Judging by the documents, on June 22, 1941, the Nazi troops entered the Soviet Union almost without hindrance ...
The Ministry of Defense has published unique documents about the first battles of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.
Today, June 22, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published unique historical documents telling about the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. Department of Information and mass communications Departments, together with the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, carried out a large-scale work to find and digitize previously unpublished primary sources from the period of late June - early July 1941.
Of undoubted interest will be the first published copy of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 1 dated June 22, 1941, signed by Zhukov and Timoshenko and handed over on the night of June 22 by the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies. Also in the project, for the first time, a trophy map of the initial stage of the “Barbarossa Plan” is presented, where, in addition to the detailed placement of groups of Nazi troops near the borders of the USSR, the planned directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht troops in the first days of the war are indicated. Particular attention deserves the declassified Combat Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 2 dated June 22, 1941, personally compiled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Zhukov three hours after the start of the war - at 7:15 in the morning. It is noteworthy that the order instructs the troops of the Red Army "by all means and means to fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border", and bomber and attack aircraft to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields based and grouping ground forces "to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 kilometers. At the same time, it was indicated that “no raids should be made on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.” On the back of the last page of this document is G. Zhukov's postscript: “T[ov]. Vatutin. Bomb Romania.
Behind the handwritten lines of this unique document- in fact, the first combat order of the People's Commissariat of Defense - one can read the colossal tension and tragedy of the first hours of the outbreak of war. According to the documents, all participants in the first battles describe the conditions under which our troops entered the war in one word “unexpectedly”, and the Soviet leadership delayed open resistance to the invaders to the last. So, despite cases of shelling of Soviet military personnel by German aircraft and fighting with border guards, an instruction was received from the headquarters of the 5th Army: “Do not succumb to provocation, do not shoot at aircraft ... The Germans in some places began to fight with our frontier posts. This is yet another provocation. Do not go for provocation. Raise the troops on alert, but do not give cartridges to your hands.
The published documents of the Ministry of Defense are the fruit of the work of a group of specialists led by Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, who in 1952 began to develop a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Apparently, the project was approved by Stalin. For a more complete and objective presentation of events, questions were formulated relating to the period of deployment of the troops of the Baltic, Kiev and Belorussian special military districts according to the "Plan of Defense of the State Border of 1941".
Five main questions were identified:
- Was the state border defense plan communicated to the troops? If yes, then when and what was done by the command and troops to ensure the implementation of this plan.
- From what time and on the basis of what order, the covering troops began to reach the state border, and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the start of hostilities.
- When an order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22. What and when instructions were given to the troops in pursuance of this order and what was done.
- Why most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was in training camps.
- To what extent the headquarters of the unit was prepared for command and control, and to what extent this affected the conduct of operations in the first days of the war.
Assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, who exercised control in the first days of the war. Received materials authored by well-known Soviet military leaders were carefully studied and analyzed. The conclusions were quite shocking: “The Soviet government and the high command, realistically assessing the situation in the period 1940-1941, felt the incomplete readiness of the country and the army to repel an attack from fascist Germany, an enemy strong and well-armed due to the robbery of the countries of Western Europe, with two years of experience in conducting military operations. Based objective reality At that time, by ordering the troops to be on full alert, the country's leadership did not want to give Hitler a pretext for unleashing a war in extremely unfavorable conditions for us, hoping to delay the war. Therefore, for the army and commanders of the troops, the attack of the Nazis came as a "complete surprise", despite the fact that Soviet intelligence was well aware of the plans of the Wehrmacht.
From the report of Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko, who in 1941 was the deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front):
"Group of Nazi troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in last days before the war was known to the headquarters of the district quite fully and in large part and in detail. The uncovered grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive grouping with a significant saturation with tanks and motorized units. The command and headquarters of the district had reliable data on the intensive and direct preparation of fascist Germany for the war against Soviet Union 2-3 months before the start of hostilities. Starting from the second week of the war, great attention was given to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of reconnaissance radio-equipped groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points on the territory occupied by our troops, in case of their forced withdrawal. “In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value. It was reported on the personally observed concentration of Nazi troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on the reconnaissance conducted by German officers along the border, the preparation of artillery positions by the Germans, the intensification of the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia ".
But if for reconnaissance the preparation of the Germans for the German offensive was an obvious fact, then for the commanders of the troops on June 22 it was a complete surprise.
From the report of Lieutenant General Pyotr Sobennikov, who in 1941 commanded the troops of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front):
“How unexpectedly for the approaching troops the war began can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving along railway on the
dawn on June 22, arriving at st. Siauliai and seeing the bombing of our airfields, believed that "maneuvers had begun." “At this time, almost all aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15 hours on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.
“... at about 10-11 o’clock on June 18, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to my defense sectors by the morning of June 19, and Colonel General Kuznetsov [Commander of the PriOVO]
ordered me to go to the right flank, and he personally went to Taurage, taking upon himself the duty to put the 10th rifle corps of Major General Shumilov on alert. I sent the chief of staff of the army to the settlement. Kelgava with an order to withdraw the Army headquarters to the command post.
“During June 19, 3 rifle divisions (10th, 90th and 125th) were deployed. Parts of these divisions were located in prepared trenches and bunkers. The permanent structures were not ready. Even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the chief of staff of the Klenov front in a very categorical form - by dawn on June 22, withdraw the troops from the border, withdraw them from the trenches, which I categorically refused to do and the troops remained in position.
From the report of Major General Nikolai Ivanov, who in 1941 was the chief of staff of the 6th Army of the Kiev Special Military District (Southwestern Front):
“Despite the unconditional signs of a large concentration of German troops, the commander of the Kiev Special Military District forbade the advancement of cover units, putting troops on alert, and even more so strengthening them even after the start of shelling of the state border and air raids on the night of June 21-22, 1941. Only On the afternoon of June 22, this was allowed, when the Germans had already crossed the state border and were operating on our territory.
