The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is one of the most dramatic dates in the history of our country. This event gave rise to many myths and points of view regarding the causes, plans of the parties, the number of troops and other important aspects. Let's try to understand this issue and cover Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 as objectively as possible. And let's start with the backstory.

Background to the conflict

Napoleon's invasion of Russia was not an accidental and unexpected event. This is in the novel by L.N. Tolstoy's "War and Peace" it is presented as "treacherous and unexpected". In fact, everything was natural. Russia has brought disaster upon itself by its military actions. At first, Catherine II, fearing revolutionary events in Europe, helped the First Anti-French Coalition. Then Paul the First could not forgive Napoleon for the capture of Malta - an island that was under the personal protection of our emperor.

The main military confrontations between Russia and France began with the Second Anti-French Coalition (1798-1800), in which Russian troops, together with Turkish, British and Austrian troops, tried to defeat the army of the Directory in Europe. It was during these events that the famous Mediterranean campaign of Ushakov and the heroic transition of the Russian army of many thousands across the Alps under the command of Suvorov took place.

Our country then for the first time got acquainted with the "loyalty" of the Austrian allies, thanks to which the Russian armies of many thousands were surrounded. This, for example, happened to Rimsky-Korsakov in Switzerland, who lost about 20,000 of his soldiers in an unequal battle against the French. It was the Austrian troops who left Switzerland and left the 30,000th Russian corps face to face with the 70,000th French corps. And the famous one was also forced, since all the same Austrian advisers showed our commander in chief the wrong path in the direction where there were no roads and crossings.

As a result, Suvorov was surrounded, but with decisive maneuvers he was able to get out of the stone trap and save the army. However, ten years passed between these events and the Patriotic War. And Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 would not have taken place if not for further events.

Third and Fourth Anti-French Coalitions. Violation of the Peace of Tilsit

Alexander the First also started a war with France. According to one version, thanks to the British, coup d'état in Russia, which brought the young Alexander to the throne. This circumstance, perhaps, forced the new emperor to fight for the British.

In 1805, the Third is formed. It includes Russia, England, Sweden and Austria. Unlike the previous two, the new union was designed as a defensive one. No one was going to restore the Bourbon dynasty in France. Most of all, England needed the union, since 200 thousand French soldiers were already standing under the English Channel, ready to land on but the Third Coalition prevented these plans.

The climax of the union was the "Battle of the Three Emperors" on November 20, 1805. She received this name because all three emperors of the warring armies were present on the battlefield near Austerlitz - Napoleon, Alexander the First and Franz II. Military historians believe that it was the presence of "high persons" that gave rise to the utter confusion of the allies. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the Coalition forces.

We try to briefly explain all the circumstances without understanding which Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 would be incomprehensible.

In 1806, the Fourth Anti-French Coalition appeared. Austria no longer took part in the war against Napoleon. The new union included England, Russia, Prussia, Saxony and Sweden. Our country had to bear the brunt of the battles, since England helped, mainly only financially, as well as at sea, and the rest of the participants did not have strong land armies. In one day, everything was destroyed in the battle of Jena.

On June 2, 1807, our army was defeated near Friedland, and retreated beyond the Neman - the border river in the western possessions Russian Empire.

After that, Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon on June 9, 1807 in the middle of the Neman River, which was officially interpreted as equality of the parties when signing the peace. It was the violation of the Tilsit peace that was the reason why Napoleon invaded Russia. Let us analyze the contract itself in more detail, so that the reasons for the events that occurred later were clear.

Terms of the Peace of Tilsit

The Tilsit peace treaty assumed Russia's accession to the so-called blockade of the British Isles. This decree was signed by Napoleon on November 21, 1806. The essence of the "blockade" was that France creates on European continent a zone where England was forbidden to trade. Napoleon could not physically block the island, since France did not even have a tenth of the fleet that was at the disposal of the British. Therefore, the term "blockade" is conditional. In fact, Napoleon came up with what today is called economic sanctions. England actively traded with Europe. From Russia, therefore, the “blockade” threatened the food security of Foggy Albion. In fact, Napoleon even helped England, as the latter urgently found new trading partners in Asia and Africa, making good money on this in the future.

Russia in the 19th century was an agrarian country that sold grain for export. England was the only major buyer of our products at that time. Those. the loss of a sales market completely ruined the ruling elite of the nobility in Russia. We are seeing something similar today in our country, when counter-sanctions and sanctions hit the oil and gas industry hard, as a result of which the ruling elite suffers huge losses.

In fact, Russia joined the anti-English sanctions in Europe, initiated by France. The latter itself was a major agricultural producer, so there was no possibility of replacing a trading partner for our country. Naturally, our ruling elite could not comply with the conditions of the Tilsit peace, as this would lead to the complete destruction of the entire Russian economy. The only way to force Russia to comply with the "blockade" demand was by force. Therefore, the invasion of Russia took place. The French emperor himself was not going to go deep into our country, wanting to simply force Alexander to fulfill the Peace of Tilsit. However, our armies forced the French emperor to move further and further from the western borders to Moscow.

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The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is June 12, 1812. On this day, the enemy troops crossed the Neman.

The myth of the invasion

There was a myth that Napoleon's invasion of Russia happened unexpectedly. The emperor held a ball, and all the courtiers had fun. In fact, the balls of all European monarchs of that time took place very often, and they did not depend on the events of politics, but, on the contrary, were an integral part of it. This was an unchanging tradition of monarchical society. It was on them that public hearings on the most important issues actually took place. Even during the First World War, magnificent celebrations were held in the residences of the nobles. However, it is worth noting that Alexander the First Ball in Vilna nevertheless left and retired to St. Petersburg, where he stayed throughout the entire Patriotic War.

Forgotten Heroes

The Russian army was preparing for the French invasion long before that. Minister of War Barclay de Tolly did everything possible so that Napoleon's army approached Moscow at the limit of its capabilities and with huge losses. The Minister of War himself kept his army in full combat readiness. Unfortunately, the history of the Patriotic War treated Barclay de Tolly unfairly. By the way, it was he who actually created the conditions for the future French catastrophe, and the invasion of Napoleon's army into Russia ultimately ended in the complete defeat of the enemy.

Secretary of War tactics

Barclay de Tolly used the famous "Scythian tactics". The distance between the Neman and Moscow is huge. Without food supplies, provisions for horses, drinking water The "Grand Army" turned into a huge prisoner of war camp, in which natural death was much higher than the losses from the battles. The French did not expect the horror that Barclay de Tolly created for them: the peasants went into the forests, taking cattle with them and burning provisions, the wells along the route of the army were poisoned, as a result of which periodic epidemics broke out in the French army. Horses and people fell from hunger, mass desertion began, but there was nowhere to run in an unfamiliar area. In addition, partisan detachments of peasants destroyed individual French groups of soldiers. The year of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is the year of an unprecedented patriotic upsurge of all Russian people united in order to destroy the aggressor. This point was also reflected by L.N. Tolstoy in the novel "War and Peace", in which his characters defiantly refuse to speak French, as it is the language of the aggressor, and also donate all their savings to the needs of the army. Russia has not known such an invasion for a long time. Last time before that, the Swedes attacked our country almost a hundred years ago. Shortly before this, the entire secular world of Russia admired the genius of Napoleon, considered him the greatest man on the planet. Now this genius threatened our independence and turned into a sworn enemy.

