location of the height near the highway, from which the visibility in good weather is open to the outskirts of Kursk, explains the reason for such a fierce zeal of the Germans at these heights.
portraits of 34 heroes of the Soviet Union at the Poklonny Cross
On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan German of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited the above places. Their importance in terms of perpetuating the memory of the heroism of soldiers and officers on the line of the Northern Front of the Kursk Bulge was noted, and he gave his blessing for the implementation of the project.
Metropolitan Herman at Poklonnaya Vysota 2013
On July 12, 1943, units of the Central Front launched a counteroffensive, inflicting such a blow on the Nazis after which their offensive impulse was broken, Operation Citadel was canceled to capture Kursk and create a cauldron for the Soviet troops. On this day in 2014, a solemn laying of a time capsule with an appeal to descendants took place: “A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is stored here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, benefactors on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the Angel of Peace monument of the Poklonnaya Vysota Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043."
Capsule-laying ceremony 2014
On May 7, 2015, the Angel of Peace monument was opened, which was erected on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War at height 269, as the main object of the Memorial Complex of the Northern Face of the Kursk Bulge - the location of the command post of the 70th Army of the NKVD, which defended jointly with other military formations of the Central Front, the defense of the Molotychevsk - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky heights from July 5 to 12, 1943, where a grandiose battle took place that decided the fate of the whole World and marked the beginning of the irrevocable expulsion of fascism from Europe.
visit of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the Central Federal District
to Poklonnaya Height 269
Installation of the monument. November 20, 2014
The first bucket of earth. Getting Started with Installation
Monument Angel of Peace. August 6, 2014
Installation of the monument November 20, 2014
Installation of the monument to the Angel of Peace. November 20, 2014
Opening of the monument 07.05.2015
The monument is a 35-meter sculpture, the top of which is crowned by an eight-meter angel holding a wreath and releasing a dove. The monument faces the West with a call from Russian people stop the new fascism. Standing on the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the "Angel of Peace" reminds all of humanity how it all ends.
The author of the artistic composition "Angel of Peace" sculptor A.N. Burganov. - a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.
A.N. Burganov
Angel of Peace
The composition has a backlight, thanks to which a beautiful picture opens at night (a soaring Angel over the Kursk land).
December 10, 2015 at cultural center The FSB of Russia held a solemn ceremony of awarding laureates and diploma winners of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works literature and art about the activities of organs federal service security. In the category "Fine Arts", the first prize was awarded to Burganov Alexander Nikolaevich, sculptor, author of the stele.
Presentation to A.N. Burganov Prize of the FSB of Russia
Prize of the FSB of Russia
The construction of the memorial complex was noted by President Vladimir Putin. In 2016, a letter of thanks from the President was presented to the head of the regional public organization NGO "Kursk community", for his active personal participation in the preparation and holding of events dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
Thank you letter from the President
Presentation of V.V. Pronin Letter of Appreciation from the President of the Russian Federation
On February 12, 2016, the construction of a temple in honor of the glorious and all-praised supreme apostles Peter and Paul began. On July 12, 1943, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops began on the Northern Fas on the day of the aforementioned Holy See. The work was officially launched by Alexander Mikhailov, Vladimir Pronin and Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgovsky Veniamin. In the foundation of the building, they laid a capsule with an appeal to posterity.
laying a capsule in the foundation of the Temple
construction of the Temple
At the Poklonnaya Vysota 269 memorial complex, on August 16, 2016, His Grace Veniamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgovsky, consecrated the bells and the main dome for the church in honor of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul. The peculiarity of the consecration was that in order to sprinkle the bells with holy water, Vladyka used special equipment to rise to a height. But the dome was consecrated on the ground.
Consecration of the Dome and bells of the temple
On August 20, 2016, a solemn ceremony of hoisting a cross on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul took place at the memorial complex. This event was witnessed by veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the delegation of the NGO "Kursk community", young people, residents of nearby areas who came here to honor the memory of the dead Soviet soldiers. Among the guests of honor of the solemn ceremony were the governor of the Kursk region Alexander Mikhailov, the honorary citizen of the Kursk region and the Fatezhsky district, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the general director of Management Company "Metalloinvest" Andrey Varichev and many other dignitaries. Alexander Mikhailov in his welcoming speech expressed the hope that the built temple would become a spiritual center for the inhabitants of Kursk and neighboring regions.
Installation of crosses
In addition, the geoglyph "70 Years of Victory" was created here - a giant inscription, which is "written" by pine seedlings. Each letter contained from 100 to 200 trees, and its height will be 30 meters. Giant letters can be seen while driving along the V. Lubazh - Ponyri highway at the foot of the monument, as well as from a bird's eye view or on satellite images.
It is also planned to restore the dugouts of the army command post.
The Poklonny Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial complex were built exclusively on donations from individuals and legal entities - Kursk people living in Moscow and the Kursk region for future generations.
And here is how events developed on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Here, as well as on the northern front, a preemptive strike was dealt to the Germans:
“... on the night of July 4, a Czech defector from the sapper battalion of the 52nd Army Corps said that all German soldiers were given dry rations for five days and additional portions of schnapps. Judging that in the next few hours the Germans would go on the offensive, the commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin at dawn on July 5, following the plan, gave the order to the artillerymen to open preemptive fire on the German advanced positions and places of concentration of troops. Intensive artillery counter-preparation lasted about half an hour…” (p. 273).
