October 24 is the day of units in Russia special purpose– units known as special forces. This is the word included in foreign languages, has become a symbol of extremely effective, secretive and very skillful military power. How did the creation of special forces begin and what are the most important tasks these units solve today?

For 12 years now, Special Forces Day has been an official holiday. Now the country is openly celebrating those who previously remained in the shadows. After all, even the name “special forces” itself was secret. Our “sworn friends” did not even know about the presence of these units in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Combating Nuclear Hazards

After the end of World War II, all reconnaissance and sabotage units were disbanded in the armies and navies of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But by the end of the 1940s, relations between the former allied countries had noticeably cooled. By demonstrating the nuclear bomb to the world in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Americans made it clear that the era of nuclear dictatorship was beginning - and the US would be the dictator. To realize these plans, the Americans developed programs for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. And if stationary launchers (PU) could be detected and a pre-emptive strike could be carried out on them, then mobile launchers posed a particular danger, since they could change the location of their launch positions. Something needed to be countered to this.

Therefore, by directive of the Minister of War USSR dated October 24, 1950, with combined arms and mechanized armies, in airborne army, as well as in military districts that did not have armies, 46 separate special-purpose companies were created. General management of the formation and training of companies was entrusted to the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff.

One of the main tasks of the new units was reconnaissance and destruction of operational-tactical nuclear attack weapons. In addition, the special forces were tasked with conducting special reconnaissance of enemy troop concentration areas, their headquarters, communications centers and control centers in the interests of the front headquarters. Also, the special forces were supposed to prepare a reserve for the formation of reconnaissance and sabotage formations and the deployment of partisan operations behind enemy lines in the event of an invasion of the territory of the USSR.

The commanders of the special forces companies were recent war participants - bearers of unique combat experience. The leadership of the special forces were legendary scouts and commanders of partisan units.

Marshal Zhukov's contribution

In 1953, a significant part of the special forces companies was reduced, leaving only 12.

The staffing structure of a separate company did not allow for the organization of full-fledged combat training, as well as the preparation of the necessary reserve due to the fact that the personnel were also tasked with performing internal and guard duty and performing economic work. In this regard, the head of operational intelligence, Major General N. V. Sherstnev, turned to the Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov with a proposal to form three battalions using the regular strength of the remaining companies. Understanding the importance of special reconnaissance, Georgy Konstantinovich decided to form not three, but five separate battalions, at the same time he decided to leave three separate companies. Realizing that war participants were gradually leaving the troops, and special forces required special training, Zhukov also decided to create a second airborne school in Tambov, where special forces officers were to be trained.

However, this ultimately cost him his position. The party leadership was frightened by the initiative of the strong-willed marshal, and he was accused of preparing units to organize a military coup in the country and seize power.

Fortunately, battalions were nevertheless formed in the Northern Group of Forces, Group Soviet troops in Germany, as well as in the Carpathian, Transcaucasian and Turkestan districts of the first strategic echelon. These organizational and staffing measures made it possible to improve the quality of combat training and strengthen the capabilities of special reconnaissance.

In connection with the aggravation of the international situation in the early 1960s, veterans of partisan actions addressed the CPSU Central Committee with a letter in which they proposed to form regular units, on the basis of which during the war years it would be possible to quickly form partisan units for operations behind enemy lines. As a result, the CPSU Central Committee issued Resolution No. 338 “On the training of personnel and the development of special equipment for organizing and equipping partisan detachments.” The Ministry of Defense, in pursuance of this resolution, conducted exercises during which in each district brigades of 1,700 people were formed from reserve military personnel, who for a month mastered the secrets of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines under the guidance of experienced saboteurs who had gone through the war. The results of the exercises were considered positive, and on July 19, 1962, General Staff Directive No. 140547 was issued, which ordered the commanders of the relevant districts to form separate special-purpose brigades (obrSpN). In addition, in accordance with the directive of the General Staff, by October 1, 1961, eight more separate special-purpose companies were formed.

Unique technique

In the early 1960s, special intelligence began to be formalized as a type of operational intelligence. The reconnaissance and sabotage departments and the agent and sabotage direction of the 5th Directorate of the GRU, which managed special forces formations and military units, received the name departments and special intelligence directions. With the adoption in 1968 of the Manual on Operational Intelligence, special intelligence was officially separated into an independent type of intelligence, including command and control bodies and forces and means: brigades, reconnaissance points, special-purpose companies. Thus, in 1968, the organizational formation of special forces as an integral part of military intelligence was completed.

From the moment of their formation, all special forces units received special equipment and equipment at the expense of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR. That is, the special forces were armed with small-sized short-wave radio stations, which made it possible to communicate with a group operating behind enemy lines with a center at a distance of several thousand kilometers, VHF radio stations for communication within the group, which ensured stable control of the group’s organs at a range of up to 10 kilometers with a whip antenna Kulikov, and with a traveling wave antenna - at a range of up to 25 kilometers, silent weapons and small-sized mine-explosive weapons with increased power, which no other branch of the military had Soviet army. For communication, SSN were used - special purpose ciphers. All this was classified as “top secret”. To deliver groups behind enemy lines and quickly assemble at the landing site, special-purpose controlled parachutes (PSN-66, PSN-71) were used.

Special rations “Etalon No. 5” were supplied to supply special-purpose units. They were small in size and weight with a high calorie content. This made it possible to reduce the total weight of the cargo that each scout carried. But, nevertheless, on average, the weight of a reconnaissance combat equipment was about 30–35 kilograms.

The emergence of new and unique equipment and weapons in special forces required special knowledge from special forces commanders. The tactics of the special intelligence agencies were also very different from the combined arms. All this required the creation educational institution, which would train commanders of special forces groups.

In 1968, in the Ryazan airborne command school them. The Lenin Komsomol began the formation of the 9th company of cadets, who studied under a separate program. This has seriously improved the quality of training of special forces units. The Main Intelligence Directorate oversaw the training process for cadets, and the final exams were taken by a commission that came from the GRU.