From the report of Major General Pavel Abramidze, who in 1941 was the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District (Southwestern Front):
" Before treacherous attack... I and the commanders of the units of my unit did not know the content of the mobilization plan, the so-called MP-41 of the year. After it was opened, in the first hour of the war, everyone was convinced that defensive work, command and staff exercises with access to the field, proceeded strictly from the 41-year mobilization plan, developed by the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District and approved by the General Staff.
As Major General Boris Fomin, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 12th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front), testified, “extracts from the plans for the defense of the state border (...) were kept at the headquarters of corps and divisions in sealed“ red ”packages. The order to open the red packets from the district headquarters followed at the end of June 21. An enemy air strike (3.50 on June 22) caught the troops at the moment of their advancement for defense. According to the approved state border defense plan of 1941, in connection with the concentration of large German forces to the state border, an increase in the number of troops included in the plan was envisaged. “The defense of the border before the start of hostilities was not engaged in divisions. The radio stations in the army headquarters were destroyed by bombing.
Management had to be carried out by communications officers, communications were maintained by U-2, SB aircraft, armored vehicles and cars. “To deliver the encrypted order, I sent one U-2 aircraft to each army with the order to land near the command post and hand over the order; one SB aircraft in each army with an order to drop a paratrooper near the command post with an encrypted order for delivery; and one armored car with an officer to present the same encrypted order. Results: all U-2s were shot down, all armored vehicles were burned, and only at the command post of the 10th Army, 2 paratroopers with orders were dropped from the SB. To clarify the front line had to use fighters.
Major General Mikhail Zashibalov, commander of the 86th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 10th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front) in 1941, said that he “at one in the morning on June 22, 1941, was called to the telephone by the corps commander and received the following instructions - to raise the headquarters of the division, the headquarters of the regiments on alarm and collect them at their location. Do not raise rifle regiments on combat alert, why wait for his order. At 0200, the division chief of staff reported the information received from the Chief of the Nurskaya frontier outpost that the Nazi troops were approaching the Western Bug River and bringing up crossing facilities. After the report of the chief of staff of the division at 02:10 on June 22, 1941, he ordered the “Storm” signal to be given and the rifle regiments to be alerted and to make a forced march to occupy sectors and defense areas. At 2.40 on June 22, I received an order to open the package of the corps commander stored in my safe, from which it became known to me - to raise the division on alert and act in accordance with the decision I made and the order for the division, which I did on my own initiative an hour earlier.
In turn, in 1952, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Bagramyan (June 22, 1941 - Head of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District (South-Western Front) noted in his report that “the troops that directly covered the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to the regiment, inclusive. Along the entire border, field positions were prepared for them. These troops were the first operational echelon, and were deployed directly at the borders. They began to deploy under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities. Their advance access to prepared positions by the General It was banned by the headquarters in order not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of fascist Germany.
In 1952, the specialists of the group of Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky received contradictory information on the questions asked. So, to the very first and important question - was the plan for the defense of the state border brought to the troops, some commanders reported that the plan was brought to them in advance, and they had the opportunity to develop their plans with the formation of battle formations and the definition of combat areas. Others replied that they had not been acquainted with the plan, but received it in sealed packages directly in the first days of the war. So in one of the reports that the researchers received, it was said: “Parts of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army of the Kiev Special Military District were located on the state border, being in constant combat readiness, and in a very short time they could occupy their harrow areas, but conflicting orders from the high command did not allow our gunners to open fire on the enemy until 10:00 am on June 22. And only at 4.00 am on June 23, after a 30-minute artillery preparation, our troops drove the enemy out of the city of Przemysl, which he occupied, and liberated the city, where there were many Soviet citizens, including families of officers. There were also such confessions of the commanders of the troops: “Parts of the divisions of the 5th Army of the Kiev Special Military District entered the battle with the Germans in extremely difficult conditions, since the hostilities began suddenly and came as a surprise, while one third of the troops were on defensive work, and the corps the artillery was at the army camp." “In the Baltic Special Military District, the Germans started the war at 4.00 am on June 22 with artillery preparation and direct fire at bunkers, frontier posts, settlements, creating many fires, after which they went on the offensive. The main efforts of the enemy concentrated in the direction of Palanga-Libava, along the coast of the Baltic Sea bypassed the city of Kretinga, along the Klaipeda highway.
Units of the 10th Infantry Division repelled German attacks with fire and repeatedly went over to counterattacks, fought stubborn defensive battles to the entire depth of the foredfield to the river. Minia, Plungi, Retovas. In view of the current situation, by the end of June 22, the division commander received an order from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps to withdraw. The fact that the Soviet leadership tried to delay hostilities with the enemy to the last, thereby hoping to avoid war, says a document with the following content: an order was received: “Do not succumb to the provocation, do not shoot at the planes ... The Germans in some places began to fight with our frontier posts. This is yet another provocation. Do not go for provocation. Raise the troops on alert, but they don’t give cartridges to their hands. ”
According to the disclosed documents, at dawn on June 22, almost all PriOVO aircraft were burned at the airfields. From the mixed air division attached to the 8th army of the district, by 15 hours on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained. As for the participation of artillery in the first days of the war, for the most part it was at the district and army training camps in accordance with the orders of the district headquarters. As soon as active clashes with the enemy began, artillery units arrived on their own in the areas of hostilities and took up the necessary positions. The units that remained in the places of deployment of their units took a direct part in supporting our troops as long as there was fuel for the tractors. When the fuel ran out, the gunners were forced to blow up the guns and equipment. The conditions under which our troops entered the war are described by all the participants in the first battles in one word, "unexpectedly." The situation was the same in all three districts. But by June 26, having recovered from the sudden blow, the headquarters took over the leadership of the fighting. Difficulties in command and control of troops were manifested in almost everything: the understaffing of some headquarters, the lack of the required number of communications equipment (radio and transport), the protection of the headquarters, vehicles for movement, broken wire communications. The management of the rear was difficult due to the supply system remaining from peacetime - the "district-regiment". For these and many other reasons, in the first days of the war, the German army inflicted serious damage on the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk, Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right-Bank Ukraine, Army Group North ( Commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But the Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July, 5 million people were drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps formed at the front. And 4 years later, Soviet soldiers raised a red flag over the Reichstag.
