Russian- japanese war 1904-1905

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In search of an immediate pretext for starting a war, the Japanese government, in agreement with England, proposed to Russia to begin negotiations on the state of affairs in the Far East. The tsarist government agreed, not realizing that Japan was going to unleash a war. The military-feudal and capitalist elements, interested in new concessions and enterprises in the northeastern provinces of China and Korea, did not want to make concessions to Japan.

January 24, 1904 ᴦ. Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia and, in fact, began hostilities on the same day: the Japanese fleet entered the Yellow Sea on a combat mission. The Japanese command, taking into account the experience of the Japanese-Chinese war, provided for the active development of operations at sea in order to achieve a preponderance of forces and thereby ensure the unimpeded transfer of its ground forces to the mainland. Great importance was attached to the surprise of the attack, although the Japanese fleet was already superior in strength, numbers and artillery to the Russian Pacific squadron.

The war was lost. Having seized the Liaodong Peninsula, Korea and part of Manchuria in the first period of the war, Japan began to take measures to consolidate its military successes by treaty, which cost her enormous effort and huge losses. Even before the start of the peace talks in Portsmouth, Japan undertook a number of diplomatic actions in order to enlist the support of Britain and the United States in matters related to its demands for tsarist Russia especially since, by providing loans to Japan and giving her political support, Britain and the United States acquired the right to have a decisive voice in matters of war and peace as well.

On the eve of the peace talks, the Japanese-American Katsura-Taft Agreement was signed. Taft assured the Japanese side that the United States could not agree to an alliance, but even "without such an agreement, the American people are so unanimous with the peoples of Japan and Great Britain in the matter of maintaining peace in the Far East and that under any circumstances England and Japan can count on concerted action with part of the US government, as if the US were obliged to take these actions under the treatyʼʼ. One of the main objects of Japanese claims was Korea. Japan had the official consent of the United States to the seizure of Korea under a secret agreement. There was also an Anglo-Japanese deal on the question of Korea. Japan pledged to guarantee the borders of India.

Long before the peace conference between Britain and the United States, the issue of transferring the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan with Port Arthur was also agreed. In August 1904 ᴦ. the government of Japan developed a program of peaceful conditions: Russia recognizes Japan's right to freedom of action in Korea, Russian troops are withdrawn from Manchuria, Japan receives the Harbin-Port Arthur railway and the Liaodong Peninsula. Depending on the “situation”, it was decided to insist on Russia covering military expenses, ceding Sakhalin Island and granting Japan the rights to fish in the waters of Primorye. This maximum program, with minor changes, was preserved until the peace conference.

American diplomacy was actively preparing for the opening of Russo-Japanese talks. T. Roosevelt sought to secure a leading role in settling the Far East conflict, so that the peace treaty would meet the interests of the American monopoly to the greatest extent. After the defeat of Russia at Mukden, Japan's financial difficulties forced her to ask the United States to provide her mediation services and achieve the opening of peace negotiations. Russia was in a different position.

In the context of the growing aggressiveness of German policy, the French government considered the further participation of Russia in the war in the Far East dangerous for France and was interested in an immediate end to the Russo-Japanese war. In January 1905 ᴦ. she proposed to convene international conference trying to play the role of a mediator in resolving the military conflict. But the French proposal was not supported by other powers. The actual isolation of Russia in the international arena exacerbated the difficulties facing the Russian delegation, and could not but affect the results of the peace negotiations.

The conference opened on July 27, 1905 ᴦ. in Portsmouth. At the first business meeting, the Japanese side handed over peace terms to the Russian commissioner. These conditions included the requirement that Japan be granted "freedom of hands" in Korea, evacuation from Manchuria, transfer of rights to Japan to lease the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalniy, transfer of Sakhalin, the South Manchurian Railway, reimbursement of Japan for the actual costs of the war, the issuance of Japanese military Ex Russian warships stationed in neutral ports, limiting naval forces in the Far East, granting Japanese subjects full fishing rights along the coast, in bays, harbors, bays, rivers of their possessions and in the Japanese, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

July 30, 1905 ᴦ. The Russian delegation delivered its response to the Japanese demands. He rejected 4 Japanese demands, namely, the cession of Sakhalin, the payment of military costs, the transfer of Russian military ships located in neutral ports, and the limitation of naval forces in the Far East. The adoption of the remaining points was also subject to a number of reservations. In the course of sharp and lengthy negotiations, the Japanese delegation agreed to make peace without indemnity and leave the northern part of Sakhalin Island in the possession of Russia.

At a conference meeting in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905 ᴦ. agreement was signed. It was ratified simultaneously by both the Russian and Japanese emperors on October 1, 1905 ᴦ. Thus ended the war started by the Japanese militarists. Having previously established themselves in the Kuril Islands, this time they seized from Russia the southern half of Sakhalin - primordially Russian territory, an important outpost of Russia's defense in the Pacific Ocean. By attacking Russia, Japan broke the treaties of 1855 ᴦ. and 1875 ᴦ. providing for the maintenance of good neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries, thereby she lost all right to refer to them.

The transfer to Japan of the southern part of Sakhalin, an important strategic frontier of Russia in the Pacific, meant a serious defeat for the tsarist government. Along with this, Japan consolidated its position in Korea. Japan-Korea Convention 1905 ᴦ. about Japan's control over the foreign relations of Korea issued a Japanese protectorate over it. Later in 1910 ᴦ. The Japanese-Korean annexation treaty was signed.

The defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth led to significant changes in international relations and for a long time predetermined the international situation in the Far East. Japanese militarism created the basis for carrying out its expansionist policy in the Far East.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905." 2017, 2018.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, arose in the context of the intensified struggle of the imperialist powers for the division of semi-feudal China and Korea; was predatory, unjust, imperialistic in nature on both sides. Capitalist Japan played a particularly active role in the ensuing rivalry between the powers in the Far East, striving to seize Korea and Northeast China (Manchuria). Having defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan, under the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, received the islands of Taiwan (Formosa), Penghuledao (Pescadores) and the Liaodong Peninsula, but under pressure from Russia, supported by France and Germany, was forced to abandon the latter, after which began the aggravation of Russian-Japanese relations. In 1896, Russia received from the Chinese government a concession to build a railway through Manchuria, and in 1898 leased the Kwantung Peninsula from China with Port Arthur (Luishun) with the right to establish a naval base on it. During the suppression of the Ihetuan uprising in China, the tsarist troops occupied Manchuria in 1900. Japan began energetic preparations for war with Russia, signing an Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902. The tsarist government, whose predatory policy in the Far East was directed by the adventurist "bezobrazovskaya clique", counted on an easy victory in the war with Japan, which would make it possible to overcome the aggravated revolutionary crisis.

In economic and military terms, Japan was much weaker than Russia, but the remoteness of the Far Eastern theater of operations from the center of Russia reduced the military capabilities of the latter. After mobilization, the Japanese army consisted of 13 infantry divisions and 13 reserve brigades (over 375 thousand people and 1140 field guns); in total, the Japanese government mobilized about 1.2 million people during the war. The Japanese Navy had 6 new and 1 old battleship, 8 armored cruisers (2 of them, built abroad, arrived after the start of the war), 17 light cruisers (including 3 old ones), 19 destroyers, 28 destroyers (only in part of the so-called United Fleet), 11 gunboats, etc.

Russia was not ready for a war in the Far East. With a personnel army of 1.1 million people. and a reserve of 3.5 million people, by January 1904 it had here only about 98 thousand people, 148 guns and 8 machine guns; the border guard numbered 24 thousand people. and 26 guns. These forces were scattered over a vast territory from Chita to Vladivostok and from Blagoveshchensk to Port Arthur. Bandwidth Siberian Railway the highway was very low (at first, only 3 pairs of military echelons per day). During the war, about 1.2 million people were sent to Manchuria. (most in 1905). The Russian Navy in the Far East had 7 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 10 light cruisers (including 3 old ones), 2 mine cruisers, 3 destroyers (1 of them entered service after the start of the war), 7 gunboats: most of the ships were based on Port Arthur, 4 cruisers (including 3 armored ones) and 10 destroyers - to Vladivostok. The defensive structures of Port Arthur (especially the land ones) were not completed. Pursuing an adventurist policy unsecured by forces and means, the tsarist government considered Japan a weak adversary and allowed itself to be taken by surprise.

The Russian command assumed that the Japanese army would not be able to launch an offensive on land soon. Therefore, the troops in the Far East were tasked with holding back the enemy until the arrival of large forces from the center of Russia (in the 7th month of the war), then going on the offensive, throwing Japanese troops into the sea and landing troops in Japan. The fleet was supposed to fight for supremacy at sea and prevent the landing of Japanese troops.

The Japanese strategic plan provided for seizing dominance at sea by a surprise attack and the destruction of the Port Arthur squadron, then the landing of troops in Korea and South Manchuria, the capture of Port Arthur and the defeat of the main forces of the Russian army in the Liaoyang area. In the future, it was supposed to occupy Manchuria, the Ussuri and Primorsky Territories.

From 1901 Russian-Japanese negotiations were held in St. Petersburg on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Manchuria. In December 1903, Japan issued an ultimatum to demand a change in the position of the Russian government and, despite Russia's concessions, on January 24 (February 6), 1904 broke off diplomatic relations. On the night of January 27 (February 9), 10 Japanese destroyers, taking advantage of the carelessness of the Russian command, suddenly attacked the Russian squadron, which was stationed without proper security measures on the outer road of Port Arthur, and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. January 27 (February 9) 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the Russian cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets", located in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Damaged in an unequal, heroic battle, the Varyag was flooded by its crew, and the Korean was blown up. January 28 (February 10) Japan declared war on Russia. The outbreak of war was alien to the interests of the working people of both countries. The Bolsheviks opposed the war, for the defeat of the tsarist government and the overthrow of the autocracy.

The Russian command was headed by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East, Admiral E. I. Alekseev [from October 13 (26), 1904, General A. N. Kuropatkin, from March 3 (16), 1905, General N. P. Linevich], to whom the commanders of the Manchurian army were subordinate - until October 1904, General Kuropatkin and the Pacific Fleet - Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov [since April 22 (May 5), 1904 acting Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft]. The leadership of the Japanese troops was carried out by the chief of the General Staff, who became the commander-in-chief of the ground forces in June, Marshal I. Oyama, the Japanese fleet - Admiral H. Togo.

The weakened Russian squadron in Port Arthur was limited at first only to defensive operations. Vice-Admiral Makarov, who arrived in Port Arthur on February 24 (March 8), 1904, began to prepare the squadron for active operations, but already on March 31 (April 13) he died on the battleship Petropavlovsk, which was blown up by mines. The new leadership of the fleet (Alekseev and Vitgeft) abandoned the struggle for supremacy at sea and the Port Arthur squadron was focused only on the defense of Port Arthur.