The size and characteristics of the French army

The number of Napoleon's army during the invasion of Russia was about 600 thousand people. Its peculiarity was that it resembled a patchwork quilt. The composition of Napoleon's army during the invasion of Russia consisted of Polish lancers, Hungarian dragoons, Spanish cuirassiers, French dragoons, etc. Napoleon gathered his "Great Army" from all over Europe. She was diverse, speaking different languages. At times, commanders and soldiers did not understand each other, did not want to shed blood for Great France, so at the first sign of difficulty caused by our scorched earth tactics, they deserted. However, there was a force that kept the entire Napoleonic army at bay - Napoleon's personal guard. This was the elite of the French troops, which went through all the difficulties with the brilliant commanders from the first days. It was very difficult to get into it. Guardsmen were paid huge salaries, they got the best food supplies. Even during the Moscow famine, these people received good rations when the rest were forced to look for dead rats for food. The Guard was something like Napoleon's modern security service. She watched for signs of desertion, put things in order in the motley Napoleonic army. She was also thrown into battle in the most dangerous sectors of the front, where the retreat of even one soldier could lead to tragic consequences for the entire army. The guardsmen never retreated and showed unprecedented stamina and heroism. However, they were too few in percentage terms.

In total, in Napoleon's army there were about half of the French themselves, who showed themselves in battles in Europe. However, now this army was different - aggressive, occupying, which was reflected in its morale.

Composition of the army

The "Great Army" was deployed in two echelons. The main forces - about 500 thousand people and about 1 thousand guns - consisted of three groups. The right wing under the command of Jerome Bonaparte - 78 thousand people and 159 guns - was supposed to move to Grodno and divert the main Russian forces. The central grouping led by Beauharnais - 82 thousand people and 200 guns - was supposed to prevent the connection of the two main Russian armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. Napoleon himself, with new forces, moved to Vilna. His task was to defeat the Russian armies separately, but he also allowed them to join. In the rear, out of 170 thousand people and about 500 guns of Marshal Augereau remained. According to the military historian Clausewitz, in total, Napoleon involved in the Russian campaign up to 600 thousand people, of which less than 100 thousand people crossed the border river Neman back from Russia.

Napoleon planned to impose battles on the western borders of Russia. However, Baklay de Tolly forced him to play cat and mouse. The main Russian forces all the time evaded the battle and retreated into the interior of the country, dragging the French farther and farther from the Polish reserves, and depriving him of food and provisions on his own territory. That is why the invasion of Napoleon's troops in Russia led to a further catastrophe " great army».

Russian forces

At the time of the aggression, Russia had about 300 thousand people with 900 guns. However, the army was divided. The Minister of War himself commanded the First Western Army. Grouping Barclay de Tolly, there were about 130 thousand people with 500 guns. It stretched from Lithuania to Grodno in Belarus. The Second Western Army of Bagration numbered about 50 thousand people - it occupied the line east of Bialystok. The third army of Tormasov - also about 50 thousand people with 168 guns - stood in Volhynia. Also, large groups were in Finland - shortly before that there was a war with Sweden - and in the Caucasus, where traditionally Russia waged wars with Turkey and Iran. There was also a grouping of our troops on the Danube under the command of Admiral P.V. Chichagov in the amount of 57 thousand people with 200 guns.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia: the beginning

On the evening of June 11, 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards of the Cossack Regiment discovered suspicious movement on the Neman River. With the onset of darkness, enemy sappers began to build crossings three miles up the river from Kovno (modern Kaunas, Lithuania). Forcing the river with all forces took 4 days, but the vanguard of the French was already in Kovno on the morning of June 12. Alexander the First at that time was at a ball in Vilna, where he was informed about the attack.

From Neman to Smolensk

Back in May 1811, assuming Napoleon's possible invasion of Russia, Alexander the First told the French ambassador something like this: "We would rather reach Kamchatka than sign peace in our capitals. Frost and territory will fight for us."

This tactic was put into practice: Russian troops rapidly retreated from the Neman to Smolensk with two armies, unable to connect. Both armies were constantly pursued by the French. Several battles took place in which the Russians frankly sacrificed entire rearguard groups in order to hold the main forces of the French for as long as possible in order to prevent them from catching up with our main forces.

On August 7, a battle took place near Valutina Gora, which was called the battle for Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly had teamed up with Bagration by this time and even made several attempts to counterattack. However, all these were just false maneuvers that made Napoleon think about the future general battle near Smolensk and regroup the columns from marching formation to attacking. But the Russian commander-in-chief well remembered the order of the emperor “I don’t have an army anymore”, and did not dare to give a general battle, rightly predicting a future defeat. Near Smolensk, the French suffered huge losses. Barclay de Tolly himself was a supporter of a further retreat, but the entire Russian public unfairly considered him a coward and a traitor for his retreat. Only Russian emperor, who had already fled once near Austerlitz from Napoleon, still continued to trust the minister. While the armies were divided, Barclay de Tolly could still cope with the wrath of the generals, but when the army was united near Smolensk, he still had to make a counterattack on Murat's corps. This attack was needed more to calm the Russian commanders than to give a decisive battle to the French. But despite this, the minister was accused of indecision, procrastination, and cowardice. There was a final discord with Bagration, who zealously rushed to attack, but could not give an order, since formally he was subordinate to Barkal de Tolly. Napoleon himself spoke with annoyance that the Russians did not give a general battle, since his ingenious detour maneuver with the main forces would lead to a blow to the rear of the Russians, as a result of which our army would be completely defeated.

Change of commander-in-chief

Under pressure from the public, Barcal de Tolly was nevertheless removed from the post of commander in chief. Russian generals in August 1812 already openly sabotaged all his orders. However, the new commander-in-chief M.I. Kutuzov, whose authority was enormous in Russian society, also ordered a further retreat. And only on August 26 - also under public pressure - did he give a general battle near Borodino, as a result of which the Russians were defeated and left Moscow.

Results

Let's summarize. The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is one of the tragic in the history of our country. However, this event contributed to the patriotic upsurge in our society, its consolidation. Napoleon was mistaken that the Russian peasant would choose the abolition of serfdom in exchange for the support of the invaders. It turned out that military aggression turned out to be much worse for our citizens than internal socio-economic contradictions.

Russia's war for freedom and independence against the aggression of France and its allies.

It was the result of deep political contradictions between the France of Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte, striving for European domination, and the Russian Empire, which opposed its political and territorial claims.

On the part of France, the war was of a coalition character. Only Confederation of the Rhine put 150 thousand people in the Napoleonic army. 8 army corps were made up of foreign contingents. There were about 72 thousand Poles, over 36 thousand Prussians, about 31 thousand Austrians, a significant number of representatives of other European states in the Great Army. The total number of the French army was about 1200 thousand people. More than half of it was intended for the invasion of Russia.

By June 1, 1812, the Napoleonic invasion forces included the imperial guard, 12 infantry corps, cavalry reserve (4 corps), artillery and engineering parks - a total of 678 thousand people and about 2.8 thousand guns.

As a springboard for the attack, Napoleon I used the Duchy of Warsaw. His strategic plan was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle, capture Moscow and impose a peace treaty on the terms of France on the Russian Empire. The enemy invasion forces were deployed in 2 echelons. The 1st echelon consisted of 3 groups (a total of 444 thousand people, 940 guns), located between the Neman and Vistula rivers. The 1st grouping (troops of the left wing, 218 thousand people, 527 guns) under the direct command of Napoleon I concentrated at the Elbing (now Elblag), Thorn (now Torun) line for an offensive through Kovno (now Kaunas) to Vilna (now Vilnius) . The 2nd grouping (gen. E. Beauharnais; 82 thousand people, 208 guns) was intended for an offensive in the zone between Grodno and Kovno in order to separate the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies. The 3rd grouping (under the command of the brother of Napoleon I - J. Bonaparte; troops of the right wing, 78 thousand people, 159 guns) had the task of moving from Warsaw to Grodno to pull back the Russian 2nd Western Army to facilitate the offensive of the main forces . These troops were to surround and destroy the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies in parts with enveloping blows. On the left wing, the invasion of the 1st group of troops was provided by the Prussian corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal J. Macdonald. On the right wing, the invasion of the 3rd group of troops was provided by the Austrian corps (34 thousand people) of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg. In the rear, between the rivers Vistula and Oder, there were troops of the 2nd echelon (170 thousand people, 432 guns) and a reserve (corps of Marshal P. Augereau and other troops).