Position as of June 22, 1941
By June 22, 1941, three army groups were concentrated and deployed near the borders of the USSR (a total of 181 divisions, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, and 18 brigades), supported by three air fleets. In the strip from the Black Sea to the Pripyat marshes - Army Group "South" (44 German, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades); in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to Goldap - Army Group Center (50 German divisions and 2 German brigades); in the strip from Goldap to Memel - Army Group North (29 German divisions). They were given the task of advancing in the general direction, respectively, to Kyiv, Moscow and Leningrad. 2 Finnish armies were concentrated on the territory of Finland, on the territory of Northern Norway - a separate German army "Norway" (a total of 5 German and 16 Finnish divisions, 3 Finnish brigades) with the task of reaching Leningrad and Murmansk. In total, more than 5.5 million people, 3,712 tanks, 47,260 field guns and mortars, and 4,950 combat aircraft were concentrated to attack the USSR.
On June 22, 1941, units of the Red Army (without border troops) deployed against Germany and its allies consisted of 186 divisions, 19 brigades; in addition, in the western districts there were 7 divisions, 2 brigades and 11 separate regiments of the NKVD (without the 21st, 22nd and 23rd motorized rifle divisions NKVD, the formation of which began before the war). These forces numbered 3,289,851 people, 59,787 guns and mortars, 15,687 tanks (including 11-13 thousand serviceable ones), 10,743 combat aircraft; the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets consisted of 182 S. 477 ships.
M. Meltyukhov in his 600-page monograph “Stalin's Missed Chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941" in the table gives the following balance of forces on the eastern front on the morning of June 22, 1941:
Red Army | Enemy | Ratio |
|
Personnel | |||
Guns and mortars | |||
Tanks and assault guns | |||
Aircraft |
On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 1,392 tanks of new types - T-34 and KV. Another 305 tanks were produced in June 1941. Thus, the number of heavy and medium tanks, which had no analogues in the Wehrmacht in terms of strike power, on June 22, 1941 in the Red Army was at least 1,392 units.
Samara historian Mark Solonin gives somewhat different data on the number of tanks in both armies, but the ratio of 3.8:1 in favor of the Red Army remains:
Solonin also cites the number of new types of tanks (KV and T-34) on June 22, 1941, which was 1,528 units. This figure corresponds to the data that Meltyukhov cited in his study. On the fronts, the number of tanks in the Red Army was as follows:
Northwestern Front | Western Front | Southwestern and Southern fronts | Total |
|
Tanks and assault guns |
As of June 22, 1941, out of 5807 long-term defensive structures being built by the USSR along the western borders as part of 13 fortified areas of the Molotov Line, only 880 were completed. The Stalin Line, covering the line of the old border, had in its composition 3817 long-term defensive structures, of which 538 were unfinished, was mothballed and partially disarmed. The fortifications on the new border are comparable both in quality and in the number of long-term defensive structures to the best defensive zones of the Second World War. They did not play a significant role, since the construction was not completed and the Soviet lines were not provided with field filling.
Given that the attack took place on a Sunday, government organizations it was a day off, military depots with weapons, ammunition and equipment were closed and sealed, and employees and many officers were on leave or on summer vacation. Due to confusion with orders and the loss of communications and control, entire armies were surrounded and, without any support from the central command, died or surrendered. A significant number of Soviet tanks, often superior in power to German ones, and other weapons fell into the hands of the Germans and were subsequently used by them against the Soviet troops.
According to the historian A. Isaev, the main problem was the lag in the pace of mobilization and deployment of the USSR troops. The Red Army was divided into three echelons, which could not help each other in any way, and in front of each of which the Wehrmacht had a numerical advantage. This is how Isaev explains the catastrophe of the summer of 1941.
Other historians note that in the autumn of 1941 and in 1942 the actions of the Soviet troops were no less unsuccessful than in the summer of 1941, despite the fact that the problem of echelons was no longer a problem. In this regard, the opinion is put forward that the matter is not so much in the echelons, but in the different tactical and operational levels of the Soviet and German armies.
Nazi policy plans after the victory over the USSR
The chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, after the corresponding correction, returned the draft document “Instructions on the special problems of Directive No. this project may be reported to the Führer after revision in accordance with the following provision:
“The upcoming war will be not only an armed struggle, but at the same time a struggle between two worldviews. In order to win this war in conditions where the enemy has a huge territory, it is not enough to defeat his armed forces, this territory should be divided into several states, headed by their own governments, with which we could conclude peace treaties.
The creation of such governments requires great political skill and the development of well thought out general principles.
Every revolution on a large scale brings to life phenomena that cannot simply be brushed aside. Socialist ideas in today's Russia can no longer be eradicated. These ideas can serve as an internal political basis for the creation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, which is the oppressor of the people, must be removed from the scene. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, if it still exists, primarily among emigrants, should also not be allowed to power. It will not be accepted by the Russian people and, moreover, it is hostile to the German nation. This is especially noticeable in the former Baltic states. In addition, we must by no means allow the replacement of the Bolshevik state by a nationalist Russia, which in the end (as history testifies) will once again oppose Germany.