From January 24 (February 6) to March 3 (16), 1904, the 1st Japanese Army of General T. Kursky landed in Korea (about 34 thousand bayonets and sabers, 128 guns), which by mid-April reached the river. Yalu (Yalujiang). By this time, Russian troops (over 123 thousand bayonets and sabers, 322 field guns) were located: in Vladivostok and the Amur region - over 24 thousand bayonets and sabers, 56 guns; in Port Arthur and on the Kwantung Peninsula - over 28 thousand, 56 guns; in South Manchuria - over 23 thousand, 88 guns; in the area of ​​Liaoyang - Mukden - over 28 thousand, 60 guns and on the river. Yalu - Eastern Detachment of General M. I. Zasulich (over 19 thousand bayonets and sabers, 62 guns, 8 machine guns). April 18 (May 1) in the battle on the river. Yalu, the 1st Japanese Army defeated the Eastern Detachment and, advancing to Fynhuancheng, ensured a landing on the Liaodong Peninsula on the Liaodong Peninsula near Bizivo of the 2nd Japanese Army of General Ya. Oku (about 35 thousand bayonets and cavalry, 216 guns), which cut the railway to Port Arthur and on May 13 (26) threw back a small Russian detachment that covered the distant approaches to Port Arthur on the isthmus in the Jinzhou region. Leaving one division on the Kwantung Peninsula, the Japanese command launched an offensive in the north along the railroad to Liaoyang with the forces of the 2nd Army (two divisions) and two additional landing divisions (of which General M. Nozu's 4th Army was formed in July). From Yu.-V. the 1st Japanese army (3 divisions) advanced on Liaoyang through mountain passes. To capture Port Arthur, the 3rd Japanese army of General M. Nogi was formed (in July, 3 divisions and 2 brigades, 45-50 thousand bayonets and cavalry).

Under pressure from the tsar and Alekseev, Kuropatkin sent the 1st Siberian Corps of General Stackelberg to the rescue of Port Arthur, but due to mediocre leadership, the corps was defeated near Vafangou on June 1-2 (14-15). In June - July, the Japanese armies developed a concentric offensive against Liaoyang. Russian troops, after a series of unsuccessful battles for them, in early August took up defensive positions on the distant approaches to Liaoyang. In the Liaoyang battle of 1904 on August 11-21 (August 24 - September 3), Kuropatkin failed to use the favorable situation that developed during the battles and gave real chances for victory, and ordered a retreat to the north. By mid-September, the Russian Manchurian army had strengthened to 195 thousand bayonets, 19 thousand sabers, 758 guns and 12 machine guns against 150 thousand bayonets and sabers, 648 guns and 18 machine guns in the Japanese armies. This allowed the Russian troops to launch a counteroffensive, which led to the battle on the river. Shahe, which lasted from September 22 (October 5) to October 4 (17) and ended in vain. Exhausted by heavy losses (Russians - over 40 thousand, Japanese - over 20 thousand people), the opponents went on the defensive. A positional front with a length of up to 60 km was formed, which was a new phenomenon in military art.

The Japanese command made every effort to quickly capture Port Arthur and destroy the Russian squadron, but repeated assaults were repulsed by the heroically defending Russian garrison (see Port Arthur defense). The Port Arthur squadron, which was threatened with destruction, twice unsuccessfully tried to break through to Vladivostok, but after the battle in the Yellow Sea, it was forced to return to Port Arthur in a weakened composition (some of the ships went to neutral ports). On December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905), the head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, General A. M. Stessel, treacherously surrendered the fortress without exhausting the possibilities of its defense. The capture of Port Arthur allowed the Japanese command to transfer the 3rd Army to reinforce the main forces, and the fleet got time to prepare for a meeting with the 2nd Russian Pacific Squadron, which left Libau on October 2 (15), 1904.

By January 1905, three Russian Manchurian armies (created in October 1904) occupied the river. Shahe is an almost continuous front with a length of 100 km, and with flank detachments - up to 150 km. The Russian command, seeking to defeat the enemy before the arrival of his 3rd Army, launched an offensive in January with the forces of the 2nd Russian Army in the Sandepu area, which ended in failure. On February 6 (19), Japanese troops went on the offensive in order to bypass the flanks of the Russian armies. The battle of Mukden 1905, which lasted until February 25 (March 10), ended in a major defeat for the Russian troops, who, having suffered heavy losses, withdrew to the Sypingai positions (160 km north of Mukden), where they remained until the conclusion of peace. Hostilities on land have virtually ceased. By the end of the war, the number of Russian troops in Manchuria reached over 800 thousand people. (combat strength of about 470 thousand people, 1672 guns, 374 machine guns), and Japanese troops - 380 thousand people. military composition. In July 1905, Japanese troops occupied Sakhalin Island.

From the beginning of the war until August 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers conducted active operations on the enemy’s sea lanes, destroying 15 steamships, including 4 military transports, and heroically fighting the superior forces of the Japanese on August 1 (14) in the battle in the Korea Strait. The last stage of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The Russian 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral Z.P. seas around Africa and on May 14 (27) approached the Tsushima Strait, where they entered into battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet. In a two-day naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated, which meant "... not only a military defeat, but a complete military collapse of the autocracy" (Lenin V.I., complete collection soch., 5th ed., vol. 10, p. 252).