So the enemy here suffered very significant losses even before the start of the operation. And yet the German offensive began:
“... in terms of the number of guns, the weight of a volley and fire control, the Russian artillery was incomparably stronger than the German one. The artillery pieces at Manstein's disposal were unable to destroy the Russian defensive positions or clear passages through the minefields. As a result, many tanks were blown up by mines on the outskirts of the Russian positions and soon left behind the advancing German infantry.
Tank crews received strict instructions:
“Under no circumstances stop the tank to provide assistance to damaged vehicles. Technical assistance is the responsibility of the engineering units only. Tank commanders must continue the offensive until the tank has lost mobility. In cases of loss of mobility by the tank, but while maintaining the combat capability of the gun (for example, a technical breakdown or damage to the caterpillar), the crew must continue to fire from a stationary tank.
This order, in essence, doomed the crew of a damaged tank to death, since numerous Soviet guns could shoot a stopped tank in a matter of minutes after it was blown up by a mine ”(p. 275).
So the disposition already before the start of the battle obliged the Germans to tune in to a total war. It took on the character of a total, but for the most part it was for the German side. Mellenthin:
“We met fierce resistance, and despite the best efforts of our troops, they did not manage to move forward. There was a swamp in front of the “Grossdeutschland” division, and Russian artillery fired heavily at its dense battle formations. The sappers were unable to establish the necessary crossings, as a result, many tanks became victims of Soviet aviation ... ”(p. 314).
Further:
“It was not possible to completely clear the area from the minefields left by the Soviet troops. The concentration on three kilometers of several hundred combat vehicles from different parts, vehicles with four battalions of infantry and artillery tractors, with the unpreparedness of the road, could not lead to anything except traffic jams in the main directions and losses during raids by attack aircraft of the 2nd VA and hit by mines, and did not bring” (p. 432).
“The headquarters of the 2nd SS TC was closely monitoring the situation. At that moment, for the command of the corps, as well as for the leadership of the entire army, it was very important to break through the front edge of the first most fortified Russian zone as quickly as possible and decisively move to the Prokhorovka direction, even before the moment the Soviet side brought up mobile operational reserves” (p. 393).
But these mobile reserves, which would be a complete surprise for the Germans, were brought here in advance by us - after all, our generals practiced meeting the enemy here. And this is how our “thirty-fours” “talked” with the enemy already on the second day of his extremely technical attacks. And at that moment they piled on the positions of the 1st tank:
“... the 48th Panzer Corps, the SS Panzer Division Adolf Hitler, two SS Panzer Corps, the Great Germany Motorized Division, the SS Panzer Divisions Dead Head, Reich, Viking.
But there was no time to be afraid of the superiority of the enemy ...
The first blow was taken by the 2nd tank battalion under the command of Semyon Vovchenko. The battalion had 10 tanks, but fought with 70 enemy tanks. Within two hours, Semyon Vovchenko's battalion destroyed 24 enemy tanks, including 14 “tigers”” (pp. 187–188).
So in the very first oncoming battles, our tanks had already pretty much picked the teeth of the tanks of the future memoirist - everyone and everything the winner - Mr. Manstein. And they fought not for life, but to the death, already dying themselves, while trying to destroy another five of the Kulturtragers hiding under the armor, trying in horror to dodge the burning Russian tank going to ram!
Here is how Katukov's wife, herself, which is understandable, a participant in this battle, describes the feat of Shalandin's crew in this first battle of a tank brigade:
“... Shalandin and members of his crew Vladimir Kustov, Vladimir Lakomtsev and Sergeant Pyotr Zelenin entered the battle with a numerically superior enemy. They acted from ambush, letting enemy tanks into direct range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. Yes, it needed strong nerves and a courageous heart!” (p. 188).
But Shalandin's tank caught fire. However, instead of leaving the burning tank and being shot at point-blank range from the machine guns of an advancing enemy tank, the crew, most likely wounded and crippled from a shell hitting the tank, decided to die themselves, but block the way for the enemy rushing to Kursk.
And here one has only to imagine - what horror seized the crew just a moment earlier of such a seemingly successful German ace, who nevertheless set fire to our medium tank with his heavy tank? And what did the crews of all other German tanks, who at that moment were not far away, who saw this whole picture, think? And what, perhaps most importantly, did you hear? After all, communication, unlike ours, worked excellently for German tanks. At that moment, the defense factories not only of the part of Europe captured by Hitler, but, as it turns out, of the whole world worked to improve its quality.
They saw, and most importantly, they heard with a death cry of horror from their colleagues, a prospect that was too unfun for themselves: in order to escape from Russian tankers, it was not enough to knock out their tank - you should also shy away from the set fire to a respectful distance in time. And this is in order not to fly into the air from an overabundance of shells with which the Germans were so generously supplied by Europe, which equipped them on a campaign to the East. After all, this in a different situation is just a priceless warehouse, located under the feet of German tankers, who are now simply obliged to detonate when they collide with these crazy Russians!
And our burning tank:
“... went to ram the “tiger”. The “Tiger” caught fire, but the entire crew of our tank also died” (p. 188).
The enemy, of course, hardly counted on this. AND:
“... an analysis of the information received showed that the level of resistance of the Soviet troops was underestimated. Each message from the divisions confirmed the previous one - the troops continue to mark time. The prepared plan to break through the advanced positions of the Russians collapsed already at the initial stage, and with it the entire schedule of the offensive of the corps ”(p. 393).
