Capture of Berlin

The military-political situation in Europe by mid-April 1945

It was April last year world war. Military operations covered a significant part of the territory of Germany: Soviet troops advanced from the east, and allied troops from the west. Real conditions were created for the complete and final defeat of the Wehrmacht.

The strategic position of the Soviet Armed Forces by this time had improved even more. Fulfilling a great international mission, during the winter-spring offensive they completed the liberation of Poland, Hungary, a significant part of Czechoslovakia, completed the liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia, captured East Pomerania and Silesia, occupied Vienna, the capital of Austria, and reached the southern regions of Germany.

The troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, continued to block the enemy's Courland grouping. The armies of the 3rd and part of the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Fronts destroyed the remnants of the Nazi troops on the Zemland Peninsula, in the area southeast of Danzig and north of Gdynia. The main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after regrouping to a new direction, reached the coast of the Baltic Sea west of Gdynia and the Oder - from its mouth to the city of Schwedt, replacing the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front here.

On the central sector of the Soviet-German front, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought on the left bank of the Oder River to expand the previously occupied bridgeheads, especially the Kyustra one - the largest of them. The main grouping of the forces of the front was located 60-70 km from the capital of Nazi Germany. The armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Neisse River. Their distance from Berlin was 140-150 km. The formations of the left wing of the front reached the Czechoslovak border. Thus, the Soviet troops reached the approaches to the capital of Germany and were ready to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

Berlin was not only the political stronghold of fascism, but also one of the largest centers of the country's military industry. The main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated in the Berlin direction. That is why their defeat and the capture of the capital of Germany should have led to a victorious conclusion to the war in Europe.

By mid-April, the troops of the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and completed the liquidation of the enemy's Ruhr grouping. Dealing the main blow to Dresden, they sought to dismember the opposing enemy troops and meet the Soviet army at the turn of the Elbe River.

By this time, fascist Germany was in complete political isolation, because its only ally, militaristic Japan, was unable to exert any influence on the course of events in Europe. The internal situation of the Reich also testified to the approaching inevitable collapse. The loss of raw materials from the previously occupied countries (with the exception of some areas of Czechoslovakia) led to a further decline in German industrial production. Disorganization throughout the German economy led to sharp drop military production: the output of military products in March 1945 compared with July 1944 decreased by 65 percent. Difficulties in replenishing the Wehrmacht with personnel increased. Even having called into the army another contingent born in 1929, that is, 16-17-year-old boys, the Nazis could not make up for the losses suffered in the winter of 1944-1945. However, due to the fact that the length of the Soviet-German front was significantly reduced, the fascist German command was able to concentrate large forces in the threatened directions. In addition, in the first half of April, part of the forces and equipment from the western front and the reserve was transferred to the east, and by the beginning of the Berlin operation, 214 divisions were operating on the Soviet-German front, including 34 tank and 15 motorized, and 14 brigades. Only 60 divisions remained against the American-British troops, including 5 tank divisions. At that time, the Nazis still had certain stocks of weapons and ammunition, which made it possible for the fascist command to put up stubborn resistance on the Soviet-German front in the last month of the war.

The essence of the strategic plan of the Wehrmacht's supreme command was to keep the defense in the east at any cost, to hold back the advance of the Soviet Army, and in the meantime try to conclude a separate peace with the United States and England. The Nazi leadership put forward the slogan: "It is better to surrender Berlin to the Anglo-Saxons than to let the Russians into it." The special instructions of the National Socialist Party of April 3 stated: “The war is not decided in the West, but in the East ... Our eyes must be turned only to the East, regardless of what happens in the West. Holding the Eastern Front is a prerequisite for a turning point in the course of the war.

In the Berlin direction, the troops of the Vistula and Center Army Groups as part of the 3rd Panzer, 9th Field, 4th Panzer and 17th Armies under the command of Generals X. Manteuffel, T. Busse, F. Grezer took up the defense and W. Hasse. They had 48 infantry, 6 tank and 9 motorized divisions, 37 separate infantry regiments, 98 separate infantry battalions, as well as a large number of separate artillery and special units and formations. The distribution of these forces along the front was uneven. So, in front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, 7 infantry divisions, 13 separate regiments, several separate battalions and the personnel of two officer schools defended themselves on a 120-kilometer stretch. Most of these forces and means were located in the Stettin direction. In front of the 1st Belorussian Front, in a strip up to 175 km wide, 23 divisions, as well as a significant number of separate brigades, regiments and battalions, occupied the defense. The densest grouping was created by the enemy against the Kustrinsky bridgehead, where 14 divisions were concentrated on a 44 km wide section, including 5 motorized and tank divisions.

The operational density of his forces in this sector was one division per 3 km of the front. Here, 60 guns and mortars, as well as 17 tanks and assault guns, accounted for 1 km of the front. In Berlin itself, more than 200 Volkssturm battalions were formed, and the total number of the garrison exceeded 200 thousand people.

In the strip of the 1st Ukrainian Front, 390 km wide, there were 25 enemy divisions, of which 7 constituted the operational reserve. The main forces of the defending troops were concentrated in the Forst-Penzig sector, where the operational density was one division per 10 km, more than 10 guns and mortars, as well as up to 3 tanks and assault guns per 1 km of the front.

In the Berlin area, the German command had up to 2,000 combat aircraft, including 70 percent of fighters (of which 120 were Me-262 jets). In addition to fighter aircraft, about 600 anti-aircraft guns were involved to cover the city. In total, in the offensive zone of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 200 anti-aircraft batteries.

The main operational reserves of the enemy were located northeast of Berlin and in the area of ​​Cottbus. Their distance from the front line did not exceed 30 km. In the rear of Army Groups "Vistula" and "Center", strategic reserves consisting of eight divisions were hastily formed. The proximity of not only operational, but also strategic reserves testified to the enemy's intention to use them to fight for the tactical defense zone.

A defense in depth was prepared in the Berlin direction, the construction of which began as early as January 1945. The pace of work was accelerated due to the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Oder and Neisse, as well as the creation of a direct threat to the central regions of Germany and its capital. Prisoners of war and foreign workers were driven to the construction of defensive structures, and the local population was involved.

The basis of the defense of the Nazi troops was the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive area. The Oder-Neisen line consisted of three lanes, between which there were intermediate and cut-off positions in the most important directions. The total depth of this boundary reached 20-40 km. The forward edge of the main line of defense ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers, with the exception of the areas of Frankfurt, Guben, Forst and Muskau, where the enemy continued to hold small bridgeheads on the right bank. Settlements were turned into strong strongholds. Using locks on the Oder River and numerous canals, the Nazis prepared a number of areas for flooding. A second line of defense was created 10-20 km from the front line. The most equipped in terms of engineering, it was on the Zelov (Zeelovsky) heights - in front of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead. The third lane was located at a distance of 20-40 km from the leading edge of the main lane. Like the second, it consisted of powerful nodes of resistance, interconnected by one or two trenches and communication passages.

During the construction of the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the fascist German command paid special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense, which was based on a combination of artillery fire, assault guns and tanks with engineering barriers, dense mining of tank-accessible directions and the mandatory use of such natural obstacles as rivers, canals and lakes. To combat tanks, it was planned to use the anti-aircraft artillery of the Berlin defensive area on a large scale. Numerous minefields were created not only in front of the front edge of the defensive zones, but also in the depths. Average mining density per the most important directions reached 2 thousand minutes per 1 km. In front of the first trench, and in the depths of the defense at the intersection of roads and along their sides, there were tank destroyers armed with faustpatrons.

By the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy comprehensively prepared the Berlin defensive area, which included three ring bypasses prepared for a stubborn defense. The outer defensive bypass passed along rivers, canals and lakes 25-40 km from the center of the capital. It was based on large settlements, turned into centers of resistance. The inner defensive contour, which was considered the main line of defense of the fortified area, ran along the outskirts of the suburbs. All strongholds and positions were interconnected in terms of fire. Numerous anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire were erected on the streets. The total depth of defense on this bypass was 6 km. The third - the city bypass passed along the district railway. All streets leading to the center of Berlin were blocked by barricades, bridges were prepared to be blown up.

For the convenience of defense management, the city was divided into nine sectors. The most carefully prepared central sector, which covered the main state and administrative institutions, including the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery. Trenches for artillery, tanks and assault guns were dug in the streets and squares, and numerous reinforced concrete firing structures were prepared. All defensive positions were interconnected by communications. The subway was widely used for covert maneuvers by forces and means, the total length of lines of which reached 80 km. Considering that the defensive structures were occupied in advance by the troops of the Berlin garrison, the number of which was constantly increasing due to the incoming replenishment, it was clear that a stubborn and intense struggle was ahead for Berlin.

The order issued on March 9 to prepare the defense of Berlin said: “Defend the capital to the last man and to the last cartridge ... The enemy must not be given a single minute of rest, he must be weakened and bled white in a dense network of strongholds, defensive nodes and nests of resistance. Every lost house or every lost stronghold must be immediately returned by counterattack ... Berlin can decide the outcome of the war.

Preparing to repel the offensive of the Soviet army, the Nazi command carried out a number of measures to strengthen its troops organizationally. At the expense of strategic reserves, spare parts and military schools, it restored the strength and technical equipment of almost all divisions. The number of infantry companies by mid-April was increased to 100 people. Instead of Himmler, General G. Heinrici, who was considered a major defense specialist in the Wehrmacht, was appointed commander of the Vistula Army Group instead of Himmler. On April 8, the commander of Army Group Center, F. Scherner, was awarded the rank of field marshal. The new chief of the general staff of the ground forces, General G. Krebs, in the opinion of Hitler's military experts, was the best expert on the Soviet army, since before the war he was an assistant to the military attache in Moscow.

On April 15, Hitler issued a special appeal to the soldiers of the Eastern Front. He urged at all costs to repel the offensive of the Soviet army. Hitler demanded that anyone who dared to retreat or give the order to withdraw be shot on the spot. The calls were accompanied by threats against the families of those soldiers and officers who would surrender to the Soviet troops.

Instead of stopping the senseless bloodshed and accepting unconditional surrender, which would be in the interests of the German nation, the Nazi leadership tried to postpone its inevitable end with cruel repressions. V. Keitel and M. Bormann issued an order to protect every settlement to the last person, and to punish the slightest instability with the death penalty.

The Soviet Armed Forces were faced with the task of inflicting a final blow on fascist Germany in order to force it to capitulate unconditionally.

Preparations for the Berlin operation

The military-political situation that had developed by April required the Soviet command to prepare and carry out an operation to decisively defeat the Berlin group and capture the German capital in the shortest possible time. Only a successful solution to this problem could thwart the plans of the fascist leadership to prolong the war. It was necessary to take into account the fact that every extra day gave the enemy the opportunity to improve the defense in engineering terms and strengthen the Berlin grouping of troops at the expense of other fronts and sectors, as well as new formations. And this would significantly complicate the overcoming of enemy defenses and would lead to an increase in losses from the advancing fronts. Breaking through the enemy's powerful defenses, crushing his large forces, and quickly capturing Berlin necessitated the creation of strong strike groupings and the use of the most expedient and resolute methods of conducting combat operations.

Given these factors, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command attracted troops from three fronts for the Berlin operation - the 2nd and 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, in total 21 combined arms, 4 tank, 3 air armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized, as well as 4 cavalry corps. In addition, it was supposed to use part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet, the 18th Air Army of long-range aviation, the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Dnieper military flotilla, operationally subordinate to the 1st Belorussian Front. Polish troops were also preparing for the final operation to defeat Nazi Germany, consisting of two armies, tank and aviation corps, two breakthrough artillery divisions and a separate mortar brigade with a total number of 185 thousand soldiers and officers. They were armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 508 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 320 aircraft.

As a result of all the measures, a strong grouping of troops was concentrated in the Berlin direction, which outnumbered the enemy. The creation of such a group testified to the enormous potentialities of the Soviet socialist state, which had powerful Armed Forces by the end of the war, its military and economic advantages, and the art of strategic leadership.

The concept of the Berlin operation was developed during the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. Having comprehensively analyzed the military-political situation prevailing in Europe, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command determined the purpose of the operation and reviewed the plans prepared by the headquarters of the fronts. The final plan of the operation was approved in early April at an expanded meeting of the Headquarters with the participation of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, members of the State Defense Committee and commanders of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. The plan for the Berlin operation was the result of the collective creativity of the Headquarters, the General Staff, commanders, headquarters and military councils of the fronts.

The purpose of the operation was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Vistula and Center Army Groups, capture Berlin and, having reached the Elbe River, link up with the troops of the Western Allies. This was to deprive Nazi Germany of the possibility of further organized resistance and force her to unconditional surrender.

The completion of the defeat of the Nazi troops was supposed to be carried out jointly with the Western allies, an agreement in principle with which to coordinate actions was reached at the Crimean Conference. The plan for the offensive on the western front was outlined in Eisenhower's message to the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces on March 28. In a reply message dated April 1, JV Stalin wrote: "Your plan for cutting the German forces by joining the Soviet troops with your troops completely coincides with the plan of the Soviet high command." Further, he informed the allied command that the Soviet troops would take Berlin, having allocated part of their forces for this purpose, and reported the approximate date for the start of the offensive.

The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to break through the enemy defenses along the Oder and the Neisse with powerful blows from the troops of three fronts and, developing the offensive in depth, encircle the main grouping of Nazi troops in the Berlin direction with its simultaneous dismemberment into several parts and the subsequent destruction of each of them. . In the future, Soviet troops were to reach the Elbe.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set specific tasks for the fronts.

The commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was ordered to prepare and conduct an operation with the aim of capturing the German capital and reaching the Elbe River no later than the 12-15th day of the operation. The front was supposed to inflict three blows: the main one - directly on Berlin from the Kustrinsky bridgehead and two auxiliary ones - north and south of Berlin. Tank armies were required to enter after the breakthrough of the defense in order to develop success bypassing Berlin from the north and northeast. Given the important role of the front in the upcoming operation, the Stavka reinforced it with eight breakthrough artillery divisions and a combined arms army.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to defeat the enemy grouping in the area of ​​Cottbus and south of Berlin, not later than the 10-12th day of the operation, to capture the lines of Belitz, Wittenberg and further along the Elbe River to Dresden. The front was ordered to deliver two blows: the main one - in the general direction of Spremberg and the auxiliary one - on Dresden. On the left wing, the troops of the front were to go over to a tough defense. To reinforce the strike force, two combined-arms armies from the 3rd Belorussian Front (28th and 31st), as well as seven breakthrough artillery divisions, were transferred to the front. Both tank armies were to be brought in in the direction of the main attack after the defense had been breached. In addition, at a meeting at Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front received a verbal order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to provide in the front-line operation plan for the possibility of turning tank armies to the north after breaking through the Neissen defensive line to strike at Berlin from the south.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were tasked with crossing the Oder, defeating the enemy's Stettin grouping, and capturing the Anklam, Waren, and Wittenberg line no later than the 12-15th day of the operation. Under favorable conditions, they were supposed to, acting part of the forces from behind the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, roll up the enemy defenses along the left bank of the Oder. The coast of the Baltic Sea, from the mouth of the Vistula to Altdamm, was ordered to be firmly covered by part of the forces of the front.

The beginning of the offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts was scheduled for April 16. Four days later, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to go on the offensive.

Thus, the main efforts of the three fronts were directed primarily to crushing the enemy defenses, and then to encircling and dismembering the main forces of the Nazis defending in the Berlin direction. The encirclement of the enemy grouping was supposed to be carried out bypassing Berlin from the north and northwest by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, and from the south and southwest by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Its dissection was ensured by the strike of two combined-arms armies of the 1st Belorussian Front in the general direction of Brandenburg. The direct capture of the capital of Germany was entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. The 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in a northwestern direction, and with part of its forces on Dresden, was supposed to defeat the Nazi troops south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center and thereby ensure the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south; in addition, he had to be ready to directly assist the 1st Belorussian Front in capturing the capital of Nazi Germany.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to cut off the 3rd German Panzer Army from Army Group Center and destroy it, thereby ensuring the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front from the north. The task of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was to cover the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, ensuring the blockade of the enemy's Courland grouping, and disrupt his sea communications. In accordance with the tasks received, the Soviet troops in early April began direct preparations for the operation.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front Marshal Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov decided to strike the main blow with the forces of five combined arms (47th army, 3rd with the 9th tank corps and 5th shock, 8th guards and 3rd armies) and two tank armies (1- I and the 2nd Guards) from the bridgehead west of Kustrin. Combined-arms armies of the first echelon of the main strike force were supposed to break through two strips of the Oder defensive line in three sectors with a total length of over 24 km on the very first day of the operation. It was especially important to seize the enemy's second line of defense, the front line of which ran along the Zelov Heights. In the future, it was planned to develop a swift offensive against Berlin from the east, and bypass it with tank armies from the northwest and south. On the sixth day of the operation, it was planned to completely capture the capital of Nazi Germany and reach the eastern shore of Lake Havel. The 47th Army, advancing on the right flank of the shock group, was supposed to bypass Berlin from the north and reach the Elbe on the 11th day of the operation. To build up the efforts of the strike force, it was planned to use the second echelon of the front - the 3rd Army; The 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was in reserve.

The auxiliary strikes prescribed by the Headquarters to ensure the offensive of the main strike force were planned to be delivered: on the right - by the forces of the 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army in the general direction of Eberswalde, Zandau; on the left - the troops of the 69th and 33rd armies together with the 2nd guards cavalry corps on Fürstenwalde, Brandenburg. The latter were first of all to cut off the main forces of the enemy's 9th Army from Berlin.

It was planned to bring tank armies into battle at a depth of 6-9 km after the combined arms armies took possession of the strongholds on the Zelov heights. The main task of the 2nd Guards Tank Army was to bypass Berlin from the north and northeast and capture its northwestern part. The 1st Guards Tank Army, reinforced by the 11th Tank Corps, was given the task of attacking Berlin from the east and capturing its eastern and then southern suburbs. In making this decision, the front commander sought to increase the power of the strike in the main direction, speed up the breakthrough of the enemy defenses, and prevent the withdrawal of the main forces of the 9th Army to Berlin.

Setting the tank armies the task of capturing Berlin inevitably led to a limitation of their maneuverability and striking power. So, when bypassing the city from the south, the 1st Guards Tank Army had to maneuver in the immediate vicinity of the inner contour of the Berlin defensive area, where the possibilities for this were very limited, and sometimes completely excluded.

The Dnieper military flotilla, operating in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, under the command of Rear Admiral V.V. bridgehead. The third brigade was supposed to assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Furstenberg area and provide mine defense of the waterways.

The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 3rd Guards (with the 25th Tank Corps), 13th and 5th Guards (with the 4th Guards Tank Corps) combined arms , 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies from the Tribel region in the general direction of Spremberg. They were supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the Forst, Muskau sector 27 km long, defeat his troops in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin. Part of the forces of the main group planned to strike at Berlin from the south. In the direction of the main attack, it was also planned to use the second echelon of the front - the 28th and 31st armies, which were supposed to arrive by April 20-22.

An auxiliary strike was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army together with the 1st Polish Tank Corps and the right flank of the 52nd Army in cooperation with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps in the general direction of Dresden with the task of ensuring the operations of the strike force from the south. The reserve of the front was the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which was intended for use in the band of the 52nd Army.

