GREAT CHANCELER

In my empire, there is only one great thing, that I am a great prince, but even that greatness of the latter is nothing more than a ghost.

Empress Elizabeth

Bestuzhev-Ryumin replaced Prince Cherkassky, who died in November 1743, but not immediately: the post of chancellor remained vacant for some time. Having become chancellor, he submitted a petition to the empress, in which he outlined his entire career and pointed out his small salaries, which he had to spend for representative purposes. As a result, complained the new chancellor, he fell into debt and asked to maintain himself with dignity "in the character newly granted from the first state ranks", give him ownership of state-owned lands in Livonia: Wenden Castle with villages that once belonged to the Swedish Chancellor A. Oksensherne. The cost of villages was estimated in the amount of 3642 efimka. The Chancellor's request was granted. In addition, Elizaveta Petrovna gave him a house in St. Petersburg, which previously belonged to Count and Chancellor A.I. Osterman.

On June 25, 1744, Bestuzhev recommended Count Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov (1714-1767) as his assistant as "only an honest and conscientious and through many experiences faithfully zealous of your imperial majesty a zealous slave." The chancellor does not mention the business qualities of the "zealous slave". Smart and observant H.-G. Manstein calls Vorontsov an honest man, but a limited mind, "without special education and even less learned later".

Immediately after his elevation, Bestuzhev achieved the removal from Russia of Frederick II's agent, Princess of Zerbst, mother of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna. Lestok, while he was still at large, was given to understand that his interests in St. Petersburg should not extend beyond medicine. During the preparation of the wedding ceremonies in connection with the marriage of Peter Fedorovich to the princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, the master of ceremonies, Count Santi, turned to Lestok for an indication of what place Brummer and another German should occupy in them. Lestok, out of old habit, like a minister, came to Elizabeth with a report on this matter and received in response that it was indecent for the chancellor to interfere in medical affairs, and for him in the chancellor's, and at the first audience, Bestuzhev ordered to reprimand Count Santi, so that he knew his business and addressed on all issues either to the chancellor or to the vice-chancellor, otherwise he could lose his place. Bestuzhev accepted this remark with great satisfaction, since he did not like Count Santi and called him in derision "chief confusion master."

Somewhat later, Bestuzhev, under a plausible pretext, managed to remove Brummer from the "Holstein courtyard" as well. Now no one interfered with the chancellor, vice-chancellor Count M.I. Vorontsov has not yet openly demonstrated his oppositional views, and Bestuzhev could use his abilities in a high diplomatic post to the fullest. And there was something to put their hands and knowledge to: the “violator of the European order” Prussia and its king attracted the attention of all European capitals.

Versailles and Berlin, realizing that it would not be possible to overthrow Bestuzhev from the post of chancellor, concentrated their efforts on Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov. Bestuzhev-Ryumin himself now had to fight with one empress - or rather, with her inertia and prejudices. In particular, it cost him considerable effort to persuade Elizaveta Petrovna to treat the actions of the Austrian ambassador de Botta more condescendingly and, in the interests of the cause, to consign them to oblivion.

Obligations to the Holstein court were bound by the chancellor's hands in Sweden as well. He insisted on restoring Biron's rights to Courland, but Elizabeth did not want to hear about it and gave Courland to the control of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. The solution of the main issue was also slowly moving forward - Russia's accession to the alliance of maritime powers, Austria and Saxony in order to rally forces against Prussia. The Empress considered it expedient to refrain from active participation in European affairs, and Bestuzhev, for the time being, also shared these views. He saw the enmity of Paris and Berlin, the insincerity of Vienna and Dresden, and was not eager to run errands at foreign courts.

Even before his chancellorship, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, in all likelihood, already had a well-defined program of action in his head, otherwise he would hardly have acted so confidently and purposefully both in peace negotiations with the Swedes in Oba, and in a fight with his opponents, and in contacts with potential allies. Anti-French focus foreign policy Russia was obvious to him, it was its foundation, but a positive program was also needed.

Brother Mikhail Petrovich also wrote to him about this from Warsaw:

“... To me, top cherfrere, it seems necessary that if we have not yet adopted any direct system, then now, together with your comrade, having adopted the most useful system for Russia, draw up a plan and act on it.”

So far, Mikhail Petrovich was a faithful ally of his brother and fully shared his views on what policy would be in favor of Russia.

The new chancellor, as we have already reported above, first outlined his concept of a system useful for the country or a European “concert” in a letter to his comrade, Vice-Chancellor M.I. Vorontsov, and then developed it in notes, letters and reports to the Empress. Bestuzhev called this concept the “Peter I system”, because he believed that he was following in the footsteps of the great emperor, although historians later called it the Bestuzhev system.

Bestuzhev's system was not only the fruit of his armchair reflections and rich diplomatic experience. It was brought to life by the events themselves: in August 1744, Frederick II began the second Silesian war and resumed hostilities against Austria. The Prussian army captured Prague and part of Bohemia (Czech Republic), and then invaded Saxony. Russia had a defensive alliance with Saxony, but the alliance treaty with Prussia remained in force. For the second time, Russia found itself in a delicate situation, but now the St. Petersburg cabinet and Bestuzhev considered it necessary to warn the aggressor and act more decisively in favor of Saxony, especially since the Prussian troops inflicted serious defeats on Austria and Saxony in the spring and summer of 1744 and were approaching the Russian Baltic.

Of course, times have changed, and Bestuzhev was by no means going to copy the policy of Peter I. He meant to follow the spirit and precepts of the great reformer. Their essence was to strive to establish allied relations with those states with which Russia had the same long-term interests. First of all, the chancellor attributed to such states the maritime powers of England and Holland, with which Russia had no territorial disputes, had long-standing relations and had common interests in northern Europe. The elector of Saxony, who was also the king of Poland, also had a certain significance as an ally. Bestuzhev-Ryumin recalled that Peter I “The Saxon court invariably desired, as much as possible, naive to appropriate for itself, so that the Polish kings of this house, together with them, kept the Polish Commonwealth in check.” He knew and understood very well that the unruly gentry Poland could easily become the object of various anti-Russian intrigues, which history has repeatedly demonstrated.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin considered Austria a potential ally of Russia - primarily because the Habsburgs were traditional opponents of France, and now Prussia, and therefore were interested in peace in Central and Eastern Europe. But Austria was also needed to resist the mighty Ottoman Empire, constantly threatening Russia on the southern borders. Russia's interests require, wrote the Chancellor, “so that you don’t leave your allies for mutual observance in any case ... such friends on whom you could rely, and these are the maritime powers that Peter the Great always tried to observe, the King of Poland as the Elector of Saxony and the Queen of Hungary(that is, the Austrian Maria Theresa. - B. G.) according to the position of their lands, which naturally have an interest with this empire.

The Chancellor quite rightly referred France and Sweden to secret and open opponents, the first of which opposed the strengthening of Russia, and the second longed for revenge for the defeat in the Northern War. In relation to Sweden, he believed, it was necessary to pursue a calm, thoughtful policy that did not allow infringement of its interests. He also pointed to the traditional connection of these states with Turkey, where they "since ancient times, intrigues that are very harmful to us ... have been produced."

The chancellor believed that the main core of his foreign policy system was its anti-Prussian orientation. Therefore, he paid special attention to the enemy so far "hidden", and therefore more dangerous - Prussia. He noted the aggressive nature of its foreign policy, the build-up of the army and a significant territorial gain - especially with the coming to power of Frederick I. To believe the word or even the agreement signed with Berlin, he said, is in no way possible - this was proved by the entire perfidious foreign policy of the Prussian king, and therefore no alliance with him is possible and dangerous.

This was not an exaggeration of facts, Bestuzhev was a real politician, and he knew what he was talking about. Prussia kindled the fire of war not only in Europe, she intrigued in Poland, Turkey and Sweden, and the goals pursued by Prussian diplomacy in these countries contradicted the interests of both Austria and Russia. And this, perhaps, was the main motive for the rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Warning of the danger posed to Russia by France, Prussia and Sweden, the Chancellor did not rule out maintaining normal diplomatic relations with them.

Now, at a distance of centuries, we can say that the Bestuzhev-Ryumin system, of course, was far from flawless. Now it is obvious that he overestimated the common interests of Russia with the allied countries he named, especially with England. Apparently, Bestuzhev paid tribute to the idea of ​​a “regular state” by G. Leibniz, which had spread in Europe, according to which the state mechanism had to be systematized and set in motion, as in a clock. It is no secret that these mechanistic systems were too rigid and undynamic, poorly adapted to the current changes in the situation, although they made it possible to achieve the set goals without the risk of a serious confrontation with partners. After 20 years of unsystematic Russian foreign policy, the Bestuzhev-Ryumin system worked and bore fruit.

Anti-Prussian motives in the affairs of the chancellor were decisive, regardless of the situation. Under the pressure of external circumstances and, perhaps, to temporarily reduce tension in Russian-Prussian relations, Bestuzhev was forced to conclude a defensive alliance with Prussia, but he was in no way going to fulfill it completely. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Prussia, G. Podevils, in connection with the Saxon crisis, asked Bestuzhev about the reasons for Russia's failure to fulfill its obligations under the defensive alliance, he replied that Russia was not obliged to do this, since Prussia acted as an aggressor in the war with Saxony.

As for the robbery actions of Prussia in Saxony in August 1745, Petersburg prudently decided not to get involved in this war for the time being, limiting itself to diplomatic support in relation to Dresden and the promotion of additional troops to Courland. He did not trust either allies or opponents. Particularly alarming was the deal between Lord Harrington and the Prussian resident in London, Andrie, secret from St. Petersburg, to finally assign Silesia to Prussia in exchange for the fact that Frederick II at the all-German congress voted in favor of recognizing Maria Theresa's husband as Holy Roman Emperor. Harrington also undertook to reconcile Berlin with Vienna.

At the same time, Bestuzhev did not rule out the possibility that Russia would be forced to send troops against Prussia, but only after the final construction of the allied anti-Prussian coalition, for example, if Russia, under certain conditions, was accepted into the Warsaw Treaty of the Union, concluded between Austria, England, Holland and Saxony in 1745. Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov, in principle supporting the Chancellor's opinion about Saxony, also offered to provide her with financial assistance.

The whole life of Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin, as we see, consisted of struggle.

The very way up was given to him, not a very noble and wealthy nobleman, not easy, and having taken the responsible post of almost the first nobleman after the empress, he did not walk on rose petals at all, but walked through prickly thorns. The presence of numerous external enemies was explained by quite understandable reasons, and they, perhaps, only brought adrenaline, useful for his temperament, into his blood. But the envy and jealousy of compatriots, people of the court of Elizabeth and people who accidentally surrounded this court, caused much more trouble and annoyance, not giving rest for one day, not for one hour. In Russian history it is difficult to meet another such fate of an official of the highest rank, who would be forced to tirelessly, all his life, fight not for life, but to death with his many enemies.

And there was no peace. And after the expulsion of Chétardie from Russia and the neutralization of Lestocq, the enemies of Bestuzhev and the empire continued their secret subversive work, and there was no way to calm down. On September 1, 1744, Bestuzhev wrote to Vorontsov: “Although I wished, and Your Excellency ... the most merciful permission to intercede so that they no longer look at ministerial letters, then, however, I find it necessary to look at the current circumstances for Barons Mardefeld and Neuhaus to look like they ... are cheating." Reading and deciphering the dispatches of foreign envoys and residents continued to be an important means of monitoring the designs of Russia's opponents.

So the day before, a letter from the Bavarian envoy I. Neuhaus (Neuhaus) dated July 13 was opened, which stated: “Yesterday, at the end of the Kurtag, the Princess of Zerbst handed me a letter to your Imperial Majesty, adding that she, not only as an imperial vassal, every due veneration(that is, respect. - B. G.) to your highest person, but also ... she has a special humility and veneration innate in her house, to which she has her daughter, who, with her future spouse, is already inclined, with other surrounding people, he will most zealously attract.

Mardefeld continued to "trick" and sang the praises of the mother of the bride Pyotr Fedorovich, who was delayed in Russia in connection with her daughter's wedding: "I must do justice to the princess of Zerbst, that she truly cares for the royal interests." Congratulating Frederick II on a successful campaign in Bohemia, the envoy wrote to him: “The Grand Duke said to me: I heartily congratulate you. The young Grand Duchess repeated many times: “Thank God!” The princess mother could not find strong enough expressions for her joy…” Of course, from such heirs to the Russian throne, Alexei Petrovich's mood was hardly raised.

The envoy of France d "Allion made another attempt at the same time to bribe Bestuzhev and Vorontsov, promising them from his court a favorable attitude towards the treaty beneficial to Russia. Bestuzhev and Vorontsov answered him that they should have signed the treaty first, and then start talking about "pension ".

We humbly thank you, - they answered the French ambassador, who insisted on his own version: first a pension, and then a contract. “The generosity of the Empress relieves us of want.

But that was soon all gone. Soon Mikhail Illarionovich will change his attitude towards the Chancellor and will begin to “drift” in the opposite direction from him. While still a conference minister, Vorontsov was one of those Russian nobles who considered it necessary to prevent French influence on Russia and to pursue exclusively national Russian policy outside and support any anti-French and anti-Prussian movement in Europe. Vorontsov actively participated in the coup d'etat and contributed to the enthronement of Elizabeth Petrovna, and it is quite natural, Solovyov writes, that in relation to the Bestuzhevs, who fell under the repressive machine of previous regimes, he behaved like a patron. This can be seen at least from those respectful and almost obsequious letters that Vice-Chancellor Bestuzhev wrote to him in the early 1940s.

The French and Prussian diplomats, despite the minimal difference in views between the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, made another attempt to remove Bestuzhev-Ryumin from business and replace him with Vorontsov. This plan was not without foundation for several reasons. Firstly, Mikhail Illarionovich was a great admirer of France and French culture and also favorably treated Prussia. Secondly, he was married to Elizabeth Petrovna's cousin, Countess Anna Karlovna Skavronskaya, and was among the close friends of the Empress. And, thirdly, he, unlike Alexei Petrovich, did not yet burn with the desire to engage in the service, but his pride “burned”. He envied Bestuzhev, who alone enjoyed all the honor and respect, while he himself remained in the shadows - in the words of Solovyov, "a modest satellite of a brilliant planet." And so Vorontsov changed and became not only an opponent of Bestuzhev, but also his ardent enemy.

The fuss around Vorontsov, it seems, took place without any participation of Elizabeth. When one day Brummer began to praise Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov to her, she said: “I have a very good opinion about Vorontsov, and the praise of a scoundrel like you can only change that mind, because I must conclude that Vorontsov has the same opinions as you. This phrase alone does honor to our allegedly eccentric and not disposed to state affairs empress. She did not stand on ceremony with impudent and scoundrels.

In the spring of 1744, Frederick II began to fuss about granting Vorontsov the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire, and in August 1745, the French ambassador d'Allion confidently (once again!) Wrote to Paris about the imminent fall of Bestuzhev-Ryumin. A year later, he more carefully assumed that Bestuzhev could only be "blinded" by a large bribe, while Vorontsov could be satisfied with a "pension". , but he listened to his proposal indifferently. Vorontsov, without any pension or bribe, gave d "Allion assurances that France could always rely on the friendly attitude of the Russian court, and the envoy joyfully informed Paris that he had saved on the Vice-Chancellor royal money.

Mikhail Illarionovich knew that the Chancellor closely followed the incoming and outgoing correspondence of foreign ministers in St. Petersburg, and showed extreme caution in his contacts with them. On the perlusted and decoded dispatch of d "Allion, he made a justificatory note that if the Frenchman offered him a bribe in the form of 50 thousand, he would refuse it, because he had not previously been tempted by 100 thousand rubles. But Vorontsov was summed up by the following dispatch of d" Allion, which said: “There is almost no doubt that Vorontsov will overthrow Bestuzhev, and this event would not have been long in coming if, unfortunately, Mr. Vorontsov’s ill health did not force him to go ... abroad.” The vice-chancellor hastened to dissociate himself from d "Allion with a note that the French minister had not received any assurances from him about the overthrow of the chancellor, and that Bestuzhev "Apart from direct friendship, nothing else will come from me." But it was difficult to deceive the chancellor with this excuse: he must have already reported this episode to Elizaveta Petrovna and made the necessary conclusions for himself.

Vorontsov, in the words of the English envoy Hindford, took off his mask in April 1745, when a conference was held in St. Petersburg with the participation of Bestuzhev, Vorontsov and the envoys of England (Hindford), Austria (Rosenberg), Holland (Dedier) and Saxony (Petzold). The issue of Russia's accession to the Warsaw Pact was discussed at the conference. Vorontsov, seduced by d'Allion's proposal for a quadruple alliance of France, Russia, Prussia and Saxony, openly opposed Russia's participation in this anti-French and anti-Prussian alliance, and Hindford wrote to Lord Carteret on April 29: "My friend(Bestuzhev. - S.S.) intends to present his opinion in the strongest terms, if the opponent dares to present his own in the same. But Bestuzhev-Ryumin apparently had to compromise with Vorontsov, because his May 30 reply to the ambassadors said that Russia had no reason to join the Warsaw Pact, since it was already bound by a number of bilateral agreements with its participating countries. It seems that this deviation from his system was allowed by Bestuzhev not without pressure from Elizaveta Petrovna.

Both the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor knew that they were regarded by the environment as bitter rivals, and that alone was enough for them to see that a knife had been thrown between them. The only way out for Vorontsov was to become in open opposition to the chancellor and try to win his own authority. It was easy and profitable to do this: both the country and the state, and people were tired of upheavals, coups and wars, and the chancellor did not tire of calling everyone for new tests and the establishment of Russia on the European arena. It was useful and necessary, but who at that time fully shared these views? Isolationism was in the blood of the Russian people, and after Peter I, his chicks began to perceive abroad only as an opportunity to join in luxury. Yes, and only a dozen two or three aristocrats could use this luxury.

So Vorontsov could successfully play the role of a "patriot". To do this, there was no need to change the system - it was enough to confine ourselves to easy help from Austria and Saxony and scare Prussia with strong demarches and diplomatic representations, without getting involved in ruinous wars. This fully corresponded to both the Russian mentality and the interests of those same France and Prussia, who zealously began to tear Vorontsov away from Bestuzhev.

Solovyov writes that Vorontsov's position in the Prussian-Saxon conflict - limiting himself to monetary support for Dresden and the role of an intermediary between both warring countries - became fatal for him. Elizabeth did not like her much, and without any diplomacy she made it clear to the Vice-Chancellor that she did not mind if he went abroad for medical treatment for a while.

On August 29, the Empress signed a passport for Vorontsov's departure "to foreign lands" and a rescript to all foreign courts with a notice of the Vice-Chancellor's departure to Europe. The collegial discussion of the Prussian-Saxon conflict took place already without Vorontsov. Paris and Berlin once again miscalculated, Bestuzhev won the upper hand in the struggle for power in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and Vorontsov was forced to go with his wife and secretary F.D. Bekhteev on a trip to Europe. His itinerary from September 1745 to August 1746 included Berlin, Dresden, Prague, Vienna, Venice, Rome, Naples and Paris. Leaving, he left the Empress a prophecy that the British, on whom the chancellor made such a strong bet, would eventually let Russia down and conclude a separate peace with Prussia. Unfortunately, this prophecy soon came true.

Passing through Berlin, Vorontsov visited Frederick II, thereby incurring the additional wrath of Elizabeth Petrovna. Returning home a year later, he seemed to have finally lost all chances to return to studies under Bestuzhev-Ryumin. foreign policy. But he will come there again, although for this it will be necessary to “leave” Bestuzhev-Ryumin himself.

