It seems that the arrangement of the letters on the keyboard influences which words we choose.

QWERTY - the odd-sounding word used to refer to the most popular layout type - is quite an important phenomenon. In the course of various studies, it has been proven that people tend to choose certain words depending on the number of letters in them, located on the right side of the keyboard.

The most recent and most rigorous study was conducted by David Garcia of ETH Zurich and Martin Strohmeyer of the Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences in Mannheim, Germany. The scientists analyzed millions of product names and headlines on 11 websites, including Yelp, Rotten Tomatoes, and even .

"Clear evidence" for the existence of the QWERTY effect was presented by scientists in April at the 25th World Wide Web Conference. Garcia and Strohmeyer showed that product names consisting mainly of letters on the right half of the keyboard received more high marks on 9 out of 11 sites i It's about only about english layout. The reverse was true for only one of them, the porn site Redtube. “This proves that such a preponderance towards symbols that fall under right hand, does not necessarily work in any context,” the authors comment.

Also, during the analysis of the texts of reviews, it turned out that words with a larger proportion of characters from the right half of the QWERTY layout prevailed in positive reviews.

Photo: Reuters/Kacper Pempel

Why do people prefer words consisting of characters from the right half of the keyboard?

This may be due to the association of the right with something good, and the left with something bad, accepted in many cultures. We can give preference to these letters also because it is more convenient for us to enter them: firstly, most people are right-handed, and secondly, there are fewer letters on the right side than on the left.

Naomi Baron, an American University professor of language and technology, told New Scientist that the reason for this preference may also be that there are more vowels on the right side of the keyboard, which evoke more positive associations. "We don't put emotion in consonants, only vowels," says Baron.

The QWERTY effect does not determine our purchasing preferences, as Garcia and Strohmeyer saw no pattern in the list of best-selling items on Amazon. However, this effect can influence how parents name their children. A 2014 study found that right-hand-letter-dominated names have become more popular since the 1960s, when the QWERTY layout took off.

In addition, in 2012, scientists proved a particularly strong influence of the QWERTY effect on the structure of words that appeared already in the computer age. This fully explains why we use the LOL expression so much.

In English literature, the “institutional trap” is most often used not as an “institutional trap”, but as a lock-in effect: according to North, this means that one day decision hard to undo (2). In terms of neo-institutional theory, "an institutional trap is an inefficient stable norm (an inefficient institution) that has a self-sustaining character" (3). Its stability means that if an inefficient norm prevailed in the system, then after a strong perturbation the system can fall into the "institutional trap", and then it will remain in it even when the external influence is removed.

A textbook example of such an inefficient technological development was the problem of the QWERTY effect, described in the work of P. David (1) and further developed in the works of V.M. Polterovich (3) in relation to institutions and defined as an institutional trap.

Moreover, in this case, discussions about the degree of efficiency or inefficiency of the applied technology are relegated to the background, since the very possibility of the existence of QWERTY effects, named by analogy with the above example, and the search for solutions to the problems associated with them are of scientific interest.

From the point of view of the theory of transaction costs, the appearance of the QWERTY effect is explained by at least two reasons:

1. Mismatch of a number of interests of various groups of economic agents. The appearance of the QWERTY effect is the result of a partial disagreement between the interests of producers and consumers. The goal of manufacturers is to sell faster and more, to achieve this, the real arrangement of letters on the keyboard was adopted. The goal of consumers is 1) to improve the quality of paperwork (printed is more presentable and readable than written by hand) and 2) appeared a little later - to increase the speed of typing. Given the different compatibility of goals (neutrality, compatibility, incompatibility and the degree of effect from their interaction - neutral, increasing and decreasing), the goals of producers (sell more) and consumers (improve the quality of paperwork) can be considered compatible. However, subsequently, the combination of the number of sales and speeding up typing by changing the arrangement of letters on the keyboard are clearly incompatible goals. In this case, the result of whether we fall into the trap or not depends on the effect obtained from the imposition of goals. If buyers didn't have the first target, perhaps this would encourage manufacturers to look for faster lettering. However, the dual goals of consumers stimulated the initial demand and expansion of the production of QWERTY-efficient products, subsequently, economies of scale played a role.

Based on the foregoing, it follows that the QWERTY effect is one of the products and at the same time a fiasco of the supply-side economy, when the interests of producers prevail over the tastes and preferences of consumers.

Thus, as in the case of QWERTY effects, one of the main reasons for the appearance of institutional traps is the discrepancy between the short-term and long-term interests of economic agents and the combination of behavior patterns formed on the basis of these interests with economic efficiency.

Getting out of the institutional trap

The critical moment (the bifurcation point of history) occurs when the transaction costs of operating an inefficient norm exceed the transformation costs of abolishing the old norm and/or introducing a new norm:

As an example, consider the introduction of new forms of organization of labor or production, within the institutional terminology of institutions: the shop floor system, trusts, syndicates, marketing, etc.

Both the costs of adapting the new institution and the socio-economic consequences of the continuation of the functioning of the old inefficient norm should be considered as determining values.