The general situation in the front line was more favorable for the actions of tank armies, since the enemy’s defense in this direction was less deep than in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, and between the Spree River and the outer contour of the Berlin defensive area, he essentially did not there were prepared lines. In this regard, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to bring both tank armies into battle on the second day of the operation, after the combined arms formations had reached the left bank of the Spree. They were to develop a swift offensive in a northwestern direction, on the sixth day of the operation, advance detachments would capture the areas of Rathenow, Brandenburg, Dessau and create conditions for encircling the Berlin grouping of Nazi troops. In addition, it was planned to attack Berlin directly from the south with one corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

During the preparation of the operation, the front commander clarified his decision on the use of tank armies. Keeping the main idea of ​​the decision - to bring them into battle on the second day of the operation, he ordered the army commanders to be ready to bring forward detachments of the first echelon corps on the first day, together with the infantry, to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and seize a bridgehead on the Spree River. One of the most important tasks of the advanced detachments was to disrupt the planned withdrawal of enemy troops from the line of the Neisse River to the Spree River. The tank and mechanized corps attached to the combined arms armies were to be used as their mobile groups.

The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, decided to deliver the main blow on the Altdamm, Nipperwiese sector with the forces of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies, 1st, 8th and 3rd guards tank, 8th mechanized and 3rd th Guards Cavalry Corps in the general direction of Neustrelitz. During the first five days, the formations of the shock group were supposed to force both channels of the Oder and completely break through the Oder defensive line. With the introduction of mobile formations into battle, the troops of the front had to develop an offensive in the northwestern and western directions in order to cut off the main forces of the 3rd German tank army from Berlin. The troops of the 19th and the main forces of the 2nd shock armies received the task of firmly holding the occupied lines. Part of the forces of the 2nd shock army was planned to assist the 65th army in capturing the city of Stettin, and subsequently to develop an offensive on Forbein.

The separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps that were part of the front during the period of forcing the Oder and capturing bridgeheads on its left bank by combined arms formations were to remain directly subordinate to the front commander, who retained the right to determine the moment they were brought into battle. Then they were reassigned to the commanders of the combined arms armies and had to develop an offensive in the directions of the main attacks of these armies.

In preparing the offensive, the front commanders sought to create powerful strike groups. In the 1st Belorussian Front, 55 percent of rifle divisions, 61 percent of guns and mortars, 79 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations were concentrated in the direction of the main attack in a section of 44 km (25 percent of the total length of the front line). In the 1st Ukrainian Front, on a section of 51 km (a total of 13 percent of the front line), 48 percent of rifle divisions, 75 percent of guns and mortars, 73 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations were concentrated. This massing of forces and assets made it possible to create high operational densities and achieve decisive superiority over the enemy.

The concentration of significant forces and resources on the main attack axes made it possible to create a deep formation of troops. The fronts had powerful success development echelons, strong second echelons and reserves, which ensured the build-up of forces during the operation and its development at a high pace. In order to create powerful strike groupings, combined arms armies received strips from 8 to 17 km wide. Only the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced in a strip 28 km wide. The combined-arms armies of the strike groups of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts broke through the enemy defenses in sectors of 4-7 km, and in the 1st Ukrainian Front - 8-10 km. To provide maximum strength During the initial strike, the operational formations of most combined-arms armies were one-echelon, while the battle formations of corps and divisions were, as a rule, built in two, and sometimes even three echelons. Rifle divisions operating in the directions of the main attacks usually received offensive zones up to 2 km wide in the 1st Belorussian and up to 3 km in the 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The operational formation of tank armies for entry into battle, except for the 1st Guards, was in two echelons. The mechanized corps stood out as part of the second echelon. The 1st Guards Tank Army had all three corps in one echelon, and a separate Guards Tank Brigade and a separate tank regiment. The combat formations of tank and mechanized corps were also built in two echelons. The densities of tanks for direct support of infantry in the armies of strike groups were different and reached: in the 1st Belorussian - 20 - 44, in the 1st Ukrainian - 10 - 14 and in the 2nd Belorussian - 7 - 35 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations on 1 km front.

When planning the artillery offensive in the Berlin operation, it was characteristic even more than before to mass the artillery in the directions of the main attacks, create high densities for the period of artillery preparation and ensure continuous fire support of the troops throughout the offensive.

The largest grouping of artillery was created in the 1st Belorussian Front, which made it possible to concentrate about 300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area. The front command believed that with the existing density of artillery, the enemy's defenses would be reliably suppressed in the course of a 30-minute artillery preparation. Support for an attack by infantry and tanks to a depth of up to 2 km was to be carried out by a double, and to a depth of up to 4 km by a single fire shaft. Accompanying the battle of rifle and tank units and formations in depth was planned to be ensured by the consistent concentration of fire in the most important directions.

In order to achieve the surprise of the attack of the main strike force, it was decided to launch an attack of infantry and close support tanks 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the terrain ahead and blind the enemy in the offensive zones of the 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards and 69th armies, it was planned to use 143 searchlight installations, which, with the start of the infantry attack, were to simultaneously turn on the light.

A strong artillery group was also created in the 1st Ukrainian Front. In accordance with the tasks ahead, the front command regrouped artillery and concentrated about 270 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area. Due to the fact that the offensive of the front troops began with the crossing of a water barrier, the total duration of the artillery preparation was planned to be 145 minutes: 40 minutes - artillery preparation before forcing the river, 60 minutes - ensuring the crossing and 45 minutes of artillery preparation for the attack of infantry and tanks across the river. Taking into account the closed nature of the area, it was planned to support the attack of infantry and tanks, as a rule, by the method of successive concentration of fire.

In the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of artillery were also concentrated in the breakthrough areas, where the density reached over 230 guns and mortars per 1 km. The artillery offensive was planned in the armies, which was explained by the various conditions for forcing the Oder. The duration of artillery preparation was set at 45-60 minutes.

Strong regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups were created in the armies of the strike groups of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, instead of corps groups, each army group singled out corps subgroups from its composition. According to his command, this allowed the commanders of the armies to have at their disposal large artillery weapons for maneuver during the operation.

In the fronts, a significant amount of artillery was allocated for direct fire and to ensure the introduction of mobile formations into battle. So, only in the 13th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in a 10-kilometer zone, 457 guns were allocated for direct fire. To ensure the entry into battle of the tank armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, it was planned to bring in a total of 2250 guns and mortars.

The enemy's large aviation grouping and the proximity of its airfields to the front line made high demands on the reliable provision of ground troops from air strikes. By the beginning of the operation, the three fronts and corps of the country's Air Defense Forces, which were supposed to cover front-line facilities, had 3275 fighters, 5151 anti-aircraft guns and 2976 anti-aircraft machine guns. The organization of air defense was based on the principle of massive use of forces and means for reliable support of the combat formations of ground forces in the main attack axes. Covering the most important rear facilities, especially crossings over the Oder, was entrusted to the Air Defense Forces of the country.

The main forces of the aviation of the fronts were planned to be used massively to support the offensive of the strike groups. Its tasks included conducting aerial reconnaissance, covering ground troops from enemy air strikes, ensuring a breakthrough in defense and bringing mobile troops into battle, and fighting enemy reserves.

The most important task of the 4th Air Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front was to ensure the crossing of the Oder River. In addition, it was assigned to accompany the infantry offensive during the fighting in the depths of enemy defenses, since the crossing of artillery, which usually performed this task, could take considerable time. A feature of the preliminary aviation training planned in the 2nd Belorussian Front was that it was supposed to be carried out for three nights before the start of the operation. Direct aviation training was planned to be carried out two hours before the troops went on the offensive.

While maintaining air supremacy, the 16th Air Army of the 1st Belorussian Front was to reliably cover the troops of the front and the crossings, at night, during the period of artillery preparation, with Po-2 aircraft, strike at enemy headquarters, communication centers and artillery positions. Assistance to the troops of the front in breaking through the defense at night was entrusted to the 18th Air Army (Il-4 aircraft). With the start of the offensive, attack aircraft and bombers were to concentrate their main efforts on the strongholds and centers of resistance of the Nazis, conduct reconnaissance to the Elbe River and on the flanks of the strike groups. As part of the 1st Belorussian Front, Polish aviation was actively operating, which supported the 1st Army of the Polish Army.

Before forcing the Neisse River, the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front was to establish a smoke screen in the offensive zone of the strike force and on its flanks, and during the period of overcoming the river and the offensive on its left bank, to inflict massive strikes on enemy battle formations located directly at the front line, as well as at its command posts and centers of resistance in the depths of the defense.

Thus, the combat use of aviation in the fronts was planned taking into account the specific situation in the zone of each front and the nature of the tasks that the ground forces had to solve.

An important place was given to engineering support. The main tasks of the engineering troops were to establish crossings and prepare bridgeheads for the offensive, as well as to assist the troops during the operation. So, in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, 25 bridges were built across the Oder and 40 ferry crossings were prepared. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, for the successful crossing of the Neisse, 2440 sapper wooden boats, 750 linear meters of assault bridges and more than 1000 meters of wooden bridge elements for loads from 16 to 60 tons were prepared.

One of the features of the Berlin operation was the short duration of the period of its direct preparation - only 13-15 days. In such a short period of time, it was necessary to carry out a large number of the most diverse and very complex measures to prepare troops and staffs for an offensive. It was especially difficult to carry out numerous regroupings of troops that took part in the East Pomeranian and Upper Silesian operations. After their completion, it became possible to concentrate the main forces in the Berlin direction.

The largest was the regrouping of troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of which deployed 180 degrees and were transferred 250-300 km within 6-9 days. “It was a complex maneuver of the troops of the whole front,” recalled Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, “the like of which was not seen throughout the Great Patriotic War.” The transfer of troops and military equipment was carried out by rail, by road, and some rifle formations - by a combined method, sometimes even on foot. In order to ensure secrecy, movement was most often carried out at night.

In the combat training of the troops, the main attention was paid to putting together units, working out the interaction between the branches of the military, training them in overcoming water barriers and actions in settlements. All combat training was carried out in an environment as close as possible to the upcoming events, and taking into account the accumulated experience. The headquarters of the fronts developed and sent instructions to the troops on the organization and conduct of offensive combat in large German cities. Special memos were also sent out, which summarized the experience of fighting for settlements.

Command-staff exercises were held at the fronts with the headquarters of rifle corps and divisions, as well as artillery, tank and aviation units and formations. Joint reconnaissance was carried out with representatives of all branches of the armed forces, mutual familiarization with the tasks, signals were determined and communication was organized for the interaction of supporting means with combined arms armies, a procedure was established for clearing routes when moving groups were introduced into the breakthrough and securing their flanks.

An important measure was the solution of the tasks of operational camouflage, which pursued the goal of ensuring the operational-tactical surprise of the offensive. For example, by simulating the concentration of three tank corps and two combined arms armies with a large number of crossing facilities in the zone of the 2nd shock army, the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front misled the enemy about the direction of the main attack. In the 1st Belorussian Front, a plan of measures was developed and successfully implemented to create the impression that the troops in the central sector were going over to a long defense, while preparations for the offensive were being carried out on the flanks. As a result, the German command did not dare to sharply strengthen the central sector of the front by weakening the flanks. Measures for operational camouflage were also carried out in the 1st Ukrainian Front. When the regrouping of his troops to the right wing began, in the areas of the former concentration of tank armies, numerous mock-ups of various types of military equipment and radio stations were installed, which continued their work according to the previously determined regime until the start of the offensive.

Along with measures to disinform the enemy, much attention was paid to the fight against fascist intelligence. The state security organs protected the Soviet troops from the penetration of enemy agents, supplied the command of the fronts with intelligence information about the enemy.

The tight deadlines for the preparation of the operation led to a particularly intense nature of the work of the rear, since it was necessary to create the necessary stocks of various materials. Only in the 2nd Belorussian Front during the period of preparation of the operation, 127.3 thousand tons of cargo were to be transported, and the rear parts of the front at the same time had to allocate more than a thousand trucks to ensure the regrouping of troops.

Great difficulties in the work of the rear were also observed on other fronts. To facilitate the work of motor transport, supply stations were as close as possible and transshipment bases were organized at the points of transshipment of wagons to the Western European gauge.

The careful organization of the supply of supplies and the strict control of the military councils over the work of the rear services made it possible to provide the troops with everything they needed. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had on average: basic types of ammunition - 2.2-4.5 ammunition, high-octane gasoline - 9.5 refills, motor gasoline - 4.1, diesel fuel - 5 refills. Equipment and weapons were well prepared, combat and transport vehicles were transferred to the spring-summer operation mode.

The main task of party political work was to ensure high morale and an offensive impulse among the personnel. At the same time, the need to prepare soldiers for overcoming great difficulties was taken into account, to warn them both against underestimating and overestimating the strength of the enemy. The consciousness of the soldiers was to be firmly grasped by the idea that the defeat of the enemy's Berlin grouping, the capture of its capital, is the decisive and final act that ensures complete victory over German fascism. On the eve of the Berlin operation, the cultivation of a feeling of hatred for the enemy took on a particularly clear direction. An article published in Pravda on April 14 once again set out the Communist Party's point of view on this complex issue. It said: "The Red Army, in carrying out its great liberation mission, is fighting for the liquidation of the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite state, the Hitlerite government, but has never set and does not set as its goal to exterminate the German people."

In connection with the 75th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, propaganda of Lenin's ideas about the defense of the socialist Fatherland, about the international mission of the Soviet soldier, was launched in the troops. The Main Political Directorate in a special directive to the military councils and political agencies gave specific instructions on preparations for this significant date. In all units and formations of the fronts, a cycle of lectures was read for the personnel on the topics: “Under the banner of Lenin”, “Lenin is the great organizer of the Soviet state”, “Lenin is the inspirer of the defense of the socialist Fatherland”. At the same time, propagandists and agitators emphasized Lenin's precept about the danger of underestimating the strength of the enemy, about the importance of iron military discipline.

In the course of previous operations, the fronts received significant reinforcements, mainly from recently liberated regions of the USSR. Being cut off from the life of their country for a long time, they were exposed to fascist propaganda, which in every possible way fanned the myth that Germany had special secret weapons that would be put into use at the right time. Such propaganda continued during the preparations for the Berlin operation. Enemy planes continuously dropped leaflets into the location of the Soviet troops, the content of which was aimed at instilling in the souls of insufficiently ideologically tempered soldiers uncertainty about the success of the upcoming offensive operations. One of these leaflets said: “You are not far from Berlin, but you will not be in Berlin. In Berlin, every house will be an impregnable fortress. Every German will fight against you." And here is what was written in another leaflet: “We also visited Moscow and Stalingrad, but they were not taken. You won’t take Berlin either, but you’ll get such a blow here that you won’t even pick up the bones. Our Fuhrer has huge manpower reserves and secret weapons, which he saved in order to completely destroy the Red Army on German soil.

Before the start of offensive operations, it was necessary, using various forms of educational work among personnel, to instill in the minds of soldiers, sergeants and officers firm confidence in the complete success of the planned operation. Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists, being among the soldiers, persistently explained to them that a situation had developed on the Soviet-German front when the balance of forces had changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Army propagandists and agitators showed by numerous examples how much the power of the Soviet rear had increased, which, on an ever-growing scale, supplied the fronts with human reserves, weapons, military equipment, equipment and food.

All this was brought to the consciousness of the soldiers with the help of various forms of party political work. The most common in those days was the organization of short rallies. Such forms of work were also widely used, such as group and individual conversations with soldiers and sergeants, reports and lectures for officers, short meetings on organizational and methodological issues of educational work.

For agitators of the units, the political administration of the 1st Belorussian Front within a few days issued a number of thematic developments: “The victory of the Red Army is the victory of the Soviet socialist system”, “The closer our victory is, the higher our vigilance should be, the stronger should be our strikes on enemy." A member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General K. V. Krainyukov, recalled: “We urged the soldiers to prepare as best as possible for the final battles, to attack decisively and swiftly, to save our relatives Soviet people driven away to fascist hard labor and death camps, to save humanity from the brown plague.

The political departments of the fronts, the political departments of the armies published a large number of leaflets, the content of which was very diverse: patriotic appeals to soldiers, appeals, advice on the use of military equipment. A significant part of these materials was published not only in Russian, but also in other languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR.

The success of the operation had to be determined by the high morale and combat qualities of soldiers, sergeants and officers, military skills, the ability to apply in battle and use the entrusted military equipment and weapons to the end. That is why serious attention was paid to the combat training of the troops, the cohesion of subunits and units. The officers of the political departments, together with the commanders, carefully selected people for assault battalions and took part in their preparation for offensive battles. Assault battalions were reinforced by communists and Komsomol members.

Taking into account the experience of previous hostilities, leaflets-memos were issued in large quantities for personnel with summary what every soldier who takes part in breaking through a heavily fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defense needs to know, and they summarized the positive and negative points from the experience of the combat operations of the front troops in capturing Poznan, Schneidemühl and other large cities. Among the leaflets published in the 1st Belorussian Front were: “Memo to an infantryman for fighting in a large city”, “Memo to the crew of an easel machine gun operating as part of an assault group in street battles in a large city”, “Memo to the crew of a tank fighting in big city as part of an assault group”, “Memo to a sapper on storming enemy cities”, etc. The political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front published 350 thousand leaflets, which said how to cross large rivers, fight in the forest, in a large city.

The Soviet command knew that the Nazis intended to widely use faustpatrons to fight tanks. Therefore, during the period of preparation for the operation, the task was set and then solved - not only to acquaint the soldiers with the tactical and technical data of faustpatrons, but also to train them in the use of these weapons against the Nazi troops, using captured stocks. Komsomol members became skirmishers in mastering the faustpatrons. Groups of volunteers were created in the units to study this type of weapon. And this was very important for ensuring the advancement of the tanks, since on their own they could not successfully fight the Faustniks hiding in the basements, around the corners of buildings, etc. The infantrymen, sitting on the armor of the tanks, had to detect and destroy them in a timely manner.

In the last days before the operation, the influx of applications from soldiers with a request to accept them into the party sharply increased. In the 1st Belorussian Front alone, on the night of April 16 alone, more than 2,000 applications were submitted to party organizations. From March 15 to April 15, over 17 thousand soldiers were accepted into the ranks of the CPSU on three fronts. In total, by the beginning of the operation, they included 723 thousand members and candidate members of the party and 433 thousand Komsomol members.

Party-political work was characterized by high efficiency: the soldiers were informed about the situation on all sectors of the Soviet-German front, about the successes of the Soviet troops, about the importance of the upcoming operation. At seminars and meetings, at meetings of party and Komsomol activists, commanders of units and formations spoke. At the meetings held in all parts of the Party and Komsomol, the Communists and Komsomol members undertook the obligation to be the first to go on the attack. Red flags were prepared in advance in the troops for hoisting them on the main administrative buildings of Berlin. On the eve of the offensive, special appeals were published by the military councils of the fronts, which called on the soldiers to honorably fulfill the task set by the party, the Supreme High Command and the Soviet people. One of the leaflets published on the eve of the offensive contained a map of Germany and the following text: “Look, comrade! 70 kilometers separates you from Berlin. This is 8 times less than from the Vistula to the Oder. Today, the Motherland is waiting for new exploits from you. Another mighty blow - and the capital of Nazi Germany will fall. Glory to whoever breaks into Berlin first! Glory to the one who will hoist our Banner of Victory over the enemy capital!”