Legendary operation in Afghanistan

As for the combat use of special forces units, it was very limited. Thus, during the Czechoslovak events in 1968, three special forces groups operated from eight special forces units, which carried out the arrest of the rebel government of Dubcek, and also solved other special tasks.

Afghanistan became a serious baptism of fire for special forces, where the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan under the leadership of Nur Mohammad Taraki carried out the April revolution and seized power in the country. Initially, the course of the new Afghan government was pro-Soviet. At the same time, internal party disagreements and the struggle for power led to Taraki being killed, and power was seized by his closest associate Hafizula Amin. He hid the fact of Taraki's elimination from the Soviet leadership and constantly appealed to the Soviet government with a request to send troops to support the power of his regime. As a last resort, he asked to send a battalion of paratroopers to strengthen personal security.

In this regard, the head of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army Ivashutin P.I. On May 2, 1979, assigned the senior officer of the special intelligence department, Colonel V.V. Kolesnik, the task of forming the 154th separate special forces detachment, staffed by officers and personnel of three Central Asian nationalities: Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. That is why the battalion received the unofficial name “Muslim battalion”, or “musbat” for short. The difference between the battalion and all special forces units was that it was armed with military equipment: BMP-1, BMD-1, etc. The staff was more reminiscent of a motorized rifle battalion. Therefore, it was staffed by recruiting military personnel from tank and motorized rifle units of the TurkVO and SAVO. But not only the composition of the unit, its equipment and weapons were unique, the combat training program was also unique. The battalion mainly practiced assault operations.

In mid-December, the battalion was airlifted to Bagram and subsequently arrived under its own power in Kabul, where it was placed at the disposal of Major Javdat, commander of the security brigade of the Taj Beg Palace, Amin’s residence. The palace itself was guarded by a company of personal guards, staffed by Amin's relatives. Around the palace there were units of a brigade numbering about 3,000 people. "Musbat" took security positions between the brigade units and the security company, the so-called. second security ring. Together with the detachment, V.V. Kolesnik arrived, as well as Yu.I. Drozdov and the KGB special forces groups “Grom” and “Zenith”. At a certain time, Colonel Kolesnik was given the task of developing an assault on the palace and the elimination of Amin. A detailed plan was developed and approved by the NGS Marshal Ogarkov. On December 27, 1979, the battalion brilliantly fulfilled V.V. Kolesnik’s plan. The operation took less than 50 minutes. Five people each died from the detachment and from the KGB special forces during the assault. The security brigade was neutralized, and the security company, having suffered heavy losses, surrendered after the death of Amin. This operation is the standard and subject of study by special forces around the world.

Having successfully completed the task, the Musbat returned to the Union and became part of the 15th Brigade. Thus began the Afghan special forces epic. At the initial stage, the 459th special forces unit, the so-called, operated in Afghanistan. Kabul company. Its actions were considered effective, after which two detachments were first introduced into Afghanistan, in 1984 – two more, and in 1985 – three detachments and the headquarters of the 15th and 22nd Special Forces. The eighth detachment was already formed in Afghanistan.

Special forces blocked caravan routes and intercepted deliveries of weapons, ammunition and other logistics items that came from the territory of Pakistan and Iran. The special forces destroyed Mujahideen caravans from ambushes, destroyed bases and base areas. Conducting air patrols during the day, special forces groups stopped the movement of units and Vehicle Mujahideen. It was the GRU special forces that captured the first sample of the newest Stinger MANPADS, which the Americans supplied to the Mujahideen.

And today in Syria

The coming to power of M. S. Gorbachev reduced the intensity of hostilities, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of troops in February 1989. But processes began in the Union that led to the collapse of the USSR. Gorbachev's actions plunged the country into a series of interethnic conflicts - from Central Asia and Transcaucasia in 1989 to Chechnya and the North Caucasus as a whole to the present time. During the period 1999–2001. Special forces units operated in Yugoslavia.

The role of special forces in all of these conflicts was not limited to banal participation. Everywhere special forces units solved the most complex and important tasks. For example, it was the special forces in Tajikistan that stood at the origins of the formation Popular Front Tajikistan and organized its opposition to Islamist gangs. Thanks to the actions of special forces, it was stopped Civil War in Tajikistan, and the candidacy of the country's president, Emomali Rahmon, was coordinated with special forces officers. In the North Caucasus, special forces captured and eliminated the most odious field commanders: Salman Raduev, Shirvani Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev and many others. It was special forces, operating in small groups in the mountains of Chechnya and Dagestan, that found and destroyed disguised field bases of bandits.

2014 demanded special skill from the special forces. It was the forces of “polite people” from the GRU special forces (and without the use of weapons) that ensured the free expression of the will of the people of Crimea and the entry of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.

Currently, special forces units are successfully carrying out tasks to combat international terrorism in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. And here special forces solve the most complex and risky tasks. Successful strikes by the Aerospace Forces against terrorist targets would have been impossible if special forces had not identified these targets and directed aircraft at these targets.

Celebrates the day of special forces units - units known as spetsnaz. This word, which entered foreign languages, became a symbol of extremely effective, secretive and very skillful military power. How did the creation of special forces begin and what are the most important tasks these units solve today?

For 12 years now, Special Forces Day has been an official holiday. Now the country is openly celebrating those who previously remained in the shadows. After all, even the name “special forces” itself was secret. Our “sworn friends” did not even know about the presence of these units in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Combating Nuclear Hazards

After the end of World War II, all reconnaissance and sabotage units were disbanded in the armies and navies of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But by the end of the 1940s, relations between the former allied countries had noticeably cooled. By demonstrating the nuclear bomb to the whole world in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Americans made it clear that the era of nuclear dictatorship was beginning - and the United States would be the dictator. To implement these plans, the Americans developed programs for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. And if stationary launchers (PU) could be detected and a pre-emptive strike could be carried out on them, then mobile launchers posed a particular danger, since they could change the location of their launch positions. Something needed to be countered to this.