Here is how the German side described these events:
“On the southern face of the arc, a day after the start of the offensive, with the efforts of the 48th Panzer Corps of General Knobelsdorf and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of General Hausser, the Germans managed to penetrate the Russian defenses ... Goth decided with the first rays of the sun to strike across the Berezovaya River with the forces of the 3rd Panzer divisions and divisions "Grossdeutschland". But at night a thunderstorm broke out, pouring rain poured down, the water in the river overflowed its banks and turned the adjacent meadows into a swampy, dirty swamp. Under cover of darkness, the Russians pulled up artillery and tanks to the ruins and surviving houses on the north bank, and both German panzer divisions took heavy damage from direct Russian fire as they formed up in tight battle formations at dawn. During the day, under the cover of smoke screens, German sappers stubbornly built crossings. A furious artillery duel raged over their heads between Soviet guns and concentrated tanks, accompanied by continuous raids by German dive bombers, with which Hoth sought to compensate for the lack of heavy artillery. By evening, the Germans, despite serious losses, could not advance a single step. On the night of July 6-7, both divisions were pulled back and reorganized” (p. 279).
“... well-prepared positions, a well-thought-out system of artillery fire and engineering structures - all this amazed the enemy and suggested that if victory was achieved in this operation, then a very high price would have to be paid for it” (p. 451).
But in other parts of this battlefield, the defeat of the attacking side was already read at its very beginning:
“Already the first hours of the fighting showed that the bet on a massive strike by heavy combat vehicles on the defense of the Russians did not justify itself.
“...Shackled by minefields and natural obstacles, the advancing tanks were a good target for the Russians,” G. Heinrici and V. Gauk note. “Therefore, super-heavy tanks could not actually show their strike power” (p. 114–115)” (p. 431).
Not without the confusion inherent in battles of this magnitude. This is how the company of "tigers" from the 503rd brigade of the 19th TD, Major General G. Schmidt, completed its attack:
“The report of the division noted:
“... The company of “tigers” that crossed during the day under the command of Captain Heitman failed to break through the enemy fortifications around the Mikhailovka suburb. Almost all the “tigers” were put out of action by mines” (TsAMO RF, f. 38 A, op. 9027, d. 46, l. 151–152).
Nine “tigers” were blown up by mines, and seven of them on their own…” (p. 435).
And here is how our gunners fought here. On July 7, the captain of the artillery division, Vasily Mironenko, accomplished his feat. When in the heat of battle with the German "tigers" the gun crew was killed, and the enemy tanks were already close to the battery:
“... Mironenko took the place of the gunner and, loading the gun himself, began to shoot tanks point-blank. He set fire to six tanks. A shell exploded next to him, and Vasily Mironenko died. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union” (p. 190).
And this is just one of the many episodes that glorified the resilience of the Russian people on this fiery Kursk salient. That's why:
“... despite huge losses, the Germans failed to break through our front. The enemy stumbled upon an impenetrable wall” (p. 190).
Here's another episode:
“A hot situation has also developed in the zone of the 6th tank corps.
... here the enemy ran into the stubborn resistance of the tankers. The enemy lost 74 tanks and had no success” (p. 190).
“Our troops showed courage and bravery. They did not spare their lives, showing mass heroism. These were infantrymen, and artillerymen, and tankmen, and doctors, and rear servicemen - all as one. Everything was given for victory” (p. 191).
Here is another episode:
“The commander of the 3rd company, Lieutenant Kruglov, let 56 enemy tanks pass through the company. The company was hidden in the cracks, and not a single soldier flinched, there were no losses in the company. After three attacks, the enemy lost 20 tanks burned and knocked out” (p. 191).
And here is what the Germans who fought here report. Erhard Raus:
“The development of the operation has reached a crisis point. We have no reserves left to throw them into battle” (p. 306).
Here are the impressions of our front-line intelligence officer Vladimir Karpov about this moment of the Battle of Kursk:
“Tank armadas, bombed by aircraft and shot by artillery, burned in the fields like iron cities.
Finally, the Nazis backed off. At first slowly, now and then rushing into ferocious counterattacks, then faster, but still organized, from line to line. Our troops were on their heels. No, not only by the divisions that were kept in reserve, but mainly by the same ones that stood to the death in defense. Tired, unshaven, soaked with burning fighters pressed the enemy day and night. Fatigue accumulated so much that people sometimes fell asleep on the move and moved forward half asleep, with their eyes closed, holding a wagon, a cannon, or a neighbor with their hands” (p. 226–227).
But until the very moment of its retreat, this southern, more powerful enemy grouping, advanced during this deadly week for it in one of the sectors at a distance of up to 35 km. But even this, with the speed of advancing tank columns of 5 km per day, speaks precisely of the mountains of corpses that the Germans sacrificed for this last attempt to move across our land in order to capture it.
“On July 6 alone, the enemy lost here more than 200 tanks, tens of thousands of soldiers and about 100 combat aircraft” (p. 153).
“... two guard divisions of General I.M. Chistyakov, in a daily battle, they were able to break the plan of the enemy command and keep on their lines the most powerful tank formation of the GA "South" - the Knobelsdorf corps "(p. 364).
“The division of Brigadeführer T. Wisch was also marking time. Her armored groups could not immediately break through the sector of the 151st Guards. cn… From the diary of the division summary: “The artillery preparation of our offensive on 5.7.43 went according to plan and, according to the testimony of the prisoners, very successfully. The breakthrough with the last bomb at 4.05 was successful only as far as the anti-tank ditch, where the troops, under the flanking fire of enemy batteries from the western bank of the Vorskla, lay down and dug in” (Stadler S. Op. cit. S. 43).