The Russian Empire after a series of anti-Napoleonic wars by the beginning of World War II remained in international isolation, besides experiencing financial and economic difficulties. In the two pre-war years, its spending on the needs of the army accounted for more than half of the state budget. Russian troops at the western borders had about 220 thousand people and 942 guns. They were deployed in 3 groupings: 1st Western Army (general of infantry; 6 infantry, 2 cavalry and 1 Cossack Corps; about 128 thousand people, 558 guns) constituted the main forces and was located between the Rossiens (now Raseiniai, Lithuania) and Lida; The 2nd Western Army (an infantry general; 2 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; about 49 thousand people, 216 guns) concentrated between the Neman and Bug rivers; The 3rd Western Army (Cavalry General A.P. Tormasov; 3 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; 43 thousand people, 168 guns) was stationed in the Lutsk region. In the Riga region there was a separate corps (18.5 thousand people) of Lieutenant General I. N. Essen. The nearest reserves (corps of Lieutenant General P. I. Meller-Zakomelsky and Lieutenant General F. F. Ertel) were located in the areas of the cities of Toropets and Mozyr. In the south, in Podolia, the Danube army (about 30 thousand people) of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was concentrated. The leadership of all the armies was carried out by the emperor, who was with his main apartment at the 1st Western Army. The commander-in-chief was not appointed, but Barclay de Tolly, being the minister of war, had the right to issue orders on behalf of the emperor. The Russian armies stretched out on the front with a length of over 600 km, and the main enemy forces - 300 km. This put the Russian troops in a difficult position. By the beginning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I accepted the plan proposed by the military adviser, the Prussian General K. Ful. According to his plan, the 1st Western Army, retreating from the border, was to take refuge in a fortified camp, and the 2nd Western Army to go to the flank and rear of the enemy.

According to the nature of military events in the Patriotic War, 2 periods are distinguished. The 1st period - from the invasion of the French troops on June 12 (24) to October 5 (17) - includes defensive actions, the flank Tarutinsky march-maneuver of the Russian troops, their preparation for the offensive and partisan operations on enemy communications. 2nd period - from the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive on October 6 (18) to the defeat of the enemy and the complete liberation of the Russian land on December 14 (26).

The pretext for attacking the Russian Empire was the alleged violation by Alexander I of the main, according to Napoleon I, provision - "to be in eternal alliance with France and at war with England", which manifested itself in the sabotage of the continental blockade by the Russian Empire. On June 10 (22), Napoleon I, through the ambassador in St. Petersburg, Zh. A. Loriston, officially declared war on Russia, and on June 12 (24) the French army began crossing the Neman on 4 bridges (near Kovno and other cities). Having received news of the invasion of French troops, Alexander I made an attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully, calling on the French emperor to "withdraw his troops from Russian territory." However, Napoleon I rejected this proposal.

Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat inland. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Drissa camp (near the city of Drissa, now Verhnedvinsk, Belarus), increasing the gap with the 2nd Western Army to 200 km. The main enemy forces rushed into it on June 26 (July 8), occupying Minsk and creating the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one. The 1st and 2nd Western armies, intending to unite, retreated in converging directions: the 1st Western Army from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk (the corps of a lieutenant general was left to cover the St. Petersburg direction, from November the general of infantry P. Kh. Wittgenstein), and the 2nd Western Army from Slonim to Nesvizh, Bobruisk, Mstislavl.

The war stirred up the entire Russian society: peasants, merchants, commoners. By mid-summer, self-defense units began to be spontaneously created in the occupied territory to protect their villages from French raids. foragers and looters (see Looting). Assessing the importance, the Russian military command took measures to expand and institutionalize it. For this purpose, army partisan detachments were created in the 1st and 2nd Western armies on the basis of regular troops. In addition, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6 (18), in Central Russia and the Volga region recruitment was carried out into the people's militia. Its creation, acquisition, financing and supply was led by Special set. A significant contribution to the fight against foreign invaders was made by the Orthodox Church, which called on the people to protect their state and religious shrines, collected about 2.5 million rubles for the needs of the Russian army (from the church treasury and as a result of donations from parishioners).

On July 8 (20), the French occupied Mogilev and prevented the Russian armies from joining in the Orsha region. Only thanks to stubborn rearguard battles and maneuver did the Russian armies unite near Smolensk on July 22 (August 3). By this time, Wittgenstein's corps retreated to the line north of Polotsk and, having pinned down the enemy's forces, weakened his main grouping. The 3rd Western Army after the battles on July 15 (27) near Kobrin, and on July 31 (August 12) near Gorodechnaya (now both cities are in the Brest region, Belarus), where it inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, defended itself on the river. Styr.

The outbreak of war upset the strategic plan of Napoleon I. The Grand Army lost up to 150 thousand people in killed, wounded, sick and deserters. Its combat effectiveness and discipline began to decline, the pace of the offensive slowed down. Napoleon I was forced on July 17 (29) to give an order to stop his army for 7-8 days in the area from Velizh to Mogilev to rest and wait for the approach of reserves and rears. Obeying the will of Alexander I, who demanded active action, the military council of the 1st and 2nd Western armies decided to take advantage of the dispersed position of the enemy and break the front of his main forces with a counterattack in the direction of Rudnya and Porechye (now the city of Demidov). On July 26 (August 7), Russian troops launched a counteroffensive, but due to poor organization and lack of coordination, it did not bring the expected results. The battles that began near Rudnya and Porechye were used by Napoleon I to suddenly cross the Dnieper, threatening to take Smolensk. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat to Smolensk in order to reach the Moscow road before the enemy. During the Battle of Smolensk in 1812, the Russian armies, by active defense and skillful maneuvering of reserves, managed to avoid the general battle imposed by Napoleon I in unfavorable conditions and retreat to Dorogobuzh on the night of August 6 (18). The enemy continued to advance on Moscow.

The duration of the retreat caused a murmur among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army, general discontent in Russian society. The departure from Smolensk aggravated hostile relations between P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. This forced Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all active Russian armies and appoint general of infantry (from August 19 (31) field marshal) M. I. Kutuzov, head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Kutuzov arrived in the army on August 17 (29) and took over the main command.

Having found a position near Tsarev Zaimishch (now the village of the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region), where Barclay de Tolly on August 19 (31) intended to give the enemy a battle, unprofitable, and the army’s forces were insufficient, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to several crossings to the east and stopped in front of Mozhaisk, near the village Borodino, on a field that made it possible to advantageously position troops and block the Old and New Smolensk roads. Arrived reserves under the command of an infantry general, the Moscow and Smolensk militias made it possible to bring the forces of the Russian army to 132 thousand people and 624 guns. Napoleon I had a force of about 135 thousand people and 587 guns. None of the parties achieved their goals: Napoleon I was unable to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov - to block the path of the Great Army to Moscow. The Napoleonic army, having lost about 50 thousand people (according to French data, over 30 thousand people) and most of the cavalry, was seriously weakened. Kutuzov, having received information about the losses of the Russian army (44 thousand people), refused to continue the battle and gave the order to retreat.

Departing to Moscow, he hoped to partially make up for the losses incurred and give a new battle. But the position chosen by the cavalry general L. L. Bennigsen near the walls of Moscow turned out to be extremely unfavorable. Taking into account the fact that the first actions of the partisans showed high efficiency, Kutuzov ordered to take them under the control of the Main Headquarters of the army in the field, entrusting their leadership to the duty general of the headquarters, General.-l. P. P. Konovnitsyna. At a military council in the village of Fili (now within the boundaries of Moscow) on September 1 (13), Kutuzov ordered that Moscow be left without a fight. Most of the population left the city with the troops. On the very first day of the entry of the French into Moscow, fires began, which lasted until September 8 (20) and devastated the city. During the stay of the French in Moscow, partisan detachments surrounded the city in an almost continuous mobile ring, preventing the enemy foragers from moving further than 15-30 km from it. The most active were the actions of army partisan detachments, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner.