As a result of the enormous political work carried out in preparation for the operation, the order of the Supreme High Command to "hoist the Banner of Victory over Berlin" was brought to the consciousness of every soldier and officer. This idea took possession of all the soldiers, caused an unprecedented upsurge in the troops.

The defeat of the Berlin group of Nazi troops. Capture of Berlin

Before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the bands of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. To this end, on April 14, after a 15-20-minute fire raid on the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front, reinforced rifle battalions from divisions of the first echelon of combined arms armies began to operate. Then, in a number of sectors, regiments of the first echelons were also brought into battle. During the two-day battles, they managed to penetrate the enemy defenses and capture certain sections of the first and second trenches, and advance up to 5 km in some directions. The integrity of the enemy defense was broken. In addition, in a number of places, the troops of the front overcame the zone of the most dense minefields, which should have facilitated the subsequent offensive of the main forces. Based on an assessment of the results of the battle, the front command decided to reduce the duration of the artillery preparation for the attack of the main forces from 30 to 20-25 minutes.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the night of April 16 by reinforced rifle companies. It was established that the enemy firmly occupied defensive positions directly on the left bank of the Neisse. The front commander decided not to make changes to the developed plan.

On the morning of April 16, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts went on the offensive. At 5 o'clock Moscow time, two hours before dawn, artillery preparation began in the 1st Belorussian Front. In the zone of the 5th shock army, ships and floating batteries of the Dnieper flotilla participated in it. The force of the artillery fire was enormous. If for the entire first day of the operation the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front used up 1,236 thousand shells, which amounted to almost 2.5 thousand railway cars, then during the artillery preparation - 500 thousand shells and mines, or 1 thousand cars. Night bombers of the 16th and 4th air armies attacked enemy headquarters, artillery firing positions, as well as the third and fourth trenches of the main line of defense.

After the final volley of rocket artillery, the troops of the 3rd and 5th shock, 8th guards, and also the 69th armies, commanded by generals V. I. Kuznetsov, N. E. Berzarin, V. I. Chuikov, moved forward, V. Ya. Kolpakchi. With the beginning of the attack, powerful searchlights located in the zone of these armies directed their beams towards the enemy. The 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 47th and 33rd armies of Generals S. G. Poplavsky, F. I. Perkhorovich, V. D. Tsvetaev went on the offensive at 6 hours and 15 minutes. Bombers of the 18th Air Army under the command of Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov attacked the second line of defense. With dawn, the aviation of the 16th Air Army of General S. I. Rudenko intensified the fighting, which on the first day of the operation made 5342 combat sorties and shot down 165 German aircraft. In total, during the first day, the pilots of the 16th, 4th and 18th air armies made over 6550 sorties, dropped over 1500 tons of bombs on command posts, resistance centers and enemy reserves.

As a result of powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy. Therefore, for the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong, engineered second line of defense, put up fierce resistance. Intense battles unfolded along the entire front. Soviet troops strove to overcome the stubbornness of the enemy at all costs, acting assertively and energetically. In the center of the 3rd Shock Army, the 32nd Rifle Corps under the command of General D.S. Zherebin achieved the greatest success. He advanced 8 km and went to the second line of defense. On the left flank of the army, the 301st Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel V.S. Antonov, took an important enemy stronghold and the Verbig railway station. In the battles for her, the soldiers of the 1054th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel H. H. Radaev, distinguished themselves. The Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion, Lieutenant G. A. Avakyan, with one submachine gunner, made his way to the building where the Nazis sat down. Throwing them with grenades, the brave soldiers destroyed 56 Nazis and captured 14. Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

To increase the pace of the offensive in the zone of the 3rd shock army, the 9th tank corps of General I.F. Kirichenko was brought into battle at 10 o'clock. Although this increased the force of the blow, the advance of the troops was still slow. It became clear to the front command that the combined-arms armies were not able to quickly break through the enemy defenses to the depth planned for bringing tank armies into battle. Especially dangerous was the fact that the infantry could not capture the tactically very important Zelov heights, along which the front edge of the second defensive line passed. This natural boundary dominated the whole area, had steep slopes and in every respect was a serious obstacle on the way to the capital of Germany. The Zelov heights were considered by the Wehrmacht command as the key to the entire defense in the Berlin direction. “By 13 o’clock,” Marshal G.K. Zhukov recalled, “I clearly understood that the enemy’s fire defense system had basically survived here, and in the battle formation in which we launched the attack and were advancing, we couldn’t take the Zelov Heights” . Therefore, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov decided to bring tank armies into battle and, by joint efforts, complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone.

In the afternoon, the 1st Guards Tank Army of General M. E. Katukov was the first to enter the battle. By the end of the day, all three of its corps were fighting in the zone of the 8th Guards Army. However, on this day, it was not possible to break through the defenses at the Zelov Heights. The first day of the operation was also difficult for General S.I. Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army. In the afternoon, the army received an order from the commander to overtake the infantry battle formations and strike at Bernau. By 19 o'clock, its formations reached the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, but, having met fierce resistance from the enemy, they could not advance further.

The course of the struggle on the first day of the operation showed that the Nazis were striving to keep the Zelov Heights at any cost: by the end of the day, the fascist command advanced the reserves of the Vistula Army Group to strengthen the troops defending the second line of defense. The fighting was exceptionally stubborn. During the second day of the battle, the Nazis repeatedly launched violent counterattacks. However, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov, who fought here, persistently moved forward. Warriors of all branches of the military showed mass heroism. The 172nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 57th Guards Rifle Division fought courageously. During the assault on the heights covering Zelov, the 3rd battalion under the command of Captain N. N. Chusovsky especially distinguished himself. Having repulsed the enemy counterattack, the battalion broke into the Zelov heights, and then, after a heavy street battle, cleared the southeastern outskirts of the city of Zelov. The battalion commander in these battles not only led the units, but also, dragging the fighters with him, personally destroyed four Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. Many soldiers and officers of the battalion were awarded orders and medals, and Captain Chusovskoy was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zelov was taken by the troops of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps of General V.A. Glazunov in cooperation with part of the forces of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of Colonel A.Kh. Babadzhanyan.

As a result of fierce and stubborn fighting, the troops of the shock group of the front by the end of April 17 broke through the second defensive zone and two intermediate positions. The attempts of the fascist German command to stop the advance of the Soviet troops by bringing four divisions from the reserve into battle were not successful. Bombers of the 16th and 18th air armies attacked enemy reserves day and night, delaying their advance to the line of combat operations. On April 16 and 17, the offensive was supported by the ships of the Dnieper military flotilla. They fired until the ground forces went beyond the firing range of naval artillery. Soviet troops persistently rushed to Berlin.

Stubborn resistance also had to be overcome by the troops of the front, who attacked on the flanks. The troops of the 61st Army of General P. A. Belov, who launched an offensive on April 17, crossed the Oder by the end of the day and captured a bridgehead on its left bank. By this time, formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army crossed the Oder and broke through the first position of the main line of defense. In the Frankfurt area, the troops of the 69th and 33rd armies advanced from 2 to 6 km.

On the third day, heavy fighting continued in the depths of the enemy defenses. The Nazis committed almost all of their operational reserves to the battle. The exceptionally fierce nature of the struggle affected the pace of advance of the Soviet troops. By the end of the day, they covered another 3-6 km with their main forces and reached the approaches to the third defensive line. Formations of both tank armies, together with infantrymen, artillerymen and sappers, continuously stormed enemy positions for three days. The difficult terrain and the strong anti-tank defense of the enemy did not allow the tankers to break away from the infantry. The mobile troops of the front have not yet received operational scope for conducting swift maneuvering operations in the Berlin direction.

In the zone of the 8th Guards Army, the Nazis put up the most stubborn resistance along the highway running west from Zelov, on both sides of which they installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns.

The slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, jeopardized the implementation of the plan to encircle the enemy's Berlin grouping. As early as April 17, the Headquarters demanded that the front commander ensure a more energetic offensive by his subordinate troops. At the same time, she instructed the commanders of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian fronts to facilitate the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front. The 2nd Belorussian Front (after forcing the Oder) received, in addition, the task of developing the offensive to the southwest with the main forces no later than April 22, delivering a blow around Berlin from the north, in order to complete encirclement of the Berlin group.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front demanded that the troops increase the pace of the offensive, artillery, including high power, be pulled up to the first echelon of troops at a distance of 2-3 km, which should have contributed to closer interaction with infantry and tanks. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in decisive directions. To support the advancing armies, the front commander ordered more resolute use of aviation.

As a result of the measures taken, by the end of April 19, the troops of the shock group broke through the third defensive zone and advanced to a depth of 30 km in four days, having the opportunity to develop an offensive against Berlin and bypassing it from the north. The aviation of the 16th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground troops in breaking through the enemy's defenses. Despite unfavorable meteorological conditions, during this time she made about 14.7 thousand sorties and shot down 474 enemy aircraft. In the battles near Berlin, Major I.N. Kozhedub increased the number of enemy aircraft shot down to 62. The famous pilot was awarded a high award - the third Golden Star. In just four days, Soviet aviation made up to 17,000 sorties in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front spent four days to break through the Oder defensive line. During this time, the enemy suffered great damage: 9 divisions from the first operational echelon and a division: the second echelon lost up to 80 percent of the personnel and almost all military equipment, and 6 divisions advanced from the reserve, and up to 80 different battalions sent from the depths, - more than 50 percent. However, the troops of the front also suffered significant losses and advanced more slowly than planned. This was primarily due to the difficult conditions of the situation. The deep formation of the enemy's defense, which was occupied in advance by troops, its large saturation with anti-tank weapons, the high density of artillery fire, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, continuous counterattacks and reinforcement of troops with reserves - all this required the maximum effort from the Soviet troops.

Due to the fact that the strike force of the front launched an offensive from a small bridgehead and in a relatively narrow zone limited by water barriers and wooded and swampy areas, the Soviet troops were constrained in maneuver and could not quickly expand the breakthrough zone. In addition, the crossings and rear roads were extremely overloaded, which made it extremely difficult to bring new forces into battle from the depths. The rate of advance of the combined-arms armies was significantly affected by the fact that the enemy defense was not reliably suppressed during artillery preparation. This was especially true of the second defensive line, which ran along the Zelovsky Heights, where the enemy withdrew part of his forces from the first line and advanced reserves from the depths. It did not have a special effect on the pace of the offensive and the introduction of tank armies into battle to complete the breakthrough of the defense. Such use of tank armies was not envisaged by the operation plan, so their interaction with combined arms formations, aviation and artillery had to be organized already in the course of hostilities.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was successfully developing. On April 16, at 0615, artillery preparation began, during which the reinforced battalions of the divisions of the first echelon advanced directly to the Neisse River and, after shifting artillery fire under the cover of a smoke screen placed on a 390-kilometer front, began crossing the river. The personnel of the advanced units were transported along the assault bridges, induced during the period of artillery preparation, and on improvised means. A small number of escort guns and mortars were transported along with the infantry. Since the bridges were not yet ready, part of the field artillery had to be dragged through the ford with the help of ropes. At 7:50 am, the first echelons of bombers of the 2nd Air Army attacked enemy resistance centers and command posts.

The battalions of the first echelon, quickly seizing bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. The sappers of one of the units of the 15th Guards Separate Motor Assault Engineer Battalion showed exceptional dedication. Overcoming barriers on the left bank of the Neisse River, they discovered property for an assault bridge, guarded by enemy soldiers. Having killed the guards, the sappers quickly built an assault bridge, along which the infantry of the 15th Guards Rifle Division began to cross. For the bravery and courage shown, the commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, General G.V. Baklanov, awarded the entire personnel of the unit (22 people) with the Order of Glory. Pontoon bridges on light inflatable boats were built after 50 minutes, bridges for loads up to 30 tons - after 2 hours, and bridges on rigid supports for loads up to 60 tons - within 4 - 5 hours. In addition to them, ferries were used to transport tanks of direct infantry support. In total, 133 crossings were equipped in the direction of the main attack. The first echelon of the main strike force finished crossing the Neisse in an hour, during which the artillery fired continuously at the enemy's defenses. Then she concentrated blows on the strongholds of the enemy, preparing an attack on the opposite bank.

At 0840 hours, the troops of the 13th Army, as well as the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies, began to break through the main defensive line. The fighting on the left bank of the Neisse took on a fierce character. The Nazis launched furious counterattacks, trying to eliminate the bridgeheads captured by the Soviet troops. Already on the first day of the operation, the fascist command threw into battle from its reserve up to three tank divisions and a tank destroyer brigade.

In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, the front commander used the 25th and 4th Guards Tank Corps of Generals E.I. Fominykh and P.P. armies. Working closely together, by the end of the day, combined arms and tank formations broke through the main line of defense on the front of 26 km and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

The next day, the main forces of both tank armies were introduced into the battle. Soviet troops repulsed all enemy counterattacks and completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense. In two days, the troops of the shock group of the front advanced 15-20 km. Part of the enemy forces began to retreat across the Spree River. To ensure the combat operations of the tank armies, most of the forces of the 2nd Air Army were involved. Attack aircraft destroyed the firepower and manpower of the enemy, and bomber aircraft struck at his reserves.

On the Dresden direction, the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army under the command of General K.K. Sverchevsky and the 52nd Army of General K.A. K. Kimbara and I.P. Korchagina also completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and in two days of hostilities advanced in some areas up to 20 km.

The successful offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front created for the enemy the threat of a deep bypass of his Berlin grouping from the south. The Nazis concentrated their efforts in order to delay the advance of the Soviet troops at the turn of the Spree River. They also sent the reserves of Army Group Center and the retreating troops of the 4th Panzer Army here. However, the enemy's attempts to change the course of the battle were not successful.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the night of April 18, the front commander assigned the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies under the command of Generals P. S. Rybalko and D. D. Lelyushenko the task of reaching the Spree, forcing it on the move and developing the offensive directly to Berlin from the south. The combined arms armies were ordered to carry out the tasks assigned earlier. The military council of the front drew special attention of the commanders of tank armies to the need for swift and maneuverable actions. In the directive, the front commander emphasized: “In the main direction with a tank fist, it is bolder and more resolute to break forward. Bypass cities and large settlements and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand a firm understanding that the success of tank armies depends on bold maneuver and swiftness in action. On the morning of April 18, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies reached the Spree. They, together with the 13th Army, crossed it on the move, broke through the third defensive line in a 10-kilometer section and captured a bridgehead north and south of Spremberg, where their main forces were concentrated. On April 18, the troops of the 5th Guards Army with the 4th Guards Tank Corps and in cooperation with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps crossed the Spree south of the city. On this day, the planes of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division three times Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel A. I. Pokryshkin covered the troops of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, 13th and 5th Guards Armies, crossing the Spree. During the day, in 13 air battles, the pilots of the division shot down 18 enemy aircraft. Thus, favorable conditions for a successful offensive were created in the zone of operations of the front's shock grouping.

The troops of the front, operating in the Dresden direction, repulsed strong enemy counterattacks. On this day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of General V.K. Baranov was brought into battle here.

In three days, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 30 km in the direction of the main attack. Significant assistance to the ground troops was provided by the 2nd Air Army of General S. A. Krasovsky, who during these days made 7517 sorties and shot down 155 enemy aircraft in 138 air battles.

While the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts were conducting intense combat operations to break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were completing preparations for forcing the Oder. In the lower reaches, the channel of this river is divided into two branches (Ost- and West-Oder), therefore, the troops of the front had to overcome two water barriers in succession. In order to create the best conditions for the main forces for the offensive, which was planned for April 20, the front commander decided on April 18 and 19 to cross the Ost-Oder River with advanced units, destroy the enemy’s outposts in the interfluve area and ensure that the formations of the front’s shock group occupy an advantageous starting position.

On April 18, simultaneously in the bands of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies under the command of generals P.I. Batov, V.S. Popov and I.T. smoke screens crossed the Ost-Oder, in a number of areas they overcame the enemy defenses in the interfluve and reached the banks of the West-Oder River. On April 19, the units that crossed over continued to destroy enemy units in the interfluve, concentrating on dams on the right bank of this river. The aircraft of the 4th Air Army of General K. A. Vershinin provided significant assistance to the ground forces. It suppressed and destroyed strongholds and firing points of the enemy.

By active actions in the interfluve of the Oder, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had a significant impact on the course of the Berlin operation. Having overcome the swampy floodplain of the Oder, they took an advantageous starting position for forcing the West Oder, as well as breaking through the enemy defenses along its left bank, in the sector from Stettin to Schwedt, which did not allow the fascist command to transfer formations of the 3rd Panzer Army to the zone of the 1st Belorussian front.

Thus, by April 20, generally favorable conditions had developed in the zones of all three fronts for the continuation of the operation. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed the offensive most successfully. In the course of breaking through the defenses along the Neisse and Spree, they defeated the enemy’s reserves, entered the operational space and rushed to Berlin, covering the right wing of the Frankfurt-Guben group of Nazi troops, which included part of the 4th tank and the main forces of the 9th field armies. In solving this problem, the main role was assigned to tank armies. On April 19, they advanced 30-50 km in a northwesterly direction, reached the Lübbenau, Luckau area and cut the communications of the 9th Army. All enemy attempts to break through from the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg to the crossings over the Spree and reach the rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were unsuccessful. Troops of the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies under the command of Generals V.N. 45-60 km and reach the approaches to Berlin; The 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov advanced 30 km.

The rapid offensive of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 13th Armies, by the end of April 20, led to the cutting off of the Vistula Army Group from the Center Army Group, the enemy troops in the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg were in a semi-encirclement. In the highest circles of the Wehrmacht, a commotion began when they learned that Soviet tanks had entered the Wünsdorf area (10 km south of Zossen). The headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces and the general staff of the ground forces hastily left Zossen and moved to Wanse (Potsdam region), and part of the departments and services on airplanes was transferred to South Germany. The following entry was made in the diary of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command for April 20: “For the highest command authorities, the last act of the dramatic death of the German armed forces begins ... Everything is done in a hurry, because you can already hear Russian tanks firing from cannons in the distance ... Depressed mood."

The rapid development of the operation made a quick meeting of Soviet and American-British troops real. At the end of April 20, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent a directive to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, as well as the commander of the Air Force, armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet army. It indicated that it was necessary to install signs and signals for mutual identification. By agreement with the allied command, the commanders of the tank and combined arms armies were ordered to determine a temporary tactical dividing line between the Soviet and American-British units in order to avoid mixing troops.

Continuing the offensive in a northwestern direction, by the end of April 21, the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front overcame enemy resistance in separate strongholds and came close to the outer contour of the Berlin defensive area. Given the upcoming nature of hostilities in such a large city as Berlin, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to reinforce the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. artillery division and the 2nd Fighter Aviation Corps. In addition, two rifle divisions of the 28th army of General A. A. Luchinsky, brought into battle from the second echelon of the front, were transferred by motor transport.

On the morning of April 22, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, having deployed all three corps in the first echelon, began an attack on enemy fortifications. Army troops broke through the outer defensive bypass of the Berlin region and by the end of the day started fighting on the southern outskirts of the German capital. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front broke into its northeastern outskirts the day before.