Our task is precisely to create these socialist states dependent on us as quickly as possible and with the least expenditure of military effort.
This task is so difficult that one army is not able to solve it.
An entry dated March 3, 1941 in the diary of the Headquarters of the Operational Command of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW).
30.3.1941 ... 11.00. Big meeting with the Fuhrer. Almost 2.5 hour speech...
The struggle of two ideologies... The great danger of communism for the future. We must proceed from the principle of soldier's camaraderie. The communist has never been and never will be our comrade. It's about about the struggle for destruction. If we do not look like this, then, although we will defeat the enemy, in 30 years the communist danger will arise again. We are not waging war in order to conserve our adversary.
Future political map Russia: Northern Russia belongs to Finland, protectorates in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus.
The struggle against Russia: the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligentsia. The new states must be socialist, but without their own intelligentsia. We must not allow a new intelligentsia to form. Here only the primitive socialist intelligentsia will suffice. We must fight against the poison of demoralization. This is far from a military-judicial issue. Unit and subunit commanders are required to know the aims of the war. They must lead in the struggle ..., firmly hold the troops in their hands. The commander must give his orders, taking into account the mood of the troops.
The war will be very different from the war in the West. In the East, cruelty is a boon for the future. Commanders must make sacrifices and overcome their hesitation...
Diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder
Baltic region
Based on the instructions of the Reichsführer SS, the development policy of the territories east of Germany included, first of all, the development and Germanization of the following regions:
1) Ingermanlandia (Leningrad region),
2) Memel-Narva region (Bialystok region and Western Lithuania).
These areas were supposed to be purposefully populated by returning the original Germans ("Volksdeutsche"). It was planned to create special legal conditions in these three areas as border areas of settlements, since they performed a special task as an outpost of the German people in the east.
In order to more closely connect these border areas of the settlements with the Reich and provide a transport link between them, it was proposed to build along the main railway lines and highways 36 stronghold settlements (of which 14 are in the general government). These points adjoined the existing favorable central points and were covered by strong points of the SS and police. The distance between the strongholds was about 100 km. The management of the strongholds of Ingermanland is envisaged taking into account the special significance of the Baltic space for German persons along two lines.
Black Sea region
The German colonization of the Black Sea region planned by Hitler “restored” the state of the Goths in the Crimea, for which it was supposed to rename Simferopol to Gothenburg (“City of the Ready”), and Sevastopol to Teoderikshafen (“Theodoric Port”). Theodoric was the king of the Goths, but others - in the Balkans and in Italy. He has never been to Crimea. But the Nazi leadership was not embarrassed by this, since the name Gotenhafen ("Port Ready") was already occupied by the Polish Gdynia.
Caucasus
The Caucasus is a proposed autonomous region (Reichskommissariat) within the Third Reich. The capital is Tbilisi. The territory would cover the entire Soviet Caucasus from Turkey and Iran to the Don and Volga rivers. As part of the Reichskommissariat, it was planned to create national entities. The basis of the economy of this region would be oil production and agriculture.
Forces that fought on the side of Germany
Blue color - Germany, allies, protectorates. Red - England. Green - USSR
The Wehrmacht and the SS troops replenished over 1.8 million from among the citizens of other states and nationalities. Of these, during the war years, 59 divisions, 23 brigades, several separate regiments, legions and battalions were formed. Many of them bore names according to state and nationality: "Walonia", "Galicia", "Bohemia and Moravia", "Viking", "Denemark", "Gembez", "Langemark", "Nordland", "Netherlands", " Flanders", "Charlemagne" and others.
Also, the armed forces and SS troops included the armies of Germany's allies - Austria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia. The Bulgarian army was involved in the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia, but the Bulgarian ground units did not fight in Eastern Front.
They acted on the side of Nazi Germany, although they were not part of the Wehrmacht:
Russian Liberation Army of General Vlasov (ROA),
15th Cossack Corps General von Panwitz
The Nazis declared the Cossacks to be descendants of the Ostrogoths. Nevertheless, a significant number of Cossacks took part in the war and on the side of the Red Army, in which Cossack formations were created on the orders of Stalin.
Russian Corps of General Shteifon,
Ukrainian rebel army(Bandera)
a number of separate units formed from citizens of the USSR.
Territories of military operations of the USSR
Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, MSSR, Estonian SSR, Kazakh SSR (air raid on Guryev), Karelo-Finnish SSR, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Leningrad, Murmansk, Pskov, Novgorod, Vologda, Kalinin, Yaroslavl (air raids), Moscow, Tula , Kaluga, Smolensk, Orel, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad regions, Krasnodar, Stavropol Territories, Kabardino-Balkaria, Crimean, Ossetian, Chechen-Ingush republics, Astrakhan (air raids), Arkhangelsk (air raids), Saratov (air raids) regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory (combat operations at sea), Penza region (air raids). On June 18, 1941, some formations of the border military districts of the USSR were put on alert.
According to G.K. Zhukov, with the receipt of direct data from various sources about the upcoming attack on the USSR, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. in full combat readiness. The answer followed: "Prematurely", and before the start of the war there were no more than 5 hours. However, other sources do not confirm this information.
The military-political leadership of the state only at 23.30 on June 21 made a decision aimed at partially bringing the five border military districts to combat readiness. The directive prescribed the implementation of only part of the measures to bring to full combat readiness, which were determined by operational and mobilization plans. The directive, in essence, did not give permission for the implementation of the cover plan in in full, as it was instructed "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications." These restrictions caused bewilderment, requests to Moscow followed, while only a few minutes remained before the start of the war.
