Historians have an unspoken rule that before giving a reliable assessment, one or another event should take at least 15-20 years. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different, and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these most bloody and tragic pages in the newest Russian. But society has every right to know the names of the people who unleashed this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually laid the foundation for a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen one.
The events leading up to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 1990 to 1991, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime without bloodshed, and the second stage from the beginning of 1992, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.
Stage one. How it all began.
The first impetus for the beginning of events can be considered Gorbachev's promise to give all autonomous republics the status of Union and Yeltsin's subsequent phrase - "Take as much independence as you can carry." Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to get support from the inhabitants of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.
A few months after Yeltsin's statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Although, in fact, it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and authority, nevertheless, the first bell had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appears in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in Soviet army, who has never been a Muslim and has state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too quickly. In the same Chechnya, many are still convinced that serious people sitting in Moscow offices stood behind Dudayev.
Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev overthrow the Supreme Soviet with its chairman, Doku Zavgaev, on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such in Chechnya no longer existed. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic was looted, in which there was a rifleman for a whole regiment, all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the holding of presidential elections on October 26 of the same year, in which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and on November 1 to adopt a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.
The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoi, it was he who tried to declare a state of emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. Yeltsin these days was in his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not accept the document on the state of emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoy himself, who, during the discussion of the document, literally stated the following - "these black-assed people must be crushed." This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.
True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny) several planes with fighters nevertheless landed internal troops with a total of about 300 people. Naturally, 300 people had no chance to complete the task and overthrow Dudayev and, on the contrary, became hostages themselves. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and, as a result, they were taken out of Chechnya by buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president and his authority and power in the republic became unlimited.
Stage two. War becomes inevitable.
After Dudayev officially took office as president of Chechnya, the situation in the republic heated up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all the weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. In the 173rd Grozny training center alone, there were weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.
In January 1992, not a single soldier remained in the training center, and all this mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50 to 50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains incomprehensible, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to the extremely nationalist policy pursued by Dudayev, a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic took place in Chechnya. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border of Kulikov every day.
But the anarchy that was going on in the republic influenced not only the Russian inhabitants in the republic itself, but also the inhabitants of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Avisos and, most importantly, they made money on this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from this and in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 1992-1993 well-known Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month. According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of "distinguished guests", Dudayev personally gave instructions on the acquisition of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.
Turning a blind eye to this was no longer possible, and Yeltsin instructed the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) Savostyanov to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev by the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov made a bet on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and they began to send money and weapons to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters were left to Dudayev's palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the Savostyanov assault.
The next attempt to storm the opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. It is after this assault that Minister of Defense Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tankmen who were taken prisoner and declare that the Russian Army would take Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.
Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council, completely dedicated to the Chechen problem, had already taken place in Moscow. At this meeting, two polar reports were delivered by the Minister regional development Nikolai Yegorov and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Yegorov stated that the situation for the introduction of troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the population of the republic will undoubtedly support this decision, and only 30 percent will be neutral or resist. Grachev, on the contrary, in his report emphasized that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed to postpone the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan of the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and said that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin's demand to prepare a plan of operation for the introduction of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.
On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, Andrey Kozyrev, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short time, this will not cause a particular negative reaction from the US administration.
One way or another, the introduction of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals at once, whom Grachev offered to lead the operation, refused to do so, and only in mid-December Anatoly Kvashnin agreed to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny ...
On September 30, 1999, the first units of the Russian army entered the territory of Chechnya. The second Chechen war or - officially - the counter-terrorist operation - lasted almost ten years, from 1999 to 2009. It was preceded by an attack by militants Shamil Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan and a series of terrorist attacks in Buynaksk, Volgodonsk and Moscow that took place from 4 to 16 September 1999.
View in full size Russia was shocked by a series of monstrous terrorist attacks in 1999. On the night of September 4, a house in the military town of Buynaksk (Dagestan) was blown up. 64 people were killed and 146 were injured. By itself, this terrible crime could not stir up the country, such precedents in the North Caucasus have become a common occurrence in recent years. But subsequent events showed that now the inhabitants of not a single Russian city, including the capital, can feel completely safe. The next explosions thundered already in Moscow. On the night of September 9-10 and September 13 (at 5 o'clock in the morning), 2 apartment buildings located on the street took off into the air along with sleeping residents. Guryanov (109 people died, more than 200 were injured) and on Kashirskoye Highway (more than 124 people died). Another explosion occurred in the center of Volgodonsk (Rostov region), where 17 people died, 310 were injured and injured. According to the official version, the attacks were carried out by terrorists trained in the Khattab sabotage camps in Chechnya.