Leaving Moscow, Russian troops retreated along the Ryazan road. After walking 30 km, they crossed the Moskva River and turned west. Then, with a forced march, they crossed to the Tula road and on September 6 (18) concentrated in the Podolsk region. After 3 days they were already on the Kaluga road and on September 9 (21) camped near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra (since 1.7.2012 within Moscow). Having made 2 more crossings, Russian troops on September 21 (October 3) concentrated near the village of Tarutino (now the village of Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region). As a result of a skillfully organized and executed march maneuver, they broke away from the enemy and took up an advantageous position for a counteroffensive.

The active participation of the population in the partisan movement turned the war from a confrontation between regular armies into a nationwide war. The main forces of the Great Army and all its communications from Moscow to Smolensk were threatened by Russian troops. The French lost their freedom of maneuver and activity in action. For them, the paths were closed in the province south of Moscow, not devastated by the war. The “small war” launched by Kutuzov further complicated the position of the enemy. The bold operations of the army and peasant partisan detachments disrupted the supply of the French troops. Realizing the critical situation, Napoleon I sent General J. Lauriston to the headquarters of the Russian commander in chief with peace proposals addressed to Alexander I. Kutuzov rejected them, saying that the war was just beginning and would not stop until the enemy was completely driven out of Russia.

The Russian army, located in the Tarutinsky camp, reliably covered the south of the country: Kaluga with military reserves concentrated there, Tula and Bryansk with weapons and foundries. At the same time, reliable communications were provided with the 3rd Western and Danube armies. In the Tarutinsky camp, the troops were reorganized, understaffed (their number was increased to 120 thousand people), supplied with weapons, ammunition and food. Artillery now had 2 times more than the enemy, cavalry outnumbered 3.5 times. The provincial militias numbered 100 thousand people. They covered Moscow in a semicircle along the lines of Klin, Kolomna, Aleksin. Under Tarutin, M. I. Kutuzov developed a plan to encircle and defeat the Great Army in the interfluve of the Western Dvina and Dnieper with the main forces of the army in the field, the Danube army of P. V. Chichagov and the corps of P. Kh. Wittgenstein.

The first blow was struck on October 6 (18) against the vanguard of the French army on the Chernishnya River (Battle of Tarutino 1812). The troops of Marshal I. Murat in this battle lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners. Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow on October 7 (19), and on October 10 (22) advanced detachments of Russian troops entered it. The French lost about 5 thousand people and began to retreat along the Old Smolensk road, which they had devastated. Tarutinsky fight and the battle of Maloyaroslavets marked a turning point in the war. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Russian command. fighting Russian troops and partisans from that time on became active and included such methods of armed struggle as parallel pursuit and encirclement of enemy troops. The persecution was carried out in several directions: north of the Smolensk road, a detachment of Major General P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov was operating; along the Smolensk road - the Cossack regiments of the general from the cavalry; south of the Smolensk road - the vanguard of M. A. Miloradovich and the main forces of the Russian army. Having overtaken the rearguard of the enemy near Vyazma, Russian troops defeated him on October 22 (November 3) - the French lost about 8.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, then in the battles near Dorogobuzh, near Dukhovshchina, near the village of Lyakhovo (now the Glinsky district of Smolensk region) - more than 10 thousand people.

The surviving part of the Napoleonic army retreated to Smolensk, but there were no food supplies and reserves there. Napoleon I began to hastily withdraw his troops further. But in the battles near Krasnoye, and then near Molodechno, Russian troops defeated the French. Scattered parts of the enemy retreated to the river on the road to Borisov. The 3rd Western Army also approached the connection with the corps of P. H. Wittgenstein. Its troops occupied Minsk on November 4 (16), and on November 9 (21) P. V. Chichagov’s army approached Borisov and, after a battle with a detachment of General Y. Kh. Dombrovsky, occupied the city and the right bank of the Berezina. Wittgenstein's corps, after a stubborn battle with the French corps of Marshal L. Saint-Cyr, captured Polotsk on October 8 (20). Having crossed the Western Dvina, Russian troops occupied Lepel (now the Vitebsk region, Belarus) and defeated the French at Chashniki. With the approach of Russian troops to the Berezina, a “bag” was formed in the Borisov region, in which the retreating French troops were surrounded. However, Wittgenstein's indecisiveness and Chichagov's mistakes made it possible for Napoleon I to prepare a crossing over the Berezina and avoid the complete annihilation of his army. Having reached Smorgon (now the Grodno region, Belarus), on November 23 (December 5), Napoleon I left for Paris, and the remnants of his army were almost completely destroyed.

On December 14 (26), Russian troops occupied Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk (now Brest), completing the liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire. M. I. Kutuzov on December 21, 1812 (January 2, 1813), in an order to the army, congratulated the troops on the expulsion of the enemy from the country and urged "to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields."

The victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 preserved the independence of Russia, and the defeat of the Great Army not only dealt a crushing blow to the military power of Napoleonic France, but also played a decisive role in the liberation of a number of European states from French expansion, intensified the liberation struggle of the Spanish people, etc. As a result of the Russian army of 1813 -14 and the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the Napoleonic empire collapsed. At the same time, the victory in the Patriotic War was used to strengthen the autocracy both in the Russian Empire and in Europe. Alexander I led the Holy Alliance, created by European monarchs, whose activities were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary, republican and liberation movements in Europe. The Napoleonic army lost in Russia over 500 thousand people, all the cavalry and almost all the artillery (only the corps of J. Macdonald and K. Schwarzenberg survived); Russian troops - about 300 thousand people.

The Patriotic War of 1812 is notable for its large spatial scope, intensity, and variety of strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle. The military art of Napoleon I, which surpassed the military art of all the armies of Europe at that time, collapsed in a collision with Russian army. The Russian strategy surpassed the Napoleonic strategy, designed for a short-term campaign. M. I. Kutuzov skillfully used the popular character of the war and, taking into account political and strategic factors, implemented his plan to fight the Napoleonic army. The experience of the Patriotic War helped to consolidate the tactics of columns and loose formation in the actions of the troops, to increase the role of aimed fire, to improve the interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery; the form of organization of military formations - divisions and corps - was firmly entrenched. The reserve became an integral part of the battle order, and the role of artillery in battle increased.

The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies an important place in the history of Russia. She demonstrated the unity of all classes in the fight against foreigners. aggression, was the most important factor in the formation of self-consciousness in Rus. people. Under the influence of the victory over Napoleon I, the ideology of the Decembrists began to take shape. The experience of the war was generalized in the works of domestic and foreign military historians, the patriotism of the Russian people and the army inspired the work of Russian writers, artists, composers. The victory in the Patriotic War is associated with the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, numerous churches throughout the Russian Empire; military trophies were kept in the Kazan Cathedral. The events of the Patriotic War are captured in numerous monuments on the Borodino field, in Maloyaroslavets and Tarutino, are reflected in the triumphal arches in Moscow and St. Winter Palace, the panorama "Battle of Borodino" in Moscow, etc. A huge memoir literature has been preserved about the Patriotic War.

