Was World War I inevitable?

Mountain peaks
They sleep in the darkness of the forests,
Carpathian valleys -
The grave of the daredevils.
Gray-haired old colonel
I galloped along the line,
"Guys, don't be shy!"
He shouted loudly.
"While I'm smoking my pipe,
"Guys, stand still,
"When I hang up,
"Go boldly into battle!"
The Germans have awakened
The horns sing the dawn,
The Colonel hung up
And the regiments went into battle.
Hurray, hurray, guys!
Let's go against the enemy
For the Orthodox faith,
For the king's father!

The First World War occupies a special place in the history of mankind. The obvious senselessness of this war, combined with huge, unprecedented losses, the enormous world-historical significance of its results, combined with a feeling of incompleteness, the inevitability of the “second series”, push us to think about what would have happened if the European powers behaved more rationally a hundred years ago than in real life. Indeed, the Austro-Serbian conflict could have been easily localized. Moreover, in hindsight, such a development of events seems almost the only possible: after all, the Serbs won their small war against Austria-Hungary in 1914! Why was it necessary to drag the whole world into it? Moreover, for Russia, the victory of Serbia was not a surprise: the head of Austrian counterintelligence, Colonel Alfred Redl, was a Russian agent, and he handed over to Russia the entire Austrian plan for the war against Serbia, and the Russians handed it over to the Serbs. Nothing stopped the Russians from telling the Serbs then:

You started this mess, now you have to clear it up. You have a good chance of fighting off the Austrians alone - after all, their war plan is known to you through our efforts. We will, of course, intervene if things go badly for you, but not before that.

Moreover, the Austrians had no reason to ask anyone for help against insignificant Serbia. Redl, although exposed, shot himself before he could be interrogated, and Austrian counterintelligence did not know exactly what information he conveyed to the Russians. One could assume that we are talking about Austrian plans for war against Russia, which the Russians were naturally interested in in the first place. In any case, in reality the Austrians did not change their war plans against Serbia.

The only one who would have had an interest of its own to intervene in the Austro-Serbian war was Bulgaria, but this country, still recovering from its recent defeat in the Second Balkan War of 1913, was not ready for war. In reality, Bulgaria declared war on Serbia only in October 1915; in our version, the Austro-Serbian war would have already ended by that time.

So, let’s imagine that military operations on the Austro-Serbian front took place as in real life, but no one intervened in this war. The victory of tiny Serbia in the war against one of the then great powers would have caused a shock throughout Europe, and above all in Austria-Hungary itself. It is safe to assume that if Austro-Hungarian dualism was the result of Austria's defeat in the war against Prussia in 1866, then the much more ignominious defeat in the war against Serbia would have been its end. The collapse of Austro-Hungarian dualism would mean in practice the fulfillment of the long-standing dream of all Germans: the reunification of the German part of Austria-Hungary with Germany. Moreover, we should not forget that this “German part” then included, in addition to present-day Austria, also the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The Czechs and Slovenians, of course, would protest loudly, but they would hardly dare to resort to armed resistance. The Habsburg dynasty would most likely retain power in the Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarians themselves would be interested in this, first of all, in order to prevent the radical democratization of this country, which then included, in addition to Hungary itself, Croatia, Slovakia, Transylvania and Vojvodina. Only the prestige of the dynasty could keep this conglomerate of peoples with its Slavic-Romanian majority from disintegrating. Bosnia-Herzegovina would most likely go to Serbia, becoming the main prize of this war, which, in fact, began with it, especially since neither Germany nor Hungary would be interested in keeping it. The fate of Galicia and Bukovina would be much more problematic. Formally, these territories were part of the German part of Austria-Hungary (Cisleithania), but Greater Germany (Gross-Deutschland, as this new state would most likely be called, in imitation of Great Britain) would not have the slightest desire to incorporate them into its composition. It was also impossible to grant them independence due to the variegated ethnic composition of the population, divided almost equally into Poles, Ukrainians and Romanians. The voluntary transfer of Bukovina to Romania, in exchange for the latter's renunciation of all claims to Hungarian Transylvania, is theoretically possible. However, the transfer of Galicia to Russia would have been politically impossible due to Russia's pro-Serbian position during the war. It is possible that Galicia (with or without Bukovina) would have been declared a kind of “Grand Duchy” in a personal union with the Hungarian Habsburgs or with the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany.

So, let's assume that the Austro-Serbian war was localized. Does this mean that a pan-European war was averted? Not at all! After all, we should not forget that simultaneously with the Balkan crisis in 1914, the Irish crisis was rapidly gaining momentum. On May 25, 1914, Asquith's liberal government finally passed the so-called Home Rule Bill - a law on Irish self-government, promised to the Irish by Gladstone in 1886. Unionist Protestants in Northern Ireland, who began to arm themselves from the beginning of parliamentary debates on this bill in 1912 ., responded to it with an uprising. The English army, sent to pacify this uprising, refused to carry out orders. A situation arose similar to the Algerian coup of 1958, which led to the fall of the 4th republic in France. The government was forced to “temporarily” suspend implementation of the law and began tripartite negotiations (Irish Protestants, Catholics and the government) at Buckingham Palace. These negotiations quickly reached a dead end (as was to be expected), but then, very conveniently, the world war broke out, a state of emergency was declared, and the whole Irish problem was postponed until better times. Now let's assume that the war did not start in August 1914. The government could either exclude Northern Ireland from the jurisdiction of Irish self-government (which it did at the next round of the crisis in 1920), or abandon the entire project altogether. In both versions, an uprising of Irish Catholics would have been inevitable, and it would have happened not at Easter 1916, as in real life, but not later than Christmas 1914. In real life, the insurgent leader Roger Casement arrived in Dublin on a German submarine. At the same time, the British coastal defense intercepted a German ship off the coast of Ireland with a shipment of weapons for the Irish rebels. Of course, all this happened during the war; in peace, Germany would have acted much more carefully. However, there is no doubt that Casement would have found a way to move from Germany to rebellious Ireland, and the Irish rebels themselves could have bought a shipment of weapons in Germany and would have tried to transport it to Ireland at their own peril and risk. Now let us imagine that immediately after the suppression of the uprising (and it would undoubtedly have been suppressed), English newspapers come out with sensational headlines: “The threads of the conspiracy lead to Berlin!” The act of aggression is obvious, and the cause for war is no worse than the shot in Sarajevo. In reality, Great Britain entered the war for much less - “over a piece of paper,” as Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg put it. The fact is that back in 1871, the British Foreign Office clarified in a special note that the British guarantees of the neutrality of Belgium apply only to an attempt by France and Holland to divide this country among themselves, but not to an invasion of Belgium by a third party during a war with someone else . The Germans, of course, would deny everything, but the British, following the recent example of the Austrians, would present an ultimatum demanding that the investigation be conducted on German territory. Oil painting! England would have met face to face immediately with its real enemy, without any complex maneuvering with the aim of starting a world war by proxy. Indeed, in reality, the British Foreign Minister Edward Gray categorically refused to publicly declare that England would enter the war on the side of its Entente allies if Germany attacked them. This position created in Germany a complete illusion that England would remain neutral, which pushed it to declare war on Russia and France simultaneously. But that was not the case: Great Britain entered the war the next day under the completely unexpected pretext of protecting Belgian neutrality.

This Anglo-German war certainly would not have been localized. England cannot wage a war on the continent without allies, without those whom Napoleon once contemptuously called les salariés - “mercenaries.” Now France itself would find itself in the role of such a “hireman”. The French were already eager to fight, seeking revenge for the shame of 1871 and the return of Alsace and Lorraine, and the fateful visit of President Poincaré to St. Petersburg at the end of July 1914 actually played almost a decisive role in drawing Russia into the world war. And formally, France has been an ally of Great Britain in the Entente cordiale since 1904. On the side of Germany, Hungary would undoubtedly have entered the war, although it would have been of little use in a purely military sense. The positions of Italy and Russia are much more difficult to predict in the current situation. Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance (with Germany and Austria-Hungary) from 1882 and left it only in the spring of 1915. Italy had territorial claims both against France (Nice and Savoy) and against Austria (Trieste and South Tyrol), and in real life the claims against Austria turned out to be more important. In our case, it is possible that a united Germany could show generosity towards its ally and voluntarily transfer Trieste to Italy (but not South Tyrol with its German majority). This option would strengthen supporters of the Triple Alliance in Italy and make claims against France, and not against the now united Germany. Moreover, in reality, Italy did not enter the war in August 1914 on the side of Germany, under the pretext that its allied obligations were of a defensive nature, and no one attacked Germany; it itself declared war on Russia and France. In our case, there would be no such pretext, since England and France would have declared war on Germany, and not vice versa. All this allows us to assume that the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Hungary and Italy, would have been preserved, and would have entered the war against England and France in this composition.

