And fourthly. There were quite a lot of traitors in the ranks of the GRU. So it is not possible to talk about everyone, and there is no need for this. Therefore, this essay will focus on P. Popov, D. Polyakov, N. Chernov, A. Filatov, V. Rezun, G. Smetanin, V. Baranov, A. Volkov, G. Sporyshev and V. Tkachenko. As for the "traitor of the century" O. Penkovsky, so many books and articles have been written about him that it would be a waste of time to talk about him once again.

Petr Popov

Petr Semenovich Popov was born in Kalinin, in peasant family, fought in the Great Patriotic War, during which he became an officer. At the end of the war, he served as envoy to Colonel-General I. Serov and, under his patronage, was sent to the GRU. Short, nervous, thin, without any imagination, he kept himself to himself, was very secretive and did not get along well with other officers. However, as his colleagues and superiors later said, there were no complaints about Popov's service. He was diligent, disciplined, good performance and actively participated in all social events.

In 1951, Popov was sent to Austria as an intern in the legal Vienna residency of the GRU. His task included recruiting agents and working against Yugoslavia. Here, in Vienna, in 1952, Popov began an affair with a young Austrian, Emilia Kohanek. They met in restaurants, rented hotel rooms for several hours, trying to keep their relationship secret from Popov's colleagues. Of course, such a lifestyle required significant expenses from Popov. And if we take into account the fact that in Kalinin he had a wife and two children, then financial problems soon became the main ones for him.

On January 1, 1953, Popov approached the US Vice Consul in Vienna and asked him to arrange access to the American representation of the CIA in Austria. At the same time, Popov handed him a note in which he offered his services and indicated the place of the meeting.

The acquisition of an agent on the spot, within the walls of the GRU, was a big event in the CIA. To provide support for operations with Popov, within the framework of the Soviet department, special unit, called SR-9. George Kaiswalter was appointed head of Popov on the spot, who was assisted (with a break from the end of 1953 to 1955) by Richard Kovacs. Popov's operational pseudonym was the name "Grelspice", and Kaiswalter acted under the name Grossman.

At the first meeting with the CIA, Popov said that he needed money to settle things with one woman, which was met with understanding. Kaiswalter and Popov established a rather relaxed relationship. Kaiswalter's strength in dealing with the new agent was his ability to gain Popov's trust through long hours of drinking and talking together. He was not at all disgusted by Popov's peasant simplicity, and their drinking after successful operations was well known to the CIA officers who knew about Popov. Many of them had the impression that Popov considered Kaiswalter to be his friend. At that time, there was a joke around the CIA that in one Soviet collective farm the department had its own cow, since Popov bought a heifer for his collective farmer brother with the money given by Kaisvalter.

Starting to cooperate with the CIA, Popov passed on to the Americans information about the personnel of the GRU in Austria and the methods of its work. He provided the CIA with important details about Soviet policy in Austria and, later, policy in East Germany. According to some, most likely highly exaggerated reports, during the first two years of cooperation with the CIA, Popov gave Kaisvalter the names and codes of about 400 Soviet agents in the West. Anticipating the possibility of recalling Popov to GRU headquarters, the CIA launched an operation to pick up hiding places in Moscow. This task was assigned to Edward Smith, the first CIA man in Moscow, sent there in 1953. However, Popov, having been in Moscow on vacation and having checked the hiding places chosen by Smith, found them to be worthless. According to Kaiswalter, he said: “They are lousy. Are you trying to destroy me?" Popov complained that the hiding places were inaccessible and that using them would be tantamount to suicide.

In 1954 Popov was recalled to Moscow. Perhaps this was due to his acquaintance with P. S. Deryabin, a KGB officer in Vienna, who fled to the United States in February 1954. But neither the GRU nor the KGB had any suspicions about Popov's loyalty, and in the summer of 1955 he was sent to Schwerin in the north of the GDR. The transfer to Schwerin cut off Popov's connection with his operator Kaisvalter, and he sent a letter through a prearranged channel.

In response, Popov soon received a letter placed under the door of his apartment, which said:

“Hello, dear Max!

Hello Grossman. I'm waiting for you in Berlin. There is every opportunity to have as good a time as in Vienna. I am sending a letter with my man, with whom you must meet tomorrow at 8 pm near the photo showcase, near the House of Culture. Gorky in Schwerin, and give him a letter.

Contact with Popov in Schwerin was established with the help of a German woman named Inga, and was later maintained by CIA agent Radtke. During the investigation, 75-year-old Radtke said that their meetings always took place every four weeks. At each of them, Radtke received from Popov a package for Kaiswalter and handed Popov a letter and an envelope with money.

While Popov was in Schwerin, despite all his efforts, he could not personally meet Kaiswalter. This opportunity presented itself to him in 1957, when he was transferred to work in East Berlin. Their meetings took place in West Berlin at a safe house, with Kaiswalter changing the name under which he worked from Grossman to Scharnhorst.

In Berlin, - Popov said during the investigation, - Grossman took me more seriously. He was literally interested in my every step. For example, after returning from a vacation that I spent in the Soviet Union, Grossman demanded the most detailed report on how I spent my vacation, where I was, who I met, demanded that I talk about the smallest details. He came to each meeting with a pre-prepared questionnaire and during the conversation he set specific tasks for me to collect information.

The temporary interruption of communication with Popov after his recall from Vienna alarmed the CIA. To insure against such surprises, the conditions for contacts with Popov were worked out in case he was recalled from Berlin. He was equipped with cryptographic tools, encryption and decryption notebooks, a radio plan, detailed instructions for using ciphers, and addresses where he could notify the CIA from the USSR about his situation. To receive radio signals, Popov was given a receiver, and at one of the meetings with Kaisvalter, he listened to a tape recording of the signals that he was supposed to receive while in the USSR. The instruction handed to Popov stated:

“Plan in case you stay in Moscow. Write in secret writing to the address: Family V. Krabbe, Schildov, st. Franz Schmidt, 28. Sender Gerhard Schmidt. In this letter, please provide all the information about your situation and future plans, as well as when you will be ready to receive our radio broadcasts. The radio plan is next. Broadcasts will be on the first and third Saturdays of each month. The transmission time and wave are indicated in the table ... ".

In addition, in the spring of 1958, Kaiswalter introduced Popov to his possible liaison in Moscow - the attaché of the US Embassy in the USSR and the CIA officer Russell August Langelli, who was specially summoned to Berlin on this occasion and received the pseudonym "Daniil". At the same time, Kaiswalter assured Popov that he could always go to the United States, where he would be provided with everything he needed.

In mid-1958, Popov was instructed to drop an illegal into New York - a young woman named Tayrova. Tayrova left for the US on an American passport that belonged to a hairdresser from Chicago, which she "lost" during a trip to her homeland in Poland. Popov warned the CIA about Tayrova, and the Agency, in turn, informed the FBI. But the FBI made a mistake by surrounding Tayrova with too much surveillance. She, having discovered surveillance, independently decided to return to Moscow. At the analysis of the reasons for the failure, Popov blamed Tayrova for everything, his explanations were accepted and he continued to work in the central apparatus of the GRU.

On the evening of December 23, 1958, Popov called the apartment of US Embassy attache R. Langelli and, by a prearranged signal, invited him to a personal meeting, which was to be held on Sunday, December 27 in the men's room of the Central Children's Theater at the end of the first intermission of the morning performance. But Langelli, who came to the theater with his wife and children, waited in vain for Popov at the appointed place - he did not come. The CIA was concerned about Popov's absence from communication, and made a mistake that cost him his life. According to Kaiswalter, CIA recruit George Payne Winters Jr., who worked as a State Department representative in Moscow, misunderstood instructions to send a letter to Popov and mailed it to his home address in Kalinin. But, as the defectors Nosenko and Cherepanov later showed, KGB officers regularly sprayed a special spray on the shoes of Western diplomats. Chemical substance, which helped to trace the path of Winters to the mailbox and withdraw the letter addressed to Popov.

In the light of the foregoing, we can confidently say that M. Hyde in his book "George Blake the Super Spy", and after him K. Andrew, are mistaken when they attribute the exposure of Popov to J. Blake, an SIS officer recruited by the KGB in Korea in the autumn of 1951. M. Hyde writes that after being transferred from Vienna, Popov wrote a letter to Kaisvalter, explaining his difficulties in it, and handed it to one of the members of the British military mission in East Germany. He passed the message to the SIS (Olympic Stadium, West Berlin), where it lay on Blake's desk, along with instructions to send it to Vienna for the CIA. Blake did just that, but only after he had read the letter and handed over its contents to Moscow. Upon receiving the message, the KGB placed Popov under surveillance, and when he arrived in Moscow, they arrested him. Blake, in his book No Other Choice, rightly refutes this assertion, saying that the letter Popov handed to an employee of the British military mission could not have reached him, since he was not responsible for communications with this mission and the CIA. And then, if the KGB had known back in 1955 that Popov was an American agent (this would have happened if Blake had reported the letter), then they would not have kept him in the GRU, and even more so, they would not have believed his explanations about the failure of Tairova.

After tracing the path of Winters and learning that he had sent a letter to a GRU officer, KGB counterintelligence took Popov under surveillance. During the observation, it was established that Popov twice - on January 4 and 21, 1959 - met with the attache of the US Embassy in Moscow Langelli, and, as it turned out later, during the second meeting he received 15,000 rubles. It was decided to arrest Popov, and on February 18, 1959, he was detained at the suburban cash desks of the Leningradsky railway station, when he was preparing for another meeting with Langelli.

During a search at Popov's apartment, secret writing tools, a cipher, and instructions were seized, stored in hiding places equipped in a hunting knife, a spinning reel and a shaving brush. In addition, a secret message prepared for transmission by Langelli was discovered:

“I answer your number one. I accept your instructions for guidance in my work. I will call you for the next meeting by phone before leaving Moscow. If it is impossible to meet before leaving, I will write to Crabbe. I have a carbon paper and tablets, I need a radio manual. It is desirable to have an address in Moscow, but very reliable. After my departure, I will try to go to meetings in Moscow two or three times a year.

… I heartily thank you for taking care of my safety, for me it is vital. For money too thank you very much. Now I have the opportunity to meet with numerous acquaintances in order to obtain the necessary information. Thank you very much again."

After the interrogation of Popov, it was decided to continue his contacts with Langelli under the control of the KGB. According to Kaiswalter, Popov managed to warn Langelli that he was under KGB surveillance. He deliberately cut himself and put a note in the form of a strip of paper under the bandage. In the restroom of the Agavi restaurant, he took off his bandage and handed over a note saying that he was being tortured and that he was under surveillance, as well as how he had been captured. But this seems unlikely. If Langelli had been warned of Popov's failure, he would not have met with him again. However, on September 16, 1959, he got in touch with Popov, which happened on the bus. Popov discreetly pointed to the tape recorder so that Langelli would know about the observation, but it was already too late. Langelli was detained, but thanks to diplomatic immunity he was released, declared persona non grata and expelled from Moscow.

In January 1960, Popov appeared before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The verdict of January 7, 1960 read:

“Popov Petr Semenovich found guilty of treason and on the basis of Art. 1 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility to be shot, with confiscation of property.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Popov was the first traitor from the GRU, about whom it was written in the West that, as a warning to other employees, he was burned alive in a crematorium furnace.

Dmitry Polyakov

Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born in 1921 in the family of an accountant in Ukraine. In September 1939, after graduating from school, he entered the Kiev Artillery School, and as a platoon commander entered the Great Patriotic War. He fought on the Western and Karelian fronts, was a battery commander, and in 1943 was appointed an artillery intelligence officer. During the war years, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War and the Red Star, as well as many medals. After the end of the war, Polyakov graduated from the intelligence faculty of the Academy. Frunze, courses of the General Staff and was sent to work in the GRU.

In the early 1950s, Polyakov was sent to New York under the guise of being an employee of the Soviet UN mission. His task was to provide undercover agents for the GRU illegals. Polyakov's work on the first trip was recognized as successful, and at the end of the 50s he was again sent to the United States to the post of deputy resident under the guise of a Soviet employee of the UN military staff committee.

In November 1961, Polyakov, on his own initiative, came into contact with FBI counterintelligence agents, who gave him the pseudonym "Tophat". The Americans believed that the reason for his betrayal was disappointment in the Soviet regime. CIA officer Paul Dillon, who was Polyakov's cameraman in Delhi, says the following about this:

“I think that the motivation for his actions goes back to the Second World War. He compared the horrors, the bloody massacre, the cause for which he fought, with the duplicity and corruption that, in his opinion, were rampant in Moscow.

Polyakov's former colleagues do not completely deny this version either, although they insist that his "ideological and political rebirth" took place "against the background of painful pride." For example, Colonel-General A. G. Pavlov, former First Deputy Chief of the GRU, says:

“Polyakov at the trial declared his political rebirth, his hostile attitude towards our country, he did not hide his personal self-interest.”