2) Revolutionary, in which the liquidation and replacement of an ineffective norm occurs by force, as a result of reforms that involve changing the cultural values ​​of society and carried out, in particular, by the state, or on its behalf by certain interest groups. If such changes are associated with the redistribution of property and affect the interests of most social groups, then the reforms are rather slow, encountering resistance from those strata whose interests are infringed, which inevitably leads to a sharp increase in the costs of transformation. In this case, success depends on the balance of funds and the willingness to "go to the end" of various interest groups:

The costs of getting out of the institutional trap can be classified as follows:

• the costs of establishing a new norm;
• costs of overcoming cultural inertia (unwillingness to change old stereotypes);
• the costs associated with the destruction of the lobbying mechanism of the old norm;
• costs of adapting the new norm to the existing institutional environment;
• the costs of creating accompanying norms, without which the functioning of the new norm will be inefficient, etc.

investment trap

In the development of the proposed approach to the analysis of institutional traps, in the author's opinion, it is interesting to consider the investment trap, which is directly related to the change in the behavioral model from long-term to short-term.

In the transition economy in the first half of the 1990s. the benefits of economic agents from short-term operations, mainly the sale and purchase of imported goods, far exceeded the benefits from investments in production, which in most cases did not pay off, since in the process of multiple redistribution of property, the last word was not with the one who managed production more efficiently or invested in him any means, and the one who was "in right time in the right place." After several unsuccessful attempts at long-term investment, conscientious economic agents were forced to change their behavior and reorient their activities towards short-term, but highly profitable transactions. There is a global trap in the transition economy: the prevalence of short-term investments over long-term ones. Moreover, the state itself in its economic policy was guided by the solution of short-term problems, for example, covering the state budget deficit (for this, obtaining a foreign loan “by all means”, selling enterprises of strategic importance for the country, signing agreements that are not always economically beneficial for the country etc.).

The formation of an investment trap took place in a shorter period of time than the exit from it. This is explained by the fact that it takes longer for economic agents to understand the benefits of long-term investments than for the inverse behavior to take root, and there is a significant time lag between decision-making and the benefits received by innovators and conservatives, who make decisions on long-term investments only after innovators will receive not a one-time, but a constant profit.

The way out of the institutional trap is very long and rather difficult (the bifurcation point is a new economic crisis). An evolutionary path is possible, but only with the help of the state. Until it itself changes its policy from a short-term model to a long-term one and starts investing in its capital (to a greater extent in human capital, since investments in production can also be made by the private sector), thus showing the seriousness of their intentions, economic agents will feel uncertain and will not make long-term investments, that is, change their behavioral model from short-term to long-term. Only when resident economic agents begin to benefit from following the long-term model can long-term foreign investment be expected.

Applying Institutional Trap Theory to Macroeconomic Policy Analysis

The theory of institutional traps opens up wide opportunities for scientists to apply a fundamentally new approach to analysis in various fields of activity, and in particular, to assess both the state of the economic system and the ongoing macroeconomic policy. If we look at the Russian economy through the prism of the theory of institutional traps, then the conclusion suggests itself: it has become a "hostage" of the system of institutional traps, which was largely the result of macroeconomic policy.

One of the global pitfalls of our macroeconomic policy is the dependence on the trajectory of the previous development that took shape in the first half of the 1990s, namely, on adherence to the recommendations of the neoclassical school, under the influence of which the reform policy was formed and implemented. Despite the fact that in the second half of the 1990s. general “enlightenment” has come (see, for example, articles by J. Stiglitz, J. Kornai on the need for institutional reforms in the journals “Voprosy ekonomiki”) macroeconomic policy is still being built according to the neoclassical scenario: hypnotic effect The "infallibility" of individual neoclassical models that do not work and cannot work for institutional reasons in the Russian economy, we still feel today:

1. First of all, we are talking about the denial of the role of social policy and its impact on political stability and economic development (see the main reforms - the monetization of benefits, the reform of education, health care), although the instability of the institutional matrix is ​​mathematically calculated with insufficient development of one of the spheres of society - social, political or economic (8). Within the framework of institutional theory social sphere in many respects it is decisive in the formation of the "rules of the game" in other areas.
2. Copying individual measures of macroeconomic policy, unfortunately, does not lead to the same results in the Russian economy as in countries with developed market economies. We should get used to the fact that the sensitivity coefficient of our economy is many times less than macroeconomic policy, much less than in other countries. When analyzing the monetary policy of the Central Bank, in particular, leading to a change in the money supply, we forget that our multiplier is two, and not eight or twelve for individual aggregates, as in the United States, and therefore all activities aimed at changing the money supply should be carried out in more. When the Central Bank talks about adjusting the dollar exchange rate by 1-3%, it is obvious that this measure will lead to nothing because of the dollar overhang, and if the dollar exchange rate is liberalized, it will cost a maximum of 20 rubles.
3. Another trap is that processes that are effective from the point of view of the development of a “normal” economy are negative impact on the state of modern Russian system. Paradoxical as it may seem, for example, such a deal as an early offset of the Russian debt by Turkey by our helicopters and planes, a deal that, all other things being equal, effectively affects the growth of output, unemployment, in the conditions of an excess dollar supply, leads to inflation. The activities of guest workers in Russia can be viewed with the opposite effect, since they are a channel for the leakage of the dollar supply and help reduce inflation.
4. Another confirmation that the Russian economy is a continuous chain of institutional traps is that the government itself is trapped: simultaneously achieving incompatible goals, for example, curbing inflation and lobbying the interests of large corporations to maintain a high dollar rate.

