Chechnya, September 2001. At Khankala, the main military base of the federal forces, a large-scale revision of the funds received by the republic since the beginning of the second Chechen campaign. The commission of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is engaged in the verification.

Officers - Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, Major General Pavel Varfolomeev, Colonel Igor Abramov, Colonel Vladimir Talaev, Colonel Igor Khakhalkin, Colonel Yuri Makhov, Colonel Sergei Toryanin, Colonel Igor Tribunov, Colonel Vladimir Smolennikov and Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Lyubimsky - regularly fly helicopters united military group from Khankala to Grozny and back.

All funds received in the republic (both the military budget of the group and the budget of the Chechen government) go through field banks military units. Most effective method detect embezzlement - conduct a counter check. That is, to compare the financial documents received at Khankala with the financial statements kept by the government. Thus, auditors from the General Staff actually check not only the military, but also the leadership of the republic.

From Khankala to the complex of government buildings in Grozny - very close. But Grozny 2001 is dangerous for ground movement. Military and high-ranking civilians prefer "air taxi". Dozens of helicopters fly over the city every day. A specialized helipad No. 104 was even built near the government complex. However, these measures are justified by statistics: during the period of active hostilities in the Grozny region, not a single aircraft was shot down.

Little is known about the commission's work. Without exception, all members of the commission flew away on a business trip without telling their loved ones what exactly they would do. The wives of some officers did not know at all that their husbands were in Chechnya. But even information from open sources allows us to conclude that many did not like the work of the General Staff Commission.

On September 10, at a meeting in Khankala, the head of the commission, Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, proposed reducing the number of roadblocks and checkpoints in the Chechen plains and at the same time increasing the number of ambushes, patrols and secrets in the mountainous regions of the republic. Such a proposal did not arouse enthusiasm among the military, although it was dictated by even primitive logic: according to statistics, the federal forces suffered the largest losses precisely at checkpoints. On the other hand, the checkpoints were not only a target for the militants, but also a source of income for the federals - fees were levied on almost every car and passenger. This practice was widespread and ineradicable. However, General Pozdnyakov gave an ultimatum that he would return to Moscow and prepare everything within a week. Required documents and sign them with his leader, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Defense Ministry, General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin.

Three hours before the tragedy

On the morning of September 17, a member of the commission, deputy head of the 4th department of the rear headquarters of the Armed Forces, Colonel Yuri Makhov called home. Makhov told his wife that the business trip was over and he would be at home tomorrow.

The members of the commission completed their work in the government of Chechnya with a short meeting with the leadership of the republic. At 12.06 Mi-8 helicopter tail number 33 landed on site 104, took on board members of the commission and boxes with documents. At 12.07 he took off and flew towards Khankala at an altitude of 150-200 meters. The flight time is about 10 minutes...

From the “Aircraft Accident Investigation Act” dated October 17, 2001: “Clarification of the task of transporting a group of generals and officers from site No. 104 (Grozny) to the Khankala airfield to the crew of Captain Mineev V.N. was carried out at 9.00 on September 17 ... At 12.06 the crew landed on site No. 104, and at 12.07, with a group on board, they took off from the site, which was reported to the AA OGV checkpoint. After the report, the crew did not get in touch.

<…>At 12.20 a report was received from the duty officer about a crash on the eastern outskirts of Grozny next to the railroad tracks of a Mi-8 helicopter. Raised on command group PSO ( search and rescue team. - EAT. ) at 12.43 discovered the crash site of the helicopter. Having landed next to the burning helicopter, the PSO crew confirmed that the helicopter with tail number 33 was on fire, there were no living crew members and passengers, and employees of the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic and the commandant's office of the Oktyabrsky district were working at the crash site. Due to a strong fire, the bodies of the dead could not be evacuated by PSO means.

