The nature of the actions of illegal armed groups.
The changed geopolitical conditions posed little-studied problems for the Russian Armed Forces, since the troops, performing the tasks of restoring the constitutional order and disarming illegal armed formations (IAF) in the Chechen Republic, faced qualitatively new circumstances, a fundamentally atypical operational situation for them, which can be characterized as a large-scale internal armed conflict with all the signs of a local war. The nature and scale of this conflict were such that they required the involvement of formations and units of the grouping of general-purpose troops of the RF Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies of the Russian Federation into the combat zone.
Attempts to solve emerging problems in traditional ways, inherent in ordinary situations, in the conditions of an internal armed conflict, in many cases do not achieve the desired effect, lead to the loss of initiative, the collapse of elements of the management cycle, which ultimately jeopardizes the implementation of decision and leads to unjustified human losses.
This circumstance predetermines the direction and necessity of forming a modern concept for the use of general-purpose groupings of troops in cooperation with other troops, military formations and bodies in an armed conflict and local war, in accordance with which theoretical provisions, composition, forms of use and methods of action, a control system will be developed and purposeful training of joint groupings of troops (forces) intended for combat operations to eliminate an armed conflict both on the territory of the country and in regions strategically important for Russia.

For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command, similarly to the events of 1995, created three defensive lines:
- internal - with a radius of up to 1 km around Minutka Square;
- medium - at a distance of up to 1 km from the border of the inner boundary;
- external - passed through the outskirts of Grozny.

The defense system of the illegal armed formations in Grozny was characterized by the following features:
1. the presence of an extensive network of underground communications, pre-prepared bases and warehouses with weapons, ammunition and food, a large number of shelters and basements to protect militants during bombing and assault strikes;
2. flexible communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
3. the presence of mobile groups and reserves, which were quickly transferred to the necessary areas;
4. mining approaches to strong points and laying directional land mines; the presence of containers with chemical poisonous substances (chlorine and ammonia) prepared for an explosion, etc.
A focal defense system was created within the city, which included firing positions for armored vehicles, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and anti-tank barriers. The lower floors of houses in the main directions were equipped for long-term firing points. Windows and entrances to the basements of houses on the outskirts of Grozny, along main streets and at intersections were covered with sandbags, stones and bricks. Loopholes were left for observation and firing. Most of the armored vehicles and artillery were camouflaged in residential areas and enterprises. On the roofs and upper floors of buildings, firing positions for snipers and anti-aircraft gunners were created, and important objects and approaches to individual military camps were mined. Street intersections in Grozny were littered with reinforced concrete slabs, heaps of gravel, sand and other materials. DOTs were built. They were built at crossroads, connecting passageways with adjacent courtyards for hidden occupation and maneuver. Responsible persons for the defense of quarters and streets were appointed, and the commandant's service was strengthened.

The management system of illegal armed formations in Grozny included city ​​defense headquarters, headquarters and command posts of detachments and groups. Each body and control point of the illegal armed formations, the commander of a separate detachment had mobile means of communication.
Command posts, weapons storage bases, ammunition depots, medicines and food depots were also created in advance. Military camps and bases were used to deploy command posts. There was a fairly well-established system of centralized leadership of all armed formations in the Chechen Republic. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic independently managed their paramilitary structures. The main command posts of the armed formations were located in the capital of the republic, while the spare ones were located in other regions.

A characteristic feature of the militant communication system was the use of small-sized radio stations such as "Motorola" and "Kenwood", the use of closed communication channels by the top leadership of the illegal armed formations. The stability of the communication system was ensured by a wide network of repeaters. The order of the radio exchange of militants was characterized by strict communication discipline and the use of covert command and control measures, including coded messages about their location and planned activities.

For conducting reconnaissance illegal armed groups used predominantly the local population, mostly women, girls, old people and children, who almost unhindered approached the columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, entered into conversations with military personnel, counted the approximate number of troops, equipment and weapons, and then transferred the obtained information to the militants.
Intelligence was also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups from the special forces. In order to obtain and verify information about our troops, the leaders of the intelligence agencies of the illegal armed formations also used hostage, mainly in relation to the Russian population. Threatening to kill and holding family members hostage, the militants demanded certain information about the troops from relatives, and only upon receiving it guaranteed the release of the hostages.
Target reconnaissance for artillery and fire correction carried out by specially appointed spotters. As a rule, disguised as locals or refugees, they were located on the top floors of high-rise buildings or cruised past the location and positions of federal troops.
One of the methods of conducting reconnaissance of illegal armed formations was the interrogation of prisoners or hostages of the military personnel of the Armed Forces and internal troops.
The militants received a significant part of the information from our radio networks by listening to them, in particular, units of the internal troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, which did not fully use closed communication channels.
The beginning of the first stage of the assault on the city of GROZNY was characterized by stubborn resistance from illegal armed formations in strong points along the routes of advance of troops.

The defense of Grozny was organized by sectors, which were assigned to groups (combat, reserve of up to 500 people), consisting of detachments of 100 people, which in turn are divided into groups of 10-20 people each, armed with small arms and grenade launchers. Seeping through the battle formations of the federal troops to their rear, these groups acted in squads of 4-7 people. (the commander is also a radio operator, 1-2 snipers, 1-2 grenade launchers armed with RPG-7, 1-2 machine gunners or machine gunners, who, as a rule, have 2-3 disposable RPGs or RPOs). In the basements and attics of many houses on the streets suitable for the movement of equipment, stocks of shots for RPGs (disposable RPGs and RPOs) were concentrated. The so-called "leaving stocks" tactic, which has been widely used recently by partisan formations around the world, was used. There were several sabotage and reconnaissance groups from special detachments, in particular, the name of Sheikh Mansour, battle banner and documentation, which were captured when the detachment left the city. The total number of militants concentrated in the city of Grozny was up to 6,000 people.

A characteristic feature of the tactics of the actions of gangs it turned out that when delivering air and artillery strikes, the militants took refuge in shelters and prepared basements of houses to reduce losses, and also tried to get as close as possible to the positions of the federal troops. The tactics of action became more and more diverse and sophisticated, and at the same time it was continuously improved.
Despite the blockade of the city, the militants were able to enter Grozny, delivering ammunition, food and medicine, as well as evacuate the wounded. The main exit routes for the militants were the following areas: the village of Kirov, Chernorechye, Aldy, Starye Promysla, Staraya Sunzha. When trying to overcome the minefields, the militants made passages in them, driving animals into the minefields, and on the night of January 29 to January 30, 2000, when a large detachment (more than 400 people) left, people.
During the hostilities, the leadership of the illegal armed formations actively carried out reconnaissance activities to clarify the grouping and deployment of units of the united group. Facts were noted indicating that the militants were using a reconnaissance system and warning of air and artillery strikes.
The system of supplying militant detachments with weapons, ammunition, food and other materiel included pre-prepared warehouses and bases.
The militants paid considerable attention to the conduct of psychological warfare.. To raise morale, the leadership of the gangs actively spread misinformation about the significant losses of the federal forces. To distribute fakes, the leaders of the illegal armed formations attracted foreign correspondents, whose task was to select and mount photo and video materials about the alleged victories of the militants and the atrocities of the federal troops, as well as distribute these materials in the media and on the Internet. In the Grozny region, under the guise of Russian military personnel, a detachment of militants operated, which carried out executions of civilians.

The strengths of the NVF include:
* high mobilization opportunities;
* a clear control system that ensures the centralization of the leadership of armed formations with the autonomous nature of their combat operations;
* proximity to the structures of army-type formations, the presence in their composition of units and subunits of various purposes (motorized rifle, mountain rifle, tank, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, communications, and others);
* the national-ethnic and religious community of the contingent, contributing to the solution of issues of moral and psychological support, maintaining discipline;
* the presence of a professionally trained contingent of mercenaries.

Weak sides of the organizational structure of illegal armed formations were:
* lack of units and subdivisions of logistic and technical support;
* a significant number of militants with a criminal past and criminal inclinations, who corrupted the illegal armed formations from within and gave rise to conflicts both between individual militants and formations.
The management of illegal armed formations was carried out centrally using modern means of communication. Active reconnaissance of a group of federal troops and consolidated units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was constantly conducted. Communications of Dagestan and Ingushetia were used to deliver weapons, ammunition and mercenaries to Chechnya.
The main reasons for the successful actions of the militants were:
1. thorough reconnaissance and preparation for raids;
2. skillful misinformation, surprise, swiftness, decisiveness and coordination of actions;
3. high personal professional training of most militants.
From the first days of hostilities, the federal troops faced wide application IAF snipers. The scope of their actions was such that military experts rightfully started talking about "sniper warfare."
Single snipers operating in Chechnya were, as a rule, professional mercenaries, many of them were athletes. They were thoroughly prepared for conducting sniper warfare in settlements and mountains, they planned and coordinated actions in advance, chose advantageous positions, and established communications. Corner apartments were a favorite place for snipers, from where it was possible to fire in several directions. At the prepared positions, hiding places were equipped, in which a sniper rifle and ammunition were disguised. In order to make it difficult to detect, the fire, as a rule, was conducted by snipers from the depths of the rooms.
The general leadership of the city's defense was carried out by A. Maskhadov, direct - by Sh. Basaev. In accordance with the plan for the defense of the city, the leadership of the illegal armed formations intended to conduct fighting within 20 days after the start of the assault on the city in order to inflict maximum damage on the federal troops. In the future, it was supposed to make a breakthrough and leave the city for the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

findings
1. The federal forces, which were carrying out the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic, were actually opposed by a well-trained, mono-ethnic army, reinforced by mercenaries from other states, psychologically ready for death.
2. The tactical methods used by illegal armed formations were distinguished by a variety of forms and methods of armed struggle, but they were based on general rules that can be attributed to the principles of their combat use. The main ones were:
* close relationship with the local population;
* actions mainly by small detachments and groups;
* careful reconnaissance and selection of the object, place and time of the attack;
* the use of infiltration and concentration tactics in the area of ​​the assigned task;
* evasion of protracted positional combat operations;
* skillful use of terrain and conditions of limited visibility;
* exhaustion of the enemy;
* psychological support for subversive activities;
* blocking units of federal troops (checkpoints, checkpoints) in areas of deployment, depriving them of the possibility of maneuvering forces and means with simultaneous fire and psychological impact;
* covert penetration to the entire depth of the area where federal units are located, simultaneous impact from several directions;
* high controllability of detachments and groups, their mobility and high professionalism.
The illegal armed formations promptly changed their tactics of action, reacting to weak, stereotyped aspects in the actions of the federal troops. At the same time, methods prohibited by the Geneva Conventions were used, such as the capture and execution of hostages from among the civilian population, and terrorist acts.
3. The defense of the city was characterized by the following features:
- a pre-prepared system of many-layered defense, which included heavily fortified strongholds and lines;
- knowledge of the area and the city by the militants;
- the presence of an extensive system of underground communications, a large number of shelters and basements;
- the presence of poisoning agents in the militants chemical substances;
- the possibility of covert movement from one area of ​​the city to another;
- keeping civilians in the city and using them as a "human shield";
- the presence of pre-created warehouses and bases with weapons, ammunition and food, including in underground shelters;
- an effective control and communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
- the presence of mobile groups and reserves, the ability to quickly transfer them to the necessary areas;
- mining approaches to strong points and laying directional landmines.

Toolkit

Some Issues of Organization and Tactics of Actions of Illegal Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic

Introduction

The experience of suppressing the bandit activities of Islamic extremists during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region indicates that the tactics of the bandit formations opposing the federal troops have undergone significant changes. At present, along with traditional forms, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and hold important strategic objects, is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed uprisings by small (15–20 people) and large (up to 500 people and more) in groups. At the same time, surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short-term raids are still the fundamental principles of the tactics of bandit formations.

The most important factor determining the specifics of the actions of gangs is the conduct of systematic "harassing" actions that force the troops to resort to defensive tactics, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. Moreover, they give the impression of the ability of bandit formations to strike anywhere, sometimes quite unexpectedly. "Disturbing" and "Exhausting" operations form the basis of the tactics of the actions of bandit formations, which, as a rule, sought to evade direct confrontation with large forces of federal troops. Their actions in this case are based on preemption of the opening of fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan showed, in some cases, when they achieve a tactical advantage, gangs make attempts to capture and hold for a long time an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support for the population. This testifies to a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and the federal troops and the stake of the leaders of gangs on long-term and fierce resistance.

Organization and arming of illegal armed formations of Chechnya

An armed formation is a large paramilitary formation led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to protect the interests of a certain financial, economic and political (religious) group by force. An armed formation, as a rule, includes representatives of one or more related teips (jamaats).

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Groupings, in turn, are subdivided into combat, intended for the direct conduct of an operation in a specified area, and reserve, intended for building up efforts and scheduled (usually in a week) replacement of warring fighters.

grouping is divided into five or six detachments (of 100 people or more), which are led by amirs (field commanders).

Detachment usually consists of three groups.

First- the central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in a combat state with the amir and does not have a permanent place of deployment.

Second a group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in the settlement. This group is subordinated, controlled and connected only with the amir. Members of the group were trained in a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply, conspiratorial and are engaged in legal social activities.

Third group - a group of "helpers". These are like-minded people and supporters of the Amir, living at home. In order to save money, this group is not constantly with the detachment. In the case of the Amir's order, they come to him and carry out the task, then return home again and do their usual business or act independently with the consent of the Amir.

Thus, central the group is the main formation of the detachment and consists of three platoons on three departments in everyone. The group is armed with only easy-to-carry weapons, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and leaving. The time, place and purpose of the attack are appointed by the Amir.

Approximate armament and equipment of the bandit squad:

Radio stations-2pcs, binoculars-2pcs, map of the area -2pcs, cartridges 7.62 mm for PK-1000-1300pcs, 5.45mm - 500–600pcs, 4pcs. RPG-18 "MUHA"; each militant has a flask for water, spare clothes, a raincoat, a sleeping bag, medicines, dry rations for 7 days

Tactics of actions of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of actions of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of a military operation and terrorist acts.

The leadership of the extremists for the armed action in the Republic of Dagestan identified three areas in advance: to the west of BOTLIKH, near the settlement. ANDI and the GIGATLI area. Accordingly, three armed formations were created: the main and central one under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the northern one - Shervani Basayev and the southern one - Bagautdin. In total, the formations, estimated, there were up to 3,000 militants. Formations were structurally divided into battalions (50-70 people each), companies (15-20 people each) and platoons (5-7 people each).

Preparation for the operation and terrorist acts

The stage of preparation for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct training of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the area of ​​operation included:

Study of the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

reconnaissance of the locations of federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage sites for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the activities of the troops, the routes of advancement for subsequent ambushes and mining of roads.

During the reconnaissance, detailed video filming was carried out.

Immediate preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruitment of local residents on the basis of religious, national and kinship principles, indoctrination of identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as much as possible more residents on their side.

Negotiating with the administration and local residents through persuasion, bribery or threats in order to ensure their support and conduct joint actions with the militants or not interfere with their actions against the Federal forces;

Creation of detachments and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.

Carrying out operations and terrorist acts

The operation of the armed formations of Chechen extremists and local separatists can be divided into four periods:

Reconnaissance of exit routes and capture of approaches to settlements.

Exit forward detachments, disarmament of police officers and engineering equipment of the area.

Exit and occupation of the area by the main group.

Conducting hostilities against federal troops and withdrawal.

Reconnaissance of exit routes and the capture of approaches to settlements was carried out at night by forward patrols of 5–8 people (machine gunners 1–2, grenade launchers 2–3). After approaching the settlements and occupying the outermost houses or outbuildings, surveillance was organized by head patrols, then, if there was no danger, a command was given to the actions of forward detachments.

The forward detachments, as a rule, captured the settlement from two directions. After the disarmament of the militia workers, they carried out an ideological indoctrination of the population aimed at convincing the inhabitants that the militants were only fighting for the faith among the “infidels”. At the same time, measures were taken to organize a surveillance system, communications and engineering equipment of the area. At the same time, local residents were used to equip dugouts, shelters for militants and equipment, and ammunition depots.

After the complete capture of settlements and partial of their engineering equipment, at night, on vehicles (KAMAZ, UAZ, URAL and cars) using blackouts, the main forces of illegal armed groups (IAF) left.

To accommodate the main forces of illegal armed formations, they occupied suitable houses of local residents (favorable in terms of location), buildings of hospitals, schools, and enterprises. Residents of occupied houses were expelled under the threat of air strikes and artillery raids by federal forces. At the initial stage, under the guise of "Sharia law," food, livestock, and property were taken away from some residents. Later, with the outbreak of hostilities, the militants openly engaged in looting, robbery, stealing vehicles for movement, engineering equipment (tractors, bulldozers, etc.) to restore roads and equip trenches.

With the outbreak of hostilities against the federal troops, the armed formations of Chechen extremists and Dagestan separatists used in their tactics classic actions in mountains and settlements:

Capture of dominant heights, passes, advantageous routes and deployment of firepower there.

Closed firing positions, caves and basements of houses in settlements were widely used for firing.