An exit or a new bifurcation point could be a financial crisis caused by an “adjustment” of the artificially restrained dollar exchange rate. Such a policy cannot continue for a long time, since the consequences are getting worse: the government is getting used to an artificially growing stabilization fund, the Central Bank is getting used to the growth of gold and foreign exchange reserves, and so on. You get used to good things easily, but we already know what the prevalence of short-term interests over long-term ones leads to.

Literature:

1. David P. Clio and Economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review.- 1985. - V.75. - No.2.
2. North D. Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy. - M: Foundation of the economic book "Beginnings", 1997.
3. Polterovich V.M. Institutional traps and economic reforms. – M.: Russian School of Economics, 1998.
4. Balatsky E. The theory of institutional traps and legal pluralism // Society and Economics. - No. 10. - 2001.
5. Stigler J. Diverse tools, broader goals: moving towards a post-Washington consensus. Voprosy ekonomiki. - 1998. - No. 8.
6. Lyasko A. Non-monetary settlements in the Russian transitional economy: an institutional approach // Report. Institute of Economics RAS, March, 2001.
7. Sukharev O.S. Institutional Theory and Economic Policy (K new theory transmission mechanism in macroeconomics) / Book. 1. Institutional theory. Methodological sketch. – M.: IE RAN, 2001.
8. Degtyarev A.N. Sustainability and development of socio-economic systems: the experience of institutional architectonics. – Report at the International Symposium “Economic Theory: Historical Roots, state of the art and development prospects”. - Moscow, Moscow State University, June 10-11, 2004

E.A. Brendeleva
Proceedings of the Internet conference 20 years of research on QWERTY effects and dependence on previous development (from 15.04.05 to 05.06.05)

The problem of "institutional traps" has attracted close attention in the last ten years by economists and scientists involved in the study of economic processes in countries with economies in transition.

In English literature, the “institutional trap” is most often used not as an “institutional trap”, but as a lock-in effect: according to North, this means that once a decision is made it is difficult to reverse (2). In terms of neo-institutional theory, "an institutional trap is an inefficient stable norm (an inefficient institution) that has a self-sustaining character" (3). Its stability means that if an inefficient norm prevailed in the system, then after a strong perturbation the system can fall into the "institutional trap", and then it will remain in it even when the external influence is removed.

As D. North notes, “an increment of changes in the technological field, once taken in a certain direction, can lead to the victory of one technological solution over others even when the first technological direction, in the end, turns out to be less effective compared to the rejected alternative” (3 ).

A textbook example of such inefficient technological development was the problem of the QWERTY effect, described in the work of P. David (1) and further developed in the works of V.M. Polterovich (3) in relation to institutions and defined as an institutional trap.

Moreover, in this case, discussions about the degree of efficiency or inefficiency of the applied technology are relegated to the background, since the very possibility of the existence of QWERTY effects, named by analogy with the above example, and the search for solutions to the problems associated with them are of scientific interest.

From the point of view of the theory of transaction costs, the appearance of the QWERTY effect is explained by at least two reasons:

1. Mismatch of a number of interests of various groups of economic agents. The appearance of the QWERTY effect is the result of a partial disagreement between the interests of producers and consumers. The goal of manufacturers is to sell faster and more, to achieve this, the real arrangement of letters on the keyboard was adopted. The goal of consumers is 1) to improve the quality of paperwork (printed is more presentable and readable than written by hand) and 2) appeared a little later - to increase the speed of typing. Given the different compatibility of goals (neutrality, compatibility, incompatibility and the degree of effect from their interaction - neutral, increasing and decreasing), the goals of producers (sell more) and consumers (improve the quality of paperwork) can be considered compatible. However, subsequently, the combination of the number of sales and speeding up typing by changing the arrangement of letters on the keyboard are clearly incompatible goals. In this case, the result of whether we fall into the trap or not depends on the effect obtained from the imposition of goals. If buyers didn't have the first target, perhaps this would encourage manufacturers to look for faster lettering. However, the dual goals of consumers stimulated the initial demand and expansion of the production of QWERTY-efficient products, subsequently, economies of scale played a role.

Based on the foregoing, it follows that the QWERTY effect is one of the products and at the same time a fiasco of the supply-side economy, when the interests of producers prevail over the tastes and preferences of consumers.

Thus, a trap was formed, the exit from which was associated with high costs (retraining of typists already working on typewriters, the cost of resistance and the cost of retraining, reprofiling production for the production of typewriters with a new keyboard, as well as the costs of changing the opinion of consumers about the lack of efficiency of this product ).

2. Mismatch of short-term and long-term interests. In this case, such a discrepancy is associated with the concept of "efficiency" and is largely determined by the incompleteness of information. Since economic agents have incomplete information, in particular about the future level of technology development, and sometimes due to limited information in other areas of society (due to physical and mental capacity human), it is illegal to talk about the effectiveness of certain technologies, methods of organization, we can only talk about comparative efficiency at the present stage of development.