In October 1745, a report from mission adviser G. Gross arrived from Paris, greatly irritating Elizaveta Petrovna. Gross reported that during an audience with the State Secretary of the French Foreign Ministry, Rene-Louis "Argenson (1694-1757), the last “he spoke with disapproval of the chancellor and his brother, honoring them, like him, Gross, to the English side as devotees, and that they supposedly act in deeds that are dissimilar to the intentions of Her Imperial Majesty”. The Empress pointed out to her ambassador in Holland A.G. Golovkin (1688-1760) to take a demarche in front of the French envoy, Abbé de la Bille, and express to the King of France his indignation at the behavior of d "Argenson. Chancellor Bestuzhev-Ryumin received a similar instruction: he had to “Speak about such darzhance insults in a decent and, if possible, sensitive way” ambassador in St. Petersburg d "Allion. Of course, the empress first of all defended her own honor and the honor of the country, but at the same time she stood up for her chancellor, took him under her protection and demonstrated to his offenders that Alexei Petrovich enjoyed her full confidence.

At the same time, Ambassador Golovkin received a decree from Elizabeth on the purchase of a tiny monkey from a certain Amsterdam merchant. “lilac, a monkey, green in color and only small, which completely enters into an Indian walnut ... and so that, for curiosity, we would get it to Our Court ...”. A letter with a decree came to Golovkin signed by the Grand Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor - in addition, they had to deal with the petty amusements of their empress! The monkey was bought and delivered to Elizaveta Petrovna with a guard courier Sergeant Valuev. It is not known only, with a nut or without.

But the empress did not recognize her chancellor as "great", despite the title. Jean-Louis Favier, secretary of the French mission in St. Petersburg in the 1760s, cites a revealing episode in his notes: Bestuzhev somehow “reported” in the presence of the empress and called himself, according to the official title, “great” and immediately received a flick on the nose: "Know she told him, that in my empire there is only a great one, that I am a great prince, but even that greatness of the latter is no more than a ghost.

... While the Prussian-Saxon affairs were being discussed, Elizabeth was in a hurry to put an end to the somewhat protracted matrimonial affairs. From August 21 to August 31, 1745, St. Petersburg finally celebrated the wedding of the heir to the princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, and the need for the presence of such persons hated by Bestuzhev as the mother of the bride and Brummer disappeared. Brummer really hoped to get the place of the Holstein governor, the Swedish Crown Prince Adolf-Fredrik was also interested in this, but by this time everyone, including Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich, was completely tired of him, and Bestuzhev and Elizaveta Petrovna did not fail to take advantage of this.

Pyotr Fedorovich had another uncle, Prince August, who accused his older brother Adolf-Fredrik of having allowed the treasury of the duchy to be embezzled when he was the ruler of Holstein. Petersburg has now decided to stake on Augustus. Prince August received an invitation to come to Russia to formalize his rights, while his sister, the mother of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna (Princess of Zerbst), dissuaded him in every possible way, frightened him with the terrible Bestuzhev and offered him a better job in the Dutch army.

On September 28, the Princess of Zerbst, after a dramatic and impartial conversation with Elizaveta Petrovna, finally left Russia. Back in June, Elizaveta Petrovna, on the report of the chancellor, ordered “The correspondence of Her Serene Highness the Princess of Zerbst should be secretly opened and examined, and if anything reprehensible is found, then the original letters should be kept.” Following her ladyship began to pack things and Brummer. Petersburg air became cleaner, and Bestuzhev could breathe a sigh of relief for a while.

... Bestuzhev's opinion about general position Russia and the Prussian-Saxon conflict was filed on 13/24 September 1745. S. Nelipovich writes that this was the second after the famous opinion of A.I. Osterman 1725 analysis of the role of Russia in modern Europe. The chancellor strongly disagreed with the isolationists, arguing that "Not a single power can support itself without alliances." In the introductory part, the chancellor recalled the great role that England played in politics, but especially in trade with Russia. The present relations of the Empire with this country are fixed by a useful and necessary treaty of alliance, based on common interests in the Baltic Sea, and is a guarantee that the British will maintain neutrality in a conflict with the Swedes. An alliance with Prussia would also be very useful to Russia if it were not for the treacherous behavior of its king Fiedrich II and his anti-Russian intrigues in Sweden and the Ottoman Porte. The third useful alliance for Russia is with Saxony. This moment was, according to the Chancellor, such that Russia in the conflict between Prussia and Saxony had to take the side of the victim of aggression, that is, take the side of Saxony, but not take direct part in hostilities.

At the council on October 3, Elizabeth, after listening to the opinion of her ministers and generals, decided to put forward to Courland such a number of regiments that it would be possible to place there in winter quarters. At the same time, Chernyshev, the Russian resident in Berlin, was supposed to warn the Prussian government that Prussia should refrain from attacking Saxony, and M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin was invited to enter into consultations with the court of the Elector of Saxony Augustus III.

Solovyov writes that when Chancellor Bestuzhev informed Mardefeld of this decision, he was struck dumb with surprise. Hindford wrote to London that England and other maritime powers (Holland and Denmark) should not miss the moment and support Russia with subsidies. Bestuzhev, the only "partisan" of England at the court of Elizabeth, having persuaded the empress to take a decisive step in Courland, hoped to attract English money to support the Russian regiments. If subsidies were not forthcoming, Hindburgh wrote, London might lose Bestuzhev's friendship.

Unfortunately, the measures taken by Russia were not enough. Frederick II realized that Russia was not ready to fight him, and invaded Saxony with his army. The Prussians won a very easy and loud victory over the Saxons, and the electorate of Saxony for Russia became lost, being crushed by the political system of Prussia and France. Was the position of the Chancellor in relation to the Prussian-Saxon conflict a miscalculation? Hardly. Bestuzhev understood that the Russian army was not yet ready to conduct active military operations in Europe, because there were not enough funds to maintain it, and therefore he gave advice to confine himself to a show of force in Courland in the hope that Frederick would get scared and refrain from invading Saxony. But the Prussian king unraveled Bestuzhev's plan and acted in accordance with his plans. S. Nelipovich claims that the chancellor did not want to involve Russia in the war for Saxony, because he feared that the Russian side would have to endure all the hardships of the war. This looks like the truth. Soon the actions of the British confirmed these fears.

M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin reported to his brother about how he, having arrived from Dresden in Prague, listened to the speech of the King of Prussia. In his speech, Frederick II declared that he would never forget how Russia chose to apply the alliance treaty with Saxony, but refused to do so in relation to Prussia. At the end of his speech, Frederick II promised to take revenge on the Russians and their allies and looked pointedly at the Swedish envoy.

However, Frederick II did not test the patience of Europe anymore and hurried to make peace not only with the defeated Saxony, but also with Austria. M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin in Dresden complained that the Saxon cabinet did not have enough accurate information about the intentions of Frederick II, while the Prussian generals had complete and reliable information about the Saxon army. Against these words, the chancellor in St. Petersburg made a note in the margins: “All-merciful God, save me so that I don’t know about local perceptions and warn you, like the Saxons.”

What were those before perception?

These were the measures which Russia had to take in the new situation confronted by the daring victorious march of the Prussian army on Dresden. Elizabeth was forced to admit that it was necessary to prepare for a possible war with Prussia. From December 21 to 25, a special council met in the Winter Palace of Her Imperial Majesty, dominated by the Chancellor. The conclusion adopted at the council and approved by the Empress provided for the provision of more active assistance to Saxony against Prussia, and Bestuzhev triumphed. He told Hindford that if the maritime powers gave subsidies, then Russia could restore peace in Germany in one campaign.

It was during the Prussian-Saxon war that d'Allion offered Bestuzhev a bribe of 50 thousand rubles. The chancellor triumphantly reported to Elizabeth Petrovna: “When Dallion previously promised half a million livres to the chancellor twice, he did not prescribe any conditions; and despite the fact both times he was so honed that it is surprising how he again dared to offer 50,000 with the condition that the Russian troops assigned to help the elector of Saxony remain motionless in Courland.

At the urging of the chancellor, Empress Elizabeth told the British at the end of 1745 that Russia was ready to commit itself to continue the fight against Prussia, but subject to receiving subsidies from London for the maintenance of the army. But England, already bound by the Hanoverian (treacherous) treaty with Prussia, met this proposal with a refusal. Austrian Maria Theresa had by this time reconciled with Frederick II, and England, of course, was also interested in peace with Prussia. The British ambassador told Bestuzhev that Russia was late with its proposal. In the past, London several times tried to persuade St. Petersburg to an alliance (albeit before Bestuzhev-Ryumin began to manage foreign policy), but Osterman each time dragged on and found pretexts to drag out the negotiations.

The vanity of the chancellor, who relied on England in his policy, was dealt a severe blow. He was furious, discouraged and angry, and in the heat of the discussion with Hindford even hinted at the possibility of a rapprochement between Russia and France. But all these were emotions, which both interlocutors understood well.

It was the first call to warn the chancellor of the danger that threatened him and his system. He should have taken steps to correct his system, but, probably due to self-confidence and pride, he did not do this, continuing to stubbornly adhere to the pro-British orientation.

Meanwhile, events began to develop in such a way that the St. Petersburg cabinet, with the active participation of Bestuzhev-Ryumin, was nevertheless forced to plan an offensive military operation against Prussia for 1746, for which the Russian army defiantly began to concentrate its troops in Courland. But this time Russia did not enter the war again: in December, “Shah Nadir of Prussia,” as Elizabeth Petrovna called Frederick II, greatly frightened by the appearance of the Russian army at his borders, hastened to make peace with Austria. However, Prussian diplomacy only intensified its anti-Russian activities, which was not slow to convey to the chancellor envoys from Stockholm, Copenhagen and Hamburg. At the same time, Berlin again relied on bribing Russian ministers, primarily those who were involved in Russia's foreign affairs.

On April 8/19, 1746, Frederick II wrote to his Chancellor Podevils about his concerns about the strength of the Russian army and especially about the Cossacks and Tatars, “who can burn and devastate the whole country within 8 days without the slightest opportunity to interfere with them. If a declaration of war by Russia is likely, then I see no other way than buying peace from a vain minister for 100-200 thousand thalers. S. Nelipovich writes that on April 19/30, Berlin sent a note of protest to St. Petersburg in connection with the concentration of Russian troops on the borders with Prussia and Poland, as well as 100,000 thalers (more than 100,000 silver rubles) to be presented to Bestuzhev-Ryumin.

According to Valishevsky, the Prussian envoy Mardefeld, in pursuance of the instructions of Frederick II, handed Bestuzhev and Vorontsov 50,000 thalers each. The chancellor accepted the money willingly, this happened during negotiations with Mardefeld on Russian guarantees of the Dresden peace, but at the same time he stated that Silesia guarantees were out of the question. As for the concentration of the Russian army on the outskirts of Prussia, he explained it by the need to defend the Russian borders in the context of ongoing wars in Europe.

In August, at the Senate commission on the security of Livonia and Estland and the Prosecutor General of the Senate, Prince I.Yu. Trubetskoy and generals P. Shuvalov A.I. Rumyantsev opposed the buildup of troops on the northwestern borders, in favor of cutting spending on the army and withdrawing regiments from the Ostsee province to the interior of the country. However, under pressure from A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin and generals A.B. Buturlina, V.A. Repnin and President of the Military Collegium S.F. Apraksina Elizaveta Petrovna agreed to leave the troops in the Baltic in winter quarters and requisition in their favor the bread of the landowners of the Pskov and Ostsee provinces. The Vorontsov group was defeated in this matter. Berlin failed to buy peace from the "conceited minister". However, "Shah Nadir" did not scatter money and preferred to win resounding victories over the Austrians and Saxons instead of bribery. The victories acted much more correctly.

When resolving urgent matters, the chancellor did not forget about such “trifles” as the development of rules and etiquette for receiving foreign ambassadors, giving them gifts, the right to duty-free import of goods for diplomats, etc. (letter to Cherkasov dated March 12, 1744) or the payment of another amount of subsidies to Sweden, which he reminds Baron Cherkasov of in a letter dated September 26, 1746.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin continued to follow the envoy of Prussia, Mardefeld, in the most attentive manner. In November 1745, the empress ordered the chancellor “opening letters in the mail from Baron Mardefeld and those sent to him continue. And write off all of them in reserve, if the digital key for disassembling them from Frankfurt ... will be brought. Apparently, in Frankfurt, the chancellor had his own little man who had access to the ciphers of the Prussian king. By the way, when the empress set out to visit Riga at the end of 1745, she ordered to include not only Chancellor Bestuzhev and the staff of the KID, but also the DSS in the number of officials accompanying her. Goldbach - “for his well-known work and every French an occasional essay." The work of the decipherer Goldbach should not have been interrupted for a single day!

French diplomacy, which was behind the aggressive actions of Prussia, also did not stop trying to "tame" the Russian chancellor. At the end of 1745, the envoy d'Allion made another unsuccessful attempt to bribe Bestuzhev-Ryumin, but she did not make the proper impression on the chancellor. Alexei Petrovich undoubtedly loved money, they quickly slipped out of his hands, but he nevertheless had principles regarding from whom and when gifts should be accepted.

In the meantime, with the help of H. Goldbach, the chancellor continued to read the correspondence of the unsuccessful bribe-giver with his minister d "Argenson and knew very well how little d" Argenson appreciated his envoy in St. , calling "a dishonest man who sells his influence for gold to the British and Austrians, without depriving himself, however, of the opportunity to earn money elsewhere." On the margins of his report to Empress Bestuzhev-Ryumin, against these words, he made a note in the margins: “These and similar lies perpetrated by Dalion in an inconspicuous way prepare the way to Siberia; but since these will worsen over time, for the sake of weakening, it seems to him for a few more times the freedom to give poison to him further to emit ".

The chancellor was no longer afraid of anyone. “At a time when almost all of Europe and Asia are in wrecking wars,- Bestuzhev wrote in September 1745, - the local empire safely uses deep peace and silence for the benefit of its peoples.

The situation in Europe was actually getting more complicated, and it was necessary to constantly think about finding allies for Russia. It was impossible to wait any longer, and at the end of 1745 Bestuzhev-Ryumin, relying on the results of the conference in winter palace dated December 21, 1745/January 1, 1746, which outlined decisive military measures against Prussia in the Baltics and the Baltic, began negotiations with Vienna on the conclusion of a Russian-Austrian defensive alliance. He believed that a similar treaty of 1726 should have served as the basis for it. The negotiations were complicated by the echoes of the Lopukhin case, but Empress Maria Theresa was eventually forced to make concessions to the Russian side and ordered her former envoy Botta to be imprisoned. Her new envoy, Urzinn von Rosenberg, arrived in Petersburg, and brought a conciliatory letter from his empress to Elizabeth. And things moved on. The Austrians, however, demanded that Russia's allied obligations extend to the Austro-French conflict, but the vigilant Bestuzhev-Ryumin sharply opposed this, explaining to the Austrians that such obligations for Russian side would be too burdensome. In his opinion, the participation of Russian soldiers in military operations against Prussia alone was enough.

That's what they decided on. On May 22/June 2, 1746, an agreement was signed in Bestuzhev-Ryumin's house for a period of 25 years, which at that time, with the constantly changing foreign policy situation, was quite bold for Russia. Each of the parties undertook to put up 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry to help the attacked ally. In the event of a war between Austria and Italy or Russia and Turkey, the ally was limited only to a show of force on the border of the allied state. One of the secret articles provided for Austria's support for the rights of Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich to Schleswig-Holstein, which Denmark annexed. Austria made this sacrifice, although it could lead to a break in the Austro-Danish treaty of 1732.

S. Nelipovich writes about the great victory of the Russian diplomats led by Bestuzhev-Ryumin: Russia's obligations in relation to Austria were significantly outweighed by Vienna's guarantees against the restless Russian neighbors - Sweden, Prussia and Turkey. The Russo-Austrian treaty, one of the first secret treatises in the history of Russia, having an unequivocally anti-Prussian orientation, became only the first link in the system of treaties, anticipating a whole chain of other international agreements of Russia.

Following the Russian-Austrian agreement, on June 10, 1746, Bestuzhev managed to conclude a defensive alliance with Denmark, which had a pronounced anti-Swedish orientation. To do this, he had, on the contrary, to refuse to protect the interests of the Holstein court. It seems to us that the Chancellor did not feel much pity for this. Grand Duke Pyotr Fedorovich, the formal ruler of the lost Holstein, gave him nothing but trouble with his claims. The Holstein minister Peter Pe (x) lin, completely devoted to Chancellor Bestuzhev, and the Danish envoy in St. Petersburg Linar, who dealt with this issue, offered the Grand Duke a replacement - the Duchy of Oldenburg and the Principality of Delmenhorst, but Peter Fedorovich did not want to part with Holstein. I had to simply ignore his desire, of course, without informing him about it. In a secret article of the treaty, absolutely unknown then to the Swedes, Elizaveta Petrovna assumed a reciprocal obligation to the Danes never to allow the Swedish kings to own Holstein and promised to persuade Adolf-Fredrik to renounce his hereditary rights to the dukedom. Copenhagen liked this real and profitable offer much more than Sweden's unsubstantiated promises. All this testified to the fact that a real view of the development of events in Scandinavia began to prevail in St. Petersburg, and that the Collegium of Foreign Affairs no longer made a bet on Adolf-Fredrik.

In the following year, 1747, Russia, that is, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, managed to conclude an advantageous convention with the Ottoman Porte and for some time neutralize its aggressive intentions towards Russia. The Austro-Russian treaty - the cornerstone of Bestuzhev-Ryumin's foreign policy program - was also somewhat later supplemented by treaties with Poland and England. The course towards an alliance with Austria, taken by the diplomacy of Peter I, but implemented only by Bestuzhev-Ryumin, will continue - whether it's bad or good, this should be judged elsewhere - for more than a hundred years. In any case, at that time this alliance was a very necessary and useful measure for Russia.

For new successes on the foreign policy front, Bestuzhev-Ryumin was showered with favors from the Empress: he received 6 thousand chervonets from her, and he was granted the Kamenny Nos manor in Ingermanland, confiscated from the same A.I. Osterman. It is difficult to say whether the great chancellor of Elizabeth experienced any internal triumph over his former adversary, although Alexei Petrovich's friends and foes believed that this was the case.

A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin was also counting on a reward from the Austrians. What was his surprise when the envoy J. Urzinn von Rosenberg told him that not only did he not have free money, but he lacked funds even for his own maintenance. At a reception with Elizaveta Petrovna, he was invited to the card table, and the unfortunate Austrian was sweating at the mere thought that in case of a loss he would have nothing to pay the debt with. He managed, however, to win 400 rubles from the Russian Empress, on which he somehow made ends meet with his living in the expensive Russian capital. Bestuzhev was not a stingy person and lent Rosenberg his own money, lending him 3,000 rubles. Later, for signing the treaty, Bestuzhev nevertheless "recouped" the Austrians and received, as he expected, the Austrian "pension" in the amount of 6 thousand chervonets.

Vienna and St. Petersburg urged other countries to join the treaty, primarily England. Brother of Chancellor M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin tried to resist the Franco-Prussian diplomacy in Poland and began to study the conditions in order to free Saxony from the arms of Prussia and again persuade Augustus III to the side of Austria and Russia.

The Russo-Austrian treaty took Versailles by surprise. While d "Argenson" gratified "vice-chancellor M.I. Vorontsov, who was visiting France, who spoke with a mysterious look about the favors that he allegedly enjoyed from the Empress Mother Elizabeth, about his disagreements with Bestuzhev and sympathies for France, Bestuzhev married his son Andrei to the niece of the favorite A.G. Razumovsky and further strengthened his position.In the absence of Vorontsov, his party suffered a final defeat and fell silent, and the supporters of the great chancellor at a conference in the Winter Palace in late 1746 - early 1747 managed to convince the empress of the need to join the Austro-British convention directed against France.With the money of the Austrians and the British, Russia pledged to send a 30,000-strong auxiliary corps or instead concentrate in Courland and on the Dvina near Riga a 90,000-strong army and 50 galleys.

But the chancellor was not too arrogant and tried to maintain at least the appearance of decent relations with his deputy. Thus, in correspondence with him, Bestuzhev called Vorontsov his sincere and unfeigned friend, and himself his most faithful and diligent servant. Notifying Mikhail Illarionovich that the Empress always spoke graciously of him and his wife, Alexei Petrovich wrote: “I can say without praise that rarely a day goes by when I and your other Excellency friends do not drink for your health.”