The reader probably drew attention to the inconsistency in the report: the artillery preparation was successful, but there was no breakthrough. This form of reports “we are acting according to a perfectly developed plan, but there are no results” was widely used in German army. The reason for its survivability is its versatility, it suited everyone: both the higher command (everything goes according to plan, failures are a temporary phenomenon), and performers (we are acting according to your plan; it is brilliant, of course, the enemy’s stubbornness is not taken into account in it and everything is wrong, as we wanted, but we are heroes and under your leadership we will certainly win). Already after the war, the beaten generals of the Wehrmacht transferred this proven technique to memoir literature” (p. 388).
But if the Germans only report on some alleged success of their actions, very prudently avoiding mention of losses, then this is how the operational reports of our units looked that day:
“On the results of the battles on July 6 and the state of the corps, its headquarters deployed reported to the command of the 1st TA in the operational summary by 12.00 on July 7:
“... 10th MBR ... Losses: 3 T-34s, killed - 1 person, wounded 3 people. Destroyed: 36 tanks, 9 vehicles and up to 70 enemy soldiers and officers...
1st MBR ... 13 people were killed, 84 people were injured. Losses of equipment and weapons: machine guns - 1, carbines - 1, armored personnel carriers - 1, vehicles - 5. Destroyed: 40 enemy tanks, 23 of them burned, 17 hit, vehicles with ammunition and infantry - 7, ammunition depots - one and up to 400 soldiers and officers.
3rd MBR ... Losses in materiel and personnel: 3 T-34 tanks, 3 vehicles, one 45-mm cannon, one 76-mm cannon, one heavy machine gun. Killed - 7 people, injured 10 people. Destroyed: up to 20 enemy tanks, the rest is being specified.
1st Guards brigade ... Losses: (burnt down) 8 T-34s, 3 T-34s were shot down and left on the battlefield, one 76-mm gun was broken, one car was hit, 16 people were killed, 25 people were wounded. Destroyed: enemy tanks (killed) - 18, of which 3 T-6, two anti-tank guns, destroyed to the enemy's infantry company.
49th brigade ... Losses: 7 T-34s burned down in battle, 4 T-34s did not return from the battle. Total losses 11 T-34s. In personnel: killed - 11 people, wounded - 10. Destroyed: 4 tanks, of which T-6 - 2, armored tractors - 5, carts with ammunition - 3 and 150 soldiers and officers "(p. 585-586) .
This is how these losses were recorded in the camp of the enemy. Division "Grossdeutschland":
“On July 4, the tank regiment of the division had 112 combat-ready tanks ... after two days of fighting, the Strachwitz regiment lost more than half of the tank fleet - 53%.
The panther brigade found itself in a more difficult situation. According to the state, she had 192 line tanks ... According to the same report from the corps headquarters, by the end of the day on July 6, only a fifth of them remained in service - 40 combat vehicles.
Most of the T-5 - more than a hundred tanks - was out of order for technical reasons and required repair. But in combat conditions, both the command of the 48th TC and the 4th TA, in general, did not care for what reasons they failed. The main thing is different: the strike group of the GA “South” lost such a significant amount of military equipment almost simultaneously ... But in terms of the “Citadel”, calculations were made for these forces, certain goals and tasks were set for them, and considerable ones. And everything collapsed. The sharp loss of combat capability of the brigade and serious problems with its use, along with a significant backlog of the troops of the AG "Kempf", had a very significant negative impact on the actions of the troops of the 4th TA during the first stage of the operation and were important factors that "broke down" the "Citadel" " (c. 587–588).
And with all that, many German units did not budge. But later on, the Germans continued to stagnate, assuring their command that they were winning victory after victory:
“On the morning of July 7, fierce enemy attacks began again” (p. 153).
However, over the next two days:
“... the enemy lost at least 200 more tanks and many other equipment. His infantry units already numbered in their ranks no more than half of their original strength” (p. 133).
Serious damage to the enemy was caused by competent mining of military facilities deliberately left by our troops. Here is just one example:
““Good results have been obtained from bringing TOS funds into action in the area of high. 228.6.
The plan of mining the height included the following. The attacking enemy infantry following the tanks, when it captures the height, is driven into previously mined trenches, dugouts and bomb shelters and completely destroyed in them. This idea was completely successful ... on the site at the height. 228.6, 12 enemy tanks and up to one and a half infantry battalions were destroyed” (TsAMO RF, f. 203, op. 2845, d. 227, l. 13)” (p. 390–391).
And this is just one of many episodes when the advancing side is often simply not able to protect itself from such losses. But such “surprises” were simply crammed with those fields of glory of Russian weapons, when the already bloodless German formations near Stalingrad were finally finished off and since then the enemy continued to yield more and more to us in manpower.
Mellenthin:
“The speed with which the Russians laid the mines was amazing. In two or three days they managed to lay over 30 thousand mines ... Despite the fact that we advanced deep into the Russian defenses up to 20 km, there were still minefields around us, and anti-tank defense areas prevented further progress. In this connection, the skillful disguise of the Russians should be emphasized once again. Not a single minefield, not a single anti-tank area could be found until the first tank was blown up on a mine or the first anti-tank gun opened fire. It is difficult to directly answer the question of how the German tanks managed to overcome all this powerful anti-tank defense ... ”(p. 469).
There is only one thing that Mellenthin, which is understandable, is too shy to mention: mountains of twisted iron and cannon fodder compatriots of the German general. That's why:
“... one cannot but agree with the beaten German general” (p. 469).