Additional literature:

Akhsharumov D.I. Description of the war of 1812 St. Petersburg, 1819;

Buturlin D.P. The history of the invasion of Emperor Napoleon on Russia in 1812, 2nd ed. SPb., 1837-1838. Ch. 1-2;

Okunev N.A. Discourse on the great hostilities, battles and battles that took place during the invasion of Russia in 1812, 2nd ed. SPb., 1841;

Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Description of the Patriotic War of 1812, 3rd ed. SPb., 1843;

Bogdanovich M.I. History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources. SPb., 1859-1860. T. 1-3;

Patriotic War of 1812: Materials of the Military Scientific Archive. Dep. 1-2. SPb., 1900-1914. [Issue. 1-22];

Patriotic war and Russian society, 1812-1912. M., 1911-1912. T. 1-7;

Great Patriotic War: 1812 St. Petersburg, 1912;

Zhilin P.A. The counteroffensive of the Russian army in 1812, 2nd ed. M., 1953;

he is. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. 2nd ed. M., 1974;

he is. Patriotic War of 1812 3rd ed. M., 1988;

M. I. Kutuzov: [Documents and materials]. M., 1954-1955. T. 4. Ch. 1-2;

1812: Sat. articles. M., 1962;

Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 M., 1962;

Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;

Korneichik E.I. Belarusian people in the Patriotic War of 1812 Minsk, 1962;

Sirotkin V.G. Duel of two diplomats: Russia and France in 1801-1812. M., 1966;

he is. Alexander the First and Napoleon: a duel on the eve of the war. M., 2012;

Tartakovsky A.G. 1812 and Russian memoirs: The experience of source studies. M., 1980;

Abalikhin B.S., Dunaevsky V.A. 1812 at the crossroads of opinion Soviet historians, 1917-1987. M., 1990;

1812. Memoirs of the soldiers of the Russian army: From the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum. M., 1991;

Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 1812. M., 1992;

he is. 1812: Chosen. works. M., 1994;

1812 in the memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1995;

Gulyaev Yu.N., Soglaev V.T. Field Marshal Kutuzov: [Historical and biographical essay]. M., 1995;

Russian archive: History of the Fatherland in evidence and documents of the 18th-20th centuries. M., 1996. Issue. 7;

Kirkheyzen F. Napoleon I: In 2 vols. M., 1997;

Chandler D. Napoleon's Military Campaigns: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Conqueror. M., 1999;

Sokolov O.V. Napoleon's army. SPb., 1999;

Shein I.A. War of 1812 in national historiography. M., 2002.

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war continued until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied troops. This is a nice page Russian history, which we will consider, referring to the official textbooks of the history of Russia and France, as well as to the books of the bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.

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The beginning of the war

Causes of the War of 1812

The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the reasons from France and the reasons from Russia.

Reasons from France

In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own view of Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor). In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:

1. Breaking the Tilsit Accords: Relaxing the Continental Blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. In fact, this made the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined the plans of France.
2. Refusals in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry the imperial court of Russia in order to become "God's anointed". However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 the French emperor married an Austrian princess.
3. The transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising in Poland, which could be transferred to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for a war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.

Soldiers! A new, second in a row, Polish war begins! The first ended in Tilsit. There Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but she broke her promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they think that we have become different? Are we not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia put France before a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French weapons. It will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on the affairs of Europe.

Thus began a war of conquest for France.

Reasons from Russia

On the part of Russia, there were also weighty reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation state. Among the main reasons are the following:

1. Great losses of all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but only its elite, which, as a result of the lack of the possibility of trade with England, was losing money.
2. The intention of France to recreate the Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate ancient state in true size. Perhaps this was only in the case of the seizure of Russia's western lands.
3. Violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by Napoleon. One of the main criteria for signing this agreement was that Prussia should be cleared of French troops, but this was not done, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded of this.

For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on the independence of Russia. Always we tried to be meek, thinking so to deflect her attempts at capture. With all our desire to keep the peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend the Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict with France, which means that only one thing remains - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from the invaders. I do not need to remind commanders and soldiers of courage, it is in our hearts. In our veins flows the blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs. Soldiers! You are defending the country, defending the religion, defending the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.

The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman took place on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200,000 people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on the part of both sides, then the total number of the French army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 was 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland) fought on the side of France. However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who won many victories with their emperor.

Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the size of the army was 227 thousand people, and they were divided along three fronts:

• Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. The population is 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
• Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number - 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
• Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. The number is 58 thousand people. They were located in Volhynia, covering the attack on Kyiv.

Also in Russia, partisan detachments were actively operating, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.

The first stage of the war - the offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)

At 6 am on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War with Napoleonic France began for Russia. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the strike was supposed to be in Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the legs, I will capture St. Petersburg, I will take it by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”

The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very helpful to the aggressors. However, at the initial stage, Barclay de Toli played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and retreat inland. This was necessary in order to combine forces, as well as to pull up reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed cattle, poisoned water, burned fields. In the literal sense of the word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and were not behaving according to the rules.

North direction

32 thousand people, led by General MacDonald, Napoleon sent to St. Petersburg. The first city on this path was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and go further.

The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18,000 soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. MacDonald by this time captured Dinaburg (the Russians left the city with the outbreak of war) and did not conduct further active operations. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and was waiting for the arrival of artillery.

General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toli. However, on July 18, Wittenstein delivered an unexpected blow to Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by the corps of Saint-Cyr who came to the rescue. As a result, a balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.

South direction

General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.

On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where the main forces of Ranier gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - 5 thousand people were killed in the battle in 1 day, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred the troops of General Schwarzenberg there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. In the future, the French did not undertake active offensive operations in the southern direction. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.

The course of events of the offensive company

On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, tasked by Alexander 1 to engage in battle with the main enemy forces in order to wear them out. Everyone was aware of the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17, the emperor was finally dissuaded from this undertaking. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.

On July 6, the large number of Napoleon's troops became clear. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signs a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all the inhabitants of the country are recorded in it - in total, there were about 400 thousand volunteers.

On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army consisted of 150 thousand soldiers.

On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to go on the counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with the enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a grand failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.

On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover, occupying the village of Krasnoe, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.

On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were made with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired.

August 5 is one of the important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its massive retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only 1 plan - to wear down the enemy and take the decisive battle when the balance of power was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had the advantage.

On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army, who took command. This candidacy did not raise any questions, since Kutuzov (Suvorov's student) enjoyed great respect and was considered the best Russian commander after Suvorov's death. Arriving in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: "The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army or give up Moscow."

On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby introducing an initial turning point in the battle of 1812.

September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history books. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals, on the wave of success, demanded a battle in order to defeat Napoleon as soon as possible. Opponents of such a development of events were Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly. The military council in Fili ended with the phrase Kutuzov “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only the ancient capital, but the whole of Russia.”

September 2 - following the results of the military council of the generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, even this is not the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set fire to the city. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. Most importantly, literally all food depots were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French did not get anything from what the enemies could use for food, movement, or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.

The second stage of the war - the retreat of Napoleon (October - December)

Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission accomplished. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Russia would break the victorious spirit, and the leaders of the country had to come to him with a request for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov stationed himself with an army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself introduced a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for an offer of peace from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.

Napoleon's Desire for Peace

According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to play a decisive role. Here it was possible to deploy a convenient bridgehead, including for a trip to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who literally fought for every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies was actually equal to death. This became clear by the end of September, when it started to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that his biggest mistake was a trip to Moscow and a month spent there.

Understanding the severity of his position, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with her. Three such attempts have been made:

1. September 18th. Through General Tutolmin, a message was sent to Alexander 1, which said that Napoleon honored the Russian emperor and offered him peace. Russia is only required to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
2. September 20th. Alexander 1 was delivered a second letter from Napoleon with an offer of peace. The conditions were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not answer these messages.
3. The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to the fact that Napoleon literally begged for peace. Here is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the prominent French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, no matter what, just save the honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the emperor of France did not wait for an answer.

The retreat of the French army in autumn-winter 1812

For Napoleon, it became obvious that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and to stay for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians, retreating, burned down, was recklessness. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since the constant raids of the militias caused great damage to the army. So, for a month, while the French army was in Moscow, its number was reduced by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.

On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Luckily, he didn't succeed. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to the high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.