Russia was an ally of France in the Franco-Russian Alliance since 1894 and an ally of Great Britain in the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, but in our case no one attacked France, and the treaty of 1907 was not a mutual defense treaty, but only defined spheres of influence of Russia and England in Asia. The “ownerless” status of Galicia would create a strong temptation in Russia to take over this territory, which the Russians have coveted for so long. However, entering the war in order to defend England, towards which Russian public opinion had developed a persistently hostile attitude, would be much more difficult than for the sake of “brotherly” Serbia. Pro-German and pro-French forces balanced each other in the ruling circles of Russia: Empress Alexandra Feodorovna (Princess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt), temporary worker Rasputin and Minister of War Sukhomlinov on the one hand, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov and the leaders of the Duma majority, Guchkov ( Octobrist) and Miliukov (cadet) - on the other. In reality, the “military party” prevailed due to the fact that Sukhomlinov insisted on general mobilization for technical reasons (there were no plans for partial mobilization), although he understood perfectly well that general mobilization in Russia in itself has been considered in Germany since 1912 a legitimate reason for war. Later, Sukhomlinov justified himself by saying that partial mobilization (against Austria-Hungary) would still have led to war, but would have created chaos on the railways. In our case, there would be no room left for ambiguous maneuvers with mobilization, and the conversation would immediately turn to declaring war on Germany, which even Sazonov would hardly have dared to do.

Having decided on the likely participants in our “alternative” pan-European (but not world) war of 1915 (the Anglo-French Entente against the Triple Alliance of Great Germany, Hungary and Italy), let’s now try to guess its course. In reality, Moltke the Younger made a grave strategic mistake by abandoning Schlieffen's plan to encircle the entire French army from the north and launched a frontal attack directly on Paris, which put the German southern flank under attack. The result was the “miracle on the Marne”, the “flight to the sea” and the formation of a continuous front, which led the war into a protracted tactical deadlock. There is no reason to assume that Moltke would have acted differently in the alternative, but the absence of an eastern front may have allowed the Germans to secure overwhelming numerical superiority and avoid the “miracle on the Marne.” The rapid fall of France would not, of course, mean the end of the war, just like 1940. The war could have further developed according to the scenario of the Second World War, but here one most important difference between the two world wars should be taken into account: in the Second World War the Germans had practically no fleet - four battleships against 15 British, while in the First World War the forces at sea were approximately equal - 19 German dreadnoughts against 18 British (and six more under construction). In reality, the Germans never decided on a general naval battle against the Royal Navy. In the conditions of the deadlock of trench warfare on land, this decision may have been justified, but if the alternative had been the escalation of the war, that is, the involvement of new participants in it, which was not at all in the interests of Germany, there would most likely have been no other option.

Here we come to the most important fork in the probabilities further development events. Until now, the actions of all sides would have been fairly predictable within the framework of the original assumption that the Austro-Serbian war was localizable. It is absolutely impossible to predict, given the equal strength of the parties, the result of a general naval battle. If the Royal Navy had won, the war would have inevitably followed the lines of World War II. British diplomacy would focus on bringing the United States and Russia into the war on its side. Most likely, she would have been able to achieve this. In reality, England twice maneuvered its continental opponents into a suicidal invasion of Russia: in 1812 and in 1941. If she had failed, more drastic measures could have been used, such as the assassination of Emperor Paul in 1801 (to withdraw Russia from the alliance with Napoleon), or the assassination of Rasputin in 1916 (to prevent Russia from leaving the war).

As for the United States, there is no reason to believe that the surreal elections of 1916 would have ended differently than in reality. Let us recall that Woodrow Wilson then acted as a “guardian of peace,” and his rival, Charles Hughes, accused him of depending on the votes of American Germans and Irish. A month after taking office, Wilson declared war on Germany! If Hughes had won the election, the United States would have entered the war even earlier. The results of the war in this case would not differ significantly from the real ones, although the war could drag on for a long time. Like Battle of Trafalgar Just as 1805 decided the fate of the Napoleonic Empire nine years before its fall, a British naval victory would decide the outcome of the war this time.

Let's now try to play out the second option for a possible development of events: the victory of the Imperial Navy in a general naval battle. In this case, England, facing the threat of a land invasion (for the first time since the landing of William the Conqueror in 1066), would undoubtedly be forced to agree to almost any conditions. A German victory on land and sea, formalized diplomatically by a peace treaty, would dramatically change the entire history of the 20th century. First of all, a German-dominated European Union would have been formed at the beginning of the 20th century, not at the end. Further, unlike the real European Union, it would be a truly global super-state, controlling, including colonies, about half the territory of the globe and about half of its population. Neither the USA, nor Russia, nor Japan could seriously compete with this monster. The atomic bomb would also have been created in Europe, and not in America - after all, neither Oppenheimer, nor Einstein, nor Teller would have had any reason to flee Europe. The latter circumstance is closely related to the internal political situation in Germany. The patriotic position of the Social Democratic Party, its ability to mobilize the German working class for a victorious war, would dispel the suspicious attitude towards this party in ruling circles. The formation of a social democratic government in post-war Germany would be only a matter of time, and its consequence would be radical democratization political system with the preservation of the constitutional monarchy and without revolutionary upheavals. Neither the anti-war group Spartacus nor the far-right, ultra-nationalist groups would have had any chance of success. In France and England, on the contrary, extreme left and extreme right movements with revanchist slogans would enjoy considerable popularity, and perhaps would have some chances of collapsing the European Union over time, not without external help, of course.

In Russia, the Polish question would acquire unusual urgency. The “restlessness” of Galicia even after the war would create a temptation to grant Russian Poland broad autonomy within the framework of a personal union with the House of Romanov, subject to its peaceful unification with Galicia. Moreover, during the war itself, Russia and Germany could well have come to a secret agreement that the condition of Russia’s neutrality would be the transfer of Galicia to it, conditioned, in turn, by the broad autonomy of Poland. The failed constitutional monarch of Russia, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich would be quite suitable for the role Polish king. Of course, only the Cadets were in favor of Polish autonomy, but the formation of the Progressive Bloc with the Octobrists on this very platform had already been discussed since 1912. In reality, this bloc was formed in 1915, which resulted in strengthening demands for a responsible government, the tsar’s decree on the dissolution of the Duma and finally, the Duma's call for revolution. All this would have happened in the same sequence in our version, but with one significant difference: not during a bloody and completely senseless war, but in peacetime. This clause would mean in practice that the Bolsheviks would not have in their hands the main trump card - the demand for an immediate exit from the war, which brought them to power. Personally, I believe that the formation in Russia of a totalitarian regime based on state capitalism (better known as socialism) in the 20th century was what is called “historical inevitability.” In reality, the Socialist Revolutionaries won the only free elections in Russian history in December 1917, which was quite natural for a peasant country. They were not allowed into power then, but in our version nothing would have prevented them from becoming the builders of a new one after revolutionary Russia. The Romanov dynasty would have survived in this case, oddly enough, in Poland, which most likely would have joined the European Union after the revolution in Russia.

The further course of events cannot be predicted. Japanese-American rivalry in the Pacific region would be inevitable, but how the European Union and Russia would (and would) be involved in it is impossible to predict.

For decades, there has been a debate about responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Of course, we can put the question this way: the August drama of 1914 broke out in an incredibly complex interweaving of circumstances, events, and a bizarre combination of specific volitional decisions of the main “ characters» European politics and diplomacy. All these factors came into irreconcilable contradiction with each other, and it was possible to cut the “Gordian knot” that had arisen only by resorting to extreme measures, namely, the outbreak of an armed conflict on a global scale. The most experienced politicians immediately realized that attempts to limit the lightning-fast conflict to certain limits were completely hopeless.