Therefore, by the directive of the Minister of War of the USSR of October 24, 1950, 46 separate special-purpose companies were created in the combined arms and mechanized armies, in the airborne army, as well as in military districts that did not have armies. General management of the formation and training of companies was entrusted to the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff.

One of the main tasks of the new units was reconnaissance and destruction of operational-tactical nuclear attack weapons. In addition, the special forces were tasked with conducting special reconnaissance of enemy troop concentration areas, their headquarters, communications centers and control centers in the interests of the front headquarters. Also, the special forces were supposed to prepare a reserve for the formation of reconnaissance and sabotage formations and the deployment of partisan operations behind enemy lines in the event of an invasion of the territory of the USSR.

The commanders of the special forces companies were recent participants in the war - bearers of unique combat experience. The leadership of the special forces included legendary intelligence officers and commanders of partisan units.

Marshal Zhukov's contribution

In 1953, a significant part of the special forces companies was reduced and only twelve remained.

The staffing structure of a separate company did not allow for the organization of full-fledged combat training, as well as the preparation of the necessary reserve, due to the fact that the personnel were also tasked with performing internal and guard duty and performing economic work. In this regard, the head of operational intelligence, Major General N. V. Sherstnev, turned to the Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov with a proposal to form three battalions using the regular strength of the remaining companies. Understanding the importance of special reconnaissance, Georgy Konstantinovich decided to form not three, but five separate battalions, at the same time, he decided to leave three separate companies. Realizing that war participants were gradually leaving the troops, and special forces required special training, Zhukov also decided to create a second airborne school in Tambov, where special forces officers were to be trained.

However, this ultimately cost him his position. The party leadership was frightened by the initiative of the strong-willed marshal and he was accused of preparing units to organize a military coup in the country and seize power.

Fortunately, battalions were nevertheless formed in the Northern Group of Forces, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, as well as in the Carpathian, Transcaucasian and Turkestan districts of the first strategic echelon. These organizational and staffing measures made it possible to improve the quality of combat training and strengthen the capabilities of special reconnaissance.

The Ministry of Defense spent more than 50 million rubles. for the modernization of the Molkino training ground, where, presumably, soldiers of private military companies participating in combat operations in Syria and Ukraine train. In total, the military department has allocated more than 1 billion rubles over the past three years for the improvement of military units located in close proximity to the training site.

The Molkino training ground was included in news reports after the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. As previously reported, in addition to military personnel Russian army On the side of the government forces of Bashar al-Assad, fighters of the non-existent de jure private military company (PMC) Wagner are fighting and suffering losses with the terrorist group IS (an organization banned in Russia).

It is in Molkino that Wagner’s fighters undergo special training.

As Gazeta.Ru has already written, 46-year-old reserve lieutenant colonel Dmitry Utkin, who until 2013 commanded the 700th separate special forces detachment of the 2nd separate special forces brigade Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. After being transferred to the reserve, he worked for the Russian PMC Moran Security Group, which is engaged in the protection of trade sea ​​vessels in the waters of Somalia and Nigeria. In 2014, presumably, Utkin created his own division, which received the code name “ PMC Wagner" The fighters of this unofficial unit, according to sources, fought in Donetsk, and in Lately took part in hostilities in Syria, in particular near Palmyra.

According to the Fontanka publication, the training base for fighters for the Wagner PMC is located in the Krasnodar Territory near the village of Molkino. At first, Wagner’s fighters trained before being thrown across the border in Rostov region, then their base was moved to Molkino near Krasnodar, Gazeta.Ru’s interlocutors in the military sphere confirm.

The Molkino farm is located 40 km from Krasnodar, in the Goryacheklyuchevsky district. According to open sources, three military units are stationed in Molkino: the 1st Guards Missile Brigade (military unit 31853), the 10th separate special forces brigade of the GRU of the Ministry of Defense (military unit 51532), as well as the 243rd combined arms training ground (military unit 51532). h 55485).

Meanwhile, as Gazeta.Ru found out, at the beginning of 2015, before the start of the Syrian campaign and the appearance of Wagner PMC fighters in Molkino, the training ground was seriously modernized, and new equipment worth more than 50 million rubles was supplied to the training site.

Information on the purchase of testing equipment for Molkino was posted on the website of the “unified electronic trading platform” in April 2015. Then the military department allocated 293.9 million rubles. for the supply of technical equipment for five training grounds, including Molkino (an average of 56 million rubles was allocated for each training ground - Gazeta.Ru). The tender itself was declared invalid, and the supply contract was concluded with JSC Garrison, owned by the Ministry of Defense. The company had until the fall of 2015 to re-equip the training site, and from the tender documentation it becomes clear what the soldiers were taught in Molkino.

Thus, according to the tender documentation, 53 UMU-S-127 unified target installations were to be delivered to Molkino, designed to display light and medium targets when training to shoot at emerging targets.

The documentation also speaks of the delivery of 40 sets of the UMU-T1-127 target installation, designed for lifting heavy, medium and light (by weight) targets at shooting ranges, directorates and firing camps when training troops to shoot at emerging targets: tanks, armored personnel carriers, cars, anti-tank guns.

“With the help of this equipment, fighters are taught to shoot at night using night vision devices,” says an interlocutor at the military department.

In addition, such targets can be fired not only from small arms, but also from heavier weapons.”

In addition to the target equipment, five RTK-1 company tactical sets were delivered to the training ground, with the help of which you can control targets during tactical live-fire exercises, using light simulation of shooting and detonation of pyrotechnic means, in day and night conditions. And also two sets of PSO-R - radio-controlled portable shooting range equipment designed for the rapid creation and control of a target situation along the front up to 500 m and in depth up to 1500 m at any time of the year, day and weather conditions.