Anti-aircraft installations to cover the militants, as a rule, at commanding heights, however, lethal fire was opened after the target reached a minimum distance.

Mining of the area was widely used.

As a feature of the fighting, it should be noted the use of small groups consisting of a mortar crew, a grenade launcher and a pair of snipers. Sniper shooting was carried out under cover of the sound of mortar and grenade launchers from caves or other shelters.

After the capture of the area from several settlements, work was carried out on the penetration of militants into the rear of the FV to organize pockets of resistance in the depths of the areas where the troops were located (Buinaks, Makhachkala, on Khasavyurt and Kizlyar, for example) in order to divert part of their forces. Subversive groups were sent out with the task of cutting off the supply routes for troops (the road to Botlikh).

After the air strikes were carried out, the camouflage and engineering equipment were strengthened.

Repeating the experience of military operations in Chechnya, a strict rotation of militants was organized. The replacement of those who had already fought with fresh ones was carried out from the reserve group, the withdrawal was carried out on command in cars to Chechnya to pre-prepared recreation centers.

To carry out the retreat, the militants used small cover groups (1–2 mortar crews, 2 heavy machine gun crews, 2 snipers, 2 grenade launchers, 1–2 AGS-17 crews).

Video footage of the fighting was conducted, especially when the situation developed favorably for the militants, the video materials were then used to raise the morale of the Islamists (delivering demonstrative strikes on helicopters).

Before the start of hostilities in Dagestan, religious extremists, as one of the ways to deliver weapons to the "Kadar zone" of Dagestan, used the delivery of manure by heavy vehicles for spring field work. Weapons and ammunition, as a rule, were covered with manure in sealed packaging, which prevented inspection of these vehicles at checkpoints and checkpoints of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Internal Troops of the Russian Federation.

Features of the conduct of hostilities by militants on the territory

Chechen Republic in October 1999

Understanding the futility of open armed confrontation with the FS, the leadership of the BF adopted the tactics of focal defense, ambushes, "traps", rapid raids and raids by mobile detachments, especially at night. To this end, the settlements of Ishcherskaya, Goragorsk, Naurskaya, Alpatovo, Vinogradnoye were turned into defense centers. The militants, as in the first Chechen conflict in 1994, use methods of guerrilla warfare based on constant reconnaissance, transience and military cunning.

Without entering into direct confrontation with the FS, BFs prefer to operate in small groups (3–5 people), including a grenade launcher, a sniper, a machine gunner, and 1–2 submachine gunners. They do not count on the result of inflicting heavy losses, but rather short shelling, but on the other hand, often and successfully, without losses on their part.

The most effective actions on mobile weapons. Mortars, ZU, KPVT, DShK, AGS, sections of rocket launchers are installed on vehicles of the UAZ, JIP type. At night, they move around using "Swedish glasses", "Quakers" on cars, without turning on the headlights. Fire is fired from temporary firing positions (5-6 shots), then the location quickly changes.

When conducting reconnaissance, the Scouts use horses, which greatly increases their maneuverability. When performing tasks, Scouts often disguise themselves as refugees or shepherds, acting in 1-2 people. During the arrangement of ambushes, they practice thorough camouflage, let the enemy pass through themselves, and then open fire from the rear and flanks.

During the defense of the site, the following methods are used

Immediately before the start of the artillery preparation, the militants make a swift rush forward to the safe zone and hide on the ground. After the motorized riflemen go on the attack, they are shot point-blank from a distance of 100–150 meters. There were cases when the militants managed to get within the range of a grenade throw.

On the way of advancement of our troops, the presence of strong points is indicated, where 2-3 people are in position. Gradually retreating, they lure the units of the federal forces in a direction favorable to them, after which they attack the flank.

In the first minutes of the battle, snipers knock out command staff and the most active soldiers and sergeants, trying to sow panic.

They calmly and boldly take advantage of the carelessness of our servicemen, taking advantage of the fact that in our dispositions there is always a "passage yard". For a small fee (cigarettes, beer) you can learn anything you want.

Training of militants of illegal armed groups of Chechnya

1. The tactics of "fleas and dogs" or the strategy of the Mujahideen

Tactics "fleas and dogs" translates as a flea bites a dog and immediately moves to another place . The bottom line is that the Mujahid attacks the enemy (kafir) and immediately moves to another place, otherwise he dies. The fighter is constantly on the move. Gradually, the number of Mujahideen increases, they continue to attack more often and immediately retreat. As a result, the rebuff of the infidels begins to weaken, management and control is reduced first in certain places, and then in the regions. With each attack of the Mujahideen, the enemy's losses increase and morale is lost.

The Mujahideen attack first in groups, and then in units and formations. They act in an organized and thoughtful manner. Having received trophies and replenishment, as well as having obtained information about their troops from prisoners, they begin to plan and conduct large-scale operations. They try to recruit prisoners, and those who agree are exchanged and they begin to give the necessary information. According to the plan of the field commanders, the infidels become dependent on the Mujahideen, weaken morally, materially and physically, while the Mujahideen, on the contrary, become stronger, become more organized, experienced and financially secure. After that, a plan is developed for delivering the final blow to the leading center of the infidels. As a result, the enemy must be blocked or destroyed.

2. Movement

In connection with the specifics of the combat operations of the Baltic Fleet, special attention is paid to individual training. The choice of the type of movement depends on the characteristics of the actions of the FS, weather conditions and terrain. The optimal size of a moving group of Mujahideen is from 8 to 11 people.

Types of movement:

Column movement - moving one after another at a distance of 5 to 10 meters. The amir moves forward at the head of the column, and his deputy at the tail of the column. As a disadvantage of such movement: a large stretch of the column, poor control and vulnerable when attacked in the front, but strong when attacked from the flanks;

Movement in two columns - carried out in a narrow place or where on one side of the mountain. Amir leads the first column, and the deputy leads the second. When attacked in front and behind, the columns are strong, weak from the flank;

Movement in line used when attacking federal forces or in areas where the enemy is suspected to be. Amir is in the center, the deputy is on one of the flanks.

Crawling methods:

"tiger" - carried out in an open area, eyes directed towards the enemy, weapons behind;

"worm" - in the location of the enemy, the eyes are directed towards the enemy, the weapon is in full combat readiness, the speed of movement is low, the energy costs are high;

"monkey" - used when there is a half-height fence (bushes, wall, etc.) for intrusion, attack, reconnaissance; weapons - in the hands, on the shoulder or behind the back;

"on the back" - used to move under an obstacle, weapons in combat readiness;

"cast" - used in mined areas, weapons behind the back, eyes towards the enemy, hands, before moving, probe the space in front of him in search of mines, stretch marks;

rotation "roulette" used for short distances to change the firing position or cross the viewed (shootable) area;

"crocodile" - for movement on half-fours in wetlands, weapons behind the back.

Overcoming dangerous places:

open area - the group is taken away by the amir to a safe place, disguised, intelligence agencies are sent out, escape routes are outlined, and then the groups can go along one path or through several passages;

Crossing over roads in dangerous places - the group is withdrawn to a safe place, intelligence agencies are sent, a safe passage is determined, and then a transition is made;

Pass through villages (with civilians) - as far as possible, do not enter the village, when bypassing, the direction of the wind is taken into account;

Minefield - in advance by intelligence agencies to detect and bypass;

water barrier - find a ford, preferably with natural disguise (reeds, bushes, algae, etc.)

3. Conventional signs of combat control

The front side of the brush is the face of a person, the back side is the back of the head;

If the militant who is called is behind - raise the brush to shoulder level with the front side forward and move the brush back and forth, if in front, vice versa;

Move the fist of the hand up and down - quickly;

Raised palm - stop, stop;

Rotational movement of the fist above the head from left to right - come back, come back;

A hand above the head with spread fingers pointing down with a pinch - gathering around the amir or mujahideen;

Movement of the brush face down - lie down, vice versa - stand up;

Fist of the hand directed to the side - direction of movement (right, left)

Rotational movement of the index finger around the eye, and then point it in any direction - to conduct reconnaissance of the area;

Attached one hand to the mouth, and the other to close the eyes - did not understand the signs;

Two hands with clenched fists intersect above the head canceling the order;

Weapon directed towards the enemy - an indication of the location of the enemy;

Bring the fist of the hand behind the back over the other shoulder - organize an ambush;

Fist with thumb pointing up - request for readiness (ready - answer with the same sign, if not - then thumb down);

Raised hand up with a clenched fist - stand in a column, in two columns - two hands up, and in a line - hands with fists to the sides;

4. Disguise

Requirements for the leadership of bandit formations to carry out camouflage measures:

study the area of ​​location, its location, soil, natural shelters and obstacles, the presence and condition of possible escape routes and free maneuvering, places of possible mining, as well as the presence of water sources;

choose a place for a trench so that it is easier to dig;

mask the soil in place or take it to another place and mask it there;

after the trench is ready to stand where the enemy should be and see if there are any shortcomings;

you can’t go to extremes and disguise too much or too weakly:

enemy positions should be visible;

it is forbidden to leave sparkling and reflective things near the trench or location, kindle fires, take off clothes, leave noticeable marks and any unmasking objects (colorful clothes, bottles, canned food, etc.);

change person silhouette:

mask parts of the body with mud or coal, you can use a shadow;

car disguise:

douse the machine with machine oil and cover it with soil (sand, etc.).

Fundamentals of the combat use of illegal armed groups

1. Organization of intelligence

Intelligence occupies a special place in the tactics of bandit formations. For its conduct, mainly the local population (mainly women, old people, children) is used, whose representatives practically freely approach the columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, enter into conversations with military personnel, calculate the approximate number of troops, equipment and weapons, and then pass the obtained information to the militants. Reconnaissance is also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups, as well as by groups of intelligence officers with communications equipment operating in passenger cars. The reconnaissance of the militants pays special attention to determining the location of the command posts of the troops.

The reconnaissance group that provides the invasion may be one or more people. One of the main requirements for the group is the thoroughness of reconnaissance. They carefully study roads, locations of military installations, mined areas. The disposition of the federal forces is ascertained (concentrated in one place, scattered over the territory in groups), the state of the enemy (attack, defense, waiting to move, etc.), routes of advance to the enemy's location.

Conditions to be observed in the course of reconnaissance:

Preliminary preparation of entry and exit routes;

Give orders to each group, explain its combat mission;

Have backup programs (plan);

Prevent information leakage;

Determine the place of rest;

Indicate the routes and type of transport on which to advance;

Stealth;

Surprise;

Patience;

It is forbidden to talk;

It is necessary to find the weakest points in the enemy's defense;

Physical training;

Be fluent in the art of silent combat;

Take all the people you meet along the way.

Information to be obtained in the course of reconnaissance :

Where are the buildings, defenses, cannons, machine guns, etc.

The number of enemy infantry;

Armament, task and purpose of the federal forces;

minefields and barbed wire;

Time and place of divorces and fees;

Time and place of food;

Time and place of release;

Time and place of operation of the power generator;

Location of the light source;

Places and number of posts, time of their change;

Place and time of administration;

Availability of warehouses (weapons, ammunition, products and spare parts).

2. Ambushes

Ambush actions, attacks, checkpoints, units on the march, support and communication facilities, traditional for bandit tactics, are widely used. Ambushes are arranged in gorges, narrowings of roads. Depending on the objectives of the attack, in a number of cases, ambushes act selectively, skipping reconnaissance, guarding and making a surprise fire attack on the main forces of our troops, mainly on command posts on the march, rear units. At the same time, during the fighting in Gorny Dagestan, the bandits switched mainly to night operations and operations in conditions of limited visibility, especially actively - in inclement weather. A new element in the militants' tactics is the organization of fire ambushes at commanding heights with the aim of destroying helicopters of the federal troops on the runways.

Attention is drawn to the tactics of the actions of gangs of formations in groups, including a sniper, a grenade launcher and a submachine gunner. Having settled down dispersed, a group of submachine gunners deliberately causes a response from the troops. In this case, the sniper is located at a distance of 400-600 m from the intended targets. The objects of destruction for small groups and lone militants are single vehicles and military personnel of the Russian troops (primarily officers). Like snipers, the latter tend to act with certainty and primarily hit military personnel without bulletproof vests.

At its core, the tactics of militants during ambush operations consists in a short fire raid from an ambush and retreat to a safe place (hit - ran away). With the beginning of our operations to clean up settlements, the militants widely use the mining of buildings, individual items, weapons, equipment, and even corpses. There are actions of militants, especially mercenaries, on a "rotational basis", that is, when they conduct military operations for up to three days, and then go to rest at a base in a safe area (from Tandy, the Blue Lake region in the Botlikh direction).

3. Organization of an attack on a post

According to field commanders, there are two ways to attack a post:

First way The group is divided into three parts. The grenade launcher and the machine gunner occupy a permanent position 50 meters from the post, the submachine gunners covertly approach the post as close as possible. The battle begins with a grenade launcher, and then a machine gunner and a grenade launcher conduct continuous aimed fire at the post. At this time, the promotion to the post begins. At the beginning, two flank groups take up positions in the nearest shelters and open fire, while the central group advances 15–20 m ahead of them in dashes, lies down and opens fire. In the future, the flank groups rush forward and so on until they reach the post.

Second way attack is the same as the first, but with this method of attack, submachine gunners move on the offensive through one (one moves - the other covers).

At the same time, you must remember that it is impossible to attack a post that is next to your village. It is necessary to leave the village on the other side, bypass the settlement, and then carry out an attack on the post.

Conclusion

In general, the analysis of the modern tactics of the actions of bandit formations allows us to draw the following conclusions:

In the North Caucasus region, the federal troops are confronted by a well-trained in operational tactical terms, equipped with the latest models of small arms, a cruel and uncompromising enemy, who uses a complex of sabotage and terrorist methods and elements of combined arms combat tactics to achieve his extremist goals.

The fierceness of the armed confrontation showed that the invasion of gangs into Dagestan was preceded by a long and thorough preparation, carried out with the active assistance and participation of both special services, extremist international Islamic organizations, and illegal armed formations operating semi-legally on the territory of Chechnya.

Terrorism, including the use of explosive devices, murders, kidnappings, infliction of bodily harm, torture, blackmail and threats, remains an integral component of the tactics of gangs.

Modern tactics of gangs

The experience of suppressing the bandit activities of Islamic extremists in the Republic of Dagestan indicates that the tactics of bandit formations have undergone significant changes. At present, along with the traditional forms of insurgent activity, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and hold strategically important objects, is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed uprisings by small (15-20 people) and large (up to 500 or more people) groups. At the same time, surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short-term raids are still the fundamental principles of tactics of action.

An important factor determining the specifics of the actions of bandit formations is the conduct of systematic "harassing" actions that force the troops to resort to defensive tactics, forcing them only to react to the operations of bandit formations, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya.

"Harassing" actions drain government resources and disrupt communications. Moreover, they give the impression of the ability of the militants to strike anywhere, sometimes quite unexpectedly.

"Disturbing" and "exhausting" operations form the basis of the tactics of bandit formations, which, as a rule, seek to evade direct confrontation with large forces of federal troops. Their actions in this case are based on preemption of the opening of fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances. After a clash, the bandits, as a rule, carry away the corpses of their accomplices, taking their weapons and documents. At the same time, since the time of the Chechen campaign, it has become traditional to desecrate the bodies of the killed servicemen of the Republic of Armenia.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company, and especially the events in Dagestan, has shown, in some cases, when a tactical advantage is achieved, gangs make attempts to capture and hold for a long time an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support. This testifies to a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and the federal troops and the stake of the leaders of gangs on long-term and fierce resistance.

A feature of the fighting of gangs in Dagestan was the use of offensive actions, which were predominantly objective or zonal (in a certain area) in nature and were carried out with the aim of capturing administrative centers or tactically important objects (dominant heights, passes). In this case, first of all, the possibility of delivering an unexpected swift blow to the enemy was used. When organizing an offensive, special attention is paid to achieving surprise, choosing the place and direction of the attack. great attention is given to the maximum use of the terrain. Thus, the entry of gangs from Chechnya into Dagestan was carried out along a relatively gentle slope, while the federal troops had to recapture hard-to-reach areas in the mountains from the militants.

In the course of armed opposition to the federal troops, the gangs also carried out active defensive operations, which were aimed at holding bases and base areas in mountainous Dagestan. At the same time, special attention was paid to the defense of mountain passes of dominant heights, passages, road junctions (paths), and settlements.

A characteristic feature of the actions of gangs is that preparations for conducting defensive operations in Dagestan (especially in the Kadar zone) began well in advance. At the same time, the main efforts of the militants were concentrated on equipping strongholds and centers of resistance, on the approaches to which ambushes and guards were set up, observation posts were located mainly on commanding heights. The strongholds were equipped in engineering terms and prepared for a long-term defense. Mining of roads, terrain, approaches to settlements was actively carried out. A network of control points, bases (warehouses) for storing weapons, ammunition, medicines and food were created in advance.