It was clear that Russia could not allow the destruction of Serbia by Austria-Hungary. In the summer of 1914, an opinion was expressed in the diplomatic circles of the Entente countries: if Vienna provokes a war against Belgrade, this could lead to a pan-European war. However, considerations and statements (even the most true and profound) belonging to individuals who were hesitant about making a decision to start a war or feared its outbreak could not prevent a global catastrophe. Therefore, a more general question arises: who, from a long-term perspective, is to blame for the outbreak of the First World War?

In general, responsibility falls on all its active participants - both the countries of the Central Bloc and the Entente states. But if we talk about the blame for provoking the First World War precisely in August 1914, then it falls mainly on the leadership of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. To prove this thesis, one should recall the events that preceded the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and try to explain the motives for the actions of representatives of the political, military and diplomatic elite of the opposing blocs.

The very fact of the Sarajevo murder gave Austria-Hungary and Germany a favorable opportunity to use this tragedy as a convenient pretext for war. And they managed to seize the initiative by starting active diplomatic activities aimed not at localizing, but at escalating the conflict.

Austria-Hungary did not find any serious grounds to connect the official circles of the Serbian state with the organization of the assassination attempt on the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. But in Vienna they saw the existence of wide contacts between the Slavs living in the Habsburg Empire and those Slavs who were outside its borders.

The imperial leadership saw this as a real threat to the very existence of Austria-Hungary. The political elite, including the Austrian Prime Minister Count K. Stürgk, was confident that such “dangerous ties” could only be broken through war.

The Emperor of Austria-Hungary, Franz Joseph himself, was not an ardent enemy of Serbia and even objected to the annexation of its territory. But - the rules of the geopolitical struggle for spheres of influence in the Balkans dictated their own - the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary collided here. The latter, naturally, could not tolerate the strengthening of “Russian influence” in the immediate vicinity of its borders, which manifested itself, first of all, in the open support of Serbia by the Russian Empire. In addition, the leadership of Austria-Hungary did its best to prove that, despite the rumors spreading outside its borders about the weakness of the Habsburg monarchy (especially multiplied during the crisis period of the Balkan Wars for Vienna), it remained quite resilient and quite strong. The main argument in this tough polemic with the outside world, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian leadership, was active action in the international arena. And in this regard, Vienna, in order to prove its right to be strong, was ready to take extreme measures, even a military conflict with Serbia and its allies.

The matter remained small. At the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the most radical politicians and diplomats towards Serbia drew up an ultimatum addressed to Belgrade.

The ministers of the Serbian government gathered in Belgrade and drew up a response note. And although it was maintained in an extremely polite tone, the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Belgrade, Baron V. Gisl, who discovered after reading it that the demands of his government were not accepted “letter to letter,” announced to Pašić, who personally brought the Serbian response, a severance of diplomatic relations. On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia by telegraph.

On the day the hostilities began, Emperor Franz Joseph published a manifesto, which, among other things, contained the famous phrase: “I have weighed everything, I have thought about everything”...

It can be assumed that the top leadership of Germany and Austria-Hungary did not imagine what catastrophic consequences their actions would lead to, but it was the political shortsightedness of Berlin and Vienna that made such a fatal development of events possible. In conditions when there was still a possibility of resolving the crisis peacefully, neither in Germany nor in Austria-Hungary there was a single politician who would take such an initiative.

It can also be assumed that at the beginning of the 20th century there were no such insurmountable contradictions between Germany and Russia that would inevitably develop into such a large-scale military confrontation.

However, it is difficult to ignore the obvious desire German Empire to European and world domination. The Habsburg Empire was guided by similar ambitions. In the context of the strengthening of their military-political power, neither Russia, nor France, nor especially Great Britain could afford to find themselves in a secondary role. As Russian Foreign Minister S.D. noted on this occasion. Sazonov, in case of inaction, one would have to “not only abandon Russia’s age-old role as the protector of the Balkan peoples, but also recognize that the will of Austria and Germany standing behind it is the law for Europe.”

By the beginning of August 1914, the prospect of a “great European war” was obvious. The main powers of the opposing alliances - the Entente and the Central Bloc - began to bring their armed forces to combat readiness. Armies of millions were moving to their original combat positions, and their military command was already anticipating an imminent victory. Back then, few could have guessed how unattainable it was...

The participation of the Russian Empire was an important condition for the Entente's victory over the Triple Alliance. It was the war on two fronts that made the defeat of Germany as certain as possible. Therefore, the allies (especially France and England) tried very hard to enlist her support. Protracted nature and enormous burden on both the economy and public opinion Russian Empire plunged it into a deep crisis that ended with revolutions and the collapse of tsarism (about the same thing happened in Kaiser’s Germany, by the way).

Now we are closer to the answer to the question itself: war was inevitable, because the declaration of war became only a formality and a consequence of long and unresolved political contradictions between countries. In particular between Germany and Russia.

Judge for yourself:

July 23 Austria-Hungary accused Serbia of allegedly being behind the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and announced an ultimatum to it

26 July Austria-Hungary announced mobilization and began to concentrate troops on the border with Serbia and Russia.

July 29 Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II with the proposal “ refer the Austro-Serbian issue to the Hague Conference"(to the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague).Wilhelm II did not respond to this telegram

July 31 in the Russian Empire, general mobilization into the army was announced. On the same day, a “situation threatening war” was declared in Germany

August 3rd Germany declared war on France, accusing it of “organized attacks and aerial bombing of Germany” and “violating Belgian neutrality.”

August 3rd Belgium refused Germany's ultimatum. On August 4, German troops invaded Belgium. King Albert of Belgium turned for help to the guarantor countries of Belgian neutrality. London sent an ultimatum to Berlin: stop the invasion of Belgium, or England will declare war on Germany. After the ultimatum expired, Great Britain declared war on Germany and sent troops to help France.

(in the photo, Nicholas II announces the start of war with Germany)

As you can see, the process is avalanche-like and each new stage everything is worse than before (by the way, this is called something, but I forgot what, Evgeniy Evgeniy will definitely add if he sees the topic). And most importantly, all this did not happen at random, but as a result of the long-term build-up of militaristic muscle in all participating countries. Some were building up their military potential, while the weaker ones were looking for guarantors of their security.

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Introduction

The First World War: background, progress, results.

1. The world on the eve of the First World War

2. Causes of the First World War

3. Russia in the First World War

4. Military-political results of the war.

Was the First World War inevitable?

List of used literature

Application

Introduction

There are many reasons why the First World War began, but various scientists and various records of those years tell us that main reason is that at that time Europe was developing very rapidly. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were no longer any territories around the world that were not captured by capitalist powers. During this period, Germany surpassed all of Europe in terms of industrial production, and since Germany had very few colonies, it sought to capture them. By capturing them, Germany would have new markets. At that time, England and France had very large colonies, so the interests of these countries often clashed. I chose this topic because I decided to figure it out:

What was the reason for this?

How did the war affect the course of history?

What technological advances occurred during the war?

What lessons did the participating countries learn from this war?

Why did the First World War serve as an impetus for the Second?

Target my job is to find out:

Was the First World War inevitable? It seems to me that this topic in itself is very interesting. Even when analyzing only companies, we come to different conclusions each time, and each time we extract something useful from these situations. During the First World War, it is possible to trace how the technical and economic development of each country developed. During the four years of war, we find how new technical means influence the course of the war, how the war helps scientific progress. The war even changes the idea of ​​the army. The greater the economic and technological progress, the more murder weapons appear, the bloodier the war itself becomes, and the more countries become participants in this war. In August 1914, the world did not yet know how grandiose and catastrophic the war declared on the first day of the last summer month would become. No one yet knew what innumerable victims, disasters and shocks it would bring to humanity and what indelible mark it would leave on its history.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR: BACKGROUND, COURSE, RESULTS

1. The world on the eve of the First World War

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the balance of power in the international arena changed dramatically. The geopolitical aspirations of the great powers: Great Britain, France and Russia, on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the other, led to unusually intense rivalry.