“With the help of this equipment, fighters are taught not just to shoot, but to interact with each other during an attack or defense,” says the expert.

Meanwhile, according to the State Procurement website, the army command was concerned not only with the technical equipment of the training ground, but also with raising the morale of students.

Thus, in the fall of 2014, the Federal Institution “United Strategic Command of the Southern Military District” held an auction for the provision of services for artistic and design work and the creation of exhibitions on the territory training centers Ashuluk, Molkino and Prudboy. The winning company for 2 million rubles. had to produce and install at the training grounds 12 posters with the inscriptions: “Defending the Fatherland is a sacred duty”, “Hard in training - easy in march”, “Every shot is on target”, “Armor power”, “There is such a profession - to defend the homeland " As follows from the terms of reference, under the inscriptions there should have been images “illustrating the life activities, combat training of the formation, military unit, fragments of exercises and everyday life.”

Also, in addition to funds for the development of the training ground, the Ministry of Defense previously allocated money for the construction of facilities in military units, stationed in Molkino. Thus, in 2013, the department allocated 1.2 billion rubles. to “perform a full range of work on the project: Development of the park area and technical territory of military unit 31853, Goryacheklyuchevsky garrison of the Southern Military District.”

The contract involved the construction of hangars for military equipment, weapons warehouses and access roads to facilities.

Meanwhile, training fighters also costs money. Boris Chikin, a weapons specialist at Noran Security Group, claims that training costs are kept to a minimum because PMCs recruit people who know how to handle weapons.

“Such structures hire people who are trained,” explains Chikin. - A priori, they know how to perform certain tasks. If you were a machine gunner or a sniper in the army, then you will be a machine gunner or a sniper here too. Skills are tested, adjusted if necessary, and then combat coordination of the new unit is carried out for a specific task.

According to the specialist, the head of the department will never hire an incomprehensible person. “Everything comes from a specific task. For example, if they are recruiting a group to escort a convoy, we look at what weapons the customer can provide us with. Well, we are recruiting people for this business,” explains Chikin. - Preference is always given to paratroopers, former special forces and marines. Nobody wants to spend extra money.”

Gazeta.Ru sent an official request to the Ministry of Defense with a request to comment on the information that soldiers of a private military company could be trained at the Molkino training ground to participate in a special operation in Syria. And also explain on what basis and at whose expense they can undergo training. However, the military department was unable to comment promptly.

What did the 10th Brigade do on Georgian territory?
Since the brigade’s units were on Georgian territory for a long time (several years), they apparently managed to do a lot.Of course, you can’t tell us everything, but if you carefully read the materials major milestones are still drawn.

1. "The third force."
In 2008-09 The author of these lines spent a lot of time in the Tbilisi district of Krtsanisi, in a small mansion, which then housed the headquarters of OSCE observer officers in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Among different topics, which we managed to discuss before the mission was closed under unprecedented pressure from Russia, the main thing, of course, was the situation in the zone that preceded August 7. For quite a long time, the mission officers were not very willing to have a serious conversation. As they later admitted, they did not want to be frank with the Russian.

But at some point they finally started talking. The main observation they made in July 2008, which they eventually shared with me, was that a “third force” had emerged in the region.
- What is this “third force”? - I was amazed.
“Here’s the thing,” they explained to me. - Skirmishes between the parties to the conflict - South Ossetians and Georgians - were, if not regular, quite common. After each such shelling, OSCE officers went to the scene of the incident, examined it, identified the perpetrators, drew up a protocol, and sent copies of it to the parties to the conflict, to the JCC, Kulakhmetova, and to their headquarters in Vienna. Everything was quite clear - yesterday it was the Ossetians who fired, today it was the Georgians. Or vice versa. After the shelling, the identification of the perpetrators and the corresponding representations, the situation stabilized for some time. Until the next outbreak.

However, in the summer of 2008 the situation changed radically. Firstly, the shelling became much more daring and more professional. Secondly, professionally prepared car bombings began to occur on the roads. Thirdly, it became unclear who was carrying out the explosions and shelling. One day the Georgians will be fired upon, the Georgians will immediately protest: “Again these Ossetians have committed a violation!” OSCE officers go to the scene, examine the evidence and circumstances, try to identify the culprits and are forced to come to the conclusion that the Ossetians could not have fired at the Georgians at such and such a time in such and such a place.

The next day there will be shelling of the South Ossetians, they have no limit to their indignation: “Again these Georgians are not giving life!” OSCE observers go to the site, examine it, try to determine the culprit and are forced to come to the conclusion that the Georgians could not have fired at the Ossetians at that time and in that place. After this kind of shelling was repeated several times, the OSCE observer mission came to the conclusion that a new “third” force had appeared in the region, not Georgians or Ossetians.

And who? - I asked almost automatically, at the same time catching myself thinking that I didn’t expect at all that I would be forced to listen now from the lips of foreign military men to some more tales about black forces, evil spirits, elusive Joes and other nonsense that is usually told on dark evenings by seasoned citizens somewhat tipsy.

The OSCE officers were silent for a long time, apparently wondering whether to speak to me or not. Then, finally, they decided. And, looking at me gloomily, they said:
- Russians.
- Russians? - Out of amazement, I could only repeat the same word with a questioning intonation. - What kind of Russians?
The OSCE officers were silent for a little longer. And then they said even more gloomily:
- Saboteurs. Professional saboteurs.
- Are you sure? - That’s all I could ask.
They looked at me with longing, filled with undisguised pity for my civilized naivety, and just shook their heads.