The action is more to the left of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the General AېRD. By the end of April 22, D. Lelyushenko also broke through the outer defensive contour and, having reached the line of Zarmund, Belits, took an advantageous position for connecting with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and completing, together with them, the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy grouping. Its 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards Armies, by this time had reached the Belitz, Treyenbritzen, Tsana line. As a result, the path to Berlin was closed to enemy reserves from the west and southwest. In Treuenbritzen, the tankers of the 4th Guards Tank Army rescued from fascist captivity about 1600 prisoners of war of various nationalities: British, Americans and Norwegians, including the former commander of the Norwegian army, General O. Ryge. A few days later, the soldiers of the same army released from the concentration camp (in the suburbs of Berlin) the former French Prime Minister E. Herriot - the famous statesman, who back in the 1920s advocated a Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

Using the success of the tankers, the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards armies quickly advanced westward. In an effort to slow down the advance of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front on Berlin, the fascist command on April 18 launched a counterattack from the Gorlitsa area against the troops of the 52nd Army. Having created a significant superiority in forces in this direction, the enemy tried to reach the rear of the strike group of the front. On April 19-23, fierce battles unfolded here. The enemy managed to wedge into the location of the Soviet, and then the Polish troops to a depth of 20 km. To help the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army, the 4th Guards Tank Corps were transferred and up to four aviation corps were redirected. As a result, heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy, and by the end of April 24, his advance was suspended.

While the formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were carrying out a swift maneuver to bypass the German capital from the south, the shock group of the 1st Belorussian Front was advancing directly on Berlin from the east. After breaking through the Oder line, the troops of the front, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, moved forward. On April 20, at 13:50, long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army fired the first two volleys at the fascist capital, and then systematic shelling began. By the end of April 21, the 3rd and 5th shock, as well as the 2nd Guards Tank Armies, had already overcome resistance on the outer contour of the Berlin defensive area and reached the northeastern outskirts of the city. By the morning of April 22, the 9th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Havel River, which is on the northwestern outskirts of the capital, and, in cooperation with units of the 47th Army, began to cross it. The 1st Guards Tank and 8th Guards Armies also successfully advanced, which by April 21 reached the outer defensive contour. On the morning of the next day, the main forces of the strike force of the front were already fighting the enemy directly in Berlin.

By the end of April 22, Soviet troops created the conditions for completing the encirclement and dissection of the entire Berlin enemy grouping. The distance between the advanced units of the 47th, 2nd Guards Tank Armies, advancing from the northeast, and the 4th Guards Tank Army was 40 km, and between the left flank of the 8th Guards and the right flank of the 3rd Guards Tank Army - no more than 12 km. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, assessing the current situation, demanded that the front commanders complete the encirclement of the main forces of the 9th Field Army by the end of April 24 and prevent its retreat to Berlin or to the west. In order to ensure the timely and accurate implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front brought his second echelon into battle - the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General V.V. Kryukov. In cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were supposed to cut off the main forces of the enemy's 9th Army from the capital and surround them southeast of the city. The troops of the 47th Army and the 9th Guards Tank Corps were ordered to accelerate the offensive and complete the encirclement of the entire enemy grouping in the Berlin direction no later than April 24-25. In connection with the withdrawal of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the southern outskirts of Berlin, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the night of April 23 established a new demarcation line with the 1st Belorussian Front: from Lübben to the northwest to the Anhalt station in Berlin.

The Nazis made desperate efforts to prevent the encirclement of their capital. On April 22, in the afternoon, the last operational meeting was held in the Imperial Chancellery, which was attended by V. Keitel, A. Jodl, M. Bormann, G. Krebs and others. Hitler agreed to Jodl's proposal to withdraw all troops from the western front and throw them into the battle for Berlin. In this regard, the 12th Army of General W. Wenck, which occupied defensive positions on the Elbe, was ordered to turn around to the east and advance to Potsdam, Berlin to join the 9th Army. At the same time, an army group under the command of SS General F. Steiner, which operated north of the capital, was supposed to strike at the flank of the grouping of Soviet troops, bypassing it from the north and northwest.

To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. Completely ignoring the actual state of affairs, the German command counted on the offensive of this army from the west, and the Steiner army group from the north, to prevent the complete encirclement of the city. The 12th Army, having turned its front to the east, began operations on April 24 against the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies, which occupied the defenses at the Belitz-Treuenbritzen line. The German 9th Army was ordered to withdraw to the west to join the 12th Army south of Berlin.

On April 23 and 24, hostilities in all directions took on a particularly fierce character. Although the pace of advance of the Soviet troops slowed down somewhat, the Nazis failed to stop them. The intention of the fascist command to prevent the encirclement and dismemberment of their group was thwarted. Already on April 24, the troops of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front joined with the 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front southeast of Berlin. As a result, the main forces of the 9th and part of the forces of the 4th tank armies of the enemy were cut off from the city and surrounded. The next day, after joining west of Berlin, in the Ketzin area, the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front with the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front was surrounded by the Berlin enemy group itself.

On April 25, a meeting of Soviet and American troops took place. On this day, in the Torgau area, units of the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army crossed the Elbe and established contact with the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st American Army that had approached here. Germany was divided into two parts.

The situation in the Dresden direction has also changed significantly. By April 25, the counterattack of the Görlitz grouping of the enemy was finally thwarted by the stubborn and active defense of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army. To reinforce them, the defense zone of the 52nd Army was narrowed, and to the left of it, formations of the 31st Army, which arrived at the front, under the command of General P. G. Shafranov, deployed. The released rifle corps of the 52nd Army was used in the sector of its active operations.

Thus, in just ten days, Soviet troops overcame the powerful enemy defenses along the Oder and Neisse, surrounded and dismembered his grouping in the Berlin direction and created conditions for its complete liquidation.

In connection with the successful maneuver to encircle the Berlin grouping by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there was no need to bypass Berlin from the north by the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front. As a result, already on April 23, the Headquarters ordered him to develop the offensive in accordance with the original plan of the operation, that is, in the western and northwestern directions, and with part of the forces to strike around Stettin from the west.

The offensive of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began on April 20 with the crossing of the West Oder River. Thick morning fog and smoke sharply limited the actions of Soviet aviation. However, after 09:00, visibility improved somewhat, and aviation increased support for ground troops. The greatest success during the first day of the operation was achieved in the zone of the 65th Army under the command of General P.I. Batov. By evening, she captured several small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, transporting 31 rifle battalions, part of the artillery and 15 self-propelled artillery installations there. The troops of the 70th Army under the command of General V. S. Popov also operated successfully. 12 rifle battalions were transferred to the bridgehead they captured. The forcing of the West-Oder by the troops of the 49th army of General I. T. Grishin was less successful: only on the second day did they manage to capture a small bridgehead.

In the following days, the troops of the front fought intense battles to expand their bridgeheads, repulsed enemy counterattacks, and also continued to cross their troops to the left bank of the Oder. By the end of April 25, formations of the 65th and 70th armies had completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense. In six days of hostilities, they advanced 20-22 km. The 49th Army, using the success of its neighbors, on the morning of April 26 crossed the main forces across the West-Oder along the crossings of the 70th Army and by the end of the day advanced 10-12 km. On the same day, in the zone of the 65th Army on the left bank of the West Oder, the troops of the 2nd shock army of General I.I. Fedyuninsky began to cross. As a result of the actions of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 3rd German Panzer Army was pinned down, which deprived the Nazi command of the opportunity to use its forces for operations directly in the Berlin direction.

At the end of April, the Soviet command focused all its attention on Berlin. Before its assault, party-political work unfolded with renewed vigor in the troops. As early as April 23, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front addressed an appeal to the soldiers, which said: “Before you, Soviet heroes, is Berlin. You must take Berlin, and take it as quickly as possible so as not to let the enemy come to their senses. For the honor of our Motherland forward! To Berlin!" In conclusion, the Military Council expressed full confidence that the glorious warriors would fulfill the task entrusted to them with honor. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations used any respite in the fighting to familiarize everyone with this document. Army newspapers called on the soldiers: “Forward, for a complete victory over the enemy!”, “Let's hoist the banner of our victory over Berlin!”.

During the operation, employees of the Main Political Directorate negotiated almost daily with members of the military councils and heads of political directorates of the fronts, heard their reports, and gave specific instructions and advice. The Main Political Directorate demanded that the soldiers be made aware that in Berlin they were fighting for the future of their homeland, of all peace-loving mankind.

In the newspapers, on the billboards installed along the path of the movement of Soviet troops, on guns, vehicles were inscriptions: “Comrades! The defenses of Berlin have been breached! The longed-for hour of victory is near. Forward, comrades, forward!”, “One more effort, and victory has been won!”, “The long-awaited hour has come! We are at the walls of Berlin!

And the Soviet soldiers stepped up their blows. Even the wounded soldiers did not leave the battlefield. So, in the 65th Army, more than two thousand soldiers refused to be evacuated to the rear. Soldiers and commanders daily applied for admission to the party. For example, in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, 11,776 soldiers were accepted into the party in April alone.

In this situation, special care was shown to further increase the feeling of responsibility for the performance of combat missions among the command staff, so that the officers would not lose control of the battle for a minute. All available forms, methods and means of party political work supported the initiative of the soldiers, their resourcefulness and audacity in battle. Party and Komsomol organizations helped the commanders to concentrate their efforts in a timely manner where success was expected, and the Communists were the first to launch attacks and drag along non-Party comrades. “What strength of mind and desire to win had to be in order to reach the goal through a smashing barrage of fire, stone and reinforced concrete barriers, overcoming numerous “surprises”, fire bags and traps, engaging in hand-to-hand combat, - recalls a member of the Military Council 1- th Belorussian Front, General K. F. Telegin. - But everyone wanted to live. But I've been brought up that way. soviet man- the common good, the happiness of his people, the glory of the Motherland is dearer to him than everything personal, dearer than life itself.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that demanded a humane attitude towards those rank and file members of the National Socialist Party who are loyal to the Soviet army, to create local administration everywhere, and to appoint burgomasters in cities.

Solving the problem of capturing Berlin, the Soviet command understood that the Frankfurt-Guben grouping, which Hitler intended to use to deblockade his capital, should not be underestimated. As a result, along with building up efforts to defeat the Berlin garrison, the Stavka considered it necessary to immediately begin the liquidation of the troops surrounded southeast of Berlin.

The Frankfurt-Guben group consisted of up to 200 thousand people. It was armed with over 2 thousand guns, more than 300 tanks and assault guns. It occupies a wooded and swampy area of ​​​​about 1500 square meters. km was very convenient for defense. Given the composition of the enemy grouping, the Soviet command involved in its liquidation the 3rd, 69th and 33rd armies and the 2nd guards cavalry corps of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 3rd guards and 28th armies, as well as the rifle corps of the 13th army 1st Ukrainian Front. The actions of the ground troops were supported by seven aviation corps. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, artillery - by 3.7 times. Since the bulk of Soviet tanks at that time fought directly in Berlin, the forces of the parties were equal in their number.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of the blocked enemy grouping in the western direction, the troops of the 28th and part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive. On the paths of a probable enemy offensive, they prepared three defensive lines, laid mines and made blockages.

On the morning of April 26, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the encircled group, trying to cut and destroy it piece by piece. The enemy not only offered stubborn resistance, but also made repeated attempts to break through to the west. So, parts of two infantry, two motorized and tank divisions struck at the junction of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies. Having created a significant superiority in forces, the Nazis broke through the defenses in a narrow area and began to move west. During fierce battles, Soviet troops closed the neck of the breakthrough, and the part that had broken through was surrounded in the Barut region and almost completely eliminated. The ground forces were greatly assisted by aviation, which made about 500 sorties during the day, destroying the enemy's manpower and equipment.

In the following days, the Nazi troops again tried to connect with the 12th Army, which, in turn, sought to overcome the defenses of the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies, operating on the outer front of the encirclement. However, all enemy attacks during April 27-28 were repelled. Given the likelihood of new attempts by the enemy to break through to the west, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front strengthened the defenses of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies and concentrated their reserves in the areas of Zossen, Luckenwalde, Yuterbog.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front at the same time (April 26-28) were pushing the encircled enemy grouping from the east. Fearing complete elimination, the Nazis on the night of April 29 again tried to break out of the encirclement. By dawn, at the cost of heavy losses, they managed to break through the main defensive zone of the Soviet troops at the junction of two fronts - in the area west of Wendisch Buchholz. On the second line of defense, their advance was stopped. But the enemy, despite heavy losses, stubbornly rushed to the west. In the second half of April 29, up to 45 thousand fascist soldiers resumed their attacks on the sector of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, broke through its defenses and formed a corridor up to 2 km wide. Through it they began to retreat to Luckenwalde. The German 12th Army attacked in the same direction from the west. There was a threat of a connection between two enemy groups. By the end of April 29, the Soviet troops by decisive actions stopped the advance of the enemy at the line of Shperenberg, Kummersdorf (12 km east of Luckenwalde). His troops were dismembered and surrounded in three separate areas. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of large enemy forces into the Kummersdorf area led to the fact that the communications of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 28th Army, were cut. The distance between the forward units of the group that had broken through and the troops of the enemy's 12th Army advancing from the west was reduced to 30 km.

Especially intense battles unfolded on April 30. Regardless of the losses, the Nazis continued the offensive and advanced 10 km to the west in a day. By the end of the day, a significant part of the troops that had broken through had been eliminated. However, one of the groups (numbering up to 20 thousand people) on the night of May 1 managed to break through at the junction of the 13th and 4th Guards Tank Armies and reach the Belitsa area, now only 3-4 km separated it from the 12th Army . To prevent the further advance of these troops to the west, the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army advanced two tank, mechanized and light artillery brigades, as well as a motorcycle regiment. During fierce battles, the 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps rendered great assistance to the ground forces.

By the end of the day, the main part of the Frankfurt-Guben grouping of the enemy was liquidated. All hopes of the fascist command to unblock Berlin collapsed. Soviet troops captured 120,000 soldiers and officers, captured more than 300 tanks and assault guns, over 1,500 field guns, 17,600 vehicles and many different military equipment. Only the killed enemy lost 60 thousand people. Only insignificant scattered groups of the enemy managed to seep through the forest and go to the west. Part of the troops of the 12th Army who survived the defeat retreated to the left bank of the Elbe along the bridges built by the American troops and surrendered to them.

In the Dresden direction, the fascist German command did not abandon its intention to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops in the Bautzen area and go to the rear of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Having regrouped their troops, the Nazis launched an offensive on the morning of April 26 with the forces of four divisions. Despite heavy losses, the enemy did not reach the goal, his offensive was stopped. Until April 30, stubborn battles continued here, but there was no significant change in the position of the parties. The Nazis, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went over to the defensive in this direction.

Thus, thanks to stubborn and active defense, the Soviet troops not only thwarted the enemy’s plan to go behind the lines of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, but also captured bridgeheads on the Elbe in the Meissen and Riesa area, which later served as an advantageous starting area for an attack on Prague.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Berlin reached its climax. The garrison, which was constantly increasing by attracting the population of the city and the retreating military units, already numbered 300 thousand people. It was armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 250 tanks. By the end of April 25, the enemy occupied the territory of the capital, together with the suburbs with a total area of ​​325 square meters. km. Most of all, the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Berlin were fortified. Strong barricades crossed the streets and lanes. Everything adapted to the defense, even the destroyed buildings. The underground structures of the city were widely used: bomb shelters, metro stations and tunnels, sewers and other objects. Reinforced concrete bunkers were built, the largest for 300-1000 people each, as well as a large number of reinforced concrete caps.

By April 26, the troops of the 47th Army, the 3rd and 5th shock, the 8th Guards Combined Arms, the 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In total, they included about 464 thousand people, over 12.7 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, up to 2.1 thousand rocket artillery installations, about 1500 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.

The Soviet command abandoned the offensive along the entire circumference of the city, as this could lead to excessive dispersal of forces and a decrease in the pace of advance, and concentrated its efforts on separate directions. Thanks to this peculiar tactic of "driving" deep wedges into the enemy's position, his defense was divided into separate parts, and command and control was paralyzed. This mode of action increased the pace of the offensive and ultimately led to effective results.

Taking into account the experience of previous battles for large settlements, the Soviet command ordered the creation of assault detachments in each division as part of reinforced battalions or companies. Each such detachment, in addition to infantry, included artillery, tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, sappers, and often flamethrowers. It was intended for action in any one direction, which usually included one street, or an assault large object. To capture smaller objects from the same detachments, assault groups were allocated from a rifle squad to a platoon, reinforced with 2-4 guns, 1-2 tanks or self-propelled artillery mounts, as well as sappers and flamethrowers.

The beginning of the actions of assault detachments and groups, as a rule, was preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation. Before attacking a fortified building, the assault detachment was usually divided into two groups. One of them, under cover of tank and artillery fire, burst into the building, blocked the exits from the basement, which served as shelter for the Nazis during the artillery preparation, and then destroyed them with grenades and bottles of flammable liquid. The second group cleared the upper floors of submachine gunners and snipers.

The specific conditions of warfare in a large city led to a number of features in the use of combat arms. Thus, artillery destruction groups were created in divisions and corps, and long-range groups in combined arms armies. A significant part of the artillery was used for direct fire. The experience of previous battles has shown that tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts can only advance if they cooperate closely with the infantry and under its cover. Attempts to use tanks on their own led to their heavy losses from artillery fire and faustpatrons. Due to the fact that Berlin was shrouded in smoke during the assault, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. Therefore, the main forces of bomber and attack aircraft were used to destroy the Frankfurt-Guben grouping, and fighter aircraft carried out an air blockade of the Nazi capital. The most powerful strikes on military targets in the city were delivered by aviation on the 25th and on the night of April 26th. The 16th and 18th air armies carried out three massive strikes, in which 2049 aircraft took part.

After the Soviet troops captured the airfields in Tempelhof and Gatow, the Nazis tried to use Charlottenburgstrasse for landing their planes. However, these enemy calculations were thwarted by the actions of the pilots of the 16th Air Army, who continuously patrolled over this area. Attempts by the Nazis to parachute cargo to the encircled troops were also unsuccessful. Most of the enemy transport aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and aviation while they were still approaching Berlin. Thus, after April 28, the Berlin garrison could no longer receive any effective outside help. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. By the end of April 26, Soviet troops had cut off the Potsdam grouping of the enemy from Berlin. The next day, formations of both fronts penetrated deeply into the enemy's defenses and began hostilities in the central sector of the capital. As a result of the concentric offensive of the Soviet troops, by the end of April 27, the enemy grouping was compressed in a narrow strip (from east to west it reached 16 km). Due to the fact that its width was only 2-3 km, the entire territory occupied by the enemy was under the continuous influence of the fire weapons of the Soviet troops. The fascist German command tried by all means to help the Berlin grouping. “Our troops on the Elbe,” the OKB diary noted, “turned their backs on the Americans in order to alleviate the position of the defenders of Berlin with their offensive from the outside.” However, by the end of April 28, the encircled grouping was divided into three parts. By this time, attempts by the Wehrmacht command to help the Berlin garrison with strikes from outside had finally failed. The political and moral state of the fascist troops fell sharply.

On this day, Hitler subordinated the General Staff of the Ground Forces to the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command, hoping to restore the integrity of command and control. Instead of General G. Heinrici, accused of unwillingness to help encircled Berlin, General K. Student was appointed commander of the Vistula Army Group.