Meanwhile, this very effective means of defense, which is one of the surprises prepared especially for this German offensive, was perfectly used not only before Mellenthin. Minefields:
"... were widely used by all the armies defending the Kursk salient" (p. 469).
But even fragments of quite successful military operations of individual formations of the German army in the Battle of Kursk did not bring any benefit to the enemy:
“... along with positive results, the breakthrough of the SS corps brought a number of significant problems. Moreover, they arose like a chain reaction - one gave rise to another. The main one - the front of the 2nd SS TC turned out to be significantly stretched, more than 40 km. In addition to the fact that he was constantly subjected to strong pressure, including from tank units, his divisions had open flanks. It was not possible, as expected, to break the resistance of the Russians at the junction of the 48th TC and the 2nd SS TC. This led to the fact that on July 6, Knobelsdorff failed to withdraw the corps to the Yakovlev area and change Hausser's left-flank division. And he, in turn, was not able to reduce the front of the 2nd SS TC and concentrate significant forces on the breakthrough site in the northeast direction.
The failures of the Kempf AG had a significant impact on the situation in the direction of the main attack of the 4th TA, in fact, on the situation in the Prokhorovsky direction. Her troops were moving far from what was originally supposed - shoulder to shoulder with the SS corps. She continued to stagnate ... Already in the morning of July 6, a new strong and fairly active Russian tank corps appeared in the floodplain of the Lipovoy Donets. The presence of two tank groups at the base of the shock wedge of the 2nd SS TC: in the area of Novye Lozy and Yakovlevo-Pokrovka fettered his actions, forced him to divert significant forces for cover. Along the floodplain of the Lipovoy Donets, the “Dead Head” and the main forces of “Das Reich” are already concentrated. At the same time, the main forces of the Leibstandarte, due to the active actions of enemy tank forces from the north, could not advance further than Yakovlev, its battle group, including the tank regiment, fought heavy defensive battles ...
At the same time, the 48th Tank Corps failed to create a bridgehead on the western bank of the Pena ... The Russians held firm everywhere, fortifying the rifle units with numerous tanks. The concentration of tank formations on the flanks of the 48th TC increased the danger of a strike under the base of the entire 4th TA ...
In this situation, on July 7, Goth intended to suspend attempts to break through to the north and northeast ... to solve the problem of the threat to the flanks of both corps, and the left wing of the army ”(pp. 613-614).
In this way:
“Instead of creating a grandiose cauldron for the Soviet fronts, the enemy drove himself into the steel grip of our defense ... the armored fist of Army Group South was cut into several separate parts ... Goth and Manstein broke through the echeloned defense, albeit with iron, but spread “fingers” ”(from . 778–779).
So even very modest successes brought the Germans only the addition of trouble:
“The thoughtful and long-tested tactics used by M.E. Katukov, allowed five tank brigades to chain three enemy divisions and part of the Das Reich tank regiment” (p. 629).
Here, our rocket artillery also brought very significant help. Here is one of the results of her shelling:
““... they fired a volley of 4 M-13 installations. After that, reconnaissance reported that 140 burnt vehicles were found in these squares, transporting infantry, ammunition and fuel” (TsAMO RF, f. 11 guards shopping mall, op. 1, d. 28, l. 276) ”(p. 636) .
What horrors of a stampede, only by chance, a few German soldiers who survived in this hell are behind these dry, laconic figures extracted from the archive?!
But such successful attacks on the enemy by rocket artillery were not an exception here, but the norm:
“We fired a volley from open firing positions direct fire at fascist tanks and infantry. As a rule, several tanks were knocked out, the infantry was practically destroyed. Further, our tanks entered the battle, and the combat vehicles quickly left and took cover in the ramps ”(p. 765).
So the Germans on the Kursk Bulge had a rather hard time. And therefore:
“The breakthrough into the areas planned by Goth was very difficult. The Russian lines turned out to be much stronger and more resistant to heavy tank attacks than expected. And thanks to the introduction of operational tank reserves into battle, the Soviet side created such conditions under which, even splitting in half the front of the 6th Guards. And in fact, having broken through the second line of defense, the 4th TA was completely constrained by battle throughout the offensive sector, and even the divisions of the 2nd SS TC could not close their flanks, not to mention the corps. The divisions of the Hausser strike group fought in the corridors they had penetrated, experiencing strong pressure not only along the front, but also on the flanks. Hausser was forced to allocate substantial funds to cover them. This led to the dispersal of forces and did not allow the forces of the formation to be concentrated on the direction of the main blow. The absence of a continuous breakthrough front and the constant flank threat were the most important problems that both the command of the 4th TA and the GA "South" had to solve in the coming days. After all, AG "Kempf" on July 7 did not manage to overcome the line of the 7th Guards. And securely cover the right wing of Gotha's army.
In addition, another important factor has appeared that will negatively affect the actions of Manstein's formations - the failures of the 9th A of General V. Model GA "Center". She was completely bogged down in the defense of the troops of the Central Front of General K.K. Rokossovsky. The High Command of the Wehrmacht already on the evening of July 7 took a number of steps to bring the situation in its zone out of the impasse. And Berlin was forced to withdraw the means of reinforcement for Kluge from Manstein” (pp. 661–662).
But such "help" was only "Trishkin's caftan", which by no means could be stretched on two fronts.
The technique of the Germans was such that in order to continue the full-fledged offensive of their bulky tanks, it was necessary to wait "by the sea for weather." That is, in order to advance, they needed puddles to dry up ...