2. "S" soldiers and officers of the GRU OBRSpN are required to be able to conduct subversive activities."
Among the educational courses for special forces of the 10th brigade, preparation for sabotage and subversive acts occupies a special place:
The compulsory training program for military personnel of the 10th Special Forces Brigade includes demining. On the territory of military unit 51532 in Molkino there is a training ground where special forces of the 10th ObrSpN hone their mining skills, of course, having previously mastered the theory in classroom... There are many myths and legends about the training of military intelligence special forces soldiers - of course, much is fiction, but the fact remains: in accordance with the regulations, soldiers and officers of the GRU OBRSpN are required to be able to conduct sabotage and subversive activities (for example, single-handedly running trains under slope or mine large industrial facilities.)

In some new light I remembered the story of the mother of R. Abdullin, who posthumously became a Hero of Russia:
« I called him on the evening of August 6, and the tank was roaring on the phone. “Where did you go?” - I ask. “Mom, call me back later, okay?” And the phone turned off.
Gulfruz Sergeevna sat and looked at the wall past me and Anna Viktorovna.
- And before that, I called on the second of August. He asks: “What day is it today?” I say: “The second of August.” - “No, what day is it today?” “Saturday,” I say. “Today is Airborne Forces Day, we have a holiday, they gave me an award.” He didn’t say what reward ».
http://www.kp.ru/daily/24145/362608/

What a rewardawarded the special forces paratrooper of the Airborne Forces R. Abdullin to his superiors August 2, 2008 , unknown. But the date of his award suggests what exactly he could have received his award for. The day before, on the morning of August 1, a car with Georgian policemen was blown up on the Eredvi-Kurta road, six were injured, five of them seriously:

6 special forces officers were injured today on the bypass road connecting the Small and Big Liakhvi gorges in the Tskhinvali conflict zone as a result of an explosion. At approximately 09:40 in the morning, a Pickup vehicle, in which there were representatives of the Georgian special services, was blown up by a mine. 5 of them were seriously injured...
According to Emzar Beruashvili, chairman of the meeting of the village of Maly Liakhvi, the explosion occurred approximately in the place where a month ago a terrorist attack was carried out on the head of the provisional administration of South Ossetia, Dmitry Sanakoev. Presumably, an explosive device was used remote control, since the mines were installed at a distance of 10-15 meters from each other. The first explosion was soon followed by a second, control explosion.
The territory where the incident occurred borders the controlled Ossetian separatist slopes, where illegal armed groups constantly take refuge.
http://www.apsny.ge/news/1217608406.php

The bombing of a Georgian police car early in the morning of August 1 launched a long-developed operation. Believing that the terrorist attack was carried out by Ossetians, the Georgians in the evening of the same day carried out a retaliation operation following the Israeli model (as in previous years), firing at the positions of the separatists, during which 6 employees of the South Ossetian security forces were killed. But instead of the usual calm in such cases, the escalation of violence only intensified. The separatists responded with massive fire, so that on the night of August 1-2, real fighting broke out in the conflict zone, with the death toll on both sides going into the dozens. Thus, by the morning of August 2, it became absolutely clear that the provocative terrorist attack on the road between Eredvi and Kurta not only led to the expected consequences, but also turned out to be extremely successful. About 50 journalists from Moscow were brought to Tskhinvali on August 1, ready to cover the pre-declared war. Now on August 2, the day of the Airborne Forces, special forces paratrooper R. Abdullin could safely be presented with the award he deserved.

3. “The main advantages of the mortar as a special forces weapon.”
Does the reader remember what happened in the early morning of August 8 in the Upper Town, what did the doctors assigned to the peacekeepers talk about? They reported in particular, that first there was a mortar attack on the Upper Town.

DZ: There was mortar shelling along the fence, and then small arms fire started. At the same time they started shooting...
AK: At first they fired at us from small arms, but it was more of a scare, most likely. It started somewhere around 5.50...
Thus, at approximately 5.50 a.m., “along the fence” surrounding the location of the peacekeeping battalion in the Upper Town, mortar shelling began, and then small arms fire. It was already noted above that during the shelling of Tskhinvali on the night of August 7–8, Georgian units did not use mortars, and in the area of ​​the Upper Town on August 8 there were no Georgian infantry at all...
If on August 8 there were no Georgian infantry in the Upper Town area, if Georgian units did not open mortar fire on Tskhinvali on the morning of August 8, then who exactly started firing at 5.50 am on August 8:
- from mortars and small arms,
- and at first they “most likely scared”
- “along the fence” of the Upper Town and according to the location of the peacekeeping battalion in the Upper Town?
http://aillarionov.livejournal.com/563585.html

As you know, special forces units are armed with mortars. Moreover, according to experts, mortars have serious advantages for special forces.

The same applies to firearms - the 10th separate special-purpose brigade has the latest models of foreign automatic weapons, sniper rifles, mortars, etc. .
http://voenpro.ru/voentorg/brelok-10obrspn

In the early 2000s, the 82-mm mortar 2 B14 (2 B14-1) “Tray” was adopted into service with individual detachments and special-purpose brigades. The main advantages of the 82-mm mortar as a special forces weapon are the high accuracy of fire and the power of the ammunition, the possibility of concealed fire, the high rate of fire (10-25 rounds/min.) and the mobility of this artillery weapon system.
For firing from all domestic 82-mm mortars, six-feather (old models) and ten-feather fragmentation mines, as well as smoke and illumination mines, are used. To increase the firing range, additional powder charges are attached to the mine (charge No. 1, 2, 3 and “long-range”). The mortar ammunition is carried by the crew in special trays of 4 mines or in pack bags.

Silent mortar complex 2 B25
Currently, domestic designers are developing an 82-mm silent mortar system BShMK 2 B25 and an 82-mm mortar with an increased firing range of up to 6000 m.
Designed for special forces to ensure secrecy and surprise in combat use due to noiselessness, flamelessness and smokelessness when defeating enemy personnel wearing personal armor protection. Mortar weight no more than 13 kg, crew of 2 people. The fragmentation efficiency of the mine is at the level of a standard 82-mm mine.
http://army-news.ru/2011/02/arsenal-specnaza/

The main advantages of the 82-mm mortar as a special forces weapon are not only its high shooting accuracy, but also the possibility of covert firing, as well as the high mobility of this artillery weapon system.
http://www.fastmarksman.ru/1_pyt/2_specnaz_8.ph p

Of course, the fact of the presence of a particular weapon does not in itself confirm its use. But then the testimony of other Russian soldiers who happened to be in the same places a few days later comes to the rescue.