Vorontsov also knew the value of all these assurances and was angry with the chancellor for not informing him of the important and secret affairs of the Collegium. Vorontsov became even more angry when he learned that the man who had been his right hand- Adrian Ivanovich Neplyuev - was appointed a resident in Constantinople, and did not hide his displeasure. Bestuzhev justified himself that even without Neplyuev, things in the Collegium were going well, and that he still had a good attitude towards this worker.

Solovyov writes that from the correspondence between the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor it is clear that the former was still very afraid of the latter, flattered him and wished “to enter into former friendly relations with him, into former political unanimity…”. But Bestuzhev did not miss an opportunity not to stab his opponent with the fact that the French allegedly did not show him the honors befitting his high rank when entering Paris: “Truly, your excellency in all French cities has a lot of honor, as a crowned head, because for you they put garrisons in a gun, and fired from cannons, and captains with a whole company for guards were attached, which is why I expected that because Paris is alive, a reception for your Excellency will be ordered. But what a surprise I came when I saw something very contrary to this, especially that Her Excellency, your dearest wife, is not allowed to sit on a stool with the queen ... "

It is difficult to say what is more in this letter - mockery, gloating or feigned respect, but it does not smell of sincere regret. As if in response to this letter from the Chancellor, Vorontsov sent a detailed report on how honorably and how magnificently Frederick II received him in Berlin. But it seems that he did it in vain - Elizabeth took it with great displeasure.

Vorontsov's supporters, in the words of d'Allion, were waiting for his return to Petersburg, like the Jews of the prophet Moses. And official Petersburg, with undisguised irritation, watched the enemies of Russia "caress" her minister: "Shah Nadir" gave the Vice-Chancellor a rich sword with diamonds and ordered him to be carried around the country for free, Mardefeld from St. Petersburg called Vorontsov "the most worthy minister and the most honest man in Europe", and Princess Johanna Elisabeth of Anhalt-Zerbst, expelled from Russia for her espionage activities, also lavished compliments on the Vice-Chancellor. The purpose of such treatment of Vorontsov was obvious - to make him an obedient and suggestible person for Berlin's plans. Reception old, but tested.

Before Vorontsov left for Russia, Princess Anhalt-Zerbst met him and handed him a letter for her daughter, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna, which "miraculously" fell into the hands of Bestuzhev. In this letter, the spy of Frederick II complained that her daughter rarely writes to her, that her husband Pyotr Fedorovich removed Brummer from himself, that in Holstein they were persecuting the confidants of her brother, the Swedish Crown Prince Adolf-Fredrik. And the most important thing: “I find in Count Vorontsov a man of proven devotion, filled with zeal for the common cause ... Connect with him, and you will be able to sort out these difficult relationships, but be careful and do not neglect anyone. Thank the Vice-Chancellor and his wife Anna Karlovna for making a detour on purpose to meet with us. I earnestly ask you to burn my letters, especially this one.”

They didn't burn it. The chancellor read it first.

By the way, in November 1745, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, on the orders of Elizabeth Petrovna, sent Vorontsova "a warning in reserve, so that the wife of the Vice-Chancellor, Countess Vorontsova ... when meeting with Princess Anhalt-Zerbstek, her hands ... do not kiss (as this is indecent there)." I wonder if Anna Karlovna observed these propriety?

Of course, it was obvious that Vorontsov, willy-nilly, had already fallen into the net of Frederick II's anti-Bestuzhev conspiracy. Presenting the letter of Princess Elizabeth of Zerbst, Bestuzhev supplied it with notes. He reminded the empress that before leaving abroad "the rapprochement of the Vice-Chancellor with Lestok, Trubetskoy and Rumyantsev has not yet been fully approved ...". But: "As Lestocq's nephew Chapizo testified, Vorontsov had already made confidential correspondence with Lestocq during his travels." And the main clue: Connect with him”; if it only meant the overthrow of the chancellor, then there would be no need to take so many measures. This means that Bestuzhev suspected something worse than his removal from the post of chancellor - in all likelihood, damage to his system, and this for him, and for Elizabeth, was tantamount to high treason. And further: “Burn, please diligently, all my letters, especially this one.” The diligent request that all letters be burned shows that the previous letters were of no less importance, like this one.

Of course, after such a letter, the vice-chancellor should certainly be interrogated, and interrogated with prejudice, for example, in the office of A.I. Ushakov. But Elizabeth, so accustomed to palace intrigues and, in general, rather careless and at times frivolous (if it was not about the throne or life), the betrayal of Vorontsov, who was also married to her half-sister Skavronskaya Anna Karlovna, probably did not seem such. If she took note of this fact, she soon forgot.

In the meantime, one intrigue was wound on another, some secret plans were intertwined with others or destroyed them, virtue fought evil, flattery with deceit, envy with frivolity, greed with wastefulness, nepotism with kindred feelings, and at the center of all this was one person - great chancellor, who managed to parry and strike back, intercept other people's letters and reports and scribble his own, keep numerous agents and fire them for treason or unsuitability, keep dozens of important threads in his hands and thousands of equally important thoughts in his head. Fighting day after day, without compromises and stops...

And all this against the backdrop of colossal efforts to contain revanchist and anti-constitutional sentiments in Sweden, confrontations with Berlin and Paris, and scrupulous application of the “system” strained the nerves. And Bestuzhev won this war of nerves. The modern German researcher W. Mediger writes that by the time of the Swedish crisis of 1749-1751. the Russian chancellor's mental faculties, ingenuity, memory and combinational abilities weakened. What can be said to this? If Herr Mediger would have read the AVPRI archives, and not just the reports of Prussian and French diplomats, then he would have had a completely different opinion about mental capacity Bestuzhev-Ryumin.

... Having missed the Russian-Austrian rapprochement, d "Allion had to be urgently recalled from St. Petersburg, but for some reason they could not find a replacement for him in Versailles. Truly, this envoy was a great misfortune for France. Having exhausted all means against Bestuzhev, he decided to accuse him of that he is conspiring in favor of Ivan Antonovich, imprisoned in the Shlisselburg Fortress.In the margins of the intercepted dispatch of the French Minister, Bestuzhev makes a very important remark: “Her Majesty about the undoubted chancellor's loyalty, even before the all-joyful ascension to the ancestral throne, through Count Mikhail Aarionovin and Lestok, received satisfactory experiences and will graciously recall everything.”

We will forgive poor d "Allion's ignorance of this fact, because he was unknown not only to him, but, it seems, to many Russian historians. We wrote above (and wrote before us) that Bestuzhev did not participated. According to all reports, he suddenly appears on the stage at the moment when the conspiracy has already been committed, and he is instructed to write a manifesto about the accession of Elizabeth to the "ancestral throne". Why Bestuzhev? It turns out that there were reasons. It turns out that Bestuzhev, allegedly » idle in last days the reign of Anna Leopoldovna, “before the joyful ascension to the ancestral throne, he rendered some important service to Elizabeth! What? Obviously, neither Solovyov, who casually mentioned this fact in his more than voluminous work, nor other Russians and Soviet historians. But be that as it may, it becomes clear that Elizabeth at one time had good reasons to note Bestuzhev Jr. with her attention and nominate him to an important public post.

... To the attacks of d "Allion, Bestuzhev answered with invariable notes in the margins of the deciphered dispatches of a Frenchman like: “These and similar lies perpetrated by Dalion in an inconspicuous way prepare the way to Siberia ...”

In spite of everything, the enemies met each other and, as it should be for diplomats, they made good mines with a bad game. During dinner at the English ambassador Hindford d "Allion refused to drink for the health of the English king - so he decided to defend the honor of France. When the English consul Wulf proposed a toast to Louis XV, the owner stood up and said that he knew better than d" Allion, what respect he is indebted to the crowned head of another state.

The Frenchman meanwhile continued to sit.

I never drink to the health of a foreign monarch without drinking to the health of my sovereign,” he said haughtily.

But get up, sir," said Hindford, "since you see me standing!

Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who was sitting at the table, took a glass and exclaimed:

I drink to the victory of the English army!

In a refined, gallant age, diplomatic manners were as raw and direct as battle cries on the battlefield.

Note that France at the moment being described (the Seven Years' War) was Russia's ally in the war with Prussia and at the same time was at war with England, which did not prevent the French envoy from attending a dinner with an English diplomat.

D "Allion, throwing poisonous arrows at Bestuzhev, once again got into trouble, informing Versailles about Lestocq's "new elevation" after his marriage to his old mistress Anna Mengden, the sister of Anna Leopoldovna's favorite Yulia Mengden. Bestuzhev intercepted this report and showed Hindford The Englishman, after reading d'Allion's dispatch, rolled with laughter.

Previously, d "Allion, Petersburg was forced to leave the Prussian envoy Mardefeld. The Prussian once again tried to open his wallet in front of the chancellor to test his stamina, but he abruptly cut him off and said that in view of the upcoming war with Prussia, he had no right to communicate with him. Elizabeth finally recalled her envoy Chernyshev from Berlin and forbade her diplomats to communicate with the Prussians.

Less noticeable were Bestuzhev's successes in Sweden, where the influence of Prussia and France increased, although there, too, Bestuzhev's supporter, envoy Baron I.A. Korf, tirelessly and zealously tried to defend the position of Russia.

Frederick II fenced himself off from the attack of the maritime powers by the Hanover Convention, which is why the performance of the Russian auxiliary corps could not threaten him. The main obstacle to this was the ill-fated alliance between England and Prussia. London, according to the rules known only to him, simultaneously, at the same table, played two card games. Naturally, Bestuzhev did not like this much, but he could do nothing about it.

Frederick II and Louis XV continued their anti-Russian intrigues in Sweden and Poland, but, not satisfied with this, they began to incite the Ottoman Porte against Russia. The Austrians intercepted a letter from d "Argenson to his Berlin colleague Valory, which, in particular, said: "We have hope in the Ottoman Porte to find ways to occupy the queen from this side and from the side of Persia." The Berlin court began to mercilessly treat and survive the acting representative of Russia in Berlin, Count Chernyshev, which led to Bestuzhev's retaliatory actions against the Prussian envoy to Russia, Mardefeld. Tensions between the two countries reached their highest point.

The new Prussian envoy, Karl von Finckenstein, wrote reassuring dispatches to King Friedrich that Russian troops did not threaten Berlin in any way, although he had to admit that "Bestuzhev treats us rather badly, and the Empress is even worse." In response, Frederick II wrote that as long as he had an agreement with England, he had nothing to fear from Russia. "I willingly allow you to cut it off whenever you see fit,"- the king consoled Finkenstein about the rude speeches of the Russian chancellor.

In August 1746, Vorontsov returned home, whom all the chancellor's opponents were looking forward to. Francophile Count C.G. Tessin, who managed Sweden's foreign affairs, reassured his government that with the return of the Vice-Chancellor, things would go contrary to Bestuzhev's system. On the margins of the report of the Russian envoy to Sweden Korf, the chancellor wrote on this occasion: “Tessin very biasedly and with truth dissimilarly discloses that the current system is not that of the chancellor, but of the sovereign Peter the Great ... the chancellor is only a small tool in pursuance of her majesty’s only wise orders and commands.”

On the joyful dispatch of d "Allion about the meeting with Vorontsov, intercepted by Bestuzhev's agents, the vice-chancellor was forced to leave exculpatory notes that he did not give any reason to praise the Frenchman. Taking into account Vorontsov's excuses, the empress also read Bestuzhev's remark, in in which the Chancellor drew her attention to the fact that the Vice-Chancellor, having undergone "training" in Europe, arrived with the clear intention of "refuting" his comrade and "Assign the main board of affairs to yourself." Bestuzhev referred to 26 years of service in the diplomatic field, pointed to constant intrigues and undermining under his activities and asked Elizabeth "to protect and free from such a sad life in the fifty-fourth year of his old age."

"The chancellor was protected and released"- writes Solovyov.

But for how long?

In the meantime, d'Allion, in a panic, informed d'Arzhanson that Bestuzhev's position had only intensified with the arrival of Vorontsov, and the disgrace of Empress Elizabeth had befallen the vice-chancellor. “In my dealings with Vorontsov, he wrote, I follow your intentions exactly, I caress him with great diligence ... I force pride to act in him ... Bestuzhev Lately he did such a thing that strengthens his mercy and power of attorney and destroys the plans of Count Vorontsov: he married his only son to the niece of Count Razumovsky ... "

Yes, in some way, the chancellor sacrificed his son Andrei, marrying him, according to the calculation, to a relative of the Elizabethan favorite, but the matter required sacrifice. The marriage of the son, by the way, will be unsuccessful.

Vorontsov, feeling a chill in the attitude of the empress towards him, wrote her a letter in which he assured her of loyal feelings and lamented about "poor and painful state of his heart."

The Chancellor, at that time, was tormented by debts.

He received a large house as a gift from the Empress, but he could not furnish and put it in order due to lack of funds. He turned to the English Minister Hindford for help, asking him for a loan of £10,000, and also tried to encourage Elizabeth to a new “gift”, but so far everything was in vain. Finally, the English consul Wulf helped him out and lent him the sum of 50,000 rubles. Debts came from large hospitality expenses, and from playing cards, and from an addiction to Bacchus. These diseases came to the chancellor along with the triumph of his brilliant position, unlimited power and impudent stubborn character. Cards and wine became the subject of constant family quarrels with his wife and son.

In early 1747, negotiations continued on a military convention and subsidies with England. Already at the stage of negotiations, Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov began to put a spoke in the wheels, presenting clearly excessive demands to the British side. What it was - the desire to "annoy" the chancellor or protect the legitimate interests of the state - it's hard to say. Perhaps both together.

Bestuzhev was indignant: instead of coordinating their objections with him in advance, Vorontsov and his supporters, during the negotiations that began, opposed the position of their chancellor, which, naturally, made a bad impression on the British. The main obstacle in the negotiations was the issue of subsidies. For every thousand Russian soldiers who were to take part in the war against Prussia, Bestuzhev asked for 375 thousand rubles, and another 10 thousand f.st. personally for yourself. The Anglo-Russian convention nevertheless took place, and with English money in the amount of 100 thousand f.st. a year, an auxiliary Russian corps of General Repnin was sent to the Rhine region.

In the meantime, a situation that was paradoxical for its chancellor was created in the College of Foreign Affairs: most of its employees supported the line of their manager, Count M.G. Vorontsov and was hostile to Bestuzhev-Ryumin. True, in practice, the chancellor managed to belittle the significance of the CFA in foreign policy so much that he did not even honor it with his presence and conducted all affairs alone. “What should I do with them? Bestuzhev explained. - They do not open a single paper and can only contradict me without coming to any conclusion.. Of course, this did not bode well for the future, but such was the independent and tough temper of the great chancellor: he went straight ahead to the goal, through all obstacles and obstacles, using friends, eliminating or outplaying enemies, convincing the sovereign of his rightness.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin ignored the CFA not only because of its hostile atmosphere, but also out of pure principle - he believed that collegiality in politics is harmful. He was too vain and proud to consult and share his innermost thoughts with strangers. This, of course, had its pros and cons: in an atmosphere of intrigue, tricks and denunciations, relying on someone was really dangerous, and sometimes unreasonable. At the same time, be deprived of the opportunity to listen to the pros and cons of your ideas and come to common decision was also hardly productive. But such was Alexei Petrovich - the lone wolf of diplomacy.

By the way, about the Chancellor's attitude towards the Foreign Collegium. We will skip ahead a year and give Solovyov’s story about how on December 8/19, 1748, Bestuzhev held one amazing meeting, inviting two leading employees of the Foreign Collegium to his house - Privy Councilor Isaak Veselovsky and Obersecretary Ivan Pugovishnikov. An interesting conversation followed, which, in all probability, was recorded by Pugovishnikov.

Bestuzhev began by showing the guests a pile of extracts (extracts) from the raw ministerial reports sent to him that required decisions to be made, and expressed his surprise that "gentlemen, ex officio, do not exert their efforts," that is, he rebuked them for their inaction.

Veselovsky objected that he, like other members of the board, was at work “Always sitting has and, as far as possible, exercises its own in business.” The chancellor did not agree with this and pointed to cases that had lain in the collegium for six months or more without any resolutions. “If you think that I myself should give my reasoning in advance for every matter, then this is not my position, and I can’t stretch out to become alone in all matters,” he answered sharply. He does not have enough time for the most important and urgent matters that need to be reported to the Empress. Veselovsky innocently replied that he did not know such cases. Then the chancellor cited as an example the appeal of the Saxon court, which offered Russia the conclusion of a union treaty, the answer to which he had to compose himself. Veselovsky said that he had seen this paper, but he did not know why it lay motionless for so long. The chancellor replied that Veselovsky or anyone else in the board should have told him their opinion on this document.

As an example of a conscientious attitude to his duties, Bestuzhev cited the late office secretary Brevern. The Privy Councilor, backed up against the wall, was offended and said that if he had the strength and summer of Brevern, then he could also work successfully. He works by virtue of his mind and strength, but if they are not enough, then where can they be found? If they could be bought or forged in a forge, he would gladly do it. Bestuzhev, ignoring the Privy Councilor's mocking reply, pointed out edifyingly that it was not a matter of old age, but of diligence. In addition, the Privy Councilor has secretaries at his disposal, who can be ordered to do whatever is necessary.

To all appearances, the Chancellor never managed to reach an understanding with his staff. Veselovsky expressed the opinion that general meetings and hearings of cases are now rarely held in the collegium, at which decisions on all important cases are developed and agreed upon. In response, Bestuzhev said that he refused to attend these meetings, because instead of a constructive discussion of his proposals, he received only critical remarks there. These sittings in the college were a waste of time - "... I much more at home ... I can fix the most necessary things ”.

And the skirmish ended in nothing.

At this conversation, the invisible presence of Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov is felt, and Veselovsky spoke clearly on his behalf. From the conversation it is clear that the Privy Councilor behaves rather independently in a conversation with the Chancellor, does not feel guilty and, without any hesitation, objects to Bestuzhev on every occasion. This is understandable: Finkenstein, who replaced Mardefeld, continued the course to overthrow Bestuzhev-Ryumin and maintained friendship with "important and courageous buddies", that is, Vorontsov and Lestok. Together they won over to their side the former member of the Bestuzhev circle and the protege of Alexei Petrovich, Privy Councilor I. Veselovsky, an intelligent, active person, initiated into many secrets of the Chancellor. At this conversation, Veselovsky was already Vorontsov's slander.

And once the Jew Veselovsky had a certain influence on Bestuzhev-Ryumin: he even persuaded him, then Vice-Chancellor, to petition Elizaveta Petrovna to cancel the decree of December 13, 1742 on the expulsion of all Jews from Little Russia. The troubles, however, did not lead to anything, the empress did not cancel the decree, but this did not interfere with the friendship of Alexei Petrovich with Isaac Veselovsky. And now Veselovsky has gone over to the camp of his opponent...

Of course, in vain Alexei Petrovich ignored the Board and its members. Thus, he gave Vorontsov more freedom of action in it. Commenting on this conversation, Solovyov writes that, of course, the chancellor shifted the blame from a sick head to a healthy one: he himself accustomed the members of the collegium to inaction, personally “correcting all things” at home and without giving them any initiative. It's also hard to disagree with this.

And with regard to the former friend of Veselovsky, Bestuzhev nevertheless tried to recoup: he wrote to Elizaveta Petrovna a denunciation that at one of the diplomatic receptions, Isaac Veselovsky refused to drink the health of the empress: “Only Veselovsky did not want to drink full, but he poured a spoonful and a half and then only with vodka and stood stubbornly in front of everyone, although the chancellor, out of loyalty to Her Imperial Majesty and out of shame in front of the ambassadors, told him in Russian that he owed this health drink with a full glass, like a faithful slave, and because he is from E.I.V. much mercy is shown by awarding him from a small rank to such a noble one. But nothing came of the denunciation: the empress ignored the denunciation and showered Isaac Pavlovich with new favors. And this despite the fact that Elizaveta Petrovna did not like the “Kids” very much.