And they waited for this:
“On the third day of the offensive, the soil had dried up sufficiently ... and the 48th Panzer Corps was finally able to cross to the northern bank of the river. The Goth army had now almost half crossed the Russian army defense zone and came close to the second defensive zone. To the right of Knobelsdorf's corps, three SS divisions managed to penetrate even deeper into the Russian defensive formations, but, unlike Knobelsdorf, the SS corps commander did not manage to push the Russians back on a wide front. Instead, each SS panzer division made its own breach and now, suffering heavy losses, under continuous enemy flank fire, tried to move further north” (p. 280).
“Analyzing the situation, Goth realized that very serious problems were beginning to arise with the Citadel, the offensive was causing significant disruptions, losses were growing, and there was no need to even think about reserves” (p. 695).
“By the end of July 9, 1943 German-fascist. At the cost of huge losses, the troops succeeded in penetrating the defenses of the Voronezh troops. front (commander of the army general N.F. Vatutin) in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 km ”(vol. 6, p. 612).
“For two days, the grenadiers of the 3rd Panzer Division and the motorized infantry of the “Grossdeutschland” stubbornly stormed the positions of the Russians. In continuous fierce fighting, they captured a number of villages straddling the Pena River valley, and by the evening of July 11 forced the Russians to retreat to a forested area north of Berezovka. A quadrangular ledge about 15 kilometers deep and 25 kilometers wide was pressed into the defenses of the Voronezh Front - a pitiful result of a week of colossal efforts and losses ...
In the offensive sector of the SS Panzer Corps, even this limited success could not be achieved. The grenadiers were forced to fight such heavy battles to protect the flanks of the tank divisions that had penetrated that the divisional commanders could hardly pull back the tanks that were at the edge of the wedges. On July 11, the divisions "Reich" and "Adolf Hitler" managed to link up with each other, but the division "Totenkopf" still remained isolated from them.
This was the last and most furious battle fought by the SS divisions, manned only by the Germans. After Operation Citadel, Himmler will open access to the SS troops for an influx of volunteers from the occupied countries and criminal rabble from the civilian prisons of the Reich” (p. 281).
So if Stalingrad only starts grinding the bones of the aggressor who invaded our country, then Kursk Bulge will complete the destruction of elite units made up exclusively of Germans. And all because after this battle there will be no more Germans left to recreate the SS units.
What can be said about this?
Why they came, they got it.
Bibliography
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2. Zamulin V. Kursk fracture. "Yauza" "Eksmo". M., 2007.
3. Katukova E.S. Commemorative. M., 2002.
4. Koltunov G.A., Solovyov B.G. Battle of Kursk M., 1970.
5. Raus E. Tank battles on Eastern Front. LLC "AST Publishing House". M., 2005.
6. Karpov V. Take alive. Soviet writer. M., 1980.
7. Marshal Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. Volume 2. News press agency publishing house. M., 1978.
8. Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Tt. 1-8. Military publishing house MO. M., 1976.
The Kursk Bulge (Battle of Kursk) is a strategic ledge near the city of Kursk. From July 5 to August 23, 1943, one of the most significant battles of the Great Patriotic War (06/22/1941 - 05/09/1945) took place here. After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German army wanted to take revenge and regain the offensive initiative. The General Staff of the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) developed Operation Citadel. Its goal was to encircle a huge grouping of Red Army troops in the area of the city of Kursk. To do this, it was supposed to strike from the north (Army Group Center from Orel) and south (Army Group South from Belgorod) towards each other. Having united, the Germans formed a cauldron for two fronts of the Red Army (Central and Voronezh) at once. After that, the troops of the German army were to send their forces to Moscow.
Army Group Center was led by Field Marshal Hans Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge (1882-1944) and Army Group South by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (1887-1973). To implement Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated huge forces. In the north, the organizational strike group was led by the commander of the 9th Army, Colonel-General Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945), in the south, Colonel-General Hermann Goth (1885 - 1971) coordinated and led the tank units.
Scheme of the Battle of Kursk
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the body of the highest military administration, which carried out during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces) decided to first conduct a defensive battle in the Battle of Kursk. Further, having withstood the blows of the enemy and exhausted his forces, at a critical moment, deliver crushing counterattacks on the enemy. Everyone understood that the most difficult thing in this operation would be to withstand the onslaught of the enemy. The Kursk Bulge was divided into two parts - the northern and southern faces. In addition, realizing the scale and significance of the upcoming operation, the reserve Steppe Front under the command of Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897 - 1973) was located behind the ledge.
Northern face of the Kursk Bulge
The northern face is also called the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. The length of the defense line was 308 km. The Central Front was located here under the command of General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky (1896 - 1968). The front included five combined arms armies (60, 65, 70, 13 and 48). The reserve of the front was mobile. It included the 2nd Panzer Army, as well as the 9th and 19th Panzer Corps. The headquarters of the front commander was located in the village of Svoboda near Kursk. Currently, this place houses a museum dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Here they recreated the dugout of Rokossovsky K.K., from where the commander led the battles. The interior is very modest, the most necessary. In the corner, on a bedside table, there is a high-frequency communication device, through which you can contact the General Staff and Headquarters at any time. Adjacent to the main room is a recreation room, where the commander could restore his strength by leaning his head on a camping metal bed. Naturally, there was no electric lighting; simple kerosene lamps burned. At the entrance to the dugout there was a small room for the officer on duty. This is how a man lived in combat conditions, in whose submission there were hundreds of thousands of people and a huge amount of various equipment.
Dugout Rokossovsky K.K.