Despite the victory, Japan was exhausted by the war, anti-war sentiment was growing in it, Russia was engulfed in revolution, and the tsarist government sought to make peace as soon as possible. On May 18 (31), 1905, the military government turned to US President T. Roosevelt with a request for mediation in peace negotiations, which began on July 27 (August 9) in the American city of Portsmouth. On August 23 (September 5), the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905 was signed, according to which Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese influence, transferred to Japan the lease rights of Russia to the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin.

The root causes of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were the reactionary and rotten nature of tsarism, the inability of the highest military command, the unpopularity of the war among the people, the low combat quality of reinforcements manned by storekeepers, including those of older ages who did not have sufficient combat training, and poor preparedness. a significant part of the officer corps, insufficient logistics, poor knowledge of the theater of operations, etc. Japan won the war with widespread support from Britain and the United States. From April 1904 to May 1905, she received 4 loans from them in the amount of 410 million dollars, which covered 40% of military expenses. The most important outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the establishment of Japanese imperialism in Korea and South Manchuria. Already on November 17, 1905, Japan imposed a protectorate agreement on Korea, and in 1910 included it in the Japanese Empire. The strengthening of Japanese imperialism in the Far East changed the attitude of the United States towards Japan, which became a more dangerous competitor for them than Russia.

The war had big influence on the development of military art (see. Operational art). It was the first time that rapid-fire weapons (rifles, machine guns) were used on a mass scale. In defense, trenches have replaced the complex fortifications of the past. The need for closer interaction between the military branches and wide application technical means of communication. Artillery firing from closed positions became widespread. Destroyers were used for the first time at sea. Based on the experience of the war in the Russian army, military reforms of 1905-12 were carried out.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905 brought the peoples of Russia and Japan a worsening of their financial situation, an increase in taxes and prices. Japan's public debt increased 4 times, its losses amounted to 135 thousand killed and died from wounds and diseases and about 554 thousand wounded and sick. Russia spent 2347 million rubles on the war, about 500 million rubles were lost in the form of property that went to Japan and sunk ships and vessels. Russia's losses amounted to 400 thousand killed, wounded, sick and captured. The Far Eastern adventure of tsarism, which led to heavy defeats, accompanied by great sacrifices, caused indignation among the peoples of Russia and accelerated the beginning of the first bourgeois-democratic Revolution of 1905-07.

Lit .: Lenin V.I., To the Russian proletariat, Complete collection soch., 5th ed., vol. 8; his, the First of May. Draft leaflet, ibid.; his, The Fall of Port Arthur, ibid., vol. 9; his, First of May, ibid., vol. 10; his own, Rout, ibid., vol. 10; Yaroslavsky E., Russo-Japanese War and the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards it, M., 1939; Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the Russian-Japanese war, vol. 1-9, St. Petersburg. 1910; Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. The work of the historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff, Prince. 1-7, St. Petersburg, 1912-18; Kuropatkin A. N., [Report...], vol. 1-4, St. Petersburg - Warsaw, 1906; Svechin A., Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, Oranienbaum, 1910; Levitsky N.A., Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, 3rd ed., M., 1938; Romanov B. A., Essays on the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese war. 1895-1907, 2nd ed., M. - L., 1955; Sorokin A.I., Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905, M., 1956: Luchinin V., Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Bibliographic index, M., 1939.

As a result of the entire land campaign, Japan was able to retain almost the entire southern part of Manchuria.

The failures of the Russian troops in the distant Far East caused anger and pain among the entire people. Terrible news of the defeat of the Russian troops stirred up the Russian public in protest. The majority of sensible people could clearly see all the perniciousness of the unleashed massacre, the whole weight of which lay an unbearable burden on the shoulders of a simple Russian artisan and peasant.

Trying to somehow calm public opinion, the tsarist government was forced to admit the mediocrity of the Russian high command and, first of all, General Kuropatkin A.R. He was even tried after the war, but he escaped with a slight fright, being dismissed. The Japanese were also dead tired of bloody battles with Russian soldiers. After the Mukden battle, General A. N. Kuropatkin was replaced by N. L. Linevich. But by that time, none of the warring parties was physically able to conduct active hostilities.

Back in October 1904 and February 1905, in order to support our forces in the Far East, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was sent from the city of Liepaja in the Baltic to the theater of operations. The squadron went to sea on October 2 under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky Z.P. The squadron included various types of ships: both combat and auxiliary. In the wake formation were 7 squadron battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers, which were just lightly armed commercial steamers and 8 destroyers.

The squadron of Rozhdestvensky Z.P., passing along the coast of Western Europe and rounding the western coast of Africa, on March 3, 1905, stood near the island of Madagascar to replenish fuel and water supplies. Here the squadron of Rozhdestvensky Z.P. a detachment of ships under the command of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was already expecting. consisting of 4 battleships, 3 cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers and 2 destroyers, which, by a shorter route through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, arrived in Madagascar on January 27, 1905.

In connection with the dramatically changed situation after the surrender of Port Arthur, without taking into account the real situation that had developed by that time in other areas of hostilities, the squadron was given a task that did not correspond to its capabilities: to break through to Vladivostok and ensure dominance not only in the battle area, but also in throughout the Sea of ​​Japan.