<…>According to eyewitnesses,<…>a shot (launch) at the helicopter was fired from the region of Grozny, which caused the first explosion on board. The helicopter caught fire in the air and began to descend into the wasteland of the eastern outskirts of the city. The burning fuel spilling onto the ground set fire to a tree along the street. Nursery. At a height of 15-20 meters and at a distance of 70-100 meters from the place where the helicopter crashed, a second explosion occurred (presumably an additional fuel tank exploded), and the uncontrolled helicopter fell to the ground, collapsed and burned down. The crew to the last opportunity tried to turn the collapsing helicopter away from residential buildings, which saved dozens of civilians from death, did not use the means of rescue, fighting for the lives of passengers ... "

One very important conclusion follows from the “Act of Investigation”: few people knew what task was assigned to the crew of the helicopter with tail number 33. The crew itself was instructed to deliver the General Staff commission from Grozny to Khankala 3.5 hours before departure. I repeat: dozens of helicopters fly over Grozny every day. During the hostilities over the city, not a single vehicle was lost. But it was precisely on September 17, and precisely the same aircraft on which the generals and colonels of the General Staff flew, that became the target. The fact that this is far from an accidental target is evidenced by another fact recorded in the materials of the criminal case.

Cross fire to kill

The Mi-8 helicopter was fired from two points from two MANPADS systems*.

Aviation helicopter commander's report internal troops The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of Captain Semenov clearly indicates that they observed at Khankala “two strong traces of a dove color of medium density, presumably from rockets, one of which ended in a fireball ...”

Detailed testimony was given by foreman Chernikov and senior police sergeant Cherepanov. They saw exactly how the helicopter with the commission of the General Staff was shot down, described in detail and accurately determined the place from which the missile was launched. This is a building on Sapernaya Street, 750 meters from checkpoint No. 26, over which a helicopter with a commission of the General Staff actually flew. This is the most important moment.

At checkpoint No. 26, there was another witness to the shelling of the helicopter - an employee of the St. Petersburg OMON Sergei Oraev. Witness Oraev describes in great detail the launch of a rocket from ... a completely different place - from the side of the tram depot in Grozny, near the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya streets. But this is very far from checkpoint No. 26 and from the flight path of the Mi-8. From the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya, apparently, that same second rocket was fired, which, in the words of Captain Semenov, "ended in a fireball", or rather, self-destructed. In the table of the main characteristics of domestic MANPADS ( magazine "Soldier of Fortune", No. 11, 1999, p. 46) the maximum firing range of a missile fired from the Igla MANPADS is indicated - 3300 meters. The Mi-8 helicopter at the time of the missile launch was more than three and a half kilometers from the tram depot and the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya streets. That is, outside the zone of destruction of this missile.

Witness Oraev testified that “during his service in the army he was a senior MANPADS shooter”. And at the same time, an experienced MANPADS shooter Sergei Oraev DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING in his testimony that another missile was launched near checkpoint No. 26, where he served. The one that achieved the goal!

Papers worth a lifetime

Another equally important question: what happens at the site of a helicopter crash in the first minutes and hours?

Here is the testimony of senior engineer-sapper Valery Solopov: “On September 17, I was at checkpoint No. 26. “... In addition, I want to inform you that when the helicopter fell, a trail of falling sheets of paper trailed behind it, which we later collected. On the following days they gave<эти листы>in the VOVD** of the Oktyabrsky district”.

This is extremely interesting evidence. There are other eyewitness accounts from which the fact follows: when the helicopter was shot down, members of the General Staff commission began to throw documents overboard. They were saving documents - the results of a two-week revision. Apparently, there was something very important in these papers. In fact, it's not even a guess. This statement. Because the hunt immediately began for these documents.

Here is the testimony of Anatoly Chaikin, an employee of the Rostov City Department of Internal Affairs, Yaroslavl Region: “In September 2001< я>was on a business trip to Chechnya as the head of the criminal investigation department of the VOVD of the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny. According to functional duties, he had to go to all the murders. On September 17, 2001, I went with the task force as a senior to the crash site of the Mi-8 helicopter.<…>Everything that was at the scene of the incident was put into one place and recorded in the protocol, which was kept by the investigator. Along with the inspection, video filming was conducted by an expert. In my presence, the wreckage of the helicopter and documents were taken. Some of the things and fragments of the helicopter were taken by the colonel of the Armed Forces from Khankala, arguing that they are secret and are not subject to inclusion in the criminal case ... "

And here is a request from Colonel Peshkhoev, First Deputy Head of the Federal Security Service for the Chechen Republic, addressed to Captain 1st Rank Maltsev (at that time, the acting head of the Russian Federal Security Service Department for coordinating the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region).