There were a small number of militants directly at the positions, carrying out direct protection of settlements and conducting reconnaissance. With the beginning of the attack of the RA units, using hidden approaches and passages of messages, the main forces of the militants, who had previously been in shelters (caves, basements, etc.), advanced to the firing positions.

During the offensive of superior forces, the militants, after a short-term shelling of federal troops, retreated, as a rule, in small groups to a new line, using passages, hollows and all kinds of paths. Withdrawal is carried out under cover of fire from previously prepared positions and ambushes, as well as minefields. Perfectly oriented on the terrain, groups of militants skillfully used this type of maneuver.

After getting out of the blows of the federal troops, the gangs sought to take up new advantageous positions. Sometimes, if possible, they went to the rear of the advancing troops, which made it possible to defeat them in the back. In this regard, the militants quite effectively used the tactics of "infiltrating" with the subsequent unification of small groups in the area of ​​the object of attack. This tactic was also actively used by the militants when they were pursued by federal troops, during which the bandit groups, if they could not break away from our troops, occupied an all-round defense and fought a stubborn battle until dark. Then, using a good knowledge of the terrain, they infiltrated in small groups through the battle formations of the units surrounding them.

During the operations of the federal troops to clean up settlements, the bandits, without entering into direct contact with our units, fired at them and quickly retreated to safe areas. If the troops did not consolidate on the achieved lines, with the onset of the dark time of the day, the militants returned to the old areas and again proceeded to active operations. This was the case, for example, in the Kadar zone.

Convinced after the infliction of fire strikes by Russian aircraft and artillery on strongholds and centers of resistance in the futility of attempts to impose positional battles on the grouping of the Federal Forces, the bandit formations changed their tactics of action, retreating from the outskirts into the depths of settlements to positions prepared in advance in engineering terms.

Ambush actions, attacks on checkpoints, units on the march, support and communication facilities were widely used. Ambushes were arranged in gorges, narrowing roads. Depending on the goals of the attack, in a number of cases, ambushes acted selectively: they let through reconnaissance and guards and made a surprise fire attack on the main forces of our troops, mainly on command posts on the march, rear units. At the same time, during the fighting in mountainous Dagestan, the bandits switched mainly to night operations and operations in conditions of limited visibility, especially actively in non-flying weather. A new element in the tactics of the actions of the militants is the organization of fire ambushes at commanding heights in order to destroy the helicopters of the Federal troops on the runways.

Attention is drawn to the tactics of the actions of bandit formations in groups, which included a sniper, a grenade launcher and a submachine gunner. Having settled down dispersed, the group deliberately caused a fire reaction of the troops with the fire of a submachine gunner. The sniper, having identified the firing points, hit them, and when the equipment was advanced, it was destroyed by the grenade launcher. The sniper was located at a distance of 400-600 meters from the intended targets. Objects of destruction for small groups and lone militants. Like snipers, the latter sought to act with certainty and, first of all, hit military personnel without bulletproof vests.

At its core, the tactics of the militants during the ambush consisted of a short fire raid from an ambush and retreat to a safe place ("hit and run"). With the beginning of our operations to clean up settlements, the militants widely used mining of buildings, individual items, weapons, and even corpses. There were actions of militants, especially mercenaries, on a "shift basis", when they fought for 1-3 days, and then went to rest at a base in a safe area (from Tando to the area of ​​the blue lake in the Botlikh direction).

Realizing the futility of long-term organized resistance to the actions of the Russian troops, the leadership of the gangs began to actively work to prepare militant bases in the southern mountainous and wooded regions of the Chechen Republic, to establish a centralized control network for them. For this purpose, transshipment bases were created and movement routes were prepared for the transfer of mercenaries to the territory of Chechnya from the territory of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Intelligence occupies a special place in the tactics of bandit formations. For its conduct, mainly the local population (mainly women, old people, children) was used, whose representatives practically unhindered passed to the columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, entered into conversations with military personnel, counted the approximate number of troops, equipment, weapons, and then transferred the extracted information to the militants. Reconnaissance was also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups, as well as by groups of intelligence officers with communications equipment operating on passenger vehicles. The reconnaissance of the militants paid special attention to determining the locations of the command posts of the troops.

Worthy of attention is the organization of the communication system of gangs, which was built on the basis of stationary and mobile radio communications. For this, portable radio stations of the old R-105M (R-109) park were mainly used, a network of amateur radio stations was also widely used, in addition, the militants had a certain number of foreign-made radio stations (Motorola, etc.).

The command of the grouping of federal troops took into account the experience of the Chechen campaign, during which they had facts of militants getting into communication on the frequencies of our formations and units, attempts by them to transmit false messages and commands, in particular, to strike at certain objects (regions) where the troops were located . In Dagestan, such attempts were intersected by electronic countermeasures.

Bandit formations in Dagestan were also armed with air defense systems (ZU-23, ZPU, MANPADS), including foreign-made ones, which were distributed among detachments and groups of militants. First of all, small arms and even anti-tank grenade launchers were used to fight against helicopters. In order to increase the survivability of fire weapons, the militants located them in populated areas, near residential buildings, in yards, sheds and camouflaged them well.

Thus, on the basis of preliminary conclusions from the experience of hostilities in the Republic of Dagestan, it is possible to determine the main types of actions of illegal armed groups. Among them:

Defense in populated areas with the involvement of significant forces and means (up to 300 or more people), on the Botlikh-Tsumadinsky and Novolaksky directions in populated areas, militants set up powerful fortified strongholds, approaches to strongholds in populated areas, as a rule, were mined, all the terrain in front of them was shot through using landmarks. For firing and adjusting it at night, the militants widely used light rockets. All types of weapons, including grenade launchers, were used to repel army aviation strikes.

Ambush actions with extensive use of mine-explosives. The ambush sites were prepared in advance. Firing positions were equipped, mines and land mines were installed.

Active sabotage and terrorist activities.

Having lost control over the mountainous part of the Republic of Dagestan (the Botlikh-Tsumadinsky direction) and having suffered heavy losses in open clashes with federal troops, the militants began to rely on organizing and carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions.

Creation of a network of support bases in the mountainous regions of the Republic of Dagestan, in the frontier regions of Chechnya.

In the mountainous regions of the Republic of Dagestan (in the Kadar zone), a large number of bases and warehouses were equipped with stocks of weapons, ammunition, medicines and food. In the interests of ensuring the actions of the militants, an extensive network of caches with material and financial resources was also created. Among the other most characteristic manifestations of the tactics of bandit formations, it seems possible to single out the following:

Systematic organization of sabotage, raids, raids. At the same time, the retreat to the areas where large forces of militants are based is carried out, as a rule, under the cover of the captured hostages.

To conduct combat operations, commit sabotage and terrorist acts, groups (5-10 people) and formations of up to 300 people or more were created, depending on the tasks.

As a rule, militant groups and formations penetrated to the objects in conditions of limited visibility or at night, often under the guise of local residents, refugees, police officers.

Objects for attack were chosen both in tactical and operational depth in accordance with the strategy of the militants "transferring the war to the territory of Russia", which was confirmed by terrorist acts in Buynaksk, Volgodonsk, Moscow and other settlements.

The militants skillfully disguise their terrorist actions. The syndrome of "getting used to constant danger" played its negative role in this regard.

An analysis of the tactics of bandit formations cannot be objective without taking into account their qualitative characteristics, which determine their strengths and weaknesses. Particular attention should be paid to the strengths of gangs, which include:

intelligence organization. It provides bandit formations with continuous information about the deployment and movement of federal troops, their numbers, composition, combat capability and vulnerable spots. As a rule, bandits have a widely deployed network of agents among the local population.

local conditions. Bandits often mix with the local population, which increases their ability to act suddenly. To determine them among the local population, it is effective to introduce access control over the movement of the population.

Awareness. The militants' knowledge of local characteristics enables them to exercise effective psychological pressure on the local population. This strong side should be neutralized by establishing good relations between the command and control agencies of the federal troops (forces) with local authorities and the population. An essential addition to this is the organized participation in the conduct of operations by local anti-bandit militia units.

Decisiveness, discipline and physical training of militants. Field commanders, as a rule, are well prepared, trained, have a high determination to defend the interests of their cause to the end, strengthened by firm, sometimes even cruel discipline. At the same time, not all ordinary militants possess these qualities and are much more easily panicked, especially in an unfavorable situation for them.

The weaknesses of the gangs are:

lack of personnel and resources. The most vulnerable to the actions of gangs is the destruction of their supply bases, blocking the routes for the delivery of reinforcements, weapons and food. This neutralizes the active activity of the gang for a certain time.

the vulnerable side of the gangs is their dependence on the local population. A decrease or complete absence of it significantly reduces the effectiveness of their actions. In this regard, one of the main tasks is to win and retain support from the local population.

Political, religious and ethnic divisions taking place among the bandits.

Definitions of psychological preparation, its essential content, the novelty factor and its role in the formation and manifestation of psychological qualities, the psychological mechanism, the organization and conduct of psychological preparation in the course of training, education and psychological preparation itself.

Organization of psychological preparation.

Directions of psychological preparation, principles of its organization.

The role and place of a psychologist in psychological preparation.

Psychological model of modern combat.

The tasks of psychological training, the form and methods of their implementation in teaching the driving of combat vehicles and in the course of tactical training.

The concept of psychological preparation

The psychological training of servicemen is a system of purposeful influences aimed at forming and strengthening psychological readiness and stability in soldiers, mainly on the basis of self-improvement of personal and development of professionally important qualities, acquiring experience of successful operations in simulated extreme conditions of a combat situation.

A more accessible understanding of the essence of psychological preparation was, in our opinion, formulated by the famous Russian physiologist I.P. Pavlov: “The point here is not only in the strength of interacting stimuli, but in their novelty ... The main reaction of the passive-defensive reflex is not to force, but to novelty".

Why, in our opinion, is the essence of psychological preparation stated in the above quotation? What is this about? In the course of training and education of any specialist of a serviceman, it is provided for the formation of a wide range of professional activity qualities. And in general, the task is solved successfully. However, the experience of combat operations shows that not every previously formed quality can manifest itself in a serviceman when the conditions of activity (weather, terrain, visibility, fire impact, etc.) change, especially when switching to real combat. There are a lot of examples when a warrior successfully hits a target in training sessions and does not shoot in the best way when combat conditions change, when passive-defensive reflexes actually contribute to the inadequate behavior of the warrior and reduce the effectiveness of combat activity.

That is, the factor of novelty sometimes plays a decisive role in the manifestation of previously formed qualities in a person, and therefore in the performance of the exercise. And the task is to provide for and put the trainee in such conditions in peacetime, in the course of training and education, in which the psychological qualities necessary for the performance of a combat mission will be developed. In other words, in the course of everyday combat training, to reduce to a minimum everything new, unknown, with which a person can meet in battle.

What is the psychological mechanism of psychological preparation? Due to what internal and external influences on the psyche of a serviceman is its influence carried out? These and other questions can be answered if we approach the understanding of the main theoretical and practical task of psychological training, which is the purposeful formation and consolidation of mental images in military personnel of a model of their upcoming or future actions. And the logic here should be the following: the greater the number of upcoming mental images that are most appropriate to the combat situation, we form in a soldier, the less likely he is to fall into a situation of uncertainty, uncertainty, which, as a rule, entails a passive-defensive reflex in a person, and therefore inadequate actions. .

For a better understanding of this issue, consider what is essentially a mental mode of action?

The mental image, or in other words, what a person saw, heard, experienced, etc., is nothing more than a psychological model of action (combat) in the mind of a warrior. This is not a picture that captures any situation, but much more. This is a rather complicated process in time of reflecting not only objective reality, but also the reconstruction of previously experienced, seen, etc. images, in order to build the future activity of a warrior, adequate to the actual situation. The regulator of such activity is the motives and needs of the serviceman, his attitude, and the operational structure is professional actions. That is, it will be methodologically correct if, in the course of all daily activities in organizing psychological preparation, we direct our conditions to the formation of both the conceptual and figurative foundations of the model of upcoming actions.

At the same time, it is very important to take into account that the manner in which a particular action is performed is determined both by its subject content (where, how, with whom to go, what to take with you), and its significance for a soldier (whether or not to go there). One can be perfectly prepared professionally in terms of the ability to drive, fly, hike, etc., have sufficiently developed professional qualities, but if the conceptual basis of the model of upcoming actions, which is the fundamental basis of the semantic attitude to behavior in battle, is not developed, with great certainty it can be argued that the task will not be completed with due efficiency.

In this regard, when organizing psychological training, it is important to proceed from the principle of anticipating the formation of the conceptual basis of the model of combat operations in relation to the figurative one. This means that any idea in the implementation of psychological training should get its start through the activation of beliefs in the necessity and importance of the tasks set, the consolidation of motivational attitudes, the accumulation of ideas about the conditions of the battle, etc. For these purposes, proven psychological training methods related to mainly with the verbal, oral influence of commanders, other specialists on the psyche of personnel - persuasion, suggestion, etc.

However, the installation alone for solving the problems of psychological preparation is extremely insufficient. The success of a warrior's actions largely depends on how much the mental images formed in him correspond to reality. To do this, a warrior must sensually fill the mental image of the model of combat work: perform practical actions during training, exercises, firing, missile launches day and night. Under these conditions, it is possible to widely use methods that allow fixing the figurative basis of the combat model by hardening the necessary professionally important qualities. They may include: exercises and training on special simulators, simulators, training fields, at airfields; physical and sports exercises to overcome special obstacle courses, obstacles, blockages, water lines; special sports games and competitions; psychological exercises for purposeful development of cognitive, emotional and volitional qualities; psychological training on cohesion of the team, the formation of compatibility, collectivism, interchangeability, etc.

A significant number of different approaches to understanding the organization and conducting psychological preparation have been formed in science. Without setting the task of analyzing them, we proceeded from the fact that psychological training is carried out in the course of indoctrination (by educational structures), training (by combat training bodies), and during the conduct of measures of psychological training proper. Taking into account the fact that training, upbringing and proper psychological preparation are closely interconnected and interdependent, it is very important to consider what qualities, properties, mental processes and states are formed in each of the listed areas.

Carrying out the most general analysis, we can state that in the process of education, military personnel develop skills and habits of behavior in various conditions, and consequently develop volitional qualities; the development of the emotional-volitional sphere of the personality and its adaptation to new conditions is carried out; military personnel are purposefully oriented towards overcoming possible difficulties in combat conditions, they are instilled with stamina, courage, bravery, courage, conviction in the rightness of their actions, etc.

In the process of training, the moral and combat qualities and feelings necessary for the successful defense of the Fatherland are formed and tempered (the same courage, fortitude, courage, determination, initiative, readiness for battle, a sense of collectivism), motivational attitudes are activated; through the accumulation of relevant knowledge, ideas about modern combat are formed, and the consolidation of skills and abilities contributes to the development of psychological readiness, stability, etc.

However, it would be wrong to reduce psychological preparation only to training and education. training and education is much broader in terms of tasks to be solved than psychological training. There are a number of such tasks, especially in the formation, development and hardening of the psychological and special qualities necessary for the performance of combat, which can be solved only in the process of psychological preparation. For example, consolidating and developing the skills and abilities necessary to perform a specific task; activation of features of cognitive processes, motives, abilities characteristic of a particular military specialist, or such special qualities of a fighter as discretion, eye, thinking, coordination of movements, resistance to overload, etc.

That is, along with training and education, during which psychological preparation is partially carried out, a number of tasks are solved that allow us to conclude that it is independent, has its own ways, means, forms and methods (auto-training, accumulation of ideas about combat situations and adaptation to them, psychocorrection, psychorehabilitation, etc.). It is this circumstance that often introduces some uncertainty into issues related to the organization of psychological preparation.

In this regard, it is very clearly important to distinguish between the content of general, special and targeted psychological training. So, in the course of general psychological training, which is carried out in the process of training and education, professionally important qualities necessary for combat (courage, heroism, bravery, etc.) are formed, which must correspond to the general goals and requirements for personnel.

Special psychological training is less related to training and education and is closer to independent psychological preparation for the fulfillment of the task. It is more inherent in specific methods (exercise, ideomotor training, the study of the main signs of goals, etc.). In the course of special psychological training, questions are resolved on understanding a combat mission, convincing soldiers of the need for its unquestioning fulfillment, and activating readiness and other specific professionally important qualities for these purposes. It is in the course of special psychological training that the issues of reducing the elements of uncertainty in the general system of forthcoming actions are solved to the greatest extent, the specific qualities necessary for the fulfillment of this task are formed and activated.

Targeted psychological training is carried out for a specific battle, for a specific flight, campaign, launch, etc. It is least related to training and is aimed at raising the activity of personnel, mobilizing their psyche to complete the task.

Organization of psychological preparation

The main areas of psychological training of military personnel are: the formation of science-based knowledge of military operations among soldiers, ideas about future war, beliefs, readiness for a feat, committing selfless deeds in the name of victory over the enemy; increasing the level of psychological stability and endurance of military personnel, developing unpretentiousness, unpretentiousness, moderation in desires and needs; instilling trust in commanders and superiors, installation on unquestioning obedience and obedience, trustworthiness and loyalty to state policy; reduction of mental trauma, increase in the level of professional and combat skills and abilities, physiological and psychological endurance of servicemen.

