Shahe

Battle on the Shahe River (September 1904). Unsuccessful attempt of the offensive of the Russian troops against the Japanese. Undertaken by only part of the forces, it could not bring victory and contributed to the defeat of the Russian troops. After that, both sides switched to trench warfare for almost three months.

Shahe, a river in Northeast China (Manchuria), on which September 22 (October 5) - October 4 (17), 1904, the largest battle of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, took place. between Russian and Japanese troops. All R. sept. 1904 commander of the Russian. Manchurian army (over 200 thousand people, 758 op., 32 machine guns) gene. A. N. Kuropatkin, at the request of the king, decided to launch an offensive against the Japanese. forces (1st, 2nd and 4th armies, up to 170 thousand people in total, 648 ord., 18 machine guns), led by Marshal I. Oyama, in order to help the besieged Port Arthur and try to change the course of the war in favor of Russia. Application of Ch. the blow is assigned to the East. team: gen. G.K. Shtakelberg (1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian Corps) and a detachment of General. P. K. Rennenkampf. His task is to attack from the front and cover the right flank of the Japanese in the Benxihu region. Zap. detachment of Gen. A. A. Bilderling applied an auxiliary. blow along the on Liaoyang, Mukden. 22 Sept. (5 Oct.) Rus. troops began to advance. By the end of 23 Sept. (Oct. 6) on the right flank they reached Sh., and on the left they approached the advanced positions of the pr-ka and started stubborn battles for them. Japanese the command did not expect the Russian offensive. army, but, having guessed the intentions of the Russian. command, decided to wrest the initiative. 27 Sept. (Oct. 10) the Japanese launched a counteroffensive, inflicting Ch. strike by the 2nd and 4th armies on the troops of the West. detachment (6th Sib., 17th and 10th army corps). During the oncoming battles on 29 Sept. (Oct. 12) they pushed back the Zap. detachment for Sh. 30 Sept. (Oct. 13), unable to break the resistance of the 1st Japanese. army, began to withdraw Vost. detachment. Subsequent hostilities, which were mostly of a counter nature, took place with varying degrees of success. On October 5 (18), having suffered heavy losses (the Russians - over 40 thousand people, the Japanese, according to them, up to 20 thousand), both sides suspended their attacks and began to strengthen their positions. A 60-km positional front was established, which was a new phenomenon in the military. art. On the results of the battle on the river. Sh was affected by the fact that for applying Ch. the Russians allocated only 1/4 of their troops to strike, about the same number was concentrated on auxiliary. direction. Half remained in reserve. The unpreparedness of both sides to conduct oncoming battles and their inability to seize the initiative, carry out a bold maneuver and ensure the interaction of troops were revealed. The battle also demonstrated the increased importance of reconnaissance, night fighting and artillery and indirect fire. In terms of scope (front and depth of about 60 km, duration 14 days), it, in essence, was an operation. The battle did not have a significant impact on the course of the war.

Materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia

Literature:

History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. M., 1977, p. 283-294;

Sorokin A.P. Russian- japanese war 1904-1905 M., 1956, p. 198-216;

History of the Russian army and navy. T. 14. M., 1912, p. 122-145.

Cards:

Read further:

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905(chronological table).

Arabic Bulgarian Chinese Croatian Czech Danish Dutch English Estonian Finnish French German Greek Hebrew Hindi Hungarian Icelandic Indonesian Italian Japanese Korean Latvian Lithuanian Malagasy Norwegian Persian Polish Portuguese Romanian Russian Serbian Slovak Slovenian Spanish Swedish Thai Turkish Vietnamese

definition - BATTLE ON THE SHAH RIVER

Battle on the Shah River

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle on the Shah River(Shahe) - a major battle of the Russo-Japanese War.

The course of the battle

In mid-September 1904, the commander of the Russian Manchurian army (over 200 thousand people, 758 guns, 32 machine guns), General Kuropatkin, at the request of the king, decided to launch an offensive against the Japanese forces (1, 2 and 4 armies, up to 170 thousand people in total ., 648 guns, 18 machine guns), led by Marshal Iwao Oyama, in order to help the besieged Port Arthur and try to change the course of the war in favor of Russia. The delivery of the main blow was assigned to the Eastern Detachment: General G.K. Shtakelberg (1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian Corps) and the detachment of General Rennenkampf. His task is to attack from the front and cover the right flank of the Japanese in the Benxihu area. Western Detachment Gen. A. A. Bilderling struck an auxiliary blow along railway Liaoyang - Mukden.