“Dear Yuri Alexandrovich! ...From the testimonies of the witnesses interrogated in the case, it follows that after the helicopter crashed, servicemen of the Rosh*** arrived at the scene of the incident, who collected and took away the documents and objects found at the crash site of the helicopter. In addition, the foreman of the police ... Chernikov V.I. The officers, who arrived from Khankala, seized a video cassette with a recording of the helicopter crash.

Based on the foregoing, I ask you to instruct your subordinate employees:

1. Send to our address the documents and objects found at the crash site of the helicopter, which are of evidentiary value in the criminal case under investigation.

2. Establish the location of the video cassette for its subsequent attachment to the materials of the criminal case as material evidence.

3. Ensure the appearance at the investigative department of the Federal Security Service of Russia for Chechen Republic for interrogation as witnesses of the servicemen of the ROSH, who were on September 17-18 at the site of the helicopter crash ... "

Call sign "Typhoon"

And, finally, the enigmatic report of police lieutenant Kirillov, the detective of the VOVD of the Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs in Grozny: “During the operational-search activities, a woman, an FSB officer, was identified at the scene of the incident.<с документами прикрытия>major<а>militia ... which is deployed in n.p. Khankala is in the regional operational headquarters and has the call sign "Typhoon" and the name Tamara.

When talking<с ней>it was established that she was going to her cousin, who lives on the street. Parnikova, d. 1 ... I couldn’t explain anything more, but I didn’t give my personal data, explaining that I could give an explanation with the permission of my superiors ... ”

The question arises: were not too many nameless FSB officers from Khankala discovered by investigators of the Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs who arrived at the scene of the helicopter crash? In violation of the law, they collect and take away from the scene the documents thrown by the dead officers of the General Staff from the burning helicopter. What was their interest?

In the materials of the criminal case, only one “interested person” appears briefly - a native of military counterintelligence, Yuri Maltsev, head of the special department of the FSB of Russia for coordinating the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region. In ROSH, he headed one of the key structures - the Operational Directorate, which was engaged in the development of all major special operations carried out on the territory of Chechnya.

Shortly after the death of the commission of the General Staff, Maltsev was formally withdrawn from the FSB, transferred to the post of deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and appointed head of the ROSH.

Here is his response to a request from Peshkhoev’s colleague, deputy head of the FSB for Chechnya, which Maltsev clearly ignores, writing directly to the head of the FSB for Chechnya, Sergei Babkin:

“In connection with your request, I answer that ... the employees of the ROSH did not participate in the investigation of the causes of the disaster. All items seized from the helicopter crash site were sent to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic.

But the documents of the commission of the General Staff do not appear in the materials of the investigation at all. It is also not reflected anywhere that any documents were handed over to the prosecutor's office. So why did the employees of the ROSH "light up", hastily taking away valuable material evidence from the helicopter crash site?

To answer this question, it is worth recalling who exactly the commission of the General Staff checked. And she checked the regional operational headquarters.

Sudden consequence

An important point. Despite the death high-ranking commission General Staff (two generals, seven colonels, one lieutenant colonel!), the criminal case is being investigated at a very low level - just the Grozny prosecutor's office. But just then, at the first (always the most important) stage of the investigation, employees of the Grozny prosecutor's office, as the most disinterested persons, "dug up" all the important facts. It only remained to compare them. At this stage, the top realized it. And the case was transferred "by jurisdiction" to the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic. Since that moment, practically no investigative action has been carried out. Four months later, on December 17, 2001, the investigation was suddenly suspended due to the impossibility of identifying the perpetrators.