Polyakov himself said the following during the investigation:

“At the heart of my betrayal lay both my desire to openly express my views and doubts somewhere, and the qualities of my character - the constant desire to work beyond the risk. And the greater the danger became, the more interesting my life became ... I used to walk on the edge of a knife and could not imagine another life.

However, to say that this decision was easy for him would be wrong. After his arrest, he also said the following words:

“Almost from the very beginning of cooperation with the CIA, I understood that I had made a fatal mistake, a grave crime. The endless torment of the soul, which lasted all this period, so exhausted me that I myself was more than once ready to confess. And only the thought of what would happen to my wife, children, grandchildren, and the fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued the criminal relationship, or silence, in order to somehow delay the hour of reckoning.

All of his operators noted that he received little money, no more than $3,000 a year, which was given to him mainly in the form of Black and Decker electromechanical tools, a pair of overalls, fishing tackle and guns. (The fact is that in his spare time, Polyakov loved carpentry, and also collected expensive guns.) In addition, unlike most other Soviet officers, recruited by the FBI and the CIA, Polyakov did not smoke, almost did not drink and did not cheat on his wife. So the amount he received from the Americans for 24 years of work can be called small: according to a rough estimate of the investigation, it amounted to about 94 thousand rubles at the rate of 1985.

One way or another, but from November 1961, Polyakov began to transmit information to the Americans about the activities and agents of the GRU in the United States and other Western countries. And he began to do this already from the second meeting with the FBI agents. Here it is worth quoting again the protocol of his interrogation:

“This meeting again was mainly devoted to the question of why I nevertheless decided to cooperate with them, and also whether I was a set-up. In order to double-check me, and at the same time to consolidate my relationship with them, Michael concluded by suggesting that I name the employees of the Soviet military intelligence in New York. I did not hesitate to list all the persons known to me who worked under the guise of the USSR Representative Office.

It is believed that already at the very beginning of his work for the FBI, Polyakov betrayed D. Dunlap, a staff sergeant in the NSA, and F. Bossard, an employee of the British Air Ministry. However, this is unlikely. Dunlap, recruited in 1960, was guided by a cameraman from the Washington GRU station, and his connection to Soviet intelligence was uncovered by chance when his garage was searched after he committed suicide in July 1963. As for Bossard, the FBI's intelligence department had in fact misled MI5 by attributing the information to "Tophat". This was done to protect another GRU source in New York, who went by the pseudonym "Niknek".

But it was Polyakov who betrayed Captain Maria Dobrova, an illegal GRU in the United States. Dobrova, who fought in Spain as a translator, after returning to Moscow, began working in the GRU, and after appropriate training was sent to the United States. In America, she acted under the cover of the owner of a beauty salon, which was visited by representatives of high-ranking military, political and business circles. After Polyakov betrayed Dobrova, the FBI tried to recruit her, but she chose to commit suicide.

In total, during his work for the Americans, Polyakov gave them 19 Soviet intelligence officers-illegals, more than 150 agents from among foreign citizens, revealed the belonging to the GRU and the KGB of about 1500 current intelligence officers.

In the summer of 1962, Polyakov returned to Moscow, provided with instructions, communication conditions, and a schedule of hiding operations (one per quarter). Places for caches were selected mainly along the route of his journey to work and back: in the areas of Bolshaya Ordynka and Bolshaya Polyanka, near the Dobryninskaya metro station and at the Ploshchad Vosstaniya trolleybus stop. Most likely, it was this circumstance, as well as the lack of personal contacts with CIA representatives in Moscow, that helped Polyakov avoid failure after another CIA agent, Colonel O. Penkovsky, was arrested in October 1962.

In 1966, Polyakov was sent to Burma as head of the radio interception center in Rangoon. Upon his return to the USSR, he was appointed head of the Chinese department, and in 1970 he was sent to India as a military attaché and resident of the GRU. At this time, the volume of information transmitted by Polyakov to the CIA increased dramatically. He gave out the names of four American officers recruited by the GRU, handed over photographic films of documents testifying to the deep divergence of the positions of China and the USSR. Thanks to these documents, CIA analysts concluded that the Sino-Soviet differences were of a long-term nature. These findings were used by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to help him and Nixon mend relations with China in 1972.

In light of this, it seems at least naive that L. V. Shebarshin, then the deputy resident of the KGB in Delhi, claims that the KGB had certain suspicions about him while Polyakov was working in India. “Polyakov demonstrated his complete disposition towards the Chekists,” writes Shebarshin. - but it was known from military friends that he did not miss the slightest opportunity to turn them against the KGB and surreptitiously persecuted those who were friends with our comrades. No spy can avoid miscalculations. But, as often happens in our case, it took another year for the suspicions to be confirmed.” Most likely, behind this statement there is a desire to show off one's own foresight and unwillingness to recognize the unsatisfactory work of the KGB military counterintelligence in this case.

It should be said that Polyakov was very serious about the fact that the leadership of the GRU formed an opinion about him as a thoughtful, promising worker. To do this, the CIA regularly provided him with some secret materials, and framed two Americans whom he presented as having been recruited by him. For the same purpose, Polyakov sought to ensure that his two sons received higher education and had a prestigious profession. He gave many trinkets, such as lighters and ballpoint pens, to his employees in the GRU, giving the impression of himself as a pleasant person and a good comrade. One of Polyakov's patrons was Lieutenant-General Sergei Izotov, head of the GRU personnel department, who had worked for 15 years in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU before this appointment. In the Polyakov case, expensive gifts made by him to Izotov appear. And for the rank of general, Polyakov presented Izotov with a silver service, bought specifically for this purpose by the CIA.

The rank of Major General Polyakov received in 1974. This provided him with access to materials that were outside the scope of his direct duties. For example, to the list of military technologies that were purchased or obtained by intelligence in the West. Reagan Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Pearl said he was breathless when he learned of the existence of 5,000 Soviet programs that used Western technology to build military capabilities. The list provided by Polyakov helped Perl persuade President Reagan to secure tighter controls on the sale of military technology.

Polyakov's work as a CIA agent was distinguished by audacity and fantastic luck. In Moscow, he stole a special self-illuminating film Mikrat 93 Shield from the GRU warehouse, which he used to photograph secret documents. To pass on information, he stole fake hollow stones, which he left in certain places where they were picked up by CIA operatives. To give a signal about laying the hiding place, Polyakov, driving by public transport past the US Embassy in Moscow, activated a miniature transmitter hidden in his pocket. While abroad, Polyakov preferred to pass information from hand to hand. After 1970, the CIA, in an effort to ensure Polyakov's security as fully as possible, provided him with a specially designed portable pulse transmitter, with which information could be printed, then encrypted and transmitted to the receiving device in the American embassy in 2.6 seconds. Polyakov conducted such programs from various places in Moscow: from the Enguri cafe, the Vanda store, the Krasnopresnensky baths, the Central Tourist House, from Tchaikovsky Street, etc.

By the end of the 1970s, the CIA, they said, already treated Polyakov more as a teacher than as an agent and informer. They left it up to him to choose the place and time of meetings and to lay hiding places. However, they had no other choice, since Polyakov did not forgive them for their mistakes. So, in 1972, without the consent of Polyakov, the Americans invited him to an official reception at the US Embassy in Moscow, which actually put him in danger of failure. The GRU leadership gave permission, and Polyakov had to go there. During the reception, he was secretly given a note, which he destroyed without reading. Moreover, he cut off all contacts with the CIA for a long time, until he was convinced that he did not fall under the suspicion of the KGB counterintelligence.

In the late 1970s, Polyakov was again sent to India as a resident of the GRU. He stayed there until June 1980, when he was recalled to Moscow. However, this early return was not associated with possible suspicions against him. Just another medical commission forbade him to work in countries with a hot climate. However, the Americans got worried and offered Polyakov to go to the USA. But he refused. According to a CIA officer in Delhi, in response to a wish to come to America in case of danger, where he is welcomed with open arms, Polyakov replied: “Don't wait for me. I will never come to the USA. I'm not doing this for you. I do this for my country. I was born Russian and I will die Russian.” And to the question of what awaits him in case of exposure, he replied: "Common grave."

Polyakov looked into the water. His fantastic luck and career as a CIA agent came to an end in 1985, when Aldrich Ames, a CIA career officer, came to the KGB residency in Washington and offered his services. Among the KGB and GRU officers named by Ames who worked for the CIA was Polyakov.

Polyakov was arrested at the end of 1986. During a search carried out at his apartment, at his dacha and at his mother's house, material evidence of his espionage activities was found. Among them: sheets of cryptographic carbon paper made by typography and inserted into envelopes for phonograph records, cipher pads camouflaged in the cover of a travel bag, two attachments for a small-sized Tessina camera for vertical and horizontal shooting, several rolls of Kodak film, designed for special development , a ballpoint pen, the clip head of which was intended for writing cryptographic text, as well as negatives with the conditions of communication with CIA officers in Moscow and instructions for contacts with them abroad.

The investigation into Polyakov's case was led by KGB investigator Colonel A.S. Dukhanin, who later became famous for the so-called "Kremlin case" of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Polyakov's wife and adult sons were witnesses, since they did not know and did not suspect about his espionage activities. After the end of the investigation, many generals and officers of the GRU, whose negligence and talkativeness Polyakov often took advantage of, were brought to administrative responsibility by the command and dismissed or retired. In early 1988, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Polyakov D.F. for treason and espionage to death with confiscation of property. The sentence was carried out on March 15, 1988. And officially, the execution of D. F. Polyakov was reported in Pravda only in 1990.

In 1994, after the arrest and exposure of Ames, the CIA admitted that Polyakov was collaborating with him. It has been stated that he was the most important of Ames's victims, far surpassing all others in importance. The information he gave and photocopies of classified documents make up 25 boxes in the CIA file. Many experts familiar with the Polyakov case say that he made a much more important contribution than the more famous GRU defector, Colonel O. Penkovsky. This point of view is shared by another traitor from the GRU, Nikolai Chernov, who said: “Polyakov is a star. And Penkovsky is so-so ... ". According to CIA Director James Woolsey, of all the Soviet agents recruited during the " cold war", Polyakov "was a real diamond."

Indeed, in addition to the list of interests of scientific and technical intelligence, data on China, Polyakov reported information about new weapons Soviet army, in particular about anti-tank missiles, which helped the Americans destroy these weapons when they were used by Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991. He also handed over to the West more than 100 issues of the secret periodical "Military Thought", published by the General Staff. According to Robert Gates, director of the CIA under President Bush, the documents stolen by Polyakov provided insight into the use of the military in the event of war, and helped draw the firm conclusion that Soviet military leaders did not consider it possible to win a nuclear war and sought to avoid it. According to Gates, familiarization with these documents prevented the US leadership from erroneous conclusions, which may have helped to avoid a "hot" war.

Of course, Gates knows better what helped to avoid a "hot" war and what Polyakov's merit is in this. But even if it is as great as the Americans are trying to assure everyone, this does not in the least justify his betrayal.

Nikolay Chernov

Nikolai Dmitrievich Chernov, born in 1917, served in the operational and technical department of the GRU. In the early 1960s, he was sent to the United States as a New York station operator. In New York, Chernov led a rather unusual way of life for a Soviet employee in foreign countries. He often visited restaurants, nightclubs, cabarets. And all this required appropriate financial expenditures. Therefore, it is not surprising that once, in 1963, together with KGB Major D. Kashin (surname changed), he, having gone to the wholesale base of an American construction company located in New York to buy materials for repairing premises in the embassy, ​​persuaded the owner of the base issue documents without reflecting in them a trade discount for a bulk purchase. Thus, Chernov and Kashin received $200 in cash, which they divided among themselves.

However, when Chernov arrived at the base for building materials the next day, he was met in the owner's office by two FBI agents. They showed Chernov photocopies of payment documents, from which it was clear that he had embezzled $ 200, as well as photographs in which he was depicted in entertainment establishments in New York. Declaring that they knew that Chernov was a member of the GRU, the FBI agents offered to cooperate with him. Blackmail had an effect on Chernov - in those years, for visiting entertainment establishments, they could easily be sent to Moscow and made it impossible to travel abroad, and this is not to mention the misappropriation of state money.

Prior to his departure for Moscow, Chernov, who was given the pseudonym “Niknek” by the FBI, held a series of meetings with the Americans and handed over to them secret writing tablets used by the GRU and a number of photocopies of materials that GRU operational officers brought to the laboratory for processing. At the same time, the Americans demanded from him photocopies of those materials that were marked: NATO, military, and top secret. Just before Chernov left for the USSR at the end of 1963, the FBI arranged contacts with him during his next trip to the West and handed over 10,000 rubles, Minox and Tessina cameras, as well as English-Russian dictionary with secret writing. As for the money Chernov received from the Americans, he told the following during the investigation:

“I figured, next time I will come abroad in five years. I need ten rubles a day for singing. There are about twenty thousand in total. That's what he asked for."