September 22 (October 5) Russian troops launched an offensive. By the end of September 23 (October 6), on the right flank they reached Shakhe, and on the left they approached the advanced positions of the enemy and started stubborn battles for them. The Japanese command did not expect the offensive of the Russian army, but, having guessed the intentions of the Russian command, decided to seize the initiative. On September 27 (October 10), the Japanese launched a counteroffensive, inflicting the main blow with the 2nd and 4th armies on the troops of the Western. detachment (6th Sib., 17th and 10th army corps). During the oncoming battles on September 29 (October 12), they pushed back the Western Detachment behind the Shahe on September 30. (Oct. 13), unable to break the resistance of the 1st Japanese Army, the Eastern Detachment began to withdraw. Subsequent fighting, which were mostly of a counter nature, were held with varying degrees of success. On October 5 (18), having suffered heavy losses (Russians - 40 thousand people, Japanese - up to 20 thousand), both sides suspended their attacks and began to strengthen their positions. A 60-km positional front was established, which was a new phenomenon in the military. art.

The results of the battle on the Shah River were affected by the fact that for applying Ch. the Russians allocated only 1/4 of their troops to strike, about the same number was concentrated in the auxiliary direction. Half remained in reserve. The unpreparedness of both sides to conduct oncoming battles and their inability to seize the initiative, carry out a bold maneuver and ensure the interaction of troops were revealed. The battle also demonstrated the increased importance of reconnaissance, night fighting, and indirect artillery fire. In terms of scope (front and depth of about 60 km, duration 14 days), it, in essence, was an operation. The battle did not have a significant impact on the course of the war. [ source not specified 416 days]

Battle on the Shahe River. Due to those coming from European Russia reinforcements, increasing his army to 200 thousand people with 758 field guns and 32 machine guns, General Kuropatkin launched an offensive against the 170,000 troops with 648 field guns and 18 machine guns of the troops of Marshal Iwao Oyama, again concentrating the main force of the strike on the 1st Army of Field Marshal Tamesada Kurski , now located on the right flank of the Japanese. While General Kursky's troops dug in to hold off the Russian attack, Marshal Oyama furiously threw his full force into the weakened Russian center.

The Japanese blow was so strong that General Kuropatkin had to interrupt the offensive in order to strengthen his own center on October 13. Both sides soon resumed active operations on October 16-17, but did not achieve noticeable results.

Russian losses reached 40 thousand, Japanese - 20 thousand people in total killed and wounded. The exhausted armies took refuge in the trenches. The battle on the Shakh River is Kuropatkin's first and, in fact, his last attempt to seize the tactical initiative. The need for the operation was dictated by the situation near Port Arthur, which was already under fire from enemy siege artillery. It was clear that if the Manchu group really wanted to help the fortress, then it had to be done quickly.

Such offensives are usually carried out with no regard for loss or risk. Kuropatkin, however, allocated about 14 troops and less than half of the artillery for the main attack, significant forces were left in reserve and guarding the rear. The commander-in-chief showed the same caution during the operation, which sharply reduced its pace and gave Oyama time to organize a counter-manoeuvre.

Oyama showed not so much tactical skill as perseverance and fortitude. Having fallen under an unexpected flank attack, he not only did not retreat, but also refused to reinforce the attacked sector, because this meant submitting to the plans of the enemy. Instead, he went on the offensive himself, seeking to envelop the Russian right flank. By October 12, both offensives - Russian and Japanese - stopped, and the fighting took on a positional character. Tactically, the battle ended with an uncertain outcome, with both sides holding their positions.

The Russians suffered heavy losses, but these losses were quickly made up. Strategically, Oyama won the decisive operation, thwarting the last Russian attempt to unblock Port Arthur. January 26-27, 1905

End of work -

This topic belongs to:

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Knowledge of the past makes it possible to understand the process of the formation of the aggressive policy of international imperialism, and makes it possible to more effectively expose .. The End XIX beginning XX centuries were marked by the sharpest struggle of the great powers for .. The largest number various works were published in Russia.