Based on these two reasons, it is possible to explain the existence of a number of incompatible with each other, relatively inefficient standards: electricity transmission, different railway gauges, multidirectional traffic on roads, etc.

Causes of institutional traps

"Institutional traps" have accompanied and continue to accompany Russia's transitional economy in various areas: property relations, the monetary system, the structure of the real sector of the economy, and so on. Institutional traps include barter, non-payment, corruption, tax avoidance, and so on. According to economists, see, for example, the works of V.M. Polterovich, A.K. Lyasko, O.S. Sukharev, these traps are, as a rule, the result of a sharp change in macroeconomic conditions.

One of the most serious consequences of "institutional traps" is that, although they mitigate the negative short-term consequences of unprepared, too rapid changes, at the same time they hinder long-term economic growth.

Thus, as in the case of QWERTY effects, one of the main reasons for the appearance of institutional traps is the discrepancy between the short-term and long-term interests of economic agents and the combination of behavior patterns formed on the basis of these interests with economic efficiency.

During the period of existence of the Soviet model of development, a behavioral model has been formed in society, focused on achieving long-term interests and based on long-term planning, both in economic activity and in Everyday life. The formation of this model was directly influenced by the main trends in the development of society. The life of the members of the society was practically scheduled “on the shelves” for many years to come: a nursery - a kindergarten - a school - a pioneer camp in the summer - an institute - a “potato” in the summer, a construction team - guaranteed distribution work - a guaranteed pension.

In a transitional economy, the system of basic values ​​of society is changing: there is a reorientation from a long-term model of behavior to a short-term one. This is due to the fact that in conditions of uncertainty and instability, following the long-term model brings only losses, and profitable short-term intermediary transactions convince economic agents to abandon the model based on long-term interests. The destruction of the latter was facilitated by numerous unsuccessful attempts by citizens to save their depreciating savings in numerous financial pyramids, suspicious banks, and dubious scams. The destruction of a long-term model of behavior occurred simultaneously with the destruction of the institution of trust in the state, the system of law, partners, and, finally, neighbors, friends, and relatives.

As a result, a model focused on achieving short-term interests has taken root in society. Life "today" has become the norm and the processes of returning to the previous model are associated with high costs, if irreversible, since in the market society on the American model, which was taken as a basis by our reformers, it is the short-term model that prevails. It should be noted that in the new generation this short-term model of behavior is laid down as a basic one.

Thus, we fell into a global institutional trap associated with mismatch effective development and short-term patterns of behavior.

Getting out of the institutional trap

The transition to the initial state or exit from the institutional trap is associated with very high transformation costs, which hinders any serious transformations, thereby predetermining the long-term existence of an inefficient norm, in addition, exit from the institutional trap can be held back by such forces as the state, influential interest groups etc.

Within the framework of the theory of institutional change and the theory of transaction costs, at least two possible ways out of the institutional trap can be considered:

1) Evolutionary, in which the exit conditions are formed by the economic system itself, for example, the destruction of the institutional trap can be facilitated by the acceleration of economic growth, a systemic crisis, etc.

27. QWERTY effects
QWERTY effects in modern scientific literature mean all sorts of relatively inefficient but persistent standards that demonstrate that "history matters".

These effects can be detected in two ways:

- or to compare actually coexisting in modern world technical standards,

-or compare implemented technical innovations with potential ones that have not been implemented.
Although the modern economy has long been globalized and unified, in different countries ah of the world continue to maintain different technical standards that are not compatible with each other. Some examples are well known. In addition to the well-known history of typewriter keyboards, from which, in fact, the term QWERTY effects came2, one can cite, for example, the differences between left-handed (in the former British Empire) and right-hand traffic on the roads of different countries. This forces some automakers to put the steering wheel on the cars on the left, and others on the right. Other examples are less well-known, such as differences in rail gauge or transmission standards.

Perhaps QWERTY effects appeared only relatively early in economic history? No, they manifest themselves in the era of scientific and technological revolution. Examples often cited are the formation of television equipment standards (the 550-line standard in the US compared to the best 800-line standard in Europe), video cassettes and CDs, the development of the software market, and so on.

28, 29, 30.
From QWERTY nomics to economics of standards

and alternative economic history of technology

The name of the Path Dependency theory is usually translated in Russian literature as “dependence on previous development” 3 . She also draws attention to institutional change and the role of institutions in technical change. However, if in the "North" new economic history the main emphasis is on the revolutionary impact that legal innovations and changes in transaction costs have on socio-economic development, then in the theory of dependence on previous development, the main attention is paid to the inertia of development. In other words, if the followers of D. North study how institutional innovations become possible, then the followers of P. David and B. Arthur, on the contrary, study why institutional innovations are far from always possible. In addition, if D. North, when studying institutions, focuses on property rights, then P. David and B. Arthur focus on informal choice mechanisms.

Since both of these aspects are related to each other, like heads and tails, there is an intensive interaction and mutual enrichment of these two institutional theories of economic history. It is characteristic that D. North in his book “Institutions, Institutional Changes and the Functioning of the Economy” very quickly responded to the ideas of “recent economic historians” that were just beginning to gain popularity and included them in his concept as one of its key components.