After April 28, the struggle continued with unrelenting force. Now it has flared up in the Reichstag area, for which the troops of the 3rd Shock Army began fighting on April 29. The Reichstag garrison, consisting of 1 thousand soldiers and officers, was armed with a large number of guns, machine guns and faustpatrons. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various barriers were set up, machine-gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

The task of taking over the Reichstag building was assigned to the 79th Rifle Corps of General S. N. Perevertkin. Having captured the Moltke bridge on the night of April 29, by 4 o’clock on April 30, parts of the corps captured a large resistance center - the house where the Ministry of the Interior of Nazi Germany and the Swiss Embassy were located, and went directly to the Reichstag. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks by the 150th and 171st rifle divisions of General V.M. Shatilov and Colonel A.I. D. Plekhodanov and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major VD Shatalin, burst into the building. Soldiers, sergeants and officers of the battalions of captains S. A. Neustroev and V. I. Davydov, senior lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov, as well as separate groups of Major M. M. covered themselves with unfading glory. Bondar, Captain V.N. Makov and others.

Together with the infantry units, the Reichstag was stormed by the valiant tankmen of the 23rd Tank Brigade. The commanders of tank battalions, Major I. L. Yartsev and Captain S. V. Krasovsky, the commander of a tank company, Senior Lieutenant P. E. Nuzhdin, the commander of a tank platoon, Lieutenant A. K. Romanov, and the assistant commander of a reconnaissance platoon, Senior Sergeant N. V. glorified their names. Kapustin, tank commander senior lieutenant A. G. Gaganov, drivers senior sergeant P. E. Lavrov and foreman I. N. Kletnay, gunner senior sergeant M. G. Lukyanov and many others.

The Nazis offered fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued on the stairs and in the corridors. The assault units meter by meter, room by room cleared the Reichstag building from the Nazis. The fighting continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, who had settled in the compartments of the cellars, capitulated only on the night of May 2.

Early in the morning of May 1, on the pediment of the Reichstag, near the sculptural group, the Red Banner was already fluttering, handed over to the commander of the 150th Infantry Division by the Military Council of the 3rd Shock Army. It was hoisted by scouts of the 756th Infantry Regiment of the 150th Infantry Division M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria, headed by Lieutenant A.P. Berest, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, with the support of machine gunners of the company I. Ya. Syanov. This Banner symbolically embodied all the banners and flags that were hoisted by the groups of Captain V.N. Makov, Lieutenant R. Koshkarbaev, Major M.M. Bondar and many other soldiers during the most fierce battles. From the main entrance of the Reichstag to the roof, their heroic path was marked by red banners, flags and flags, as if now merged into a single Banner of Victory. It was the triumph of the victory won, the triumph of the courage and heroism of the Soviet soldiers, the greatness of the feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people.

“And when a red banner, hoisted by the hands of Soviet soldiers, hoisted over the Reichstag,” said L. I. Brezhnev, “it was not only the banner of our military victory. It was the immortal banner of October; it was the great banner of Lenin; it was the invincible banner of socialism - a bright symbol of hope, a symbol of freedom and happiness of all peoples!

On April 30, the Nazi troops in Berlin were actually divided into four isolated units of different composition, and command and control of the troops was paralyzed. The last hopes of the fascist German command for the liberation of the Berlin garrison by the forces of Wenck, Steiner and Busse were dispelled. Panic began among the fascist leadership. To avoid responsibility for the atrocities committed, on April 30, Hitler committed suicide. In order to hide this from the army, the fascist radio reported that the Fuhrer had been killed at the front near Berlin. On the same day in Schleswig-Holstein, Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Doenitz, appointed a "provisional imperial government", which, as subsequent events showed, was trying to reach contact with the United States and England on an anti-Soviet basis.

However, the days of Nazi Germany were already numbered. By the end of April 30, the position of the Berlin grouping had become catastrophic. At 3 o'clock on May 1, the chief of the general staff of the German ground forces, General Krebs, by agreement with the Soviet command, crossed the front line in Berlin and was received by the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General V. I. Chuikov. Krebs announced Hitler's suicide, and also handed over a list of members of the new imperial government and the proposal of Goebbels and Bormann for a temporary cessation of hostilities in the capital in order to prepare the conditions for peace negotiations between Germany and the USSR. However, this document did not say anything about surrender. This was the last attempt by the fascist leaders to split the anti-Hitler coalition. But the Soviet command unraveled this plan of the enemy.

Krebs' message was reported through Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The answer was extremely brief: to force the Berlin garrison to surrender immediately and unconditionally. The negotiations did not affect the intensity of the fighting in Berlin. The Soviet troops continued to actively advance, striving for the complete capture of the enemy capital, and the Nazis - to put up stubborn resistance. At 18 o'clock it became known that the fascist leaders had rejected the demand for unconditional surrender. In this way, they once again demonstrated their complete indifference to the fate of millions of ordinary Germans.

The Soviet command ordered the troops to complete the liquidation of the enemy group in Berlin as soon as possible. Half an hour later, all the artillery hit the enemy. The fighting continued throughout the night. When the remnants of the garrison were divided into isolated groups, the Nazis realized that resistance was useless. On the night of May 2, the commander of the defense of Berlin, General G. Weidling, announced to the Soviet command that the 56th Panzer Corps, which was directly subordinate to him, had surrendered. At 6 o'clock, having crossed the front line in the band of the 8th Guards Army, he surrendered. At the suggestion of the Soviet command, Weidling signed an order for the Berlin garrison to cease resistance and lay down their arms. Somewhat later, a similar order on behalf of the "provisional imperial government" was signed by Goebbels' first deputy G. Fritsche. Due to the fact that the control of the Nazi troops in Berlin was paralyzed, the orders of Weidling and Fritsche could not be brought to all units and formations. Therefore, from the morning of May 2, separate groups of the enemy continued to resist and even tried to break out of the city to the west. Only after the announcement of the order on the radio did mass capitulation begin. By 15 o'clock the enemy had completely ceased resistance in Berlin. On that day alone, Soviet troops captured up to 135 thousand people in the city area.

The figures cited convincingly testify that the Hitlerite leadership attracted considerable forces for the defense of its capital. The Soviet troops fought against a large enemy group, and not against the civilian population, as some bourgeois falsifiers claim. The battles for Berlin were fierce and, as Hitler's general E. Butlar wrote after the war, "cost heavy losses not only to the Germans, but also to the Russians ...".

During the operation, millions of Germans were convinced by their own experience of the humane attitude of the Soviet army towards the civilian population. Fierce fighting continued on the streets of Berlin, and Soviet soldiers shared hot food with children, women and the elderly. By the end of May, ration cards were issued to the entire population of Berlin and food distribution was organized. Although these norms were still small, the inhabitants of the capital received more food than recently under Hitler. No sooner had the artillery salvos died down than work began on the establishment of the urban economy. Under the guidance of military engineers and technicians, Soviet soldiers, together with the population, restored the metro by the beginning of June, and trams were launched. The city received water, gas, electricity. Life was back to normal. The dope of Goebbels' propaganda about the monstrous atrocities that the Soviet army allegedly brings to the Germans began to dissipate. “The innumerable noble deeds of the Soviet people will never be forgotten, who, while still holding a rifle in one hand, were already sharing a piece of bread with the other, helping our people overcome the terrible consequences of the war unleashed by the Hitlerite clique and take the fate of the country into their own hands, clearing the way for the enslaved and enslaved by imperialism and fascism to the German working class ... "- this is how, 30 years later, the Minister of National Defense of the GDR, General G. Hoffmann, assessed the actions of Soviet soldiers.

Simultaneously with the end of hostilities in Berlin, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to regroup in the Prague direction to complete the task of completing the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced westward and by May 7 reached the Elbe on a broad front .

During the assault on Berlin in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg, a successful offensive was launched by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. By the end of May 2, they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and the next day, advancing to the line of Wismar, Schwerin, the Elbe River, they established contact with the 2nd British Army. The liberation of the islands of Wollin, Usedom and Rügen ended the offensive operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Even at the final stage of the operation, the troops of the front entered into operational-tactical cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: the aviation of the fleet provided effective support to the ground troops advancing in the coastal direction, especially in the battles for the naval base of Swinemünde. Landed on the Danish island of Bornholm, the amphibious assault disarmed and captured the Nazi troops stationed there.

The defeat of the enemy's Berlin grouping by the Soviet army and the capture of Berlin were the final act in the struggle against fascist Germany. With the fall of the capital, she lost all possibility of conducting an organized armed struggle and soon capitulated.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, won a world-historic victory.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 12 tank, 11 motorized divisions and most of the Wehrmacht aviation. About 480 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, as well as 4.5 thousand aircraft were captured as trophies.

Together with the Soviet soldiers, soldiers and officers of the Polish Army took an active part in the defeat of this group. Both Polish armies operated in the first operational echelon of the Soviet fronts, 12.5 thousand Polish soldiers participated in the storming of Berlin. Above the Brandenburg Gate, next to the victorious Soviet Red Banner, they hoisted their national banner. It was the triumph of the Soviet-Polish military commonwealth.

The Berlin operation is one of the largest operations of World War II. It was characterized by exceptionally high intensity of the struggle on both sides. Poisoned by false propaganda and intimidated by cruel repressions, the fascist troops resisted with extraordinary stubbornness. The heavy losses of the Soviet troops also testify to the degree of fierceness of the fighting. From April 16 to May 8, they lost more than 102 thousand people. Meanwhile, the American-British troops on the entire Western Front lost 260,000 men during 1945.

As in previous battles, in the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers showed high combat skill, courage and mass heroism. More than 600 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was awarded the third, and Marshals of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and K.K. Rokossovsky the second Gold Star medal. The second Gold Star medal was awarded to V. I. Andrianov, S. E. Artemenko, P. I. Batov, T. Ya. Begeldinov, D. A. Dragunsky, A. N. Efimov, S. I. Kretov, M. V. Kuznetsov, I. Kh. Mikhailichenko, M. P. Odintsov, V. S. Petrov, P. A. Plotnikov, V. I. Popkov, A. I. Rodimtsev, V. G. Ryazanov, E. Ya. Savitsky, V. V. Senko, Z. K. Slyusarenko, N. G. Stolyarov, E. P. Fedorov, M. G. Fomichev. 187 units and formations received the names of Berlin. Only from the composition of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, 1141 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, many units and formations were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and 1082 thousand participants in the assault were awarded the medal "For the Capture of Berlin", established in honor of this historical victory.

The Berlin operation made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of Soviet military art. It was prepared and carried out on the basis of comprehensive consideration and creative use of the richest experience of the Soviet Armed Forces accumulated during the war. At the same time, the military art of the Soviet troops in this operation has a number of features.

The operation was prepared in a short time, and its main goals - the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy grouping and the capture of Berlin - were achieved in 16-17 days. Noting this feature, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “The pace of preparation and implementation of the final operations indicates that the Soviet military economy and the Armed Forces had reached such a level by 1945 that it made it possible to do what would previously have seemed like a miracle.”

The limited preparation time for such a major operation required commanders and staffs of all levels to adopt new, more efficient forms and methods of work. Not only in the fronts and armies, but also in the corps and divisions, the parallel method of work of commanders and staffs was usually used. In all command and staff instances, the rule worked out in previous operations was steadily observed to give the troops as much time as possible for their direct preparation for combat operations.

The Berlin operation is distinguished by the clarity of the strategic plan, which fully corresponded to the tasks set and the specifics of the current situation. It is a classic example of an offensive by a group of fronts, carried out with such a decisive goal. During this operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest grouping of enemy troops in the history of wars.

The simultaneous offensive of three fronts in a 300-kilometer zone with six strikes fettered the enemy's reserves, contributed to the disorganization of his command and in a number of cases made it possible to achieve operational-tactical surprise.

The Soviet art of war in the Berlin operation is characterized by a decisive massing of forces and assets in the directions of the main strikes, the creation of high densities of means of suppression and the deep echeloning of combat formations of troops, which ensured a relatively quick breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the subsequent encirclement and destruction of his main forces and the preservation of general superiority over enemy throughout the operation.

The Berlin operation is very instructive from the experience of the diverse combat use of armored and mechanized troops. It involved 4 tank armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized corps, 16 separate tank and self-propelled artillery brigades, as well as more than 80 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The operation once again clearly demonstrated the expediency of not only tactical, but also operational massing of armored and mechanized troops in the most important areas. The creation in the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts of powerful success development echelons (each consisting of two tank armies) is the most important prerequisite for the successful conduct of the entire operation, which once again confirmed that tank armies and corps, if used correctly, are the main means of developing success.

The combat use of artillery in the operation was characterized by its skillful massaging in the directions of the main strikes, the creation of artillery groups in all organizational units - from the regiment to the army, the central planning of the artillery offensive, the wide maneuver of artillery, including large artillery formations, and the steady fire superiority over the enemy. .

The art of the Soviet command in the use of aviation was manifested primarily in its massing and close cooperation with the ground forces, to support which the main efforts of all air armies, including long-range aviation, were directed. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation firmly held air supremacy. In 1317 air battles, 1132 enemy aircraft were shot down. The defeat of the main forces of the 6th air fleet and the Reich air fleet was completed in the first five days of the operation, and subsequently the rest of the aviation was finished off. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation destroyed the enemy's defenses, destroyed and suppressed his firepower and manpower. Working closely with combined-arms formations, she struck at the enemy day and night, bombarded his troops on the roads and on the battlefield, when they advanced from the depths and when leaving the encirclement, disrupted control. The use of the Air Force was characterized by the centralization of their control, the timeliness of redeployment, and the continuous buildup of efforts in solving the main tasks. Ultimately, the combat use of aviation in the Berlin operation most fully expressed the essence of that form of warfare, which during the war years was called an air offensive.

In the operation under consideration, the art of organizing interaction was further improved. The foundations of strategic cooperation were laid down during the development of its concept through careful coordination of the actions of the fronts and services of the Armed Forces in the interests of successfully accomplishing the main operational-strategic tasks. As a rule, the interaction of the fronts within the framework of a strategic operation was also stable.

The Berlin operation gave interesting experience use of the Dnieper military flotilla. Noteworthy is its skillfully carried out maneuver from the Western Bug and Pripyat to the Oder. In difficult hydrographic conditions, the flotilla made more than 500-kilometer passage in 20 days. Part of the ships of the flotilla was transported by rail over distances exceeding 800 km. And this took place in conditions when there were 75 operating and destroyed crossings, railway and highway bridges, locks and other hydraulic structures on the way of their movement, and in 48 places clearing of the ship's passage was required. In close operational-tactical cooperation with the ground forces, the ships of the flotilla solved various tasks. They participated in artillery preparation, assisted the advancing troops in forcing water barriers and actively participated in the battles for Berlin on the Spree River.

The political bodies showed great skill in ensuring the combat activity of the troops. The intense and purposeful work of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations ensured an exceptionally high morale and offensive impulse among all the soldiers and contributed to the solution of the historical task - the victorious end of the war with Nazi Germany.

The successful conduct of one of the last operations of the Second World War in Europe was also ensured by a high level of strategic leadership, the art of military leadership by the commanders of the fronts and armies. Unlike most previous strategic operations, where the coordination of the fronts was entrusted to representatives of the Headquarters, in the Berlin operation, the overall command of the troops was carried out directly by the Supreme High Command. The Headquarters and the General Staff have shown particularly high skill and flexibility in leading the Soviet Armed Forces. They timely set tasks for the fronts and services of the Armed Forces, refined them during the offensive depending on changes in the situation, organized and supported operational-strategic cooperation, skillfully used strategic reserves, continuously replenished the troops with personnel, weapons and military equipment.

Evidence of the high level of Soviet military art and the skill of military leaders in the Berlin operation was the successful solution of the complex problem of logistical support for the troops. The limited time for preparing the operation and the high expenditure of material resources, due to the nature of the hostilities, required great tension in the work of the rear services of all levels. Suffice it to say that during the operation, the troops of the three fronts used up over 7,200 wagons of ammunition and from 2-2.5 (diesel fuel) to 7-10 (aviation gasoline) front-line fuel refueling. The successful solution of logistic support was achieved mainly due to the sharp approach of material reserves to the troops and the widespread use of road transport to bring in the necessary supplies. Even during the preparation of the operation, more materiel was brought by road than by rail. Thus, 238.4 thousand tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants were delivered to the 1st Belorussian Front by rail, and 333.4 thousand tons by front and army vehicles.

Military topographers made a great contribution to ensuring the combat operations of the troops. In a timely and complete manner, the military topographic service provided the troops with topographic and special maps, prepared initial geodetic data for artillery fire, took an active part in deciphering aerial photographs, and determined the coordinates of targets. Only the troops and headquarters of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were issued 6.1 million copies of maps, 15 thousand aerial photographs were deciphered, the coordinates of about 1.6 thousand support and artillery networks were determined, geodetic binding of 400 artillery batteries was made. In order to ensure the fighting in Berlin, the topographic service of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared a relief plan of the city, which proved to be of great help to the headquarters in preparing and conducting the operation.

The Berlin operation went down in history as a victorious crown of that difficult and glorious path that the Soviet Armed Forces, led by the Communist Party, traveled. The operation was carried out with the full satisfaction of the needs of the fronts with military equipment, weapons and material and technical means. The heroic rear supplied its soldiers with everything that was necessary for the final defeat of the enemy. This is one of the clearest and most convincing testimonies of the high organization and power of the economy of the Soviet socialist state.

On April 23, Hitler was informed that the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, Weidling, had moved his headquarters and was already west of Berlin, although he had to defend it. Based on this rumor, Hitler ordered the general to be shot. But he came straight to the bunker where the top leadership was hiding Nazi Reich, and reported that his headquarters was almost at the forefront. Then Hitler changed his mind about shooting Weidling, and on April 24 he appointed him commander of the defense of Berlin. “It would have been better if Hitler had upheld the order to execute me,” Weidling said upon learning the news. But he accepted the appointment.

Berlin militia. (topwar.ru)

It turned out that Hitler was impressed by the courage of the general who did not run from the front line. After all, he no longer had practically a single worthy commander left to defend the city, which he planned to turn into a German version of the battle for Moscow: to defeat the Soviet army in a defensive battle and go on the counteroffensive. Hitler persisted to the last: "If Berlin falls into the hands of the enemy, then the war will be lost." Of course, the Fuhrer's crazy plans could not have been realized even by the best commander.

Day after day, the German defense forces, glued together from the remnants of broken and battered units, from the militias and teenagers of the Hitler Youth, retreated and surrendered. Every day Weidling reported to Hitler on the situation. On April 30, when it became clear even to Hitler that the fight was futile, he killed his beloved dog, and then he and his wife Eva Hitler (Brown) committed suicide. Upon learning of this, on the morning of May 2, General Weidling surrendered to the Russians, signed the act of surrender and ordered the remaining German troops in Berlin to cease resistance. The battle for Berlin is over. On May 3, 1945, Weidling was already testifying to Soviet investigators at the Intelligence Staff of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Weidling, like many officers, complained about the degradation of the German command during the war, caused by Hitler’s desire to personally control the actions of all troops: “I must note that the Russians took a long step forward in the tactical sense during the war, but our command stepped back. Our generals are "paralyzed" in their actions, the corps commander, the army commander and partially the commander of the army group did not have any independence in their actions. The commander of the army does not have the right to transfer the battalion from one sector to another at his own discretion without the sanction of Hitler. Such a system of troop leadership has repeatedly led to the death of entire formations. There is no need to even talk about the commanders of divisions and corps, they were generally deprived of the opportunity to act according to the situation, to take the initiative, everything must be done according to the plan from above, and these plans often did not correspond to the situation at the front.