Having united and replenished the holds with coal and fresh water, the second Pacific squadron crossed the Indian Ocean, passed along the coast of Indonesia, and in 7 months of an unprecedented campaign for that time, having overcome over 18,000 miles of water in May 1905, approached the Korea Strait separating Korea and Japan . In its narrowest part, between the islands of Tsushima and Iki, the squadron was already waiting for Japanese ships deployed for battle under the command of Admiral Togo. Haihatiro Togo was not a genius at sea combat, but circumstances and military strength, as well as the proximity of his native shores, which allowed his squadrons to replenish their resources, made his naval armada a formidable force capable of successfully resisting the 2nd Pacific squadron of Rozhdestvensky Z.P. In addition, Japanese ships had a higher speed, and therefore greater maneuverability. Their personnel were better trained, while the Russian sailors in a hastily formed squadron had only about two months to train. Fatigue from a long voyage also affected. Japanese gunners had at their disposal shells stuffed with shimoza. Exploding inside the ship, they not only hit people with fire and fragments, but also emitted asphyxiating gas. Russian gunners, famous all over the world for their accuracy, used shells with a Brink fuse,

who assured: "Regarding our artillery, you can be calm - it is certainly higher than the Japanese."

But in reality, in battle, everything turned out to be different. The accuracy of Russian gunners was much higher than that of the Japanese, but Russian shells, hitting the enemy, for the most part pierced the ship through and only then exploded. This greatly reduced their destructive power. The Japanese themselves later admitted: "If your shells had the same explosive power as ours, then the result of the battle could have ended badly for us." The Japanese were amazed at the resilience of the Russian ships, which continued to fight, having terrible destruction of the hulls and fires in the superstructures.

In addition, the Russian squadron was connected in maneuver by a detachment of transports, auxiliary and hospital ships. The Japanese squadron, being close to their bases, was not burdened by all this. In this battle, two seemingly incompatible extremes were combined: the general weakness of Russian technology, compared to Japanese, and the heroic prowess of Russian naval crews.

Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky Z.P. together with his headquarters and flagship commanders, he did not have the necessary training to lead a military operation of such a magnitude as the Tsushima battle. And he did not believe in victory. Even before the squadron sailed from Liepaja, he said: “The Russian public, excited by newspaper insinuations, blindly believed in my success. But I am aware of what fate has prepared on the paths of our wanderings. You shouldn't have started this hopeless business at all. But how can I refuse to lead a squadron if the whole country believes in my victory? And the squadron weighed anchor and went on a long voyage to their death.

The Tsushima battle began on May 27, 1905 at about 2 p.m. Within half an hour, the battleship Oslyabya was out of order and soon died. The Japanese concentrated their fire on the battleship Suvorov, where the squadron commander Rozhdestvensky Z.P. was located. The Russian battleship bravely fought back, causing significant damage to Japanese ships. But the forces were not equal and, having lost control, the battleship left the battle formation. In addition, Admiral Rozhestvensky Z.P. was seriously wounded. Because of this, the Russian squadron lost control and the battle broke up into fights between individual Russian ships and superior enemy forces. The battle continued into the sunset. At night, attacks by Japanese destroyers inflicted particularly heavy damage on the Russian squadron. As a result of day and night fighting, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized, combat-ready force. 4 newest squadron battleships and one old one were sunk. 4 battleships and 1 destroyer from the detachment under the command of Nebogatov N.I. They were forced to surrender to superior enemy forces. 1 destroyer and 3 cruisers went to foreign ports and were interned there. Only 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers broke through to Vladivostok.

As a result of the Tsushima battle, the Russian squadron lost over 5 thousand people killed. 27 warships were sunk, surrendered and interned. The Japanese squadron also suffered serious losses, but they were much smaller. The Tsushima battle is the largest defeat of the Russian fleet in the entire history of its development. And although the Russian sailors showed unparalleled heroism, selflessness and fearlessness in the Tsushima battle, fighting in difficult conditions against a well-prepared and numerically superior enemy, the inept leadership of the high command, the backwardness in armament and technical support led to such a deplorable result. In the Tsushima battle, the tsarist government with its military department was defeated, first of all, but not the heroism and stamina of the Russian sailor. Lenin V.I. accurately described the Tsushima battle as the military collapse of the Russian autocracy.

In the land theater of operations, after Mukden, there were practically no active hostilities. Both warring parties by this time were exhausted both morally and financially. This was especially true for the Japanese. In the Russian army, moreover, after a series of defeats, primarily due to inept command, a noticeable decay and growth of anti-government sentiment began not only among the soldiers, but also among the officers. The obvious futility of this war, which is being waged far from Russia, in unfamiliar territory, became clearer and clearer.

In Japan, they realized the futility of the planned enterprise much earlier. Back in the summer of 1904, even before the fall of Port Arthur, Tokyo, anticipating the threat of impending crises, both military and financial, and, which was especially frightening, political, secretly began to probe the ground for peace. Through the side channels of diplomacy, the Russian Minister Witte was invited to meet with Japanese representatives somewhere in a European resort and start peace negotiations. And although the Japanese victory at Tsushima further revived the spirit of the most vulgar chauvinism in the country, the Japanese government began to clearly understand that their policy had reached a dead end. And not only went, but also began to hurt the political interests of powerful patrons, who throughout the entire period of hostilities provided Japan with significant assistance, both with strategic materials and military ones.

On the other side Pacific Ocean in the White House in Washington began to experience increasing anxiety. The President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, always very much wanted Russia and Japan to fight "until both powers are completely exhausted, and then peace will come on terms that will create neither yellow nor Slavic danger." Many years later, his words were almost exactly repeated by the English leader Winston Churchill when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Theodore Roosevelt, supporting Japan, wanted to weaken Russia's position in the Far East, which he considered a zone of his interests. But when Russia lost almost all of its fleet, the United States did not benefit from the strengthening of Japan in this region of the globe. In the historical perspective, Roosevelt already saw the future Japanese maritime threat to both Russia and America, which happened during the Second World War.

Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima, Japan turned to the United States with a request for peace mediation. The Russian autocracy, intimidated by the impending revolution and general dissatisfaction in the country with the results of the Far Eastern campaign, agreed to sit down at the negotiating table. The negotiations were held in the American city of Portsmouth. On September 5, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed between Russia and Japan. Under this agreement, the Russian government ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin Island and renounced the right to lease the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway. The Russian government also recognized Japan's "special" interests in Korea. As you can see, the signing of such an agreement did not bring victorious laurels to the Russian state and did not raise its prestige in the world.

If we judge the Russo-Japanese war from the point of view of tactics and strategy of warfare, it showed that by that time there had been significant changes in the art of war in this direction, which were not taken into account in a timely manner by either the tsarist government or the military department.

The conduct of hostilities in a theater of war so remote from the center showed a significantly increased role of the rear, the reliability of railway transport.

The experience of the war showed that the number of armies involved in hostilities increased dramatically. The width of the front of hostilities has also increased. In combat, the value of the fire strike has increased. Especially machine guns, as a mobile means of fire impact on infantry. Artillery learned to hit the enemy from covered positions, and the importance of heavy artillery, capable of crushing enemy fortifications with its shells, grew.

The war required not only troops to dig into the ground, digging trenches, but also to build complex engineering positions that required greater mechanization of troops and the creation of fairly large engineering units.

In the course of hostilities, the infantry abandoned the close formation and began to use loose formation, adapting to the surrounding terrain. The special benefit of such a system became clearly visible with the massive use of machine guns.

In naval combat, high-speed cruisers and destroyers began to play an important role. The tactics and strategy of naval combat have also undergone significant changes.

The bitter experience of the Russian-Japanese war was taken into account in the reorganization of the army and navy, which was carried out in 1908-10.

The weakness of the military-economic potential of tsarist Russia, the backwardness of the army and navy from the advanced military technologies of that time, mediocrity and poor training of senior officers - these are the main reasons for the defeat of Russia in this war, short in time, but very large in terms of damage and prestige of the country, war .

In the war of 1904-1905, Russia and Japan fought for dominance in Northeast China and Korea. Japan started the war. In 1904, the Japanese fleet attacked Port Arthur. The defense of the city continued until the beginning of 1905. During the war, Russia suffered defeats in battles on the Yalu River, near Liaoyang, on the Shahe River. In 1905, the Japanese defeated the Russian army in a general battle at Mukden, and the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of influence of Japan, ceded to Japan South Sakhalin and rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with the cities of Port Arthur and Far. The defeat of the Russian army in the war was one of the prerequisites for the revolution of 1905-1907.

In the context of world politics:

At the end of XIX - beginning of XX century. the contradictions between the leading powers, which by this time had mostly completed the territorial division of the world, escalated. The presence in the international arena of "new", rapidly developing countries- Germany, Japan, the United States, purposefully seeking a redistribution of colonies and spheres of influence. In the world rivalry between the great powers, Anglo-German antagonism gradually came to the fore. It was in this complex situation, saturated with international crises, that Russian diplomacy operated at the turn of the century.

The basis of the foreign policy of the autocracy was the Franco-Russian alliance, which guaranteed the western borders of the empire from the German threat and played the role of one of the most important elements of political balance, neutralizing the influence and military power Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) on European continent. The strengthening of contacts with France, the main creditor of the tsarist government, was essential for the autocracy for financial and economic reasons as well.

The arms race, which progressed as the contradictions between the great powers aggravated, overstrained Russia's forces, which forced Russian diplomacy to look for a way out of the current situation. Russia initiated the convening of the Hague "peace conference" held in 1899. True, the wishes regarding the limitation of armaments adopted at the conference, in fact, did not oblige its participants to anything. They concluded a convention on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, signed a number of conventions and declarations that regulated the rules of war.

At the same time, the autocracy took an active part in the struggle of the great powers for colonies and spheres of influence. In the Middle East, in Turkey, he increasingly had to deal with Germany, which had chosen this region as a zone of its economic expansion. In Persia, the interests of Russia clashed with the interests of England. The most important object of the struggle for the final division of the world at the end of the XIX century. China was economically backward and militarily weak. Exactly on Far East since the mid-1990s, the center of gravity of the foreign policy activity of the autocracy has shifted. a strong and very aggressive neighbor in the face of Japan, which has embarked on the path of expansion.

After as a result of victory in the war with China in 1894-1895. Japan, under a peace treaty, acquired the Liaodong Peninsula, Russia, acting as a united front with France and Germany, forced Japan to abandon this part of Chinese territory. In 1896, a Russian-Chinese treaty on a defensive alliance against Japan was concluded. China granted Russia a concession for the construction of a railway from Chita to Vladivostok through Manchuria (Northeast China). The Russian-Chinese Bank received the right to build and operate the road. The course towards the “peaceful” economic conquest of Manchuria was carried out in accordance with the line of S.Yu. Witte (it was he who largely determined the policy of the autocracy in the Far East at that time) to seize foreign markets for the developing domestic industry. Russian diplomacy also achieved great success in Korea. Japan, having established its influence in this country after the war with China, was forced in 1896 to agree to the establishment of a joint Russian-Japanese protectorate over Korea with the actual predominance of Russia. The victories of Russian diplomacy in the Far East caused growing irritation in Japan, England and the USA.