The formation of the theory of Path Dependency began in 1985, when P. David published a short article 4 devoted to such a seemingly minor issue as the formation of a standard for printer keyboards. He argued that the well-known QWERTY keyboard for printing devices was the result of the victory of a less efficient standard over more efficient ones. The study of the economic history of technical standards, begun after the pioneering work of P. David and B. Arthur, showed an unusually wide distribution of QWERTY effects in almost all industries.

By QWERTY effects in the modern scientific literature, they mean all kinds of relatively inefficient but persistent standards that demonstrate that “history matters”. These effects can be detected in two ways −

1. 
   or to compare technical standards that actually exist in the modern world,
2. 
   or to compare implemented technical innovations with potential ones that have not been implemented.

Although the modern economy has long been globalized and unified, different technical standards that are incompatible with each other continue to be maintained in different countries of the world. Some examples are well-known, such as the difference between left-hand drive (in the former British Empire) and right-hand drive on the roads of different countries, which leads some automakers to put the steering wheel on the left and others on the right. Other examples are less well-known, such as differences in rail gauge or transmission standards.

Compared to studying the competition of different technical standards, the analysis of "failed economic history" is somewhat more speculative, but also more promising. The point is that, according to many economic historians, some technical innovations that won due to market circumstances blocked other, potentially more effective ways of development.

The theory of dependence on the previous development and close to it Scientific research on alternative history are based not on neoclassical "economics" (like Vogel's new economic history), but on the metascientific paradigm of synergetics associated with the ideas of the famous Belgian chemist Ilya Prigozhin (also Nobel laureate), creator of the theory of self-organization of order from chaos 5 . According to the synergetic approach developed by him, the development of society is not rigidly predetermined (according to the principle “no other way is given”). In fact, there is an alternation of periods of evolution, when the development vector cannot be changed (movement along the attractor), and bifurcation points, in which the possibility of choice arises. When "QWERTY-economists" talk about the historical randomness of the initial choice, they consider precisely the bifurcation points of history - those moments in it when a choice of any one possibility occurs from a fan of various alternatives. The choice in such situations almost always takes place in conditions of uncertainty and instability of the balance of social forces. Therefore, during a bifurcation, even very small subjective circumstances can turn out to be fateful - according to the principle of the “Bradbury butterfly”.

So, after numerous studies of QWERTY-effects, historians-economists discovered with amazement that many of the symbols of technological progress around us acquired a look familiar to us as a result of, in general, largely random circumstances, and that we do not live in the best of worlds at all. .
From QWERTY nomics to economics of Path Dependency

and alternative economic history of institutions

The most important of the new ideas proposed in the development of the original concept of P. David is that the victory of the initially chosen standards / norms over all others, even relatively more effective ones, can be observed not only in the history of technology development, but also in the history of the development of institutions . In the 1990s a lot of research has appeared, including the work of Douglas North himself, developing this new direction of using the QWERTY approach. The English scientist D. Puffert directly stated that “the dependence on the previous development for institutions is likely to be quite similar to the dependence on the previous development for technologies, since both are based on the high value of adaptation to some general practice (any technique or rules), so that deviations from it become too costly.

If, when describing the history of technical innovations, they often write about QWERTY effects, then in the framework of the analysis of institutional innovations, they usually talk about Path Dependency - dependence on previous development. However, the two terms are often used interchangeably. P. David himself defined Path Dependency as follows: “dependence on previous development is such a sequence of economic changes in which distant events of the past can have an important impact on the possible result, moreover, more random events than systematic patterns” 7 .

In the history of the development of institutions, manifestations of dependence on previous development can be traced at two levels - firstly, at the level of individual institutions (legal, organizational, political, etc.), and secondly, at the level of institutional systems (especially national economic systems).

To date, a lot of research has accumulated that analyzes the dependence on the previous development and in the formation of the institutions themselves - the gold standard, common and civil law systems, the central bank, etc.

An important contribution to economic theory Institutional changes were introduced by the Russian economist Viktor Meerovich Polterovich, who, using the example of the post-Soviet economy, considered such a curious kind of dependence on previous development as an “institutional trap” 8 . The point is that among the development paths there are options that are more profitable in the short term, but in the long term they are not only less effective than alternative ones (foreign economists considered just such cases), but make further development simply impossible. This was, in particular, the effect of the development of the barter economy in post-Soviet Russia: it made it possible to temporarily solve the problems of inefficient enterprises, but made any decisive restructuring of production impossible.

Concerning comparative analysis national economic systems as an institutional framework for economic evolution, then it has a fairly long tradition in economics. One can recall at least the textbook for Russian social scientists of the older generation the works of V.I. Lenin (for example, “The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907”, written in 1908), dedicated to the comparison of the Prussian (Junker) and American (farm) ways of developing capitalism in agriculture nine . He emphasized that the main brake on the development of capitalism in Russia is precisely the feudal heritage, which manifests itself not only in landownership but also in communal land use. In foreign historical and economic science, one can recall, for example, the theory of echelons of development of capitalism according to A. Gershenkron 10 , according to which the path of development of a country is “programmed” for centuries to come by whether it was able to come to capitalism on its own (the first echelon), or external influence initiated internal sources of self-development (second tier), or capitalism remains an "addition from the outside" (third tier). D. North worked in the same vein, pointing out the deep and insurmountable differences between the development of Latin America, which inherited the institutions of backward Spain, and North America, which developed under the influence of more advanced English institutions.