In the last third of the 19th century, the geopolitical picture of the world looked like this. The USA and Germany began to outpace and, accordingly, displace Great Britain and France in the world market in terms of economic growth rates, while simultaneously laying claim to their colonial possessions. In this regard, relations between Germany and Great Britain became extremely strained in the struggle both for colonies and for dominance in maritime areas. During the same period, two friendly blocs of countries were formed, which finally demarcated relations between them. It all started with the Austro-German alliance, formed in 1879 on the initiative of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Subsequently, Bulgaria and Türkiye joined this alliance. Somewhat later, the so-called Quadruple Alliance, or Central Bloc, took shape, which marked the beginning of a series of international treaties that led to the creation of an opposing Russian-French bloc in 1891-1893. Further, in 1904, Great Britain signed three conventions with France, which meant the establishment of the Anglo-French “Concord of the Heart” - “Entente cordiale” (This bloc began to be called the Entente in the early 1840s, when there was a short period of conflicting relations between these two countries rapprochement). In 1907, in order to resolve colonial issues regarding Tibet, Afghanistan and Iran, a Russian-English treaty was concluded, which actually meant the inclusion of Russia in the Entente, or the “Tripartite Agreement.” First World War. M. 1993. Ryavkin A.

In the growing rivalry, each of the great powers pursued its own interests.

The Russian Empire, realizing the need to contain the expansion of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and strengthen it there own positions, counted on recapturing Galicia from Austria-Hungary, without excluding the establishment of control over the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which were in Turkish possession.

The British Empire aimed to eliminate its main competitor, Germany, and strengthen its own position as a leading power, maintaining dominance at sea. At the same time, Britain planned to weaken and subordinate its allies Russia and France to its foreign policy. The latter thirsted for revenge for the defeat suffered during the Franco-Prussian War, and most importantly, wanted to return the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine lost in 1871.

Germany intended to defeat Great Britain in order to seize its colonies rich in raw materials, defeat France and secure the border colonies of Alsace and Lorraine. In addition, Germany sought to take possession of the vast colonies that belonged to Belgium and Holland; in the east, its geopolitical interests extended to the possessions of Russia - Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states, and it also hoped to subordinate to its influence Ottoman Empire(Turkey) and Bulgaria, after which, together with Austria-Hungary, establish control in the Balkans.

Aiming at achieving their goals as quickly as possible, the German leadership was looking in every possible way for a reason to unleash military action, and it was ultimately found in Sarajevo...

2. Causes of the first worldsoh war

The First World War arose as a result of the intensification of the political and economic struggle between the largest imperialist countries for markets and sources of raw materials, for the redivision of an already divided world. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the division of the world had already been completed, there were no territories left on the globe that had not yet been captured by the capitalist powers, there were no more so-called “free spaces” left. As a result of the uneven, spasmodic development of capitalism in the era of imperialism, some countries that took the capitalist path of development later than others quickly caught up and surpassed such old colonial countries as England and France in technical and economic terms. Particularly indicative was the development of Germany, which by 1900 had surpassed these countries in terms of industrial production, but was significantly inferior in the size of its colonial possessions. Because of this, the interests of Germany and England collided most often. Germany openly sought to capture British markets in the Middle East and Africa. Germany's colonial expansion was met with resistance from France, which also had huge colonies. Very sharp contradictions between the countries existed over Alsace and Lorraine, captured by Germany back in 1871. With its penetration into the Middle East, Germany created a threat to Russian interests in the Black Sea basin. Austria-Hungary, allied with Germany, became a serious competitor Tsarist Russia in the struggle for influence in the Balkans. The aggravation of foreign policy contradictions between the largest countries led to the division of the world into two hostile camps and the formation of two imperialist groupings: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Triple Agreement, or Entente (England, France, Russia). The war between the major European powers was beneficial to the US imperialists, since as a result of this struggle favorable conditions developed for the further development of American expansion, especially in Latin America and in the Far East. American monopolies relied on maximizing benefits from Europe. In preparing for war, the imperialists saw in it not only a means of resolving external contradictions, but also a means that could help them cope with the growing discontent of the population of their own countries and suppress the growing revolutionary movement. The bourgeoisie hoped during the war to destroy the international solidarity of the workers, to physically exterminate the best part of the working class, for the socialist revolution. Due to the fact that the war for the redivision of the world affected the interests of all imperialist countries, most of the world's states gradually became drawn into it. The war became global, both in its political goals and in scale.

3. Russia in the First World War

June 15, 1914 In the city of Sarajevo, Serbian student terrorist Gavrilo Princip shot and killed the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. In response to this murder, Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Serbia on July 10, which contained a number of obviously unacceptable demands. Upon learning of this ultimatum, Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov exclaimed: “This is a European war!”

On the same day, a meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers took place. The country's military leadership considered it necessary to carry out general mobilization, conscripting 5.5 million people into the army. Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov and Chief of the General Staff N.N. Yanushkevich insisted on this in the hope of a fleeting (lasting 4-6 months) war.

Representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who did not want to give the Germans a pretext to accuse Russia of aggression, were convinced of the need for only partial mobilization (1.1 million people).

Germany presented Russia with an ultimatum demanding general demobilization within 12 hours - until 12.00 on August 1, 1914.

In the evening of the said day, the German envoy F. Pourtales arrived at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Having heard a categorical “no” in response to the question whether Russia would stop general mobilization, Pourtales handed the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sazonov an official note declaring war.

Further events developed rapidly and inevitably. On August 2, Germany entered the war with Belgium, on August 3 - with France, and on August 4, official notification of the start of military action against it by Great Britain was received in Berlin. Thus, diplomatic battles in Europe gave way to bloody battles.

At first glance, there was no logic in the fact that the subsequent events of August 1914 unfolded according to a scenario that no one could have predicted. In reality, such a turn was predetermined by a number of circumstances, factors and trends.

From the very first days of August, the governments of the warring countries were faced with not only urgent tasks of uninterruptedly replenishing the existing armies with human resources and military equipment, but also no less pressing political and ideological problems.

The Russian leadership appealed to the patriotic feelings of its fellow citizens from the very first days of the war. On August 2, Emperor Nicholas II addressed the people with a Manifesto, in which the traditional love of peace of Russia was contrasted with the constant aggressiveness of Germany.

On August 8, at a meeting of the State Duma, representatives of most political parties and associations expressed feelings of loyalty to the emperor, as well as faith in the correctness of his actions and readiness, putting aside internal disagreements, to support soldiers and officers who found themselves at the front. The national slogan “War to a victorious end!” was taken up even by liberal-minded oppositionists, who quite recently advocated for Russia’s restraint and caution in foreign policy decisions.

In the wake of the rise of national patriotism, anti-German sentiments manifested themselves with particular vividness, expressed in the renaming of a number of cities (and above all St. Petersburg, which became Petrograd), and in the closure of German newspapers, and even in pogroms of ethnic Germans. The Russian intelligentsia was also imbued with the spirit of “militant patriotism”.

Many of its representatives actively participated in the anti-German campaign launched in the press at the very beginning of August, tens of thousands voluntarily went to the front.

And yet, the main factor that had a dramatic impact on the general situation that had developed in Europe by the end of August 1914 was an unforeseen change in the very nature of hostilities. According to the prevailing stereotypes and rules of wars of the 18th and especially 19th centuries, the warring parties hoped to determine the outcome of the entire war with one general battle. To this end, large-scale strategic offensive operations were conceived on both sides, capable of a short time defeat the main forces of the enemy. Military history: Textbook/I.E. Krupchenko, M.L. Altgovsen, M.P. Dorofeev and others - M.: Voenizdat, 1984.

However, the hopes of the highest command of both warring blocs for a fleeting war did not come true.

Despite the fact that the August confrontation between the Entente and Germany Western Front reached great tension, as a result, the Anglo-French and German forces stopped in front of each other’s fortified positions. The events of the same month on the Eastern Front also fully confirmed this trend.

The Russian army, being not yet fully mobilized and not ready to conduct large-scale operations, fulfilling its allied duty to France, nevertheless began to carry out offensive actions in the second half of August. Initially, the successful advance of Russian troops into East Prussia ultimately ended in failure. But, despite this, the very fact of the enemy’s invasion of the territory of the German Empire forced the German high command to hastily transfer large combat formations from west to east. In addition, by launching active operations in East Prussia, Russian troops diverted a significant part of the enemy forces to themselves. Thus, the plans of the German command to achieve a quick victory over France were crossed out.