The effectiveness of the work being done will largely depend on how punctually the principles of psychological modeling of confrontation with the enemy are observed; professional-tactical conditionality of the content of psychological training to the tasks to be solved in various branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, ensuring the safety of actions during exercises and training. In addition, it is very important to observe the psychological compliance of training and combat tasks; the problematic nature of the created combat training situations; psychological confrontation modeling the adequacy of mental states and actions to combat conditions.

The question involuntarily arises - who and where will carry out such meaningful work on the organization of psychological preparation? The currently existing legal documents regulating the conduct of psychological training emphasize that its organization is entrusted to both psychologists in combat training structures and psychologists of educational structures.

The accumulated work experience shows that the effectiveness of the activities of psychologist officers of the combat training bodies is higher where their main attention is focused on the implementation psychological analysis types of combat activities; development of recommendations for the formation of the necessary professionally important qualities in the process of combat training; the development of psychological models of classes, exercises, maneuvers and the development of proposals for commanders to create optimal levels of mental tension of personnel by means of simulating the psychological factors of combat, the creation of psychological training simulators, training places, training grounds, shooting ranges, etc. in parts of the educational and material base. purposefully and effectively solve the problems of psychological preparation.

As for the officers of the psychologists of educational structures, they actually build their work in the field of psychological training in close cooperation with the combat training bodies, being guided by functional duties, in particular the position "... to take part in the psychological training of personnel and the conduct of combat, the solution of training combat and other tasks, to carry out measures to maintain their psychological stability. At the same time, it is important to note that in the main link where psychological training is carried out, in the regiment, all work on its organization and conduct is entrusted to the psychologist of the regiment.

Taking into account the importance and insufficient development of approaches to the organization of psychological training in the regimental level, there is a need to describe in more detail the methodology for its implementation, paying special attention to the introduction of psychological elements in the process of combat training.

Advanced experience in the troops shows that the psychological model of modern combat is created by:

The use of various simulation tools (training explosives, simulators nuclear explosion, training formulations of OV, imitation grenades and land mines, explosives, smoke bombs, rockets (signals), fire mixtures, blank cartridges, etc.).

Broadcasts of recordings of the sound effects of the battle (shots of tanks, guns, explosions of shells, mines, sound low-flying aircraft, etc.).

Creation of fires, models of damaged equipment, all kinds of engineering barriers and obstacles applied suddenly (imitation minefields, wire and hardly noticeable fences, ditches, traps, blockages, barricades, destroyed sections of roads and bridges).

Organization of real opposition to the enemy (prepared group of personnel, two-sided game by the forces of two platoons, etc.).

By implementing various compositions of the above means, depending on the tasks being solved, the type of weaponry and the type of troops, the psychologist, together with officers of the combat training bodies, commanders and headquarters, can consciously introduce various psychological factors into the process of combat training activity that can cause both positive activity of a soldier, as well as negative mental phenomena. Thus, the creation of a threat to the life of personnel is accompanied by the action of a danger factor, real fire impact - surprise, lack of information uncertainty, the implementation of unplanned actions - the novelty of the situation, etc. The skillful thoughtful introduction of these factors into the educational process allows you to really simulate the individual elements of modern combat, and therefore decide tasks of psychological preparation.

For the sake of persuasiveness and practical consolidation of the stated theoretical premises, we will consider the process of psychological training of personnel on the example of conducting classes in driving military vehicles and in the course of tactical training.

The main tasks of the psychological training of personnel in training to drive combat vehicles are:

overcoming the negative impact of a long stay in the specific conditions of a moving machine on maintaining attentiveness and speed of reaction when driving a machine;

the formation of strong-willed qualities necessary for the successful driving of combat vehicles in terrain and conditions, as well as for the courageous overcoming of various obstacles and obstacles;

overcoming the "fear of water" among the personnel when driving combat vehicles through water barriers.

The successful solution of these tasks is mediated by the exact fulfillment of the requirements of the manual on the rules for driving military vehicles, the Driving Course, the Guidelines for training to overcome water obstacles; purposeful and persistent actions of trainees, creation of a complex environment in driving lessons, close to the conditions of real combat reality; increasing the time of continuous stay of trainees in a moving car; performing exercises after receiving a large physical load; selection of sections and routes that require a lot of effort to control the machine; the setting of special tasks for observation on the move, as well as the constant improvement of acquired skills and qualities in the course of tactical exercises, exercises, shooting and other outings in the field.

The psychological training of personnel in the process of everyday combat training is carried out by working out certain elements of the psychological hardening of soldiers at each lesson. Their development is necessarily included in the lesson plan. So, for example, in order to form the conceptual basis of the model of upcoming actions (combat) in the course of tactical training, it is advisable to set the following goals:

in the process of training: familiarization of the personnel with the military equipment of the unit;

a clear demonstration of the superiority of our technology over enemy technology, the capabilities of weapons and military equipment to protect against weapons of mass destruction.

At this lesson, the goals of psychological preparation can be achieved by: designing a stand for comparative performance characteristics of our equipment and weapons and similar equipment of the enemy; real actions of trained crews, crews and personnel in the conditions of application of training recipes; ostentatious firing from standard weapons: individual firing, firing as part of a squad and platoon.

Similarly, they think over the elements of psychological hardening of personnel at each lesson in all academic disciplines.

The main burden of solving the problems of psychological training, in particular, the formation of the figurative basis of the combat model, falls on tactical and fire training classes (for driver mechanics - in driving classes). In the course of combat training, the training plan must include the development of elements of the psychological hardening of personnel through the formation of the conceptual and figurative basis of the model. As an example, consider the topics and goals of psychological hardening in the course of tactical training.

Lessons 1-2:

"Actions at rise on alarm". At the lesson, it is important to explain the essence of the psychological requirements for a warrior in this type of action; conduct personnel training on a sudden rise in combat alert and announcing a muster after hours (1–1.5 hours after lights out, in the middle of the night, 1–1.5 hours before getting up, in the course of performing other tasks during the daytime) .

Lessons 3.

"Actions of a motorized rifle soldier in battle". To acquaint the personnel with the psychological qualities necessary in modern combat, to reveal the essence of the psychological preparation of the squad, crew, crew, and its content.

Lessons 4.

Organize: the presence of a real, actively opposing enemy (a group of personnel); create a model of modern combat using imitation tools, noise, sound and light effects; perform an exercise in attacking a real enemy, hand-to-hand combat in a trench; work out the actions provided for by the lesson plan after physical activity (march from the place of permanent deployment to the training field).

Lessons 5.

Perform: actions in the conditions of application of educational formulations of OV; imitation of a nuclear explosion and actions during it: hand-to-hand combat with a real enemy, training in the fight against incendiary weapons, extinguishing real fires on models of military equipment and terrain.

In the process of working out the topic "Fighting tanks, armored vehicles and PTS of a potential enemy" to carry out:

Lesson 1.

Focusing on the vulnerable spots of enemy equipment, on unaffected areas when firing from a cannon and machine gun (specially prepared posters).

Lesson 2.

Demonstration of weak points of armored vehicles and unaffected areas when firing from it on real objects (mock-ups); practicing and demonstrating exercises to master the methods and techniques of combating armored vehicles during a real run-in of personnel; imitation of the enemy's fire impact with the help of imitation means (explosive packs, fire mixture).

In the process of a field trip, work out the integrated use of all means of psychological hardening used in previous classes (creating a model of modern combat, the presence of a real actively opposing enemy; using training recipes for ground forces; creating fires, etc.). In particular, during the offensive:

1) with the personnel of the units to work out the actions:

in conditions of active imitation of the enemy (explosions, firing with blank cartridges);

in the presence of a real enemy (part of the personnel) counteracting the attackers;

when overcoming imitation fields (mine);

in the conditions of application of educational formulations of OV;

firing blank shots, shells from infantry fighting vehicles over the head of the attackers;

in personal protective equipment.

At the next lesson - actions in the presence of a really opposing enemy; imitation of a night battle with the help of noise, sound, light effects;

2) for tank units:

exercise in overcoming imitation minefields, mine-explosive barriers;

organize the presence of a real actively defending enemy;

create a model of modern offensive combat using simulation tools;

perform actions in means of protection with the use of educational formulations of OV.

When working out the topic "Squad (tank, infantry fighting vehicle) in defense in the first two lessons, it is advisable to: explain to personnel the psychological characteristics of defensive combat; reveal the essence of the psychological qualities necessary for a soldier in defense, bring to him the features of a potential enemy in an offensive battle, his strengths and weaknesses.

a) for motorized rifle units -

organize actions under the conditions of the actual use of educational formulations of OV, means of simulating a nuclear explosion, with the designation of the enemy (part of the personnel, dummies, imitations);

perform active actions of the advancing enemy (two-sided game option) with real engineering equipment of the firing position of the squad.

In subsequent lessons, create a model of a night battle with a real enemy using noise, sound and light effects; perform exercises to develop methods of dealing with incendiary means, extinguishing fires at night;

b) for tank units -

create a model of a defensive battle using imitation tools, noise, sound and light effects,

simulate the presence of a real advancing enemy (part of the personnel or another platoon of the company),

striking and performing combat missions in protective equipment,

combating fires in the field of equipment and on the ground at night, as well as simulating losses in manpower (models of the dead, wounded), removing the wounded from the tank, rendering assistance to them.

When working out the topic "Squad (tank. BMP) in field guards and on the march," it is necessary to explain the essence of the psychological qualities necessary for personnel to successfully complete combat missions in field guards and on the march; perform an exercise in real actions to overcome obstacles and zones of infection with educational formulations of OM; organize the actions of a real enemy in the form of sabotage groups; to work out the skills of conducting dysometric control and partial special processing when meeting and conducting a battle with a really opposing enemy in the following conditions: actions when overcoming training minefields, mine-explosive barriers; combating incendiary means, extinguishing fires on mock-ups of equipment; firing blank shots over the head of advancing personnel; overcoming water barriers.

These are the elements of the psychological training of servicemen in the process of practical training in tactics. Similarly, it would be possible to present a list of activities and recommendations for the introduction of elements of psychological preparation in conducting other types of classes. Each branch of the Armed Forces, branch of service, and, ultimately, each unit or subunit has its own specific features of organizing and conducting psychological training. It is very difficult, and in fact impossible, to provide recipes for each individual case. In this sense, a very large field of activity is revealed to the psychologists of the regiments. Only initiative, creativity, great competence and knowledge of the tasks solved by personnel make it possible to successfully organize and carry out work on the psychological preparation of personnel.

At the same time, the psychologist, together with the commanders and officers responsible for organizing combat training, must constantly remember that the practical implementation of the principles of psychological training is achieved if: a high rate of action day and night in difficult weather conditions (rain, fog, snowfall, ice, sandstorms); quick and abrupt change of tactical situation during training; shooting from all types of small arms; running in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, forcing water barriers, overcoming infection zones, fighting fires; prolonged stay in protective equipment against weapons of mass destruction; combating tanks, low-flying air targets, enemy landings and sabotage groups.

The described approach to the organization and conduct of psychological training of servicemen is not final. There may be various methodological techniques that will significantly enrich the content of the work being done to prepare the psyche of a warrior for battle.

Materials seized from militants

The following materials were obtained from one of the liquidated bases Chechen fighters and are published so that our units have the opportunity to prepare in advance for the specifics of hostilities in Chechnya and other similar regions.

HOW TO NEUTRALIZE AND BREAK THE ENEMY'S MILITARY TACTICS

AND DIVERSIFY AND IMPROVE OUR TACTICS

(Khattab's instruction for the winter-spring period of 2001)

The commander should not get bogged down in providing his groups with food, uniforms, ammunition and medicines. For this, responsible people must be appointed, whom the commander controls. The main time of the commander should be occupied with the development of various operational-tactical plans and sabotage operations.

In the war against the infidels, we do not lack Mujahideen who are ready to give their souls in the way of Allah and there is no problem in the influx of fresh Islamic youth into our ranks. The main problem is in the commanders, their ability to clearly organize a military operation, where the enemy is dealt a tangible blow with minimal losses among the Mujahideen. Our commanders, on the contrary, are almost proud of the fact that there are many martyrs and many wounded in their group. They do not ask themselves the question - how and through whose fault it happened, we will all have to answer before Allah for this. Unsuccessful military operations with heavy losses break the spirit of the Mujahideen, and they begin to doubt the commanders. In this letter, we must consider two main questions: how to study and break the tactics of the enemy, which they use today against us; how to improve and diversify our military tactics and how to impose them on the enemy.

Compared to the first war, the Russians changed their tactics: they tried to use a large number of armored vehicles - one type of long armored column was already supposed to mentally suppress the enemy, but this tactic in the fight against the Mujahideen did not bring success. The Russians tried to take into account their mistakes in the last war. Today they have adopted a different tactic of warfare, using the following scheme: everywhere infantry is advanced and used as the main force, and armored vehicles as auxiliary; quick landing of troops and special forces from helicopters to the places of the alleged location of the Mujahideen and sweeping the area with the support of helicopters; sudden raids and raids by riot police and special forces on settlements on targeted tips from their informants. These groups react quickly to any rumors and information about the location of the Mujahideen. Contrary to previous tactics, the Russians advance their detachments at night and make ambushes near the bases of the Mujahideen and on the roads of their movement, or they surround the house and wait until the morning.

Today we propose the following scheme to neutralize this tactic: we will supply each field commander with anti-personnel mines, we will send an instructor to teach the Mujahideen how to mine. During combing, it is necessary to quickly mine forest paths along which Russian infantry walks (during combing, civilians do not walk through forests). It is also necessary to mine the approaches to the Mujahideen bases. The second mine must be hidden on a tree from above, after the first explosion, wait 1.5 - 2 minutes and, when help comes to the wounded, blow up the second mine through a cord (wire) or remote control. After the Russians leave, the unexploded mines must be removed and hidden near the path for next use.

We will send several Strela missiles to each field commander with instructions on how to use them. Each field commander must purchase barrels for KPVT, DShK and make simple guns that produce at least one shot. It is necessary to have a stock of cartridges for them, as well as 7.62 mm BZT for setting up ambushes on the helicopter flight route. Machine guns can be hidden in the ambush site so that the changing Mujahideen do not carry a large load with them.

After we warned the informers and, by the decision of the Sharia court, began to execute them, we significantly broke the Russian program, but did not completely solve this problem. The next step is for us to pit the informers against the Russian special services. For example, buy an old abandoned house or garage, make a warehouse with various military equipment there, mine it, and then leak information through informers. Another option: to ambush and wait for the Russians on the way to the "punctured" address. After that, they will not believe the informers and, possibly, eliminate one of them. They will have to rely on their own information, which, in most cases, is not reliable. On the radio and in notes, use the names of informers so that the Russians stop trusting them. You can throw compromising things, cartridges, grenades, uniforms, etc. into their yards and houses.

In some cases, the Russians use the Mujahideen's carelessness and weak tactics of tracking the enemy. It is not enough to guard a street or alley imperceptibly - the Russians can bypass the imperceptibly guarded street if they guess that it is under surveillance. Mujahideen need to constantly monitor enemy bases and notify their own in time. Many times we were taken by surprise and, apart from shooting back from machine guns, there was no resistance, the most successful options were when they managed to kill one or two Russians. It is known when in one day 6 Mujahideen became martyrs. This is a very careless tactic. It is necessary to mine the perimeter fence (where the Russians can take positions), lead the cord into the house and blow it up in case of a Russian attack. After several tangible losses, the Russians will reduce their activity. But at the same time, we should not wait for the Russians to come and surround the house - this is the last option. It is necessary, after the Russians start moving out of the base, to put forward several Mujahideen along their route and strike. Even one shot from the "Flies" is enough to frustrate the plans of the enemy. This time is enough for the Mujahideen to change their location or prepare for battle. Therefore, there should be constant surveillance on the outskirts of villages.

We will provide the commanders with the necessary number of radios, it is also necessary to introduce the tactics of mining the approaches to the bases at night, and remove the mines in the morning. Each commander should have night vision devices.

Now consider the question of improving and strengthening our military tactics.

Guerrilla warfare requires small mobile groups well prepared and trained for this warfare. For this period, our tactics are mine warfare, which bleeds and weakens the enemy before inflicting a strong decisive blow on him.

The enemy is trying to adapt to the mine war: they send out sappers with mine detectors. It is necessary to scatter small nails in mining areas (from 100 m to 1 km) that do not pierce tires, then the mine detector becomes useless. The Russian infantry is looking for stretch marks on the ground. It is necessary to install high extensions at the level of the Ural cabin 2.5 - 3 meters. These tripwires inflict great damage on Russian infantry. Approaches to land mines must be covered with one or two anti-personnel mines. We will send you mines that are almost impossible to neutralize and teach you how to use them. We will also send you remote fuse mines and ask you to use them for a backup explosion when help comes to the wounded. This is called a double strike.