The materials handed over by Chernov were very valuable for American counterintelligence. The fact is that when reshooting documents received by the GRU residency from agents, Chernov handed over to the FBI officers their names, photographs of title pages and document numbers. This helped the FBI identify the agent. So, for example, Chernov was processing the secret "Album of US Navy guided missiles" received from the GRU agent Drona, and handed over copies of these materials to the FBI. As a result, in September 1963, "Dron" was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. Also, on a tip received from Chernov, in 1965, the GRU agent "Bard" was arrested in England. It turned out to be Frank Bossard, an employee of the British Ministry of Aviation, recruited in 1961 by I. P. Glazkov. Accused of passing information about American missile guidance systems to the USSR, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison. The importance of the Niknek agent for the FBI is evidenced by the fact that the FBI intelligence department misled MI-5 by attributing the information about Bossard received by Chernov to another source - Tophet (D. Polyakov).

In Moscow, Chernov until 1968 worked in the operational and technical department of the GRU in the photo laboratory of the 1st special department, and then moved to the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU as a junior assistant. During his work in the photo laboratory of the GRU, Chernov processed the materials received by the Center and sent to the residencies, which contained information about the agents. These materials, with a total volume of over 3,000 frames, he handed over to the FBI in 1972 during a foreign business trip through the USSR Foreign Ministry. Having a diplomatic passport in his hands, Chernov easily took the exposed films abroad in two packages.

This time, the FBI catch was even more significant. According to an excerpt from Chernov's court case, due to his fault in 1977, the commander of the Swiss air defense forces, Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire, was sentenced to 18 years in prison for spying for the USSR. He and his wife were recruited by the GRU in 1962 and worked actively until their arrest. "Moore" and "Mary" were identified on the basis of data received by the Swiss counterintelligence from one of the foreign intelligence services. At the same time, as noted in the press, the information came from a Soviet source.

In the UK, with the help of materials received from Chernov, Air Force Second Lieutenant David Bingham was arrested in 1972. He was recruited by GRU officer L.T. Kuzmin in early 1970 and for two years passed him secret documents, which he had access to at the naval base in Portsmouth. After his arrest, he was charged with espionage and sentenced to 21 years in prison.

The GRU intelligence network in France suffered the greatest damage from Chernov's betrayal. In 1973, the FBI turned over information about France received from Chernov to the Territory Protection Authority. As a result of the search activities carried out by the French counterintelligence, a significant part of the GRU agent network was uncovered. On March 15, 1977, 54-year-old Serge Fabiyev, a resident of an undercover group, was arrested, recruited in 1963 by S. Kudryavtsev. Together with him, Giovanni Ferrero, Roger Laval and Marc Lefebvre were detained on March 17, 20 and 21. The court, held in January 1978, sentenced Fabiev to 20 years in prison, Lefevre to 15 years, and Ferrero to 8 years. Laval, who suffered memory lapses during the investigation, was placed in a psychiatric hospital with a diagnosis of "dementia" and did not appear at the trial. And in October 1977, another GRU agent, Georges Beaufis, a longtime member of the PCF who had worked for the GRU since 1963, was arrested by the Territorial Protection Directorate. Given his military past and participation in the resistance movement, the court sentenced him to 8 years in prison.

After 1972, Chernov, according to him, stopped his relations with the Americans. But this is not surprising, since at that time he began to drink heavily and was expelled for drunkenness and for suspicion of losing a secret directory, which contained information about all illegal communist leaders, from the Central Committee of the CPSU. After that, Chernov drank “in a black way”, tried to commit suicide, but survived. In 1980, having quarreled with his wife and children, he left for Sochi, where he managed to pull himself together. He left for the Moscow region and, having settled in the countryside, began to engage in agriculture.

But after the arrest in 1986 of General Polyakov, Chernov became interested in the KGB Investigation Department. The fact is that at one of the interrogations in 1987, Polyakov said:

“During a meeting in Delhi in 1980 with an American intelligence officer, I became aware that Chernov was handing over to the Americans cryptography and other materials to which he had access by the nature of his service.”

However, it may well be that information about Chernov's betrayal was obtained from Ames, who was recruited in the spring of 1985.

One way or another, but from that time on, Chernov began to be checked by military counterintelligence, but no evidence of his contacts with the CIA was found. Therefore, none of the leadership of the KGB found the courage to authorize his arrest. And only in 1990, the deputy head of the department of the KGB Investigation Department, V.S. Vasilenko, insisted on the arrest of Chernov before the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.

At the very first interrogation, Chernov began to testify. Here, most likely, the fact that he decided that the Americans had betrayed him played a role. When Chernov told everything a few months later, investigator V.V. Renev, who was in charge of his case, asked him to provide material evidence of what he had done. Here is what he himself recalls about this:

“I noticed: give material evidence. This will be credited to you in court.

It worked. Chernov remembered that he had a friend, a captain of the 1st rank, a translator, to whom he presented an English-Russian dictionary. The one that the Americans gave him. In this dictionary, on a certain page, there is a sheet that is impregnated with a cryptographic substance and is a cryptographic carbon paper. A friend's address.

I immediately called the captain. We met. I explained all the circumstances, looking forward to an answer. After all, tell him that he burned the dictionary, and the conversation is over. But the officer answered honestly, yes, he gave. Whether I have this dictionary at home or not, I don’t remember, I have to look it up.

The apartment has a huge bookcase. He took out one dictionary - it does not fit the one described by Chernov. The second one is him. With the inscription "Chernov's gift. 1977“

On the title page dictionary - two lines. If you count the letters in them, you will determine on which sheet the secret carbon copy is. When the experts checked it, they were surprised: they met with such a substance for the first time. And although thirty years had passed, carbon paper was completely usable.

According to Chernov himself, during the investigation, the KGB had no material evidence of his guilt, but the following actually happened:

“They told me, ‘Many years have passed. Share your secrets about the activities of American intelligence agencies. Like, the information will be used to train young employees. And we won't bring you to court for that." So I invented, fantasized that I once read in books. They were delighted, and they blamed on me all the failures that have been in the GRU over the past 30 years ... There was nothing of value in the materials I handed over. The documents were filmed in a regular library. And in general, if I wanted to, I would have destroyed the GRU. But I didn't."

On August 18, 1991, Chernov's case was brought to court. At the court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Chernov pleaded guilty and gave detailed testimony about the circumstances of his recruitment by the FBI, the nature of the information he had given out, and the methods of collecting, storing and transferring intelligence materials. About the motives of betrayal, he said this: he committed the crime out of selfish motives, he did not feel hostility to the state system. On September 11, 1991, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Chernov N. D. to imprisonment for a period of 8 years. But 5 months later, by the Decree of the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, Chernov, as well as nine other people convicted at different times under Article 64 of the Criminal Code - “Treason to the Motherland”, were pardoned. As a result, Chernov actually escaped punishment and calmly returned home to Moscow.

Anatoly Filatov

Anatoly Nikolayevich Filatov was born in 1940 in the Saratov region. His parents embroidered from the peasants, his father distinguished himself in the Great Patriotic War. After graduating from school, Filatov entered an agricultural technical school, and then worked for a short time at a state farm as a livestock specialist. Being drafted into the army, he began to quickly advance in the service, graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy and was sent to serve in the GRU. Having proven himself well on his first trip to Laos, Filatov, who by that time had received the rank of major, was sent to Algeria in June 1973. In Algeria, he worked under the "roof" of the embassy translator, whose duties included organizing protocol events, translating official correspondence, processing the local press, and purchasing books for the embassy. This cover allowed him to actively move around the country without arousing undue suspicion.

In February 1974, Filatov made contact with the CIA. Later, during the investigation, Filatov will show that he fell into a “honey trap”. In connection with the breakdown of the car, he was forced to move on foot. Here is how Filatov himself spoke about this in court:

“In late January - early February 1974, I was in the city of Algiers, where I was looking for literature about the country in bookstores on issues of ethnography, life and customs of the Algerians. When I was returning from the store, a car stopped near me on one of the streets of the city. The door opened a crack and I saw a young woman I didn't know who offered to take me to my place of residence. I agreed. We got to talking, and she invited me to her home, saying that she had literature that interested me. We drove up to her house, went into the apartment. I chose two books that interest me. We drank a cup of coffee and I left.

Three days later I went to the grocery store and again met the same young woman at the wheel of a car. We greeted each other and she suggested that we stop by for another book. The woman's name was Nadia. She is 22-23 years old. She spoke fluent French, but with a slight accent.

Entering the apartment, Nadia put coffee and a bottle of cognac on the table. Turned on the music. We started drinking and talking. The conversation ended in bed.

Filatov was photographed with Nadia, and these photographs were shown to him a few days later by a CIA officer who introduced himself as Edward Kane, the first secretary of the US special advocacy mission at the Swiss Embassy in Algiers. According to Filatov, fearing a recall from a business trip, he succumbed to blackmail and agreed to meet with Kane. The fact that the Americans decided to blackmail Filatov with the help of a woman is not surprising, since even in Laos he was not distinguished by discriminating relations with them. Therefore, the version of the beginning of Filatov's contacts with the CIA, which was put forward by D. Barron, the author of the book "The KGB Today", looks completely implausible and absolutely unproven. He writes that Filatov himself offered his services to the CIA, knowing full well what risk he was taking, but not seeing how otherwise one could harm the CPSU.

In Algeria, Filatov, who received the pseudonym "Etienne", had more than 20 meetings with Kane. He gave him information about the work of the embassy, ​​about the operations carried out by the GRU on the territory of Algeria and France, data on military equipment and the participation of the USSR in the training and education of representatives of a number of third world countries in the methods of conducting guerrilla war and sabotage activities. In April 1976, when it became known that Filatov was to return to Moscow, another CIA officer became his operator, with whom he worked out secure methods of communication on the territory of the USSR. To send messages to Filatov twice a week, encrypted radio transmissions were made from Frankfurt to German. It was stipulated that combat transmissions would begin with an odd number, and training programs - with an even number. For the purpose of disguise, radio broadcasts began to be transmitted in advance, before Filatov returned to Moscow. For feedback, it was supposed to use cover letters, allegedly written by foreigners. As a last resort, a personal meeting with a CIA operative in Moscow near the Dynamo stadium was provided.

In July 1976, before leaving for Moscow, Filatov was given six cover letters, a carbon copy for cryptography, a notebook with instructions, a cipher notebook, a device for tuning the receiver and spare batteries for it, a ballpoint pencil for cryptography, a Minox camera and several spare cassettes for it, inserted into the gasket of stereo headphones. In addition, Filatov was awarded 10,000 Algerian dinars for his work in Algeria, 40,000 rubles and 24 gold coins of royal minting worth 5 rubles each. In addition, a predetermined amount in dollars was monthly transferred to Filatov's account in an American bank.

Returning to Moscow in August 1976, Filatov began working in the central office of the GRU and continued to actively transmit intelligence materials to the CIA through hiding places and through letters. Since his arrival, he himself has received 18 radio messages from Frankfurt. Here are some of them:

“Do not limit yourself to collecting information that you have in your service. Win the trust of close acquaintances and friends. Visit them at work. Invite guests to your home and restaurants, where, through targeted questions, find out secret information that you yourself do not have access to ... "

"Dear E! We are very pleased with your information and express our deep gratitude to you for it. It is unfortunate that you do not yet have access to classified documents. However, we are not only interested in what is labeled "Secret". Please provide details of the institution you currently work for. By whom, when, for what purpose was it created? Departments, sections? The nature of submission up, down?

It is a pity that you did not manage to use the lighter: its expiration date has expired. Get rid of her. It is best to throw it into the deep part of the river when no one will look at you. Get a new one through the cache.

Filatov did not forget about himself either, having acquired a new Volga car and skipping 40 thousand rubles in restaurants, which his wife did not know about. However, as in the case of Popov and Penkovsky, the CIA did not fully consider the KGB's ability to spy on foreign and domestic citizens. In the meantime, in early 1977, the KGB counterintelligence, as a result of monitoring the employees of the US Embassy, ​​found that the CIA residents began to carry out covert operations with an agent located in Moscow.

At the end of March 1977, Filatov received a radiogram informing him that instead of the Druzhba cache, another one located on Kostomarovskaya Embankment and called Reka would be used to communicate with him. On June 24, 1977, Filatov was supposed to receive a container through this cache, but it was not there. There was no container in the cache on June 26 either. Then on June 28, Filatov, using a cover letter, informed the CIA about what had happened. In response to this alarm signal, Filatov received the following response after some time:

"Dear E! We were not able to deliver at the "River" on June 25, because our man was being followed and it is clear that he did not even come to the place. Thank you for the "Lupakov" letter (cover letter - author).