Weidling testified that although food and ammunition were available in Berlin for 30 days, they could not be delivered normally, and the warehouses located on the outskirts were captured by Soviet troops. 4 days after being appointed commander of the defense, Weidling's troops had practically nothing to resist.

Question: What were Hitler's orders regarding the defense of Berlin? Light up the situation in Berlin at the time of your surrender.

Answer: Having been appointed commander of the defense of Berlin, I received an order from Hitler to defend Berlin to the last man. It was clear to me from the very first moment that there was no way to defend Berlin with the hope of success. Every day the position of the defenders worsened, the Russians squeezed the ring around us more and more, every day getting closer and closer to the city center. I reported daily to Hitler in the evening the situation and the situation.

By April 29, the situation with ammunition and food became very difficult, especially with ammunition. I realized that further resistance, from a military point of view, is insane and criminal. On the evening of April 29, after an hour and a half report by me to Hitler, in which I emphasized that there was no way to continue resistance, that all hopes for air supplies had collapsed, Hitler agreed with me and told me that he had given special orders for the transfer of ammunition by aircraft, and that if on April 30 the situation with the delivery of ammunition and food by air does not improve, he will give sanction for the abandonment of Berlin, for an attempt by the troops to break through.

This was the last meeting between Weidling and Hitler. The next day, he committed suicide and gave the general freedom of action, which he immediately took advantage of: “I gave the order to the units, who can and wants to, let them break through, the rest to lay down their arms. On May 1, at 21:00, I gathered the employees of the headquarters of the 56th TK and the employees of the Berlin defense headquarters in order to decide whether the headquarters would break through or surrender to the Russians. I declared that further resistance was useless, that to break out of the cauldron means, if successful, to get from the "cauldron" to the "cauldron". All the employees of the headquarters supported me, and on the night of May 2 I sent Colonel von Dufing as a truce to the Russians with a proposal to stop the resistance by the German troops. […] Although I was the commander of the defense of Berlin, the situation in Berlin was such that after my decision, I felt safe only with the Russians.

Later, General Helmut Weidling was convicted by the Soviet investigation and confessed to war crimes committed under his command on the territory of the USSR. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He died in 1955 in the Vladimir Central and was buried there.

Never before in world history has such a powerful citadel been taken in such a short time: in just a week. German command carefully thought out and perfectly prepared the city for defense. Six-story stone bunkers, pillboxes, bunkers, tanks dug into the ground, fortified houses in which “faustniks” settled down, representing a mortal danger to our tanks. The center of Berlin with the Spree River, cut by canals, was especially strongly fortified.

The Nazis sought to prevent the Red Army from seizing the capital, knowing that the Anglo-American troops were preparing an offensive in the direction of Berlin. However, the degree of preference for surrender to the Anglo-Americans, rather than the Soviet troops, was greatly exaggerated in the Soviet era. On April 4, 1945, J. Goebbels wrote in his diary:

The main task of the press and radio is to explain to the German people that the Western enemy is hatching the same vile plans for the destruction of the nation as the Eastern one ... We must again and again point out that Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin will ruthlessly and regardless of anything carry out their deadly plans, as soon as the Germans show weakness and submit to the enemy ...».

Soldiers of the Eastern Front, if in the coming days and hours each of you fulfills his duty to the Fatherland, we will stop and defeat the Asian hordes at the gates of Berlin. We foresaw this blow and countered it with a front of unprecedented power... Berlin will remain German, Vienna will be German...».

Another thing is that the anti-Soviet propaganda among the Nazis was much more sophisticated than against the Anglo-Americans, and the local population of the eastern regions of Germany experienced panic at the approach of the Red Army, and Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were in a hurry to break through to the West to surrender there. Therefore, I.V. Stalin hurried the Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov as soon as possible to begin the assault on Berlin. It began on the night of April 16 with the most powerful artillery preparation and the blinding of the enemy by a multitude of anti-aircraft searchlights. After long and stubborn battles, Zhukov's troops captured the Seelow Heights, the main German defensive point on the way to Berlin. Meanwhile, the tank army of Colonel-General P.S. Rybalko, having crossed the Spree, advanced on Berlin from the south. In the north, on April 21, the tankers of Lieutenant General S.M. Krivoshein were the first to break into the outskirts of the German capital.

The Berlin garrison fought with the desperation of the doomed. It was obvious that he could not resist the deadly fire of Soviet heavy 203 mm howitzers, nicknamed by the Germans "Stalin's sledgehammer", "Katyusha" volleys and constant air bombardment. Soviet troops acted on the streets of the city in the highest degree professionally: assault groups with the help of tanks knocked out the enemy from fortified points. This allowed the Red Army to suffer relatively small losses. Step by step, Soviet troops approached the government center of the Third Reich. Krivoshein's tank corps successfully crossed the Spree and connected with the units of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing from the south, encircling Berlin.

The captured defenders of Berlin are members of the Volksshurm (detachment militia). Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Who defended Berlin from the Soviet troops in May 1945? The Berlin Defense Headquarters urged the population to prepare for street fighting on the ground and underground, using the metro lines, sewer network and underground communications. 400 thousand Berliners were mobilized for the construction of fortifications. Goebbels began to form two hundred Volkssturm battalions and women's brigades. 900 square kilometers of city blocks turned into "impregnable fortress Berlin".

The most combat-ready divisions of the Waffen-SS fought in the southern and western directions. The newly formed XI Panzer Army under the command of SS-Oberstgruppenführer F. Steiner operated near Berlin, which included all the surviving SS units of the city garrison, reservists, teachers and cadets of the "SS Junker Schools", personnel of the Berlin headquarters and numerous SS departments.

However, in the course of fierce battles with the Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Steiner's division suffered such heavy losses that he, in his own words, "remained a general without an army." Thus, the main part of the Berlin garrison was made up of all kinds of improvised battle groups, and not regular formations of the Wehrmacht. The largest division of the SS troops with which the Soviet troops had to fight was the SS division Nordland, its full name is the XI Volunteer SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. It was recruited mainly from volunteers from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. In 1945, the division included the Danmark and Norge grenadier regiments, Dutch volunteers were sent to the emerging SS Nederland division.

Berlin was also defended by the French SS division "Charlemagne" ("Charlemagne"), the Belgian divisions of the SS "Langemark" and "Wallonia". On April 29, 1945, for the destruction of several Soviet tanks, a young native of Paris from the SS Charlemagne division, Unterscharführer Eugene Valo, was awarded the order Knight's Cross, becoming one of his last holders. On May 2, a month before his 22nd birthday, Vajo died on the streets of Berlin. The commander of the LVII battalion from the Charlemagne division, Haupsturmführer Henri Fene, wrote in his memoirs:

Berlin has a French street and a French church. They are named after the Huguenots, who fled from religious oppression and settled in Prussia at the beginningXVIIcentury, helping to build the capital. In the middle of the 20th century, other Frenchmen came to defend the capital that their ancestors had helped build.».

On May 1, the French continued to fight on Leipziger Strasse, around the Air Ministry and at Potsdamer Platz. The French SS "Charlemagne" became the last defenders of the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery. For the day of fighting on April 28 from total number 108 Soviet tanks were shot down, the French "Charlemagne" destroyed 62. On the morning of May 2, following the announcement of the surrender of the capital of the III Reich, the last 30 Charlemagne fighters out of 300 who arrived in Berlin left the Reich Chancellery bunker, where, apart from them, no one was left alive . Along with the French, the Reichstag was defended by the Estonian SS. In addition, Lithuanians, Latvians, Spaniards and Hungarians took part in the defense of Berlin.

Members French division SS "Charlemagne" before being sent to the front. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Latvians in the 54th fighter squadron defended the Berlin sky from Soviet aviation. The Latvian legionnaires continued to fight for the Third Reich and the already dead Hitler even when the German Nazis stopped fighting. On May 1, a battalion of the XV SS Division under the command of Obersturmführer Neulands continued to defend the Reich Chancellery. The famous Russian historian V.M. Falin noted:

Berlin fell on May 2, and "local battles" ended in it ten days later ... In Berlin, SS units from 15 states resisted the Soviet troops. Along with the Germans, Norwegian, Danish, Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourg Nazis acted there».

According to the French SS man A. Fenier: “ All of Europe gathered here for the last meeting”, and, as always, against Russia.

Ukrainian nationalists also played their part in the defense of Berlin. On September 25, 1944, S. Bandera, Ya. Stetsko, A. Melnyk and 300 other Ukrainian nationalists were liberated by the Nazis from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin, where the Nazis had once placed them for too zealous agitation for the creation of an “Independent Ukrainian State”. In 1945, Bandera and Melnyk were instructed by the Nazi leadership to gather all Ukrainian nationalists in the Berlin area and defend the city from the advancing Red Army units. Bandera created Ukrainian units as part of the Volkssturm, and he himself hid in Weimar. In addition, several Ukrainian air defense groups (2.5 thousand people) operated in the Berlin area. Half of the III company of the 87th SS Grenadier Regiment "Kurmark" were Ukrainians, reservists of the XIV Grenadier Division of the SS troops "Galicia".

However, not only Europeans took part in the Berlin battle on the side of Hitler. Researcher M. Demidenkov writes:

When in May 1945 our troops were fighting on the outskirts of the Reich Chancellery, they were surprised that they came across the corpses of Asians - Tibetans. This was written about in the 50s, however, briefly, and was mentioned as a curiosity. The Tibetans fought to the last bullet, shot their wounded, did not surrender. Not a single living Tibetan in the form of the SS left».

In the memoirs of veterans of the Great Patriotic War, there is information that after the fall of Berlin, corpses were found in the Reich Chancellery in a rather strange form: the cut was everyday SS troops (not field), but the color was dark brown, and there were no runes in the buttonholes. Those killed were clearly Asians and pronounced Mongoloids with rather dark skin. They apparently died in battle.

It should be noted that the Nazis conducted several expeditions to Tibet along the Ahnenerbe line and established strong, friendly relations and a military alliance with the leadership of one of the largest religious movements in Tibet. Permanent radio communications and an air bridge were established between Tibet and Berlin; a small German mission and a guard company from the SS troops remained in Tibet.

In May 1945, our people crushed not just a military enemy, not just Nazi Germany. Nazi Europe was defeated, another European Union, previously created by Charles of Sweden and Napoleon. How can one not recall here the eternal lines of A.S. Pushkin?

The tribes went

Trouble Russia threatening;

Wasn't all of Europe here?

And whose star led her! ..

But we have become the fifth solid

And breast took the pressure

Tribes obedient to the will of the proud,

And it was an unequal dispute.

But no less relevant today is the following stanza from the same poem:

Your disastrous escape

Boasting, they have forgotten now;

Forgot Russian bayonet and snow

Buried their glory in the wilderness.

A familiar feast beckons them again

- The blood of the Slavs is intoxicating for them;

But it will be hard for them to hangover;

But the guests' sleep will be long

On a cramped, cold housewarming party,

Under the grass of the northern fields!

April 16, 1945 began the last, decisive military operation of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. The final destination is Berlin. It turned into a race of fronts, illuminated by Georgy Zhukov's searchlights.

When did the war end?

The Red Army could start the operation to capture Berlin as early as the beginning of February 1945, at least the Allies thought so. Western experts believe that the Kremlin has postponed the attack on Berlin in order to delay hostilities. Many Soviet commanders spoke about the possibility of the Berlin operation in February 1945. Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov writes:

“As for risk, in war it is often necessary to take it. But in this case, the risk was well justified.”

The Soviet leadership deliberately delayed the attack on Berlin. There were objective reasons for this. The position of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts after the Vistula-Oder operation was complicated by the lack of ammunition and fuel. The artillery and aviation of both fronts was so weakened that the troops were not able to advance. Having postponed the Berlin operation, the headquarters concentrated the main efforts of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts on defeating the East Pomeranian and Silesian enemy groupings. At the same time, it was supposed to carry out the necessary regrouping of troops and restore the dominance of Soviet aviation in the air. It took two months.

Trap for Stalin

At the end of March, Joseph Stalin decided to speed up the attack on Berlin. What prompted him to force things? Fears grew in the Soviet leadership that the Western powers were ready to start separate negotiations with Germany and end the war "by political means". Rumors reached Moscow that Heinrich Himmler was seeking, through the vice-president of the Red Cross, Folke Bernadotte, to establish contacts with representatives of the allies, and SS-Oberstgruppenführer Karl Wolf began negotiations in Switzerland with Allen Dulles on a possible partial surrender of German troops in Italy.
Stalin was even more alarmed by the message from the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Western powers, Dwight Eisenhower, dated March 28, 1945, that he was not going to take Berlin. Previously, Eisenhower had never informed Moscow about his strategic plans, but here he went out in the open. Stalin, who expected a possible betrayal by the Western powers, in his response message indicated that the areas of Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden and Vienna-Linz-Regensburg should become the junction of the Western and Soviet troops. Berlin, according to Stalin, has lost its former strategic importance. He assured Eisenhower that the Kremlin was sending secondary forces to the Berlin direction. The second half of May was called the potential date for the start of the main blow of the Soviet troops to the Western powers.

Whoever came first, that and Berlin

According to Stalin's estimates, the Berlin operation should have begun no later than April 16 and completed within 12-15 days. The question remained open as to who should capture the Nazi capital: Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and the 1st Belorussian Front or Ivan Stepanovich Konev and the 1st Ukrainian Front.

“Whoever breaks through first, let him take Berlin,” Stalin told his generals. The third commander of the Soviet armed forces, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky and his 2nd Belorussian Front, were to advance north of Berlin, go to the sea coast and defeat the enemy grouping there. Rokossovsky, like the rest of the officers of his regiment, was annoyed that he could not take part in the capture of Berlin. But there were objective reasons for this, their front was not ready for an offensive operation.

Zhukov's optical "wonder weapon"

The operation began at five in the morning (three in the morning Berlin time) with artillery preparation. Twenty minutes later, searchlights were turned on, and the infantry, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, went on the attack. With their powerful light, more than 100 anti-aircraft searchlights were supposed to blind the enemy and provide a night attack until dawn. But in practice they had the opposite effect. Colonel General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov later recalled that it was impossible to observe the battlefield from his observation post.

The reason was the unfavorable foggy weather and the cloud of smoke and dust formed after the artillery preparation, which even the light of searchlights could not break through. Some of them were faulty, the rest turned on and off. This greatly interfered with the Soviet soldiers. Many of them stopped at the first natural obstacle, waiting for dawn to cross some stream or canal. The "inventions" of Georgy Zhukov, successfully used earlier in the defense of Moscow, near Berlin, instead of benefit, brought only harm.

"Mistake" of the commander

The commander of the 1st Belorussian Army, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, believed that during the first days of the operation, he did not make a single mistake at all. The only oversight, in his opinion, was the underestimation of the complex nature of the terrain in the area of ​​​​the Seelow Heights, where the main defensive forces and equipment of the enemy were located. The battles for these heights cost Zhukov one or two days of battle. These heights slowed down the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front, increasing Konev's chances for the right to be the first to enter Berlin. But, as Zhukov expected, the Seelow Heights were soon taken by the morning of April 18, and it became possible to use all the tank formations of the 1st Belorussian formation on a wide front. The way to Berlin was open and a week later Soviet soldiers stormed the capital of the Third Reich.

Author
Vadim Ninov

The main staircase to the Reichstag. There are 15 victory rings on the barrel of a broken anti-aircraft gun. In 1954, the damaged dome of the Reichstag was demolished because it could spontaneously collapse. In 1995, work began on the construction of a new dome. Today, to take a walk in the new glass dome, tourists line up no less than the one that once was at the Lenin Mausoleum.

In February 1945, Hitler declared Berlin a fortress, and already in April, Nazi propaganda announced that Festung Berlin was the culmination of the fighting on the eastern front and should become a mighty bastion against which a furious wave of Soviet troops would break. Soviet historiography liked this statement about "Fortress Berlin" so much that it enthusiastically picked it up, multiplied it and put it as the basis for the official version of the assault on the capital of the Third Reich. But this is propaganda and pathos, and the real picture looked somewhat different.

Theoretically, the assault on Berlin could take place from two opposite directions: from the West - by the forces of the Allies and from the east - by the Red Army. This option was the most inconvenient for the Germans, because it would require the troops to be dispersed in different directions. However, in the hands of the German leadership there was a top secret plan of the Allies - "Eclipse" ("Eclipse" - an eclipse). According to this plan, all of Germany had already been divided in advance by the leadership of the USSR, England and the USA into zones of occupation. Clear boundaries on the map indicated that Berlin was withdrawing into the Soviet zone and that the Americans were to stop on the Elbe. Based on the captured plan, the German command could have strengthened its positions on the Oder at the expense of troops from the west, but this was not done in due measure. Contrary to the popular version, the troops of the 12th A Wenck did not actually turn their backs on the Americans and did not completely expose their defenses in the west, until the order of the Führer on April 22, 1945. Keitel recalled: "For several days in a row, Heinrici insistently demanded that Steiner's SS Panzer Group, and especially the Holste Corps, be subordinated to him to cover the southern flank. Jodl was categorically opposed, rightly objecting to Heinrici that he could not protect his flanks due to the rear cover of the Wenck army." But these are particulars, and the most blatant example of Hitler's tactical recklessness is the transfer of the bulk of the troops from the Ardennes not to the Oder, where the fate of Berlin and Germany was decided, but to a secondary sector in Hungary. The looming threat to Berlin was simply ignored.

The total area of ​​Berlin was 88,000 hectares. The length from west to east is up to 45 km, from north to south - more than 38 km. Only 15 percent were built up, the rest of the space was occupied by parks and gardens. The city was divided into 20 districts, of which 14 were external. The inner part of the capital was most densely built up. The districts were divided among themselves by large parks (Tiergarten, Jungfernheide, Treptow Park and others) with a total area of ​​131.2 hectares. The Spree flows through Berlin from southeast to northwest. There was a developed network of canals, especially in the northwestern and southern parts of the city, often with stone banks.

The general layout of the city was characterized by straight lines. The streets, intersecting at right angles, formed many squares. The average width of the streets is 20-30 m. The buildings are stone and concrete, the average height is 4-5 floors. By the beginning of the storm, a significant part of the buildings had been destroyed by bombardments. The city had up to 30 stations and dozens of factories. The largest industrial enterprises were located in the outer regions. The district railway passed through the city.

The length of metro lines is up to 80 km. The subway lines were shallow, often going outside and walking along flyovers. Berlin had a population of 4.5 million at the start of the war, but massive Allied bombing raids in 1943 forced an evacuation, reducing the population to 2.5 million. The exact number of civilians in the capital at the start of urban fighting is impossible to ascertain. Many Berliners evacuated east of the city returned home as the Soviet army approached, and there were also many refugees in the capital. On the eve of the battle for Berlin, the authorities did not call on the local population to evacuate, since the country was already overcrowded with millions of refugees. Nevertheless, everyone who was not employed in production or in the Volkssturm was free to leave. The number of civilians in different sources ranges from 1.2 million to 3.5 million people. Probably the most accurate figure is about 3 million.