Today we must deliver powerful blows, trying to avoid heavy losses among our own. The issue of advancing large columns is the most painful for the Russians. They drive infantry everywhere, trying to find ambush sites, trying to secure their columns and avoid nervous tension among their soldiers (especially OMON) on the march. There are ways to strike at the columns without the direct participation of a large number of Mujahideen. For example, install camouflaged grenade launchers, RPOs, etc. at the level of armored vehicles and run a cord from them for 400-500 meters. When equipment appears in the affected area, close the contacts. Especially it should be used in the defeat of railway trains. Enemies today use the railway as the most economical way of transferring equipment and manpower. You can tie "Flies" and flamethrowers both on trees and on flat terrain. Perhaps the Russians will be able to detect these surprises, but they are not able to carefully comb the entire route within a radius of 200 meters from the road.

A big request to the commanders to fire at least five shots from a sniper rifle or grenade launchers at the posts of Russian dogs during the day, especially during the month of Ramadan. Shelling must be carried out at different times of the day from different directions in order to constantly keep the enemy in suspense. The winter initiative should be ours. Snow is a natural disguise. Helicopter flies low in winter. It is necessary to ambush along their routes. After the shot, you can trample footprints in the direction of the informers' houses. It is necessary not only to mine and blow up their administrative buildings, but also to burn them.

We must be ready for a war with the infidels for hundreds of years, so after the death of the commander, there should not be squabbles and confusion in the group. Each commander must have at least 2 deputies in the group who are privy to his plans and orient themselves in the situation. The military amir should know about them. If the commander becomes a martyr, the group must work as clearly as before.

We ask field commanders to send a list of their deputies to the military amir, to share combat experience and their thoughts on combat tactics in order to exchange experience with other commanders.

THE WAR CONTINUES!

These materials were obtained from one of the liquidated bases of Chechen fighters and are published so that our units have the opportunity to prepare in advance for the specifics of hostilities in Chechnya and other similar regions.

It is important to have an idea of ​​how the militant leadership thinks and breathes, its educational and cultural level, the level of communication with subordinates, units, etc.

Absolutely

secret

As we noted earlier, we need to improve and diversify our military tactics and neutralize the enemy. And we ask you to send your suggestions, opinions on these issues to the address of the Higher School of Music and share your experience.

After much effort and labor that we have invested in establishing bases in the mountains, it turned out that the Russians could detect and destroy them. This may be due to an unsuccessful choice of a place for the base (not far from forest roads where people often visit), or information about the location of the base becomes known to FSB informants, or the base is poorly camouflaged (new paths have been trodden, visible from above). The reason may also be the careless behavior of the Mujahideen themselves. When a base or its alleged location is discovered, the base is subjected to massive shelling and air strikes. Then the infantry moves to this place to clear it. In other cases, when a base was discovered, the Russians began to practice the nomination of special forces. groups for a quick and sudden attack on the base. Often this is done at night or in the morning. As a rule, they are led to the location of the base by a guide - a munafiq.

First. It is necessary to put forward a post during the day at a distance of 300-400 m from the base, at night - at 50-2100 m from the base. Usually Russian infantry advances early - before or after dawn. Thanks to the advanced post, the Mujahideen have the opportunity to take timely measures: retreat or surround the Russian infantry according to a pre-drawn plan (scheme). In cases of retreat, it is necessary to quickly mine the base and approaches to it (make a trap).

Second. It is necessary to systematically conduct observation from heights or convenient points from where roads and approaches to the base are clearly visible. It is extremely important to do this, at least during the movement of Russian equipment and infantry in a given zone, or when they receive information from a messenger from the nearest village. There are cases when the Mujahideen discovered the Russian infantry in broad daylight, only when it approached the base at a distance of 100–150 m. Of course, in this case, one cannot think of serious resistance, it is necessary to quickly leave the encirclement.

Third. One of the most important moments. It is necessary to mine roads at a distance of 300 m from the retractable base post. It is advisable to stretch the cord, and this cord must be constantly checked. In this case, there is more guarantee that the explosion will take place. Other explosive systems may not work. Blow up only when the main group of Russians approaches the mined area, having previously missed the advanced reconnaissance group. Several explosions from the ground and from above from the trees will sow panic among the enemy. It is not profitable to get involved in a positional automatic firefight, since special. groups of Russians have better weapons. And losses in forest battles, even one to ten are not profitable for us.

In the tactics we propose, the Russians suffer heavy losses, panic arises among them and the main superiority that they hoped for - surprise, is lost. And the Mujahideen can use this moment to encircle and then destroy the enemy group according to a predetermined scheme. It is good to use duplicate explosions (through cords).

Fourth. When leaving, be sure to mine the base, after scattering small nails around. And be sure to mark the location of the mines on the base diagram.

Fifth. It is very important to create trap bases. To do this, it is necessary to make a semblance of a base (dugout, toilet, tread paths, etc.), then it is necessary to “leak” information. First, make shots from the place of the trap base. Then spread the word that young militants are being trained there. When Russian intelligence appears, it is necessary that they see smoke from a fire, a horse tied to a tree, hear music, or create any other imitations confirming that the base of the Mujahideen is probably located here. After that, we must wait for the arrival of the Russians. It is necessary to mine the territory, the base. First, a few people will come to check the base, and the main group of Russians will take a position around the base. Places convenient for taking a position should be mined first, especially from above. Explosions must be made at the same time. Then, after firing, which is likely to be opened by the enemy in a panic, duplicate explosions can be made. At the same time, it is necessary to mine the road along which the Russians came. If possible, set up an ambush at the same time. This tactic is good because we call the enemy where it is convenient for us to fight with him. This is easier than looking for the enemy in hard-to-reach places. 2-3 Mujahideen are enough to carry out this operation. With this tactic, the commander can effectively engage his entire group. And as our prophet (s.a.s.) said, "War is a trick" And we must adhere to the Sunni.

Sixth. Only the physical elimination of hypocrites is not enough to paralyze their activities. They find more sophisticated and discreet methods in their dirty work. We must think about how to push the hypocrites against their Russian masters. So that the hypocrites and their relatives completely lose confidence in the Russians. For example, put zinc or some of the ammunition in the informer's garden, having previously “snitched” on the informer that he supplies weapons to the Mujahideen. It is more convenient to do this on the eve of inspections, by making the same “leak” about buried ammunition. It is possible to call the Russians through a letter to the commandant's office on behalf of the munafik and blow up or fire at them on the way. Usually the Russians send no more than three pieces of equipment. And as a rule, the Russians react to signals from the population to show how they follow the law and order.

1. Compile a clear list of hypocrites executed by us by the verdict of the Sharia Court.

2. Constantly patrol the village, especially at night and eliminate special. groups of Russians who terrorize the population. This operation must be filmed with a video camera and these video frames with appropriate explanations made public.

The Supreme Military Majlis-Shura gives the commanders of directions, groups and ordinary Mujahideen the following

ORDER

each commander must prepare and conduct at least 1-2 "base-trap" operations;

carry out at least two operations to discredit hypocrites in front of the Russians in the territory you control;

conduct at least two “house-trap” operations in the territory you control, especially in the so-called safe places (Shali, Znamenskoye, Tolstoy-Yurt, Achkhoy-Martan, Shchelkovskaya).

in the near future, each direction commander should organize a group of 25 people, which should include a sniper, machine gunners, and grenade launchers to participate in a large operation;

organize the children to shout "Allah Akbar" in front of the commandant's offices of the occupiers. Encourage children with small gifts. Such performances greatly break the morale of the Russians;

organize a committee of women who will initiate rallies against the occupiers. It is necessary to financially support these women and their families as far as possible, each women's committee must be strictly attached to a specific sector and a specific commander of the direction.

To fulfill the previous order, direction commanders must draw up a clear list of group commanders subordinate to them and send them to the VVMSh in order to avoid uncontrolled spending of funds and ammunition. This paragraph of the order is motivated by the fact that some group commanders use the means by contacting several area commanders at the same time.

Rumors are spreading among the people that the Russians are leaving either in November, or in a month, or in two. Commanders should not build their military program based on these rumors. Such rumors discourage the Mujahideen, and they plan simple short-term operations. We need to plan our military strategy based on the fact that the war with the Russian infidels will be long-term.

May Allah give us all the strength, health and greatness to work for the triumph of Islam.

Allah Akbar!

Military Amir VVMSH

Amir Khattab. December 03, 2000

Department of Internal Troops of the NKVD

North Caucasus District

Top secret

Ex. No. of mountains Pyatigorsk

Commander of the 1st Infantry Division of the NKVD VV, Major General Comrade. Vetrov mountains. Krasnodar

From the experience of the Chekist-military operations carried out to eliminate banditry in the North Caucasus, the regions of which are similar in their geographical position to the mountainous regions of the Crimean ASSR, the following has been established.

I. Features of the conditions for combating banditry in the mountains

The terrain is high-mountainous with deep gorges, sometimes with sheer cliffs. The gorges are cut by numerous ravines and ravines covered with forest, thickets and shrubs. This provided good hiding places for gangs and made it difficult to conduct combat operations (movement, reconnaissance, surveillance, communications).

The turbulent flows of mountain rivers, especially during heavy rains and melting snow, as well as the lack and poor quality of wheeled roads, and in some places their complete absence, made it difficult for the movement and maneuver of the troops conducting operations.

Abrupt changes weather: fog, downpour, snowstorm, etc. (which is a frequent occurrence in the mountains) - in some cases led to the disruption of the planned plan and the confusion of the officers, who were not prepared to make a quick decision on the changed situation.

Especially difficult is the issue of organizing radio communication in mountainous conditions due to the fact that, as a rule, it requires studying the passage of radio waves in the daytime and at night in the mountains.

The material support of the troops (delivery of food and ammunition), due to the lack of products, small in weight, volume and high in calories, is difficult and requires a significant amount of pack transport.

Bandits' knowledge of the area and training in moving in the mountains, as well as family ties of the bandits with the local population, which served as a material support base for the bandits and a source of information about the movement military units and units, often made it possible for gangs to escape from the blow.

Special, unknown to a significant number of our troops, including officers, national, cultural and everyday customs and customs (which is important in terms of undercover activities, deployment of troops, use of guides, etc.), as well as the presence of tribal remnants, the strength of authorities and religious fanaticism influenced the organization of activities to combat banditry.

The fact that the population has a large amount of weapons and ammunition, left to them by the German command and collected on the lines of military operations of the Red Army units with German troops, is a source of armament for the bandits.

II. The tactics of the gangs

From the experience of combating banditry in the North Caucasus, it has been established that bandit groups, depending on the prevailing situation, changed their tactics of action, namely:

FIRST PERIOD(the period of the first 3 months after the liberation of the territory from the German invaders). The activities of the bandit groups were characterized by great activity. The bandits sought to retain entire areas and maintain fascist order in them. To achieve this, gangs united into large groups of several hundred people with a single leadership. The tactics of the bandit groups during this period were characterized by:

the preparation of defense lines with the deployment of guards and ambushes on the distant approaches, the good organization of reconnaissance through observation from the dominant heights and through their relatives-accomplices;

in a favorable situation for bandit groups, they took open battle with military units, trying to inflict as much damage as possible on our troops;

they widely used the method of encirclement and destruction of small units, using the entry of units into deep gorges, setting up ambushes in them and on the paths in the form of fire bags, often with false dashes they led fighters to their ambushes;

they set up ambushes that missed reconnaissance and security and fell upon the columns with strong fire, causing great damage to our troops;

when the gang was surrounded, the bandits occupied all-round defense and fought a stubborn battle. In cases where they were convinced of the advantage on the side of the units and subunits operating against them, the gangs, trying to evade the battle, dispersed with the onset of darkness and, using knowledge of the terrain, hid singly or in small groups;

Considering the current situation, to defeat these bandit formations, several large Chekist-military operations were organized and carried out with the involvement of a large number of troops, as a result of which the main bandit groups were defeated. However, during these operations, our troops suffered losses in manpower and equipment, and a number of operations were not successful.

Significant losses in our units and the unsuccessful conduct of individual operations are explained by the following:

the headquarters of the units and officers did not study the operational situation well and did not have a permanent business connection with the NKVD bodies, therefore, they learned about the presence of bandit groups when the Chekist-military operation was already overdue and it had to be carried out immediately. As a result, the units did not have time to study the area of ​​operation and prepare for hostilities, they carried out them hastily and thoughtlessly, especially in the correct use of the terrain, the organization and use of battle formations and in matters of material support;

the issues of ensuring the march and battle were poorly mastered: security, reconnaissance, communications and surveillance, as a result, the units fell into ambushes, fire bags and suffered losses in people and equipment;

they sent out small groups of fighters (5–7 people), who, being surrounded, could not decide the outcome of the battle on their own and died;

hastily organized offensives and attacks on the camps of the bandits without sufficient barriers covering all the escape routes from the area where the bandits were located gave them the opportunity to escape from the blow;

the detention of citizens by our ambushes and their release after verification in a number of cases led to the fact that the released turned out to be gang scouts, as a result of which the ambushes were fired upon and suffered losses;

some of our units went into operations armed exclusively with machine guns, which led to the fact that bandits armed with rifles, using the ballistic properties of their weapons, fired with impunity from distances inaccessible to fire from machine guns;

our units, moving, as a rule, along the bottom of gorges and paths, did not occupy command heights, which made it possible for the bandits to use them for observation and shelling, as a result of which our troops suffered significant losses.

SECOND PERIOD. After the defeat of large gangs in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus, a significant number of small scattered gangs of 5-40 people appeared. The leaders of these gangs were career bandits, German agents and traitors to the Motherland - former German burgomasters, elders and policemen.

Gangs began to be based in the areas and around the settlements of which they were residents, maintaining close contact with relatives and gang accomplices. At the same time, the gangs switched to a different tactic of action, namely:

Fearing penetration into the gang of our agents, they let only great authorities and their relatives into their camps;

they did not accept open battle even with our small units. The battle was fought only by force, hiding under the cover of night or fog;

organized ambushes, attacked small groups and individual outfits, disarmed the dead fighters, took off their uniforms and changed into military uniform;

cattle were stolen in large numbers from farms and pastures.

In this situation, operations involving a large number of troops did not already give the desired effect, therefore our tactics of actions also changed, namely:

it was necessary to use small RPGs and IGs capable of quick maneuvering;

through undercover activities of the NKVD bodies, the use of data from the Armed Forces and the use of permanent reconnaissance and search groups, to accurately establish the lairs of gangs and, acting swiftly and covertly, destroy them,

systematic explanatory work among the population and repeated raids in settlements destroyed the gang-supporting base.

During the Chekist- military operation after the liquidation of these disparate small gangs, a significant number of them were liquidated, some of the gangs disintegrated, and in groups or singly the bandits began to surrender.

During the conduct of military operations, the following shortcomings were identified.

Intelligence data was not always checked and in many cases was implausible, and sometimes belated, which led to unnecessary exhaustion of the forces of the fighters and to the failure of the operation.

The lack of camouflage during the period of concentration in the initial areas and the inability to covertly bring units to ambush sites. Weak discipline among the personnel during the period of service in ambush and secret.

Slowness of action. Lack of coordination in time between separate groups-outfits in the matter of closing the escape routes of the surrounded gang.

Underestimation of the service of search and prosecution of gangs hiding from the blow.

THIRD PERIOD the struggle of parts of the district against banditry took place in an environment where:

bandit groups, losing an accomplice base, decomposed, some of them went underground, some turned up in the garrisons and organs of the NKVD with confession;

career bandits and terry traitors to the Motherland began to be divided into small gangs (2-5 people) and strictly conspire, breaking family ties.

Only individual gangs retained their membership of up to 25 people.

During this period, the tactics of bandit groups were characterized by:

attacks and assassinations from ambush of single and small groups of military personnel, as well as party activists;

robbery and murder of citizens on the roads, farms and villages. The bandits took away mainly food, salt and clothes;

cattle theft.

In this situation, our methods of dealing with them changed accordingly.

A significant number of small RPGs were sent to areas affected by banditry, which, by scouring ravines and hollows, as well as reconnaissance of paths and traces in the forests, established gang lairs, surrounded and destroyed them.

Ambushes and secrets were set up on more likely gang routes.

On the one hand, the NKVD organs continued to work on the decomposition of the gangs through undercover activities, on the other hand, they established the exact location of the gangs and aimed military groups at them.

In the third period of the fight against banditry, the following main shortcomings were noted:

RPGs and detachment groups were not always led by officers or experienced non-commissioned officers, some groups did not provide themselves with adequate reconnaissance and security measures during the movement, due to which they fell under the sudden fire of bandits and lone bandits, suffering losses.

The chiefs of the RPG - officers - could not determine their place in the RPG, moved forward and died from the first shots of the bandits, which led to disorganization of management and a large number of loss of officers.

Poor knowledge of the map on the part of the middle-level officers.

THE FOURTH PERIOD. After the Karachais, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars were evicted from the North Caucasus, the bandits operating in the mountainous regions were joined by a part of the bandits legalized before the eviction, as well as a part of the population of these regions, who evaded eviction, deprived of their main bases, but possessing a significant amount of weapons, including and automatic, small gangs stepped up their activities. Their techniques and methods at this stage are determined by the following.