On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to get to Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but this direction was blocked by Kutuzov. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to get around. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. During the day, this small town passed 8 times from one side to the other. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take up fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the plans of the French were frustrated, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already scorched earth - without food and without water.

Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with the army of Kutuzov, we also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially its trailing units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not make a radical change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.

Crossing the Berezina River

The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) in order to force the river and go to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured actively loomed for him, since he was surrounded.

On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to simulate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began the transfer of troops. At that moment, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28 did Chichagov realize his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit with a loss huge amount human lives. When crossing the Berezina, 21,000 Frenchmen died! The "Great Army" now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of whom were already unfit for combat.

It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts set in, to which the French emperor referred, justifying the huge losses. In the 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the French newspapers, it was said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that very severe cold came, for which no one was ready.

Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)

The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed for Paris.

On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left the territory of Russia. Its number was only 1600 people. The invincible army, which inspired fear throughout Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.

Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on a map.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon was of great importance for all the countries involved in the conflict. Largely due to these events, the undivided dominance of England in Europe became possible. Such a development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war must be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial for strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not heed the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war

Determining the main reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic army, it is necessary to focus on the most important ones that historians most often use:

• The strategic mistake of the emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for the representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and to run out of provisions, and the constant raids of partisan movements made a turning point in the war.
• Unity of the Russian people. As usual, in the face of a great danger, the Slavs rally. So it was this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that main reason France's defeat lies in the mass nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - both women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The emperor of France did not break him.
• The unwillingness of the Russian generals to accept a decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration's army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand army of Bagration against 400 thousand army of aggressors. It would be an unconditional victory, and after it they would hardly have had time to recover. Therefore, the Russian people must express their gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order to retreat and unite the armies.
• Genius Kutuzov. The Russian general, who learned well from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but he managed to win the Patriotic War tactically and strategically.
• General Frost is used as an excuse. In fairness, it must be said that the frost did not have any significant effect on the final result, since at the time of the start of abnormal frosts (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.

Patriotic War of 1812

PATRIOTIC WAR of 1812, the liberation war of Russia against Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon's invasion (cm. NAPOLEON I Bonaparte) was caused by the aggravation of Russian-French economic and political contradictions, the actual refusal of Russia from the Continental blockade (cm. CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE). The main events of 1812: June 12 (24) - the passage of the French army across the Neman (the forces of the parties at the beginning of World War II: the French - about 610 thousand people; the Russians - about 240 thousand people); August 4-6 - Battle of Smolensk (cm. BATTLE OF SMOLENSK 1812), an unsuccessful attempt by Napoleon to defeat the main forces of the Russian troops; August 8 - appointment of M. I. Kutuzov as commander-in-chief (cm. KUTUZOV Mikhail Illarionovich); August, 26th - battle of Borodino (cm. BATTLE OF BORODINO); September 1 - military council in Fili, Kutuzov's decision to leave Moscow; the entry of French troops into Moscow; September 2-6 - Moscow fire; September-October - Kutuzov conducts Tarutinsky march-maneuver (cm. TARUTO MARSH-MANEUVER AND BATTLE), forcing the French to leave Moscow and retreat along the Old Smolensk road; guerrilla warfare unfolds; November 14-16 - the battle of the Berezina; November-December - the death of the French army; December 14 - the expulsion of the remnants of the "great army" from Russia.
Causes and preparations for war

The war was caused by political and economic contradictions between Russia and France, the clash of their interests in Germany, Poland, the Middle East, France's desire for European hegemony, Russia's refusal to support the continental blockade of England.
Preparations on both sides began almost simultaneously - around 1810. Both empires carried out a huge set of measures over a two-year period in order to achieve victory in the upcoming military clash: lines of operations were created, troops were concentrated to the borders; preparations were made for the rear and fortifications were carried out, diplomatic soundings were carried out in search of allies, and intelligence activity on both sides was sharply intensified.
During the first half of 1812, French troops concentrated near the Russian borders, and these forces formed an invading army (Grand Army). Only half of its numbers were French, the rest (Germans, Italians, Poles, Austrians, Swiss, Spaniards, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, Austrians) were recruited from European states allied and vassal of France. The main grouping (250 thousand) under the command of Napoleon himself (cm. NAPOLEON I Bonaparte) focused on East Prussia. The central group (90 thousand) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy E. Beauharnais (cm. Beauharnais Eugene) was under Olita. On the right flank in the Duchy of Warsaw, the French emperor entrusted the leadership of the corps to his brother Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia. During the campaign, an additional 190,000 second-echelon troops entered Russian territory.
The Russian troops, divided before the war into three armies, had the following location: 1st Western Army (130 thousand) under the command of General of Infantry M. B. Barclay de Tolly (cm. BARKLAY-DE-TOlly Mikhail Bogdanovich) was in the Vilna region, the 2nd Western Army (45 thousand) led by the infantry general Prince P. I. Bagration (cm. BAGRATION Petr Ivanovich)- near Volkovysk, and the 3rd Observation Army (45 thousand) of the cavalry general A.P. Tormasov was placed on the left flank (cm. TORMASOV Alexander Petrovich) covering the southwestern direction. During the war, other regular units were transferred to the flanks - the Moldavian army (50 thousand) of Admiral P. V. Chichagov (cm. CHICHAGOV Pavel Vasilievich) and a corps from Finland (15 thousand) Lieutenant General F. F. Shteingel (cm. STEINGEL Faddey Fyodorovich), and reserve and militia formations were used as reserves for the active troops.
Napoleon's operational plan consisted in the rapid maneuver of his main forces against the right wing of the 1st Western Army and the use of numerical superiority with the aim of successively defeating the units of Barclay and Bagration in border battles. After these victories, he hoped to sign a profitable peace with Russia “on the drum”. Among the Russian top leadership before the war, despite the hesitation and abundance of various projects, the concept of active defense was established to achieve the final victory. This was largely facilitated by intelligence data about the enemy (in particular, the first echelon of Napoleon's troops was realistically estimated at 450,000). The main idea of ​​the plan was to conduct retreat tactics against the main enemy grouping until the moment of equality of forces, along with active operations against the weak Napoleonic flanks.
Campaign start

The initiative to start hostilities belonged to Napoleon, his corps crossed the Neman on June 12 (24) and came into combat contact with the Russian troops. But the first, most powerful and concentrated, blow of the French emperor was in vain. The Russians, not accepting the battle, began to retreat, leaving Vilna. Bonaparte then tried to use to his advantage the situation of disunity between the two Western armies. He decided to defeat them one by one, using an offensive along the internal line of operations and sending the combined corps of one of his best marshals L.-N. Davout (cm. DAVOU Louis Nicola).
However, Barclay de Tolly abandoned the project proposed by General K. Ful - to expect the French in the Dris fortified camp; he continued further retreat, leaving the 1st Corps under the command of Lieutenant General P. Kh. Wittgenstein to cover the St. Petersburg direction (cm. Wittgenstein Petr Khristianovich).
Russian troops, after rearguard clashes near Ostrovno, Mir and Saltanovka, successfully maneuvering, broke away and, avoiding meetings with superior enemy forces, were able to connect near Smolensk on July 22.
In response, Napoleon, after a short rest near Vitebsk, sent his main forces across the Dnieper and made a successful maneuver from Krasnoye to Smolensk, but the Russians, albeit with difficulty, managed to fend off the Napoleonic blow and even gave a three-day battle for this ancient city. The abandonment of a large territory and the unpopular retreat tactics of Barclay caused displeasure against him in the highest circles of the generals and society. Alexander I was forced on August 8 to appoint M. I. Kutuzov as the sole commander in chief (cm. KUTUZOV Mikhail Illarionovich).
After the failure of the original plan, Napoleon, according to the testimony of memoirists, repeatedly experienced hesitation regarding the advisability of further persecution of the Russian armies. But the political necessity to resolutely finish things in Russia in one campaign, the logic of events and the hope that he was about to catch up with the Russians, forced him to go forward. And after Smolensk, he continued to move to Moscow. By this time, after the failures of his flank corps near Klyastitsy and Kobrin, the French emperor was forced to direct a significant part of his forces to ensure extended communications and thereby weaken the central grouping. On August 26, the decisive general battle of the Patriotic War took place near the village of Borodino, 120 km from Moscow.
In the battle of Borodino (cm. BATTLE OF BORODINO) there was already an approximate numerical parity between the French and Russians, which can explain why neither side achieved decisive results in this battle.
Moscow period and the beginning of the persecution of the French