While works on QWERTY effects in the history of technology often emphasize the randomness and opportunism of choosing the winning technology, Path Dependency researchers in the development of institutions have this motif much weaker. Apparently, the choice of institutions, in contrast to the choice of technologies, is more collective in nature, and therefore it is more natural 11 . Both directions are related in that researchers emphasize the high inertia of social development, which makes it impossible to quickly change both the technologies used and the prevailing norms.

1 is typical for the analysis of moral hazard problems with covert action.

2 Actually, the diametrically opposite situation also deserves attention - the complementarity of tasks from the point of view of the agent in combination with their substitutability for the principal.

3 Strictly speaking, such a simplified translation is not entirely correct, since it is fraught with a simplification of the essence of the phenomenon. Everything in the world depends on the past in the sense that nothing comes from nothing. The meaning of the Path Dependency theory is that the possibilities of the choice that is made "here and now" are rigidly determined by the choice made "somewhere and sometime before."

4 David Paul A. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY // American Economic Review. 1985 Vol. 75. No. 2.

5 S. Margolis and S. Liebowitz, in their encyclopedic article on Path Dependency, make it clear that “predevelopment dependence is an idea that came into economics from intellectual movements that originated in another area. In physics and mathematics, these ideas are associated with chaos theory” (Margolis S.E., Liebowitz S.J. Path Dependence // The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law. Ed. by P. Newman. L.: Macmillan, 1998). See also: Borodkin L.I. "Order out of chaos": concepts of synergetics in the methodology of historical research // New and recent history. 2003. No. 2. S. 98-118.

6 Puffert Douglas J., 2003a. Path Dependence, Network Form and Technological Change // History Matters: Essays on Economic Growth, Technology and Demographic Change. Ed. by W. Sundstrom, T. Guinnane, and W. Whatley. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003 ( http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_komlos/nettech1.pdf). See also: David P. Why are institutions the “carriers of history”? Path dependence and the evolution of conventions, organizations and institutions // Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 1994 Vol. 5. No. 2.

7 David Paul A. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY // American Economic Review. 1985 Vol. 75. No. 2. R. 332.

8 Polterovich V.M. Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms // Economics and Mathematical Methods. 1999. V. 35. No. 2.

9 See, for example: Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 16. S. 215-219.

10 Herschenkron A. The approach to European industrialization: a postscript // Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University, 1962, pp. 353-364.

11 However, another explanation is also possible – it is psychologically more difficult to model an alternative version of institutional history than to imagine a different version of technology development. It is enough to turn to alternative history as a genre of science fiction: writers "invented" steampunk ( alternate history new and modern times, where there are no gasoline engines), but in the construction of alternative institutions they cannot come up with anything more original than extending or shortening the “lifetimes” of fascism, communism, etc.

12. The role of Path Dependence, QWERTY-effects in public administration: problem or opportunity.

"Path dependence" (dependence on previous development) is a concept that initiates the placement of new ontological accents in social sciences. Its formation takes place at a time when social transformations have reached an unprecedented uncertainty in terms of reflecting the dynamics of these changes in the social sciences. In this regard, any social problem, which has the last basis of the problem of social time, in the transitional period reveals itself from the point of view of the historicity of man and society. For Russia, with its "unpredictable", sometimes deliberately falsified past, path dependence is endowed with significant semantic and explicative potential, opening up new possibilities for integrating social memory into a single integrity. A comparative analysis of the conceptualization of path dependence in the domestic and Western traditions reveals the specific features of the opposition of time inherent in different cultures.

In the very general view it comes down to asserting the "meaning" of the past for the present and the future, and sounds trivial. The problem is to give it analytical efficiency. Here, it may be useful to turn to the concept of “pathdependence”, which is actively discussed in the framework of modern economic theory, i.e. depending on previous development.

It is far from speculative "historicism", as it is built to explain a very specific phenomenon - cases of victory of such technical standards that are not the best, most efficient and economical. This phenomenon cannot be explained within the framework of neoclassical economic theory, according to which competitive market mechanisms should lead to the selection of the most effective technical solutions. The answer of the pathdependence theory is that the initial choice is made in conditions of non-obvious advantages of one or another option and can be determined by random or "non-economic" factors. And then mechanisms begin to work - technical interdependence, increasing returns to scale, durability of capital equipment - that make it preferable (more profitable) for economic agents to use the established standard, rather than trying to introduce another, albeit technically more advanced. Choices made in the past under certain conditions predetermine choices made today when those conditions no longer exist. This is the dependence on the previous development.

The generalization of the pathdependence concept is connected with its development within the framework of neo-institutional economic theory, first when explaining why some countries demonstrate successful economic development for a long time, while others lag behind just as steadily. The answer was found in the differences in institutions that once established themselves in countries that had approximately the same starting opportunities for economic growth. Further analysis showed that in the history of institutions there are also pathdependence mechanisms - coordination effect, network effects, durability of social capital. Forward-development dependency in the institutional realm is like pathdependence in technology—both based on the value of endorsing a common practice (in technique or in rules) that proves costly to change.