Miscalculation in time exacerbated the existing shortcomings in the combat readiness of the army and thereby sharply increased the objectively existing advantages of the aggressor. The time that the troops had to bring them to full combat readiness turned out to be clearly not enough. Instead of 25-30 minutes, it took an average of 2 hours and 30 minutes to alert the troops to bring them to combat readiness. The fact is that instead of the signal "Proceed to implement the cover plan for 1941" joins and joins received an encrypted directive with restrictions on the input of the cover plan.
Under these conditions, even formations and units of the first echelon of the covering armies, which had constant combat readiness within 6-9 hours (2-3 hours - to raise an alarm and collect, 4-6 hours - to advance and organize defense), did not receive this time. Instead of the specified period, they had no more than 30 minutes, and some connections were not notified at all. The delay, and in a number of cases, the failure of the transmission of the command was also due to the fact that the enemy managed to significantly disrupt wire communications with troops in the border areas. As a result, the headquarters of the districts and armies did not have the opportunity to quickly transmit their orders.
The same Zhukov declares that the commands of the western (Western Special, Kyiv Special, Baltic Special and Odessa) border military districts at that time were moving forward to field command posts, which were supposed to arrive just on June 22.
Summer-autumn campaign 1941
Operation Barbarossa.
Map of the plan ";Barbarossa";
In the early morning of June 22, 1941, after artillery and aviation training German troops crossed the border of the USSR. After that, at 5:30 am, German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg appeared before the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov and made a statement, the content of which was that the Soviet government pursued a subversive policy in Germany and in the countries occupied by it, carried out foreign policy, directed against Germany, and "concentrated all its troops on the German border in full combat readiness." The statement ended with the following words: "The Führer therefore ordered the German armed forces to confront this threat with all the means at their disposal."
On the same day, Italy declared war on the USSR (Italian troops began hostilities on July 20, 1941) and Romania. June 23 - Slovakia, and June 27 - Hungary.
The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began in the northern Baltic on the evening of June 21, when German minelayers based in Finnish ports set up two large minefields in the Gulf of Finland. These minefields were ultimately able to trap the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. Later that evening, German bombers, flying along the Gulf of Finland, mined the harbor of Leningrad and the Neva. On the way back, the planes refueled at one of the Finnish airfields.
On the morning of June 22, the Finnish army entered the Aland Islands. The staff of the Soviet consulate in Aland (31 people) was arrested, which was a gross violation of the status of the diplomatic mission. The attack on the Finnish ships undertaken by the Soviet bombers was unsuccessful.
On the morning of June 22, German troops stationed in Norway began advancing to the Soviet-Finnish border in the Petsamo area. Finland did not allow the Germans to strike directly from their territory, and the German units in Petsamo and Salla were forced to refrain from crossing the border. There were episodic skirmishes between Soviet and Finnish border guards, but in general, a calm situation remained on the Soviet-Finnish border.
However, starting on 22 June, German Luftwaffe bombers began using Finnish airfields as a refueling base before returning to Germany. On the same day, 16 Finnish saboteurs dressed in German uniforms were landed from two seaplanes near the locks of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. The saboteurs were supposed to blow up the locks, but because of the increased security, they failed to do this.
On the same day, three Finnish submarines laid mines off the Estonian coast, and their commanders had orders to attack Soviet ships in the event of a meeting.
On June 23, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador to him. Molotov demanded from Finland a clear definition of its position - is it on the side of Germany or is it neutral? Does Finland want to have among her enemies the Soviet Union with a population of two hundred million, and possibly also England? Molotov accused Finland of bombing Hanko and flying over Leningrad. The Finnish ambassador was unwilling to explain Finland's actions.
On June 24, the commander-in-chief of the German Ground Forces sent an instruction to the representative of the German command at the headquarters of the Finnish army, which stated that Finland should prepare for the start of the operation east of Lake Ladoga.
In the early morning of June 25, the Soviet command decided to launch a massive air strike on 18 Finnish airfields using about 460 aircraft. A session of the Finnish parliament was scheduled for June 25, at which, according to Mannerheim's memoirs, Prime Minister Rangel was supposed to make a statement about Finland's neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict, but Soviet bombing forced him to declare that Finland was again at war with the USSR.
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70 years ago the Great Patriotic War began. Before dawn, when sleep is at its strongest, Nazi Germany started bombing and crossed the border into Western Ukraine. Stalin was warned repeatedly, but the mustachioed ogre refused to believe. Even after Hitler attacked, he was in a trance for several days, not believing that this had happened. incapacity Soviet army before the start of the war, rearmament started at the wrong time and miscalculations of the high command cost 26 million human lives. These photographs, taken on the first day of the war, show how easily and practically without resistance the Wehrmacht soldiers began to implement their plan "Barbarossa". And the blitzkrieg was almost a success... it was possible to stop it at the cost of huge human losses only near Moscow itself.
These photographs have one thing in common: they were taken in the first hours and days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
German soldiers cross the state border of the USSR.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941
Soviet border guards on patrol. The photograph is interesting because it was taken for a newspaper at one of the outposts on the western border of the USSR on June 20, 1941, that is, two days before the war.
Shooting time: 06/20/1941
The first day of the war in Przemysl (today - the Polish city of Przemysl) and the first dead invaders on Soviet soil (soldiers of the 101st light infantry division). The city was busy German troops June 22, but the next morning was released by the Red Army and border guards and held until June 27.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941
June 22, 1941 near the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav. At that time, the San River was the border between German-occupied Poland and the USSR.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941
The first Soviet prisoners of war, under the supervision of German soldiers, head west along the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941
After the failure of the surprise takeover Brest Fortress The Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941
Battle of the German strike units in the Brest area.