Commandant of the Berlin Defense Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (in a trench)

In the winter of 1945, the tasks of the Berlin defense headquarters were concurrently performed by the headquarters of Wehrkeis III - the 3rd Corps District, and only in March did Berlin finally have its own defense headquarters. General Bruno Ritter von Haonschild was replaced as commander of the defense of the capital by Lieutenant General Helmut Reiman, Oberst Hans Refior became his chief of staff, Major Sprotte became the head of the operations department, Major Weiss was the head of supply, Oberstleutnat Plateau was the chief of artillery, Oberstleutnant Erike became his chief of communications, chief of engineering support - Oberst Lobek. Propaganda Minister Goebbels received the post of Imperial Defense Commissioner of Berlin. Relations between Goebbels and Reimann immediately developed a strained relationship, because Dr. Joseph unsuccessfully tried to subdue the military command. General Reiman repulsed the encroachments of a civil minister to command, but he made himself an influential enemy. On March 9, 1945, the plan for the defense of Berlin finally appeared. The author of a very vague 35-page plan was Major Sprotte. It was envisaged that the city would be divided into 9 sectors named from "A" to "H" and diverging clockwise from the ninth, central sector "Citadel", where government buildings were located. The citadel was supposed to be covered by two defense areas "Ost" - around Alexanderplatz and "West" - around the so-called Knee (Ernst-Reuther-Platz area). Oberst Lobeck was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying out defensive engineering work under the direction of the Reich Defense Commissioner. Quickly realizing that you couldn’t build much with one engineering battalion, the command consulted with Goebbels and received 2 Volkssturm battalions specially trained for construction work, and most importantly, workers from the civil construction organization Todt and Reichsarneitsdienst (Labor Services). The latter turned out to be the most valuable help, because they were the only ones who had the required equipment. Military engineers and engineering units were sent by sector commanders for specific jobs.

Fortification work on the Berlin direction began as early as February 1945, when a Soviet breakthrough to the capital was looming. However, contrary to all logic, fortification activities were soon curtailed! Hitler decided that since the Red Army did not dare to go to the weakly defended capital, the Soviet troops were completely exhausted and would not be able to conduct large-scale operations in the near future. While the Soviets were intensively building up their forces for the strike, the leadership of the OKW and OKH remained in blissful inactivity expressing solidarity with the Fuhrer. Engineering and defense work was restarted only at the very end of March, when the main human and material potential was already involved in the battle on the Oder, where the German front in the east finally collapsed.

The construction of a massive system of fortifications around and inside one of the largest cities in Europe required a clear organization and understanding of who is in charge of construction, who is responsible for planning and who is building. There was complete chaos in this matter. Formally, the Reich Defense Commissioner and part-time Berlin Defense Commissioner and at the same time the Minister of Information and Propaganda, a civilian, Dr. Goebbels, were responsible for the defense of Berlin, but it was really up to the military to defend the capital, which was represented by the military commandant of Berlin, General Reiman. The general rightly believed that since it was he who would lead the defense, it was he who should be responsible for the construction of fortifications, on which he would have to fight tomorrow. Goebbels was of a different opinion. Here a dangerous dualism of influences arose. The ambitious Goebbels was too zealous about his position and tried too actively to subdue the army. The army men, seeing the complete incompetence of the Minister of Propaganda, tried to protect their independence from civilian encroachments. They already had a gloomy example when SS Reichsführer Himmler decided on January 24, 1945 to command the Vistula Army Group, and this despite the fact that Reichsfuehrer cannot be called civil. When the collapse was ripe, on March 20, 1945, Himmler urgently handed over the reins of command of the army group to Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici and joyfully washed his hands. In Berlin, the stakes were higher. There was a paradoxical situation - 10 kilometers from Berlin, the military could build anything for themselves, but mostly on their own. And inside the 10-kilometer zone and in the capital itself, construction was subordinated to Goebbels. The irony is that Goebbels had to build spare positions just for the military, with whom he was not particularly willing to consult. As a result, fortifications around and in the capital itself were built completely mediocre, without the slightest understanding of tactical requirements, and their wretched quality deserves special mention. Moreover, materials and personnel of combat units were taken for useless construction, however, the military was involved as workers, and not as the main customer. For example, many anti-tank obstacles were erected around the city, from which there was little use or they generally interfered with the movement of their own troops, and therefore it was required to destroy them.

The Nazis optimistically planned to recruit up to 100,000 people for defensive work, but in reality the daily number barely reached 30,000 and only once reached 70,000. In Berlin, until the last moment, enterprises continued to operate, where workers were also required. In addition, it was necessary to ensure the daily transportation of tens of thousands of workers involved in the construction of defensive contours. The railway around the capital was overloaded, subjected to heavy air raids and worked intermittently. When the place of work was away from the railroad tracks, people had to be transported by buses and trucks, but there was no gasoline for this. To get out of the situation, local residents of nearby settlements were involved in the construction of remote frontiers, but they could not always provide the required number of workers for large-scale work. At the beginning, excavators were used for earthmoving work, but fuel shortages quickly forced mechanized labor to be abandoned. Most workers generally had to come with their tools. The shortage of entrenching tools forced the authorities to publish in the newspapers desperate appeals to the population to help with shovels and picks. And the population showed amazing affection for their shovels and did not want to give them away. Desperate haste and a shortage of building materials soon led to the abandonment of the construction of reinforced concrete structures. Mines and barbed wire were very limited. In any case, there was no time or energy left for large-scale work.

The defenders of Berlin also did not work out with ammunition. By the beginning of the urban battles in Berlin, there were three large ammunition depots - Martha's warehouse in the People's Park Hasenheide (southern sector of Berlin), the Mars warehouse in the Grunewald park on Teufelssee (western sector) and the Monica warehouse in the People's Park Jungfernheide (north-western sector). When the fighting began, these warehouses were 80% full. A small amount of ammunition was stored in a warehouse near the Tiergarten park. When the threat of a Soviet breakthrough from the north arose, two-thirds of Monica's stockpiles were transported by horse-drawn transport to the Mars warehouse. However, on April 25, a catastrophe happened - the warehouses of Martha and Mars went to Soviet troops. The defense leadership was initially confused with the warehouses, for example, the chief of artillery at Reiman's headquarters did not even hear about them. Reiman's main mistake was that instead of many small warehouses in the city itself, they organized three large warehouses in the outer sectors, where they quickly fell into the hands of the enemy. Perhaps Reiman was afraid that the authorities would not take away ammunition from him in favor of other troops and therefore did not advertise this issue even in his headquarters, preferring to stock up outside the city, away from the authorities' eyes. Reiman had something to fear - he was already deprived of troops and robbed like sticky. Later, the warehouses were probably to go to the 56th Panzer Corps when it withdrew to the city. On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Reimann from the post of commander of the Berlin Defense Region, which added to the general confusion. As a result, the entire defense of Berlin took place in the conditions of a severe shortage of ammunition among its defenders.

The defenders also could not boast of food. In the Berlin area there were civilian food warehouses and warehouses of the Wehrmacht. However, the command was unable to establish the correct distribution of reserves in the current conditions. This once again confirms the very low level organizing and planning the defense of Berlin. For example, on the south bank of the Teltow Canal there was a large food warehouse near Klein Machnow, behind the outer defensive line. When the first Soviet tank broke into the warehouse area and stopped just a few hundred meters away, Volksturmists from the opposite northern shore immediately visited the guards. Even under the noses of the enemy, the warehouse guards vigilantly and fearlessly drove away the ever-hungry Volkssturmists, because they did not have the appropriate waybill. However, the enemy did not get a crumb - at the last moment the warehouse was set on fire.

A sufficient supply of food was accumulated in civilian warehouses so that the population could eat autonomously for several months. However, the supply of the population was quickly disrupted, since most of the food depots were located outside the city and quickly fell into the hands of the Soviet troops. However, the distribution of the meager food that remained within the city continued even during urban battles. It got to the point that in the last days of the defense of Berlin, the defenders were starving.

On April 2, 1945, the head of the OKH, Jodl, ordered General Max Pemsel to urgently fly to Berlin. However, due to bad weather, he arrived only on April 12 and found out that it was on the eve of him, they wanted to appoint him commander of the defense of Berlin, but he was late. And Pemsel was happy. In Normandy, he headed the headquarters of the 7th Army and was well versed in fortification. Leaving the capital, the general assessed the Berlin fortifications simply: "extremely useless and ridiculous!" The same is said in the report of General Serov dated April 23, 1945, prepared for Stalin. Soviet experts stated that within a radius of 10-15 km from Berlin there are no serious fortifications, but in general, they are incomparably weaker than those that the Red Army had to overcome when storming other cities. It was under these conditions that the German garrison needed to repel the attack of two Soviet fronts ...

However, what was the Berlin garrison that stood guard over the capital of the Reich and Adolf Hitler personally? And he didn't represent anything. Prior to the departure of 56 TK to Berlin from the Seelow Heights, there was practically no organized defense of the city. The commander of the 56th TK, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling, saw the following: “Already on April 24, I was convinced that it was impossible to defend Berlin and from a military point of view it was pointless, since the German command did not have sufficient forces for this, moreover, by April 24 there was not a single regular formation at the disposal of the German command in Berlin, for with the exception of the security regiment "Gross Deutschland" and the SS brigade guarding the imperial office.

The entire defense was entrusted to the units of the Volkssturm, the police, the personnel of the fire brigade, the personnel of various rear units and service authorities.

Moreover, the defense was impossible not only numerically, but also organizationally: "It was clear to me that the current organization, i.e., the breakdown into 9 sections, was unsuitable for a long period of time, since all nine commanders of the sections (sectors) did not even have staffed and knocked together headquarters"(Weidling).

The Berlin Volksstrum is learning how to deal with faustpatrons. Not every Volkssturmist has undergone such training, and the majority saw how this weapon shoots only in a battle with Soviet tanks.

In fact, the entire defense structure of more than two million Berlin rested on the miserable remnants of the 56th Panzer Corps. On April 16, 1945, on the eve of the Berlin operation, the entire corps numbered up to 50,000 people, including the rear. As a result of bloody battles on the suburban defensive lines, the corps suffered huge losses and retreated to the capital, greatly weakened.

By the beginning of the fighting in the city itself, the 56th TC had:

18.Panzergrenadier-Division - 4000 people

"Muncheberg" Panzer Division - up to 200 people, artillery and 4 tanks

9. Fallschimjager Division - 4000 people (having entered Berlin, the division numbered about 500 people, and was replenished to 4000)

20. Panzergrenadier Division - 800-1200 Human

11. SS "Nordland" Panzergrenadier Division - 3500-4000 people

Total: 13.000 - 15.000 people.

Armored personnel carrier SdKfz 250/1 of the company commander of the Swedish volunteers of the SS division Nordland Hauptsturmführer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson (Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson). The car was hit on the night of May 1-2, 1945, when it participated in an attempt to escape from Berlin through the Weidendamer Bridge and further along the Friedrichstrasse, on which it got into the frame. To the right of the car lies the murdered driver - Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson (Ragnar Johansson). Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson himself was wounded, but managed to escape and hide in a residential building, where he spent two days in the pantry. Then he went outside and met a woman who promised to help him with civilian clothes. However, instead of helping, she brought conscientious soldiers with her and Pehrsson was captured. Luckily for him, he had already changed his SS tunic to that of the Wehrmacht. Soon Pekhrson escaped from Soviet captivity, took refuge in a residential building and got hold of civilian clothes. After some time, he met his Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin (SS-Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin) and with him made his way to the British occupation zone, from where they got home to Sweden. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson returned to his homeland with the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class and 5 wounds.

SS Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson

Thus, at first glance, the capital was defended by 13,000-15,000 people of regular army formations. However, this is on paper, but in reality the picture was depressing. For example, the 20th Panzergrenadier Division already on April 24, 1945 consisted of 80% Volkssturmists and only 20% of the military. Can 800-1200 people be called a division? And if 80% of them are old people and children, then what kind of regular army formation is this? But in Berlin, such metamorphoses happened at every step: formally a division is fighting, but in reality a small group of military men or a bunch of unprepared children and old people. The 20th Panzergrenadier Division, due to its weakness, was sent to the 5th sector in positions along the Teltow Canal to meet 12A Wenck.

In 9. Fallschirmjager Division the situation was no better. All over the world, airborne troops have always been considered the elite. And according to the documents, an elite division fought in Berlin airborne troops. Terrifying picture. But in reality, 500 battle-weary paratroopers were urgently diluted, not hard to guess by whom. Here is such an elite and such a division ...

The 11th Volunteer Division "Nordland" remained the most combat-ready formation. Paradoxically, it was foreigners who played a significant role in the defense of Berlin.

As part of the 56th TK, the remnants of the 408th Volks-Artillerie-Korps (408th People's Artillery Corps) also retreated to Berlin, the strength of the people who reached the capital is not exactly known, but so small that Weidling did not even mention him among his troops . 60% of the guns that ended up in Berlin had almost no ammunition. Initially, 408. Volks-Artillerie-Korps consisted of 4 light artillery battalions, two heavy artillery battalions with captured Soviet 152mm guns and one howitzer battalion with four howitzers.

In the foreground is the deceased SS Hauptsturmführer, next to him is an FG-42 Model II landing rifle and a landing helmet. The picture was taken at the intersection of Shossestrasse (in front) and Oranienburger Strasse (right), near the metro station Oranienburger Tor.

It is more difficult to determine the rest of the forces in the garrison. During interrogation, Weidling testified that when his corps entered the city: "The entire defense was entrusted to the units of the Volkssturm, the police, the personnel of the fire brigade, the personnel of various rear units and service authorities". Weidling did not have an exact idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthese forces, unsuitable for battles: “I think that the Volkssturm units, police units, fire departments, anti-aircraft units numbered up to 90,000 people, in addition to the rear units serving them.

In addition, there were divisions of the Volkssturm of the second category, i.e. those who joined the ranks of the defenders already during the battles and as certain enterprises were closed".

90,000 child-aged fire-logistics troops, not counting their rear, look simply grotesque and do not fit in with other sources. And this is against the backdrop of a meager number of troops of the 56th Panzer Corps. Such a suspicious discrepancy with the rest of the assessments raises serious doubts about the reliability of the words of Weidling, or rather those who compiled the protocol of interrogation. And the interrogation was conducted by Comrade Trusov, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The very front that Berlin could not take in the promised 6 days; systematically disrupted the timing of the offensive; failed not only to capture, but even to reach the outskirts of Berlin on Lenin's birthday, and after all, on April 22, the red flag was supposed to fly over Berlin for a day; failed to crush the remnants of the garrison for the holiday of May 1. With all this, the average daily losses of the Red Army in the Berlin operation were the highest in the entire war, although Comrade Trusov said that the front command had a complete idea of ​​the enemy and his forces in advance. On May 2, Soviet troops finally captured Berlin, but three times later than promised. How to justify before Stalin? That is why, probably, the idea was born to overestimate the enemy's forces. However, by whom? Regular formations are easy to account for and verify, but the Volkssturm leaves unlimited room for maneuver - here you can attribute as much as you like and say that the civilians simply fled, not wanting to experience the hospitality of Soviet captivity. It should be especially noted that by that time the Red Army had developed a practice of colossal overestimation of German losses, which sometimes became the reason for the corresponding proceedings. In the end, Weidling did not sign the interrogation protocol with a lawyer, if he signed it at all. And Weidling did not come out of Soviet captivity alive ... Helmut Weidling died in the second building of the Vladimir prison.

defenders of Berlin...

Let's deal with the Volkssturm in more detail. Before Weidling, the defense of Berlin was commanded by Lieutenant General Helmut Reiman (not counting two precocious generals) and under him the recruitment of the militias took place. Reiman quite reasonably believed that he would need 200,000 trained military men to defend the capital, but there were only 60,000 Volkstrumists available, of which 92 battalions were formed. The Germans joked that those who already can walk and those who more can walk. There is only a fraction of a joke in this joke (*Hitler's decree about VS). The combat value of this "army" was below any criticism. As the commander of the Bergewalde Infantry Division, Lieutenant General W. Reitel, noted: "The Volkssturm is great in its design, but its military significance is very insignificant. The age of the people, their poor military training and the almost complete absence of weapons play a role here."

Propaganda. In short pants against Soviet tanks, and grandfather will cover if he does not lose points.

Formally, General Reiman had at his disposal 42,095 rifles, 773 submachine guns, 1953 light machine guns, 263 heavy machine guns, a small number of field guns and mortars. However, the use of this motley arsenal could be very limited. Reiman stated the armament of his militia as follows: “Their weapons were produced in all the countries with which or against which Germany fought: in Italy, Russia, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway and England. It was practically impossible to find ammunition for at least fifteen different types of rifles and ten types of machine guns. hopeless business." Those who had Italian rifles were the luckiest, because they received up to 20 rounds per person. The lack of ammunition reached the point that Greek cartridges had to be fitted to Italian rifles. And going into battle with non-standard, fitted cartridges against the regular Soviet army is not the best prospect for untrained old people and children. On the first day of the Soviet offensive, each Volkssturmist with a rifle carried an average of five rounds. There were enough Faustpatrons, but they could not compensate for the lack of other weapons and the lack of military training. The combat value of the Volkssturm was so low that the regular units, heavily exhausted by battles, often simply disdained to be replenished at the expense of the militias: "When the question arose of replenishing my division with the Volkssturm, I refused it. The Volkssturmists would have reduced the combat effectiveness of my division and would have made even more unpleasant diversity in its already rather motley composition"(Lieutenant General Reitel). But that's not all. Weidling testified during interrogation that the Volkssturm had to be replenished with people as various enterprises closed. At the signal of "Clausewitz Muster", 52,841 more militiamen could be called up within 6 hours. But what to equip them with and where to get cartridges for a rich collection of foreign weapons? As a result, the Volkssturm was divided into two categories: those who had at least some kind of weapon - Volkssturm I and those who did not have it at all - Volkssturm II. Of the 60,000 child and elderly militias, only one-third were considered armed - about 20.000 . The remaining 40,000 unarmed militias could not fight and seriously replenish the losses. If a Soviet army had good reserves, and, in extreme cases, could throw into battle and wagonmen, then the militias could not afford this. And so they went into battle with only five rounds of ammunition, with a mighty reserve of 40,000 unarmed old men and children. Having honestly shot his meager "ammunition", the Volkssturmist could not borrow cartridges from his fellow soldier - their rifles are different.

Militia battalions were formed not according to the military scheme, but according to party districts, so the quantitative composition of motley battalions could vary greatly. Battalions could be divided into companies. Party members or reservists who were not trained in military affairs became commanders. Not a single battalion had its own headquarters. It is noteworthy that the Volkssturm did not even stand on allowance, did not have field kitchens, and he had to find his own food on his own. Even during the battles, the Volkssturmists ate what the locals would serve them. When the fighting went away from the place of residence of the Volksturmists, they had to eat what God would send, that is, starving. They also did not have their own transport and means of communication. The situation was aggravated by the fact that formally the entire leadership of the Volkssturm was in the hands of the party, and only after the Clausewitz code signal, which meant the beginning of the assault on the city, the militias were to go directly under General Reiman.

A dead German soldier on the steps of the Reich Chancellery. Please note that he has no shoes on, and his feet are tied with a tourniquet with a stick. Boxes with German awards are scattered on the steps. Several different Soviet propaganda pictures are known from this site. It is possible that the deceased was put there for the sake of a "successful" shot. There were practically no battles for the Reich Chancellery itself. In its cellars there was a hospital with approximately 500 seriously wounded SS soldiers, as well as a bomb shelter with many civilian women and children, who were then subjected to abuse by the Red Army. The Soviet military occupying power soon demolished the building of the Reich Chancellery, and used the stone blocks of decorative sheathing to build a monument in Berlin to itself.