The problem of "institutional traps" has attracted the close attention of economists and scientists studying economic processes in countries with economies in transition over the past ten years.

In the English-language literature, the “institutional trap” is most often used not as an “institutionaltrap”, but as a lock-in effect: according to North, this means that once a decision is made it is difficult to reverse (2). In terms of neo-institutional theory, "an institutional trap is an inefficient stable norm (an inefficient institution) that has a self-sustaining character" (3). Its stability means that if an inefficient norm prevailed in the system, then after a strong perturbation the system can fall into the "institutional trap", and then it will remain in it even when the external influence is removed.

As D. North notes, “an increment of changes in the technological field, once taken in a certain direction, can lead to the victory of one technological solution over others even when the first technological direction, in the end, turns out to be less effective compared to the rejected alternative” (3 ).

A textbook example of such inefficient technological development was the problem of the QWERTY effect, described in the work of P. David (1) and further developed in the works of V.M. Polterovich (3) in relation to institutions and defined as an institutional trap.

Moreover, in this case, discussions about the degree of efficiency or inefficiency of the applied technology are relegated to the background, since the very possibility of the existence of QWERTY effects, named by analogy with the above example, and the search for solutions to the problems associated with them are of scientific interest.

From the point of view of the theory of transaction costs, the appearance of the QWERTY effect is explained by at least two reasons:

1. Mismatch of a number of interests of various groups of economic agents. The appearance of the QWERTY effect is the result of a partial disagreement between the interests of producers and consumers. The goal of manufacturers is to sell faster and more, to achieve this, the real arrangement of letters on the keyboard was adopted. The goal of consumers is 1) to improve the quality of paperwork (printed is more presentable and readable than written by hand) and 2) appeared a little later - to increase the speed of typing. Given the different compatibility of goals (neutrality, compatibility, incompatibility and the degree of effect from their interaction - neutral, increasing and decreasing), the goals of producers (sell more) and consumers (improve the quality of paperwork) can be considered compatible. However, subsequently, the combination of the number of sales and speeding up typing by changing the arrangement of letters on the keyboard are clearly incompatible goals. In this case, the result of whether we fall into the trap or not depends on the effect obtained from the imposition of goals. If buyers didn't have the first target, perhaps this would encourage manufacturers to look for faster lettering. However, the dual goals of consumers stimulated the initial demand and expansion of the production of QWERTY-efficient products, subsequently, economies of scale played a role.

Based on the foregoing, it follows that the QWERTY effect is one of the products and at the same time a fiasco of the supply-side economy, when the interests of producers prevail over the tastes and preferences of consumers.

Thus, a trap was formed, the exit from which was associated with high costs (retraining of typists already working on typewriters, the cost of resistance and the cost of retraining, reprofiling production for the production of typewriters with a new keyboard, as well as the costs of changing the opinion of consumers about the lack of efficiency of this product ).

2. Mismatch of short-term and long-term interests. In this case, such a discrepancy is associated with the concept of "efficiency" and is largely determined by the incompleteness of information. Since economic agents have incomplete information, in particular about the future level of technology development, and sometimes due to the limited information in other areas of society (due to the physical and mental abilities of a person), it is wrong to talk about the effectiveness of certain technologies, methods of organization, we can talk only about comparative efficiency at the present stage of development.

Based on these two reasons, it is possible to explain the existence of a number of incompatible with each other, relatively inefficient standards: electricity transmission, different railway gauges, multidirectional traffic on roads, etc.

9. The role of the bureaucracy in the modernization processes. Is bureaucracy a "monster" or a "rational machine"?

Bureaucracy- this is a social layer of professional managers included in the organizational structure, characterized by a clear hierarchy, "vertical" information flows, formalized methods of decision-making, a claim to a special status in society.

Bureaucracy is also understood as a closed layer senior officials opposing itself to society, occupying a privileged position in it, specializing in management, monopolizing power functions in society in order to realize its corporate interests.

The term "bureaucracy" is used not only to refer to a certain social group, but also to a system of organizations created by public authorities in order to maximize their functions, as well as institutions and departments included in the branched structure of executive power.

The object of analysis in the study of bureaucracy are:

contradictions that arise in the implementation of management functions;

management as a labor process;

interests of social groups participating in bureaucratic relations.

Weber's theory of bureaucracy

The emergence of the term "bureaucracy" is associated with the name of the French economist Vincent de Gournay, who introduced it in 1745 to denote the executive branch. This term entered the scientific circulation thanks to the German sociologist, economist, historian Max Weber (1864-1920), the author of the most complete and comprehensive sociological study of the phenomenon of bureaucracy.

Weber proposed the following principles for the bureaucratic concept of organizational structure:

hierarchical structure of the organization;

a hierarchy of orders built on legal authority;

subordination of a lower-level employee to a higher one and responsibility not only for their own actions, but also for the actions of subordinates;

specialization and division of labor by function;

a clear system of procedures and rules that ensures the uniformity of the implementation of production processes;

a system of promotion and tenure based on skills and experience and measured by standards;

orientation of the communication system, both in the organization and outside, to the written rules.