Senior Lieutenant Artur Kurbanov recalls:
On August 11, our mortar battery took a position south of Tskhinvali. Having set up a position, I and a group of officers went on a reconnaissance mission. It was decided to examine the nearby hills and mark landmarks. Not far from the dirt road we found the destroyed position of our mortar battery. It was clear that the mortar peacekeepers were fired upon, the firing points of our “samovars” were suppressed by superior fire. The abomination of desolation reigned all around, but there were no corpses of our peacekeepers.
We found a completely intact compass - a device for adjusting art fire PAB - 2. The device was completely intact and is always necessary in the household. We grabbed some compass for ourselves.
http://maxpark.com/user/1954118055/content/1809568

A. Kurbanov does not doubt for a second the identity of the mortar battery - it, in his opinion, belonged to Russian “peacekeepers”. But “peacekeepers” in the language of military slang in South Ossetia meant military personnel of only two units - the second battalion of the 135th motorized rifle regiment and the 107th detachment of the 10th special forces brigade. At the same time, there is not a single evidence that Timerman’s mortars left the territory of the Upper Town and even opened fire. In addition, it would obviously be difficult for Timerman to order them, and for them to carry out the order to open fire - By own positions in the Upper Town, even “along its fence.”

However, the special forces, among whom the deputy group commander did not know the face of the commander of his neighbors from the 135th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Timerman, apparently found it much easier to do this.

4. “The best in the Union in terms of sniper training.”
At the brigade museum, the company sergeant major of the 107th special forces detachment, Hero of Russia Mikhail Oganesyan spoke about the events of 2008. “On the evening of the seventh, the Georgians began shelling our positions from Grad launchers and tanks. We tried to contact the Georgian formations, but they released the equipment without explanation,” he said. “At 2 o’clock in the morning, Dmitry Medvedev called via space communication and asked to clarify whether it was real whether the battle is going on. Then he called again at 5 a.m., and Vladimir Putin called at 7 a.m. Then it became clear that this was a real attack, and the order came from the president to respond."
http://kommersant.ru/doc/1693648

The “company sergeant major” acting as a guide for the presidential journalist pool is, of course, still those special forces-disinformation jokes. The same as the senior “title of Hero”. Here, as they say, one of them is sure to misinform: either the foreman and the “Hero of Russia”, or websites telling about the 10th Brigade, according to which there is only one Hero in it - R. Abdullin.

But the most remarkable thing, of course, is the following Freudian confession of the “sergeant major”:
«... and at 7 am Vladimir Putin called. Then it became clear that this was a real attack, and the order came from the president to respond.”

“Company Sergeant Major” and “Hero of Russia” Oganesyan seemed to be telling the truth this time. It was completely impossible to understand what exactly was the “real attack” on the Upper Town, when exactly it happened, and who exactly attacked whom, being in Tskhinvali at that time, as everyone understands. This could only be done while being thousands of kilometers away, at the Olympics in Beijing. In the process, the “sergeant major” “laid down” Vladimir Vladimirovich, revealing the main military secret of the Russian-Georgian war - from whom exactly did the order come to the snipers of the 107th detachment at 7 o’clock in the morning on August 8 to “respond”, i.e. shoot at senior lieutenants of the peacekeeping battalion Shevelev and Bobrov.

In 1987, the 10th Special Forces Brigade was recognized as the best in the Union in terms of sniper training, and in 1990, the team of the 10th Special Forces Brigade won the all-Union GRU Special Forces competition. Today's 10th ObrSpN in Molkino is also famous for its snipers. Of course, selection for sniper groups of the 10th ObrSpN is quite serious - everyone here is an experienced hunter or sports shooter. But the ability to shoot is not enough for a Special Forces sniper - the training of recruits involves learning the art of camouflage in the highest level. In addition, a military intelligence special forces sniper requires extreme endurance - sometimes it is necessary to spend a day or more in an almost motionless state. Firstly, for an unprepared person this is extremely stressful, psychological stress at the limit of possibilities, and secondly, it’s simply physically difficult. But the second problem is easier to solve - in the arsenal of GRU OBRSpN snipers there are many specialized exercises that help activate blood flow in the body. The snipers of the 10th GRU special forces brigade are armed with not only standard SVDs, but also the best foreign models - SSG-04, Truvelo.50BMG, etc.
http://voenpro.ru/infolenta/flag-10-brigady

Training snipers to shoot with the Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD) in the 10th Special Forces Brigade, Molkino

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2Ty2In0CB0&feature=player_embedded#t=1

Snipers use different rifles, including Truvelo .50BMG, Mannlicher SSG-04 .
http://twower.livejournal.com/870155.html

« They fulfilled their duty with honor» .
Despite the fact that by the morning of August 8, the commander of the “peacekeeping battalion” K. Timerman had already repeatedly received from the commander of the “peacekeeping forces” General M. Kulakhmetov a completely unambiguous order “Shoot to kill!”, despite the fact that the positions of the “peacekeepers” in The upper town had already been subjected to small arms and mortar fire from the “third force,” Timerman still hesitated in opening fire from his infantry fighting vehicles. Firstly, he understood perfectly well that his opening of cannon fire meant a flagrant violation of his peacekeeping mandate. Secondly, in the face of many times superior Georgian forces, this practically guaranteed suicide, if not for himself personally, then undoubtedly for many of his subordinates. Thirdly, Timerman still had neither a reason nor even a reason to open fire on the Georgians - despite the small arms shelling of Zemo-Nikozi launched from the Upper Town, the Georgians, who received an order from their command in no case to respond to the Russian peacekeeping contingent, strictly followed it and continued to remain silent, despite increasing provocations.