… If you have used some of the cassettes for operational photography, they can still be developed. Save them for your transfer to us at the place "Treasure". Also in your Treasure package, please let us know which camouflage device, not including lighters, you prefer for the mini-camera and cassettes that we may want to give you in the future. Since it was with the lighter, we again want you to have a cloaking device that hides your device and at the same time works correctly ...

New schedule: on Fridays at 24.00 on 7320 (41 m) and 4990 (60 m) and on Sundays at 22.00 on 7320 (41 m) and 5224 (57 m). In order to improve the audibility of our radio broadcasts, we highly recommend using the 300 rubles included in this package to purchase the Riga-103-2 radio, which we have carefully checked and believe is good.

… In this package we have also included a small plastic transfiguration table with which you can decipher our radio transmissions and encrypt your cryptography. Please handle it with care and keep...

(Greetings, J.)

Meanwhile, KGB surveillance officers, as a result of surveillance of an employee of the Moscow residency of the CIA, V. Kroket, who was listed as a secretary-archivist, found that he uses caches to communicate with Filatov. As a result, it was decided to detain him at the time of laying the container in the cache. Late in the evening of September 2, 1977, during a hiding operation on Kostomarovskaya Embankment, Crockett and his wife Becky were caught red-handed. A few days later they were declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. Filatov himself was arrested somewhat earlier.

The trial of Filatov began on July 10, 1978. He was accused of committing crimes under Article 64 and Article 78 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason and smuggling). On July 14, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel of Justice M.A. Marov, sentenced Filatov to death.

However, the sentence was not carried out. After Filatov filed a petition for pardon, the death penalty was commuted to 15 years in prison. Filatov served his term in the corrective labor institution 389/35, better known as the Perm-35 camp. In an interview with French journalists who visited the camp in July 1989, he said: “I made big bets in life and lost. And now I'm paying. It's quite natural." Upon his release, Filatov turned to the US Embassy in Russia with a request to compensate him for material damage and pay the amount in foreign currency that was supposed to be on his account in an American bank. However, the Americans at first evaded answering for a long time, and then informed Filatov that only US citizens were entitled to compensation.

Vladimir Rezun

Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun was born in 1947 in an army garrison near Vladivostok in the family of a serviceman, a front-line veteran who went through the entire Great Patriotic War. At the age of 11 he entered the Kalinin Suvorov School, and then to the Kiev Command School. In the summer of 1968 he was appointed to the post of commander of a tank platoon in the troops of the Carpathian Military District. The unit in which he served, along with other troops of the district, took part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. After the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, Rezun continued to serve in parts of the first Carpathian and then the Volga military districts as commander of a tank company.

In the spring of 1969, Senior Lieutenant Rezun became a military intelligence officer in the 2nd (intelligence) directorate of the headquarters of the Volga Military District. In the summer of 1970, as a promising young officer, he was called to Moscow to enter the Military Diplomatic Academy. He successfully passed the exams and was enrolled in the first year. However, already at the beginning of his studies at the academy, Rezun received the following characteristics:

“Volitional qualities, little life experience and experience of working with people are not sufficiently developed. Pay attention to the development of the qualities necessary for an intelligence officer, including willpower, perseverance, readiness to take reasonable risks.

After graduating from the academy, Rezun was sent to the central office of the GRU in Moscow, where he worked in the 9th (information) department. And in 1974, Captain Rezun was sent on his first foreign trip to Geneva under the cover of the position of attaché of the USSR mission to the UN in Geneva. Together with him, his wife Tatiana and daughter Natalya, born in 1972, came to Switzerland. In the Geneva residency of the GRU, Rezun's work at first was not at all as successful as can be judged from his book "Aquarium". Here is what the resident gave him after the first year of his stay abroad:

“Very slowly mastering the methods of reconnaissance work. Works scattered and unfocused. Life experience and horizons are small. It will take considerable time to overcome these shortcomings.”

However, in the future, according to the testimony of the former deputy resident of the GRU in Geneva, Captain 1st Rank V. Kalinin, his affairs went well. As a result, he was promoted from attaché to third secretary in the diplomatic rank, with a corresponding increase in salary, and, as an exception, his assignment was extended for another year. As for Rezun himself, Kalinin speaks of him as follows:

“In communication with comrades, and in public life [he] gave the impression of an arch-patriot of his homeland and the armed forces, ready to lay down on the embrasure with his chest, as Alexander Matrosov did during the war years. In the party organization, he stood out among his comrades for his excessive activity in supporting any initiative decisions, for which he received the nickname Pavlik Morozov, which he was very proud of. Official relations developed quite well ... At the end of the trip, Rezun knew that his use was planned in the central apparatus of the GRU.

This was the state of affairs until June 10, 1978, when Rezun, together with his wife, daughter and son Alexander, born in 1976, disappeared from Geneva under unknown circumstances. Resident officers who visited his apartment found a real rout there, and neighbors said that they heard muffled screams and children's crying at night. At the same time, valuable things did not disappear from the apartment, including a large collection of coins, which Rezun was fond of collecting. The Swiss authorities were immediately informed of the disappearance of the Soviet diplomat and his family, with a simultaneous request to take all necessary measures to search for the missing. However, only 17 days later, on June 27, the political department of Switzerland informed the Soviet representatives that Rezun and his family were in England, where he asked for political asylum.

The reasons that forced Rezun to commit a betrayal are spoken differently. He himself claims in numerous interviews that his escape was forced. Here is what, for example, he said to journalist Ilya Kechin in 1998:

“The situation with leaving has developed as follows. Then Brezhnev had three advisers: comrades Alexandrov, Tsukanov and Blatov. They were called "Assistant Secretary General". What these "shuriki" brought him to sign, he signed. The brother of one of them - Alexandrov Boris Mikhailovich - worked in our system, received the rank of major general, without ever going abroad. But in order to move further up the corporate ladder, he needed a record in his personal file that he went abroad. Of course, immediately a resident. And the most important residency. But he never worked either on the pickup, or in the extraction, or in the processing of information. To successfully continue his career, it was enough for him to stay a resident for only six months, and in his personal file he would have an entry: “He was a Geneva resident of the GRU.” He would return to Moscow, and new stars would fall on him.

Everyone knew it would fail. But who could object?

Our resident was a man! You could pray for him. Before his departure for Moscow, he gathered us all ... The whole residency had a good drink and a snack, and at the end of the booze, the resident said: “Guys! I'm leaving. I sympathize with you, the one who will work in the wings of the new resident: he will receive agents, the budget. I don't know how it will end. I'm sorry, but I can't help."

And now three weeks have passed since the arrival of a new comrade - and a terrifying failure. Someone had to be set up. I was the scapegoat. It is clear that over time, the top would have sorted it out. But at that moment I had no choice. The only way out is suicide. But if I did this, then they would say about me: “Well, you fool! It's not his fault! "And I left."

In another interview, Rezun emphasized that his flight was not related to political reasons:

“I never said that I was running for political reasons. And I don't consider myself a political fighter. I had the opportunity in Geneva to view the communist system and its leaders from a minimum distance. I hated this system quickly and deeply. But there was no intention to leave. In Aquarium I write like this: they stepped on the tail, that's why I'm leaving.

True, all of the above does not agree well with the nickname Pavlik Morozov and the prospects for future career growth. However, the statements of a certain V. Kartakov that Rezun fled to the West because he cousin stole ancient coins of historical value in one of the Ukrainian museums, and he sold them in Geneva, which became known to the competent authorities, looks, to put it mildly, unconvincing. If only because V. Kalinin, who personally dealt with Rezun’s case, claims that “no signals were received regarding him from the 3rd Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (military counterintelligence) and Directorate “K” of the KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence of the PSU).” Therefore, the version of the same V. Kalinin can be considered the most likely:

“As a person who is well acquainted with all the circumstances of the so-called “Rezun Case” and personally knew him, I believe that the British special services were involved in his disappearance ... One fact speaks in favor of this statement. Rezun was familiar with an English journalist, editor of a military-technical magazine in Geneva. We have shown operational interest in this person. I think that the counter-development was carried out by the British special services. An analysis of these meetings shortly before the disappearance of Rezun showed that in this duel the forces were unequal. Rezun was inferior in all respects. Therefore, it was decided to ban Rezun from meeting with an English journalist. Events have shown that this decision was taken too late, and the further development of events was out of our control.

On June 28, 1978, English newspapers reported that Rezun was in England with his family. Immediately the Soviet embassy in London was instructed to demand a meeting with the British Foreign Office. At the same time, letters to Rezun and his wife, written by their parents at the request of the KGB officers, were handed over to the British Foreign Ministry. But there was no answer to them, as well as a meeting of Soviet representatives with the fugitives. The attempt of Rezun's father, Bogdan Vasilyevich, who arrived in London in August, ended in failure to meet with his son. After that, all attempts to get a meeting with Rezun and his wife were stopped.

After Rezun's flight, emergency measures were taken in the Geneva residency to contain the failure. As a result of these forced measures, more than ten people were recalled to the USSR, and all operational communications of the residency were mothballed. The damage inflicted on the GRU by Rezun was significant, although it certainly cannot be compared with what was inflicted on the Soviet military intelligence, for example, by Major General Polyakov of the GRU. Therefore, in the USSR, Rezun was tried in absentia by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and sentenced to death penalty for treason.

Unlike many other defectors, Rezun repeatedly wrote to his father, but his letters did not reach the addressee. The first letter that Rezun Sr. received came to him in 1990. More precisely, it was not a letter, but rather a note: “Mom, dad, if you are alive, respond,” and a London address. And the son's first meeting with his parents took place in 1993, when Rezun turned to the authorities of already independent Ukraine with a request to allow his parents to visit him in London. According to his father, his grandchildren, Natasha and Sasha, are already students, and “Volodya, as always, works 16–17 hours a day. He is helped by his wife Tanya, who maintains his card file and correspondence.

Once in England, Rezun took up literary activities, acting as the writer Viktor Suvorov. The first books that came out from under his pen were "Soviet military intelligence", "Spetsnaz", "Tales of the Liberator". But the main work, according to him, was The Icebreaker, a book dedicated to proving that the Soviet Union started World War II. According to Rezun, for the first time the thought of this came to him in the fall of 1968, before the start of commissioning Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia. Since then, he methodically collected all kinds of materials about the initial period of the war. His library of military books by 1974 numbered several thousand copies. Once in England, he again began to collect books and archival materials, as a result of which in the spring of 1989 the book “Icebreaker. Who started World War II? Published first in Germany, and then in England, France, Canada, Italy and Japan, it instantly became a bestseller and caused extremely conflicting reviews in the press and among historians. However, the coverage of the discussion as to whether the writer Suvorov is right or wrong is beyond the scope of this essay. For those who are interested in this question, we can recommend the collection “Another War. 1939–1945”, published in Moscow in 1996, edited by academician Y. Afanasyev.

In Russian, "Icebreaker" was first published in 1993 in Moscow, in 1994 the same publishing house released the sequel to "Icebreaker" "Day-M", and in 1996 the third book - "The Last Republic". In Russia, these books also caused a great response, and at the beginning of 1994, Mosfilm even began to shoot a feature-documentary-journalistic film based on the Icebreaker. In addition to the above, Suvorov-Rezun is the author of the books "Aquarium", "Choice", "Control", "Purification".

Gennady Smetanin

Gennady Alexandrovich Smetanin was born in the city of Chistopol in a working-class family, where he was the eighth child. After the eighth grade, he entered the Kazan Suvorov School, and then the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School. After serving for some time in the army, he was sent to the Military Diplomatic Academy, where he studied French and Portuguese, after which he was appointed to the GRU. In August 1982, he was sent to Portugal to the Lisbon residency of the GRU under the cover of the position of an employee of the military attaché apparatus.

All colleagues of Smetanin noted his extreme selfishness, careerism and passion for profit. All this taken together pushed him onto the path of betrayal. At the end of 1983, he himself came to the CIA station and offered his services, demanding a million dollars for this. Amazed by his greed, the Americans resolutely refused to pay such money, and he moderated his appetite to 360 thousand dollars, declaring that this was the amount he had spent from government money. However, this statement of Smetanin aroused suspicion among the CIA officers. However, the money was paid to him, not forgetting to take from him a receipt with the following content:

“I, Smetanin Gennady Aleksandrovich, received 365 thousand dollars from the American government, in which I sign and promise to help him.”

When recruiting, Smetanin was tested on a lie detector. He "worthily" passed this test, and was included in the CIA agent network under the pseudonym "Million". In total, from January 1984 to August 1985, Smetanin held 30 meetings with CIA officers, at which he passed on intelligence information and photocopies of secret documents to which he had access. Moreover, with the help of Smetanin, on March 4, 1984, the Americans recruited his wife Svetlana, who, on the instructions of the CIA, got a job as a secretary-typist at the embassy, ​​which allowed her to gain access to secret documents.