In 1747, Bestuzhev filed, as he now began to often express himself, his "weakest opinion" in favor of the dissolution of the Senate and the establishment of the Cabinet of Ministers in its place, "not having any kind of self." The Senate, in fact, was a cumbersome bureaucratic institution, with difficulty turning its mechanisms. At the same time, the chancellor knew very well that he was going against the opinion of the empress, who insisted on preserving this legacy of Peter I. There is no information that Bestuzhev's initiative in any way influenced his position, but there is no doubt that his enemies took advantage of this to accuse him of intending to subdue the entire state apparatus. In the Cabinet of Ministers, the chancellor, in all likelihood, expected to occupy a dominant position.

Among its devoted and laconic performers, history has preserved the names of the Saxon Funk (not to be confused with Funk, who “distinguished himself” by writing pamphlets in Sweden), the Saxon Prasse and the Italian Santi. It is noteworthy that the Russian patriot Bestuzhev-Ryumin clearly did not trust his compatriots and did not involve them in the circle of his confidants. Who were these confidants?

Funk, secretary of the Saxon mission in St. Petersburg, until 1754 played the actual role of deputy under the chancellor, being both his chief adviser and inspirer. “He was the necessary alter ego of a man decidedly incapable of performing a task far beyond his gifts,- Valishevsky, obviously not disposed to the personality of Bestuzhev, writes evilly, - was his brain and his right hand." Funk's successor, an employee of the Prasse Saxon mission, put as much zeal into his work as Funk, but was inferior to him in ability. Waliszewski claims that when French diplomacy managed to get rid of Funk in 1754, "Bestuzhev turned out to be a body without a soul, floating with the flow until falling into a fatal abyss." In 1754, Funk, already an envoy of King Augustus III, without explanation was called by Elizabeth "an objectionable minister of a friendly state" and, at her urgent request, with complete bewilderment of the Saxon court, was recalled from Russia. The hand of Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov is clearly felt here.

The Italian Santi was useful to Bestuzhev in matters of etiquette, protocol, and appearances. He taught the chancellor how to behave with foreign ministers and other diplomats and emissaries.

In August 1747, Vorontsov received the Prussian envoy Finkenstein. In the report of this audience, Finkenstein called the vice-chancellor an "important friend" of Prussia. According to the report, Vorontsov told the Prussian that Bestuzhev accused him of handing over classified information to the Prussian king, while he, an honest and well-meaning man, allegedly simply does not know how to keep secrets and sincerely shares them, having love for Friedrich P. Vorontsov also told the Prussian about his last conversations with Elizabeth, in which he expressed his thoughts about how to reduce the excessive powers of the chancellor, including the proposal that Bestuzhev decide all cases only through the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. The empress kept the written draft of the Vice-Chancellor, promising to study it carefully at her leisure.

The vice-chancellor, in his "sincere love" for the Prussian king, went even further and warned Finkenstein to be careful in his correspondence, because Bestuzhev's agents intercept the dispatches of foreign ministers and read them. Finkenstein thought that his "brave" friend was a coward and did not believe his last statement. Then Vorontsov told the Prussian the contents of his last dispatch to Berlin, which plunged him into extreme amazement.

Vorontsov's talkativeness, bordering on betrayal, Finkenstein rewarded with "stunning news" that the chancellor was involved in a conspiracy in favor of Ioan Antonovich. Vorontsov found the courage to object to his friend, saying what Bestuzhev was simply not able to do.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin had to work with such a vice-chancellor, this is how the person who was once his closest assistant degraded.

In 1747, obedient to France, Stockholm joined the fight against Bestuzhev. The Swedes considered the actions of their ambassador in St. Petersburg too weak in this regard and replaced him with a new one - Wulfenscherna. The envoy in Stockholm, Korf, managed to obtain information about the secret instructions received by the new ambassador: the main task of Wulfensherna was determined to be the overthrow of Chancellor Bestuzhev from his post (of course, in alliance with d "Allion and Finkenstein). The Swede also had to try - no more and no less - to replace the real Russian cabinet of ministers with other, more friendly Swedes. The Swedish envoy had to get in touch with Bestuzhev's enemies and find out which ladies of the court could be bet on. Why ladies? According to Solovyov, Stockholm counted on the pretty face of Wulfenstierna , his passion for playing cards and red tape, is a weapon that the Swede allegedly successfully used before as an envoy to the Saxon court. If you need money, the instructions said, then Wulfensherna had to turn to d "Allion for them - he would not refuse. The new ambassador will also receive special credit for his efforts to recall the overly active Russian ambassador Korf from Stockholm, for it is only through his efforts that the pro-Russian party in Sweden is stubbornly holding on. Wulfenstierna also had to prevent the appointment of Chancellor M.P.'s brother as ambassador to Stockholm in every possible way. Bestuzhev-Ryumin.

But Bestuzhev continued to vigilantly follow all the steps of his enemies according to Finkenstein's dispatches. The Prussian minister, warned by the vice-chancellor, apparently relied too much on the strength of his ciphers and continued to inform not only Frederick II, but also the Russian chancellor Bestuzhev. The irony of the situation was that Vorontsov also read copies of Finkenstein's intercepted dispatches, which put him in a delicate position in relation to both the chancellor and the Prussian envoy. It is not for nothing that Finkenstein writes to Berlin that Vorontsov has become timid and does not share all the details with him.

At that time, all the intrigue unfolded around the expedition of the Russian Repnin corps in Europe, and Lestok and Vorontsov tried to convince Frederick II that he should not have any fears from Russian soldiers, because there is no discipline in the army, soldiers do not obey officers, and no one likes the commander-in-chief of the corps, General Georgy Liven, etc. Bestuzhev, commenting on Finkenstein's report and his correspondence with Lestok, bitterly complains that Vorontsov is with Lestok plus Chief Prosecutor Trubetskoy, “wishing to destroy him, they harm the interests of their monarchy and fatherland.”

The vice-chancellor criticized his boss and officially, demagogically asserting that by sending a 30,000-strong corps to Europe against Prussia and to help Austria and Saxony, Bestuzhev was drawing the empire into "European confusion." Bestuzhev rightly objected that in this situation, sitting behind the fence would be detrimental to the interests of Russia itself, and that Peter the Great himself would have done the same.

From Finkenstein's dispatch dated July 23/August 3, Bestuzhev found out that Vorontsov was on the payroll of Frederick II and was receiving a pension from him. The envoy, reporting to the king that the pension expired on September 1, wrote that an "important friend" had hinted to him that he was counting on its extension. "Friend" Vorontsov, wrote Finkenstein, despite the fact that he greatly reduced the amount of information transmitted to him, still continues to be useful to the Prussian court. Bestuzhev wrote on the margins of the intercepted dispatch: “Christ says in the Gospel, a slave cannot work for two masters, God and mammon; meanwhile, from this it is clear that this amount was already appointed notably through Mardefeld even before he was in Berlin. Much now became clear to Bestuzhev, for example, that it was Vorontsov who gave the Prussians Privy Councilor Ferber, who was executed on the orders of Frederick II for transferring important secret information to the Russian government, and from Dresden supplied the Prussian king with important information on the eve of the campaign of the Prussian army in Saxony.

Vorontsov acted as a traitor to Russia in its purest form.

At the end of August 1748, the chancellor intercepted a new message from Finkenstein, from which it was clear that Lestok had supplied the Prussian with information that Elizaveta Petrovna was very irritated against the maritime powers and that the chancellor's opponents should immediately take advantage of this circumstance. Bestuzhev marked the dispatch with the words: "Her emperor. majesty knows better whether she deigned to keep such conversations under Lestocq; but his crime is the same whether he lied to her majesty or made a true report to the minister of the king of Prussia. Her empire Majesty has already deigned to see from previous letters that Lestok advised that neither Her Majesty's Minister should be allowed to the Congress, nor should Russia be included in the peace treaty.

Old Repnin, who commanded a 30,000-man Russian corps sent to help Austria and did not fire a single shot during his campaign in Germany, was soon forced to give the order to return home. However, N.I. Kostomarov believes that this campaign contributed to the speedy conclusion of the Peace of Aachen (10/18/1748). The sight of the Russian "bears" heading west past Prussia to measure strength with the Gallic "roosters" still scared Friedrich I. The Congress secured the accession of Silesia to Prussia and drew a line under the eight-year war for the Austrian inheritance. The Russian delegation, at the prompting of Lestok, was not invited to the Aachen Peace Congress, which, of course, was a great omission of Bestuzhev's diplomacy. Europe agreed on everything without the participation of Russia, although she sent her corps to participate in hostilities. True, Commander-in-Chief Repnin, a sick and indecisive man, never took any part in hostilities on the side of England, Austria and Saxony, for which Bestuzhev received criticism from his allies.

Now that the hands of Prussia, France and, unfortunately, Russia's allies Austria and England, had created a new situation in Europe, the Prussian ambassador to Russia Finkenstein suggested using it against Bestuzhev as a person allegedly guilty of belittling the authority of Russia. Vorontsov, on behalf of Finkenstein, was supposed to inspire this idea to the Empress Elizabeth. And the vice-chancellor promised to do it at the first opportunity.

Lestok received a similar order. It is not known, Solovyov writes, whether he managed to explain himself to Elizabeth, because soon, in December (Soloviev indicates November) 1748, he was arrested. Lestok had long been forbidden to interfere in state affairs, and then Elizabeth, on the advice of Bestuzhev, denied the surgeon access to the court and the treatment of her imperial person. But the life physician, as we see, lasted until 1748.

In 1747, Lestok married for the third time to the girl Anna Mengden, whose family members suffered greatly after the 1741 coup. By her marriage to Lestock, Anna hoped to alleviate the fate of her disgraced relatives. Elizabeth herself combed the bride's hair and adorned her head with her diamonds. Having yielded to Bestuzhev and refusing to use Lestok as a doctor and adviser, she still showed him signs of attention and mercy.

But Lestok, as we see, soon betrayed himself. The dispatches of the Prussian envoy Finkenstein intercepted by Bestuzhev unequivocally testified that the envoy, together with Lestok, acted as a conspirator. Lestok has been under surveillance since May. On December 20, 1747, when he was visiting a Prussian merchant, his secretary and nephew, the French captain Chapusot (Chavuzot, Chapizo), discovered that he was being followed near the house, which was carried out rather rudely. Threatening the bastard with his sword, Chapuseau forced him to enter the house, where he, after long squabbles, confessed that he was instructed to follow Lestocq's every movement.

The life doctor rushed to the palace to the empress with a complaint. There was some kind of reception, and Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna was the first to see Lestok. She rushed to meet him, but he stopped her with the words:

Don't come near me! I am suspicious!

He found the Empress and began to speak rudely and unceremoniously to her. He was trembling with excitement, his face was covered with red spots, and Elizabeth, thinking that he was drunk, withdrew, promising to whitewash him from any suspicion. But it was necessary to know Elizabeth in order to place at least some hope on her now, Finkenstein wrote. Soon Chapusot and several servants were arrested. Lestok again rushed to the palace, but they did not let him in.

Two days later, Elizabeth told Bestuzhev that he could do whatever he wanted with Lestok. On December 24, sixty guards under the command of S.F. Apraksin (1702-1758), by the way, a close friend of Lestok, cordoned off the house in which the wedding of one of the maids of honor of the Empress was to take place and at which Lestok should have been present as a witness either of the groom or the bride. There he was arrested and taken to the fortress.

He was asked to answer several questions: for what purpose did he maintain contact with the Prussian and Swedish ministers, why did he agree to fulfill the order of the “blameless Shetardius” to return the snuffboxes presented to him by the Empress, which was his advice to the Grand Duchess. Ekaterina Alekseevna about how to "lead by the nose" of her husband, whether he contributed to the quarrel between Pyotr Fedorovich and Elizabeth, which was his friendship with the chief prosecutor Trubetskoy. Then he was accused of intending to change the form of government in Russia, of inciting I. Veselovsky to the side hostile to the chancellor, of transmitting information to Prussia about the cooling of Russia’s relations with the maritime powers and about the details of sending a Russian expeditionary force to Europe, as well as receiving a “gift » from Frederick II in the amount of 10,000 rubles. Bestuzhev forgot nothing and missed nothing.

During interrogations, Lestok behaved fearlessly and courageously. For eleven days he did not take food, supporting himself only with mineral water and refusing to give any testimony. By order of Elizabeth, he was pulled up on the rack, but even there he did not open his mouth and did not ask for help or mercy from those in power. In vain his wife tried to persuade him to confess to the conspiracy, promising the Empress' mercy. He allegedly showed her his tortured hands and answered:

I no longer have anything in common with the empress, she betrayed me to the executioner.

N.I. Kostomarov claims that before his arrest, Lestok managed to hand over the documents incriminating him to the Swedish emissaries Volkenstierne and Höpken, who arrived in St. Petersburg on the eve of his arrest with a special assignment from their government. The Swedes took them with them to Stockholm.

The trial of the former medical officer of the Empress lasted until 1750, and then he was exiled to Uglich, from where he was transferred to Veliky Ustyug, allowing his wife to come to him. There he met his accomplice in the 1741 coup d'état, Peter Grünstein, also exiled after being punished with a whip. In 1759, Lestok turned to the favorite of the Empress I.I. Shuvalov with a request to send a fur coat to his wife, who suffered from the cold. When Peter III ascended the throne, Lestok was pardoned, and he appeared in St. Petersburg, full of energy and vitality, despite 14 years of exile and his age (he was 74 years old).

He died in 1767, having outlived his hated adversary by a year.

"The fall of Lestocq made a strong impression at foreign courts,- Soloviev concludes, - it showed the invincible strength of Bestuzhev, and, consequently, showed the future direction of Russian politics ... "

Lestok was defeated, but intrigues against Chancellor Bestuzhev (1693–1766) continued. There was a struggle for power, for influence on the empress, and Bestuzhev's first opponents were the Shuvalov brothers and Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov, who joined them. The Shuvalovs were a serious force. Ivan Ivanovich was the favourite, Alexander Petrovich was the head of the secret chancellery, Pyotr Ivanovich, Feldzeugmeister General, senator and businessman, was the richest man in Russia. Ivan Ivanovich Shuvalov, cousin Peter and Alexander, appeared at court in 1747, and in the fall of 1749, celebrating her name day in the Resurrection Monastery of New Jerusalem, Elizabeth granted Ivan Ivanovich Shuvalov to the chamber junkers. The rise of Ivan Ivanovich greatly raised the shares of all the Shuvalovs. The story about them is ahead.

From an unexpected side, another mortal enemy appeared. They became the elder brother Mikhail Petrovich Bestuzhev. Count Mikhail Petrovich has long served in the diplomatic sector. He began his career under Peter I. Thanks to his intelligence and education, at the age of seventeen he began to serve as a secretary at our embassy in Copenhagen. At twenty-four he was a chamber junker, and in 1720 became our resident in London. Then he quickly rose through the ranks. After the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad, he was appointed envoy to Sweden and held this position until 1741. Elizaveta Petrovna appointed him minister plenipotentiary in Warsaw.

He entered into marriage with Yaguzhinsky's widow, Anna Gavrilovna, in 1743. Could he have guessed what this marriage would turn out for him? In July, the wife was arrested under the Lopukhin conspiracy. Mikhail Petrovich himself was not involved in the case, but throughout the investigation he was kept under guard in his own house. After Anna Gavrilovna, who had been beaten with a whip, was sent into exile for life in Yakutsk, Mikhail Bestuzhev went abroad. A year later he is already our envoy in Berlin.

And then true love came to the diplomat, this is at the age of 56! The subject of passion was the widow of Ober-Schenk Gaugwitz. He decided to marry her. With a living wife, this was not easy, and Mikhail Petrovich turned to his brother, the all-powerful chancellor, for help. Alexei Petrovich had to obtain permission from the Empress for divorce and remarriage. Wrote a letter, one, two. In the autumn of 1747, he sent a request to the highest name, but the matter never got off the ground. Those burned by love are reckless not only in their youth, but also in advanced years. Without waiting for an answer from St. Petersburg, on March 30, 1749, Mikhail Petrovich married his beloved, and soon learned that the newly minted Countess Bestuzheva was not recognized not only in St. Petersburg, but also at the courts where Bestuzhev was an ambassador. From the point of view of etiquette, he was a bigamist who had a concubine, a metress, as they said then.

Rumors reached Mikhail Petrovich that in the case of divorce and a new marriage, his younger brother was not only not an assistant, but also an opponent, de, it was he who put the spokes into the wheels. The relationship between the two brothers was before, as they say now, “difficult”, and then outright hatred has already flared up.

Mikhail Petrovich began to ask for help from Vorontsov, which we learn from his letter: “Your Excellency, as I hope, as my gracious patron and true friend, take part in this adventure, and by your sincere friendship and mercy to me, sometimes done more do not leave to refute the aspirations against this innocent act of suggestion in justice and philanthropy in my favor: for this matter is not different, but the most particular, does not in the least concern state interests, and to which I only to calm my conscience and for an honest life on acted in the light." With this letter, Bestuzhev Sr. confirmed that he was moving into the camp of the enemy of the chancellor. However, Vorontsov did nothing to help Mikhail Petrovich. Help came from the peace-loving Ivan Ivanovich Shuvalov, who persuaded the empress to recognize Bestuzhev's marriage as legal. In 1752, Mikhail Petrovich was called with his wife to St. Petersburg. Bestuzhev announced that he would return to Russia with the sole purpose of taking revenge on his younger brother and pushing him out of his position. On the way from St. Petersburg, he fell ill and arrived in Russia only in 1755, at the height of the intrigues. I will say right away that a year later he was appointed envoy to France, and at this place he actively intrigued against his brother. In 1760 he died, according to his will he was buried in Russia.

But this is still far away, let's go back to the beginning of the fifties of the XVIII century. Bestuzhev is still an opponent of Prussia, a supporter of Austria and England. Everyone understands that Europe is on the verge of a big war. Diplomatic relations with France have already ceased, and the same is about to happen with Prussia. Bestuzhev had to look at the court for allies against the Shuvalovs and others like them. And where to look for them? Most likely, among the enemies of the Shuvalov clan. So Bestuzhev had the idea to go to reconciliation with the Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna. Reconciliation took place, and this laid the foundation for future mournful events for Alexei Petrovich. But before moving on to them, one should dwell in detail on the figure of the chancellor, a person "ambiguous" in his characteristics. My God, no matter how many derogatory characteristics they awarded him!

Manstein in his Notes on Russia writes that Bestuzhev was an intelligent, hardworking man with great skill in public affairs, patriotic, but at the same time proud, vindictive, ungrateful and intemperate in life. Catherine II also pays tribute to the mind and talents of the chancellor, but adds that he was crafty, tyrannical, suspicious and petty.

And here is Valishevsky about Bestuzhev: “He was certainly not deprived of some personal talents, of those that bring happiness to the majority of adventurers; he acted with the help of subtle cunning and rude impudence, imperturbable calm and unerring instinct for external decorum, combining them with majesty, which he knew how to preserve in the most humiliating situations and with which he deceived not only Elizabeth, but all Europe. He demanded subsidies from Russia in an authoritative tone and accepted bribes as if he were doing it a great honor. And it seems to me that a true diplomat should possess precisely such qualities. Or I do not understand anything in diplomacy?

Alexei Petrovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin was born in Moscow into a noble family on May 20, 1793. He was the third child (sister Agrafena and brother Michael). Father - Peter Mikhailovich (1764-1743). Mother's name was Evdokia Mikhailovna.

But first, a few words about the surname. According to legend, the Bestuzhev family descended from a certain Gabriel Best, an Englishman from Kent who came to Russia in 1403, that is, even under Vasily I. Gabriel had a son, Yakov Ryuma, and then reigning Ivan III the Great granted this Ryum to the boyars. Hence the Bestuzhevs-Ryumins, who in no case should be confused with simply Bestuzhevs. The encyclopedia denies the Bestuzhevs an English origin, arguing that their ancestors lived in Veliky Novgorod and were forcibly relocated to Moscow by Ivan III during the defeat of the Novgorod freemen. "Bestuzh" in Old Slavonic - "not bothering with anything." There is a clear genetic conflict. Alexey Petrovich all his life was only engaged in refuting the hidden meaning of his surname, annoying everyone who turned up on the way.