Timerman hesitated.

When, together with reconnaissance platoon commander Sergei Shevelev, he was returning from positions south of the Upper Town and was already approaching the command post set up by Timerman in the medical unit, a sniper bullet fired “under the cover of small arms fire from all sides” from above (from the roof of the barracks?), pierced Shevelev’s neck and came out in his back at the seventh vertebra. It was a classic black mark. Timerman didn't need to explain its meaning. He had little choice - either a possible shell from a Georgian tank, or a guaranteed bullet Russian sniper. Timerman chose the former.

That’s when the “Thunder” cannons, mounted on “peacekeeping” infantry fighting vehicles, moved to open positions south of the Upper Town, started working on Zemo-Nikozi. It was then that they could not help but respond to cannon fire and Georgian tanks, in five minutes, as if at a firing range, they burned the infantry fighting vehicles that violated the Dagomys agreements along with their crews. It was then that the corpses of Russian peacekeepers so demanded by Kulakhmetov and his superiors - military and political - were received. Now they could be presented to the Russian and world public, the whole planet could be shouted about the treachery of the Georgian military and the massive invasion of Georgia by Russian troops that had long been carried out for a long time could be justified by the need to “protect the lives of Russian peacekeepers.”

And three years later, Medvedev could calmly come to the base of the 10th brigade in Molkino to award it with a high state award for merits “in the development and conduct of major military operations”, i.e. for “the ability to make correct, adequate decisions in very difficult situation, selflessly carry out command assignments in the shortest possible time.”

Dmitry Medvedev’s awarding of the 10th separate special forces brigade of the GRU of the General Staff of the Moscow Region with the Order of Zhukov “for participation in the operation to force Georgia to peace in 2008” is, frankly speaking, an extraordinary event.

Judge for yourself.

Scout Sniper Alexey Batuev ended up in South Ossetia at the beginning of May 2008.:
About the same thing is said about the evacuation from the South Ossetian capital reconnaissance sniper Alexey Batuev from the Krasnodar special forces unit , seconded to the peacekeeping contingent three months ago:

Official short historical reference units seen by participants in press tours to the 10th Brigade report that the special forces were already there in April 2008.:
Units of the formation performed special tasks in the territory:
...
Republic of North Ossetia KP - Tskhinvali
Operational group from OO Special Forces from April 30, 2008 to August 28, 2008
http://twower.livejournal.com/870155.html

Raushan Abdullin, reconnaissance sapper of the 107th Special Forces detachment, was hit South Ossetiain 2007.:
«... in 2007, he remained to serve under a contract as part of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia»:
http://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=12094

Paratrooper (special forces soldier) Sergei Aboimov found himself in the future theater of military operations back at the end of 2006:
...remembers... paratrooper Sergei ABOIMOV , served a year and eight months in the peacekeeping troops in Tskhinvali .
http://www.kp.md/daily/24143.5/361507/

This time series gradually receding into history can be continued further. Therefore, we can now go to its source, which very frankly reveals the answer to the key question of when it all began:
«... situation on beginning of XXI century dictated the need to strengthen the Russian-Georgian border in the area from the Krasnodar Territory to Dagestan. It was decided that it was necessary to form a separate special forces brigade here, whose fighters could work effectively in the problem area. On October 10, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed an order to recreate the 10th GRU Special Operations Brigade. The corresponding directive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is dated November 30 - the village of Molkino in the North Caucasus Military District was chosen as the location of the 10th Brigade.
Military unit 51532 began to form in Molkino in January 2003, and by May 1 new part GRU special forces were already functioning. The main tasks of the 10th OBRSpN were announced from the very beginning: protecting the southern borders... monitoring the situation in the always turbulent North Caucasus. Detachments of the 10th Special Forces Brigade were in... Abkhazia, South Ossetia - hotbeds of tension here are a permanent phenomenon, fighters of the 10th GRU Special Forces Brigade from Molkino from the very beginning to this day are in constant combat readiness...
We all still have fresh memories of the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 - the 10th separate special forces brigade took the main blow here. As mentioned above, the 10th ObrSpN in Molkino was formed precisely for the purpose of protecting the southern borders of Russia. Within the set separate brigade for special purpose tasks on the territory of South Ossetia before the start of hostilities there was a peacekeeping contingent from the 107 special forces of the 10th special forces brigade - it was this unit of the GRU Special Forces that was the first to enter into battle with the Georgian armed forces ».
http://voenpro.ru/infolenta/flag-10-brigady

Military Unit 51532 was formed on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 10, 2002 No. 1334 p. Directives of the RF Ministry of Defense D - 063 dated November 30, 2002. The formation of the formation began in January 2003... Military unit 51532 was formed on May 1, 2003 with the task: cover state border in the south of the Russian Federation...

That's it - long before the night of August 7-8, 2008, when Georgian troops began an operation to save the inhabitants of the Liakhvi Gorge from the destruction promised to them by the Kokoitov thugsaccording to the Abkhazian scenario, long before the “33-fold increase in Georgia’s defense budget”, long before the emergence of the modern Georgian army, long before the arrest of Russian spies in Georgia in the fall of 2006, long before the overthrow of Aslan Abashidze in Batumi and the subsequent integration of Adjara into Georgia in May 2004 ., long before the first visit to Moscow in February 2004 by Mikheil Saakashvili, then full of illusory hopes for successful cooperation with Putin, long before Saakashvili himself won the presidential elections in January 2004, long before the Rose Revolution took place in November 2003 - long before all this (including more than a year before the Rose Revolution), V. Putin signed a simple order to createseparate special forces brigade, whose fighters could work effectively on the problem area - the Russian-Georgian border, which, as it turned out, turned out to be the internal territory of Georgia. Apparently, it is at this point that it should be emphasized that according to the decisions of the JCC in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, only motorized riflemen, the deployment of special military units - special forces and paratroopers - were allowed to serve as peacekeepers- was strictly prohibited.