Deprived of the support of the population and being daily under the combat action of the RPG, the bandit groups began to constantly change their bases.

Revenging for the resettlement of their relatives, bandit groups set up ambushes and track down our RPGs themselves, inflicting losses on the latter, committing murders of party-Soviet and collective farm activists and civilians who arrived in these areas.

The bandits are fighting extremely hard.

In accordance with this, in the tactics of combating them, the best results are obtained by ambushes and secrets created by garrisons on the probable paths of movement of the bandits, interacting with the active actions of the RPG.

Based on the experience of fighting banditry in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus and the likelihood that units of your division will fight banditry in the Crimean mountains,

OFFER

To study these instructions with all the officers of the division and in practical work avoid the mistakes listed above.

To teach the officer corps to perfectly read a map of mountainous regions, to be able to determine the steepness of slopes and cross-country ability on the map, to know how to make calculations for a march and take measures to preserve the strength of the fighters.

In the form of lectures (conversations), to study the national, cultural and everyday characteristics of the population of the area of ​​activity of the unit and their influence on operational military activities.

To acquaint the officers with the geographical and climatic features of the Crimea.

With the personnel of the units, conduct classes on the following topics:

a) for tactical training: "Reconnaissance of gangs in mountainous conditions" and "Liquidation of a bandit group that has settled on dominant, hard-to-reach heights";

b) on fire training: "Rules of shooting in the mountains."

Persistently and daily to teach the troops to carry out surveillance service.

In each platoon, company, train 3 - 5 fighters to transmit orders

light signals and flags according to a specially designed signal table and alphabet.

When organizing radio communications, take into account the need to train all officers, sergeants and enlisted personnel of communications units in the ability to organize radio communications in mountainous conditions, focusing on acquiring skills by radio operators in choosing a radio station deployment site, using appropriate types of antennas and methods for installing them, methods of transporting a radio station and power sources .

When organizing communication over a system of radio networks or individual directions, the officers must take into account the peculiarities of selecting the best radio waves for work in mountainous conditions, especially for low-power radios when working at night.

To overcome sheer cliffs and mountain streams, units intended for deployment in mountainous areas should be provided with alpine equipment and taught how to use it.

Continuously study the operational situation and, without breaking away from the NKVD bodies, receive operational orientations in a timely manner and analyze them at headquarters,

The commanders of the units and their headquarters should comprehensively analyze each operation carried out by the units and, no later than 10 days from the date of the end of the operation, carry out a detailed analysis with the officers of the unit.

When analyzing in detail, analyze the following questions:

preparation for the operation: study of the operational situation, topographic and ethnographic features of the operation area, planning of the operation;

material support of the operation, equipment for delivering ammunition and food to the mountains, measures against possible natural disasters in the mountains;

organization and conduct of undercover and military intelligence;

security measures against sudden gang raids, ambushes;

organization of communication, revealed tactics of bandits;

analysis of the main combat episodes;

shortcomings in the preparation of the operation and shortcomings of each unit in the conduct of hostilities;

reports.

Head of the Internal Troops of the NKVD SKO Major General GOLOVKO

Chief of Staff of the Internal Troops of the NKVD SKO Colonel TABAKOV

RGVA, f. 38650, op. 1, d. 129, member. I-N.

Top secret

"I approve"

Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR

Commissar of State Security 2nd rank

KOBULOV

" " July 1944

INSTRUCTIONS

troops participating in the operation to eliminate banditry in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus

I. Tasks of the operation

1. The task of the Chekist-military operation is to completely eliminate the main personnel gangs and their leaders Hassan Israilov, Idris Magomadov and Ibi Alkhastov, who are the core of gangs in the North Caucasus.

II. Conditions for the operation

4. Bandits in the fight against the troops use the following tactics:

a) careful observation of troops using optics;

b) setting up ambushes in gorges, at the bends of paths, at river crossings;

c) when surrounded, the bandits will try to leave the surrounded area in small groups and alone along paths unknown to us, rock terraces or hide in caves, crevices, forests;

d) conducting fire combat in order to cover the exit from the encirclement or gain time until a favorable moment contributes to separation from the troops (nightfall, fog, rain, etc.).

The bandits in the area of ​​their bases have equipped OTs, made of stone, with loopholes, they use old towers as OTs. OT is occupied in places that allow you to immediately take cover (near a cliff, near rock crevices, in a bush);

e) stalking our service units and attacking them;

e) dressing up in the Red Army uniform;

g) high activity in combat with the troops, the desire to preempt in opening fire, accuracy in shooting, unwillingness to surrender alive. To achieve success, troops need great restraint and the art of sudden action.

7. Previous operations often ended unsuccessfully for the following reasons:

a) incorrect calculation of forces and means by commanders when deciding to liquidate the gang: almost always, most of the forces and means were allocated for active operations in strike-fighter detachments, which created an unnecessary, multiple superiority over the gang, while the area of ​​​​operation remained unencircled ...

b) the troops did not camouflage their concentration in the area of ​​operation and their battle formations well; maneuvers to distract the bandits from the true purpose of the troops were not carried out. As a result, the bandits quickly discovered both the concentration of troops and their battle formations;

c) due to poor study of the terrain, the troops did not close all possible ways for the bandits to move, and they left. Part of the bandits, without engaging in battle with the troops, took refuge in caves, forests, crevices and were not found by us;

d) military and undercover intelligence, both before the start and at the time of the operation, worked unsatisfactorily.

III. The actions of the troops by the stages of the operation

8. Tasks of the first stage

Within the boundaries of combat areas, completely clear the area of ​​bandits and those who evaded resettlement, preventing them from infiltrating into their rear.

To accomplish the task, it is necessary: ​​to obtain a "language", to obtain from him data on the places of shelter of the gangs, their composition, routes of movement in the mountains, to find experienced guides, to obtain objects for undercover combinations.

Hidden maneuver, movement in small groups and their careful camouflage to hide from the bandits the purpose of the operation and the movement of troops,

10. The advance must be preceded by the deployment of OPs at the commanding heights in front and the dispatch of scouts to areas of terrain that are not visible from the heights.

11. Conducting a search for gangs and those who evaded eviction should be carried out with a force of 10-25 people allocated from RPG units.

In the rear of the RPG, put up NPs and secrets for the required time to detain those trying to break through to the rear,

12. Regiment, battalion, company must always have a reserve. A regiment is at least a company, a battalion is up to a platoon, a company is up to a squad. Have heavy machine guns, 82-mm mortars, snipers and search dogs as part of the regimental and battalion reserves.

13. Communication with neighboring units and subunits, as a rule, should be visual. At night, at the junctions, it is obligatory to put up service outfits.

14. In order to prevent gaps in movement between subunits and for the convenience of control, the movement of subunits should be regulated by predetermined leveling lines. Equalizing boundaries are to be set on terrain convenient for observation and orientation.

At night, set up a network of patrols, secrets, and ambushes at the leveling lines to detain those trying to break through to the rear.

15. At halts, overnight stays, it is imperative to have security guards that protect against a sudden raid by a gang. Set out outfits on the slopes of the ridges, heights that make it possible to control and shoot through dangerous areas.

17. Tasks of the second stage of the operation.

Create a dense ring of encirclement of the Khildikhoroevsky and Maysta gorges in order not to let a single bandit through.

18. The encirclement ring is made up of a combination of various types of outfit: ambushes, barriers, secrets, observation posts located along the front and in depth, which intercept all exits from the encirclement ring. The location of the outfits as a result of the study of the terrain must be continuously improved. At night, increase the number of outfits using all personnel, with the exception of the reserve.

20. The regimental section should be divided into battalion, company and platoon combat areas. In each combat area, for actions to detain bandits who have broken through the encirclement and in other unforeseen cases, have a reserve in which there should be a RP, a mortar, an anti-tank rifle, a sniper and a search dog.

21. The choice of a place for the placement of service outfits and their weapons are of great importance for successful solution tasks. NP must be hidden, numbering at least 3 people. Put them on the slopes of the command heights in places with a large field of view towards the area where the enemy is located and the possibility of visual (signals) communication with the command post. The composition of the NL should be dispersed, within a radius of 15–20 meters. Armament: rifle, binoculars, grenade, alarms or telephone.

At points with the best view of the terrain along the encirclement, place officer NPs. Secrets, ambushes to close the edges of the forest and bushes, paths, terraces, exits from the gorges. The location of the secret must allow viewing of the entire overlapped area. The number of secret and ambush is determined by the terrain. Armament is mixed: rifles, submachine guns and a sniper is a must.

22. In addition to the network of service outfits, widely use the simplest technical barriers that would make sounds when they pass: throwing dry brushwood, laying stones so that when they touch them, they make a noise when they fall, pulling twine with tin cans hung on it etc. Especially dangerous areas to mine PPM.

24. By nightfall in combat areas, stop all movement of personnel. Everyone should be in their places and by the strain of hearing and vision to reveal the movement of the bandits.

25. Tasks of the third stage of the operation

The elimination of bandits and the removal of those who evaded eviction in the surrounded area.

27. The battle order of the RPG should be given the shape of an arc, extreme points which - scouts, observers - should move forward, occupy command points that make it possible to view the gorge, identify the location of gangs, their paths of movement. To search in each shallow gorge, allocate a separate RPG. which starts the search from the top of the gorge. The RPG, operating along the main gorge, searches with a certain ledge back in relation to the RPG, operating along its spurs.

The interaction between individual RPGs and the reserve must be clearly established, otherwise the bandits will run from one gorge to another.

28. The reserve moves along a route from which it can quickly provide assistance to RPGs operating in the main directions.

29. If the operation is not completed during daylight hours, all RPGs "should reach the established leveling line by the end of the day. The head of the operation must give instructions at night about securing joints, which areas to block with squads in order to prevent the bandits from breaking through to the rear. Search for a gang continue in the morning of the next day according to a previously developed plan and additional instructions that will be given by the head of the operation in accordance with new data on the situation.

IV. RPG actions in the mountains

31. In the conditions of the mountains, bandits can hide anywhere, so the search should be carried out not only in the gorges, but also in the entire area adjacent to the gorges, which entered the encirclement ring in accordance with the combat order.

32. The search for bandits is carried out by reconnaissance and search groups. Each of them is given for searching a certain strip or area of ​​the terrain (gorge, ridge of heights, etc.). The dividing lines between the RPGs should pass through a well-visible area, and the connection should be visual.

34. The search is carried out by carefully examining the places of possible shelter: caves, rock crevices, stone heaps, bushes, buildings, cellars in houses, etc. - by finding traces and searching on the trail.

35. Before inspecting local objects, it is necessary to find a secret way to approach them. Forward movement is provided by a sniper or a fighter with a RP, who is watching the place of a possible presence of a bandit in readiness to immediately open fire. Having examined the area at one line, from behind the shelter, inspect the second line to be inspected and move in the same order. Actions for the inspection of the area by one should be provided with observation and fire support of the other.

36. Before descending into the gorge, set up observation posts on both edges of the gorge consisting of snipers and fighters from the RP in readiness to cover the groups descending into the gorges with fire.

The search in the gorges should be carried out both along the bottom and along its slopes, and those who search along the bottom should act with a ledge back in relation to those who search along the slope (ridge). Such an order best ensures fire interaction between individual RPG fighters.

38. When a cave is discovered:

a) establish covert surveillance of the exits and cover them with the fire of the RP and snipers;

b) to move to the cave secretly;

c) before inspecting the cave, call out and offer to leave, warning that the cave is surrounded. If you do not receive an answer or if you refuse to go out, throw grenades into the cave, and then carefully inspect it. If there are local guides, send them to the cave first;

d) when inspecting the cave, look for and seize weapons, ammunition, documents and food.

40. The persecution of the gang is carried out with the tension of all forces. Show the direction of the gang's departure with rockets or report on the radio to the outfits, neighboring RPGs.

When pursuing, keep in mind that the gang can leave part of the forces, and the rest can be left in cover to create a fire bag.

To counteract this, the protection of the flanks and rear is obligatory. If the terrain permits, pursuit should be carried out by reserve forces.

41. To slow down the departure of the gang along the gorges, gorges, make a barrage of fire from heavy machine guns and mortars.

43. During operations in the mountains, there are cases when a gang is discovered before it has noticed the troops. This extremely advantageous position is used as follows:

a) on a signal, the entire composition of the group is carefully masked;

6) the gang is allowed into the fire bag;

c) when the whole gang is drawn into the bag, open organized fire;

d) silently remove bandits in front;

e) if the gang leaves in the opposite direction, covertly make a detour and act with a sudden fire raid.

V. Organization and conduct of military intelligence

VI. Actions of units in case of sudden attacks by a gang

51. Small units (groups) when moving in the mountains:

a) it is forbidden to ride in groups on the same cart, go crowded, stop in closed areas, break away from each other over long distances, carry weapons in the “behind the back” position or leave them on the carts;

b) comply with the following requirements:

keep weapons ready for immediate opening of fire;

walk from each other at a distance of 3-5 meters;

when following with a wagon train, go behind the cart or from the side of the cart, closing the last from the point from which shelling by the gang is possible;

among the personnel of the group, distribute the duties of observing the terrain (forward, right, left, back);

before leaving the turn of the road (path) because of the shelter, inspect the terrain ahead.

52. In case of sudden shelling of the gang:

quickly find cover and crawl to another hiding point unnoticed by the gang;

strive to rise higher in order to find the place from where the gang is firing, take a position advantageous for shooting and fight to the last bullet;

having identified the gang, immediately open fire. With passivity and loss of self-control, you will inevitably be a victim of a gang. No aimless shooting; observe comrades and help them;

bandits, as a rule, approach the corpses of the killed fighters, search them, mock them.

The survivors should take an advantageous point for shooting, carefully disguise themselves and destroy the bandits approaching the corpse.

No one has the right to leave the battlefield while there is an opportunity to defeat the gang

53. If an ambush of bandits is detected in advance along the way, take a more advantageous position, covertly go to the location of the gang and destroy it.

Head of the VV NKVD of the USSR

Lieutenant General SHEREDEG

... July 1944 RGVA, f. 3^650, he. I, d. 129, ll. 71 - 86.

CONVENTIONAL ABBREVIATIONS

RPG - reconnaissance and search group

IS - fighter group

OT - firing point

NP - observation post

RP - light machine gun

PTR - anti-tank rifle

PPM - anti-personnel mine

Publication by V.B.VEPRINTSEV, I.A. MOCHALIN

REMINDER

for the commander of the intelligence agency for reconnaissance in the city

Using optical means of observation, sentinels begin reconnaissance of a settlement from a distance, from a distance that makes it possible to determine by characteristic signs whether there is an enemy in it.

The presence of enemy troops in the settlement can be detected by the increased barking of dogs, the smoke of camp kitchens, the burning of stoves at unusual times, the absence of people in the fields and gardens, especially during field work. Traces of tanks, combat vehicles at the entrance (exit), the sounds of the engines give out the presence of mechanized units and subunits. The presence of antenna devices on the outskirts or near a populated area, a pole cable communication line or traces of shallowly dug cables, a landing site for helicopters indicates the location of the command post.

Determine the firing point installed in the foundation of the house, it is possible according to the cleared sector for shooting (by the absence of a part of the fence or by cut down trees, etc.), the difference in color from the general background, the strengthening of the walls with additional masonry or sandbags. In winter, the embrasure can be seen by the steam coming out of it. In wooden houses, firing points can be detected by fresh filing of logs during the construction of an embrasure, strengthening the walls, and coating them with compounds that make it difficult to ignite. Loopholes are usually located closer to the corners of buildings. In buildings prepared for defense or occupied by enemy observers, there are usually no signs of life and it seems that there is no one there, but it is this emptiness that should alert scouts. When inspecting a populated area, one should pay attention to bushes, trees, individual buildings, deep ditches, ravines on the outskirts where the enemy can deploy guard units, as well as roofs, attics, windows of tall buildings, factory chimneys, from where he can observe. from afar, sentinels, hiding behind trees and bushes, from the side of vegetable gardens and outbuildings and the rear of residential buildings, penetrate into the settlement and inspect the buildings on the outskirts, if there are residents in them, they interrogate them.

In a village of rural type sentinels move through vegetable gardens, orchards, yards. You should not move close to buildings and in areas visible from windows and doors, it is advisable to conduct reconnaissance of an urban-type settlement with two pairs of sentinels. Moving with a small interval in pairs on the same level along different parties streets, they conduct surveillance, covering each other.

When inspecting buildings from the inside, the senior sentinel remains outside, being ready to assist the sentinels and maintaining visual contact with the commander. Watchers, examining the building from the inside, always leave the front door open. Entering a residential building, first of all, you need to interview the owner and do not let him go until the inspection is completed. Particular attention should be paid to attics and basements.

In an empty room, on the street and in the yard touching any things or objects is not recommended, as they can be mined. In such cases, it is necessary to use a "cat", a long pole or a rope from behind cover. The door opens with a kick to the castle area, and if it opens outward, then again using a rope or a “cat”. The safest way to enter a building (room) is to use gaps in the walls. If the situation permits, explosive charges, hand grenades, shots from a grenade launcher or guns of a combat vehicle can be used.