And then "in the text." Former Novgorodian Gavriil Bestuzhev had a son, Yakov, nicknamed Ryuma. Their descendants faithfully served the Russian sovereigns. The father of the chancellor we are describing, Pyotr Mikhailovich Bestuzhev, served as a steward for Peter I, at the same time he received an increase in his surname. The sovereign trusted him, Peter Mikhailovich managed to visit the governor in Simbirsk, carried out assignments in Berlin and Vienna, and in 1712 he settled in Mitava as chamberlain under the dowager Duchess Anna Ioannovna.

Both sons of Peter Mikhailovich received a good education abroad, they knew languages ​​very well. Peter I appreciated the talent and diligence of Alexei Bestuzhev. In 1712, the emperor sent him with the Russian embassy abroad to the Congress of Utrech. The elector of Hanover noticed an ambitious and intelligent young man and took him to his service in the rank of chamber junker. When the elector, under the name of George I, ascended the English throne, Alexei Bestuzhev was sent to Russia to tell the emperor the good news. At the same time, he was appointed envoy of England to Russia. Such a service was quite in the custom of the time, Peter I treated this quite favorably.

But hard times were coming for the Russian Empire. Even when he was a chamber junker, Alexei Petrovich decided to try his luck and sent a loyal letter to Tsarevich Alexei who had fled abroad, in which he called the prince "the future tsar and sovereign." “I am only waiting for a gracious answer so that I can immediately retire from the royal service, and I will personally appear to your highness.” This is how he committed recklessness, but fate took pity on him, "there was no merciful answer." Further fate Tsarevich Alexei was terrible. He was returned to Russia, an investigation began. There was no Bestuzhev's letter in the Tsarevich's papers, obviously, he destroyed it, and during interrogations he did not say orally about Alexei Petrovich's zeal.

But our hero suffered fear. Clever father Pyotr Mikhailovich decided to take his youngest son away from sin under his father's wing. In 1718, Alexei Bestuzhev left for Courland to serve Anna Ioannovna. There he received the rank of chamberlain, met Biron, they established a close, trusting relationship. Two years later, Alexey Petrovich went as a resident to Denmark. Alexei's older brother Mikhail - they had a five-year age difference - worked more successfully in the diplomatic field, the younger brother was jealous, they had a strained relationship all their lives.

Peter I died, the throne was taken by his crowned wife. Aleksey Petrovich understood that you couldn't make a career in Denmark. He began to "boost" the empress - of course, not to her personally, but to the environment. Letters, many letters in which he offered himself to the service, took oaths, did not disdain advice. But the Empress was not up to him.

Catherine I left for another world. In complete confusion with the succession to the throne, Alexei Petrovich made the right choice: he decided to stick to Peter II. Again letters with a proposal of his own person. But in terms of intrigue, it was difficult for Bestuzhev Jr. to outdo Menshikov. He almost fell into disgrace in the case of Devier, the "poisoner." Bestuzhev's addressees left for exile one after another. Among others, Sister Agrafena Petrovna, who fought too actively for the rank of Chamberlain, was sent to a distant village in custody. But Alexei Petrovich was not touched, Denmark is far from Russia.

While still the Duchess of Courland, Anna Ioannovna was very fond of the Bestuzhev-Ryumin family. Father - Peter Bestuzhev - not only was in charge of all Courland affairs, but was also the lover of the duchess. Then Biron took his place. This was a lowering of status, but Peter Mikhailovich received a serious defeat when he made an active attempt to put Maurice of Saxony on the ducal Kurdish throne. This Anna Ioannovna did not forgive her former chamberlain and lover. In 1728, Anna Ioannovna caught her chamberlain nothing less than theft. In St. Petersburg, a commission was set up to "count" Pyotr Bestuzhev. The case ended with a link.

The self-interest of the father was reflected in the son. As soon as Anna Ioannovna occupied the Russian throne, Alexei Bestuzhev wrote her a "touching" letter: "I, a poor and helpless cadet, my life is not easier to complete, but I have always been betrayed into oblivion." Instead of returning to her homeland, Anna appointed her "old faithful servant and servant", as he recommended himself, as a resident in Hamburg. Alexey Petrovich took this appointment as a disgrace.

It is clear that Hamburg is not Copenhagen, but Alexei spent time there to his advantage. He traveled to Kiel, got acquainted with the papers of the Holstein House, and eventually took many important documents to Russia, in particular spiritual testament Catherine I.

In 1734, Alexei Bestuzhev was again transferred to Denmark. The case helped. Bestuzhev got a document informing about the conspiracy of the Smolensk gentry. Alexei immediately reported this to Biron, received the title of Privy Councilor for the denunciation, and was assigned to Copenhagen. His name has already become popular in Europe, not because of his diplomatic talents, but because of his apothecaries. Alexey Petrovich casually invented the "Bestuzhev Drops", which were very popular in the 18th century. He carried out his chemical work jointly with the chemist Lamotte - it is clear that the latter was the main author. But Bestuzhev knew how to collect cream from any of his business. Here are the instructions of pharmacists: Dissolve 1 part of iron sesquichloride in 12 parts of alcohol with ether. Then pour the liquid into glass bottles and expose to sunlight. Keep until the solution becomes colorless. Then put the drops in a dark place, over time they will become yellowish. To drink or to smear - I did not understand, but the word "drops" means to drip, therefore - to drink. Dose not specified.

All the reign of Anna Ioannovna Bestuzhev sat in Copenhagen, learning the style and intrigues of foreign diplomacy, and in 1740 he was called to Russia. After the execution of Volynsky, Biron needed a loyal person, with whom he could resist the "intrigues" of Osterman. Here Bestuzhev is bestowed with the title of real privy councilor and appointed cabinet minister. He was forty-seven years old. A long, passionate dream of Alexei Petrovich came true, but again bad luck - Anna Ioannovna became seriously ill. Bestuzhev laid down his bones to secure the regency for Biron. He works day and night, writes "determinations" in favor of Biron, composes a "Positive Declaration". This "declaration" lay at the bedside of the dying empress for ten days. Succeeded! Ernst Johann Biron, Duke of Courland, Regent for the Infant Emperor! And twenty-four days later, Alexei Bestuzhev was already in the Shlisselburg fortress.

Upon the accession to the throne of Elizabeth Petrovna, the Bestuzhevs were again in honor, both brothers received the dignity of a count. Alexei Petrovich was awarded the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, received the rank of Vice Chancellor, and four years later became Grand Chancellor.

Bestuzhev himself tried to make Vorontsov vice-chancellor, through him he hoped to gain freer access to the empress; it happened that months passed before Elizabeth received her chancellor. But Vorontsov, who was devoted to France, did not become an ally of Bestuzhev; he went over to the opposite camp. He had to get rid of him at least for a while. Vorontsov dreamed of traveling abroad, and Bestuzhev ensured this for him, and in the absence of the traveler found a way to compromise him before the empress.

Defending his commitment to Austria and England, Bestuzhev told Elizabeth that he was continuing the policy of her great father, that was enough for her. Rare meetings with the chancellor were due not only to the laziness of Elizabeth, she did not like the company of Alexei Bestuzhev, he was a bad conversationalist: boring, persistent, not witty, false and still ugly. He was eighteen years older than the empress and seemed like an old man: toothless, with a sunken mouth, casually dressed. I don't remember who said it: "When Bestuzhev laughs, it's Satan's laugh."

But Aleksey Petrovich studied the habits and tastes of the empress well. Catching traces of displeasure on her face, he was ready to take his leave, but she herself restrained him, because he had time to tell such spicy details about the life of European courts that he kindled the curiosity of the royal interlocutor. In his hands was all the secret correspondence of foreign envoys, so the word "secret" was constantly present in the conversation. And what woman will refrain from asking questions here! And if the secret concerned Maria Theresa, Elizabeth's eternal rival, then the conversation could drag on for a long time. Between court gossip, the chancellor managed to put everything he needed into the head of the empress.

And let's not forget that the chancellor was always supported by Alexei Grigorievich Razumovsky (which cannot be said about his brother Kirill Grigorievich). In addition, the empress respected his education and knowledge of European politics - here he knew no equal. When submitting a report, the chancellor knew how to look calm, imperturbable, almost majestic. It was impossible to love him, but there was something to respect for.

All historians agree that the chancellor took bribes from foreign courts, but he had his own slogan: "I work for myself, it's true, but first of all for Russia, and only then for myself." And what are bribes and pensions from Austria and England, if Elizabeth herself says: they will not get poorer! Bestuzhev never took money from states hostile to Russia. In this respect, the case with Courland, which was under the protectorate of Poland, is indicative. Formally, Biron was the Duke of Courland, but he was in exile in Yaroslavl and was stripped of all titles. Meanwhile, Moritz of Saxony had already claimed the ducal throne for some time. This illegitimate son of the Polish king made his first attempt under Catherine I. It did not work out. Now Moritz of Saxony is an illustrious general in the service of France. Giving Moritz the Duchy of Courland was very beneficial for Paris, and highly undesirable for Russia.

Bestuzhev tried to persuade Elizabeth to return Biron from exile, restore him to the throne of Courland, and leave his sons in Russia as "amanat", that is, hostages. If Biron is restored in his rights, then France will leave her claims, and our relations with Poland will only improve, and the borders will be protected. Elizabeth did not even want to discuss this issue. This happened at the end of 1749. The Saxon adviser Funk told Bestuzhev that the Polish Count Gurovsky was coming to St. Petersburg. This count in advance in a letter offered Bestuzhev 25,000 gold coins if he would help Gurovsky get Kurdyandia.

Bestuzhev again remembered Biron and turned to Alexei Razumovsky with a lengthy letter in which he explained the essence of the matter, and also announced the “impudently” proposed bribe by Gurovskiy. Gurovsky did not calm down and turned for help to the chamberlain Andrei Alekseevich, Bestuzhev's son. To Chamberlain Andrei Bestuzhev, he offered a thousand gold chervonets "directly into his hands", as well as an annual pension, if he would affect his father. But Aleksey Petrovich remained adamant (I can’t say anything for sure about my son, Andrei Alekseevich was on the worst possible terms with his father, there it even came to assault). Count Gurovsky was expelled from Petersburg, but the matter remained at a dead point. Elizabeth categorically refused to return Biron from exile.

Many found the moral character of Chancellor Bestuzhev depressing. According to contemporaries, he drank during the day and played at night. Played Alexey Petrovich in a big way. His wife complained that once he lost 10,000 rubles in one week.

Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. Her enemies and favorites Sorotokina Nina Matveevna

Bestuzhev and Ekaterina

Bestuzhev and Ekaterina

As already mentioned, Bestuzhev planned Princess Marianne of Saxony as a bride for the heir to Peter Fedorovich. From a political point of view, it was a very beneficial marriage for Russia, but Elizabeth made her choice. After the appearance at the Russian court of the Duchess of Anhalt-Zerbst with her daughter, Bestuzhev repeatedly showed his displeasure. The father of the bride was in the service of Frederick II, the mother was with the same Frederick "on parcels." What can you expect from your daughter when she grows up?

Bestuzhev also made a bad impression on Ekaterina. In Zapiski, she writes: “The Russian court was then divided into two large camps or parties. At the head of the first, which began to rise after its decline, was Vice-Chancellor Bestuzhev, Count Bestuzhev-Ryumin; he was incomparably more feared than loved; he was an extraordinary rogue, suspicious, firm and undaunted, rather domineering in his convictions, an implacable enemy, but a friend of his friends, whom he left only when they turned their backs on him, however, quarrelsome and often petty.

The wedding of Peter Fedorovich and Catherine took place in August 1745. It was Bestuzhev who ensured that the mother of the Grand Duchess Duchess Johanna was expelled from Russia, and “observers” were assigned to the young grand ducal couple. On May 10, 1746, with his direct participation, an “instruction” was composed that determined the behavior of the young court. The impetus for compiling the instructions was the case, as they say, out of the ordinary. Pyotr Fedorovich arranged a puppet theater in his room and invited guests there. One of the doors of his room, connecting his chambers with the chambers of the Empress, was boarded up. While preparing for the performance, the Grand Duke heard voices and laughter resounding in Elizabeth's room. "With frivolous liveliness" he took a carpenter's tool, twisted holes in the clogged door and saw that Aunt Elizaveta was easily, at home, having dinner with her favorite Razumovsky dressed in a dressing gown. The Grand Duke's eyes lit up, he invited his guests to enjoy an interesting spectacle. Clever Ekaterina refused to look into the holes, and all the others were completely delighted. Of course, this story reached the ears of the Empress. She was furious and even reminded the frightened heir what his royal grandfather Peter I had done with the recalcitrant son. The Grand Duke already received a lot of criticism. He behaved "without dignity", was engaged in childishness, that is, he enthusiastically played soldiers, made friends with people of low rank, rangers and Holstein soldiers. Based on this, Bestuzhev established a kind of guardianship over the Grand Duke, everything was scheduled point by point. Here is an excerpt from this text: Their Highness should not "reveal anything funny, feigned and vile in words and mines." And in the church, Peter exactly “revealed”, mimicking not only the lame old women and other parishioners, but the priest himself. He did it so skillfully that it was impossible not to laugh.

But the main recipient of Bestuzhev's "instructions" was, of course, Ekaterina. The Empress looked at Pyotr Fedorovich as if he were a minor, stupid boy, he would live and get better, but the Grand Duchess was on her mind, smart beyond her years, and what’s really bad - she didn’t fulfill her main duty - she didn’t give birth to an heir and didn’t even show on this occasion grief.

Bestuzhev presented Elizabeth with instructions for a "noble lady" who should be assigned to the Grand Duchess in order to encourage the latter to be more attentive to her marital duties, thus contributing to the "increase of the grand ducal couple." “The Grand Duchess should be diligently used more submissively than before, with the tastes of her husband, seem helpful, pleasant, in love, ardent even if necessary, finally use all her means to achieve the tenderness of her husband and fulfill her duty.” Mrs. Chaglakova, the niece of the Empress, was appointed to the position of "noble lady"; later, her husband also began to act as a spy.

The second paragraph of the "instructions" was no less offensive to Catherine - it concerned her morality. It was necessary to follow her tirelessly and stop too free relations with court cavaliers, pages and even lackeys. The third paragraph of the instruction forbade Catherine to interfere in "local state and Holstein affairs." She was forbidden to correspond with her mother. She was surrounded by Bestuzhev's spies. These insulting conditions determined Catherine's relationship with Chancellor Bestuzhev for many years.

On September 20, 1754, Catherine gave birth to the long-awaited heir - Pavel. By this time, the relationship between Peter Fedorovich and Catherine had completely deteriorated. Everyone had their own life. The Grand Duke took mistresses, "one more terrible than the other," as Catherine used to say. The court gossiped that the father of the baby Pavel was not the Grand Duke at all, but Catherine's lover Sergei Saltykov. The Empress immediately took the child to her - he belonged to the state. Mother could see Pavel only with the permission of the empress.

Contrary to Elizabeth's expectations, the Grand Duke did not "get better". His character did not change, his habits too. Not only is there little intelligence, but he also looks into a glass. By birth and upbringing, he was a Holsteiner, duke of a tiny principality. Russia, huge and incomprehensible, he did not like, and bitterly complained that he was forced to become its ruler over time. But this issue has not yet been finally resolved. Catherine knew that the one appointed by the empress herself would be the one who would inherit Russia. And with the birth of Paul, she has plenty to choose from. And what will be her place, Catherine, after the death of the Empress? She understood that she must strengthen her connections at court. Since that time, the Chancellor and the Grand Duchess walked towards each other with slow steps.

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M.Yu. Anisimov

RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT
A.P. BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN (1693-1766)

M.Yu. Anisimov

Anisimov Maxim Yurievich- junior researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The essay was created with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (project No. 04-01-00-106a).

Alexei Petrovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin is one of the outstanding diplomats of Russia. He left a bright mark in history international relations Europe, but, despite this, is not spoiled by the attention of historians.

In the 19th century information about Bestuzhev-Ryumin, mainly of a biographical nature, was contained in various collections, such as, for example, in D.N. Bantysh-Kamensky. The most detailed biography of Bestuzhev is an article by A. Presnyakov in the "Russian Biographical Dictionary" of 1900, republished in 1992. In the modern period, Bestuzhev's political legacy has already been evaluated - an essay by A.N. Shapkina about his activities in the first years of his tenure as chancellor, included in the collection "Russian Diplomacy in Portraits", and articles by N.N. Yakovlev in the collection "Britain and Europe". The foreign policy concept of Bestuzhev was considered in the general works devoted to his era - the work of N.N. Yakovlev "Europe on the Eve Seven Years' War", two monographs by E.V. Anisimov - "Russia in the middle of the XVIII century" and "Elizaveta Petrovna". French researcher F.-D. Lishtenan, whose work "Russia enters Europe" received in 1998 the French Academy Prize, does not consider Bestuzhev as a politician who had a well-thought-out system of guidelines, and believes that "for many years, Bestuzhev made Russia's foreign policy dependent on the state of its finances and entered into alliances with those who paid more money". These works did not examine the attitude of the chancellor towards the states adjacent to Russia and the possibilities of the country's territorial expansion. The prerequisites for the fall of the chancellor's influence on the country's foreign policy also need to be clarified.

RISE AND FALL OF BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN

On May 22 (June 1), 1693, the third child was born in the family of the Moscow nobleman Pyotr Mikhailovich Bestuzhev and his wife Evdokia Ivanovna, who received the name Alexei. His family, according to legend, descended from the Englishman Gabriel Best, who left for Russia in 1403, whose son, Yakov Ryuma, was the boyar of Ivan III. In fact, Alexei Petrovich was a descendant of the Novgorodians, brought to Moscow by Ivan III after the liquidation of the independence of Novgorod. His surname has Russian roots: "coldless"- not bothering with anything. Since 1701, the Bestuzhevs began to be written as the Bestuzhevs-Ryumins. The father of the future chancellor served as governor in Simbirsk, carried out diplomatic missions in Vienna and Berlin, and in 1712 became chief chamberlain of the Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna. Then he unsuccessfully tried to help the illegitimate son of the Polish king Augustus II, Count Moritz of Saxony, get the ducal throne in Courland. In 1728, Anna Ioannovna accused him of embezzlement, in 1730 he was exiled to the village, but in 1737 he was released. From Elizabeth Petrovna, who ascended the throne on November 25, 1741, Peter Mikhailovich (together with his sons) in 1742 received the title of count. He passed away the following year.

Both of his sons, the eldest - Mikhail (1688-1760) and the youngest - Alexei in 1708 were sent by Peter I among many noble children to study abroad. Alexey studied in Copenhagen, then in Berlin. Showed great knowledge foreign languages(Latin, French and German), completed his education by traveling around Europe and in 1712, at the age of 19, he received his first diplomatic assignment - the appointment of a "gentleman of the embassy" to the Russian representation in The Hague and at the Utrecht Congress, the then center of European politics, which completed War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1713). The embassy was headed by the famous Petrine diplomat, Prince B.I. Kurakin.