The entire military training of the Volkssturmists consisted of classes on weekends from approximately 17.00 to 19.00. In the classroom, Volksturm got acquainted with the device of small arms and Panzerfausts, however, training firing was extremely rare and not for everyone. Sometimes three-day courses were practiced in SA camps. In general, the preparation of the militia left much to be desired.

Initially, it was intended to use the Volkssturm in the rear against small enemy breakthroughs or a small enemy that had leaked through the defenses, to localize paratroopers, to guard rear positions and protect fortified buildings. There was nothing for them to do on the front lines. When the fighting moved to the territory of the Reich, the Volkssturm was forced to start using it on the front line, first as auxiliary units, and then in the front line defense role that was clearly not typical for it. In Berlin, an unarmed Volkssturm II was supposed to be behind the front line occupied by a poorly armed Volkssturm I and wait for someone to be killed to take his weapon. A grim prospect for children and the elderly. However, in some sectors this was the case.

If the average militia shoots 1 time per minute, the fight will not last long. It is not difficult to imagine with what accuracy untrained children and old people shot their cartridges. At a convenient opportunity, these "soldiers for 5 minutes" simply deserted or surrendered without a fight.

April 25, 1945, providing Stalin with Serov's report of April 23, 1945, Beria made an application that demonstrated the combat capability of the Volkssturm. Thus, the German defensive line 8 km from Berlin was held by the Volkssturm, recruited in February 1945 from men aged 45 and older. For 2-3 people without military training, there was one rifle and 75 rounds of ammunition. The Germans had the dubious pleasure of watching for an hour and a half how the units of the 2nd Guards. TA prepared to attack, but the militia did not fire a single artillery or mortar shot. All that the Volkssturm opposed to the Soviet tank army was a few single rifle shots and short bursts from a machine gun.

In the Soviet 5th shock army, after the battles, they rated their opponents as follows: "In Berlin, the enemy did not have field troops, let alone full-fledged personnel divisions. The bulk of his troops were special battalions, schools, police units and Volkssturm battalions. This was reflected in the tactics of his action and significantly weakened the defense of Berlin".

The commander of the Vistula Army Group, Generaloberst Heinrici, and the Minister of Armaments, Speer, perfectly understood all the drama and hopelessness of the situation. From a military point of view, it would be much easier to defend in a large city with many canals and strong buildings than in the countryside. However, this tactic would have led to enormous, senseless suffering for the inhabitants of a capital of more than two million people. Based on this, Heinrici decided to withdraw as many troops as possible from Berlin to practically unprepared positions, even before the start of fighting in the city. This meant that the troops would have to be sacrificed, but with the same outcome of the battle, the suffering of millions of citizens could have been avoided and destruction could be minimized. The leadership of the Vistula Army Group believed that with such a game of giveaway, the first Soviet tanks would reach the Reich Chancellery by April 22. Heinrici even tried to prevent Theodore Busse's 9th Army from retreating to the capital, and ostensibly to save the LVI Panzer Corps offered to send him south. On April 22, 1945, the 56th TC received an order from the 9th Army to join it south of the capital. The German generals were clearly withdrawing their troops from Berlin. Hitler ordered Weidling to lead the corps to Berlin, nevertheless Weidling wanted to go south. Only after the Fuhrer's order was duplicated on April 23, the 56th TC began to withdraw to the capital. Soon, Field Marshal Keitel demoted Hanrici for sabotage and invited him to shoot himself as an honest general, but the traitor Heinrici met his old age safely, and Keitel was hanged by the winners.

Frey's radar in the Tiergarten. In the background is the Victory Column in honor of the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. Between this column and the Brandenburg Gate on the East-West highway there was an improvised airstrip, the construction of which was hindered by Speer.

On the afternoon of April 18, General Reimann was shocked by the order from the Reich Chancellery to transfer all available troops to Busse's 9th Army to strengthen the second line of defense of Berlin. The order was duplicated by a phone call from Goebbels. As a result, 30 militia battalions and an air defense unit left the city. Later, these formations practically did not retreat to Berlin. It was such a serious blow to the Volkssturm, which could somehow protect the capital, that Lieutenant General Reiman said: "Tell Goebbels that all the possibilities of defending the capital of the Reich have been exhausted. Berliners are defenseless". On April 19, 24,000 Volsksturms remained in Berlin with a huge shortage of weapons. Although by the beginning of the urban battles the Volkssturm could be replenished numerically, the number of armed soldiers remained unchanged.

Given the acute shortage of weapons and ammunition in the capital, the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition Speer tried to make his feasible contribution to the defense of the "Fortress Berlin". When Reimann tried to equip an airstrip in the city center, between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column, Speer began to put up all sorts of opposition to him. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions, as well as Speer's Berlin apartment, were located on Pariserplatz just outside the Brandenburg Gate. The Minister of Armaments summoned General Reiman to him and scolded him under the ridiculous pretext that during the construction of the runway at a distance of 30 meters on each side of the roadway, bronze street poles were being demolished and trees were being cut down. The discouraged general tried to explain that this was necessary for the landing of transport aircraft. However, Speer stated that Reiman had no right to touch the poles. The clarification of the relationship reached Hitler. The Fuhrer allowed the poles to be demolished, but forbade cutting trees so that the appearance of the center of the capital would not be damaged. But Speer did not let up and by his efforts the pillars remained unshakably standing still. With the beginning of urban battles, the Minister of Armaments was no longer in the capital (like most of the militias had weapons) and the pillars were finally removed. It was on this strip that, already in the midst of street fighting, on the evening of April 27, Hana Reitsch's Fi-156 landed, delivering General Ritter von Greim. The Führer summoned von Greim to appoint Goering as commander of the Luftwaffe. At the same time, Grime was wounded in the leg, and the aircraft was badly damaged. Soon, on a specially arrived Arado-96 training aircraft, Reitsch and von Greim flew away from Berlin right before the eyes of the Red Army. On the same airstrip, besieged Berlin received meager air supplies. In addition to the epic with the runway, the architect Speer also prevented the bridges from blowing up. Of the 248 bridges in Berlin, only 120 were blown up and 9 were damaged.

One of the last photos of Hitler. To the left of the Fuhrer is the head of the Hitler Youth, Reichsugendführer Arthur Axmann, who issued the order to use children in the battles for Berlin.

After the Volkssturm, the second largest category were firefighters, convoy officers and all kinds of official authorities and institutions. They account for about 18,000 people. On April 19, this category consisted of 1,713 policemen, 1,215 members of the Hitler Youth and workers of the RAD and Todt, about 15,000 people in the military rear. At the same time, the Hitler Youth was a different story. On April 22, 1945, Goebbels stated in his last printed address to the people: "A fourteen-year-old kid crawling with his grenade launcher behind a collapsed wall on a scorched street means more to the nation than ten intellectuals trying to prove that our chances are zero." This phrase did not go unnoticed by the head of the Hitler Youth Arthur Axmann. Under his strict leadership, this National Socialist youth organization was also preparing to go through the crucible of battles. When Axmann told Weidling that he had ordered the use of children in battles, instead of gratitude, he ran into obscene expressions that contained a semantic message to let the children go home. A shamed Axmann promised to withdraw the order, but not all the children who had already gone to the positions received it. Near the bridge in Pichelsdorf, the Hitler Youth experienced the full power of the Soviet army.

One of these Volkssturmist children in Berlin was the 15-year-old Adolf Martin Bormann, the son of Martin Bormann, Hitler's deputy for the party and personal secretary. The boy received his first name in honor of his godfather, Adolf Hitler. It is noteworthy that Martin-Adolf celebrated his fifteenth birthday just two days before the start of the battle for Berlin. When the battle for the city was coming to a tragic end, Bormann Sr. ordered the adjutant to kill his son so that he would not be captured and become the object of insults and bullying. The adjutant disobeyed his superior and after the war, Martin Adolf became a Catholic priest and then a teacher of theology.

The Berlin garrison also included the Gross Deutschland SS security regiment (9 companies). However, after the fighting near Bloomberg, in the highway area northeast of the capital, only 40 survivors from the entire regiment, that is, out of about 1000 people, returned to the city.

Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, commandant of the Citadel. On April 6, 1941, on the first day of the Yugoslav campaign, he was wounded during an air raid and lost his foot, but remained in the service. Fleeing from strong pain in his leg, he became addicted to morphine. Frequent pain and morphinism affected the character. After one heated conversation with the head of the officer department of the SS personnel service, he lost his position and was sent to the psychiatric department of a military hospital in Würzburg. Soon Monke returned to the service and made a career, receiving 6 very honorary awards and becoming Brigadeführer on January 30, 1945. He spent 10 years in Soviet captivity, until 1949 he was in solitary confinement. He was released on October 10, 1955. He died at the age of 90 on August 6, 2001 in the town of Damp, near Ekenförde, Schleswig-Holstein.

And, finally, the central 9th ​​sector "Citadel", defended by SS Kampfgruppe Mohnke, numbering about 2000 people. The defense of the Citadel was led by Colonel Seifert, but the government district inside the Citadel was run by SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohncke, whom Hitler personally appointed to this position. The government area included the Reich Chancellery, the Fuhrerbunker, the Reichstag and adjacent buildings. Mohnke reported directly to Hitler and Weidling could not order him. The Kampfgruppe Mohnke was urgently created on 04/26/1945 from scattered units and rear authorities of the SS:

remnants of the security regiment of the two-battalion division of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH Wach Regiment), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula (Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula)

training battalion from the same division (Panzer-Grenadier-Ersatz- & Ausbildungs-Bataillon 1 "LSSAH" from Spreenhagenn, 25 km southeast of Berlin), commander Obersturmbannfuhrer Klingemeier. The day before, part of the 12 companies of the training base in Spreenhagen left as part of the Falke regiment in the 9th Busse Army. The rest of the personnel was sent to Berlin and included in the Anhalt regiment.

Hitler's guard company (Fuhrer-Begleit-Kompanie), commander Hitler's adjutant Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche (Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche)

Himmler's guard battalion (Reichsfuhrer SS Begleit Battalion), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle (Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle)

The scattered and small SS forces Brigadeführer Monke brought together into two regiments.

The 1st Regiment "Anhalt" of the Kampfgruppe "Monke", named after the commander of the Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt (SS-Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt). When Anhalt died, on 04/30/45 the regiment was renamed by the name of the new commander - "Wal" (SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Kurt Wahl). The regiment consisted of two battalions manned by Wachbataillon Reichskanzlei, Ersatz- und Ausbildungsbataillon "LSSAH", Fuhrerbegleit-Kompanie, Begleit-Kompanie "RFSS".

The regiment fought in positions:
1st battalion - railway railway station on Friedrichsstraße, along the line Spree, Reichstag, Siegesallee
2nd Battalion - Moltkestrasse, Tiergarten, Potsdamer Pltatz.

2nd Regiment "Falke" of the Kampfgruppe "Monke". Formed from disparate rear authorities.
Fought in positions: Potsdamer Platz, Leipzigstrasse, Ministry of the Air Force, Railway Station on Friedrichsstrasse.

Sometimes in Soviet and Western sources, the Charlemagne division is mentioned among the defenders of Berlin. The word "division" sounds proud and implies a lot of soldiers. This needs to be dealt with. After bloody battles in Pomerania, out of about 7500 people of the 33rd Grenadier Division of the French Charlemagne Volunteers (33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne (franzosische Nr. 1), approximately 1100 survived. They were gathered in Macklenburg for replenishment and reformation, but after brutal unsuccessful battles, many of the will to fight was so low that the volunteers were released from their oath. Nevertheless, about 700 people decided to fight to the end. After the reorganization, one regiment of two-battalion strength remained - the Waffen-Grenadier-Rgt. der SS "Charlemagne ". 400 people who did not want to fight anymore were brought to Baubataillon (construction battalion) and used for earthworks. On the night of April 23-24, 1945, Hitler ordered from the Reich Chancellery to use all available transport and immediately come to Berlin. The Führer's personal order addressed to such a small, weakened unit, was in itself an extremely unusual affair.The division commander, SS-Brigadeführer Krukenberg, commanded a storm battalion (Franzosisches freiwilligen-sturmbataillon der SS "Charlemagne") from combat-ready units of the 57th Grenadier Battalion and the 6th Company of the 68th Grenadier Battalion, units of the division's training school (Kampfschule) were added to them. Henri Fene became the battalion commander. The assault battalion departed on 9 trucks and two light vehicles. However, two trucks were never able to reach their destination, so only 300-330 people arrived in Berlin. This was the last replenishment to reach the capital by land before the city was surrounded by Soviet troops. At the Olympic Stadium, the assault battalion was immediately reorganized into 4 rifle companies of 60-70 people each and subordinated to the Nordland Panzer-Grenadier Division (11. SS-Frw.Panzer-Gren.Division "Nordland"). Weidling immediately removed the commander of this division, SS-Brigadeführer Ziegler, who was in no hurry to arrive at Weidling's disposal, and replaced him with the determined Krukenberg. Highly motivated French volunteers made an invaluable contribution to the defense of the city - they accounted for about 92 destroyed Soviet tanks out of 108 destroyed in the area of ​​the Nordland division. It can be said that these soldiers were at the right time in the right place, despite the fact that they suffered huge losses in a hopeless battle. On May 2, 1945, about 30 surviving people from the Charlemagne were captured by the Soviets near the Potsdam railway station.

After the Charlemagne, the last meager replenishment arrived on the night of 26 April. Cadets of the naval school from Rostock were transferred to Berlin by transport aircraft, in the amount of one battalion of three companies. The battalion "Grossadmiral Donitz" of Commander Kuhlmann was placed at the disposal of Brigadeführer Mohnke. The sailors took up defense in the park near the Foreign Ministry building on Wilhelmstrasse.

On February 22, 1945, the formation began Panzer-Kompanie (bodenstandig) "Berlin"(special tank company "Berlin"). The company consisted of damaged tanks, in which the engine or running gear could not be repaired, but suitable for use as pillboxes. In two days, by February 24, 1945, the company received 10 Pz V and 12 Pz IV. The crew in fixed firing points was reduced by two people, to the commander, gunner and loader. Soon the company was reinforced with several pillboxes with turrets from Panther tanks. It was the so-called Panther Turm, which was already in service and used in the West, in particular in the Gothic Line. The bunker consisted of a tower from a Panther (sometimes specially made for such a bunker, and a turret concrete or metal section dug into the ground. The bunker was usually installed at large intersections and could be connected by an underground passage to the basement of a neighboring building.

Flakturm. In front of the tower, two twisted ISs froze surprisingly symmetrically. The three anti-aircraft towers of Berlin were powerful centers of defense.

In Berlin was the 1st air defense division "Berlin" (1. "Berlin" Flak Division), as well as units of the 17th and 23rd air defense divisions. In April 1945, anti-aircraft units consisted of 24 12.8-cm guns, 48 ​​10.5-cm guns, 270 8.8-mm guns, 249 2-cm and 3.7-cm guns. Since November 1944, in the searchlight units, all men of the rank and file were replaced by women, and prisoners of war, mostly Soviet ones, were used in auxiliary roles as ammunition carriers and loaders. At the beginning of April 1945, almost all anti-aircraft artillery was reduced to anti-aircraft strike groups and withdrawn from the city to the outer defensive bypass, where it was used mainly to combat ground targets. Three anti-aircraft towers remained in the city - in the Zoo, Humboldhain, Friedrichshain and two heavy anti-aircraft batteries in Temelhof and Eberswaldstrasse. By the end of April 25, the Germans had 17 partially combat-ready batteries left, along with turrets. By the end of April 28, 6 anti-aircraft batteries survived, with 18 guns and 3 more separate guns. By the end of April 30, there were 3 combat-ready heavy batteries (13 guns) in Berlin.

At the same time, anti-aircraft towers were bomb shelters for thousands of civilians. There were also artistic treasures, in particular the gold of Schliemann from Troy and the famous statuette of Nefertiti.

The defenders of Berlin received unexpected help already during the assault on the city. April 24-25, 1945 Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249 under the command of Hauptmann Herbert Jaschke (Herbert Jaschke), received in Spandau 31 new self-propelled guns from the Alkett Berlin plant. On the same day, the brigade was ordered to move west to the Krampnitz area to participate in the attack against the Americans on the Elbe. However, the counterattack against the Allies took place before the arrival of the Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249, so the brigade remained in Berlin, in the Brandenburg Gate area. In the capital, the brigade fought in the area of ​​Frankfurterallee, Landsbergstrasse, Alexanderplatz. On April 29, 1945, the fighting moved to the area of ​​the Higher Technical School, where the brigade's command post was located. On April 30, only 9 StuGs remained in the brigade, which retreated with fighting to Berliner Strasse. After the fall of Berlin, 3 surviving self-propelled guns and several trucks managed to escape from the city and reach Spandau, where the last self-propelled guns were knocked out. The rest of the brigade was divided into two groups. A group led by commander Hauptmann Yashke went out to the Americans and surrendered, and the second group was destroyed by Soviet troops.

The defense of the city was strengthened by 6 anti-tank and 15 artillery battalions.

On the issue of the number of the Berlin garrison, the testimony of the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 56th Panzer Corps, Siegfried Knappe, plays a huge role: "The report [...] states that the other units in Berlin were the equivalent of two or three divisions and that the Waffen SS were the equivalent of half a division. All together, according to the report, about four to five divisions of 60,000 men with 50-60 tanks ".

In the early 1950s, the American Command in Europe asked the former German military to compile an analysis of the defense of Berlin. This document comes to the same figures - 60,000 men and 50-60 tanks.

In general, for all the differences, the figures from most independent sources converge to a common figure. There were definitely not 200,000 defenders in Berlin, much less 300,000.

The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces P. Rybalko, stated bluntly: "If the Cottbus group [of the enemy] united with the Berlin one, it would be the second Budapest. If we had 80,000 people [of the enemy] in Berlin, then this number would then be replenished to 200,000 and we would not solve the problem of capturing Berlin for 10 days".

For comparison, the Soviet army involved in the assault directly on the city 464.000 people and 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

footnotes and comments

1 Cornelius Ryan - The Last Battle - M., Centerpolygraph, 2003

On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Lieutenant General Reimann from the post of commander of the defense of Berlin for defeatist sentiments. It was rumored that Goebbels had a hand in this, who, seeking to expand his influence, invited Reiman to move to his CP. Reimann rejected the proposal of the Reich Minister under the obviously far-fetched pretext that if two leaders of the defense of the capital were at the same command post, then there was a danger that the entire defense could be decapitated by an accidental explosion. As Reiman later noted, the anti-aircraft tower at the Zoo could actually withstand a direct hit from almost any bomb. Instead of Reimann, Hitler appointed Colonel Kiter (Ernst Kaeter), who was immediately promoted to major general. Prior to this, Kiter was the chief of staff of the political department of the army and this aroused the confidence of the leader. However, in the evening, the Fuhrer took command of the defense of Berlin, in which he was to be assisted by his adjutant Erich Berenfanger, who was urgently promoted to the rank of major general. And finally, on April 23, Hitler entrusted the defense of the capital and practically his life to the commander of the 56th TK, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling.

4 Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London-Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

5 http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm (GARF 9401/2/95 p.304-310)

6 Beevor E. - The fall of Berlin. 1945

7 Ilya Moshchansky. Tankmaster, No. 5/2000

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(http://militera.lib.ru/)