Doors and windows in buildings the enemy is often mined, in addition, they may be under his supervision. Therefore, you need to enter the room carefully, in readiness to open fire or, against an automatic burst, open the door in the castle area with a kick, throw a grenade inside and burst inside immediately after the gap. When booby traps are detected, they are immediately reported on command, and the places of their detection are indicated. The actions of the sentinels inspecting the settlement should be monitored by the commander. Following the sentinels, he puts forward a sentinel squad into the settlement.

If the scouts operate on combat vehicles, then the patrol squad at high speed skips the streets (areas) already inspected by the patrol, occupying positions convenient for observation, advantageous for combat, and only then the settlement passes the core of the reconnaissance body.

The sentinel squad overcomes small settlements with one throw, immediately following the sentinels to its opposite outskirts.

In large cities the sentinel core advances after the sentinel squad (sentinels) as they are examined from quarter to quarter. Detected mined buildings and barriers are indicated by pointers or inscriptions on the walls. The inscriptions made by the enemy, conventional signs, road signs are copied and, together with the found (captured) documents, are sent to the senior commander. When leaving the settlement, further movement is organized so that the local residents cannot determine the true direction of the scouts' actions.

When conducting reconnaissance in a populated area, reconnaissance subunits can also perform reconnaissance and combat missions, in particular, act as assault groups. The training of personnel in the technique of reconnaissance movement in urban conditions is of great importance. So, the wall is overcome only after a preliminary examination of its opposite side with a swift throw. Before crossing open areas of the terrain (crossroads, streets, gaps between houses), you must make sure that there is no enemy.

inspect the area expedient because of the shelter. At the same time, the most common mistake is unmasking oneself with the elements of equipment (barrel of a weapon, radio station antenna, surveillance equipment, etc.). Under the windows of the building, you should move, bending down below the cut of the window with maximum speed. The window openings of the semi-basement premises must be jumped over (stepped over). The use of doorways for entry and exit should be avoided whenever possible. If necessary, one should leave the building with a swift throw, crouching low, to a pre-planned shelter under the cover of fire from a comrade.

In the locality scouts can move both along and "through" the building, using gaps in the walls. Moreover, the latter method of transportation should be preferred. In the course of overcoming open areas, smoke and fire cover are widely used, natural shelters, service and improvised camouflage are used. The movement is carried out rapidly from shelter to shelter along a pre-planned route, and the distance between shelters should not be significant. When moving as part of a group, it is advisable to maintain a distance of 5-6 m (8-12 steps) between scouts to reduce the risk of fire damage. In the building, you should avoid moving along window and door openings; in corridors, move only along the walls.

Action success assault group will largely depend on properly organized fire engagement of the enemy. Of great importance right choice firing positions, in window and door openings, breaches, in attics and roofs. When firing from behind a wall, the scout must take a position to the right (left) of it, but not from above. When firing from door and window openings, as well as breaches in the walls, it is more expedient to take a firing position in the depths of the room.

The experience of suppressing the bandit activities of Islamic extremists during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region indicates that the tactics of the bandit formations opposing the federal troops have undergone significant changes. At present, along with traditional forms, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and hold important strategic objects, is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed uprisings by small (15–20 people) and large (up to 500 people and more) in groups. At the same time, surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short-term raids are still the fundamental principles of the tactics of bandit formations.

The most important factor determining the specifics of the actions of gangs is the conduct of systematic "harassing" actions that force the troops to resort to defensive tactics, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. Moreover, they give the impression of the ability of bandit formations to strike anywhere, sometimes quite unexpectedly. "Disturbing" and "Exhausting" operations form the basis of the tactics of the actions of bandit formations, which, as a rule, sought to evade direct confrontation with large forces of federal troops. Their actions in this case are based on preemption of the opening of fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan showed, in some cases, when they achieve a tactical advantage, gangs make attempts to capture and hold for a long time an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support for the population. This testifies to a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and the federal troops and the stake of the leaders of gangs on long-term and fierce resistance.

Organization and arming of illegal armed formations of Chechnya

An armed formation is a large paramilitary formation led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to protect the interests of a certain financial, economic and political (religious) group by force. An armed formation, as a rule, includes representatives of one or more related teips (jamaats).

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Groupings, in turn, are subdivided into combat, intended for the direct conduct of an operation in a specified area, and reserve, intended for building up efforts and scheduled (usually in a week) replacement of warring fighters.

grouping is divided into five or six detachments (of 100 people or more), which are led by amirs (field commanders).

Detachment usually consists of three groups.

First- the central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in a combat state with the amir and does not have a permanent place of deployment.

Second a group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in the settlement. This group is subordinated, controlled and connected only with the amir. Members of the group were trained in a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply, conspiratorial and are engaged in legal social activities.

Third group - a group of "helpers". These are like-minded people and supporters of the Amir, living at home. In order to save money, this group is not constantly with the detachment. In the case of the Amir's order, they come to him and carry out the task, then return home again and do their usual business or act independently with the consent of the Amir.

Thus, central the group is the main formation of the detachment and consists of three platoons on three departments in everyone. The group is armed with only easy-to-carry weapons, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and leaving. The time, place and purpose of the attack are appointed by the Amir.

Approximate armament and equipment of the bandit squad:

Radio stations-2pcs, binoculars-2pcs, map of the area -2pcs, cartridges 7.62 mm for PK-1000-1300pcs, 5.45mm - 500–600pcs, 4pcs. RPG-18 "MUHA"; each militant has a flask for water, spare clothes, a raincoat, a sleeping bag, medicines, dry rations for 7 days

Tactics of actions of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of actions of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of a military operation and terrorist acts.

The leadership of the extremists for the armed action in the Republic of Dagestan identified three areas in advance: to the west of BOTLIKH, near the settlement. ANDI and the GIGATLI area. Accordingly, three armed formations were created: the main and central one under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the northern one - Shervani Basayev and the southern one - Bagautdin. In total, the formations, estimated, there were up to 3,000 militants. Formations were structurally divided into battalions (50-70 people each), companies (15-20 people each) and platoons (5-7 people each).

Preparation for the operation and terrorist acts

The stage of preparation for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct training of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the area of ​​operation included:

Study of the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Reconnaissance of the locations of the federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage sites for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the activities of the troops, advance routes for subsequent ambushes and road mining.

During the reconnaissance, detailed video filming was carried out.

Immediate preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruitment of local residents on the basis of religious, national and kinship principles, indoctrination of identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as many residents as possible to their side.

Negotiating with the administration and local residents through persuasion, bribery or threats in order to ensure their support and conduct joint actions with the militants or not interfere with their actions against the Federal forces;

Creation of detachments and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.

The first Chechen war, which imperceptibly passed into the second, provided analysts with quite a lot of information material on the enemy opposing the Russian Armed Forces, his tactics and methods of warfare, material and technical equipment, including infantry weapons. Newsreels of those years dispassionately captured the presence of the latest models of small arms in the hands of Chechen fighters.

Armament and military equipment of the armed forces of the Dudayev regime were replenished from several sources. First of all, it was a weapon lost by the Russian Armed Forces in 1991-1992. According to the Ministry of Defense, the militants got 18,832 units of 5.45-mm AK / AKS-74 assault rifles, 9,307 - 7.62-mm AKM / AKMS assault rifles, 533 - 7.62-mm SVD sniper rifles, 138 - 30-mm machine guns grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame", 678 tank and 319 heavy machine guns DShKM / DShKMT / NSV / NSVT, as well as 10581 TT / PM / APS pistols. Moreover, this number did not include more than 2,000 RPK and PKM light machine guns, as well as 7 portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) "Igla-1", an unspecified number of MANPADS "Strela-2M", 2 anti-tank missile systems (ATGM) "Konkurs" , 24 sets of Fagot ATGMs, 51 Metis ATGMs and at least 740 rockets for them, 113 RPG-7 hand grenade launchers, 40 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, over 100 artillery pieces. During the defeat of the KGB of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in September 1991, the fighters of the OKNJ seized approximately 3,000 small arms, and more than 10,000 units were taken by them during the disarmament of local internal affairs bodies. The influx of weapons and ammunition to the North Caucasus continued later, and in 1992-1994. the number of weapons entering Chechnya has been steadily growing. And since the beginning of 1994, a large number of weapons, including the latest, began to come from federal structures to the forces of the anti-Dudaev opposition, then smoothly flowing into the hands of the Dudaevites.

The supply of weapons to Chechnya went in several ways. Along with direct purchases by the Dudayev regime in the CIS countries and the Baltic republics of regular-type small arms, a fairly large number of a wide variety of weapons came into this region by smuggling both from neighboring countries - Georgia, Azerbaijan, and far - Afghanistan and Turkey. In 1991, from Turkey, under the guise of humanitarian aid, the first batch of Soviet-style small arms (mainly produced by the GDR) was delivered to Chechnya, and part of it was smuggled by militants through the territory of Azerbaijan. Afghanistan received Chinese-made 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifles, AKMs made in the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Egypt, Chinese Degtyarev RPD and PK/PKM Kalashnikov machine guns, as well as English 7.71-mm sniper rifles that are completely atypical for our country Lee-Enfield No. 4 Mk.1 (T), widely used by spooks in Afghanistan. These rifles were armed with special Mujahideen sniper groups formed in Afghanistan and arrived with their weapons in Chechnya to continue the war with the Shuravi. A large number of Chechen fighters who fought in Abkhazia brought home-made weapons with them. Including 7.62-mm Kalashnikov assault rifles manufactured by the GDR, which the Chechens got as trophies. From the same source, 5.45-mm AK-74 and 7.62-mm AKM of Romanian production, as well as 7.62-mm PK / PKM and their tank versions of the PKT, converted by Georgians into manual ones, got to the militants.

Since the beginning Chechen war Chechen illegal armed formations are being supplied with weapons not only from abroad, but also from Russia itself. So, at the end of May 1995, during the defeat of one of the Dudayev detachments, a mortar and a batch of 5.45-mm AK-74 assault rifles, manufactured by the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant in January 1995, were captured. Moreover, by that time, these weapons had not even entered service with the Russian army.

Despite all the diversity of small arms of the illegal armed formations, their units possessed the most modern models of weapons of domestic production. As a rule, the militants were armed with 7.62 mm AK / AKM assault rifles or 5.45 mm AK / AKS-74 assault rifles, 7.62 mm SVD sniper rifles, 7.62 mm RPK / RPK-74 / light machine guns PKM or 7.62-mm PKT tank machine guns and 12.7-mm large-caliber NSV "Utes" dismantled from damaged armored vehicles. The main difference between militant formations and units of the federal troops was their greater saturation with such effective means of armed struggle as hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers of various models and 40-mm GP-25 underbarrel grenade launchers.

Sensitive defeats in the winter-spring of 1995 forced the Dudaevites to develop a new battle tactic. The transition of fire contact with the federal troops from point-blank firing distances, typical for the battles of the initial period of the Chechen war, to a distance of 300-500 meters was the main one for the militants. In this regard, priority was given to 7.62-mm AK-47 / AKM assault rifles, which have a higher damaging effect of a bullet compared to 5.45-mm AK-74 assault rifles. Significantly increased the value of long-range weapons, designed for a 7.62-mm rifle cartridge, allowing concentrated fire on point targets at a distance of 400-600 m (Dragunov SVD sniper rifles) and a distance of 600-800 m (Kalashnikov PK / PKM machine guns). Enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups have repeatedly used special types of weapons available only in the special forces of the federal troops: 7.62-mm AKM with silent-flameless firing devices (silencers) PBS-1, pistols PB and APB. However, the latest samples of domestic silent weapons were the most popular among the militants: the 9-mm VSS sniper rifle and the 9-mm AS sniper machine gun. Since these weapons are used in the federal troops only by special forces (in deep reconnaissance companies of the GRU GSh special forces, reconnaissance companies of motorized rifle and airborne units, special forces of internal troops, etc.), it can be assumed that some of them fell into militants as trophies or, more likely, stolen from warehouses.

Silent weapons have proven themselves positively on both sides. So, during a raid by one of the special forces units of the federal troops on January 2, 1995, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe base of Chechen saboteurs located in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt, Russian special forces, using VSS / AS complexes, destroyed a total of more than 60 militants. But the use of SVD and VSS sniper rifles by professionally trained mobile militant groups cost Russian soldiers dearly. More than 26% of the wounds of federal troops in the fighting of the first Chechen war were bullet wounds. In the battles for Grozny, only in the 8th Army Corps at the beginning of January 1995, in the platoon-company link, almost all officers were knocked out by sniper fire. In particular, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment in early January, only 1 officer remained in service.

In 1992, Dudayev organized a small-scale production of a 9-mm small submachine gun K6-92 "Borz" (in Chechen wolf), designed for a standard 9-mm Makarov PM pistol cartridge. In its design, many features of the Sudayev PPS submachine gun arr. 1943. However, Chechen gunsmiths competently approached the problem of creating a small-sized submachine gun and managed, using the most developed design features of the prototype, to develop a fairly successful sample of a light and compact weapon.

Automation "Borza" works on the principle of recoil free shutter. The flag of the translator of the type of fire (aka fuse) is located on the left side of the bolt box, above the pistol grip. The trigger mechanism allows both single and automatic fire. Shop box-shaped, two-row, with a capacity of 15 and 30 rounds. Shooting is carried out from the rear sear. Shoulder emphasis metal, folding.

The manufacture of these weapons, consisting almost entirely of stamped parts, did not pose any particular problems even for the underdeveloped industry of Chechnya, which has only standard industrial equipment. But the low capacity of the production base affected not only the simplicity of the design and production volumes of the Borza (the Chechens managed to produce only a few thousand weapons in two years), but also the rather low technology of its production. The barrels are characterized by low survivability due to the use of tool, rather than special steel grades. The cleanliness of the surface of the bore, not reaching the required 11-12 processing classes, leaves much to be desired. Mistakes made in the design of the Borza resulted in incomplete combustion of the powder charge during firing and abundant release of powder gases. At the same time, this submachine gun fully justified its name as a weapon for paramilitary formations of the partisan type. Therefore, "Borz", along with the same type of Western-made weapons - submachine guns "Uzi", "Mini-Uzi", MP-5 - were used mainly by reconnaissance and sabotage groups of Dudayevites.

In 1995-1996 there were repeated cases of the Chechen IMF using one of the newest domestic models of infantry weapons - 93-mm rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers RPO. The RPO "Bumblebee" wearable kit included two containers: an incendiary RPO-3 and a smoke action RPO-D, which complement each other very effectively in battle. In addition to them, another version of the reactive infantry flamethrower, RPO-A with combined ammunition, has proven itself to be a formidable weapon in the mountains of Chechnya. The RPO-A implements the capsule principle of flamethrowing, in which a capsule with a flame mixture in a "cold" state is delivered to the target, upon impact, an igniter-explosive charge is initiated, as a result of which the flame mixture ignites and its burning pieces scatter and hit the target. The warhead filled with a thermobaric mixture forms a fuel-air mixture, which increases the damaging effect and allows full use of RPO to destroy not only enemy manpower located in shelters, firing points, buildings, and create fires at these objects and on terrain, but also for the destruction of lightly armored and motor vehicles. The RPO-A thermobaric shot (volumetric explosion) is comparable in terms of the effectiveness of high-explosive action to a 122-mm howitzer projectile. During the assault on Grozny in August 1996, the militants, having received in advance detailed information about the scheme of defense of the complex of buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were able to destroy the main ammunition point located in a closed room inside the building with two aimed shots of "Bumblebees", thus depriving its defenders of almost all ammunition.

The high combat characteristics of this most powerful weapon, coupled with the massive use of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, both disposable (RPG-18, RPG-22, RPG-26, RPG-27) and reusable (RPG-7), contributed to the destruction or incapacitation of a significant number of armored vehicles of the federal troops and more severe defeat of personnel. Tankers and motorized riflemen suffered heavy losses from the latest domestic grenade launchers: 72.5 mm RPG-26 (armor penetration up to 500 mm), 105 mm RPG-27 (armor penetration up to 750 mm), as well as rounds for RPG-7 - 93/40 mm grenades PG-7VL (armor penetration up to 600 mm) and 105/40 mm PG-7VR grenades with a tandem warhead (armor penetration up to 750 mm). The widespread use by the Dudaevites during the battles for Grozny of all means of anti-tank defense, including RPGs, ATGMs and RPO flamethrowers, allowed them to destroy and damage 225 units of armored vehicles of the federal troops, including 62 tanks, in just a month and a half. The nature of the damage suggests that in most cases, fire from RPGs and RPOs was fired almost point-blank from the most favorable angles, using a multi-tiered (floor-floor) fire system. In the hulls of almost every hit tank or infantry fighting vehicle there were numerous holes (from 3 to 6), which indicates a high density of fire. Grenade snipers shot at the lead and trailing vehicles, thus blocking the advance of the columns in the narrow streets. Having lost maneuver, other vehicles became a good target for militants, who fired simultaneously at tanks from 6-7 grenade launchers from the basements of the basement floors (hitting the lower hemisphere), from ground level (hitting the driver and aft projection) and from the upper floors of buildings (affecting the upper hemisphere). When firing at infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, grenade launchers mainly hit the car bodies, the militants hit the locations of stationary fuel tanks from ATGMs, grenade launchers and flamethrowers, and mounted fuel tanks - with automatic fire.