If you need additional material on this topic, or you did not find what you were looking for, we recommend using the search in our database of works:

What will we do with the received material:

If this material turned out to be useful for you, you can save it to your page on social networks:

All topics in this section:

War on land
War on land. Defense of PORT ARTHUR. Taking advantage of the insufficient preparedness of the Russian army and navy for hostilities, the Japanese fleet on the night of January 27, 1904, without declaring war outside

Operations in central Manchuria
Operations in central Manchuria. June 1904 BATTLE NEAR VAFANGOU. The attack on Port Arthur, conducted from the Yingkou region by the forces of the 1st East Siberian Corps of the 32nd battalion with 98 field guns

Battle of Liaoyang
Battle of Liaoyang. Marshal Marquis Iwao Oyama, who was now at the head of all Japanese ground forces, prepared his 3 armies joined together for an attack on the well-fortified positions of Kuropatkin

Battle of the village of Sandepu
Battle of the village of Sandepu. Having received new reinforcements, General Kuropatkin increased the total number of his troops to 300 thousand people with 1 thousand 80 field guns and organized them into 3 armies -

Battle in the Yellow Sea
Battle in the Yellow Sea. By direct order of Emperor Nicholas II, Rear Admiral Witgeft attempted to break through to Vladivostok. He went to sea at the head of a squadron consisting of 6 battleships, 5 cruise

Naval battle near Ulsanman Bay
Naval battle near Ulsanman Bay. After the failure of the breakthrough of the 1st Pacific squadron from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, the only ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet capable of action

Portsmouth world. The results of the war
Portsmouth world. Results of the war. In the course of the armed struggle in the land and sea theaters, Japan achieved major successes. But this required a huge strain on her material and moral resources.

Conclusions of the war
Conclusions of the war. It can be seen that one of the main pillars of defense - the fleet died from disorganization, and the Main Naval Staff, led on the eve of the war and in its first months by Admiral Rozhd, is entirely to blame for this.

Attitude to the Russo-Japanese War
Attitude to Russo-Japanese War. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the big capitalist powers entered a new imperialist stage of development. Japan was no exception, and

Training.

After the humiliating and inexplicable defeat at Liaoyang, Petersburg demanded that General Kuropatkin take decisive action. Russian troops, having retreated to Mukden, received reinforcements in the composition of two corps, the total number in the fall of 1904 exceeded 200,000 people.

The Japanese also tried to make up for the losses and put the materiel in order, but for them it was a much more difficult task: there were not enough human resources, communications were stretched, and the army of General Noga was bogged down near Port Arthur and could not support the main forces. As a result, the Japanese troops took up positions near Liaoyang and did not attempt to move north.

The offensive plan of the Manchurian army was drawn up in the "best" traditions of General Kuropatkin: without serious reconnaissance and a clear understanding of the enemy's capabilities. Two main attacks were envisaged: on the left flank, three corps were to cover the eastern flank of the Japanese grouping, and on the right - to advance to the Shahe River and prevent the enemy from transferring reserves.

There was no talk of a rapid offensive: according to the plan of the Russian military leaders, the troops were to advance meter by meter, creating fortified lines. At the same time, most of Kuropatkin's huge forces participated indirectly in the offensive: the general, terrified of flank coverage, left them in position and in reserve.

Unlike the Russian troops, the Japanese had no problems with reconnaissance, so they knew about the preparation of the offensive almost earlier than the commanders of the Manchurian army. Since the Land of the Rising Sun, to put it mildly, did not have enough forces for any serious actions, Marshal Oyama made the most reasonable decision: in the event of an attack (they didn’t fully believe in it) to exhaust the enemy in defensive battles and, if the situation permits, go on the counteroffensive. The Japanese hastily fortified their positions, prepared a network of engineering barriers, restored the previously destroyed Russian forts near Liaoyang, and camouflaged and reinforced artillery positions.

The beginning of the battle. Russian offensive.

On October 5, 1904, something similar to an offensive began. Despite the fact that none of the advancing groups met serious resistance, the troops remained true to the order - to advance slowly, constantly creating fortified positions.

This "creeping" offensive lasted four days, during which the Japanese made up a complete picture of the events taking place and prepared for retaliatory actions. By October 10, Russian troops reached the Shahe River, occupied several settlements and started fighting for the advanced positions of the main Japanese forces on the flanks.

Japanese counteroffensive and oncoming battle.

On October 10, two Japanese armies launched a counterattack on the troops of the western flank of the Russian grouping and, in the course of stubborn battles, forced the forces of General Bilderling to withdraw beyond the Shahe River. Extremely heavy fighting unfolded in this area for two dominant heights - the hills, later called "Novgorodskaya" and "Putilovskaya". Captured by the Japanese during the counteroffensive, they were returned by a decisive night attack by the forces of the 22nd Infantry Division and the brigade of General Putilov. During the battles for two hills, the Japanese lost more than 1,500 people killed and surrendered several artillery batteries.