In 1713, the Elector of Hanover, Georg-Ludwig, drew attention to a young man in the retinue of the Russian envoy in The Hague and invited him to his service. Peter I did not object to Bestuzhev's transfer to foreign service, hoping that the promising young diplomat would acquire new skills at the European court. In 1714, George-Ludwig became the English King George I and sent Bestuzhev to Russia with a notice of this event, so that he would become the envoy of England in Russia, which was gladly accepted by Peter I. When, in 1716, Tsarevich Alexei fled from Russia, Bestuzhev sent a letter to him, in which he stated that he was always ready to serve him, but, being in Russia, he could not do this, and now the prince can have him. If Peter I found out about this, the story about Alexei Bestuzhev would have ended there, but Bestuzhev was lucky. In 1717, Peter recalled him from the English service, in 1718 he became the chief junker at the court of Anna Ioannovna, where his father then served; and in 1720 - a resident in Denmark. Here he managed to distinguish himself when, on December 1, 1721, he arranged celebrations on the occasion of the conclusion of the Nystadt Peace. On this occasion, he wanted to mint medals with a portrait of Peter I at the Danish Mint. However, the Danes stated that the phrase on the medal: "giving the North long-awaited calm". reprehensible for their country, and they refused to mint medals. Then Bestuzhev knocked them out in Hamburg and distributed them to foreign diplomats and Danish politicians who were forced to accept them. Peter, who was in the Caspian Sea, having learned about this, personally wrote a letter of thanks to the resident in Copenhagen. In 1723, in Revel, he awarded him with his chest portrait, strewn with diamonds (at that time a very high award), and in 1724, at the coronation of his wife Catherine, the emperor promoted Bestuzhev to actual chamberlains.

In 1725, Peter I died, and Bestuzhev's career came to a standstill. Almighty then A.D. Menshikov remembered the opposition from P.M. Bestuzhev to his plans to become a duke in Courland and was not going to patronize his son. After Anna Ioannovna came to power in 1730, Alexei Petrovich left Copenhagen. He took a much less prestigious position as a resident in Hamburg and the Lower Saxon district, but in the following year he received the powers of an extraordinary envoy. In 1733, he managed to render a rare service to the Empress by removing from the archive in the city of Kiel (Schleswig-Holstein) the testament of Catherine I, located there, according to which, if Peter II left no heirs, the throne passed to Anna Petrovna (mother of the future Peter III ), then Elizaveta Petrovna, subject to the advantage of their male descendants over women.

Then Bestuzhev's career went uphill again. At the end of 1734, he was again transferred to Denmark, but already with the award of the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. He retains his former post in Hamburg. In 1736, he received the rank of Privy Councilor, and on March 25, 1740, a real Privy Councilor and was called to the court in St. Petersburg. Anna Ioannovna had only a few months to live, and her favorite E.I. Biron needed an ally in the fight against Count A.I. Osterman, who was then in charge of foreign affairs. Biron met Bestuzhev in St. Petersburg, where he brought the stolen will of Catherine I. Probably, he already noticed the clever diplomat, and further promotions of Alexei Petrovich in Copenhagen are a matter of his patronage.

After the death of Anna Ioannovna on October 17, 1740, Biron became regent under the young Ioann Antonovich. The author of the manifesto about this event was Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who, after the execution of Biron's opponent, Cabinet Minister A.P. Volynsky took his place and received the Order of the White Eagle.

When Regent Biron was overthrown by Field Marshal Count B.X. Minich, Alexey Petrovich immediately ended up in prison, became confused and testified against Biron. Then, at a confrontation with him, he retracted his testimony, citing threats and ill-treatment in prison. He was sentenced to be quartered, then pardoned, but he was deprived of his posts and awards and sent into exile. In October 1741, the Russian ruler Anna Leopoldovna, the mother of Ivan Antonovich, allowed Bestuzhev to stay in the capital.

The coup on November 25, 1741 elevated Elizaveta Petrovna to the Russian throne. She returned to court both her father's former disgraced associates and the victims of the former regime, excluding Biron. Munnich and Osterman went into exile. One of the organizers of the conspiracy, Elizabeth's life physician, Frenchman I.G. Lestok needed an experienced and intelligent diplomat, necessarily Russian by origin, since the coup on November 25, according to the conspirators, was supposed to show everyone that the German dominance was now over. Bestuzhev-Ryumin was an intelligent, experienced diplomat, Russian by birth, the son of a comrade-in-arms of Peter I, he himself served the emperor, suffered innocently under the previous reign, and seemed to Lestok, who could have met him even before the coup, the best candidate to replace the exiled leaders of foreign policy countries.

Lestok's support gave Bestuzhev a lot: he became a co-author of the manifesto on the accession to the throne of Elizabeth, on November 30, 1741, five days after the coup, on St. Andrew the First-Called and the order of his name, received this highest award Russian Empire. Then he becomes a senator. On December 12, 1741, he was the chief director of the post offices, and in July 1744 he held the post of vice-chancellor, and in July 1744, the highest state post of chancellor. He remains in this post for a long 14 years, until 1758, despite the opposition of some European courts and his enemies at the court of Elizabeth.

BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN AND ELIZAVETA PETROVNA

Ever since the 19th century. it was generally accepted that Bestuzhev was the sovereign master of Russia's foreign policy under the lazy and frivolous Elizabeth, who trusted the chancellor in everything and allowed him to do whatever he wanted, not having the ability and desire to resist his will. However, when getting acquainted with the original documents of that time, this point of view was gradually revised, although one can still find statements that all the successes and failures of Elizabeth's foreign policy belong to Bestuzhev.

In 1863, the "Russian Archive" published a letter from the Holstein Prince Augustus (Friedrich-August), cousin uncle of the heir to the Russian throne, Peter Fedorovich (the future Peter III), where he asked Elizabeth to support his refusal to marry, which the Danes arrange for him, so that ensure a trouble-free coexistence with the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein (or rather, only Holstein, since Schleswig was captured by Denmark long ago). Denmark thus hoped to keep the prince and his descendants under their control. Bestuzhev added his own opinion to the letter: for the sake of peace in the Baltic and the union of Russia with Denmark, Copenhagen should be supported in this dispute. Elizabeth refused Bestuzhev. This fact forced the publisher of the "Russian archive" P.I. Bartenev write in the notes: "Empress Elizaveta Petrovna was not at all averse to engaging in state affairs, as we think" .

The affairs of Schleswig-Holstein in general were a constant headache for Bestuzhev, for whom this small North German duchy, ruled by the heir to the Russian throne, was the same as Hanover, the hereditary possession of the English kings, was for the English parliamentary opposition, i.e. an unnecessary appendage to the state, constantly creating problems and hindering the establishment of the European policy of the country.

Schleswig-Holstein had territorial claims against Denmark (the capture of Schleswig by Denmark mentioned above), which was forced to pay special attention to them, since Russia stood behind the duchy. With the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein - Elizabeth's nephew, the Russian Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich - Copenhagen could not reach an agreement. The Danish king Fredrik V offered the heir to the Russian throne to exchange his ancestral possessions for Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, adding a large sum of money to them. The negotiations did not lead to anything and by May 1751 they were broken. Bestuzhev tried in this situation to influence Elizabeth, first personally, then with the help of other influential dignitaries. They presented their opinion to the Empress, which was that in the event of a breakdown in negotiations, Denmark would go over to the camp of Russia's opponents, i.e. will go for an alliance with France, Prussia and Sweden, and this is fraught with the loss of Russian influence in a strategically important region. Elizabeth convened a Conference, or Imperial Council, which consisted of the chief actors her reign. The Council supported Bestuzhev's opinion. After that, the Empress turned to three members of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, one of whom was Vice-Chancellor M.I. Vorontsov, and asked for their opinion. They also supported the decision of the Conference, according to F.-D. Lishtenan, "out of fear of the Chancellor", although the same Vorontsov never hesitated to disagree with Bestuzhev. Then Elizabeth decided to remove the Holstein affairs from the jurisdiction of the Collegium and completely transfer them to the management of her heir. She probably thought that in this way her childish nephew would quickly learn to defend state interests in the international arena. Not only the Russian courtiers were unanimous on the issue of Schleswig-Holstein, but also the allied Austrians. Obviously, not knowing Russian realities, they Russian ambassador Count G.K. Keyserling advised Chancellor Bestuzhev to settle the Holstein problem: "For the de Dacian court is in alliance with France only in this matter". Elizabeth's kindred feelings clearly harmed Russia's position in Europe, but Bestuzhev was powerless.

Another failure awaited him: the Courland affair. In 1740, the Duke of Courland, a vassal territory of the Commonwealth, Biron was exiled, and the throne in Mitau was vacant. At the beginning of the summer of 1749, the former pretender to Courland, Count Moritz of Saxony, who became a French marshal, came to Saxony to visit his half-brother, the Polish king August III. He also visited Berlin, where he was well received by Frederick II, who declared his support for his claims to Courland and offered his sister's hand to the count. In the Commonwealth itself, voices began to be heard in favor of the release of Biron by Elizabeth.

Polish-Saxon Resident General K.3. Arnim, who arrived in St. Petersburg on April 5, 1750, sent a letter to Bestuzhev on May 31 asking him to release Biron, attaching a copy of Augustus III's appeal to this effect. The resident had to deliver the appeal personally to Elizabeth, but his audience was constantly delayed, and the first minister of Augustus III, Count Brühl, was nervous, as he hoped to settle the issue before the opening of the Polish Sejm. On July 25, August 29, September 5 and 26, Arnim again presented Bestuzhev with Count Brühl's letters about "the growing impatience in the nation" in the release of Biron. At the same time, all the allied states of Russia - Austria, England and Holland - submitted a joint petition to the Russian court for the release of the Duke of Courland. On November 21, 1750, General Arnim again showed Bestuzhev Brühl's new letter, in which he ordered him to once again ask for an audience with the Empress, since winter had come, Elizabeth stopped making pleasure trips and she had time to receive foreign diplomats. At the end of 1750 - beginning of 1751, Arnim, apparently, managed to present the charter of his king, since on December 29 (January 9, NS) he asked Bestuzhev about the empress's answer. At the beginning of May 1751, the Polish-Saxon envoy again turned to Bestuzhev in a multi-page letter, advising him to let Biron go and putting forward the argument that, they say, many in Poland, and even in Europe, think that Russia is going to appropriate Courland. Having achieved nothing, on July 29, Arnim informed the Russian chancellor of his recall.

What was happening at that time at the St. Petersburg court, and what was the reason for the stubborn silence of Russian officials? Chancellor Bestuzhev himself was an active supporter of Biron's release. He presented to Elizaveta Petrovna the report of the Russian envoy in Dresden, Count Keyserling, who recommended the release of Biron, with his own arguments: the return of the disgraced duke to Courland would save Russia from the possible monetary claims of the Commonwealth (Petersburg received 80 thousand thalers a year from Courland), knock out weapons from the hands of Russia's ill-wishers - France, Prussia and Sweden, will stop their intrigues on this matter in Poland and strengthen the position of the Russian Empire in the Baltic states. To ensure the safety of Biron's stay outside of Russia, Bestuzhev suggested taking his sons into the Russian service, so that they would thereby be hostages (Biron, who swore allegiance to Elizabeth, himself suggested this in letters to Vice-Chancellor M.I. Vorontsov). The empress answered the chancellor with a decisive refusal, and his further attempts to influence Elizabeth through her favorite A.G. Razumovsky had no success.

Undoubtedly, the cause of the misadventures of the "unfortunate" Biron was the position of Elizabeth, caused by purely personal reasons. Bestuzhev's letter to Razumovsky does not say anything about the reasons for the refusal, therefore, it was not a matter of political logic. It is not known whether anyone supported the Empress in her intentions regarding Biron; most likely, she alone withstood the unprecedented pressure not only from her chancellor, but also from all the powers allied with Russia, who were concerned about the possible strengthening in the Baltic States of states hostile to them and Russia - France and Prussia, as well as destabilization in the Commonwealth. Elizabeth was hardly interested in the 80 thousand thalers a year that her court received from the sequestered possessions of Biron - for the sake of principles, the empress easily sacrificed the treasury income. For example, in 1742, she ordered all Jews to be expelled from Russia and not to let them into the country anymore, despite the fact that Jewish trade brought significant profits to the state. On the presentation of this by the Senate, she imposed a resolution: "I do not want interesting profit from the enemies of Christ" .

Thus, Elizaveta Petrovna fully corresponded to the imperial title, inherited from her father. She made decisions herself, knew how not to succumb to any pressure, so that not only Bestuzhev-Ryumin, but also the Empress herself played an important role in the successes of Russia of that time, and in the failures.

And yet, the decisions of Elizaveta Petrovna on foreign policy issues mainly depended on Chancellor Bestuzhev. He came to the empress for a report with extracts from the communications of Russian representatives at foreign courts, read out what he considered important, added to this his written version of the action, provided with a lengthy justification. Usually, Bestuzhev immediately cited several versatile arguments (another proof that it was not easy for Elizabeth to impose her opinion), the vastness of which tired the Empress and made her more accommodating. Nevertheless, the empress always remembered that she was the daughter of Peter the Great, and did not allow anyone to prescribe her decisions. Foreign envoys often accused her of laziness and love of entertainment, but the empress avoided communication, as in the case of the Polish-Saxon resident Arnim, not because she could not find time for him - she did not want to spoil relations with his court by refusing to fulfill request. To Elizabeth's credit, she never succumbed to the first impression and made decisions only after carefully considering them, which again took time. She could ask the opinion of other people, listened to their advice personally, as she knew that Bestuzhev had many enemies at court. The main argument for Elizabeth was how her father acted in this situation. If the matter concerned the most important foreign policy issues for the country, Elizabeth convened the Imperial Council mentioned above, which was the heir to the Supreme Privy Council of Catherine I and the Cabinet of Anna Ioannovna. The Council (or Conference) discussed, for example, not only the situation with Holstein and Denmark, but also questions about whether to prepare for war with Prussia in 1753, whether to continue building the fortress of St. Elizabeth on the southern borders of the country, against which in 1755 Turkey actively objected. The Chancellor's opinion was not always decisive there. Yes, and Elizabeth, as in the case of Holstein, did not always follow the recommendations of her advisers.

BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN IN THE COURT WRESTLING

At court, there always existed a group that was in opposition to Bestuzhev. He defeated her many times, often lost himself, but this system of two court parties never changed, and this indicates that such a "system of checks and balances" was beneficial to Elizabeth Petrovna, supported and encouraged by her.

If Bestuzhev's "party" in terms of foreign policy orientation can be called "Anglo-Austrian", then his opponents - "French party", initially - "Franco-Prussian". At the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, this party dominated the court, since it was she who took an active part in the enthronement of the new empress. It was made up of the French ambassador, the Marquis de La Chetardie, the tutor of Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich O.F. von Brummer and the French Empress's physician, already mentioned, Lestok. However, the influence of this grouping was relative. Despite the assistance in preparing the coup of the Swedish resident E.M. Nolken and his ally Shetardi, Elizabeth always, even during the preparation of the conspiracy, refused to cede to Sweden (which began a war with Russia shortly before its accession) any part of the Baltic conquered by Peter.

It was Lestocq and Chétardie who attracted Elizabeth Bestuzhev-Ryumin to the court, helped him become vice-chancellor and later regretted it all their lives. He turned out to be an opponent of their course towards rapprochement with France, because he saw that Versailles wanted to push Russia back into the depths of Eurasia. The Marquis of Chétardie and Lestocq, as friends of the Empress, began to advise her to dismiss Bestuzhev. Elizabeth listened to them, but Bestuzhev kept his post. Gradually, the influence of former associates on Elizabeth weakened. Back in 1742, a German mathematician from Russian Academy Sciences X. Goldbach opened the diplomatic cipher of the French embassy, ​​and Bestuzhev, having accumulated material, presented to the empress extracts from the intercepted correspondence of Chétardie.

Shetardi wrote that Elizabeth is lazy, never thinks, preferring to indulge in entertainment with favorites. Elizabeth could not forgive such a thing. On June 6 (17), 1744, the Marquis of Chétardie was expelled from Russia. Then, without much fuss, the rest of the Marquis's associates left the country. In March 1748, Lestok, whose correspondence Bestuzhev also showed Elizabeth, was tortured and exiled to Veliky Ustyug. But Bestuzhev's influence did not become absolute from this. The party of opponents was headed by his deputy, Vice-Chancellor Count M.I. Vorontsov (1714-1767), former page of Princess Elizabeth and one of the most active participants in the coup on November 25, 1741. He was married to Elizabeth's cousin, Countess Anna Karlovna Skavronskaya. The lack of special abilities was balanced in him by the lack of ambition. Vorontsov was an honest, quiet and calm person. One of the few courtiers, he left a good memory of himself for everyone who knew him. If Bestuzhev can rightly be called a "Westernizer", then Vorontsov was a "soiler". He grew up in Russia, was far from foreign courts with their intrigues, valued family ties, sincerely helped Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrins who turned to Russia for help, and at the same time loved French culture and France itself, where he once visited. Bestuzhev tried to deprive him of influence on the empress, in particular, using the episode when Vorontsov, traveling around Europe in 1745, stopped by Frederick II. Elizabeth did not like this, but she quickly forgave Vorontsov. Vorontsov himself, who had no inclination to intrigues, realized that Bestuzhev was in his post for a long time, and the former fierce court battles were replaced by the "cold war".

The second leader of the "French Party" was the young favorite of the Empress I.I. Shuvalov (1727-1797), who began serving at the court in 1742 and entered into favor in 1749. The man is clearly extraordinary, he refused the title of count, large land grants and even the post of vice-chancellor when Vorontsov, who occupied him, replaced Bestuzhev. In addition, I.I. Shuvalov is known as the patron of M.V. Lomonosov and the first curator of Moscow University. He was one of the most educated people of his time and, like Vorontsov, a gallomaniac.

A prominent opponent of Bestuzhev-Ryumin was his elder brother Mikhail, who joined the "party" of Vorontsov, most likely for personal reasons. He was offended by the younger Bestuzhev: he did not help him even when his wife A.G. Yaguzhinskaya in 1743 was exiled to Siberia with a “cut down” tongue for participating in a conspiracy against Elizabeth, and he himself spent three months in prison, not when in 1749 he decided to marry a second time (although Yaguzhinskaya was alive) and secretly got married in Dresden with the Saxon Gaugwitz. Elizabeth was outraged, did not recognize this marriage for a long time, and the chancellor joined her opinion.

A.P. Bestuzhev could not find mutual language not only with the Vorontsov-Shuvalov group, but also with the "young court" of the heir to the Russian throne. He understood that Pyotr Fedorovich's coming to power would destroy his "system" and harm Russia. Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich, an admirer of Frederick II, did not hide his hatred for the Chancellor. The wife of the heir, Ekaterina Alekseevna, initially fought with Bestuzhev, who considered her an agent of Frederick II (Bestuzhev offered to marry Pyotr Fedorovich to a Saxon princess), but in 1756 the chancellor and the Grand Duchess found a common language, planning, after the expected death of Elizabeth, to proclaim the emperor of the young Pavel Petrovich and govern country on his behalf.

Bestuzhev, one against all, spent a lot of energy on the court struggle. There was not a single significant figure in his entourage. However, his voice at court was not drowned out by the slander and whispering of the courtiers and various foreign policy proposals of numerous opponents.

"SYSTEM OF PETER THE GREAT"

When in 1742 Bestuzhev-Ryumin received the post of Vice-Chancellor, he actually already did the work of his boss, since the then Chancellor Prince A.M. Cherkassky was constantly ill and was not engaged in business. Thus, Bestuzhev led the foreign policy of the Russian Empire for 16 years. Around the middle of the 40s of the XVIII century. in his view, the concept of Russian foreign policy was finally formed. He remained faithful to her until the end of his career, despite the fact that she no longer corresponded to the spirit of the times. He expounded it in his submissions to the empress and letters to Vorontsov, calling it "the system of Peter the Great", thereby emphasizing the fidelity and continuity to the ideas of Father Elizabeth, who herself believed that she was called to continue the work of her "eternally worthy of the memory of a parent."

The essence of this "system" was as follows. Bestuzhev wrote that Peter always had permanent allies, with the help of whom he controlled the state of affairs favorable for Russia in Europe and calm on the borders. Russia's allies were "sea powers" - England and Holland. Profitable trade was conducted with them, they provided the Russian army with subsidies, and also helped to control the situation in northern Europe, in the Baltic region. They should not have territorial disputes with Russia, Bestuzhev believed. Austria was an even more important ally. In 1746, the Chancellor concluded an alliance treaty with Vienna. Russia needed Austria to fight a common enemy - the Ottoman Empire, as well as to ensure control over the extended and unstable Poland. Bestuzhev remembered that only with the support of Vienna in 1735 did St. Petersburg manage to establish a Russian candidate on the Polish throne - Elector of Saxony Augustus III, who was another ally of Russia. Of course, Russia was not interested in Saxony as such - the weak and poor German electorate, but in particular its monarch, the king of the Commonwealth. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, Russia and Austria were brought together by another common concern - Prussia.