And only in May 2002, the investigation into the death of the General Staff Commission was again initiated under pressure from the prosecutor's office of Chechnya (the department for supervision of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Here is the wording: “The investigation into the case was conducted in violation of Art. 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR on a comprehensive, complete and objective study of all the circumstances of the committed act.

However, this decision does not say anything about the fact that some interrogations and very important material evidence have disappeared from the materials of the investigation. The main version is not questioned - that a helicopter with a commission of the General Staff was allegedly hit by a missile from the side of the tram depot in Grozny. All references to the fact that there were two missiles and that a completely different missile hit a helicopter with a commission of the General Staff, the one that was fired from a MANPADS near checkpoint No. 26, were erased from the file. This moment was accidentally filmed on a video camera by police foreman Chernikov. The fact that there was such a tape and that it was confiscated from Chernikov by representatives of the ROSH is known only from a request from the deputy head of the FSB for Chechnya. There is no other mention of this cassette in the file. Just like the cassette itself.

... The second time the investigation was closed even faster. A month later, on June 18, 2002, the case of the death of the General Staff Commission was again suspended with a stunning wording: “Unidentified persons fired on a Mi-8 helicopter using UNIDENTIFIED weapons ...”

From the wreckage of the side of a downed helicopter, from the smallest particles of a rocket projectile, on which, as a rule, there are special stamps with numbers (nameplate), one can determine not only the type of weapon, but also which batch the anti-aircraft complex belonged to, from which military unit it was " gone". The Ministry of Defense has a special expert institution that makes such examinations. The problem is that the investigators did not need any expertise. They were faced with a more difficult task - how to make a "hanging" out of a criminal case.

Resurrection of the "visyak"

The case has been on hold for a year and a half. No attempts are being made to identify "unidentified persons" who destroyed the commission of the General Staff. And suddenly in January 2003 in ORB-2 **** ( terrible place of torture. - EAT.) four Chechens allegedly turn themselves in confession and confess to committing many, many terrorist attacks. Including shot down on September 17, 2001, a helicopter with officers of the General Staff.

The investigation and the trial were quick to reprisal. Three Chechens - Shamsudin Salavatov, Sultan Matsiev, Dokku Dzhantemirov - were sentenced to life imprisonment. The fourth - Viskhan Khabibulatov - received 13 years in a colony strict regime. But none of them fired at a helicopter with a commission from the General Staff. In the case file, this is recorded in an anecdotal way. First, under torture, Matsiyev was forced to testify that it was he who shot down the Mi-8 by firing from a MANPADS from the roof of a three-story building from the side of the tram depot. All this was formalized in a procedural manner, they went to the scene of the crime, checked the testimony on the spot, filled out the protocol, on which the witnesses signed. And then a witness turned up who absolutely identified Matsiev. At the time of the shelling of the helicopter, she was just pouring gasoline into his car at the other end of the city. I had to beat out new evidence from Matsiev that he himself did not shoot at the helicopter, but he was in a gang, and the investigation was misleading.

Real assassination attempt on virtual killers

The history of the war in Chechnya is rich in crimes without punishment. But the tragedy with the commission of the General Staff is not just a high-profile crime. It was a challenge to the entire army system. Nevertheless, even statements that the investigation was taken under high control (as it often happens), did not follow. This story has a monstrously primitive outcome: the destruction of the largest commission of the General Staff was “hung up” on Chechens who fell under the arm. Nobody publicly objected. Even the relatives of the dead officers of the General Staff kept silent, although some of them closely followed the investigation and participated in the trials.

Only the defendants resisted. Their lawyers did a great job for the investigators and asked the right questions. There is nothing definite in this loud and mysterious case, only questions that in themselves clarify a lot. Namely: who had a motive to eliminate the commission, who had necessary information and means (in the literal sense of the word - MANPADS complexes), who was seen hiding evidence. The answer is actually clear and concise. Khankala. But Khankala is not a homogeneous concept at all, and someone, apparently, did not need the truth. The chance to fight arose after the abolition of the life sentence to the Chechens by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the return of the case to the court for a new trial. The Supreme Court suddenly broke the whole scheme and "saw" really great amount procedural violations and simply factual inconsistencies in the Ichkerian Air Defense case. But at this stage, the Chechens Salavatov, Dzhantemirov, Matsiev and Khabibulatov, in fact, stopped fighting. Although for the first time they had a chance at least for a commutation of the sentence.