After the council at Fili on September 1 and leaving Moscow on September 2, the Russian army made the Tarutino maneuver and took a very advantageous flank position in relation to the French line of operations.
While Napoleon languished in Moscow for 36 days in the fruitless expectation of peace negotiations, Kutuzov's troops received a respite, reinforcements approached. In addition, the entire Moscow region became the scene of active operations of army partisan detachments, which made it difficult for the French units to move and forage and led to heavy losses in their ranks. Especially important, as subsequent events showed, was the approach to Tarutino of 26 fresh Don Cossack regiments, which were subsequently very effectively used in battles.
After the capture of Moscow by the French, each of the parties expected the practical implementation of their long-term plans. Napoleon was skillfully misled and continued to count on the conclusion of peace. Operational issues arising from the specific situation, and the pursuit of tactical success for him more and more obscured the prospects for overall strategic leadership. The long stay of his army in Moscow was the result of a political miscalculation. On the contrary, a situation arose for the Russian command, envisaged by pre-war projects, and further actions of the armies were subordinated to the strategic plan of prolonging the war in time and in depth of territory in order to strike at the enemy from the flanks and rear. To accomplish this task in St. Petersburg, a new plan. Its essence was to encircle the main French forces near the Berezina. While Napoleonic troops were extremely stretched out and the last major strategic reserve (Victor's corps) was introduced, the Russians began to pull up fresh regular units from Moldova and Finland to the flanks.
Before the French commander in Moscow, the question arose "What to do next?". There is an opinion in the literature that he intended to break through to Ukraine from Moscow. But as the surviving documents testify, Bonaparte decided, in case the Russians refused to go to peace negotiations, to make a flank movement to Kaluga, thereby depreciating Kutuzov’s position at Tarutino, disrupting his communications and destroying the rear bases created in the south of the country. Then, in order to maintain his line of operations, he planned to retreat without hindrance to Smolensk and set up winter quarters there.
Napoleon left Moscow on October 7 only after the defeat of his vanguard under the command of Marshal I. Murat (cm. MURAT Joachim) near Tarutino, but the Russians, thanks to intelligence, very quickly determined the direction of his flank movement to Kaluga. Therefore, Kutuzov urgently transferred his main forces to Maloyaroslavets, and the Russian army stood in the way of the French. And although the city, as a result of a fierce battle, ended up in the hands of the enemy, the Russians, retreating, blocked his further movement.
The goal of Napoleon's movement was not achieved, and the French commander, not daring to start a new head-on collision, decided to move to the already devastated Old Smolensk road and continue his retreat along it. Kutuzov, with the main forces, began to move parallel to country roads and, with the threat of a possible bypass, accelerated the pace of the retreat of the Napoleonic corps. At the same time, the Russian military leaders, due to the rapidly changing situation, did not have time to extract dividends from the most profitable, but fleeting situation, and were only able to inflict tangible blows on the enemy near Vyazma and Krasny.
In general, the actions of small Cossack detachments turned out to be more effective, following on the heels of the weakened Napoleonic units and collecting abundant booty with prisoners and trophies.
The catastrophe of the Napoleonic army on the Berezina

By the time Napoleon retreated from Moscow, the situation on the flanks of the theater of operations had changed dramatically due to the arrival of the Moldavian army in Volhynia and the corps of General Steingel from Finland near Riga. The balance of power on both flanks changed in favor of the Russian army. Steingel's troops reinforced the 1st Corps of P. Kh. Wittgenstein during the assault on Polotsk and in the battles near Chashniki. Chichagov, under whose command the 3rd Observation Army also came, managed to first push back the Saxons and Austrians, and then capture Minsk and by November 10 stand on the main French retreat route near the city of Borisov on the Berezina River. The main forces of Napoleon, who were on the march, were surrounded: Chichagov was in front of the front, Wittgenstein threatened from the north, and Kutuzov was catching up from the rear. In this critical situation, the French emperor showed maximum energy, although he acted at great risk, since the troops of each of the three Russian commanders were not inferior in number to the significantly thinned Great Army. Towards the end of the campaign, French intelligence managed to carry out a successful operation to disinform Chichagov and divert his attention by setting up a false crossing near the village of Uholody south of Borisov. A real crossing was organized north of Borisov near the village of Studenka. From November 14 to November 17, Napoleon managed to transfer the combat-ready remnants of his units through the Berezina.
The success of the daring event, in addition to Chichagov's deception, was facilitated by Wittgenstein's sluggishness and Kutuzov's passivity in this dramatic situation. Here the "general-winter", which, according to many foreign authors, destroyed the Great Army, this time helped the French. Impassable in spring and autumn, the Zemba swamps, through which the further path of the retreating lay, turned out to be shackled by the frost that hit them, which made it possible to overcome them without hindrance.
Tactical success in a critical situation on the Berezina allowed Napoleon to withdraw the miserable remnants of his troops from the encirclement. He himself, in Smorgon, handing over command to Murat, urgently went to France. But it is not for nothing that most historians assess the events on the Berezina as a catastrophe for the Great Army.
The French emperor lost all the carts there, most of the stragglers, all the cavalry and artillery. His army as a fighting force ceased to exist. In conditions of complete decomposition, the French, despite the approach of a number of fresh units, were no longer able to gain a foothold at any line in western Russian territory. Their further pursuit to the border was carried out non-stop with great energy, mainly by cavalry units. Already at the end of December, the Russians entered the territory of East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw. Their losses for the entire campaign are estimated at 200-300 thousand people. Napoleon managed to withdraw from Russia from 20 to 80 thousand people (officers of the main grouping and the remnants of the flank corps). The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the death of the French army in Russia. Kutuzov wrote at the end of the campaign: "The enemy with poor remnants fled our borders." Marshal A. Berthier (cm. BERTIER-DELAGARD Alexander Lvovich), reporting to Napoleon about catastrophic losses, he was forced to draw a sad conclusion: "The army no longer exists." Over 550,000 soldiers from Western European countries died or were captured in Russia.

encyclopedic Dictionary . 2009 .

See what the "Patriotic War of 1812" is in other dictionaries:

liberation war Russia against Napoleonic aggression. The invasion of Napoleon's troops was caused by the aggravation of Russian-French economic and political contradictions, the actual refusal of Russia from the Continental blockade. Main events… … Political science. Dictionary.

"Patriotic War" redirects here; see also other meanings. This term has other meanings, see War of 1812. Patriotic War of 1812 Napoleonic Wars ... Wikipedia

And the campaigns of 1813-14. The reasons for the O. war were the lust for power of Napoleon, who, striving for dominion over the world and convinced of the insufficiency of the continental system to destroy the power of England, dreamed of inflicting a mortal blow on her ... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron

Patriotic War of 1812 - … orthographic dictionary Russian language

Main article: Patriotic War of 1812 Contents 1 Serfs 2 Poles and Lithuanians 3 Jews ... Wikipedia

Years Napoleonic Wars The retreat of the French in 1812 (I. M. Pryanishnikov) Date ... Wikipedia

Patriotic War of 1812 Napoleonic Wars The retreat of the French in 1812 (I. M. Pryanishnikov) Date ... Wikipedia

Historical tricks are performed in the same way as the tricks of a swindler, an illusionist - the attention of the audience is concentrated, focused on bright little things in order to distract them from the main thing, the essence of what is happening and create an impression of authenticity. Therefore, if you want to know what really happened, you need to digress from the magical show and detailed explanations of the fakir, and see what he really does before, at the same time, and after the show, look from the other side, look next to him, etc.