Moscow learned about Smetanin's betrayal in the summer of 1985 from O. Ames. However, even before that, some suspicions arose regarding Smetanin. The fact is that during one of the receptions at the Soviet embassy, ​​his wife appeared in outfits and jewelry that clearly did not correspond to her husband's official income. But in Moscow they decided not to rush things, especially since in August Smetanin was supposed to return to Moscow on vacation.

On August 6, 1985, Smetanin met in Lisbon with his operator from the CIA and said that he was leaving on vacation, but would return to Portugal long before the next meeting, scheduled for October 4. Arriving in Moscow, he, together with his wife and daughter, went to Kazan, where his mother lived. He was followed by the KGB task force, formed from employees of the 3rd (military counterintelligence) and 7th (surveillance) departments, which included the fighters of group "A", whose task was to detain the traitor.

Arriving in Kazan and visiting his mother, Smetanin suddenly disappeared with his family. Here is what the commander of one of the subdivisions of Group A, who worked on this case, says about this:

“One can imagine what, intelligently speaking, numbness seized all those who were“ tied ”to this person.

For several days we, as they say, were digging the ground, "plowing" Kazan in all conceivable and inconceivable directions, exhausting ourselves and driving local employees to the seventh sweat. I can still lead themed tours around Kazan. For example, this: "Kazan passage yards and entrances." And a few more of the same kind.

At the same time, all suspicious persons who ordered air or railway tickets for August 20–28 were tracked. As a result, it was established that someone took three tickets for August 25 for the Kazan-Moscow train No. 27 from the Yudino station. Since Smetanin's relatives lived in Yudino, it was decided that the tickets were purchased for him. Indeed, the passengers were Smetanin, his wife and schoolgirl daughter. No one wanted to risk more, and an order was given to arrest Smetanin and his wife. An employee of the KGB of the Tatar ASSR, Colonel Yu. I. Shimanovsky, who participated in the capture of Smetanin, tells the following about his arrest:

“Suddenly, an object came out of the observed compartment and headed towards the toilet farthest from me. A few seconds later, our employee followed him. There was no one in the corridor. All compartment doors were closed. Everything went so quickly that I just saw how our operative, the one who was following, grabbed Smetanin from behind with a professional reception, lifted him up, the second one, who was at his post, grabbed him by the legs and almost running, they carried him to the conductors' rest compartment. The woman and the man (employees of Group A - the authors) quickly got out of this compartment and went to where Smetanin's wife and his daughter were. All this happened almost without a sound.

After the detention, Smetanin and his wife were shown a warrant of arrest, after which their personal belongings and luggage were searched. During a search in Smetanin's briefcase, a case with glasses was found, in which there was an instruction for communication with the CIA and a cipher pad. In addition, an ampoule with instant poison was hidden in the temple of the glasses. And during a search of Smetanin's wife, 44 diamonds were found in the lining of a leather strap.

During the investigation, the guilt of Smetanin and his wife was fully proven and the case was taken to court. At the trial, Smetanin stated that he did not feel hostility towards the Soviet social and state system, and went on treason to the Motherland on the basis of dissatisfaction with his assessment as an intelligence officer. On July 1, 1986, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR found the Smetanins guilty of treason in the form of espionage. Gennady Smetanin was sentenced to death with confiscation of property, and Svetlana Smetanina - to 5 years in prison.

Vyacheslav Baranov

Vyacheslav Maksimovich Baranov was born in 1949 in Belarus. After graduating from the 8th grade of school, he chose military career and entered the Suvorov School, and then - in the Chernigov Higher Military Flight School. Having received officer epaulettes, he served in the army for several years. At this time, in an effort to make a career, he read a lot, learned English and even became the secretary of the party organization of the squadron. Therefore, when the order for a candidate for admission to the Military Diplomatic Academy came to the aviation regiment in which Baranov served, the command settled on him.

While studying at the Baranov Academy, he successfully completed all the courses, but in 1979, just before graduation, he committed a serious misconduct, grossly violating the secrecy regime. As a result, although he was sent for further service in the GRU, he was “restricted to leave” for five whole years. And only in June 1985, when the so-called perestroika began and everyone began to talk about “new thinking”, Baranov went on his first foreign business trip to Bangladesh, where he worked in Dhaka under the “roof” of the head of a group of technical specialists.

In the fall of 1989, at the end of a four-year trip to Baranov, Brad Lee Bradford, a CIA operative in Dhaka, began to “pick up the keys”. Once, after a volleyball match between the “near-embassy” teams of the USSR and the USA, he invited Baranov to dinner at his villa. Baranov rejected this proposal, but did not report it to his superiors either. A few days later, Bradford repeated his invitation, and this time Baranov promised to think.

On October 24, 1989, Baranov called Bradford from the Lin Chin restaurant and arranged a meeting the next day. During the conversation, Bradford asked about the financial situation of Soviet foreign workers during perestroika, to which Baranov replied that it was tolerable, but added that no one was against earning more. At the same time, he complained about the crampedness of his Moscow apartment and the illness of his daughter. Of course, Bradford hinted to Baranov that all this could be fixed, and offered to meet again.

The second meeting between Baranov and Bradford took place three days later, on October 27. Going to her, Baranov was fully aware that they were trying to recruit him. But perestroika was in full swing in the USSR, and he decided to insure himself for the future by working for two masters for some time. Therefore, the conversation between Bradford and Baranov was quite specific. Baranov agreed to work for the CIA on the condition that he and his family be taken out of the USSR to the United States. Here are the testimonies about the second meeting that Baranov gave during the investigation:

“At the second meeting with Bradford in Dhaka, I asked what awaits me in the West. Bradford replied that after a fairly long and painstaking work with me (meaning, of course, a survey), I and my whole family would be granted a residence permit, assisted in finding a job, finding housing in a selected area of ​​the United States, changing my appearance, if would need.

I asked: “What happens if I refuse the survey?” Bradford, who had previously tried to speak softly and kindly, answered rather sharply and dryly, saying the following: “No one will force you. But in this case, our assistance will be limited to granting you and your family refugee status in the United States or in one of the European countries. Otherwise, you will be on your own."

The final recruitment of Baranov took place during the third meeting, held on November 3, 1989. It was attended by the CIA resident in Dhaka, V. Crocket, who at one time was the operator of another traitor from the GRU - A. Filatov - and in 1977 was expelled from Moscow for actions incompatible with the status of a diplomat. During the meeting, the conditions under which Baranov agreed to work for the Americans were agreed - $ 25,000 for immediate consent, $ 2,000 monthly for active work, and $ 1,000 for forced downtime. In addition, the Americans pledged to withdraw him and his family from the USSR if necessary. True, Baranov received only 2 thousand dollars in his hands.

From that moment on, the new CIA agent, who received the pseudonym "Tony", began to earn his money and first of all told Crocket and Bradfrod about the structure, composition and leadership of the GRU, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bresponsibility for the operational departments, the composition and tasks of the GRU and KGB PGU residencies in Dhaka used by the Soviet scouts cover positions. In addition, he spoke about the location of the premises of the GRU and KGB residencies in the building of the Soviet embassy in Dhaka, the procedure for ensuring their security and the consequences of the recruiting approach of the Americans to one of the employees of the KGB PGU residency in Bangladesh. At the same meeting, the conditions for Baranov's connection with the CIA officers in Moscow were discussed.

A few days after the recruitment, Baranov returned to Moscow. Having spent his vacation, he started working in a new place - under the "roof" of one of the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. And on June 15, 1990, he signaled to the Americans that he was ready to start active work: in a telephone booth near the Kirovskaya metro station, he scrawled on the phone a previously agreed non-existent number - 345-51-15. After that, he three times went out on the agreed days to the meeting place agreed with Crocket with his Moscow cameraman, but to no avail. And only on July 11, 1990, Baranov met with the Deputy Resident of the CIA in Moscow, Michael Salik, which took place on the Malenkovskaya railway platform. During this meeting, Baranov was given two packets of instructions for maintaining communications, an operational task concerning the collection of data on bacteriological preparations, viruses and microbes at the disposal of the GRU, and 2,000 rubles for the purchase of a radio.

Baranov diligently completed all the tasks, but sometimes he was pursued by uniform bad luck. So, once after he laid a container with intelligence in a cache, construction workers paved the place of the laying and his work went to dust. Moreover, the Americans still did not get in touch with him, but they broadcast a message on the radio as many as 26 times. It said that the "Peacock" signal, which means Baranov's readiness for a personal meeting, was recorded by them, but they were not able to hold it because of the fire that took place on March 28, 1991 in the building of the US Embassy in Moscow.

Next and last meeting Baranova with a CIA officer took place in April 1991. On it, he was recommended, if possible, not to use hiding places anymore, to take instructions on the radio and paid 1250 rubles for the repair of his personal Zhiguli car, which he crashed in an accident. After this meeting, Baranov realized that his hopes of escaping from the USSR with the help of the CIA were unrealizable. Here is what he said about it during the investigation:

“Neither the conditions, nor the methods and terms for the possible removal of me and my family from the USSR were discussed with the Americans and were not brought to me by them. My question about a possible export scheme in both cases, both in Dhaka and in Moscow, was followed by assurances of a general nature. Let's say that an event of this kind is very difficult and requires a certain amount of time and effort to prepare. Like, such a scheme will be brought to me later ... Pretty soon, I had serious doubts that such a scheme would ever be communicated to me, and now ... my doubts have turned into confidence.

By the end of the summer of 1992, Baranov's nerves could not stand it. Considering that he should have about 60 thousand dollars in an Austrian bank account, Baranov decides to illegally leave the country. Taking three days off from work on August 10, he bought a ticket for a Moscow-Vienna flight, having previously issued a false passport for $ 150 through a friend. But on August 11, 1992, while passing through border control at Sheremetyevo-2, Baranov was arrested, and at the very first interrogation in military counterintelligence, he fully admitted his guilt.

There are several versions of how counterintelligence came to Baranov. The first was proposed by counterintelligence and boiled down to the fact that Baranov was figured out as a result of surveillance of CIA officers in Moscow. According to this version, surveillance officers in June 1990 drew attention to the interest of CIA operatives in Moscow in a telephone booth near the Kirovskaya metro station and, just in case, took control of it. After some time, Baranov was recorded in the booth, performing actions very similar to setting a prearranged signal. After some time, Baranov reappeared at the same booth, after which he was taken into operational development and was detained at the time of an attempt to illegally leave the country. According to the second version, Baranov came to the attention of counterintelligence after he sold his Zhiguli for 2,500 Deutschmarks, which in 1991 fell under Article 88 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. The next version boils down to the fact that the border guards, making sure that Baranov's passport was fake, detained the violator, and he simply chickened out during interrogation in counterintelligence and split. But most attention deserves the fourth, the simplest version: Baranova passed all the same O. Ames.

After the arrest of Baranov, a long and scrupulous investigation began, during which he tried in every possible way to belittle the damage caused to him. So, he persistently convinced the investigators that all the information transmitted to him by the CIA were “open secrets”, since the Americans had long known from other defectors, including D. Polyakov, V. Rezun, G. Smetanin and others. However, the investigators did not agree with him. According to the head of the FSB press service A. Mikhailov, during the investigation it was established that “Baranov handed over the intelligence network of his native GRU on the territory of other countries”, “handed over quite a lot of people, mainly associated with the GRU, as well as agents”, “seriously undermined the work of his department. Due to Baranov's activities, many agents were excluded from the current agent network and work with trusted persons, studied and developed, with whom he maintained contacts, was curtailed. In addition, the operational work of the GRU officers known to him, "deciphered" with his help by the Americans, was limited.

In December 1993, Baranov appeared before the Military Collegiums of the Court Russian Federation. As it was established by the court, some of the information provided by Baranov to the CIA was already known to him, and, as was specifically emphasized in the verdict, Baranov's actions did not entail the failure of persons known to him. Given these circumstances, the court, chaired by Major General of Justice V. Yaskin, on December 19, 1993, sentenced Baranov to an extremely lenient sentence, imposing a sentence below the permissible limit: six years in a strict regime colony with confiscation of the currency confiscated from him and half of his property. In addition, Colonel Baranov was not deprived of his military rank. The term Baranov was assigned to him by the court was serving in the Perm-35 camp.