At the second trial, the defendants abandoned their lawyers, who achieved the annulment of the verdict in the Supreme Court. They hired other defenders, among them leading role played by lawyer Murad Musaev.

Musaev became famous during the trial of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. But even before that, he was a well-known lawyer, persistent, tenacious. But where does all this go? Perhaps Murad Musaev decided not to aggravate the already unenviable situation of his clients when the threat to their lives was clearly identified. After the car was blown up, on which the defendants were transported from the pre-trial detention center in Grozny to the building of the Supreme Court of Chechnya. Three escorts then died, the defendants were wounded and shell-shocked. But after that, the process went without hesitation. Soon the harshest sentence was re-pronounced. This summer, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation approved it.

Help "New"

The commission of the General Staff became the third commission from Moscow, which was tried to be destroyed in Chechnya. In 2000, in one of the northern regions of Chechnya, where active hostilities have never taken place, a helicopter was shot down, on which Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of the General Staff of the Defense Ministry, was flying (he came to Chechnya to inspect the troops). True, the helicopter was fired upon after Kvashnin and those accompanying him left the board. There were no casualties, but the car itself was completely burned down. In the spring of 2001, on the border of Ingushetia and Chechnya, a helicopter of the North Caucasus Regional Directorate of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia was shot down. On board was a parliamentary commission that had completed its work in Chechnya. The crew commander, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Konstantinov, was wounded in the chest and neck and managed to land the helicopter. I myself died. Members of the commission were not injured, only deputy Alexei Arbatov was cut with shrapnel from his leg.

According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, after the death of the General Staff commission in the fall of 2001, flight safety rules were revised: high-ranking military officials were forbidden to fly in one helicopter. However, in January 2002, a Mi-8 helicopter with a commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. 14 people were killed, including Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Southern Federal District, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai Goridov. At the same time, the route Mozdok - Khankala - Mozdok, passing over the village of Shelkovskaya, was considered the most "well-known" and safe for military helicopters.

* MANPADS - portable anti-aircraft missile system.
** VOVD - temporary department of internal affairs.
*** ROSH - regional operational headquarters.
**** ORB - Operational Investigation Bureau.

Khankala in Chechnya is a Russian military base, located seven kilometers from the capital Grozny. But there is also the Khankala station, through which trains go to Moscow, Volgograd and other Russian cities.

Location

The city of Khankala in Chechnya is a western suburb of Grozny, located in the North Caucasus, in the very center of the republic. It lies on the left bank of the Argun River and on the right bank of the Sunzha River.

Unlike, for example, the Krasnodar Territory, this region of Chechnya is not protected by mountains, so the climate here is much more severe. Winters are frosty, and summers are hot and dry, as rainfall is irregular.

Khankala village

It was built with an airfield in 1949, along with it a residential town was built for military families. It was located next to the station, at which there was a small village. Today, there is also the Khankala station and the military town of Khankala.

The village still has a railway station. The movement of trains is carried out with the help of diesel locomotives, since it is not electrified, due to the dismantling of the contact network during the hostilities.

The word "khankala" is translated into Russian as "watchtower". Before the hostilities, it was a suburban rural area of ​​the city of Grozny. Currently, approximately 7,900 people live in the village, more than 83% of them are Russian military and railway station workers. In fact, only a few houses remain from the former village.

Khankala military base in Chechnya

Khankala is considered the most peaceful place in all of Chechnya, due to the location of the Main Base here. Russian troops in the country. This is the most protected object, surrounded by several rows along the perimeter of the territory. barbed wire, minefields, periodically located roadblocks. Even in previous years, the militants did not approach it, preferring to fire from afar.

Strategic military facilities are located here: the joint headquarters of the North Caucasian military district, the FSB service, a hospital, and other federal agencies. The base was established in 2000 in connection with the tragic events in Chechnya. Khankala, in addition to glorious pages in history, has sad ones.