The term "bureaucracy" was used by Weber to refer to a rational organization, the prescriptions and rules of which provide the foundation for effective work and allow you to fight against favoritism. Bureaucracy was considered by him as a kind of ideal image, the most effective management tool. social structures and separate structural units.

According to Weber, the rigidly formalized nature of bureaucratic relations, the clarity of the distribution of role functions, the personal interest of bureaucrats in achieving the goals of the organization lead to the adoption of timely and qualified decisions based on carefully selected and verified information.

Bureaucracy as a rational management machine is characterized by:

strict responsibility for each area of ​​work:

coordination in the name of achieving organizational goals;

optimal action of impersonal rules;

clear hierarchical relationship.

For the transitional period (from the aggregate of officials to the bureaucracy), these measures should be combined with the creation of motivation for officials in the implementation of the modernization project. The set of mechanisms is classic - high wages and a social package for those officials on whom the promotion of certain blocks of the modernization project depends.

However, an inevitable question arises here: what, in fact, is meant by a modernization project in modern Russia? What kind of bureaucracy Russian society will need will ultimately depend on the essential characteristics of this project.

Modernization project and perspectives of bureaucracy

A modernization project, regardless of its content, is a special case of an innovative project, i.e. a project of "targeted change or creation of a new technical or socio-economic system." The modernization project is characterized by the highest level of scientific and technical significance, surpassing in this indicator such types of projects as innovative, advanced and pioneer innovative

In modern Russia, the concept of "modernization project" has become quite widely used by experts with early XXI in .: back in 2001, at the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Research (Gorbachev-Fond), a research group led by Doctor of Philosophy V. Tolstykh developed the "Modernization Project for Russia". In our opinion, its authors were relatively free from ideological "spells", and therefore they managed to make a number of intellectual breakthroughs. Of course, ideology was present in the project (the following quote is appropriate in this case: "An important place in the formation of the Russian modernization project is occupied by the social democratic position regarding the dichotomy of "capitalism-socialism" [Modernization Challenge ... 2001], but its authors believed that the main thing is the modernization processes in the country, and not the formation of an ideological superstructure over them.

10. Basic provisions of the New State Administration.

Fundamentals of public administration

Public administration- this is the process of regulating relations within the state through the distribution of spheres of influence between the main territorial levels and branches of government. Public administration is based on the state interest aimed at protecting the integrity of the state, its key institutions, supporting the level and quality of life of its citizens. Among the priority areas in the implementation of the public (state) interest is the need to perform several functions: protective (defense), social, legal, economic, political and arbitration.

State power extends to objects located both on the territory of the state itself and outside it.

Main signs government authorities are:

o integrity;

o indivisibility;

o sovereignty.

Public administration implements the following functions.

1. Institutional - through the approval of the socio-economic, political, civil institutions necessary for solving state issues for the distribution of power.

2. Regulatory - through a system of norms and laws that establish general rules governing the behavior of subjects.

3. Goal-setting - through the development and selection of priority areas for the socio-economic and political development of the country; implementation of programs supported by the majority of the population.

4. Functional - through the development and implementation of actions aimed at supporting the entire economic infrastructure of the state in the face of its leading industries.

5. Ideological - through the formation of a national idea, designed to consolidate society within the boundaries of the state.

Main principles formation of the public administration system are as follows:

o separation of powers;

o complementarity;

o subsidiarity;

o sovereignty;

o democracy;

about homogeneity.

Principle separation of powers involves the division of the sole state power into three spheres: executive; legislative; judicial. This should serve as a condition for effective control over the activities of the state apparatus.

Principle complementarity characterized by a focus on continuity in the power structure. It assumes a uniform distribution of power functions in the context of the entire vertical of control at all territorial levels.

Principle subsidiarity implies a procedure for the distribution (and redistribution) of powers between the administrative levels of state power, i.e. the sequence of execution of power by administrative bodies and the procedure for distributing the responsibility of these bodies to the population. The transfer of powers to a higher level of management in accordance with this principle can be carried out only if it is impossible to execute them at a lower level. The principle of subsidiarity has two dimensions: vertical and horizontal.

Vertical includes the distribution of power between levels of government in the direction from local to state.

The horizontal dimension covers the procedure for the distribution of powers between the branches of government at the federal, regional and local levels.

In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, power should be distributed among power structures, mainly in connection with a reduction in the distance between the population and the authorities representing it.

Principle sovereignty presupposes the existence of actual independence as an essential feature of the state. State sovereignty means "the supremacy and independence of power subject to law, the monopoly of coercion within the limits of state powers, and the independence of the state within the framework of the international order." Being an attributive feature of the state, sovereignty implies a set of special institutions that ensure the status of an independent subject of international relations.

Principle democracy directs the population to the need for active participation: in decision-making of state and municipal significance; election of state and municipal authorities; development of territorial development programs based on mastering the mechanisms of public involvement in the current affairs of the region or municipality; allocation of zones of authority for public associations organized in the territories.

Principle homogeneity defines the advantages of federal law over regional law.

The essence of the principle of homogeneity is manifested in accordance with the subordination of regional legislation to federal legislation, which ensures the unity of the state and the universal subordination of all institutions of power to the Basic Law (Constitution of the Russian Federation).