Alexander Volkov, Gennady Sporyshev, Vladimir Tkachenko

The beginning of this story should be sought in 1992, when the decision of the acting. Russian Prime Minister E. Gaidar and Defense Minister P. Grachev, the GRU Space Intelligence Center was allowed to sell slides made from films shot by Soviet spy satellites in order to earn currency. High quality these pictures were widely known abroad and therefore the price for one slide could reach 2 thousand dollars. One of those involved in the commercial sale of slides was Colonel Alexander Volkov, head of a department at the Center for Space Intelligence. Volkov, who had served in the GRU for more than 20 years, was not engaged in operational work. But in the field of reconnaissance space technology, he was considered one of the leading specialists. So, he had more than twenty patents for inventions in this area.

Among those to whom Volkov sold the slides was a career officer of the Israeli intelligence service MOSSAD in Moscow, who coordinated the activities of Russian and Israeli intelligence agencies in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, Ruven Dinel, who was officially considered an adviser to the embassy. Volkov met with Dinel regularly, each time receiving permission from the leadership for a meeting. An Israeli bought from Volkov unclassified slides of photographs of the territory of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, which were allowed for sale, and he deposited the money received into the cash desk of the Center.

In 1993, Volkov resigned from the GRU and became one of the founders and deputy director of the Sovinformsputnik commercial association, which is still the GRU's official and sole intermediary in the trade in commercial photographs. However, Volkov did not break off contacts with Dinel. Moreover, in 1994, with the help of the former senior assistant to the head of the department of the Space Intelligence Center Gennady Sporyshev, who had also retired from the GRU by that time, he sold Dinel 7 secret photographs depicting Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv, Beer Sheva, Rehovot , Haifa and others. Later, Volkov and Sporyshev connected to their business another active employee of the Center - Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Tkachenko, who had access to a secret film library. He gave Volkov 202 secret slides, of which he sold 172 to Dinel. The Israelis did not remain in debt, and gave Volkov more than 300 thousand dollars for the sold slides. He did not forget to pay off his partners, handing Sporyshev 1600, and Tkachenko - 32 thousand dollars.

However, in 1995, the activities of Volkov and his partners attracted the attention of the military counterintelligence of the FSB. In September, Volkov's phone was tapped, and on December 13, 1995, at the Belorusskaya metro station, Volkov was detained by FSB officers at the moment when he was handing another 10 secret slides of Syrian territory to Dinel.

Since Dinel had diplomatic immunity, he was declared persona non grata, and two days later he left Moscow. At the same time, Tkachenko and three other officers of the Space Intelligence Center, who were making slides, were arrested. Sporyshev, who tried to escape, was arrested a little later.

All the detainees were prosecuted for treason. However, the investigation failed to prove the guilt of Volkov and the three officers who helped make the slides. All of them claimed that they did not know about the secrecy of the pictures. At the request of the investigator, he deposited the $345,000 found during a search of Volkov’s house to the account of the state-owned company Metall-Business, which is a center for retraining officers established by the Ministry of Defense and the Hammer and Sickle plant. And regarding the sale of photographs to Israel, he said: “Israel is our strategic partner, and Saddam is just a terrorist. I considered it my duty to help his opponents.” As a result, he and three other officers became witnesses in this case.

As for Sporyshev, he immediately confessed to everything, rendered all possible assistance to the investigation. Considering that he handed over the slides of the territory of Israel to MOSSAD and thus did not cause much damage to the country's security, the court of the Moscow Military District sentenced Sporyshev for disclosing state secret(Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) to 2 years probation.

Tkachenko was the least fortunate. He was accused of selling 202 classified photographs to Mossad. During the investigation, he fully admitted his guilt, but at the trial, which began in March 1998, he retracted his testimony, saying: “The investigators deceived me. They said that they just needed to get Dinel out of the country, and I should help. I helped." The trial of Tkachenko lasted two weeks and on March 20 a sentence was announced - three years in prison.

So ended this pretty unusual story. Its unusualness is not at all in the fact that three officers of the special services made money on state secrets, but in their strange punishment - some were convicted, while others were witnesses in the same case. Not without reason, Tkachenko’s lawyers, after sentencing him, stated that the case of their client was sewn with white thread and that “the FSB most likely had the goal of covering up their man who leaked misinformation to MOSSAD.”

These are typical stories of betrayal committed by the GRU in 1950-1990. As can be seen from the above examples, only D. Polyakov, with a big stretch, can be considered a "fighter against the totalitarian communist regime." All the rest set foot on this slippery slope for reasons very far from ideological, such as: greed, cowardice, dissatisfaction with their position, etc. However, this is not surprising, since people serve in intelligence, and they, as you know, are different. And therefore, one can only hope that there will be no people like those about whom the story has just been told in Russian military intelligence.

Notes:

Cit. Cited from: Andrew K., Gordievsky O. KGB. History of foreign policy operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. M., 1992. S. 390.

The illegal resident leads a network of agents and has his own channels of communication with Moscow, independent of the communications system used by residency officers operating under the cover of the Soviet embassy or other official representations, such as, for example, the Soviet mission to the UN.

Soviet "diamond" of the CIA ...

Soviet "diamond" of the CIA ...

Chernov himself is sure that Polyakov, who at that time worked as a deputy resident of the GRU in New York, pointed him out to the FBI agents. He said that FBI agents showed him three photographs, apparently taken with a miniature camera, which showed the corridors of the GRU and KGB residencies, as well as the referents of the Soviet mission to the UN in New York. In the photographs near each office, arrows were drawn indicating the names of employees, including Chernov himself.

Klimov V. “The one who will mortgage his own mother for half a liter is sold cheaply.” Russian newspaper, April 18, 1996.

Early P. Confession of a Spy. M., 1998.

Zaitsev V. Capture. Security Service, No. 2, 1993.

Stepenin M. GRU officers sold state secrets to Mossad. Kommersant-Daily, March 21, 1998.

Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born in 1921 in the family of an accountant in Ukraine. In September 1939, after graduating from school, he entered the Kiev Artillery School, and as a platoon commander entered the Great Patriotic War. He fought on the Western and Karelian fronts, was a battery commander, and in 1943 was appointed an artillery intelligence officer. During the war years, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War and the Red Star, as well as many medals. After the end of the war, Polyakov graduated from the intelligence faculty of the Academy. Frunze, courses of the General Staff and was sent to work in the GRU.

In the early 1950s, Polyakov was sent to New York under the guise of being an employee of the Soviet UN mission. His task was to provide undercover agents for the GRU illegals. Polyakov's work on the first trip was recognized as successful, and at the end of the 50s he was again sent to the United States to the post of deputy resident under the guise of a Soviet employee of the UN military staff committee.

In November 1961, Polyakov, on his own initiative, came into contact with FBI counterintelligence agents, who gave him the pseudonym "Tophat". The Americans believed that the reason for his betrayal was disappointment in the Soviet regime. CIA officer Paul Dillon, who was Polyakov's cameraman in Delhi, says the following about this:

"I think the motivation for his actions goes back to the Second World War. He juxtaposed the horrors, the carnage, the cause he fought for, with the duplicity and corruption that he thought was rampant in Moscow."

Polyakov's former colleagues do not completely deny this version, although they insist that his "ideological and political rebirth" took place "against the background of painful pride." For example, the former first deputy head of the GRU, Colonel-General A.G. Pavlov, says:

"Polyakov at the trial declared his political rebirth, his hostile attitude towards our country, he did not hide his personal self-interest."

Polyakov himself said the following during the investigation:

"At the heart of my betrayal lay both my desire to openly express my views and doubts somewhere, and the qualities of my character - the constant desire to work beyond the risk. And the more the danger became, the more interesting my life became ... I used to walk on the edge of a knife and could not imagine another life.

Best of the day

However, to say that this decision was easy for him would be wrong. After his arrest, he also said the following words:

“Almost from the very beginning of cooperation with the CIA, I understood that I had committed a fatal mistake, a grave crime. with my wife, children, grandchildren, and the fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued the criminal connection, or silence, in order to somehow delay the hour of reckoning.

All of his operators noted that he received little money, no more than $3,000 a year, which was given to him mainly in the form of Black and Decker electromechanical tools, a pair of overalls, fishing tackle and guns. (The fact is that in his spare time, Polyakov loved carpentry and also collected expensive guns.) In addition, unlike most other Soviet officers recruited by the FBI and CIA, Polyakov did not smoke, almost did not drink, and did not cheat on his wife. So the amount he received from the Americans for 24 years of work can be called small: according to a rough estimate of the investigation, it amounted to about 94 thousand rubles at the rate of 1985.

One way or another, but from November 1961, Polyakov began to transmit information to the Americans about the activities and agents of the GRU in the United States and other Western countries. And he began to do this already from the second meeting with the FBI agents. Here it is worth quoting again the protocol of his interrogation:

“This meeting again was mainly devoted to the question of why I nevertheless decided to cooperate with them, and also whether I was a set-up. In order to double-check me, and at the same time consolidate my relationship with them, Michael finally suggested that I name the employees of the Soviet military intelligence in New York. I did not hesitate to list all the persons known to me who worked under the guise of the USSR Representative Office. "

It is believed that already at the very beginning of his work for the FBI, Polyakov betrayed D. Dunlap, a staff sergeant in the NSA, and F. Bossard, an employee of the British Air Ministry. However, this is unlikely. Dunlap, recruited in 1960, was guided by a cameraman from the Washington GRU station, and his connection to Soviet intelligence was uncovered by chance when his garage was searched after he committed suicide in July 1963. As for Bossard, the FBI's intelligence department actually misled MI5 by attributing the information to "Tophat". This was done in order to protect another GRU source in New York, who had the alias "Niknek".

But it was Polyakov who betrayed Captain Maria Dobrova, an illegal GRU in the United States. Dobrova, who fought in Spain as a translator, after returning to Moscow, began working in the GRU, and after appropriate training was sent to the United States. In America, she acted under the cover of the owner of a beauty salon, which was visited by representatives of high-ranking military, political and business circles. After Polyakov betrayed Dobrova, the FBI tried to recruit her, but she chose to commit suicide.

In total, during his work for the Americans, Polyakov gave them 19 illegal Soviet intelligence officers, more than 150 agents from among foreign citizens, revealed that about 1,500 active intelligence officers belonged to the GRU and the KGB.

In the summer of 1962, Polyakov returned to Moscow, provided with instructions, communication conditions, and a schedule of hiding operations (one per quarter). Places for caches were selected mainly along the route of his journey to work and back: in the areas of Bolshaya Ordynka and Bolshaya Polyanka, near the Dobryninskaya metro station and at the Ploshchad Vosstaniya trolleybus stop. Most likely, it was this circumstance, as well as the lack of personal contacts with CIA representatives in Moscow, that helped Polyakov avoid failure after another CIA agent, Colonel O. Penkovsky, was arrested in October 1962.

In 1966, Polyakov was sent to Burma as head of the radio interception center in Rangoon. Upon his return to the USSR, he was appointed head of the Chinese department, and in 1970 he was sent to India as a military attaché and resident of the GRU. At this time, the volume of information transmitted by Polyakov to the CIA increased dramatically. He gave out the names of four American officers recruited by the GRU, handed over photographic films of documents testifying to the deep divergence of the positions of China and the USSR. Thanks to these documents, CIA analysts concluded that the Sino-Soviet differences were of a long-term nature. These findings were used by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to help him and Nixon mend relations with China in 1972.

In light of this, it seems at least naive that L.V. Shebarshin, then deputy resident of the KGB in Delhi, claims that the KGB had certain suspicions about him while Polyakov was working in India. “Polyakov showed his complete disposition towards the Chekists,” writes Shebarshin, “but it was known from his friends from among the military that he did not miss the slightest opportunity to turn them against the KGB and surreptitiously pursued those who were friends with our comrades. Not a single spy can to avoid miscalculations. But, as is often the case in our case, it took another year for the suspicions to be confirmed." Most likely, behind this statement there is a desire to show off one's own foresight and unwillingness to recognize the unsatisfactory work of the KGB military counterintelligence in this case.

It should be said that Polyakov was very serious about the fact that the leadership of the GRU formed an opinion about him as a thoughtful, promising worker. To do this, the CIA regularly provided him with some classified material, and also framed two Americans whom he presented as recruited by him. With the same goal, Polyakov sought to ensure that his two sons received higher education and had a prestigious profession. He gave many trinkets, such as lighters and ballpoint pens, to his employees in the GRU, giving the impression of himself as a pleasant person and a good comrade. One of Polyakov's patrons was Lieutenant-General Sergei Izotov, head of the GRU personnel department, who had worked for 15 years in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU before this appointment. In the Polyakov case, expensive gifts made by him to Izotov appear. And for the rank of general, Polyakov presented Izotov with a silver service, bought specifically for this purpose by the CIA.

The rank of Major General Polyakov received in 1974. This provided him with access to materials that were outside the scope of his direct duties. For example, to the list of military technologies that were purchased or obtained by intelligence in the West. Reagan Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Pearl said he was breathless when he learned of the existence of 5,000 Soviet programs that used Western technology to build military capabilities. The list provided by Polyakov helped Perl persuade President Reagan to secure tighter controls on the sale of military technology.