Despite local successes, the general situation was not very encouraging for the Russian troops: the offensive ran out of steam before it could begin, few were ready for a Japanese counterattack, and the oncoming battles that unfolded on the western flank did not reveal the advantage of either side.

On the eastern flank, the Russian units failed to break through the Japanese defenses and they began a gradual retreat. Losses in killed and wounded at the same time reached 40,000 people among the Russian troops and 20,000 people among the Japanese. Partridge did not dare to throw all his forces into the attack.

The end of the fighting and the transition to positional warfare.

By October 18, the battles had ceased: the Russian troops withdrew and stopped their offensive attempts, the Japanese also returned to their positions. The battle ended in nothing: neither side was able to achieve any significant success, at least on a tactical level. For the next few months, the opponents fortified on occupied lines, pulled up reserves and replenished supplies, without trying to enter into a decisive battle with each other. The Japanese were generally not capable of an offensive at that moment - they did not have enough strength, and the losses had long exceeded the allowable ones, as for General Kuropatkin, he never seriously thought about a decisive offensive.

Overall result of the battle.

The battle on the Shahe River did not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, but indirectly played a very significant role. General Kuropatkin did not believe in the possibility of victory before, and each new failure only strengthened his sense of hopelessness.

The Japanese, on the contrary, each time became convinced that they were able to thwart the plans of the enemy in almost any scenario. Once again, the complete inability of the higher commanders Russian Empire to carry out at least some successful military operations: even with a significant numerical superiority, the generals could not succeed.

The very idea of ​​a slow offensive was flawed in its essence and did not allow breaking through the enemy positions, which were reinforced in a timely manner. In addition, the Russian troops did not use their main advantage - the maneuverable and numerous cavalry, which remained passive during the entire battle. The battle on the Shahe River was the last opportunity to save the desperately fighting Port Arthur, and after it the Japanese felt more than confident under the walls of the fortress.

In mid-September 1904, the commander of the Russian Manchurian army (over 200 thousand people, 758 guns, 32 machine guns), General Kuropatkin, at the request of the tsar, decided to launch an offensive against the Japanese forces (1st, 2nd and 4th armies, up to 170 thousand people in total, 648 guns, 18 machine guns), led by Marshal Iwao Oyama, in order to help the besieged Port Arthur and try to turn the tide of the war in favor of Russia.

The delivery of the main blow was assigned to the Eastern Detachment: General G.K. Stackelberg (1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian Corps) and the detachment of General Rennenkampf. His task is to attack from the front and cover the right flank of the Japanese in the Benxihu area. Western Detachment Gen. A. A. Bilderling delivered an auxiliary strike along the Liaoyang-Mukden railway. The 1st Army and 4th Siberian Corps formed the reserve. The forces of the 5th Siberian Corps were used to cover the flanks. The 6th Siberian Corps was left in the Mukden area.

September 22 (October 5) Russian troops launched an offensive. By the end of September 23 (October 6), on the right flank they reached Shakhe, and on the left they approached the advanced positions of the enemy and started stubborn battles for them. The Japanese command did not expect the offensive of the Russian army, but, having guessed the intentions of the Russian command, decided to seize the initiative. On September 27 (October 10), the Japanese launched a counteroffensive, inflicting the main blow with the 2nd and 4th armies on the troops of the Western Detachment (17th, 10th Army Corps and the approaching 6th Siberian). During the oncoming battles on September 29 (October 12), they pushed the Western Detachment behind the Shahe. On September 30 (October 13), unable to break the resistance of the 1st Japanese Army, the Eastern Detachment began to withdraw. Subsequent hostilities, which were mostly of a counter nature, took place with varying degrees of success. On October 5 (18), having suffered heavy losses (Russians - 40 thousand people, Japanese - up to 20 thousand), both sides suspended their attacks and began to strengthen their positions. A 60-kilometer positional front was established, which was a new phenomenon in military art.

The results of the battle on the Shah River were affected by the fact that the Russians allocated only 1/4 of their troops to deliver the main blow, about the same amount was concentrated in the auxiliary direction. Half remained in reserve. The unpreparedness of both sides to conduct oncoming battles and their inability to seize the initiative, carry out a bold maneuver and ensure the interaction of troops were revealed. The battle also demonstrated the increased importance of reconnaissance, night fighting, and indirect artillery fire. In terms of scope (front and depth of about 60 km, duration 14 days), it, in essence, was an operation. The battle did not have a significant impact on the course of the war.

In this battle, a famous