Prussia, the "hidden enemy", Bestuzhev paid much attention. In 1743, Russia signed an agreement on a defensive alliance with the Prussian king Frederick II, but the behavior of this monarch during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), when Frederick II constantly violated all his treaties, then entering into an alliance with France against Austria , then leaving it and signing peace with Vienna, then again starting a war against it in alliance with the French, etc., showed that Russia had an aggressive and perfidious neighbor with whom it was difficult to negotiate. As a result of this war, Prussia captured the populous Silesia that belonged to Austria, cutting off Saxony from Poland. Moreover, at the same time, Frederick II captured Dresden and expelled King Augustus III from there to Poland. Poland could become an arena for the actions of the Prussian king, which, given the vast stretch of the Russian-Polish border not protected by natural barriers, would force Russia to be distracted from other foreign policy affairs for a long time. The sister of the Prussian king was the wife of the heir to the Swedish throne. Relying on the support of his brother-in-law, he could again raise the issue of revising the results of the Northern War, as Stockholm already tried to do in 1741-1743. By the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, it became clear to Bestuzhev that Frederick II needed to "reduce the forces" by any means.

Although Bestuzhev could not know the plans of the Prussian king, he appreciated his actions and made absolutely correct conclusions. In 1752, Frederick II wrote his "First Political Testament", which pre-revolutionary historians never got to know. Frederick II believed that Russia and Prussia had no underlying reasons for enmity, but - characteristic logic - Russia will always pose a threat, war with it should be avoided, and for this Prussia needs: strong influence in Poland, support in a strong Sweden and instability in Russia itself, preferably even a civil war. Friedrich purposefully pursued a policy of pre-empting Russia, establishing secret contacts with Istanbul, receiving representatives of the Crimean Khan with honor, trying to strengthen Sweden, flirting with the Polish Lutherans and Courland. But the Prussian king took up what turned out to be beyond his strength. Bestuzhev had numerous informants throughout Europe, was aware of almost all the anti-Russian plans of Frederick II and managed to prevent them. At the same time, thanks to the efforts of the Russian chancellor, there was not a single Prussian informer in St. Petersburg (the king had only the information about Russian policy that was supplied to him by bribed Austrian and Saxon diplomats). Frederick II was sure that English influence in Russia was absolute, and this was perhaps the main reason for the treaty of Westminster he concluded with England in 1756. By the beginning of the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763. his policy was completely bankrupt - he did not get Turkey's consent to oppose Russia, did not receive any support in Poland, and the attempts of his sister, the Queen of Sweden, to carry out an anti-parliamentary coup in Stockholm in June 1756 and strengthen royal power led Sweden to the camp of his enemies. Perhaps if Frederick II had abandoned the "preventive" geopolitical struggle against Russia, the Russians and Prussians would not have met on the fields of the Seven Years' War.

Leading a diplomatic confrontation with Prussia, Bestuzhev did not have the goal of terminating relations with her (this happened on October 25, 1750, when the Russian envoy in Berlin, G. Gross, was recalled). It is characteristic that less than two years before Gross's recall, on December 9, 1748, Elizabeth signed a rescript to Berlin to the Russian envoy Keyserling, informing him of the transfer to Dresden and ordering him to wait for his successor Gross, for the place of the Russian envoy at the Prussian court "always, and especially under present circumstances, it should not be left empty for a short time". Gross's two years in Berlin were virtually useless for him. After leaving Prussia, Gross compiled a report, where he indicated that the Prussian authorities always treated him coldly, avoided communication, and in two years held official meetings with him only four times, at which they mainly expressed their dissatisfaction with Russian policy. Moreover, the king himself deliberately insulted the representative of Elizabeth by inviting all foreign envoys to his table at one of the holidays, except for Gross. He unsuccessfully waited for an apology until he received an order from St. Petersburg to leave.

France, the "historical enemy" of Austria and an ally of all Russia's rivals - Turkey, Sweden and anti-Russian politicians in Poland, was also an enemy of St. Petersburg in Bestuzhev's constructions. However, the break in relations with France in December 1748 was not the initiative of Bestuzhev and Elizabeth. On the contrary, after the departure of the last French representative, they waited half a year for Versailles to send at least someone to Petersburg, but to no avail. Then Russia withdrew its diplomats. The French did not expect a break. They probably only wanted to teach Russia a lesson for sending its corps against them at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. The French minister, Marquis Puisieux, then carried on official correspondence with former envoy Russia in France (by the same Gross), when Gross was already in Berlin, and even reproached him for his hasty departure. Puisieux then provided great attention Prince A.M. Golitsyn, whom Petersburg unofficially sent to Paris, in the retinue of the Austrian ambassador (due to the ambiguous position of Golitsyn, he was quickly recalled). Bestuzhev resisted with all his might the arrival of any French emissary in St. Petersburg, so the French in 1755 sent the Scot Douglas on a secret mission. Just as secretly, acting this time through the head of the chancellor, Elizabeth instructed Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov to negotiate with Douglas. Bestuzhev was not afraid of the restoration of diplomatic relations as such, but rather the arrival of a French diplomat in St. Petersburg. The chancellor knew that he was an enemy for France since the time of Chétardie and the new French ambassador would certainly intrigue against him. When Douglas was in St. Petersburg in the rank of Chargé d'Affaires of France in Russia, who was then to be replaced by the Ambassador Marquis de Lopital, Bestuzhev in a conversation with him said that the Marquis was carrying instructions with him ordering to overthrow the Chancellor, spoke about the actions of his predecessors and added, what "let the Marquis Lopital, if he is an ambassador, remember who the chancellor is". Bestuzhev's intuition did not disappoint. It is the position of the French, Russia's allies in the Seven Years' War, who insisted on removing him from his post as a pro-British politician, P.P. Cherkasov, and became the main reason for his fall in 1758.

E.V. Anisimov is right when he calls the "system of Peter the Great" "Mystification of Bestuzhev-Ryumin", in the sense that it could not in everything correspond to Peter's policy in Europe - Peter I was not always on equal terms with England, Austria and Saxony-Poland. This name was focused on Elizabeth, for whom the references to the deeds and plans of her father had a magical effect, although in general Bestuzhev really continued the course of Peter the Great to integrate Russia into Europe and ensure the security of its borders. Here is what Bestuzhev himself expected from his "system": "This ... will bring an empire on such a loan that no one will dare to tear it up again; in addition, we will gain friendship with other powers" .

Bestuzhev is often accused of bribery. Indeed, he willingly accepted large sums of money from foreign powers, which at that time was not considered something out of the ordinary, although the facts of bribes were not advertised. But it does not follow K. Valishevsky and F.-D. Lishtenan asserts that Bestuzhev was corrupt and unscrupulous, and that the British were able to offer the chancellor such sums that allowed him to easily refuse Prussian or French money.

Bestuzhev took money from foreign envoys in strict accordance with the system outlined above and never deviated from it.

If money was offered by those whom he considered allies of Russia, then he took it, and sometimes even extorted it from the English, Austrian and Polish-Saxon representatives in St. Petersburg. But he never accepted money from the Prussians and the French, although he constantly needed funds. For example, when Courland, after Biron's exile, was left without a duke, in October 1749, Count Gurovsky, a representative of the pretender to Courland, Count Moritz of Saxony, arrived to Bestuzhev in St. Petersburg. He brought 25,000 chervonets for the Russian chancellor as a possible "thank you" for supporting Count Moritz's candidacy for the throne of Courland. Bestuzhev refused him and used his refusal as an additional reason to secure the release of Biron and his restoration to the throne of Courland. The chancellor wrote to the favorite of the Empress Razumovsky that he could easily take the money of the Count of Saxony, "but I am very faithful to her Imperial Majesty, a slave and a son of the fatherland, so that I can think and do the slightest thing against the future interests of her and the state". Bestuzhev's enemies knew that it was impossible to win him over to their side with money. This was also recognized by the former Prussian ambassador to Russia A. von Mardefeld: "However, no matter how you court the chancellor, there will be no other fruit from all the generosity" .

Bestuzhev did not write anything about the policy that Petersburg was supposed to pursue in relation to its neighbors, who at the same time were historical opponents of Russia. His system of views on this issue can be identified by referring to the Chancellor's instructions to Russian diplomats in these countries. The chancellor had already prepared a reliable launching pad: the War of the Polish Succession 1733-1735. approved on the Polish throne the Russian protege - Augustus III, Russian-Turkish war 1737-1739 and the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743. discouraged the Turks and Swedes from meeting the Russians on the battlefield. Bestuzhev tried, not allowing changes among his neighbors, to simultaneously remove them from the influence of France and Prussia.

In Poland, where there was a gentry republic, more like anarchy, since any member of the Sejm could cancel his decision, Russia sought to maintain the old order. Strong Poland, even if it was ruled by Russia's ally - August III, Bestuzhev did not need. In addition, the king himself had to be kept from trying to gain central government, which could lead to civil war with local magnates. Considering the vast length of the Russian-Polish border and its insecurity, the strife in Poland would have forced St. Petersburg to postpone pan-European affairs so important for Bestuzhev and Elizabeth. It was also necessary to support a viable pro-Russian party in the republic. The situation was complicated - the court allied with Russia (August III and his minister, Count Heinrich von Brühl) in 1753 quarreled with his former associates - supporters of Russia, the leading magnates, the princes Czartoryski. Both sides appealed to Petersburg, blaming each other. Some in an effort to oppress freedom, others - to overthrow the king. Bestuzhev hesitated for a long time, but nevertheless inclined to support the "Russian party" of the Czartoryskis. A decisive step was taken in 1755, when London came out for the Czartoryskis. With the beginning of the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763. the situation has changed. Augustus III became the unfortunate victim of "Herod" - Frederick II, and Elizabeth unequivocally supported him. To the youngest son Augustus, Prince Charles, she even allowed to take the long empty throne of Courland. The Czartoryskis oriented towards London. The nephew of the princes M. and A. Czartoryski was Count Stanislav Poniatowski, who arrived in St. Petersburg in the retinue of the English ambassador Williams, and then became the Polish-Saxon envoy to Russia and lover of Catherine II. The new Russian empress deprived Charles of the throne of Courland and excluded the descendants of August III, who died in 1763, from the number of contenders for the Polish crown, giving it to Poniatowski. Bestuzhev tried to prevent this, but was not heard. He needed Poland as a buffer between Russia and Europe.

One of the main foreign policy goals of Russia is the reunification of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands with it. Bestuzhev did not have this goal, just as his opponent, the patron saint of Orthodox Christians abroad, Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov, did not have it, and just as Elizabeth did not have it. The Orthodox, of course, were defended, as they were defended in Austria, Turkey, and even on the island of Minorca, but they never thought about their entry into Russia. The only step in this direction under Elizabeth seems to be the decision of the Conference at the highest court on the goals of Russia in the war with Prussia in 1756: Petersburg intended to seize the Prussian kingdom (i.e. East Prussia) and exchange it with Poland for Courland (obviously not Slavic and not Orthodox territory) and counted on "rounding the borders" in Ukraine and Belarus to suppress border complaints. There is no thought of dividing Poland here, and Russia has always rejected similar plans of other countries before. The task of "rounding the borders" was due to the fact that the Russian-Polish border, established by the Eternal Peace of 1686, was actually absent. Those. somewhere passed, but where exactly, no one could say.

Russia tried to demarcate in the early 50s of the 18th century in order to finally stop the mass flight of peasants and Old Believers to Poland, establish customs and settle disputes between Russian and Polish landowners, but was forced to retreat, as it could not do it unilaterally, and Polish the diets also could not give permission for this, because their work was paralyzed. Moreover, the Polish gentry, who did not know their own justice, with the help of their peasants, tried to seize Russian border outposts, destroyed road barriers, beat and captured entire detachments of soldiers. So, for example, in 1755, at one of the Russian outposts, the Poles captured and took a non-commissioned officer and 12 soldiers with them to Rzhishchev. Russian complaints and vague threats had practically no consequences. It is no coincidence that in 1763 the vice-president of the Military Collegium Count Z.G. Chernyshev proposed to draw the Russian-Polish border along natural barriers - the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, which would end territorial disputes and significantly reduce the flow of fugitives.

During the time of Bestuzhev, the border between Russia and Sweden, established by the Treaty of Abos in 1743, was not finally drawn. The chancellor himself practically did not participate in its conclusion, which is also confirmed by Catherine II. A.N. Shapkina is mistaken when she claims that it was Bestuzhev who suggested leaving the Swedes almost all of Finland occupied by Russian troops: "Knowing well that Sweden is constantly becoming the object of the intrigues of French and Prussian diplomacy, Bestuzhev-Ryumin preferred to conclude a lasting peace on moderate terms than to sign a treaty that would cause a desire to revise it immediately after signing". On the contrary, Bestuzhev, at that time vice-chancellor, insisted on preserving all the conquered lands with the payment of large compensation to the Swedes, or on creating a buffer principality from Finland. It was Elizabeth who insisted on moderate terms, interested in the fact that the Swedes elected Peter Fedorovich's cousin, Adolf Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp, as the heirs to the throne. Bestuzhev was against this, and turned out to be right - Adolf Friedrich sought to strengthen his power, adhering to Prussia. The "buffer" position of Finland could finally remove the threat to St. Petersburg from Sweden, which would try to return the lands conquered by Peter I under Catherine II, in the Russian-Swedish war of 1788-1790. Bestuzhev, in contrast to the envoy to Sweden in 1748-1760. N.I. Panin, did not hope to attract Sweden to Russia and did not support the attempts of the envoy to help the supporters of Adolf-Friedrich, who asked for Russian help in restoring royal absolutism, believing that the Swedish authorities would still strive for revenge. As he put it, "No matter how many wolves you feed, everyone looks into the forest". Thanks to this, Russia remained uninvolved in the unsuccessful attempt at a monarchist coup organized in 1756 by those whom Panin then asked to support, and maintained friendly relations with Sweden at the very beginning of the Seven Years' War. If the coup had been successful in Stockholm, the influence of the Prussian king Frederick II would objectively have increased.

The third frontier state was the Ottoman Empire, which still represented a real force. Bestuzhev understood that Turkey was the most dangerous adversary of all its neighbors and considered it the main task not to provoke Porto into anti-Russian actions. He did not approve of the settlement of the Black Sea steppes, near the Turkish and Crimean borders, by Serbs and Montenegrins, believing that the Porte could regard this as aggressive actions and attempts to lure her subjects to Russia. In 1755, he was inclined to stop building the fortress of St. Elizabeth there, which Turkey perceived as a violation of the Belgrade Peace of 1739. The situation was extremely delicate: on the one hand, stopping the construction of the fortress would be, in the eyes of Europe, a diplomatic defeat for Russia, on the other hand, the other - the rapidly approaching new European war dictated the need to maintain peaceful relations with Turkey. Russia's allies, Austria and England, also insisted on stopping the construction, also fearing that Turkey would form an alliance with their common enemies, Prussia and France.

After a heated debate, in 1755 the Imperial Council agreed with Bestuzhev's proposal to temporarily stop construction, although Russia had every right to build a fortress on its territory. Turkey remained aloof from the military alliances of the Seven Years' War.

Bestuzhev underestimated the importance of establishing contacts with the Balkan Orthodox, unlike his brother, M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who, when he was an envoy in Vienna, wrote to Elizabeth: "Then these peoples will always take refuge in the patronage and protection of your imperial majesty." And the rumor about the wisdom of the Empress in interceding for the Serbs "as well as some free peoples, as well as Macedonians, Bulgarians and Volohs, it has already reached and this can bring a fair amount of fruit over time" .

Thus, the policy of Bestuzhev-Ryumin in relation to neighboring countries was not of an aggressive nature and was aimed only at the security of Russian borders and ridding neighbors of influence hostile to Russia.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE "SYSTEM OF PETER THE GREAT"

Bestuzhev put his "system" into practice by becoming the organizer of Anglo-Russian subsidized conventions. Their essence was that the British gave out a certain amount of money for the maintenance of the Russian army, and the Russian army was sent to help them. The British were forced to do this, as they had on the continent the weakly protected possession of their king - Hanover. First they hired troops in the German states, and then in Russia. Bestuzhev justified the "sale" of troops by the fact that they still act in the interests of Russia, and if the British are willing to pay for them, then all the better. London, in turn, believed that "he who pays orders the music" and expected to use Russian soldiers in the place where he pleases, and against the enemy he himself appoints. In 1746, it was decided to send the 30,000th Russian corps to the Rhine, to help the English and Dutch troops suffering defeat from the French. However, an alarming signal for Russia was the categorical refusal of France to allow Russian representatives to the negotiating table in Aachen, explaining this by the mercenary status of its troops. England kept silent, and the Russian representatives were not admitted to the congress. This fact did not affect the relations between London and St. Petersburg, and they remained allies.

In 1753 relations between Great Britain and Prussia escalated. In April 1753, the British asked Saint Petersburg if Russia would provide military assistance to Britain if the Prussians attacked Hanover. On May 7, 1753, Bestuzhev submitted his "weakest opinion" on this issue to Elizaveta Petrovna. As usual, he painted a frightening picture of Russia surrounded by hostile states pushed against her by France. The ally of France, the militant Frederick II, having captured Hanover, will not only increase the number of his subjects and, as a result, his soldiers, but will also take control of the large financial resources of this electorate. It is necessary to provide military assistance to the British for the sake of the peace of Russia: "We can safely vouch that if there is any danger in the world of the Russian Empire, it will only and only from the strengthening of the Prussian king breathing towards her with malice". Elizabeth agreed with the chancellor's arguments and instructed to draw up a draft Anglo-Russian convention. The British offered their counterproject. Further negotiations led to the birth of the very Anglo-Russian subsidized convention of 1755, which N.N. Yakovlev named "the main prerequisite for changing foreign policy alliances". In addition to the disagreement of the contracting parties about the amount of the subsidy itself and the understandable desire of the British to save money, both projects initially diverged on those points that provoked the "diplomatic revolution" of 1755-1756, when the former European blocs - England, Austria, Russia against France and Prussia - transformed into the Austro-French-Russian and Anglo-Prussian alliances.

Bestuzhev's draft convention with England was extremely specific, fully in line with the international situation in the spring of 1753. It proposed a detailed plan of action for Frederick II's attack on Hanover and possible assistance to France in the process. The British, in response, did not make amendments, but proposed a new draft, drawn up in the usual diplomatic terms, consistent with international practice. It contained no mention of Frederick II and France. Most likely, this immediately alerted Elizabeth and her entourage - since Chancellor Bestuzhev began to persistently bring to the attention of the Empress his "weakest opinion", "offering" either to continue the Anglo-Russian negotiations, or to strengthen the Prussian king by refusing them. Russia must make concessions, he believed, if the British would also agree to a compromise. Bestuzhev revised his draft convention and wrote comments for Elizabeth.

At the suggestion of the British, all particulars were removed (mentions of Prussia and France), since the convention had to be approved by the parliament, therefore, it would be made public. In this case, Frederick II would have known that it was directed against him, and immediately took aggressive action. Petersburg agreed, and the anti-Prussian orientation disappeared from the official text of the convention. The first Russian draft contained an article on the prohibition of separate negotiations with the enemy. Didn't meet him in English project, Bestuzhev again entered it into his own, noticing to the Empress that the British had this item "Of course, only released by mistake", and singled it out as a separate article (probably so that the British would not decide to "forget" it again). But British diplomats could not have been so "forgetful" when drafting an international treaty.