Polyakov's work as a CIA agent was distinguished by audacity and fantastic luck. In Moscow, he stole a special self-illuminating film "Mikrat 93 Shield" from the GRU warehouse, which he used to photograph secret documents. To pass on information, he stole fake hollow stones, which he left in certain places where they were picked up by CIA operatives. To give a signal about laying the hiding place, Polyakov, driving by public transport past the US Embassy in Moscow, activated a miniature transmitter hidden in his pocket. While abroad, Polyakov preferred to pass information from hand to hand. After 1970, the CIA, in an effort to ensure Polyakov's security as fully as possible, provided him with a specially designed portable pulse transmitter, with which information could be printed, then encrypted and transmitted to the receiving device in the American embassy in 2.6 seconds. Polyakov broadcast such programs from various places in Moscow: from the Enguri cafe, the Vanda store, the Krasnopresnensky baths, the Central Tourist House, from Tchaikovsky Street, etc.

By the end of the 1970s, the CIA, they said, already treated Polyakov more as a teacher than as an agent and informer. They left it up to him to choose the place and time of meetings and to lay hiding places. However, they had no other choice, since Polyakov did not forgive them for their mistakes. So, in 1972, without the consent of Polyakov, the Americans invited him to an official reception at the US Embassy in Moscow, which actually put him in danger of failure. The GRU leadership gave permission, and Polyakov had to go there. During the reception, he was secretly given a note, which he destroyed without reading. Moreover, he cut off all contacts with the CIA for a long time, until he was convinced that he did not fall under the suspicion of the KGB counterintelligence.

In the late 1970s, Polyakov was again sent to India as a resident of the GRU. He stayed there until June 1980, when he was recalled to Moscow. However, this early return was not associated with possible suspicions against him. Just another medical commission forbade him to work in countries with a hot climate. However, the Americans got worried and offered Polyakov to go to the USA. But he refused. According to a CIA officer in Delhi, in response to a wish to come to America in case of danger, where he is welcomed with open arms, Polyakov replied: “Don’t wait for me. I will never come to the USA. I am not doing this for you. I am doing this for my country. I was born a Russian and I will die a Russian." And to the question of what awaits him in case of exposure, he replied: "Common grave."

Polyakov looked into the water. His fantastic luck and career as a CIA agent came to an end in 1985, when Aldrich Ames, a CIA career officer, came to the KGB residency in Washington and offered his services. Among the KGB and GRU officers named by Ames who worked for the CIA was Polyakov.

Polyakov was arrested at the end of 1986. During a search carried out at his apartment, at his dacha and at his mother's house, material evidence of his espionage activities was found. Among them: sheets of cryptographic carbon paper made by typography and embedded in envelopes for phonograph records, cipher pads camouflaged in the cover of a travel bag, two attachments for a small-sized Tessina camera for vertical and horizontal shooting, several rolls of Kodak film, designed for special development , a ballpoint pen, the clip head of which was intended for writing cryptographic text, as well as negatives with the conditions of communication with CIA officers in Moscow and instructions for contacts with them abroad.

The investigation into Polyakov's case was led by KGB investigator Colonel AS Dukhanin, who later became famous for the so-called "Kremlin case" of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Polyakov's wife and adult sons were witnesses, since they did not know and did not suspect about his espionage activities. After the end of the investigation, many generals and officers of the GRU, whose negligence and talkativeness Polyakov often took advantage of, were brought to administrative responsibility by the command and dismissed or retired. In early 1988, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Polyakov D.F. for treason and espionage to be shot with confiscation of property. The sentence was carried out on March 15, 1988. And officially, the execution of D.F. Polyakov was reported in Pravda only in 1990.

In 1994, after the arrest and exposure of Ames, the CIA admitted that Polyakov was collaborating with him. It has been stated that he was the most important of Ames's victims, far surpassing all others in importance. The information he gave and photocopies of classified documents make up 25 boxes in the CIA file. Many experts familiar with the Polyakov case say that he made a much more important contribution than the more famous defector from the GRU, Colonel O. Penkovsky. This point of view is shared by another traitor from the GRU, Nikolai Chernov, who said: "Polyakov is a star. And Penkovsky is so-so ...". According to CIA Director James Woolsey, of all the Soviet agents recruited during the Cold War, Polyakov "was a real gem."

Indeed, in addition to the list of scientific and technical intelligence interests given in China, Polyakov reported information about the new weapons of the Soviet Army, in particular anti-tank missiles, which helped the Americans destroy these weapons when they were used by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 . He also sent over 100 issues of the secret periodical "Military Thought" published by the General Staff to the West. According to Robert Geis, director of the CIA under President Bush, the documents stolen by Polyakov provided insight into the use of the military in the event of war, and helped draw the firm conclusion that Soviet military leaders did not consider it possible to win a nuclear war and sought to avoid it. According to Geis, familiarization with these documents prevented the US leadership from erroneous conclusions, which may have helped to avoid a "hot" war.

Of course, Geis knows better what helped to avoid a "hot" war and what Polyakov's merit is in this. But even if it is as great as the Americans are trying to assure everyone, this does not in the least justify his betrayal.

This "mole" for his twenty-five years of treacherous activity for foreign intelligence gave the FBI and the CIA over one and a half thousand GRU agents. It is believed that the death of a three-month-old son prompted General Polyakov to cooperate with Western intelligence services - the Main Intelligence Directorate “squeezed” $ 400 for an operation on a child, and this was a big blow for Dmitry Fedorovich.

Was a scout since the war

The beginning of the career of the future traitor was quite successful - D.F. Polyakov studied at the artillery school after school, fought from the first day of the Great Patriotic War. He fought, judging by the orders of the Patriotic War and the Red Star, with dignity. He was demobilized as a major, the last place of service was the military branch of the army headquarters. In 1942 Polyakov joined the party.
After the war, D. F. Polyakov studied at the Frunze Academy, on the courses of the General Staff, after which he was sent to serve in the GRU.

Why a promising specialist went for it

Until the 1960s, an officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate worked in America in the representation of the Soviet Union in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. Polyakov's three-month-old son fell ill and needed an emergency operation that cost $400. Not having such an amount, Dmitry Fedorovich wanted to borrow it from the GRU resident I. A. Sklyarov. But he, having contacted the Center, received a refusal "from above". The boy died as a result.
Historians of the special services believe that the ardent Stalinist Polyakov long wanted to annoy the Khrushchev regime, which debunked the cult of the “father of nations,” and the death of his son only catalyzed the process of betrayal.

Who and to whom did he hand over

It is believed that D. F. Polyakov took his first step towards betrayal in November 1961, when he approached an FBI officer with a proposal for cooperation. The intelligence officer by that time was the deputy resident of the GRU for illegal work in America. First, Polyakov handed over to US internal intelligence several cipher clerks who worked undercover in Soviet missions in America.
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the GRU “mole” worked under the operational pseudonym “Tophat” (translated from English as “cylinder”). Two weeks after the first contact with the FBI, a second, more “productive” one took place - Polyakov surrendered almost 50 of his colleagues and KGB agents who were operating in America at that time. Subsequently, the traitor "leaked" to the American intelligence service information about illegal agents of Soviet intelligence, suggested which of them could be recruited. He handed over classified documents, which were later used as training aids by the FBI.
Less than a year after starting work for the FBI, D. F. Polyakov began to cooperate with the CIA.

Double Bourbon

Under such an operational pseudonym, Polyakov worked for the CIA from the beginning of June 1962. Meanwhile, his career in the GRU grew rapidly. "Mole" oversaw the intelligence apparatus of the special services in New York and Washington. While in Moscow, Polyakov passed secret documents and valuable information through hiding places. Thus, he facilitated the transfer to the West of the telephone directories of the military General Staff and his own organization.
When one of the American newspapers, in a publication telling about the trial of those who had been extradited by Polyakov, mentioned him himself, the GRU officer was no longer allowed into America. In the future, the "mole" was engaged in the organization and control of residency in the Afro-Asian direction, in the 70s he worked in India, taught at the Military Diplomatic Academy.

How he was exposed

After retiring in 1980, Polyakov continued to work in the personnel department of the GRU as a civilian and for another 6 years he did not stop regularly supplying the CIA with secret information, to which he now had access.
It was already possible to open it with the help of one of the American "moles" from the CIA, recruited by Soviet intelligence. In July 1986, Polyakov was arrested, tried and sentenced to capital punishment. In the early spring of 1988, the "mole" was shot. It was said that in May of the same year, Reagan himself asked Gorbachev for Polyakov. But the President of the United States was two months late.
It is estimated that in the quarter of a century of his betrayal, Polyakov handed over to Western intelligence a total of over 20 boxes of secret documents and handed over more than 1,600 agents of the Soviet special services.

Dmitry Polyakov

Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born in 1921 in the family of an accountant in Ukraine. In September 1939, after graduating from school, he entered the Kiev Artillery School, and as a platoon commander entered the Great Patriotic War. He fought on the Western and Karelian fronts, was a battery commander, and in 1943 was appointed an artillery intelligence officer. During the war years, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War and the Red Star, as well as many medals. After the end of the war, Polyakov graduated from the intelligence faculty of the Academy. Frunze, courses of the General Staff and was sent to work in the GRU.

In the early 1950s, Polyakov was sent to New York under the guise of being an employee of the Soviet UN mission. His task was to provide undercover agents for the GRU illegals. Polyakov's work on the first trip was recognized as successful, and at the end of the 50s he was again sent to the United States to the post of deputy resident under the guise of a Soviet employee of the UN military staff committee.

In November 1961, Polyakov, on his own initiative, came into contact with FBI counterintelligence agents, who gave him the pseudonym "Tophat". The Americans believed that the reason for his betrayal was disappointment in the Soviet regime. CIA officer Paul Dillon, who was Polyakov's cameraman in Delhi, says the following about this:

“I think that the motivation for his actions goes back to the Second World War. He compared the horrors, the bloody massacre, the cause for which he fought, with the duplicity and corruption that, in his opinion, were rampant in Moscow.

Polyakov's former colleagues do not completely deny this version either, although they insist that his "ideological and political rebirth" took place "against the background of painful pride." For example, Colonel-General A. G. Pavlov, former First Deputy Chief of the GRU, says:

“Polyakov at the trial declared his political rebirth, his hostile attitude towards our country, he did not hide his personal self-interest.”

Polyakov himself said the following during the investigation:

“At the heart of my betrayal lay both my desire to openly express my views and doubts somewhere, and the qualities of my character - the constant desire to work beyond the risk. And the greater the danger became, the more interesting my life became ... I used to walk on the edge of a knife and could not imagine another life.

However, to say that this decision was easy for him would be wrong. After his arrest, he also said the following words:

“Almost from the very beginning of cooperation with the CIA, I understood that I had made a fatal mistake, a grave crime. The endless torment of the soul, which lasted all this period, so exhausted me that I myself was more than once ready to confess. And only the thought of what would happen to my wife, children, grandchildren, and the fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued the criminal relationship, or silence, in order to somehow delay the hour of reckoning.

All of his operators noted that he received little money, no more than $3,000 a year, which was given to him mainly in the form of Black and Decker electromechanical tools, a pair of overalls, fishing tackle and guns. (The fact is that in his spare time, Polyakov loved carpentry and also collected expensive guns.) In addition, unlike most other Soviet officers recruited by the FBI and CIA, Polyakov did not smoke, almost did not drink, and did not cheat on his wife. So the amount he received from the Americans for 24 years of work can be called small: according to a rough estimate of the investigation, it amounted to about 94 thousand rubles at the rate of 1985.

One way or another, but from November 1961, Polyakov began to transmit information to the Americans about the activities and agents of the GRU in the United States and other Western countries. And he began to do this already from the second meeting with the FBI agents. Here it is worth quoting again the protocol of his interrogation:

“This meeting again was mainly devoted to the question of why I nevertheless decided to cooperate with them, and also whether I was a set-up. In order to double-check me, and at the same time to consolidate my relationship with them, Michael concluded by suggesting that I name the employees of the Soviet military intelligence in New York. I did not hesitate to list all the persons known to me who worked under the guise of the USSR Representative Office.

It is believed that already at the very beginning of his work for the FBI, Polyakov betrayed D. Dunlap, a staff sergeant in the NSA, and F. Bossard, an employee of the British Air Ministry. However, this is unlikely. Dunlap, recruited in 1960, was guided by a cameraman from the Washington GRU station, and his connection to Soviet intelligence was uncovered by chance when his garage was searched after he committed suicide in July 1963. As for Bossard, the FBI's intelligence department had in fact misled MI5 by attributing the information to "Tophat". This was done to protect another GRU source in New York, who went by the pseudonym "Niknek".