These events dramatically changed the mood in society. The inhabitant, faced with an unprecedented threat, was ready to support any forceful actions against the seceded republic. Unfortunately, few paid attention to the fact that the terrorist attacks themselves became an indicator of the biggest failure of the Russian special services, which failed to prevent them. In addition, it is difficult to completely exclude the version of involvement in the explosions of the FSB, especially after the mysterious events in Ryazan. Here, on the evening of September 22, 1999, bags with RDX and a detonator were found in the basement of one of the houses. On September 24, two suspects were detained by local Chekists, and it turned out that they were acting FSB officers from Moscow. Lubyanka urgently announced "anti-terrorist exercises that were taking place," and subsequent attempts to independently investigate these events were suppressed by the authorities.
Regardless of who was behind the massacre of Russian citizens that took place, the Kremlin used the events to the fullest. Now it was no longer about protection itself. Russian territory in the North Caucasus and not even about the blockade of Chechnya, reinforced by the bombardments that have already begun. The Russian leadership, with some delay, began to implement the plan prepared back in March 1999 for another invasion of the "rebellious republic".
On October 1, 1999, federal forces entered the territory of the republic. The northern regions (Naursky, Shelkovskaya and Nadterechny) were occupied practically without a fight. The Russian leadership decided not to stop at the Terek (as originally planned), but to continue the offensive along the flat part of Chechnya. At this stage, in order to avoid major losses (which could bring down the rating of Yeltsin's "successor"), the main stake was placed on the use of heavy weapons, which allowed the federal forces to avoid contact battles. In addition to this, the Russian command used the tactic of negotiations with local elders and field commanders. From the first they sought the departure of Chechen detachments from settlements, threatening, otherwise, with massive air and artillery strikes. The second was offered to go over to the side of Russia and fight the Wahhabis together. In some places this tactic has been successful. On November 12, the commander of the Vostok group, General G. Troshev, occupied Gudermes, the second largest city in the republic, without a fight, the local field commanders, the Yamadayev brothers (two out of three), went over to the side of the federal forces. And V. Shamanov, who commanded the West grouping, preferred forceful methods of resolving problems that arose. So the village of Bamut was completely destroyed as a result of the November assault, but the regional center Achkhoy-Martan was occupied by Russian units without a fight.
The "carrot and stick" method used by the federal group worked flawlessly for another reason. In the flat part of the republic, the possibilities of defense for the Chechen army were extremely limited. Sh. Basayev, was well aware of the advantage Russian side in firepower. In this regard, he defended the option of withdrawing the Chechen army to the southern mountainous regions of the republic. Here, the federal forces, deprived of the support of armored vehicles and limited in the use of aviation, would inevitably face the prospect of contact battles, which the Russian command stubbornly tried to avoid. The opponent of this plan was Chechen President A. Maskhadov. While continuing to call on the Kremlin for peace talks, he was unwilling at the same time to surrender the republic's capital without a fight. Being an idealist, A. Maskhadov believed that large one-time losses during the storming of Grozny would force Russian leadership start peace talks.
In the first half of December, federal forces occupied almost the entire flat part of the republic. Chechen detachments concentrated in mountainous areas, but a rather large garrison continued to hold Grozny, which was captured during stubborn and bloody battles. Russian troops at the beginning of 2000. This ended the active phase of the war. The following years, Russian special forces, together with local loyal forces, were engaged in cleaning up the territories of Chechnya and Dagestan from the remaining gangs of formations.
The problem of the status of the Chechen Republic by 2003-2004. leaves the current political agenda: the republic returns to the political and legal space of Russia, takes its positions as a subject of the Russian Federation, with elected authorities and a procedurally approved republican Constitution. Doubts about the legal validity of these procedures can hardly seriously change their results, which depend to a decisive extent on the ability of the federal and republican authorities to ensure the irreversibility of Chechnya's transition to the problems and concerns of peaceful life. Two serious threats remain within this transition: (a) indiscriminate violence by the federal forces, re-binding the sympathies of the Chechen population to terrorist resistance cells/practices and thus reinforcing the dangerous "occupation effect" - the effect of alienation between [Russia] and [ Chechens] as “parties to the conflict”; and (b) the formation of a closed authoritarian regime in the republic, legitimized and protected by federal authorities and alienated from broad strata/territorial or teip groups of the Chechen population. These two threats are capable of cultivating the ground in Chechnya for the return of mass illusions and actions related to the separation of the republic from Russia.
Mufti of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack, becomes the head of the republic, who went over to the side of Russia. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.
Gradually, with the cessation foreign funding and the death of the leaders of the underground, the activity of the militants decreased. The federal center has sent and is sending large sums of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. In Chechnya, units of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are stationed on a permanent basis, maintaining order in the republic. Whether the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the KTO is not yet clear.
Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has been successfully completed. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather turbulent region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the fire of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.
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In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never respected by the Chechen side during the validity of the agreement - it was drawn up in such a way that the main obligations were imposed on Russia. The main one is the full provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was being created, on the basis of which the rest of the North Caucasian republics could also present their rights to autonomy. Some deputies of the State Duma tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists rapidly expanded their territory of influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic, cases of hostage-taking became more frequent, and facts of cruel oppression of the Russian-speaking population. No one was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. Such "sluggish schizophrenia" continued until the attack of gangs on Dagestan in 1999. The second Chechen campaign began, this North Caucasian region this time stayed in the counter-terrorist operation regime for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that the only way to fight the militants was by force, not agreeing to their terms.
History and SID
Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996, hostilities between Russian federal troops and armed formations Chechen Republic Ichkeria created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation. In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. Armed conflict in 1994-1996, the first Chechen war The Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996, hostilities between Russian federal troops and ...
First and second Chechen companies: comparative analysis.
The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - hostilities between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation. In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus.
Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (the first Chechen war)
The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - hostilities between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation. In the autumn of 1991, in the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging a sabotage war in mountainous regions. The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and others. On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Groups on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict Zone." On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Decree No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force. On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, on the orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses. ( Military Encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004) The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the task. Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed formations in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya. From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium was implemented on the use of armed force in Chechnya. Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the started negotiation process, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from the mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist attacks on an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996). On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, the federal troops left Grozny, having suffered heavy losses. The illegal armed formations also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali. On August 31, 1996, ceasefire agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya within the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996. On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded. The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took a line towards the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities has intensified, attempts have intensified to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics.
Counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)
In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants. For more than a month there were battles between the federal forces and the invading militants, which ended with the fact that the militants were forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On the same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk) - explosions of residential buildings. Given Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to military operation for the destruction of militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation", which provides for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to carry out counter-terrorist operation. On September 23, Russian aviation began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic. In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created. On February 25-27, 2000, the "West" units blocked Kharsenoy, and the "Vostok" group closed the militants in the area of Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoy, Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated. The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelaev's group in the area of the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking took place in the Theater Center on Dubrovka in Moscow. In 2004, a hostage-taking took place at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Baraev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants had significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (a raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure. From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
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1. The First Chechen War (the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, the First Chechen campaign, the Restoration of the constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - hostilities between the troops of Russia (AF and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, in order to take control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.
2. Officially, the conflict was defined as "measures to maintain constitutional order", military operations were called the "first Chechen war", less often the "Russian-Chechen" or "Russian-Caucasian war". The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, there were facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya.
3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War, and a wave of terror that swept through Russia.
4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics Soviet Union, including in Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements became more active. One such organization was the National Congress established in 1990. Chechen people(OKChN), which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed former general Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power developed in the republic.
6. During the "August coup" in Moscow, the leadership of the CHIASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of a "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. On this occasion, the head of the Chechen Republic Zavgaev D. G. spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma "
Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided), the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against the multinational people, when the criminal criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation here, filled this people with blood. The first victim of what is happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens in the first place. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny city council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the republic's Supreme Council. When Besliev, vice rector, was shot dead in the street state university. When Kankalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, Grozny's morgues were packed to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television asking them to pick them up, find out who was there, and so on.
8. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov then sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Republic's Armed Forces." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the Republic. These elections were recognized by the Russian Federation as illegal
9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)". After these actions of the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic deteriorated sharply - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was frustrated, the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)" was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots.
10. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 training aircraft, aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 planes and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60s; about 7 thousand GSh-23 air shells. 42 T-62 and T-72 tanks; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 MLRS Grad and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 memory devices of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. ZUR S-75. 590 units of anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGMs, 51 Metis ATGMs, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuel and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing items, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.
12. In June 1992, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Pavel Grachev, ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic be transferred to the Dudaevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.
13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former CHIASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia as part of the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not been defined to date (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops entered the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time to solve the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
16. As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, as a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, emblem and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was supposed to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of their own state currency - nahara. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, CRI was characterized as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal treaty with the Russian Federation.
17. In fact, state system CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and in the period 1991-1994 it was rapidly criminalized. In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders took place on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993 at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian railway 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers in the amount of 11.5 billion rubles. For 8 months in 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed in armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994
18. A special trade was the manufacture of false advice notes, on which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992, 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.
19. Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and forbade employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and resold abroad.