In September 2001, militants shot down a MI-8 helicopter here, as a result of which 2 generals and 8 officers were killed. In August 2002, an MI-26 helicopter with 154 people on board was shot down in the Khankala area while landing. Only 30 servicemen managed to survive. In September 1995, an MI-8 helicopter with wounded on board was shot down in Khankala in Chechnya, one of them died.

military airfield

At times Soviet Union The airfield of the USSR Ministry of Defense was located on the territory of Khankala. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Stavropol Flight School and was used as a training one. It had a regiment of training aircraft L-29. First Chechen war they were captured by the militants of D. Dudayev, who wanted to convert them into combat ones, but did not have time. They were located on the territory of the Khankala airfield in Chechnya. Photo attached.

The airfield is currently owned by the Russian Ministry of Defense. This is a modern and powerful strategic facility, equipped with modern instruments and devices. An Orthodox chapel built by builders from Ulyanovsk has been erected here.

Background to the Chechen conflict

In 1991, Ichkeria was proclaimed, President D. Dudayev pursued a policy of separating the CRI from Russia, which did not recognize it. military operation was carried out in the border areas and on the territory. It had the definition of an operation to maintain constitutional order. In everyday life, hostilities were called the first Chechen war.

For this war feature there were huge casualties among the Russian population, since it was at that time that ethnic cleansings were carried out against persons of non-Chechen nationalities: Russians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Tatars and others. The overwhelming majority of the victims were Russians.

Economic and political background

The situation inside Russia and Chechnya was very unfavorable. The power of the presidents increased. In Chechnya, this led to confrontation between clans and open confrontation and strengthening of anti-Dudaev positions. It was also necessary to improve relations and restore constitutional order due to the circumstances that for the transit of Caspian oil it was necessary to lay an oil pipeline through the territory of Chechnya. Dudayev did not go to negotiations. No one could give guarantees for the safety of oil.

Battles for Khankala

In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia B. Yeltsin, on December 11, 1994, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Russia entered the territory of Chechnya. After 3 days, namely on December 14, missile and bomb strikes were carried out on the three existing Khankala and Kalinovskaya, where about 250 aircraft of various classes and purposes were concentrated, ranging from civilian to agricultural.

The battle for Khankala took place from 24 to 29 December. As a result, the airfield, garden houses and the line of the Grozny-Argun road were occupied. In 2000, a Russian military base was re-established on the territory of Khankala.

From the description of the battle: "December 24, 1994, the 129th Guards motorized rifle regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were ordered to move out of the Mozdok station area to the suburban area of ​​​​Grozny settlement (airfield) Khankala. The strike group consisted of the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment(Commander Major Yu. [Yuri Grigorievich] Saulyak on the BTR-70 with the emblem of peacekeeping forces - a blue circle with yellow letters MS in it) and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion of Captain S. Kachkovsky on the T-80BV<...>. Having made a forced march Mozdok-Khankala, the 1st motorized rifle battalion and the 1st tank company, having destroyed two cars with militants, immediately occupied the settlement of Khankala, reaching the outskirts of Grozny. Having taken up defense, the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards separate tank battalion, three hours later received an order to withdraw east of the village and take up defense at the turn of 1.5 km from Khankala in order to block the road Grozny-Argun."1

From the description of the battle: "On the night of December 26, 1994, the militants launched an attack with forces up to a platoon along the Grozny-Gudermes railway embankment on guarding the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment. As a result of the heated battle, one BTR-70 was shot down, the reconnaissance platoon commander lieutenant D. [Dmitry Anatolyevich] Komirenko was killed, three soldiers were injured.As a result of the massive fire of tanks and armored personnel carriers, up to six militants were destroyed (two corpses remained in the trenches, the militants carried the rest with them during the retreat). from Grozny tanks, ZSU and cars in the direction of Khankala, where the militants carried out the engineering equipment of positions.Having adjusted the artillery fire on the night vision sights of the tanks, they managed to destroy the enemy’s T-72A tank and car.
On December 26, 1994, at about 12:00 pm, the main forces of the regiment and the tank battalion, which left Mozdok, approached the area of ​​​​concentration of the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Tank Company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. At the crossing during an overnight stay and collection of lagging equipment from locality Tolstoy-Yurt in one of the tanks of the 2nd tank company (commander Lieutenant S. Kisel) a fire broke out that destroyed the car. "2