Based on intelligence data and his combat experience, Rokossovsky K.K. from a high degree reliability determined the direction of the main blow of the Germans to the Olkhovatka-Ponyri section. In this place, the 13th Army occupied positions. Its segment of the front was reduced to 32 kilometers and reinforced with additional forces. To its left, covering the Fatezh-Kursk direction, was the 70th Army. Positions on the right flank of the 13th Army, in the area of Maloarkhangelsk, were occupied by the 48th Army.
A certain role at the beginning of the battle was played by the artillery preparation carried out by the troops of the Red Army on the positions of the Wehrmacht on the morning of July 5, 1943. The Germans were simply discouraged by surprise. In the evening, Hitler's parting address was read to them. Full of determination, in the early morning they were going to attack and crush the enemy to smithereens. And now, at the most inopportune moment, thousands of Russian shells fell on the Germans. Having suffered losses and lost its offensive fervor, the Wehrmacht launched an attack only 2 hours after the scheduled time. Despite the artillery preparation, the power of the Germans was very strong. The main blow was inflicted on Olkhovatka and Ponyri by three infantry and four tank divisions. At the junction between the 13th and 48th armies, to the left of Maloarkhangelsk, four more infantry divisions went on the offensive. On the right flank of the 70th Army, in the direction of the Teplovsky Heights, three infantry divisions piled up. There is a large field near the village of Soborovka, along which German tanks marched and marched towards Olkhovatka. Artillerymen played an important role in the battle. At the cost of incredible efforts, they resisted the advancing enemy. To strengthen the defense, the command of the Central Front ordered some of our tanks to be dug into the ground, thus increasing their invulnerability. To protect the Ponyri station, the surrounding area was covered with numerous minefields. In the midst of the battle, this was of great help to our troops.
In addition to the already known tanks, the Germans used their new self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery) Ferdinand here. They were specially designed to destroy enemy tanks and fortifications. Ferdinand weighed 65 tons and had frontal armor twice that of a heavy Tiger tank. Our guns could not hit self-propelled guns, only if they were the most powerful and from very close range. Ferdinand's gun pierced more than 100 mm of armor. at a distance of 2 km. (armor of the Tiger heavy tank). The transmission of the self-propelled gun was electric. Two engines drove two generators. From them, electric current was transmitted to two electric motors, each rotating its own wheel. At the time, this was a very interesting decision. Self-propelled guns Ferdinand, made with the latest technology, were used only on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge (there were none on the southern face). The Germans formed two heavy anti-tank battalions (653 and 654) with 45 vehicles each. To see in the sight of a gun how this colossus crawls at you, but nothing can be done - the spectacle is not for the faint of heart.
The fighting was very fierce. The Wehrmacht rushed forward. It seemed that this German power could not be stopped by anything. Only thanks to the talent of Rokossovsky K.K., who created a defense in depth in the direction of the main attack and concentrated more than half of the personnel and artillery of the front in this sector, was it possible to withstand the onslaught of the enemy. In seven days, the Germans brought almost all their reserves into battle and advanced only 10-12 km. They never managed to break through the tactical defense zone. Soldiers and officers fought heroically for their land. About the defenders of the Oryol-Kursk Bulge, the poet Yevgeny Dolmatovsky wrote the poem "Ponyri". It contains these lines:
There were no mountains, no rocks,
There were no ditches or rivers.
Here the Russian man stood,
Soviet man.
By July 12, the German forces were exhausted, and they stopped the offensive. Rokossovsky K.K. tried to protect the soldiers. Of course, war is war and losses are inevitable. It’s just that Konstantin Konstantinovich always had many times less of these losses. He spared neither mines nor shells. Ammunition can still be made, but it takes a very long time to grow a person and make a good soldier out of him. People felt this and always treated him with respect. Rokossovsky K.K. and earlier he had great fame among the troops, but after the Battle of Kursk his fame soared very high. They talked about him as an outstanding commander. No wonder he commanded the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945, which was received by G.K. Zhukov. The leadership of the country also appreciated him. Even Stalin himself I.V. after the Great Patriotic War, he apologized to him for his arrest in 1937. He invited the marshal to a dacha in Kuntsevo. Passing with him past the flowerbed, Iosif Vissarionovich broke a bouquet of white roses with his bare hands. Handing them to Rokossovsky K.K., he said: “Before the war, we offended you very much. Forgive us…” Konstantin Konstantinovich drew attention to the fact that the thorns of roses had injured the hands of IV Stalin, leaving small drops of blood.
On November 26, 1943, the first monument to military glory during the Great Patriotic War was opened near the village of Teploye. This modest obelisk glorifies the feat of artillerymen. Then many more monuments will be erected along the defense line of the Central Front. Museums and memorials will be opened, but for veterans of the Battle of Kursk, this simple monument to artillerymen will be the most expensive, because it is the first.
Monument to artillerymen near the village. Warm
Southern face of the Kursk Bulge
On the southern front, the defense was held by the Voronezh Front under the command of General of the Army Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin (1901 - 1944). The length of the defense line was 244 km. The front included five combined arms armies (38th, 40th, 6th Guards and 7th Guards - stood in the first echelon of defense, the 69th Army and the 35th Guards Rifle Corps - in the second echelon of defense). The reserve of the front was mobile. It included the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps. Before the start of the German offensive, artillery preparation was carried out, slightly weakening their first onslaught. Unfortunately, it was extremely difficult to determine the exact direction of the main attack on the Voronezh Front. It was inflicted by the Wehrmacht in the Oboyan area, along the positions of the 6th Guards Army. The Germans tried to develop success by advancing along the Belgorod-Kursk highway, but they did not succeed. Units of the 1st Panzer Army were sent to help the 6th Army. The Wehrmacht sent a distracting blow to the 7th Guards Army in the Korocha region. Given the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered Colonel General Konev to transfer two armies from the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front - the 5th combined arms and 5th tank. Not advancing a sufficient distance near Oboyan, the German command decided to move the main attack to the Prokhorovka area. This direction was covered by the 69th Army. In addition to the "Tigers" on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht used its new tanks Pz. V "Panther" in the amount of 200 pcs.