London deliberately left Russia the role of a "mercenary power" providing its troops for the sake of foreign interests, which could exclude its participation in the conclusion of peace, and Bestuzhev did not want a repeat of what was at the negotiations in Aachen. The following year, 1755, the British received a new Russian project, and on September 7, 1755, the English response was considered in St. Petersburg. In the English draft of the "Secret and Separate Article" it was said that since Elizabeth promised to give military assistance and, consequently, "in the eventual war the great will already have a part", then the contracting parties undertake to "frankly tell each other everything that can be negotiated with a common enemy". Outwardly, the British made concessions, undertaking to report on negotiations with a common enemy, but the essence of the document remained unchanged - England could start separate negotiations at any time, regardless of Russia's desire. London did not perceive St. Petersburg as an equal partner. In this form, the convention was concluded on September 19, 1755.

However, unexpectedly for the British, problems arose with the ratification of the convention by the Russian side. Opposition was provided by the anti-Bestuzhev group of Vice-Chancellor Vorontsov and favorite of the Empress Shuvalov, who sought to improve relations with France, which were terminated in 1748. Considering the English convention the brainchild of Bestuzhev, they expressed to Elizabeth the fear that the British would demand the transfer of the Russian corps to the Netherlands to fight the French. In December 1755, in response to the surprise expressed by the English ambassador Williams at the delay in ratification, he was told that "Her Majesty, being a little unwell with a handle, she, through bad luck, also damaged it". and therefore unable to sign the papers. At the same time, the ambassador was asked to accept a note for the information of his court, which considered measures in case the Anglo-French war, which began in the colonies in the same 1755, was transferred to Europe and Frederick II intervened in it. Williams flatly refused to accept the note until Elizabeth ratified the treaty. However, Ambassador "calming down a bit" noticed that the note submitted to him did not contain conditions that were impossible for his country to fulfill, and he himself could declare orally that London "nothing important will be done without the consent of the Imperial Majesty" .

Since the empress's "ill hand" could not be a good enough reason to delay ratification, Williams was given to understand what was really stopping Elizabeth. Vice Chancellor Vorontsov had a private conversation with Williams. Touching upon the issue of ratification, Vorontsov expressed the opinion that, "Perhaps Her Majesty deigns to have some correct doubt in this matter, and then the treatise is not ratified, which I only think, perhaps, is it not the reason that Her Majesty is reluctant to send her troops as far as to Germany or to The Netherlands will deign to send, but only in case of involvement in the war of the king of Prussia. Williams replied that immediately after ratification he would send a request to London on this matter, but he himself agreed that the purpose of the convention was "Restrain the King of Prussia". Vorontsov immediately requested a written assurance from the British side. Williams again made it a condition for the Russian ratification of the convention.

The chancellor himself, understanding the reasons for the delay, continued to persistently assure the empress that the Russian corps would act only against Prussia and only on its territory. In support of his opinion, the chancellor cited words from the text of the convention, refuting the fears of Elizabeth and her advisers. For example, what is the purpose of sending English galleys to the Baltic Sea, except for actions against Prussia? And if the British intend to use the corps against France, then why did they not take care to secure in advance the right of passage through the German lands? .

In the end, Elizabeth came to a compromise solution. On February 1, 1756, the convention was ratified, but along with the letters, Ambassador Williams received a secret declaration that the convention was valid only for actions against the Prussian king. Williams accepted her, although he stated that his king would be sorry. The next day, Williams unsuccessfully attempted to return the declaration. Since he could not find out about the reaction of his authorities in such a short time, he probably already knew about the conclusion of the Anglo-Prussian agreement and simply feared that if he did not accept the declaration, Russia would refuse ratification altogether. On February 3, 1756, Williams officially announced the Treaty of Westminster (Whitehall) concluded between Great Britain and Prussia, providing for the defense of Hanover by the Prussian army. The shock in St. Petersburg was strong, as evidenced by the pause in communication between Williams and the Russian chancellors. On February 22, 1756, the ambassador read the text of the treaty itself. Five days later, Williams tried to explain that "their treatise with the king of Prussia was concluded out of necessity, in order to deprive France of only a strong ally and bring Hanover to safety, so that no violation of the obligations with the former allies is inflicted". When asked why these negotiations were then kept secret from the Allies, Williams replied that the treaty was concluded very quickly, after short negotiations. Obviously aware that this was a weak excuse, the Englishman added that he at least knew nothing about the negotiations.

Not understanding what was happening to the British, who had just signed an agreement with a common enemy, Bestuzhev at first refused to believe in the viability of this unthinkable alliance. Russian envoy in England, Prince A.M. Golitsyn was ordered to remind London of the past attitude of the Prussian king to the treaties he concluded, of his ongoing negotiations with France. Along with this, Bestuzhev decided to establish personal contact with Golitsyn (appointed to London on the recommendation of Vorontsov), writing a letter to the envoy asking him to communicate the most important news to him personally. In order to convince Golitsyn to accept the offer, in the next letter the chancellor announced that a decision had been made to send additional funds to rent his house in London. (Count P.G. Chernyshev, Golitsyn’s predecessor, unsuccessfully asked St. Petersburg about this). Almost simultaneously with Bestuzhev's second letter, Golitsyn received an official rescript ordering him to pay special attention to the French ambassador in London. The chancellor increasingly lost control over the country's foreign policy. Therefore, he again wrote to Golitsyn, still hoping for a break between London and Berlin. It's hard to say exactly why, but he told the envoy that the British prime minister, the Duke of Newcastle, had decided to use Golitsyn rather than Williams in negotiations with Russia. Most likely, Golitsyn, his actions and the confidence of the Duke of Newcastle in him were Bestuzhev's last hope for preserving his "system" and, as a result, his position at court. This required the utmost trust and frankness between the envoy and the chancellor. Bestuzhev constantly inserted significant phrases into his letters: "I will open to your Excellency in a greater than ever power of attorney," and also in official rescripts sent to London: "True, they will not yet explain the whole system, but here it has long been a rule for ministers to report only the parts that belong to them," but "I won't hide from you" .

Bestuzhev's hopes to maintain an alliance with England were not destined to come true. Prince Golitsyn could only thank him for the increase in salary and pass on the excuses of the British. In particular, he said that Count Holderness, who was in charge of relations with the northern countries and Russia in the British government, told him that he did not talk about contacts with Prussia because he knew the policy of the Russian government - not to inform his representatives abroad about important matters . Bestuzhev realized that the order he had established was turning against him, and the concentration of all negotiations in St. Petersburg also did not justify itself. When Frederick II, without waiting for the Austrians and Russians to be ready to start joint actions, invaded Saxony and published his explanation of this step, this document was not handed over to Bestuzhev after receiving it in St. Petersburg. The chancellor himself had to ask the College of Foreign Affairs to send him a translation of the declaration of the Prussian king. The era of Bestuzhev has come to an end. The main element dropped out of his "system" - an alliance with Great Britain. This event was unexpected not only for the Russian chancellor, but also for the rest of Europe. Russia and England did not have a clash of interests, and yet they found themselves in opposing blocs of the Seven Years' War.

The reason for the collapse of the Anglo-Russian alliance was the inherent inequality of the parties and the dependent role of Russia. The experience of Russia's participation in the War of the Austrian Succession was most likely perceived by Elizabeth as negative. She did not want a repetition of this, which was skillfully used by the opponents of Chancellor Bestuzhev at court. The chancellor himself made a major political miscalculation, still thinking in terms of the 1740s. Then he managed to bring Russia into Europe, but now his position began to interfere with the rapid transformation of the country into a full partner in international relations. It is characteristic that, being at rest, Bestuzhev prepared for death and minted medals about himself, using two mottos on them: immobilis in mobili(stationary in motion) and semper idem(always the same). Europe was changing, but the Russian Chancellor was not. Despite this, Bestuzhev remained chancellor, Elizabeth still needed his advice. Bestuzhev was always against collegiality (by the way, violating the testament of Peter I), and the Collegium of Foreign Affairs dealt with him mainly in economic and clerical affairs, but on March 3, 1756, it was Bestuzhev who proposed to the Empress to establish a permanent Conference that would resolve issues of weakening Prussia, and Elizabeth approved this proposal. E.V. Anisimov believes that the chancellor took such a step in order not to take sole responsibility for the new foreign policy concept. In fact, Bestuzhev was afraid that his opinion would not be heard under the new circumstances, and did everything not to remain aloof from events in the future, as happened during the negotiations on the restoration of Russian-French relations.

During the Seven Years' War 1756-1763. and the constantly deteriorating state of health of the Empress, Bestuzhev again decided to secure his future (as he did many years ago, during the flight of Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich) and again riskily staked on the heirs of the current monarch. Grand Duke Pyotr Fedorovich hated the chancellor for a long time, and Bestuzhev knew that the transfer of power into the hands of this man would lead to a radical change in the country's foreign policy and to the inevitable disgrace of himself. He decided to improve relations with the wife of the Grand Duke, Ekaterina Alekseevna: he suggested that she remove her husband when he ascended the throne, proclaim the emperor of the young Pavel Petrovich, appoint Catherine as regent, and for himself the chancellor reserved the chairmanship of the Military, Admiralty and Foreign collegiums.

Meanwhile, Russian Field Marshal S. Apraksin, an ally of Bestuzhev, having inflicted a defeat on the Prussian troops at Gross-Jegersdorf, unexpectedly withdrew his troops back to the borders of Russia. Perhaps this was due to the uncertainty of the situation due to the deteriorating health of Elizabeth. The recovered empress regarded this as treason, they were going to judge Apraksin, but he died during the first interrogation. Elizabeth decided to find out the details of the suspicious correspondence between the chancellor and the field marshal and Bestuzhev's plans for the Grand Duchess. On February 27 (March 10), 1758, the chancellor was arrested, deprived of all ranks and awards. He refused to hand over only the portrait of Peter I. The prosecution was never able to prove treason, but the following year Bestuzhev was nevertheless sentenced to beheading. The empress, who did not approve a single death sentence, remained true to herself and replaced the execution with exile in one of the villages belonging to Bestuzhev, Goretovo, Mozhaisk district. Elizabeth, obviously, understood that the charges against the chancellor were rather unsteady, and therefore he was not sent to Siberia, like others who were involved in the Apraksin case, he was not tortured, the estate was not confiscated, only state debts were collected from him. However, the amount was huge. In Goretovo, Bestuzhev first lived in a smoky hut, grew a beard, read the Holy Scriptures, then he was allowed to build a house for himself, which he called "the abode of sorrow." Meanwhile, Elizaveta Petrovna died, and then Peter III was overthrown by Catherine. Catherine II remembered Bestuzhev's services and summoned him to Petersburg. All the awards were returned to him (and in 1763 nine-year-old Pavel Petrovich granted him the last - the Holstein Order of St. Anna). Since Count Vorontsov was already chancellor, on July 3, 1762, the empress promoted Bestuzhev to field marshal general (a rank corresponding to the chancellor's in the army). True, Bestuzhev never put on a military uniform. His case was reviewed, the former chancellor was fully acquitted, but he never returned to his former role. The last time Bestuzhev tried to influence foreign affairs was when he offered to support the Saxon elector in the election of the Polish king. Catherine II and former protege of Bestuzhev N.I. Panin preferred the candidacy of S. Poniatowski. Bestuzhev-Ryumin was honorably retired due to old age and died of stone disease on April 10 (21), 1766.

Both during his lifetime and after his death, Bestuzhev was repeatedly awarded unflattering assessments. He was a typical figure of his age - a recognized master of behind-the-scenes court intrigues, an insidious and cunning courtier. If he were different, he would hardly have been able to stay at the Elizabethan court, since he had nothing to do with the coup of November 25, 1741, did not enjoy the sympathy of the empress, was not, like Vorontsov, married to her relative.

Still impartial contemporaries of the chancellor distinguished between his business and personal qualities. Prussian General H.G. Manstein, who grew up in Russia and left it in 1744, wrote in his memoirs about Bestuzhev: "He has no lack of intelligence, he knows things from a long habit and is very hardworking; but at the same time he is arrogant, greedy, stingy, depraved, incredibly deceitful, cruel and never forgives". Catherine II, who knew Bestuzhev well, intriguing first against him, and then with him, noted: “He instilled in himself much more fear than affection, was extremely crafty and suspicious, firm and unshakable in his opinions, rather cruel with his subordinates, an implacable enemy, but a friend of his friends, whom he did not leave until they themselves betrayed him; in other respects he was quarrelsome and in many cases petty ... and in his character he immeasurably exceeded the diplomats of the royal antechamber"; "it was difficult to lead him by the nose" .

Bestuzhev himself never allowed his shortcomings and vices to influence his professional activities as Chancellor of the Russian Empire. The rescripts compiled by Bestuzhev to Russian diplomats, personal letters to them, notes for Elizabeth show us a smart, insightful person who did not commit rash and dangerous acts in foreign policy (unlike his life as a courtier).

Bestuzhev-Ryumin made a significant contribution to the development of Russia's foreign policy. He was the first to propose a well-thought-out and logical program aimed at actively ensuring Russia's calm on the borders and weakening its potential enemies (earlier A.I. Osterman called "seek friendship and alliance" with all neighbors without exception), turning it into a key player in the European arena, an active participant in European unions. He was the organizer of a well-functioning Russian intelligence system, as a result of which he had a clear idea of ​​​​the real goals of the country's opponents both in St. Petersburg itself and abroad. From Sweden, the envoy Panin, who bribed a number of Swedish officials, informed him about the details of diplomatic correspondence with Versailles and Berlin with Stockholm, as well as about the plans of Swedish politicians and the state of the Swedish army. From Poland, the Russian representatives were informed about political affairs by the great crown chancellor Count Jan Malachowski himself, as well as other influential magnates who were oriented towards Russia. In Turkey, several officials were Russian agents at once, including assistants who had access to the most important diplomatic documents reis-efendi(Minister in charge of foreign affairs of the Ottoman Empire). Bestuzhev's counterintelligence was also at its best - even the master of espionage Frederick II did not have any important news from St. Petersburg, and no one managed to reveal the Russian diplomatic cipher, besides, it often changed. And in the Russian missions abroad there was no one who would work for the enemies of Russia (by the way, the secretary of the Austrian embassy in Dresden and the official of the Saxon ministry informed the Prussian king Frederick II of all the information they knew). Bestuzhev took all measures in case diplomats were recruited - he forbade accepting gifts and bribes addressed to them personally, did not inform diplomats about secret negotiations held with foreign envoys in St. Petersburg, which, by the way, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs did not know anything about.

Under Bestuzhev, Russia really entered Europe, became a participant in all pan-European affairs, and yet the chancellor could not get the European powers to consider Russia an equal partner. He overestimated the strength of Anglo-Russian ties, and London's policy proved that Russia in Europe in the future can only rely on its own strength.

34. AVPRI, f. 35. Relations between Russia and England, op. 1, 1754, d. 764, l. 37.

35. Ibid., 1755, d. 770, l. 226.

36. Ibid. l. 281.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., l. 291-291 rev.

39. Ibid., 1756, d. 779, l. 13-13 about.

40. Yakovlev N.N. Decree. op., p. 81.

41. AVPRI, f. 35, Relations between Russia and England, op. 1, 1756, d. 779, l. 44.

42. Ibid., d. 776, l. 77, 77 rev.

43. Ibid., d. 777, l. 192 rev.

44. Ibid., d. 779, l. 180-181 rev.

45. Bantysh-Kamensky D.N. Decree. op., p. 12.

46. Anisimov E.V. Elizaveta Petrovna, p. 328.

47. Manstein H.G. Manstein's notes on Russia. SPb., 1875, p. 244.

48. Notes of Empress Catherine II, p. 6, 224.

49. History of Russia's foreign policy. 18th century, p. 72.

(1693-1766) - son of a privy councilor, chamberlain and favorite Anna Ioannovna Pyotr Mikhailovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin and Evdokia Ivanovna Talyzina. Born in Moscow. He received a good education at the academy in Copenhagen, and then in Berlin, showing great aptitude for languages. At the age of 19, he was appointed a nobleman at the embassy of Prince B. I. Kurakin at a congress in Utrecht; then, while in Hanover, he managed to get the rank of chamber junker at the Hanoverian court. With permission Peter I From 1713 to 1717 he was in the service in Hanover, and then in Great Britain and came to St. Petersburg with the news of the accession to the English throne of George I.

In 1717, Bestuzhev-Ryumin returned to Russian service and was appointed chief junker to the Dowager Duchess of Courland, and then held the post of resident in Copenhagen from 1721 to 1730; in Hamburg from 1731 to 1734 and again in Copenhagen until 1740.

Being all these years in the diplomatic service, Alexei Petrovich received the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky and the rank of Privy Councilor. In 1740, under the patronage of the Duke of Biron, he was given the rank of real Privy Councilor, and then he was appointed cabinet minister in opposition to Count Osterman. Bestuzhev-Ryumin assisted Biron in his appointment as regent under the young emperor John Antonovich, but with the fall of the duke, he himself lost his high position. He was imprisoned in the Shlisselburg Fortress, and then sentenced by the court to quartering, which was replaced due to lack of evidence of the accusation and strong patrons, exile to the village. At the end of the same year, he was summoned by Count Golovkin and Prince Trubetskoy to St. Petersburg, having managed to take part in the coup on November 25, 1741 in favor of Elizabeth Petrovna. 5 days after her accession, the Empress granted Alexei Petrovich the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, and then - the title of senator, the post of director of the postal department and vice-chancellor.

On April 25, 1742, Alexei Petrovich's father was elevated to the dignity of a count of the Russian Empire; and thus he became a count. In 1744, the Empress appointed him State Chancellor, and on July 2, 1745, Holy Roman Emperor Franz I awarded Bestuzhev the title of count, and the chancellor became a count of two empires.

Since 1756, Bestuzhev-Ryumin was a member of the Conference at the highest court created on his initiative and had the opportunity to influence the actions of the Russian army, which participated in this period in the Seven Years' War. Leading the foreign policy of the Russian Empire, he focused on an alliance with Great Britain, Holland, Austria and Saxony against Prussia, France and Turkey. Explaining his political course to the empress, he invariably cited Peter I as an example and said: "This is not my policy, but the policy of your great father." The change in the foreign policy situation, which led to the alliance of Great Britain with Prussia and the rapprochement between Russia and France during the Seven Years' War, as well as the participation of Bestuzhev-Ryumin in palace intrigues in which Grand Duchess Catherine and Field Marshal Apraksin were involved, led to the resignation of the Chancellor. On February 27, 1758, he was stripped of his ranks and insignia and put on trial; after a long investigation, Alexei Petrovich was sentenced to death penalty, which the empress replaced with a link to the village. The manifesto about the crimes of the former chancellor said that "he was ordered to live in the village under guard, so that others would be protected from catching the vile tricks of the villain who had grown old in them." Bestuzhev was exiled to his Mozhaisk village of Goretovo.

Peter III had a negative attitude towards the disgraced nobleman and, having returned other exiled dignitaries of the former reign, he was left in exile. Dethroned spouse and took the throne Catherine II returned Bestuzhev from exile and restored his honor and dignity with a special manifesto. It said: "Count Bestuzhev-Ryumin clearly revealed to us by what deceit and forgery of unfriendly people he was brought to this misfortune ...<...>... We accepted it as a Christian and royal duty: to show him, Count Bestuzhev-Ryumin, more than before, worthy of our late aunt, his former sovereign, power of attorney and our special favor to him, as if with our manifesto we are fulfilling returning him with the former seniority of the rank of general field marshal, real privy councilor, senator and both Russian orders of the cavalier with a pension of 20,000 rubles a year.

Having received the rank of field marshal, Bestuzhev nevertheless did not regain the title of chancellor, which he had counted on. At the beginning of the new reign, he was among the closest advisers to Catherine II, but he no longer played an active role in politics. Catherine occasionally turned to Bestuzhev for advice: "Father Alexei Petrovich, I ask you to consider the attached papers and write your opinion."

Alexei Petrovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin was married to Anna Ivanovna Bettiher and had a son and a daughter.

Solovyov B. I. "General Field Marshals of Russia". Rostov-on-Don, "Phoenix", 2000.