In 1996, the intensity of the summer fighting in Grozny increased even more. The federals made a “gift” to the Dudaevites - the militants got a railway car, unharmed, to the eyeballs stuffed with RPG-26 hand-held anti-tank grenades. In less than a week of fighting in the Chechen capital, the bandits managed to destroy more than 50 armored vehicles. Only the 205th motorized rifle brigade lost about 200 people killed.

The success of the illegal armed formations is explained by the elementary simple, but at the same time highly effective tactics of using by the Chechens maneuverable combat groups, consisting, as a rule, of 2 snipers, 2 submachine gunners, 2 grenade launchers and 1 machine gunner. Their advantage was excellent knowledge of the place of warfare and relatively light weapons, allowing covert and mobile movement in difficult urban conditions.

According to competent sources, at the end of the first campaign, the Chechens were in possession of over 60,000 small arms, more than 2 million units of various ammunition, several dozen tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, as well as several hundred artillery pieces of various calibers with several ammunition sets for them (at least 200 rounds per barrel). In 1996-1999, this arsenal was significantly replenished. Numerous stocks of weapons and military equipment, together with the presence in the Chechen illegal armed formations of trained, fired personnel who know how to competently handle their weapons, soon allowed the militants to again deploy large-scale military operations - the second Chechen war began.

MASKHADOV Aslan (Khalid) Alievich Elected in 1997 President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Was born on September 21, 1951 in Kazakhstan. In 1957, together with his parents, he returned from Kazakhstan to his homeland, to the village of Zebir-Yurt, Nadterechny district of Chechnya. In 1972 he graduated from the Tbilisi Higher Artillery School and was sent to Far East. He went through all the steps of the army hierarchical ladder from the platoon commander to the division chief of staff.

In 1981 he graduated from the Leningrad Artillery Academy. M.I. Kalinina. After graduating from the academy, he was sent to the Central Group of Forces in Hungary, where he served as a division commander, then as a regimental commander. Hungary is followed by Lithuania: the commander of a regiment of self-propelled artillery installations, the chief of staff of the missile forces and artillery of the garrison of the city of Vilnius in Lithuania, the deputy commander of the seventh division in the Baltic military district.

In January 1990, during the speeches of supporters of Lithuanian independence, Maskhadov was in Vilnius.

Since 1991 - Head of the Civil Defense of the Chechen Republic, Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Supreme Council of the Chechen Republic.

In 1992 Colonel Maskhadov resigned from Russian army and took up the post of first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chechen Republic.

Since March 1994 - Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic.

From December 1994 to January 1995 he led the defense of the presidential palace in Grozny.

In the spring of 1995, Aslan Maskhadov led the military operations of the armed formations from the headquarters in Nozhai-Yurt.

In June 1995, he headed the headquarters of the Dudayev formations in Dargo.

In August-October 1995, he headed a group of military representatives of the Dudayev delegation at the Russian-Chechen negotiations.

In August 1996, he represented Chechen separatists in negotiations with Alexander Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council

On October 17, 1996, he was appointed to the post of Prime Minister of the coalition government of Chechnya with the wording "for a transitional period."

In December 1996, in accordance with the election law, he resigned from official posts - Prime Minister of the coalition government, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in order to have the right to run for the presidency of Chechnya.

From July 1998, he served as acting prime minister of Chechnya, combining this position with the post of president.

In December 1998, under the pretext of his "pro-Russian position", Maskhadov's constitutional powers were challenged by "field commanders" Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduyev and Khunkar Israpilov. The "Council of Commanders of Chechnya" headed by them demanded from the Supreme Sharia Court that Maskhadov be removed from office. The Sharia court suggested that Maskhadov unilaterally break off relations with Russia. However, the court did not find sufficient grounds to remove the president of the Chechen Republic from office, although he was found guilty of recruiting people who "collaborated with the occupation regime" for leadership positions.
It was destroyed on March 8, 2005 by the special forces of the FSB of Russia in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, Grozny region.

Baraev Arbi. He was suspected of organizing the abductions of FSB officers Gribov and Lebedinsky, the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya Vlasov, employees of the Red Cross, as well as the murder of four citizens of Great Britain and New Zealand (Peter Kennedy, Darren Hickey, Rudolf Pestchi and Stanley Shaw). The Interior Ministry put Barayev on the federal wanted list in connection with the kidnapping of NTV journalists Masyuk, Mordyukov, Olchev and OPT TV journalists Bogatyrev and Chernyaev in Chechnya. In total, on his personal account, the death of about two hundred Russians - military personnel and civilians.

June 23-24, 2001 in the ancestral village of Alkhan-kala and Kulary special consolidated detachment The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB conducted a special operation to eliminate a detachment of militants Arbi Barayev. Destroyed 15 militants and Barayev himself.

BARAEV Movsar, nephew of Arbi Baraev. Movsar received his first baptism of fire in the summer of 1998 in Gudermes, when the Barayevites, together with the Urus-Martan Wahhabis, clashed with fighters from the detachment of the Yamadayev brothers. Then Movsar was wounded.

After the introduction of federal troops into Chechnya, Arbi Baraev appointed his nephew the commander of a sabotage detachment and sent him to Argun. In the summer of 2001, when Arbi Baraev was killed in the village of Alkhan-Kala in the Grozny rural district, Movsar proclaimed himself Emir of the Alkhan-Kala jamaat instead of his uncle. He organized several attacks on federal convoys and a whole series of explosions in Grozny, Urus-Martan and Gudermes.

In October 2002, terrorists led by Movsar Barayev seized the building of the House of Culture of the State Bearing Plant on Melnikova Street (Dubrovka Theater Center) during the musical "Nord-Ost". Spectators and actors (up to 1000 people) were taken hostage. On October 26, the hostages were released, Movsar Baraev and 43 terrorists were killed.

Suleimenov Movsan. Nephew of Arbi Baraev. He was killed on August 25, 2001 in the city of Argun during a special operation by officers of the Russian FSB Directorate for Chechnya. The operation was carried out in order to establish the exact location and detention of Suleimenov. However, during the operation, Movsan Suleimenov and three other mid-level commanders offered armed resistance. As a result, they were destroyed.

Abu Umar. A native of Saudi Arabia. One of the most famous assistants of Khattab. Explosives expert. Mined the approaches to Grozny in 1995. Participated in the organization of explosions in Buynaksk in 1998, was wounded during the explosion. He organized an explosion in Volgograd on May 31, 2000, in which 2 people died and 12 were injured.

Abu Umar trained almost all the organizers of the explosions in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.

In addition to preparing terrorist attacks, Abu-Umar dealt with financing issues

militants, including the transfer of mercenaries to Chechnya through the channels of one of

international Islamic organizations.

Destroyed on July 11, 2001 in the village of Mayrup, Shali district, during a special operation by the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Emir Ibn Al Khattab. A professional terrorist, one of the most implacable militants in Chechnya.

The most "famous" operations conducted under the leadership or with the direct participation of Khattab and his militants include:

The terrorist attack in the city of Budyonnovsk (70 people stood out from the Khattab detachment, there were no losses among them);

Providing a "corridor" for the gang of S. Raduev to leave the settlement. Pervomaiskoye - an operation prepared and personally carried out by Khattab to destroy the column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment near the settlement. Yaryshmardy;

Direct participation in the preparation and attack on Grozny in August 1996.

The terrorist attack in the city of Buynaksk on December 22, 1997. During an armed attack on military unit in the city of Buynaksk he was wounded in his right shoulder.

Raduev Salman. From April 1996 to June 1997, Raduev was the commander of the armed unit "Army of General Dudayev".

In 1996-1997, Salman Raduev repeatedly claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks committed on the territory of Russia and made threats against Russia.

In 1998, he claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. He also claimed responsibility for the explosions at railway stations in Armavir and Pyatigorsk. Raduevskaya gang was engaged in robberies on railways, she is guilty of embezzlement of public funds in the amount of 600 - 700 thousand rubles, intended for the payment of salaries to teachers in the Chechen Republic.

On March 12, 2000, he was captured in the village of Novogroznensky during a special operation by the FSB.

The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation charged Salman Raduev under 18 articles of the Russian Criminal Code (including "terrorism", "murder", "banditry"). The sentence is life imprisonment.

He died on December 14, 2002. Diagnosis: "hemorrhagic vasculitis" (blood incoagulability). He was buried on December 17 at the city cemetery of Solikamsk (Perm Region).

ATGERIEV Turpal-Ali. Former employee of the 21st company of the traffic police of Grozny. During the hostilities, he was the commander of the Novogroznensky regiment, which, together with Salman Raduev, participated in the Kizlyar and May Day events.

On this fact, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation initiated a criminal case under Art. 77 (banditry), Art. 126 (hostage-taking) and Art. 213-3, part 3 (terrorism). Declared on the federal wanted list.

On December 25, 2002, the Supreme Court of Dagestan sentenced Atgeriev to 15 years in prison for participating in the attack on the Dagestan city of Kizlyar in January 1996. Atgeriev was found guilty of terrorism, organizing illegal armed groups, kidnapping and hostage-taking, and robbery.

Passed away August 18, 2002. The cause of death was leukemia. In addition, it was found that Atgeriev had a stroke.

GELAEV Ruslan (Khamzat). Former commander of the special purpose regiment "BORZ" of the Armed Forces of the CRI, lieutenant colonel of the army of Ichkeria.

During the conduct of hostilities - the commander of the Shatoevsky garrison, the commander of the "Abkhaz battalion". In Gelaev's formation there were eight hundred - nine hundred well-armed militants, they included about fifty snipers from Lithuania, ten - fifteen snipers from Estonia. The so-called special purpose regiment was stationed in the areas of Sharoy, Itum-Kale, Khalkina.

In 2002, he announced his intention to receive the post of president of Ichkeria; supported him former leader Dudayev's foreign intelligence service, the well-known criminal oil businessman Khozhy Nukhaev.

On August 20, 2002, the gang of Ruslan Gelaev attempted an armed crossing from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia through the territory North Ossetia and Ingushetia to Chechnya.

On March 1, 2004, the territorial department "Makhachkala" of the North Caucasian branch of the border service distributed reports about the destruction of Ruslan Gelaev in the mountains of Dagestan (reports about his death were heard repeatedly).

Munaev Isa. Chechen field commander. He led the detachments operating in the Chechen capital, was appointed at the beginning of 1999 by Aslan Maskhadov the military commandant of the city of Grozny.

He was killed on October 1, 2000 during a military clash in the Stapropromyslovsky district of Grozny (according to the press center of the United Group of Russian Forces in Chechnya, 2000).

MOVSAEV Abu. Deputy Minister of Sharia Security of Ichkeria.

After the attack on Budennovsk (1995), they began to assert that Abu Movsaev was one of the organizers of the action. After Budennovsk, he received the rank of brigadier general. In 1996 - July 1997 - Head of the State Security Department of Ichkeria. During the armed conflict in Chechnya, for some time in 1996, he served as the chief of the main headquarters of the Chechen formations.

KARIEV (KORIEV) Magomed. Chechen field commander.

Until September 1998, Kariev was the deputy head of the Security Service of Ichkeria. Then he was appointed head of the 6th department of the Ministry of Sharia Security, responsible for combating organized crime.

Kariev was involved in kidnapping and taking hostages for ransom.

He was killed on May 22, 2001 by several shots at the door of the apartment, which he rented in Baku under the guise of a refugee.

Tsagarayev Magomad. One of the leaders of the Chechen gangs. Tsagaraev was Movzan Akhmadov's deputy and directly supervised military operations; was Khattab's closest confidant.

In March 2001, Tsagaraev was wounded, but managed to escape and penetrate the border. In early July 2001, he returned to Chechnya and organized gangs in Grozny to carry out terrorist attacks.

MALIK Abdul. Famous field commander. He was a member of the inner circle of the leaders of the illegal armed groups of Chechnya, Emir Khattab and Shamil Basayev. He was killed on August 13, 2001 during a special operation in the Vedensky district of the Chechen Republic.

KHAIKHAROEV Ruslan. Famous Chechen field commander. During the war in Chechnya (1994-1996) he commanded detachments of the defenders of the village of Bamut and the southeastern front of the Chechen army.

After 1996, Khaykharoev had extensive connections in the criminal world of the North Caucasus, controlled two types of criminal business: the transfer of hostages from Ingushetia and North Ossetia to the Chechen Republic, as well as the smuggling of oil products. Former member of Dudayev's personal bodyguard.

It is assumed that he was involved in the disappearance of the journalists of the Nevskoe Vremya newspaper Maxim Shablin and Felix Titov, and he also ordered two explosions in Moscow trolleybuses on July 11 and 12, 1996. accused Russian Service Security in organizing the explosion of an intercity passenger bus in Nalchik.

The organizer of the abduction on May 1, 1998 of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov (this fact was established by Russian law enforcement agencies).

He died on September 8, 1999 in the district hospital of the city of Urus-Martan, Chechen Republic. He died from wounds received on the night of August 23-24, 1999 during the fighting in the Botlikh region of Dagestan (he fought as part of the detachments of Arbi Baraev).

According to another version, Khaykharoev was mortally wounded by Bamut's fellow villagers. The news of his death was confirmed by the press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

KHACHUKAEV Khizir. Brigadier General, Deputy Ruslan Gelaev. He commanded the South-Eastern Defense Sector in Grozny. Demoted by Maskhadov to the ranks for participating in negotiations with Akhmad Kadyrov and Vladimir Bokovikov in Nazran. Destroyed on February 15, 2002 during an operation in the Shali region of Chechnya.

Umalatov Adam. Nickname - "Tehran". One of the leaders of the Chechen fighters. He was a member of Khattab's gang. He was killed on November 5, 2001 as a result of an operation carried out by special forces.

IRISKHANOV Shamil. An influential field commander from Basayev's inner circle. Together with Basayev, he took part in the raid on Budenovsk and the capture of hostages there in the city hospital in 1995. He led a detachment of about 100 militants in the summer of 2001, after his elder brother, the so-called Brigadier General Khizir IRISKHANOV, Basayev's first deputy, was killed in a special operation. "For the operation" in Budenovsk, the Iriskhanov brothers, Dzhokhar Dudayev awarded the highest orders of "Ichkeria" - "Honor of the Nation".

SALTAMIRZAEV Adam. An influential member of illegal armed groups. He was the emir (spiritual leader) of the Wahhabis of the village of Mesker-Yurt. Nickname - "Black Adam". Destroyed on May 28, 2002 as a result of a special operation of the Federal forces in the Shali region of Chechnya. When trying to detain him in Mesker-Yurt, he resisted and was killed during a shootout.

AKHMADOV Rizvan. Field commander, nickname "Dadu". He was a member of the so-called "Majlis-ul-Shura of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus."

Akhmadov assumed command of his brother Ramzan's militant unit in February 2001 after his elimination. This detachment operated in Grozny, in the Grozny rural, Urus-Martan and Shali districts, relying on accomplices in the ranks of the Chechen OMON operating in Grozny. On January 10, 2001, it was a group of militants subordinated to Dadu who took hostage the representative international organization"Doctors Without Borders" by Kenneth Gluck.

ABDUKHAJIEV Aslanbek. One of the leaders of the Chechen fighters, Shamil Basayev's deputy for reconnaissance and sabotage work. Nickname - "Big Aslanbek". As part of the gangs of Basaev and Raduev, he took an active part in armed attacks on the cities of Budennovsk and Kizlyar. During the reign of Maskhadov, he was the military commandant of the Shali region of Chechnya. In the gang, Basayev personally developed plans for sabotage and terrorist activities.

From the day of the attack on Budyonnovsk, he was on the federal wanted list.

On August 26, 2002, employees of the task force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the Shali region and one of the SOBR detachments, together with fighters from the military commandant's office of the Shali region, carried out an operation to detain a militant in the regional center of Shali. During the arrest, he offered armed resistance and was destroyed.

DEMIEV Adlan. Leader of the gang. Involved in a series of sabotage and terrorist acts on the territory of Chechnya.

It was liquidated on February 18, 2003 by the federal forces of Chechnya as a result of a counter-terrorist operation carried out in the city of Argun.

After being blocked by a unit of federal forces, Demiyev resisted and tried to escape in a car. However, it was destroyed by return fire from federal forces. When examining the deceased, a PM pistol, grenades, radio stations and a fake passport were found.

BATAEV Khamzat. A well-known field commander, who was considered the "commander of the Bamut direction" of the resistance of Chechen fighters. He was killed in March 2000 in the village of Komsomolskoye. (This was announced by the commander of the grouping of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, General Mikhail Lagunets).