Russian operations on the Southwestern Front, which also began in the second half of August, were more successful. The Battle of Galicia, which lasted over a month, in which the Russians defeated Austria-Hungary, was of enormous importance. And although our troops suffered huge losses (230 thousand people, of which 40 thousand were captured), the outcome of this battle allowed Russian troops not only to strengthen the strategic position on the Southwestern Front, but also to provide great assistance to Great Britain and France. At the critical moment of the Russian offensive for the Austro-Hungarians, the Germans were unable to provide significant assistance to their allies. For the first time, a misunderstanding arose between Berlin and Vienna regarding the general military plan.

According to the plans of the highest military command of the Entente and Germany, the strategic tasks of the unfolding war were to be resolved in the second half of August in the so-called Border Battle between the Anglo-French and German forces. However, this battle, which took place on August 21-25, also did not live up to the hopes placed on it. Its result was not only the strategic retreat of the entire northern group of Anglo-French troops, but also the fiasco of Germany. The German command was never able to achieve the goal set for its troops - to capture and defeat the main enemy forces. Thus, the task of quickly achieving successful results, which formed the basis of the German war plan, turned out to be unfulfilled.

In the new conditions, the general staffs of both Germany and the Entente had to radically revise previous plans, and this entailed the need to accumulate both new human reserves and material forces to continue further armed confrontation.

In general, the events that unfolded in Europe in August 1914 demonstrated the inability of the then political and military leadership to keep the situation under control and prevent the world from sliding towards a global catastrophe. The nature of the fighting on the main fronts already in the first month of the war clearly showed that it would no longer be possible to localize the conflict that had broken out. The short-term maneuver stage ended, and a long period of trench warfare began.

Kacompany1914. In the literature, the tsarist government is traditionally accused of poorly preparing the Russian army and military industry for the First World War. And indeed, in terms of artillery, especially heavy artillery, the Russian army turned out to be worse prepared than Germany, in terms of the saturation of vehicles it was worse than France, the Russian fleet was inferior to the German one. There were shortages of shells, ammunition, small arms, uniforms and equipment. But in fairness, it must be said that none of the war planners in any general headquarters of any country imagined that it would last 4 years and 3 and a half months. Not a single country had weapons, equipment, or food for such a long period. The General Staffs expected a maximum of 3-4 months, in the worst case, six months. Accordingly, all sides sought to quickly launch offensive actions. The Germans were counting on a lightning campaign on the Western Front with the goal of defeating France, and then on actions against Russia, whose armed forces were supposed to be shackled by Austria. Russia, as can be seen from the memorandum of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army led. book Nikolai Nikolaevich (uncle of Nicholas II), intended to launch an attack on Berlin by the forces of the Northwestern Front (commander Ya.G. Zhilinsky) and an attack on Vienna by the forces of the Southwestern Front (commander N.I. Ivanov). There were relatively few enemy troops on the Eastern Front at that time - 26 German divisions and 46 Austrian. The French armies did not plan an immediate offensive and were counting on the effect of the Russian offensive. The direction of a possible German attack was determined incorrectly by the French military command. Germany adhered to the "Schlieffen Plan", named after the long-time chief of the German General Staff, who died shortly before the war. She hoped to break through the weakly defended borders of Luxembourg and Belgium into France and force it to capitulate even before Russia concentrated its troops for a strike. A powerful group of German troops drove back the Belgian army and invaded France. The French and the English corps that landed on the northern coast of France were forced to retreat under pressure from superior forces. The enemy moved towards Paris. Emperor Wilhelm, calling for ruthlessness, promised to put an end to France in the fall. Mortal danger looms over France. The government temporarily left the capital. To save the allies, the Russian armies accelerated the preparation of the offensive and launched it with an incomplete deployment of all their forces. A week and a half after the declaration of war, the 1st and 2nd armies under the command of generals P.K. Rennkampf and A.V. Samsonov invaded East Prussia and defeated enemy troops during the Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldan. At the same time, forces were concentrated in the area of ​​Warsaw and the new fortress of Novogeorgievsk for the main strategic attack on Berlin. At the same time, the offensive of the 3rd and 8th armies of the Southwestern Front against the Austrians began. It developed successfully and led to the occupation of the territory of Galicia (Lviv was captured on August 21). At the same time, the armies in East Prussia, without achieving coordination in their actions, were defeated piecemeal by the enemy. The defeat in East Prussia in August 1914 deprived Russian troops of activity in this area for the entire duration of the war. They now received only defensive tasks - to defend Moscow and Petrograd. The successful offensive in Galicia led to the fact that reserves for the Southwestern Front began to be withdrawn even from near Warsaw, parting with plans for an attack on Berlin. The center of gravity of the Russian army's operations as a whole is moving south, against Austria-Hungary. On September 12 (25), 1914, by order of Headquarters, the offensive on the Southwestern Front was suspended. In 33 days, Russian troops advanced 280-300 km, and reached the line of the Vistula River 80 km from Krakow. The powerful fortress of Przemysl was besieged. A significant part of Bukovina with the main city of Chernivtsi was occupied. Austrian combat losses reached 400 thousand people. Of these, 100 thousand were prisoners, 400 guns were captured. The Galician offensive operation was one of the most brilliant victories of the Russian army during the entire First World War. During October - November, two major battles took place on Polish territory: Warsaw-Ivanogodsky and Lodz. At times, over 800 thousand people took part in the battles on both sides. Neither side managed to completely solve their problems. However, in general, the actions of Russian troops were more effective. Although the attack on Berlin never materialized, the Western Allies, especially France, who were in dire straits, were given a respite. Due to the sending of part of the troops from France to the east, the Germans did not have enough strength for the planned bypass of Paris. They were forced to reduce the front of their offensive, and reached the Marne River northeast of Paris, where they encountered large Anglo-French forces. More than 1.5 million people took part on both sides in the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. French and English troops went on the offensive. On September 9, the Germans began retreating along the entire front. They were able to stop the advancing enemy only at the Aisne River. The government and diplomatic corps, who hastily fled to Bordeaux, were able to return to Paris. By the end of 1914, the Western Front had stabilized from the North Sea to the Swiss border. The soldiers dug into the trenches. War of maneuver turned into positional warfare. At the end of November 1914, at a meeting of the commanders of the fronts of the Russian army in Brest, it was decided to suspend offensive operations, and until January 1915, a lull reigned on the Eastern Front. Serbian troops waged a heroic struggle against the onslaught of the Austro-Hungarian army, which captured Belgrade twice in the fall of 1914, but in December 1914 the Serbs expelled the occupiers from the entire territory of Serbia and until the fall of 1915 waged a positional war with the Austro-Hungarian army. Turkish troops, instructed by German military specialists, launched an offensive on the Transcaucasian Front in the fall of 1914. However, Russian troops repulsed this offensive and successfully advanced in the Erzurum, Alakshert and Vienna directions. In December 1914, two corps of the Turkish army under the command of Enver Pasha launched an offensive near Sarakamysh. but here, too, the Russian army forced one corps to capitulate, and the second corps was completely destroyed. Subsequently, Turkish