On the night of December 26-27, with the support of the 129 SMEs, a group of 173 ooSpN worked towards Khankala. As a result of reconnaissance, BM-21 "Grad", ZU and BTR.3 were discovered

From the description of the battle: "On December 27, 1994, preparations began in the units of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion to destroy the militants and take control of the settlement of Khankala and the airfield. During a mortar shelling of the positions of the 129th Guards of a motorized rifle regiment, two soldiers were wounded and a warrant officer was mortally wounded. One of the T-80BV tanks of the 2nd tank company, after sticking the barrel into the ground, fired a shot, and the barrel was torn off by the injector. The tank immediately received the nickname "bulldog" and was transferred to a repair platoon and was used like a tractor."4

Defense in n.p. Khankala was occupied by the battalion of Umalt Dashaev (died on 12/28/1994).

From the description of the battle: “On December 28, 1994, at 11:30 a.m., the forces of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion began the assault on Khankala. The 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment, together with the 1st tank company of the 133rd separate tank battalion, moving to the left along the Argun-Grozny road, were supposed to capture the air town.
right, along railway Gudermes-Grozny, in order to capture the railway station, the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (commander Major S. Goncharuk) advanced, the 2nd and 3rd tank companies of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion advanced along the airfield to the air town.
After turning into a line, the advancement began in battle formations in the direction of Khankala. Each motorized rifle company a tank platoon was attached. The first loss of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion was the T-80BV tank (board No. 521), which, after a dashing turn, fell from a height of 15 meters into a quarry. Having stuck the gun barrel into the ground along the driver’s hatch, the car turned out to be helpless, when trying to evacuate from the tank, the gunner-operator Private Yu. Sidorenko, the tank commander Private I. Knyazhev and the driver Private A Inzhievsky were killed under fire by shrapnel wounds. The battle unfolded on a parallel course. A 12.7-mm NSVT machine gun and two enemy grenade launchers hit through the quarry from a distance of 400 meters, and the T-72A came out along the edge, at the same time automatic fire was opened, pressing the motorized riflemen to the ground.
Taking advantage of the confusion of the attackers, the militants concentrated the fire of RPGs and five T-72 tanks and one T-62 on armored vehicles and KShM of the artillery battery commander. As a result of a direct hit by a projectile from the T-72A tank, Captain Basmanov and the driver were killed. A T-80BV tank (board No. 517) was hit by a hit in the transmission at the crossroads behind the quarry. With return fire, the commander of the 1st tank company, Captain S. Kachkovsky T-80BV (board No. 510), despite three RPG hits on the turret and hull, knocked out one T-72 tank and provided fire cover for the retreating motorized riflemen from the Grozny-Argun intersection . It was not possible to evacuate the tank (board No. 517) under fire, it was necessary to destroy it during the withdrawal. During the subsequent counterattack by militants with the participation of two T-72A tanks, one militant tank was hit by fire from T-80BV tanks of the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion.

During the attack of the 2nd tank company on the runway of the Khankala airfield, the T-80BV (board No. 536), having received a hit from the ATGM on the left side between the rollers, caught fire. The driver-mechanic Private A. Shmatko and the gunner-operator Private S. Dulov, who were seriously injured, managed to leave the burning tank under fire. After a short time, the ammunition detonated, killing the tank commander, junior sergeant E. Gorbunov. The T-80B tank of the commander of the 3rd tank company, Lieutenant D. Zevakin, was hit in the front plate in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe right towing hook from an RPG, fortunately for the crew, the cumulative jet, slipping through the armor, did not pierce it.
As a result of a fleeting battle, garden plots and the airfield of the airfield were taken under the control of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. The 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Tank Company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were located at the turn along the Argun-Grozny road, the 2nd Tank Company - between the road and the airfield in the area of ​​garden plots, 3 1st tank company - in caponiers on the airfield in front of the air town.
The air camp with several five-story buildings remained under the control of the militants.
The losses of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment were: seven people were killed and about 13 were wounded, the gun battery commander burned down, and two BTR-70s were damaged.
Five people of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were injured, two were killed. The 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion irretrievably lost four tanks (sides No. 517 and 521 from the 1st tank company and sides No. 532 and 536 from the 2nd tank company), the tank that fell into the quarry was evacuated and repaired a week later " .5