Shooting time: June 1941
A column of Soviet prisoners crossed the San River along the sapper bridge. Among the prisoners, there are noticeable not only the military, but also people in civilian clothes: the Germans detained and took prisoner all men of military age so that they could not be recruited into the enemy army. District of the city of Yaroslav, June 1941.
Shooting time: June 1941
Sapper bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav, on which German troops are transported.
Shooting time: June 1941
German soldiers are photographed on a Soviet T-34-76 tank, model 1940, abandoned in Lvov.
Location: Lviv, Ukraine, USSR
Shooting time: 30.06. 1941
German soldiers inspect a T-34-76 tank, model 1940, stuck in a field and abandoned.
Shooting time: June 1941
Captured Soviet female soldiers in Nevel (now the Nevelsky district of the Pskov region).
Shooting time: 07/26/1941
German infantry passes by broken Soviet vehicles.
Shooting time: June 1941
The Germans are inspecting Soviet T-34-76 tanks stuck in a water meadow. Floodplain of the Drut River, near Tolochin, Vitebsk region.
Shooting time: July 1941
Start of the German Junkers Yu-87 dive bombers from a field airfield in the USSR.
Shooting time: summer 1941
Red Army soldiers surrender to the soldiers of the SS troops.
Shooting time: June 1941
Destroyed by Soviet artillery, the German light tank Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C.
German soldiers next to a burning Soviet village.
Shooting time: June 1941
German soldier during the battle in the Brest Fortress.
Shooting time: June-July 1941
A rally at the Leningrad plant named after Kirov about the beginning of the war.
Shooting time: June 1941
Location: Leningrad
Residents of Leningrad near the window of LenTASS "Latest News" (Socialist street, house 14 - Pravda printing house).
Shooting time: July 1941
Location: Leningrad
Aerial photograph of the Smolensk-1 airfield taken by German air reconnaissance. An airfield with hangars and runways is marked in the upper left of the image. Other strategic objects are also marked in the image: barracks (bottom left, marked "B"), large bridges, anti-aircraft artillery batteries (vertical line with a circle).
Shooting time: 06/23/1941
Location: Smolensk
Red Army soldiers examine a wrecked German tank Pz 35 (t) (LT vz.35) of Czech production from the 6th tank division Wehrmacht. Neighborhood of the city of Raseiniai (Lithuanian SSR).
Shooting time: June 1941
Soviet refugees walk past an abandoned BT-7A tank.
Shooting time: June 1941
German soldiers examine a burning Soviet tank T-34-76 of the 1940 model.
Shooting time: June-August 1941
The Germans on the march at the beginning of the invasion of the USSR.
Shooting time: June 1941
Soviet field airfield, captured by the Germans. One can see an I-16 fighter shot down or dismantled on the ground, a Po-2 biplane and another I-16 in the background. A picture from a passing German car. Smolensk region, summer 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
Artillerymen of the 29th motorized division of the Wehrmacht from an ambush shot Soviet tanks into the side from a 50-mm PaK 38 cannon. The closest, on the left, is the T-34 tank. Belarus, 1941.
Shooting time: summer 1941
German soldiers ride along the street along the destroyed houses on the outskirts of Smolensk.
Shooting time: July 1941
Location: Smolensk
At the captured Minsk airfield, German soldiers are examining an SB bomber (or its training version of the CSS, since the nose of the aircraft is visible, which differs from the glazed nose of the SB). Early July 1941.
I-15 and I-153 Chaika fighters are visible behind.
Shooting time: July 1941
Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 (model 1931), captured by the Germans. The barrel of the gun, which was transported separately, is missing. 1941, presumably Belarus. German photo.
Shooting time: 1941
The city of Demidov, Smolensk region in the early days of the occupation. July 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
Destroyed Soviet tank T-26. On the tower, under the hatch cover, a burnt tanker is visible.
Shooting time: summer 1941
Surrendering Soviet soldiers go to the rear of the Germans. Summer 1941. The picture was apparently taken from the back of a truck in a German convoy on the road.
Shooting time: summer 1941
A lot of broken Soviet aircraft: I-153 Chaika fighters (to the left). In the background is a U-2 and a twin-engine SB bomber. The airfield of Minsk, captured by German troops (in the foreground - a German soldier). Early July 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
A lot of broken Soviet Chaika I-153 fighters. Minsk airport. Early July 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
German collection point for Soviet captured equipment and weapons. On the left, Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns, then a large number of heavy machine guns "Maxim" and light machine guns DP-27, on the right - 82-mm mortars. Summer 1941.
Shooting time: summer 1941
Dead Soviet soldiers at the captured trenches. This is probably the very beginning of the war, the summer of 1941: the soldier in the foreground wears a pre-war SSH-36 helmet, later such helmets were extremely rare in the Red Army and mainly in the Far East. It can also be seen that a belt has been removed from him - apparently, the work of the German soldiers who captured these positions.
Shooting time: summer 1941
A German soldier is knocking at the house of local residents. City of Yartsevo, Smolensk region, early July 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
The Germans inspect the wrecked Soviet light tanks. In the foreground - BT-7, the far left - BT-5 (characteristic cabin of the tank driver), in the center of the road - T-26. Smolensk region, summer 1941
Shooting time: summer 1941
Soviet artillery wagon with a gun. A shell or air bomb exploded right in front of the horses. Neighborhood of the city of Yartsevo, Smolensk region. August 1941.
Shooting time: summer 1941
Grave of a Soviet soldier. The inscription on the tablet in German reads: "Here rests an unknown Russian soldier." Perhaps the fallen soldier was buried by his own, so at the bottom of the tablet you can make out the word "Here ..." in Russian. For some reason, the Germans made the inscription in their own language. The photo is German, the shooting location is presumably the Smolensk region, August 1941.