troops did not attempt to continue any active military operations. Russian troops also expelled the Turks from Iranian Azerbaijan: only some areas of Western Iran were retained by the Turks. By the end of 1914, on all fronts, the armies of both warring coalitions switched to protracted trench warfare. The war on the seas and oceans in the second half of 1914 essentially came down to a mutual blockade of the coasts. The first naval battle was the raid on August 28, 1914, by the English squadron of Admiral Beatty on German ships stationed in the bay of the island of Heligoland. As a result of this raid, three German cruisers and one destroyer were sunk, while the British only damaged one cruiser. Then two more minor battles took place: on November 1, 1914, in the Battle of Coronel off the coast of Chile, the English squadron was defeated by German ships, losing two cruisers, and on December 8, the English squadron defeated German ships off the Falkland Islands, completely destroying Admiral Spee's squadron. These naval battles did not change the balance of naval forces: the English fleet was still superior to the Austro-German one, which took refuge in the bays of the island of Heligoland, in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. The Entente fleet dominated the oceans, North and Mediterranean seas, cutting off power to its communications. But already in the first months of the war, a great threat to the Entente fleet was revealed from German submarines, which on September 22 sank, one after another, three British battleships carrying out patrol duty on the sea routes. The pirate raid of "Goeben" and "Breslay" on the Black Sea coast of Russia did not produce significant results. Already November 18 Russian Black Sea Fleet caused severe damage to the Goeben and forced Turkish fleet take refuge in the Bosphorus. The Russian Baltic Fleet was in the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland under a reliable minefield in the Baltic Sea. Thus, by the end of 1914, the failure of the military-strategic plan of the German command became obvious. Germany was forced to fight a war on two fronts. History: Directory/V.N. Ambarov, P. Andreev, S.G. Antonenko and others - M.: Bustard, 1998. Campaign of 1915. The Russian command entered 1915 with the firm intention of completing the victorious offensive of its troops in Galicia. There were stubborn battles for the capture of the Carpathian passes and the Carpathian ridge. On March 22, after a six-month siege, Przemysl capitulated with its 127,000-strong garrison of Austro-Hungarian troops. But Russian troops failed to reach the Hungarian plain. In 1915, Germany and its allies directed the main blow against Russia, hoping to defeat it and take it out of the war. By mid-April German command managed to transfer the best combat-ready corps from the Western Front, which, together with the Austro-Hungarian troops, formed a new shock 11th Army under the command of the German General Mackensen. Having concentrated on the main direction of the counteroffensive troops that were twice as large as the Russian troops, bringing up artillery that outnumbered the Russians by 6 times, and by 40 times in heavy guns, the Austro-German army broke through the front in the Gorlitsa area on May 2, 1915. Under the pressure of Austro-German troops, the Russian army retreated from the Carpathians and Galicia with heavy fighting, abandoned Przemysl at the end of May, and surrendered Lviv on June 22. Then, in June, the German command, intending to pincer the Russian troops fighting in Poland, launched attacks with its right wing between the Western Bug and the Vistula, and with its left wing in the lower reaches of the Narew River. But here, as in Galicia, the Russian troops, who did not have enough weapons, ammunition and equipment, retreated after heavy fighting. By mid-September 1915, the offensive initiative German army exhausted. The Russian army was entrenched on the front line: Riga - Dvinsk - Lake Naroch - Pinsk - Ternopil - Chernivtsi, and by the end of 1915 the Eastern Front extended from the Baltic Sea to the Romanian border. Russia lost vast territory, but retained its strength, although since the beginning of the war the Russian army had by this time lost about 3 million people in manpower, of which about 300 thousand were killed. While the Russian armies were waging a tense, unequal war with the main forces of the Austro-German coalition, Russia's allies - England and France - on the Western Front throughout 1915 organized only a few private military operations that were of no significant importance. In the midst of bloody battles on the Eastern Front, when the Russian army fought heavy defensive battles , there was no offensive on the Western Front by the Anglo-French allies. It was adopted only at the end of September 1915, when the offensive operations of the German army on the Eastern Front had already ceased. Lloyd George felt the remorse of ingratitude towards Russia with great delay. In his memoirs, he later wrote: “History will present its account to the military command of France and England, which, in its selfish stubbornness, doomed its Russian comrades in arms to death, while England and France could so easily have saved the Russians and thus would have helped themselves best.” ". Having received a territorial gain on the Eastern Front, the German command, however, did not achieve the main thing - it did not force the tsarist government to conclude a separate peace with Germany, although half of all the armed forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary were concentrated against Russia. Also in 1915, Germany attempted to deal a crushing blow to England. For the first time, she widely used a relatively new weapon - submarines - to stop the supply of necessary raw materials and food to England. Hundreds of ships were destroyed, their crews and passengers were killed. The indignation of neutral countries forced Germany not to sink passenger ships without warning. England, by increasing and accelerating the construction of ships, as well as developing effective measures to combat submarines, overcame the danger hanging over it. In the spring of 1915, Germany, for the first time in the history of wars, used one of the most inhumane weapons - toxic substances, but this ensured only tactical success. Germany also experienced failure in the diplomatic struggle. The Entente promised Italy more than Germany and Austria-Hungary, which faced Italy in the Balkans, could promise. In May 1915, Italy declared war on them and diverted some of the troops of Austria-Hungary and Germany. This failure was only partially compensated by the fact that in the fall of 1915 the Bulgarian government entered the war against the Entente. As a result, the Quadruple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria was formed. The immediate consequence of this was the offensive of German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops against Serbia. The small Serbian army heroically resisted, but was crushed by superior enemy forces. The troops of England, France, Russia and the remnants of the Serbian army, sent to help the Serbs, formed the Balkan Front. As the war dragged on, suspicion and distrust of each other grew among the Entente countries. According to a secret agreement between Russia and its allies in 1915, in the event of a victorious end to the war, Constantinople and the straits were to go to Russia. Fearing the implementation of this agreement, on the initiative of Winston Churchill, under the pretext of an attack on the straits and Constantinople, allegedly to undermine the communications of the German coalition with Turkey, the Dardanelles expedition was undertaken with the aim of occupying Constantinople. On February 19, 1915, the Anglo-French fleet began shelling the Dardanelles. However, having suffered heavy losses, the Anglo-French squadron stopped bombing the Dardanelles fortifications a month later. On the Transcaucasian front, Russian forces in the summer of 1915, having repelled the offensive of the Turkish army in the Alashkert direction, launched a counteroffensive in the Vienna direction. At the same time, German-Turkish troops intensified military operations in Iran. Relying on the uprising of the Bakhtiari tribes provoked by German agents in Iran, Turkish troops began to advance to the oil fields and by the fall of 1915 occupied Kermanshah and Hamadan. But soon the arriving British troops drove the Turks and Bakhtiars away from the oil fields area, and restored the oil pipeline destroyed by the Bakhtiars. The task of clearing Iran of Turkish-German troops fell to the Russian expeditionary force of General Baratov, which landed in Anzali in October 1915. Pursuing German-Turkish troops, Baratov’s detachments occupied Qazvin, Hamadan, Qom, Kashan and approached Isfahan. In the summer of 1915, British troops captured German South-West Africa. In January 1916, the British forced German troops surrounded in Cameroon to surrender.