Tank battle near Prokhorovka
On July 12, southwest of Prokhorovka, the Germans went on the offensive. A little earlier, the command of the Voronezh Front sent the 5th Guards Tank Army here with two attached tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. One of the largest tank battles in the history of World War II (09/01/1939 - 09/02/1945) took place here. To stop the offensive of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (400 tanks), the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army (800 tanks) were thrown into a frontal attack. Despite the seemingly large superiority in the number of tanks, the 5th Guards Tank Army was losing in their "quality". It consisted of: 501 T-34 tanks, 264 T-70 light tanks and 35 Churchill III heavy tanks with low speed and insufficient maneuverability. Our tanks could not match the enemy in the range of destructive fire. To knock out the German Pz. VI "Tiger" our T-34 tank had to approach at a distance of 500 meters. The very same "Tiger" with 88 mm. cannon effectively fought a duel at a distance of up to 2000 meters.
Fighting in such conditions was possible only in close combat. But it was necessary to reduce the distance in some incomprehensible way. Against all odds, our simple Soviet tankers held out and stopped the Germans. Honor and praise them for this. The price of such a feat was very high. Losses in the tank corps of the 5th Guards Army reached 70 percent. Currently, the Prokhorovka Field has the status of a museum of federal significance. All these tanks and guns are installed here in memory of the Soviet people who, at the cost of their lives, turned the tide of the war.
Part of the exposition of the memorial "Prokhorovka field"
End of the Battle of Kursk
Having withstood the onslaught of the Germans on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, on July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. A little later, on July 15, troops of the Central Front attacked in the direction of the village of Kromy. Thanks to the efforts of the attackers, on August 5, 1943, the city of Oryol was liberated. On July 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front and then on July 19, the troops of the Steppe Front also went on the offensive. Developing a counterattack, on August 5, 1943, they liberated the city of Belgorod. On the evening of the same day, salutes were fired in Moscow for the first time in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Without losing the initiative, the troops of the Steppe Front (with the support of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts) liberated the city of Kharkov on August 23, 1943.
The Battle of Kursk (Kursk Bulge) is one of the largest battles of World War II. More than 4 million people from both sides took part in it. A huge number of tanks, aircraft, guns and other equipment were involved. Here, the initiative finally passed to the Red Army and the whole world realized that Germany had lost the war.
Battle of Kursk on the map
12.04.2018Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation Rumyantsev: Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk salient:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470
killed, captured, missing
608 833
the wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms
6064
tanks and self-propelled guns
5245
guns and mortars
1626
combat aircraft
1000
tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696
aircraft
| The Great Patriotic War |
|---|
| Invasion of the USSR Karelia arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikiye Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians the Baltic States Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:
| A source | Personnel (thousand) | Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns | Guns and (sometimes) mortars | Aircraft | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | |
| MO RF | 1336 | over 900 | 3444 | 2733 | 19100 | about 10000 | 2172 2900 (including Po-2 and far) |
2050 |
| Krivosheev 2001 | 1272 | |||||||
| Glantz, House | 1910 | 780 | 5040 | 2696 or 2928 | ||||
| Mueller Gill. | 2540 or 2758 | |||||||
| Zett, Frankson | 1910 | 777 | 5128 +2688 "Stavka reserve" over 8000 in total |
2451 | 31415 | 7417 | 3549 | 1830 |
| KOSAVE | 1337 | 900 | 3306 | 2700 | 20220 | 10000 | 2650 | 2500 |
The role of intelligence
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on the data of the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:
... I believe that the enemy will deploy the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to defeat our troops in this direction and gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support a large number aviation will strike with its Oryol-Kromskaya grouping around Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping around Kursk from the southeast.
Thus, although the exact text of the Citadel lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan became apparent to the highest Soviet military command four days before.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), artillery and air counter-training was carried out 30-40 minutes before it began.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but they were unable to break through the Soviet defenses here either. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.
To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to crack the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. P. Sivakov) and the 67 Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A. I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan at all.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M. K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.
Machine-gun crew firing at the advancing German units
Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly practiced interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the division "Grossdeutschland" (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkassky caused especially great difficulties), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.
The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight both with the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptaps were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the second line of defense of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied behind it).
Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5 . However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) for about a day held five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5 in the Cherkassky region, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of 2 TC SS (in the area of Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte" and in particular "Das Reich" forced the command of the Voronezh Front in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34s and 21 are Churchill Mk.IVs) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the infliction of a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki with tanks of the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of MD Das Reich, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, between 17 and 19 hours, units of the Das Reich MD managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of MD "Das Reich" actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps at hand, managed to stop the offensive of MD Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).
After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment md "Das Reich", using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
Battle of Prokhorovka
Belfry in memory of those who died on the Prokhorovsky field
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops on August 11 cut railway Kharkov-Poltava, August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge German command lost the ability to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as " Watch on the Rhine" () or the operation at Balaton () were also not successful.