Shooting time: summer 1941
German armored personnel carrier, German soldiers on it and local residents in Belarus.
Shooting time: June 1941
Ukrainians welcome the Germans in Western Ukraine.
Shooting time: summer 1941
The advancing units of the Wehrmacht in Belarus. The picture was taken from a car window. June 1941
Shooting time: June 1941
German soldiers in captured Soviet positions. A Soviet 45mm cannon is visible in the foreground, and a Soviet T-34 tank of the 1940 model is visible in the background.
Shooting time: 1941
German soldiers are approaching the freshly knocked out Soviet BT-2 tanks.
Shooting time: June-July 1941
Smoke break crews tractor tractors "Stalinets". The photo is dated in the summer of 41
Shooting time: summer 1941
Soviet female volunteers are sent to the front. Summer 1941.
Shooting time: 1941
Soviet girl-rank-and-file among prisoners of war.
Shooting time: summer 1941
The machine-gun crew of the German rangers fires from the MG-34 machine gun. Summer 1941, Army Group North. In the background, the calculation covers the StuG III self-propelled guns.
Shooting time: summer 1941
The German column passes the village in the Smolensk region.
Shooting time: July 1941
Wehrmacht soldiers are watching the burning village. The territory of the USSR, the date of the picture is approximately the summer of 1941.
Shooting time: summer 1941
Red Army soldier at the captured german lung tank of Czech production LT vz.38 (in the Wehrmacht it was designated Pz.Kpfw.38 (t)). About 600 of these tanks took part in military operations against the USSR, which were used in battles until mid-1942.
Shooting time: summer 1941
SS soldiers at the destroyed bunker on the "Stalin Line". The defensive structures located on the “old” (as of 1939) border of the USSR were mothballed, however, after the invasion of German troops, some fortified areas were used by the Red Army for defense.
Shooting time: 1941
Soviet railway station after the German bombardment, on the tracks there is an echelon with BT tanks.
The dead Soviet soldiers, as well as civilians - women and children. The bodies are dumped in a roadside ditch, like household garbage; dense columns of German troops are calmly moving past along the road.
Shooting time: summer 1941
A cart with the bodies of dead Red Army soldiers.
Soviet symbols in the captured city of Kobrin (Brest region, Belarus) - the T-26 tank and the monument to V.I. Lenin.
Shooting time: summer 1941
A column of German troops. Ukraine, July 1941.
Shooting time: July 1941
Red Army soldiers inspect a German fighter Bf.109F2 (from Squadron 3/JG3) hit by anti-aircraft fire and made an emergency landing. West of Kyiv, July 1941
Shooting time: July 1941
The banner of the 132nd NKVD escort battalion captured by the Germans. Photo from the personal album of one of the Wehrmacht soldiers.
A GOOD SONG ABOUT THIS BLACK DAY IN OUR HISTORY:
Declassified Documents on the First Days of the War: Directives people's commissariat Defense (NPO) of the USSR (including a copy of Directive No. 1 of June 22, 1941), orders and reports from commanders military units and formations, orders for awards, trophy cards and decrees of the country's leadership.
On June 22, 1941, a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Timoshenko was handed over from Moscow. A few hours earlier, soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht infantry division, Alfred Liskov, who had swum across the border river Bug. He was taken to the city of Vladimir-Volynsky, where during interrogation he said that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was passed on to the higher command.
Directive text:
“To the commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 10th armies I convey the order of the people's commissar of defense for immediate execution:
- During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO is possible (Leningrad military district. - RBC), PribOVO (Baltic Special Military District, transformed into the North-Western Front. - RBC), ZapOVO (Western Special Military District, transformed into the Western Front. - RBC), KOVO (Kyiv Special Military District, transformed into the South-Western Front - RBC), OdVO (Odessa Military District - RBC). The attack may start with provocative actions.
- The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
- I order:
- during the night of June 22, 1941, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
- before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it;
- put all units on combat readiness without additional lifting of assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects.
Do not conduct any other activities without special orders.
The directive was signed by Dmitry Pavlov, Commander of the Western Front, Vladimir Klimovskikh, Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Alexander Fominykh, member of the Military Council of the Western Front.
In July, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, the chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General Andrei Grigoriev, the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, were accused of inaction and the collapse of command and control, which led to a breakthrough in the front, and were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR to death. The sentence was put into effect in July 1941. After Stalin's death they were rehabilitated.
Order text:
“To the military councils of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO.
On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields along the western border and bombarded them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.
In connection with the unheard-of arrogance of the German attack on the Soviet Union, I order ... "<...>
<...>“The troops must use all their strength and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.
From now on, until further notice by the ground forces, do not cross the border.
Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces.<...>
<...>“With powerful strikes by bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of his ground forces. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km.
Bomb Koenigsberg (today Kaliningrad. - RBC) and Memel (naval base and port in Lithuania. — RBC).
Do not make raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.
Signatures: Timoshenko, Malenkov (Georgy Malenkov - member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. - RBC), Zhukov (Georgy Zhukov - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. - RBC).
"Tov. Vatutin (Nikolai Vatutin - Zhukov's first deputy. - RBC). Bomb Romania.
Trophy card "Plan Barbarossa"
In 1940-1941. Germany developed a plan of attack on the USSR, involving a "blitzkrieg". The plan and operation were named after King Frederick I of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor "Barbarossa".
From a brief combat history of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment with a description of the exploits of junior lieutenants Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev
Pilots Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev were the first soldiers to be awarded the titles of Heroes of the Soviet Union during the war. On June 28, on their I-16 fighters, for the first time during the defense of Leningrad, they used ramming strikes against German aircraft. On July 8, they were awarded the title.