21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply aggravated in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, in which meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; thus, a coup d'état took place in CRI. The constitution, adopted last year, was amended, Dudayev's regime of personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament
22. After the coup d'état on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against Dudayev's regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which held several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
23. Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to prevail in the struggle.
25. Only in Urus-Martan in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces CRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, on September 12 and October 15, 1994, carried out offensive actions in Grozny, but every time they retreated without achieving decisive success, although they did not suffer heavy losses.
26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with Federal Service counterintelligence.
27. Entering troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression "the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya", according to the deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.
Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government, which justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering on Chechnya and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen Grad rocket artillery installation and then entered the battle for this settlement.
The new offensive of the units of the OGV began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne regiment blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bombing of the city center was carried out. Many civilians (including ethnic Russians) were killed and wounded during artillery shelling and bombing.
Despite the fact that Grozny was still not blocked from the south side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. The Russian troops were poorly trained, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated city plans in limited quantities. The means of communication were not equipped with closed communication equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were ordered to occupy only industrial buildings, squares and inadmissibility of intrusion into the houses of the civilian population.
The western grouping of troops was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade(more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment(10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the loss of battalions Maykop brigade According to official figures, 85 people were killed and 72 were missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander, Colonel Savin, was killed, and more than 100 servicemen were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became the commander of the West group.
The Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aircraft. Fierce street fighting ensued in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV had been increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the boundary of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.
29. Establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, persuading local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.
Despite this, local battles were going on in the western regions of Chechnya. March 10 began fighting for the village of Bamut. April 7-8 consolidated detachment MIA, consisting of Sofrino brigade internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martanovsky district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" of Shamil Basayev). After the Russian servicemen entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and skirmishes began on the streets of the village.
According to a number international organizations(in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR) during the battle for Samashki, many civilians died. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency "Chechen-Press", however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the human rights center "Memorial", these data "do not inspire confidence." According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians who died during the cleansing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since now the militants occupied the dominant heights above the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed to conduct nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.
30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The blows of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Also, as in the plains, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, drove trucks into the territory of the Stavropol Territory and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The building of the GOVD became the first object of attack, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, about 2,000 hostages were in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands on the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Because of the leak of information, the terrorists had time to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; as a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except the main one), releasing 95 hostages. Spetsnaz losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees of law enforcement agencies) and 415 wounded, the losses of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded
32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but not as members of illegal armed groups, but as "self-defense units." There were local battles throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions could be resolved through negotiations. So, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militants were in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their positions, because, according to them, these were "self-defense units" that had the right to be in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was launched on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to change the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov to former leader Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Dokku Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, it took Russian troops about a week of “cleansing operations” to finally take Gudermes under their control.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, having received over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all military personnel of the UGV participated in the elections.
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar. Initially, the goal of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the soldiers guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to pull up to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiment in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations were held from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship with threats to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 78 people dead and several hundred wounded.
On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when withdrawing, took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. The losses of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing column of the vehicle, thus the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.
From the very beginning Chechen campaign Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment was installed for the bearing of a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev's motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the aircraft reached the target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation
37. Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of the forthcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided once again to negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the abolition of military duty.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaykhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2,000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not set out to capture the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at roadblocks and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.
Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the building of the commandant's office).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya has again become de facto independent, but de jure unrecognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to the former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). An interwar crisis began in the republic and the growth of Wahhabism, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
43. According to data released by the headquarters of the United Forces, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing / deserted / captured, 19,794 wounded
44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of dead soldiers).
45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers include only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract servicemen, fighters special units etc. The losses of the militants, according to the data of the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen divisions (later the President of the CRI) A.Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the HRC "Memorial", the losses of militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
46. On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of “Memorial” (later called the “Mission of public organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). The Kovalev Mission did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial Human Rights Center.
47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen fighters and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn on the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being at the headquarters of Dzhokhar Dudayev among the militants, “was almost all the time in the basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tankers “a way out of the city without firing if they mark the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
48. According to the Institute of Human Rights headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as the entire human rights and anti-war position of Kovalev, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, representatives state power, as well as numerous supporters of the "state" approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, "because of his "one-sided position" aimed at justifying illegal armed groups." In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, "for his statements against the war in Chechnya"
49. Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothes and plastic covers in the first months. In February 1995, out of the 120,000 inhabitants remaining in Grozny, 70,000 thousand were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewerage system was completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily set about organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, about 750,000 liters of chlorinated water per day, to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents, was delivered by tank trucks to 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for the inhabitants of the North Caucasus.
51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of assistance programs for the victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters on Red Cross letterhead, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contact with each other, so as all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the rehabilitation and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoi, provided regular assistance to nursing homes and orphanages shelters.