According to official data, by December 29, “6 tanks, 6 guns and one armored personnel carrier”6 were captured from the militants.

Nomination 98 Guards. vdd

On the night of December 28-29, a part of the consolidated airborne division of the 98th airborne division came to reinforce the eastern group. When making the march Mozdok-Khankala near the settlement. Petropavlovskaya, a car was blown up.8

From the description of the explosion: "The artillery control vehicle" Rheostat ", on which Lieutenant Ptitsyn was, having moved off the track in the dark, ran a caterpillar onto a landmine. The explosion threw the officer out of the car through an open landing hatch. Ptitsyn came to his senses already on the ground, when the senior ensign Alexander Kozlov pulled him away from the burning "armor". Despite the shock of pain - the cranial bones were broken, while providing first aid, Ptitsyn remained conscious, even managed to understand that the price of a driver's mistake was four wounded and two killed. "9

Ensign Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov and private Ivan Vitalievich Morozov were killed during the explosion.10

From the description of the battle: "On December 29, 1994, at the location of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion, work was carried out to equip personnel at the locations of units, equipment was repaired by crews and a platoon of material support, replenished ammunition, refueled fuel."11

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th Specialized Special Forces of the Airborne Forces): “On December 29, 1994, the Eastern group consisted of two defense rings and headquarters in the center. Tanks, other heavy equipment, and artillery approached.<...>On the night of December 30, we were again given the unusual task of holding the right flank. My group on one BTEer was given a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and a BMD-2 from the landing battalion. When management sets a task, it is not customary to ask again. Get the task, and how to solve - your problems. Before the assault on Khankala, with three pieces of equipment and personnel, I moved to the right flank and, like a gambler, castled an anti-aircraft gun, BMD-2 and my BTEer, somehow put them out. Even on the go, I figured out what an anti-aircraft gun is: how it shoots, what is its radius. Chose her place. They buried the BMD-2, put the BTEER. The right flank, as my deputy and I thought, we closed, providing protection for possible dangerous directions. "12

Senior Lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Forces (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): "On December 30, our unit bypassed the captured part of Khankala, the airfield and, as part of the group, stopped in front of a military camp, which was closely adjacent to the bridge connecting with the outskirts of Grozny."13

List of dead (incomplete)

1. Commander of the 1st rv 129 msp lieutenant Dmitry Anatolyevich Komirenko (26.12.)
2. Ensign 129 SME (December 27, mortar attack)

3. Gunner-operator of tank No. 521, Private Yuri Aleksandrovich Sidorenko (December 28.)
4. commander of tank No. 536 junior sergeant Evgeny Yuryevich Gorbunov (28.12.)
5. Oleg Viktorovich Basmanov, captain from the garden of 129 MSP (28.12.)
6. KShM sadn driver (28.12)
7. junior sergeant, 129th SME Alexander Valeryevich Noskov (December 28, missing)

8. Ensign 217th pdp Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov (29.12.)
9. Private 217 pdp Ivan Vitalievich Morozov (29.12.)

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1 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 20.
2 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 20-22.
3 Nedobezhkin V. War or a game of toy soldiers? // Kozlov S. and others. GRU special forces. M., 2002. S. 330-331.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 22.
5 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 23-25.
6 Yeltsin era. M., 2001. S. 628.
7 Criminal regime. Chechnya, 1991-95 M., 1995. S. 70.
8 Rashchepkin K. And you and I, brother, from the landing // Red Star. 2004. June 18. (