How many special forces and other Russian military personnel were deployed on Georgian territory before the start of full-scale hostilities?
The deployment of special forces was not the only violation Russian side Dagomys agreements and decisions of the JCC. According to the JCC decision of June 4, 1992, the size of peacekeeping battalions on each of the three sides was limited to 500 military personnel (plus a possible additional increase in contingents by another 300 people in case of mutual agreement of all parties). Any increase in forces in the conflict zone required, naturally, the consent of all three parties to the Dagomys agreement (Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia). Georgia has never given its permission to increase the size of peacekeeping contingents.

However, only the so-called The “peacekeeping battalion” under the command of K. Timerman from 135 small and medium-sized infantry regiments consisted of at least 526 people:

The exact strength of the 107th Detachment of the 10th Special Forces Brigade is unknown. The possible size of such a detachment can be judged by the size of the special forces detachments of the Soviet army that operated during the war in Afghanistan - from 520 to 583 people:
http://desantura.ru/forum/forum6/topic2990/
http://wiki.bratishka.ru/index.php/%D0%93%D0%A0%D0%A3

In addition to the 107th detachment, they were also sent to South Ossetia85th and 104th Special Forces Detachments 10th Special Forces Brigade.

In addition, units of the 2nd and 22nd special forces brigades were also introduced into Georgian territory:
In August 2008, reconnaissance groups of the 2nd, 10th and 22nd special forces brigades took part in the 2008 “five-day war” in South Ossetia:
http://milkavkaz.net/?q=node/71

In addition, Yamadayev’s Vostok company (approximately 200 people) was also stationed in the conflict zone.

In addition, during the Caucasus-2008 maneuvers, they crossed the internationally recognized (including by Russia) state Russian-Georgian border, entered the territory of Georgia and remained there at bases in Java, Urgadant, Elbakiat, awaiting the signal to attack battalion-tactical groups of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (under the command of Colonels G. Gostev and A. Kazachenko) - each numbering more than 700 people:

All this, naturally, happened in violation of the UN Charter, the Dagomys Agreements, and the decisions of the JCC.
And all this, according to international law, naturally, were clearly identifiable signs of Russian aggression against Georgia.
And all this information, naturally, was known to Mrs. H. Tagliavini and her German deputies on the European Union Commission during the preparation of her notorious report.
And all this information by Mrs. Tagliavini and her German deputies, naturally, was completely ignored.

Who did the special forces obey?
Despite the fact that the immediate location of the 107th special forces detachment was Verkhny Gorodok, the special forces were not subordinate to the commander of the peacekeeping battalion, Lieutenant Colonel K. Timerman.

This is how Timerman describes the units subordinate to him, which he threw into a suicidal attack on Georgian tanks in Zemo Nikozi:
[V] The peacekeepers' base camp... housed only about 220 troops. Combat units - four platoons: two motorized rifle, one reconnaissance and one grenade launcher. The rest are support workers (out of the regular 526 servicemen of the battalion, about 250 were at posts and outposts). Four platoons, 100 people, held the defense...
http://old.redstar.ru/2008/08/19_08/3_01.html

Apparently, there are no special forces among the units subordinate to Timerman. How the special forces used their weapons and against whom is a separate conversation (see below). Moreover, the soldiers of the 107th detachment, stationed at the same base as the “ordinary peacekeepers,” not only did not obey Timerman, but, it seems, were not even familiar with him.

This is how he described his meeting with Timerman in the middle of the day on August 8 deputy group commander107th Special Forces DetachmentWarrant Officer Andrey Danilyuk:
Then a colonel came up to me, I don’t know his last name, and ordered all the wounded to be collected in one place. He explained that observers from the OSCE mission had arrived. They agreed with the Georgians that they would provide us with a corridor to leave the city. We loaded first the seriously wounded into the armored Ural, then civilians, then the lightly wounded and the survivors boarded. And on command they left the town .
http://www.stihi.ru/2009/03/10/6019

The “Colonel” who approached (!) the special forces ensign (!) was, obviously, Lieutenant Colonel K. Timerman, whom A. Danilyuk did not seem to know by sight until that moment. In addition, in subsequent reprints of this text by journalist A. Kovylkov, the remark about Danilyuk’s unfamiliarity with Timerman was already prudently removed.

The special forces did not obey only Timerman?
There is no evidence that the so-called. “peacekeeping special forces” or “special forces peacekeepers” (“attached to the peacekeeping battalion”) were also subordinate to the Commander of the peacekeeping forces, Major General M. Kulakhmetov. Moreover, they did not even obey the commander of the main invasion army - the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General A. Khrulev, who was also not aware of what the special forces were doing in the zone of action of his army:

V.Sh. It is known that around this time the 10th GRU special forces brigade was active here. Have you had contact with them? ?
OH. Yes, the interaction was organized, but they acted according to their tasks set by the senior military commander.
V.Sh. There is a report that they gave target designations to your army's artillery .
OH. Perhaps they gave them when contacting the combat control group at the Central Bureau of Investigation. The fact is that special forces groups act on the orders of a senior military commander. They have their own specific tasks. If they have a need, they interact with us through the combat control center...
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1525951.html

Thus, Khrulev confirmed what, in principle, all military personnel already know - special forces groups were and are subordinate to the “senior military commander” - directly to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, thereby bypassing the regimental, divisional, army, and district levels management. In other words, the General Staff assigned tasks to the special forces detachments directly, and it received reports from them.

Perhaps Timerman, Kulakhmetov, Khrulev were allowed not to know what the special forces were doing on Georgian territory. But we are not generals; we, Russian citizens, who want to understand why Russian soldiers and officers are killed and why they are then awarded, need to know this.