Kharitonov's schemes of action
After the war, Pyotr Kharitonov continued to serve in the Air Force. In 1953 he graduated from the Air Force Academy, in 1955 he retired. He lived in Donetsk, where he worked at the headquarters of the city's Civil Defense.
Scheme of Zdorovtsev's action
After receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 8, 1941, Zdorovtsev flew out on reconnaissance on July 9. On the way back in the Pskov region, he entered into battle with German fighters. His plane was shot down, Zdorovtsev died.
Western Special Military District. Intelligence Brief #2
On June 22, 1941, the 99th Rifle Division stood in the Polish city of Przemysl, which was one of the first to be captured by German troops. On June 23, units of the division managed to recapture part of the city and restore the border.
“Reconnaissance report No. 2 shtadiv (division headquarters. — RBC) 99 forest Boratyche (a village in the Lviv region. — RBC) 19:30 June 22, 1941
The enemy is forcing the San River (a tributary of the Vistula, flows through the territory of Ukraine and Poland. — RBC) in the Baric district, occupied Stubenko ( locality on the territory of Poland. — RBC) to an infantry battalion. Up to the infantry battalion, it occupies Gurechko (a village on the territory of Ukraine. - RBC), small equestrian groups at 16:00 appeared in Kruvniki (a settlement in Poland. - RBC). At 13:20, the Przemysl hospital was occupied by an unidentified enemy.
Accumulation up to an infantry regiment on the opposite bank of the San River in the Vyshatse area. Accumulation of infantry / small groups / 1 km south of Gurechko.
16:00 to the artillery division fired from the Dusovce region (a village in Poland. — RBC). Up to three battalions of large-caliber artillery at 19:30 fired at Medyka m. (a village in Poland. — RBC) from Maykovce, Dunkovychky, Vypattse districts.
Conclusions: on the Grabovets-Przemysl front, more than one PD (infantry division. - RBC), reinforced by artillery / unspecified number.
Presumably the main enemy grouping on the right flank of the division.
Need to establish: enemy action in front of the right [inaudible] division.
Printed in 5 copies.
Signatures: Colonel Gorokhov, Chief of Staff of the 99th Infantry Division, Captain Didkovsky, Head of the Intelligence Department.
In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a short-term campaign in the summer and autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready unit of the German armed forces 1 was deployed on the border with the USSR.
Wehrmacht
For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 headquarters of army groups available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed ("North", "Center" and "South") (75%), out of 13 headquarters of field armies - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 headquarters of army corps - 34 (73.9%), out of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). In total, 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht was allocated for the Eastern Campaign. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. So, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially manned by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of the flying units, 16.9% of the air defense troops and over 48% of the signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.
German satellites
Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for a war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, who allocated the following forces for waging war (see table 2). In addition, Croatia provided 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, who arrived later. Consequently, there were 767,100 men, 37 calculated divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks, and 886 aircraft in the German allied troops deployed there.
In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 settlement divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and together with 8.5 thousand people of the Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations). 
Red Army
Under the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe, the armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to increase, and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see Table 3). In the five western border districts, 56.1% of the ground forces and 59.6% of the air force were stationed. In addition, since May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from internal military districts and from Far East. By June 22 at western counties 16 divisions arrived (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), in which there were 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.
The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy outnumbered the Red Army only in terms of the number of personnel, because his troops were mobilized.
Mandatory clarifications
Although the above data give general idea about the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed the strategic concentration and deployment in the theater of operations, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively described this situation A.V. Shubin, "a dense body was moving from the West to the East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was growing, but not at a fast enough pace" 2 . Therefore, the correlation of forces at two more levels should be considered. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on the scale of the district (front) - army group, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on the scale of the army - army. At the same time, in the first case, only the ground forces and the Air Force are taken into account, and for the Soviet side, the border troops, artillery and aviation of the Navy are also taken into account, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.
Northwest
In the North-West direction, the troops of the German Army Group "North" and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a rather significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be borne in mind that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the Army Group "North" managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).
Western direction
In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of the PribOVO opposed each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet of the Luftwaffe (43.8% aircraft) were concentrated here. Only 15 Soviet divisions were located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions arrived at the place, and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks. As a result, the troops of the ZapOVO contained in the states of peacetime were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but surpassed him in tanks, aircraft and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to smash them piece by piece.
Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the ZapOVO troops located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) the main blow was delivered. On the northern flank (Suwalki) the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was deployed, which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Panzer Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In these areas, the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority (see table 6).
Southwest
In the South-Western direction, Army Group South, which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet grouping in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was she who was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, here too Soviet troops did not complete the concentration and deployment. So, in KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 16 divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO, there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border zone, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km zone. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived in the districts, from which by June 22 concentrated 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks. Even without being staffed according to the wartime staff, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft, and somewhat less in artillery. But on the direction of the main attack of the Army Group "South", where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by units of the 6th German Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for himself (see Table 7).
The situation in the North
The most favorable for the Red Army was the ratio on the front of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and units German army"Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by the German units of the mountain infantry corps "Norway" and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant in artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be borne in mind that, since hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data given do not reflect the number of troops of the parties by the start of hostilities.
Results
Thus, German command, deploying the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, could not achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, units of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. Such an arrangement of Soviet troops made it possible to smash them piece by piece. On the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign was dealt. In other directions, even in the bands of the covering armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The overall balance of forces allowed the Soviet command to prevent the enemy's superiority even in the directions of his main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.
Since the Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 the strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations, which was to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and did not have neither offensive nor defensive grouping. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If, however, we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, then it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. By preempting the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, by creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in the chosen directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.
Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. S. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. S. 496.