1916 campaign. The 1915 military campaign on the Western Front did not produce any major operational results. Positional battles only delayed the war. The Entente moved to an economic blockade of Germany, to which the latter responded with a merciless submarine war. In May 1915, a German submarine torpedoed the British ocean-going steamer Lusitania, on which over a thousand passengers died. Without undertaking active offensive military operations, England and France, thanks to the shift in the center of gravity of military operations to the Russian front, received a respite, and focused all their attention on the development of the military industry. They accumulated strength for further war. By the beginning of 1916, England and France had an advantage over Germany by 70-80 divisions and were superior to it in the latest weapons (tanks appeared). The severe consequences of active offensive military operations in 1914-1915 prompted the leaders of the Entente to convene a meeting of representatives of the general staffs of the allied armies in December 1915 in Chantilly, near Paris, where they came to the conclusion that the war could be ended victoriously only with coordinated active offensive operations on the main fronts . However, even after this decision, the offensive in 1916 was scheduled primarily on the Eastern Front - June 15, and on the Western Front - July 1. Having learned about the planned timing of the Entente offensive, the German command decided to take the initiative into their own hands and launch an offensive on the Western Front much earlier. At the same time, the main attack was planned on the area of ​​​​the Verdun fortifications: for the protection of which, in the firm conviction of the German command, “the French command will be forced to sacrifice the last man,” since in the event of a breakthrough of the front at Verdun, a direct path to Paris will open. However, the attack on Verdun, launched on February 21, 1916, was not crowned with success, especially since in March, due to the advance of Russian troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Dvinsky Lake Naroch, the German command was forced to weaken its onslaught near Verdun. However, bloody mutual attacks and counterattacks near Verdun continued for almost 10 months, until December 18, but did not produce significant results. The Verdun operation literally turned into a “meat grinder”, into the destruction of manpower. Both sides suffered colossal losses: the French - 350 thousand people, the Germans - 600 thousand people. The German offensive on the Verdun fortifications did not change the Entente command's plan to launch the main offensive on July 1, 1916 on the Somme River. The Somme battles intensified every day. In September, after a continuous barrage of Anglo-French artillery fire, British tanks soon appeared on the battlefield. However, technically still imperfect and used in small numbers, although they brought local success to the attacking Anglo-French troops, they could not provide a general strategic operational breakthrough of the front. By the end of November 1916, the Somme fighting began to subside. As a result of the entire Somme operation, the Entente captured an area of ​​200 square meters. km, 105 thousand German prisoners, 1,500 machine guns and 350 guns. In the battles on the Somme, both sides lost over 1 million 300 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners. Carrying out the decisions agreed upon at a meeting of representatives of the general staffs in December 1915 in Chantilly, the high command of the Russian army planned for June 15 the main offensive on the Western Front in the direction of Baranovichi with a simultaneous auxiliary attack by the armies of the Southwestern Front under the command of General Brusilov in the Galician-Bukovinian direction. However, the German offensive on Verdun, which began in February, again forced the French government to ask the Russian tsarist government for help through an offensive on the Eastern Front. At the beginning of March, Russian troops launched an offensive in the area of ​​​​Dvinsk and Lake Navoch. The attacks of Russian troops continued until March 15, but led only to tactical successes. As a result of this operation, Russian troops suffered heavy losses, but they pulled over a significant number of German reserves and thereby eased the position of the French at Verdun. French troops were given the opportunity to regroup and strengthen their defenses. The Dvina-Naroch operation made it difficult to prepare for the general offensive on the Russian-German front, scheduled for June 15. However, after the help to the French, there was a new persistent request from the command of the Entente troops to help the Italians. In May 1916, the 400,000-strong Austro-Hungarian army went on the offensive in Trentino and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Italian army. Saving the Italian army, as well as the Anglo-French in the west, from complete defeat, the Russian command began an offensive of troops in the southwestern direction on June 4, earlier than planned. Russian troops under the command of General Brusilov, having broken through the enemy’s defenses on an almost 300-kilometer front, began to advance into Eastern Galicia and Bukovina ( Brusilovsky breakthrough ). But in the midst of the offensive, despite General Brusilov’s requests to reinforce the advancing troops with reserves and ammunition, the high command of the Russian army refused to send reserves to the southwestern direction and began, as previously planned, an offensive in the western direction. However, after a weak blow in the direction of Baranovichi, the commander of the northwestern direction, General Evert, postponed the general offensive to the beginning of July. Meanwhile, the troops of General Brusilov continued to develop the offensive they had begun and by the end of June had advanced far into Galicia and Bukovina. On July 3, General Evert resumed the attack on Baranovichi, but attacks by Russian troops on this section of the front were not successful. Only after the complete failure of the offensive of General Evert’s troops did the high command of the Russian troops recognize the offensive of General Brusilov’s troops on the Southwestern Front as the main one - but it was already too late, time was lost, the Austrian command managed to regroup its troops and pull up reserves. Six divisions were transferred from the Austro-Italian front, and the German command, at the height of the Verdun and Somme battles, transferred eleven divisions to the Eastern Front. Further advance of Russian troops was suspended. As a result of the offensive on the Southwestern Front, Russian troops advanced deep into Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, occupying about 25 thousand square meters. km of territory. 9 thousand officers and over 400 thousand soldiers were captured. However, this success of the Russian army in the summer of 1916 did not bring a decisive strategic result due to the inertia and mediocrity of the high command, backwardness of transport, and lack of weapons and ammunition. Still, the offensive of Russian troops in 1916 played a major role. It eased the position of the Allies and, together with the offensive of the Anglo-French troops on the Somme, negated the initiative of the German troops and forced them in the future to strategic defense, and the Austro-Hungarian army after the Brusilov attack in 1916 was no longer capable of serious offensive operations. When Russian troops under the command of Brusilov inflicted a major defeat on the Austro-Werger troops on the Southwestern Front, the Romanian ruling circles considered that the opportune moment had come to enter the war on the side of the winners, especially since, contrary to the opinion of Russia, England and France insisted on the entry of Romania into the war. On August 17, Romania independently began the war in Transylvania and initially achieved some success there, but when the Somme fighting died down, Austro-German troops easily defeated the Romanian army and occupied almost all of Romania, obtaining a fairly important source of food and oil. As the Russian command foresaw, 35 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions had to be transferred to Romania in order to strengthen the front along the Lower Danube - Braila - Focsani - Dorna - Vatra line. On the Caucasian front, developing an offensive, Russian troops captured Erzurum on February 16, 1916, and occupied Trabzond (Trebizond) on April 18. Battles developed successfully for the Russian troops in the Urmia direction, where Ruvandiz was occupied, and near Lake Van, where Russian troops entered Mush and Bitlis in the summer. Campaign 1917 of the year.