But it was Polyakov who betrayed Captain Maria Dobrova, an illegal GRU in the United States. Dobrova, who fought in Spain as a translator, after returning to Moscow, began working in the GRU, and after appropriate training was sent to the United States. In America, she acted under the cover of the owner of a beauty salon, which was visited by representatives of high-ranking military, political and business circles. After Polyakov betrayed Dobrova, the FBI tried to recruit her, but she chose to commit suicide.

In total, during his work for the Americans, Polyakov gave them 19 illegal Soviet intelligence officers, more than 150 agents from among foreign citizens, revealed that about 1,500 active intelligence officers belonged to the GRU and the KGB.

In the summer of 1962, Polyakov returned to Moscow, provided with instructions, communication conditions, and a schedule of hiding operations (one per quarter). Places for caches were selected mainly along the route of his journey to work and back: in the areas of Bolshaya Ordynka and Bolshaya Polyanka, near the Dobryninskaya metro station and at the Ploshchad Vosstaniya trolleybus stop. Most likely, it was this circumstance, as well as the lack of personal contacts with CIA representatives in Moscow, that helped Polyakov avoid failure after another CIA agent, Colonel O. Penkovsky, was arrested in October 1962.

In 1966, Polyakov was sent to Burma as head of the radio interception center in Rangoon. Upon his return to the USSR, he was appointed head of the Chinese department, and in 1970 he was sent to India as a military attaché and resident of the GRU. At this time, the volume of information transmitted by Polyakov to the CIA increased dramatically. He gave out the names of four American officers recruited by the GRU, handed over photographic films of documents testifying to the deep divergence of the positions of China and the USSR. Thanks to these documents, CIA analysts concluded that the Sino-Soviet differences were of a long-term nature. These findings were used by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to help him and Nixon mend relations with China in 1972.

In light of this, it seems at least naive that L. V. Shebarshin, then the deputy resident of the KGB in Delhi, claims that the KGB had certain suspicions about him while Polyakov was working in India. “Polyakov demonstrated his complete disposition towards the Chekists,” writes Shebarshin. - but it was known from military friends that he did not miss the slightest opportunity to turn them against the KGB and surreptitiously persecuted those who were friends with our comrades. No spy can avoid miscalculations. But, as often happens in our case, it took another year for the suspicions to be confirmed.” Most likely, behind this statement there is a desire to show off one's own foresight and unwillingness to recognize the unsatisfactory work of the KGB military counterintelligence in this case.

It should be said that Polyakov was very serious about the fact that the leadership of the GRU formed an opinion about him as a thoughtful, promising worker. To do this, the CIA regularly provided him with some classified material, and also framed two Americans whom he presented as recruited by him. With the same goal, Polyakov sought to ensure that his two sons received higher education and had a prestigious profession. He gave many trinkets, such as lighters and ballpoint pens, to his employees in the GRU, giving the impression of himself as a pleasant person and a good comrade. One of Polyakov's patrons was Lieutenant-General Sergei Izotov, head of the GRU personnel department, who had worked for 15 years in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU before this appointment. In the Polyakov case, expensive gifts made by him to Izotov appear. And for the rank of general, Polyakov presented Izotov with a silver service, bought specifically for this purpose by the CIA.

The rank of Major General Polyakov received in 1974. This provided him with access to materials that were outside the scope of his direct duties. For example, to the list of military technologies that were purchased or obtained by intelligence in the West. Reagan Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Pearl said he was breathless when he learned of the existence of 5,000 Soviet programs that used Western technology to build military capabilities. The list provided by Polyakov helped Perl persuade President Reagan to secure tighter controls on the sale of military technology.

Polyakov's work as a CIA agent was distinguished by audacity and fantastic luck. In Moscow, he stole a special self-illuminating film Mikrat 93 Shield from the GRU warehouse, which he used to photograph secret documents. To pass on information, he stole fake hollow stones, which he left in certain places where they were picked up by CIA operatives. To give a signal about laying the hiding place, Polyakov, driving by public transport past the US Embassy in Moscow, activated a miniature transmitter hidden in his pocket. While abroad, Polyakov preferred to pass information from hand to hand. After 1970, the CIA, in an effort to ensure Polyakov's security as fully as possible, provided him with a specially designed portable pulse transmitter, with which information could be printed, then encrypted and transmitted to the receiving device in the American embassy in 2.6 seconds. Polyakov conducted such programs from various places in Moscow: from the Enguri cafe, the Vanda store, the Krasnopresnensky baths, the Central Tourist House, from Tchaikovsky Street, etc.

By the end of the 1970s, the CIA, they said, already treated Polyakov more as a teacher than as an agent and informer. They left it up to him to choose the place and time of meetings and to lay hiding places. However, they had no other choice, since Polyakov did not forgive them for their mistakes. So, in 1972, without the consent of Polyakov, the Americans invited him to an official reception at the US Embassy in Moscow, which actually put him in danger of failure. The GRU leadership gave permission, and Polyakov had to go there. During the reception, he was secretly given a note, which he destroyed without reading. Moreover, he cut off all contacts with the CIA for a long time, until he was convinced that he did not fall under the suspicion of the KGB counterintelligence.

In the late 1970s, Polyakov was again sent to India as a resident of the GRU. He stayed there until June 1980, when he was recalled to Moscow. However, this early return was not associated with possible suspicions against him. Just another medical commission forbade him to work in countries with a hot climate. However, the Americans got worried and offered Polyakov to go to the USA. But he refused. According to a CIA officer in Delhi, in response to a wish to come to America in case of danger, where he is welcomed with open arms, Polyakov replied: “Don't wait for me. I will never come to the USA. I'm not doing this for you. I do this for my country. I was born Russian and I will die Russian.” And to the question of what awaits him in case of exposure, he replied: "Common grave."

Polyakov looked into the water. His fantastic luck and career as a CIA agent came to an end in 1985, when Aldrich Ames, a CIA career officer, came to the KGB residency in Washington and offered his services. Among the KGB and GRU officers named by Ames who worked for the CIA was Polyakov.

Polyakov was arrested at the end of 1986. During a search carried out at his apartment, at his dacha and at his mother's house, material evidence of his espionage activities was found. Among them: sheets of cryptographic carbon paper made by typography and inserted into envelopes for phonograph records, cipher pads camouflaged in the cover of a travel bag, two attachments for a small-sized Tessina camera for vertical and horizontal shooting, several rolls of Kodak film, designed for special development , a ballpoint pen, the clip head of which was intended for writing cryptographic text, as well as negatives with the conditions of communication with CIA officers in Moscow and instructions for contacts with them abroad.

The investigation into Polyakov's case was led by KGB investigator Colonel A.S. Dukhanin, who later became famous for the so-called "Kremlin case" of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Polyakov's wife and adult sons were witnesses, since they did not know and did not suspect about his espionage activities. After the end of the investigation, many generals and officers of the GRU, whose negligence and talkativeness Polyakov often took advantage of, were brought to administrative responsibility by the command and dismissed or retired. In early 1988, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Polyakov D.F. for treason and espionage to death with confiscation of property. The sentence was carried out on March 15, 1988. And officially, the execution of D. F. Polyakov was reported in Pravda only in 1990.

In 1994, after the arrest and exposure of Ames, the CIA admitted that Polyakov was collaborating with him. It has been stated that he was the most important of Ames's victims, far surpassing all others in importance. The information he gave and photocopies of classified documents make up 25 boxes in the CIA file. Many experts familiar with the Polyakov case say that he made a much more important contribution than the more famous GRU defector, Colonel O. Penkovsky. This point of view is shared by another traitor from the GRU, Nikolai Chernov, who said: “Polyakov is a star. And Penkovsky is so-so ... ". According to CIA Director James Woolsey, of all the Soviet agents recruited during the Cold War, Polyakov "was a real diamond."

Indeed, in addition to the list of scientific and technical intelligence interests given in China, Polyakov reported information about the new weapons of the Soviet Army, in particular anti-tank missiles, which helped the Americans destroy these weapons when they were used by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 . He also handed over to the West more than 100 issues of the secret periodical "Military Thought", published by the General Staff. According to Robert Gates, director of the CIA under President Bush, the documents stolen by Polyakov provided insight into the use of the military in the event of war, and helped draw the firm conclusion that Soviet military leaders did not consider it possible to win a nuclear war and sought to avoid it. According to Gates, familiarization with these documents prevented the US leadership from erroneous conclusions, which may have helped to avoid a "hot" war.

Of course, Gates knows better what helped to avoid a "hot" war and what Polyakov's merit is in this. But even if it is as great as the Americans are trying to assure everyone, this does not in the least justify his betrayal.

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Agents he was a precious diamond in the crown. For 25 years, Polyakov supplied Washington with the most valuable information, and this practically paralyzed the work of the Soviet special services. [S-BLOCK]

He transferred secret staff documents, scientific developments, weapons data, strategic plans of the USSR, and even Military Thought magazines to the United States. Through his efforts, two dozen Soviet intelligence officers and more than 140 recruited agents were arrested in the United States.

Polyakov was taller than average, a strong and stern man. He was distinguished by calmness and restraint. An important feature of his character was secrecy, which manifested itself both in work and private life. The general was fond of hunting and carpentry. He built a dacha with his own hands and made furniture for it, in which he arranged many hiding places.

Dmitry Polyakov has been a resident in the US, India and Burma. After receiving the rank of major general, he was sent to Moscow, where he headed the intelligence department of the Military Diplomatic Academy, and later the faculty of the Military Academy of the Soviet Army. After retiring, he worked in the personnel department of the GRU and had direct access to the personal files of employees.

Motives for betrayal and Polyakov's recruitment

Under interrogation, Polyakov said that he agreed to cooperate with a potential enemy because of the desire to help democracy stop the onslaught of Khrushchev's military doctrine. The actual push was Khrushchev's speech in France and the US, in which he said that the Soviet people were making rockets like sausages on a conveyor belt and were ready to "bury America."

However, the researchers are sure that the real reason was the death of the newborn son of Dmitry Fedorovich.

During Polyakov's service in the United States, his three-month-old son fell ill with an intractable illness. The treatment required 400 thousand dollars, which the Soviet citizen did not have. A request to the Center for help went unanswered, and the child died. The motherland turned out to be deaf to those who sacrifice their lives for her, and Polyakov decided that he owed her nothing more.

During the second trip to the United States, through his channels in the American military mission, Polyakov contacted General O'Neily, who brought him into contact with FBI agents.

Sly Fox in the Service of the CIA The FBI and CIA gave their spy many nicknames - Bourbon, Tophat, Donald, Specter, but Sly Fox would be the most appropriate name for him. Dexterity, intelligence, professional flair, photographic memory helped Polyakov to be beyond suspicion for many years. The Americans were especially struck by the strong restraint of the spy; one could not read the excitement on his face. The same was noted by Soviet investigators. Polyakov himself destroyed the evidence and established the places of Moscow caches.

His best spy the Americans supplied equipment no worse than the cinematic James Bond. A miniature Brest device was used to transmit information. [S-BLOCK]

Secret data was loaded onto the device, and after its activation, in just 2.6 seconds, information was transmitted to the nearest receiver. The operation was carried out by Polyakov during his trolleybus ride past the US Embassy. Once the transmission was spotted by Soviet radio operators, but they could not figure out where the signal came from.

Samples of secret texts, addresses in the US, ciphers, postal communications were kept in the handle of a spinning rod, presented to the spy by the First Secretary of the US Embassy. When Polyakov was in the States, encrypted messages in the New York Times were used to communicate with him. Small camouflaged cameras were used to photograph documents.

The Americans themselves treated their spy with deep respect and considered him a teacher. The agents listened to the recommendations of Polyakov, who believed that the CIA and FBI often act in a stereotyped manner, and therefore predictable for Soviet specialists.

Arrest and investigation in the case of a traitor

It was possible to get on the trail of Polyakov thanks to a leak from the United States. Information about the "diamond in the crown" was obtained by KGB spies Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. After collecting evidence, the counterintelligence officers went to the "mole" and were amazed at who he turned out to be. At this time, the honored general retired due to age and became a real legend of the GRU.

Polyakov's professional instinct did not let him down, and he went to the bottom, making contacts with the Americans. The Chekists managed to provoke the traitor through fake information, and he gave himself away by contacting the FBI. [S-BLOCK]

On July 7, 1986, Dmitry Polyakov was arrested at a meeting of veteran intelligence officers. The spy actively cooperated with the investigation and expected to be exchanged, but the court sentenced the traitor to death.

In May of the same year, at a meeting between the presidents of the USSR and the United States, Ronald Reagan asked Gorbachev to pardon Polyakov. Mikhail Sergeevich wanted to respect his overseas colleague and expectedly agreed, but it was too late. On March 15, 1988, GRU General Dmitry Polyakov and an American intelligence officer were shot.