Soon, however, the situation in this region began to change. Pushed by Germany and following its example, Russia seized Port Arthur and in 1898 leased it from China, along with some parts of the Liaodong Peninsula, to set up a naval base. S.Yu. Witte's attempts to prevent this action, which he considered as contrary to the spirit of the Russian-Chinese treaty of 1896, were not crowned with success. The capture of Port Arthur undermined the influence of Russian diplomacy in Beijing and weakened Russia's position in the Far East, forcing, in particular, the tsarist government to make concessions to Japan on the Korean issue. The Russian-Japanese agreement of 1898 actually sanctioned the seizure of Korea by Japanese capital.

In 1899, a powerful popular uprising("Boxer Rebellion"), directed against the foreigners who shamelessly ruled in the state, Russia, together with other powers, took part in the suppression of this movement and occupied Manchuria during the hostilities. Russo-Japanese contradictions escalated again. Supported by Britain and the United States, Japan sought to oust Russia from Manchuria. In 1902, an Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded. Under these conditions, Russia entered into an agreement with China and undertook to withdraw troops from Manchuria within a year and a half.

Meanwhile, a very belligerent Japan led the matter to an aggravation of the conflict with Russia. In the ruling circles of Russia there was no unity on the issues of the Far East policy. S.Yu. Witte with his program of economic expansion (which, however, still pushed Russia against Japan) was opposed by the "bezobrazovskaya gang" headed by A.M. Bezobrazov, who advocated direct military seizures. The views of this group were shared by Nicholas II, who dismissed S.Yu. Witte from the post of Minister of Finance. "Bezobrazovtsy" underestimated the strength of Japan. Part of the ruling circles considered success in the war with the Far Eastern neighbor as the most important means of overcoming the internal political crisis.

Japan, for its part, was actively preparing for an armed clash with Russia. True, in the summer of 1903 Russian-Japanese negotiations began on Manchuria and Korea, however war machine Japan, with direct support from the United States and England, has already been launched. January 24, 1904 Japanese ambassador handed over Russian minister Foreign Affairs V.N. Lamzdorff a note on the severance of diplomatic relations, and on the evening of January 26, the Japanese fleet attacked the Port Arthur squadron without declaring war. This is how it started Russo-Japanese War.

The balance of forces in the theater of operations was not in favor of Russia, which was due both to the difficulties of concentrating troops on the remote outskirts of the empire, and the slowness of the military and naval departments, and gross miscalculations in assessing the capabilities of the enemy. From the very beginning of the war, the Russian Pacific squadron suffered serious losses. Having attacked the ships in Port Arthur, the Japanese attacked the Varyag cruiser and the Korean gunboat, which were in the Korean port of Chemulpo. After an unequal battle with 6 enemy cruisers and 8 destroyers, Russian sailors destroyed their ships so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy. A heavy blow for Russia was the death of the commander of the Pacific squadron, the outstanding naval commander S.O. Makarov. The Japanese managed to gain dominance at sea and, having landed large forces on the continent, launched an offensive against Russian troops in Manchuria and Port Arthur. General A.N. Kuropatkin, who commanded the Manchurian army, acted extremely indecisively. The bloody battle near Liaoyang, during which the Japanese suffered huge losses, was not used by them to go on the offensive (which the enemy was extremely afraid of) and ended with the withdrawal of Russian troops. In July 1904 the Japanese laid siege to Port Arthur. The defense of the fortress, which lasted five months, became one of the brightest pages of the Russian military history. The hero of the Port Arthur epic was General R.I. Kondratenko, who died at the end of the siege. The capture of Port Arthur cost the Japanese dearly, who lost more than 100 thousand people under its walls. At the same time, having taken the fortress, the enemy was able to strengthen his troops operating in Manchuria. The squadron stationed in Port Arthur was actually destroyed in the summer of 1904 during unsuccessful attempts to break through to Vladivostok.

In February 1905, the Battle of Mukden took place, played out on a more than 100-kilometer front and lasting three weeks. On both sides, over 550 thousand people participated in it with 2500 guns. In the battles near Mukden, the Russian army suffered a heavy defeat. After that, the war on land began to subside. The number of Russian troops in Manchuria was constantly increasing, but the morale of the army was undermined, which was greatly facilitated by the revolution that had begun in the country. The Japanese, who suffered huge losses, were also not active.

On May 14-15, 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet destroyed the Russian squadron, transferred to the Far East from the Baltic. This squadron was commanded by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. The Battle of Tsushima decided the outcome of the war. The autocracy, busy suppressing the revolutionary movement, could no longer continue the struggle. Japan was also extremely exhausted by the war. On July 27, 1905, in Portsmouth (USA), with the mediation of the Americans, peace negotiations began. The Russian delegation, headed by S.Yu. Witte, managed to achieve relatively "decent" terms of the peace treaty. Russia ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, its lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway, which connected Port Arthur with the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russo-Japanese War ended with the defeat of the autocracy. Having undermined the authority of the authorities within the country, it at the same time weakened Russia's position in the international arena.

Materials of the book were used: History of Russia from ancient times to the beginning of the 20th century. Under. ed. I.Ya. Froyanova.