By the end of 1916, the superiority of the Entente, both in the number of armed forces and in military equipment, especially in artillery, aviation and tanks. IN military campaign In 1917, the Entente entered on all fronts with 425 divisions against 331 enemy divisions. However, differences in the military leadership and the self-interested goals of the Entente participants often paralyzed these advantages, which was clearly manifested in the inconsistency of the Entente command during major operations in 1916. Having switched to strategic defense, the Austro-German coalition, still far from defeated, confronted the world with the fact of a protracted, exhausting war. And every month, every week of the war entailed new colossal casualties. By the end of 1916, both sides had lost about 6 million people killed and about 10 million people wounded and maimed. Under the influence of enormous human losses and hardships at the front and in the rear, all the warring countries experienced a chauvinistic frenzy in the first months of the war. Every year the anti-war movement grew in the rear and at the fronts. The prolongation of the war inevitably affected, among other things, the morale of the Russian army. The patriotic upsurge of 1914 was lost long ago, and the exploitation of the idea of ​​“Slavic solidarity” also exhausted itself. Stories about German cruelties also did not have the desired effect. War fatigue was becoming more and more evident. Sitting in the trenches, the immobility of positional warfare, the absence of the simplest human conditions in the positions - all this was the background of the increasing frequency of soldier unrest. To this we must add a protest against cane discipline, abuses by superiors, and embezzlement of the rear services. Both at the front and in the rear garrisons, cases of non-compliance with orders and expressions of sympathy for striking workers were increasingly observed. In August - September 1915, during a wave of strikes in Petrograd, many soldiers of the capital's garrison expressed solidarity with the workers, and demonstrations took place on a number of ships of the Baltic Fleet. In 1916, there was an uprising of soldiers at the Kremenchug distribution point, and at the same point in Gomel. In the summer of 1916, two Siberian regiments refused to go into battle. Cases of fraternization with enemy soldiers appeared. By the autumn of 1916, a significant part of the 10 million army was in a state of ferment. The main obstacle to victory was now not material shortcomings (weapons and supplies, military equipment), but internal state society itself. Deep contradictions spanned layers. The main contradiction was between the tsarist-monarchist camp and the other two - liberal-bourgeois and revolutionary-democratic. The Tsar and the court camarilla grouped around him wanted to retain all their privileges, the liberal bourgeoisie wanted to gain access to government power, and the revolutionary-democratic camp, led by the Bolshevik Party, fought to overthrow the monarchy. The broad masses of the population of all the warring countries were gripped by ferment. More and more workers demanded immediate peace and condemned chauvinism, protested against merciless exploitation, lack of food, clothing, fuel, and against the enrichment of the elite of society. The refusal of the ruling circles to satisfy these demands and the suppression of protests by force gradually led the masses to the conclusion that it was necessary to fight against the military dictatorship and the entire existing system. Anti-war protests grew into a revolutionary movement. In such a situation, anxiety grew in the ruling circles of both coalitions. Even the most extreme imperialists could not help but take into account the mood of the masses who yearned for peace. Therefore, maneuvers were undertaken with “peace” proposals in the hope that these proposals would be rejected by the enemy, and in this case all the blame for the continuation of the war could be blamed on him. So on December 12, 1916, the Kaiser’s government of Germany invited the Entente countries to begin “peace” negotiations. At the same time, the German “peace” proposal was designed to create a split in the Entente camp and to support those layers within the Entente countries that were inclined to achieve peace with Germany without a “crushing blow” to Germany by force of arms. Since Germany’s “peace” proposal did not contain any specific conditions and completely hushed up the question of the fate of the territories of Russia, Belgium, France, Serbia, and Romania occupied by Austro-German troops, this gave the Entente a reason to respond to this and subsequent proposals with specific demands for the liberation of Germany of all occupied territories, as well as the division of Turkey, the “reorganization” of Europe based on the “national principle,” which actually meant the Entente’s refusal to enter into peace negotiations with Germany and its allies. German propaganda noisily announced to the whole world that the Entente countries were to blame for the continuation of the war and that they were forcing Germany to take “defensive measures” through merciless “unrestricted submarine warfare.” In February 1917, the bourgeois-democratic revolution won in Russia, and a movement for a revolutionary way out of the imperialist war developed widely in the country. In response to the unrestricted submarine warfare on the part of Germany, which began in February 1917, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with the latter, and on April 6, declaring war on Germany, entered the war in order to influence its results in its favor. Even before the arrival of American soldiers, Entente troops launched an offensive on the Western Front on April 16, 1917. But the attacks of the Anglo-French troops, following one after another on April 16-19, were unsuccessful. The French and British lost more than 200 thousand killed in four days of fighting. In this battle, 5 thousand Russian soldiers from the 3rd Russian brigade, sent from Russia to help the allies, died. Almost all 132 British tanks participating in the battle were knocked out or destroyed. Preparing this military operation , the Entente command persistently demanded that the Russian Provisional Government launch an offensive on the Eastern Front. However, preparing such an offensive in revolutionary Russia was not easy. Nevertheless, the head of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, began intensively preparing an offensive, hoping, in case of success, to raise the prestige of the bourgeois Provisional Government, and in case of failure, to blame the Bolsheviks. The Russian offensive in the Lvov direction, launched on July 1, 1917, initially developed successfully, but soon the German army, reinforced by 11 divisions transferred from the Western Front, launched a counteroffensive and threw the Russian troops far beyond their original positions. Thus, in 1917, on all European fronts, despite the Entente’s superiority in manpower and military equipment, its troops failed to achieve decisive success in any of the offensives undertaken. The revolutionary situation in Russia and the lack of necessary coordination in military operations within the coalition thwarted the implementation of the Entente's strategic plans, designed for the complete defeat of the Austro-German bloc in 1917. And at the beginning of September 1917, the German army launched an offensive on the northern sector of the Eastern Front with the aim of capturing Riga and the Riga coast. The Germans’ choice of the moment to attack near Riga was not accidental. This was the time when the Russian reactionary military elite, preparing a counter-revolutionary coup in the country, decided to rely on the German military. At a state meeting convened in Moscow in August, General Kornilov expressed his “assumption” about the imminent fall of Riga and the opening of roads to Petrograd, the cradle of the Russian revolution. This served as a signal for the German army to attack Riga. Despite the fact that there were every opportunity to hold Riga, it was surrendered to the Germans by order of the military command. Clearing the way for the Germans to revolutionary Petrograd, Kornilov began his open counter-revolutionary rebellion. Kornilov was defeated by revolutionary workers and soldiers under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. General history: Handbook/F.s. Kapitsa, V.A. Grigoriev, E.P. Novikova et al. - M.: Philologist, 1996. The 1917 campaign was characterized by further attempts by the warring parties to overcome the positional deadlock, this time through the massive use of artillery, tanks and aircraft. The saturation of troops with technical means of combat significantly complicated the offensive battle; it became in the full sense a combined arms battle, the success of which was achieved by the coordinated actions of all branches of the military. During the campaign operation, there was a gradual transition from dense rifle chains to group formations of troops. The core of these formations were tanks, escort guns and machine guns. Unlike rifle chains, groups could maneuver on the battlefield, destroy or bypass the firing points and strongholds of the defender, and advance at a faster pace. The growth of the technical equipment of the troops created the preconditions for breaking through the positional front. In some cases, troops managed to break through enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth. However, in general, the problem of breaking through the positional front was not solved, since the attacker could not develop tactical success to an operational scale. The development of means and methods of conducting an offensive led to further improvement of defense. The depth of defense of the divisions increased to 10-12 km. In addition to the main positions, they began to build forward, cutoff and rear positions. There has been a transition from rigid defense to maneuver of forces and means when repelling an enemy offensive. Campaign of 1918. The preparation of the parties for hostilities in the 1918 campaign took place in the context of a growing revolutionary movement in the countries of Western Europe under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Already in January 1918, mass strikes of workers broke out in a number of countries, and uprisings occurred in the armies and navies. The revolutionary movement grew especially quickly in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The growth of the revolutionary movement in European countries was the main reason why the American imperialists began to transfer their troops to France. By the beginning of 1918, the Entente (without Russia) had 274 divisions, 51,750 guns, 3,784 aircraft and 890 tanks. The countries of the German coalition had 275 divisions, 15,700 guns and 2,890 aircraft; there were no tanks in their army. Having lost numerical superiority in forces due to Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Entente command decided to switch to strategic defense in order to accumulate forces and begin active operations in the second half of 1918. The German command, planning military operations for 1918, planned to carry out two strikes: in the west - with the aim of defeating the allies, ahead of the arrival of the main contingent of US troops in France, and in the east - with the aim of unleashing a military intervention against the Soviet Republic. On February 18, 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary violated the armistice with Soviet Russia and their troops invaded the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. However, they met resistance from the working people of the Soviet Republic and were forced on February 23 to agree to peace negotiations. The Germans struck the first blow in the West on March 21 on the right flank of the British in Picardy. Superiority in forces and surprise of actions ensured their success in the first days of the offensive. The British troops had to retreat and suffered significant losses. In this regard, the German command clarified the initial plan of the operation, deciding to defeat the French troops south of the Somme. However, during the operation, superiority in forces was lost. Fighting south of the Somme continued until April 4, when the German advance was completely stopped. It was not possible to defeat the main forces of the Anglo-French troops. Five days later, the Germans launched an offensive against the British on the northern sector of the front in Flanders. As in March, here, due to the surprise of the offensive and significant superiority in forces, they initially managed to put the British in a critical position. But French reserves were brought forward to help, and this saved the British troops from defeat. Fighting in this direction continued until May 1. The Germans advanced 16-20 km, captured a number of settlements, but did not achieve the main goal - they failed to defeat the British. Despite the failure of two operations, the Germans did not give up hope of defeating the Entente and forcing it to at least a compromise peace. To this end, May 27 began new operation, now against French troops in the Paris direction. The French front was broken through on the first day of the offensive. To cause panic in Paris, the Germans began shelling it with super-heavy guns, the firing range of which reached 120 km. By May 30, German troops advancing in the center reached the Marne River, finding themselves 70 km away. From Paris. However, on the left wing their advance was stopped. Attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks were unsuccessful. The forces of the Entente were constantly growing. The balance of enemy forces was almost equalized, and by June 7 active hostilities ceased. The Germans failed to form the Marne. On June 11, the French launched a strong counterattack on the right flank of the German troops. The German offensive was stopped completely. On July 15, the German command launched a new offensive operation on the Marne with the aim of delivering the final crushing blow. The operation was prepared carefully with the expectation of a surprise attack. However, the French learned about the place and time of the upcoming attack and took a number of preventive measures, in particular, they withdrew their main forces to the rear. As a result of this, the German fire strike hit an empty place. On the first day of the offensive, German troops crossed the Marne in several places and moved 5-8 km into the French positions. Having met the main forces of the French, the Germans were unable to advance further. On July 18, French troops launched a counterattack on the right flank of German troops located on the Marne ledge, and threw them back 20-30 km beyond the Aisne River, that is, to the line from which they began their offensive in May. The Entente command planned a number of private operations for the second half of 1918 with the aim of eliminating the ledges formed during the German offensive operations. It believed that if these operations were successful, then larger operations could be carried out in the future. The offensive of the Anglo-French troops with the aim of eliminating the Amenien ledge began on August 8. An unexpected and strong blow from the Allies led to a breakthrough in the German defenses and rapid development operations. He contributed to the decline in morale of the German army. In just one day, over 10 thousand surrendered. German soldiers and officers. In the second half of August, the Entente command organized a number of new operations, expanding the offensive front, and on September 26, the Anglo-French launched a general offensive. Germany's military disaster was fast approaching. This accelerated the defeat of the German troops. During October, Anglo-French troops successively overcame several German defensive zones in Northern France. On November 5, German troops began to retreat along the entire front, and on November 11, Germany capitulated. The First World War, which lasted more than four years, ended.

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