Notes

"Guarding" (Russian-Japanese war, 1904-1905). Destroyer of the 1st Pacific Squadron. He distinguished himself in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). On February 26, 1904, he returned with the destroyer Reshitelny to Port Arthur from naval reconnaissance. On this day, both ships were discovered and attacked by Japanese destroyers. "Resolute" was able to break away from the persecution. "Guarding" had a slower course and was surrounded by 6 Japanese destroyers. For more than two hours, the crew of the Guardian, led by the seriously wounded Lieutenant A.S. Sergeev heroically repelled their attacks. From direct hits, the ship lost its course, but continued to fight back, causing heavy damage to 2 destroyers. When almost all the crew members were killed and the artillery was out of order, the Japanese tried to take the half-flooded ship in tow. Russian sailors I. Bukharev and V. Novikov, not wanting to surrender the "Guarding", opened the kingstones and sank the ship (see Port Arthur).

Tyurenchen (Russian-Japanese War, 1904-1905). Chinese locality near the border with Korea. On April 18, 1904, a battle took place in his area between the Russian Eastern Detachment and the 1st Japanese Army.

Bibliography

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4. Kilichenkov A. Togo's mistake and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's last chance. [On the tactics of the naval battle at Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -№ 3.-S. 80-84.

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8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Marine Gen. Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

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history, with Stalin. It's no secret that Westerners never loved us. But Khrushchev gave them such material, such arguments that discredited us for many years. "This is a fragment of the memoirs of D. Ustinov, in the 70s of the Minister of Defense USSR. The poet A. Tvardovsky wrote in his diary: "A terrible month after the report on the cult, the head could not contain everything .. No, everything is fine, you need to live and fulfill your duties ... The truth is needed because otherwise the world will cease to be controlled, at least to the extent that it is available to people. "Whose position do you share? Write a short essay (composition-reflection) on the topic" The truth in history: "the darkness of low truths is dearer to us than the uplifting deceit"

"Please help, I'll be grateful

1. History as a science. Subject, sources and methods historical science.
2. East Slavic tribes, their territorial distribution, economic activity and religion.
3. Education ancient Russian state. Kievan Rus in the IX - XI centuries.
4. The adoption of Christianity by Russia and its influence on the historical fate of Russia.
5. Feudal fragmentation Russia: causes and consequences.
6. Tatar-Mongol invasion. The influence of the Golden Horde on the development of medieval Russia.
7. German-Swedish aggression against Russia. Alexander Nevskiy.
8. Formation of a unified Russian state(late XIII - XV centuries). The role and significance of the Moscow principality in the unification of Russia.
9. Domestic and foreign policy of Ivan the Terrible.
10. Formation of a nationwide system of serfdom. Cathedral Code of 1649
eleven. " Time of Troubles" in Russia. False Dmitry I and False Dmitry II, foreign intervention and people's militias.
12. Socio-economic development of Russia in the XVII century. The reign of the first Romanovs.
13. Foreign policy of Russia in the XVII century. The struggle for the accession of Ukraine.
14. The development of Russia at the end of the XVII - the first half of the XVIII century. Peter I.
15. The period of palace coups (1725 - 1762).
16. Russia during the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna: inside political development and foreign policy.
17. "Enlightened absolutism" of Catherine II, her reforms.
18. Peasants' War under the leadership of E.I. Pugachev and its consequences.
19. Russia in the system of international relations in the first half of the XIX century. Patriotic War of 1812
20. Domestic politics Alexandra I. Attempts of liberal reform and Arakcheevshchina.
21. Decembrist movement: organization, program, actions, results.
22. Social thought in Russia in the 30-40s of the XIX century. Westernizers and Slavophiles.
23. Russia under Nicholas I. Crimean War.
24. The abolition of serfdom in Russia and others liberal reforms 60-70s of the XIX century.
25. The development of capitalism in Russia in the last third of the XIX century.
26. Aggravation of international relations XIX- XX century. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905
27. Socio-economic crisis in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. Revolution 1905-1907 P.A. Stolypin and the policy of modernization of the country.
28. Laying the foundations of parliamentarism 1905-1917. Political parties of Russia.
29. Russia in the First World War and the growing national crisis.
30. February Revolution in Russia: causes, course, results.
31. October Revolution in Russia. The establishment of the Soviet state.
32. Civil war in Russia. The essence of the policy of "war communism".
33. Transition to a new economic policy. The essence of the NEP.
34. Forcing the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of the USSR.
35. National policy of the Soviet state in the 20-30s of the XX century.
36. Approval of autocracy I.V. Stalin. Socio-economic and political development of the USSR in the 20-30s.
37. Causes of World War II. USSR on the eve and in the initial period of the Second World War.
38. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Moscow battle and its historical meaning.
39. A radical change in the Great Patriotic War. Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk.
40. The formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. Problems of opening the Second Front. Soviet rear in the war.
41. End and results of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. World historical significance of the victory of the Soviet people.
42. USSR in the first post-war years. Restoration of economic potential. Domestic political situation in 40-50 years. XX century.
43. Changes in the international situation after the Second World War. Reasons and essence cold war».
44. Economic and socio-political development of the USSR in the second half of the 50-60s. Reforms N.S. Khrushchev. Causes, contradictions, the meaning of the "thaw".
45. Soviet society in the 70-80s. The growth of crisis phenomena and the forms of their manifestation.
46. ​​Russia on the way of reforming society (II half of the 80s of the XX century). M.S. Gorbachev.
47. The collapse of the USSR and the formation of the CIS. The essence of economic and political transformations in post-Soviet society.
48. The essence and content of socio-economic processes in Russia at the present stage.