Instead of looking at someone else's picture of history, it's useful to research the facts yourself and find the real ones, like this:

It is interesting that simultaneously with the war that began on June 22, 1812 in Russia, in North America On June 18, 1812, a no less mysterious war also began, on which there will be a separate investigation (it, as if by accident, also ended in 1814).

The war of 1812 in Russia seems to be well described, even in excessively intrusive detail, and all the attention of researchers is automatically concentrated on chewing on the details. memoir literature about battles. The official, well-established history of the war of 1812 in Russia only at first glance seems smooth, especially if knowledge is limited to two extremely publicized episodes "the battle of Borodino" and "the fire of Moscow."

If we ignore the strongly imposed point of view, for example, by imagining that there are no memoirs-witnesses or we do not trust them, because “he is lying like an eyewitness” and check on the actual circumstances, then a completely unexpected picture is revealed:

As a result of the war of 1812 in Russia, the troops of Alexander-1, in alliance with Napoleon-1, conquered the territories of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland, or figuratively speaking, "Petersburg defeated Muscovy."

It has already been verified, many have the first reaction of rejection "the author is delirious." Starting to test the hypothesis of false coverage in the official history of the goals of the war of 1812 in Russia, I myself was quite skeptical about it, but confirmations fell like a cornucopia, I do not have time to describe them. Everything is slowly coming together into a perfectly logical picture, which is summarized on this index page. Links to detailed description researched facts will appear as relevant articles are written.

Especially for those who are unable to read multi-book pages, by popular demand, an explanation was made on the fingers without a finger (I advise beginners not to immediately rush to follow the rest of the links, but first read the general picture presented below, otherwise you risk getting confused in a sea of ​​​​information).

And those who are highly experienced in history can try to clearly answer themselves to protozoa questions:

Why did Napoleon-1 go to conquer Smolensk and Moscow, and not the capital - Petersburg?

Why did the capital of the Russian Empire become Petersburg located "on the edge of the earth" (big red dot), and not marked in green, much more suitable for the capital status of the city (from left to right) Kyiv, Smolensk, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan

Russia - possible capitals

Seaport cities are marked in red. Above, from left to right, Riga, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, below - Kherson and Rostov-on-Don

The real history of the Russian Empire becomes extremely clear, logical and easily understood, if viewed from the correct point of view, from the Baltic.

1. Let's start with well-known facts: the capital of the Russian Empire was St. Petersburg, the ruling dynasty was the Romanovs.

2. "Romanovs" is the local pseudonym of the Holstein-Gottorp branch of the Oldenburg dynasty, who ruled the Baltic Sea ()

3. Petersburg was chosen by the Oldenburgs aka "Romanovs" as the capital as the most convenient springboard for penetration from the Baltic Sea into the Volga basin, isolated from all seas, in order to expand the sphere of its economic influence (for more details, see part 1 of the motivational Stupid Petersburg (http: // igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...) + part 2 basic St. Petersburg is irreplaceable "(http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

4. The main vector of the conquest and development of the territories of Russia by the Romanovs is directed from St. Petersburg (the Baltic Sea) inland, to the Volga basin along the waterways, naturally in order to pump out useful resources from there. This part of the history of the gradual conquests of the Romanovs was disguised as various "internal" events to create the illusion of prescription of ownership (previous index page "The E-2 Wars Are Noticeable" (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/index...)

5. At the same time, additional vectors of the Romanovs' actions were directed there, to the Volga basin, from the Black and Azov Seas. This part of history is well known as the continuous wars of the Romanovs with Turkey.

Now let's look at the situation before the war of 1812. During the time of Catherine II, significant efforts were already made to penetrate the Volga basin (see page "E-2 wars are noticeable"). And still, as of the beginning of the 19th century, St. Petersburg was categorically isolated from the Moscow-Smolensk Upland, there was not a single normal direct waterway (only the unsuccessfully made Vyshnevolotsk system, somehow working to descend to St. Petersburg).

In those days, of course, there were no airplanes, no railways, no highways, only waterways along rivers and short land sections - "portages" between river routes. And if there are no normal means of communication along which goods, troops, etc. can move, then there is no transport connection, without which there can be no statehood. Couriers with decrees can get there, but without the economic and power components - these decrees are worthless.

Shortly before the war of 1812, St. Petersburg had almost all the same waterways with land sections "portages" as Novgorod merchants long before the emergence of St. Petersburg:

That is why the Moscow-Smolensk Upland, located in the upper reaches of the Volga and Dnieper basins, at that time was almost entirely out of the reach of St. Petersburg, which could be content to feed only the same as ancient Novgorod.

Lack of direct waterways messages - this is an objective, key moment for understanding what was happening, a kind of "alibi in reverse" for St. Petersburg - it had nothing to do with Moscow and Smolensk.

Skeptics can carefully examine the map of Europe from the very first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1771 and make sure that Russia (Russia) is not at all Moscow Tartaria (Muscovite Tartarie), which I call for brevity simply Muscovy or the Old Power, on the right, the toponyms of interest from this map are indicated on a fragment of the Shokalsky map from the Brockhaus dictionary, the watershed of the Baltic river basins is marked with a red line

1771 map of Europe from the encyclopedia Britannica 1771 toponyms of Britannica on the map of Shokalsky

In other words, I do not need to invent any new reality, I simply explain why these territories used to be different states and how St. Petersburg of Oldenburg-"Romanovs" conquered Moscow Tartaria, and then called their possessions the Russian Empire, that is, they extended the name Russia to the conquered lands. There is nothing offensive in this (well, except for those who consider themselves a descendant of the rulers of Tartaria ;-), on the contrary, the result was a very powerful state, so I personally have no complaints about the conquerors.

pointer

I repeat once again: in order to understand the ENTIRE history of the Russian Empire, it is very important to read: Part 1 Stupid Petersburg + Part 2 Petersburg irreplaceable (why Petersburg is in this place and why it became the capital).

The main city controlling the transport hubs of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland at that time was the "key-city" Smolensk, located in the upper reaches of the Dnieper, where a chain of portages began, connecting the river routes "from the Varangians to the Greeks" and "from the Varangians to the Persians" at the intersection trade routes from the Dnieper, West Dvina, Volkhov, Volga and Oka river basins.

A simple military conquest of the cities of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland without including them in the zone of economic interests is meaningless, and therefore preparations for war began at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries with the large-scale construction of direct waterways from St. The construction of the Berezinsky water system ensured the capture of both the trade flows of Smolensk and the city itself. Naturally, the war began only when the enumerated routes for the invasion of troops were ready, which we have to make sure of.

Red indicates the direction of movement of the Oldenburgs in the Baltic. Blue - the main rivers of the European part of Russia. Green - direct waterways formed after the construction of the St. Petersburg Oldenburgs ("Romanovs") of water systems (from left to right, from bottom to top): Berezinsky, Vyshnevolotskaya, Tikhvinskaya, Mariinsky:

Russia - waterways water systems between the Volga and the Baltic

Simultaneously with the construction of direct waterways, other large-scale and thorough preparations were carried out for a military invasion and the post-war arrangement of the occupied territory:

In 1803, the task of ideological preparation was set in advance future war: creation new history of the conquered territories - entrusted to N. Karamzin (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...), who was appointed "Russian historiographer" by personal decree (there was never such a position either before or after Karamzin). Also in 1803, a decision was made to create a monument to the winners (responsible - comrade Martos).

1804, June - the introduction of preliminary censorship, it was forbidden to print, distribute and sell anything without the consideration and approval of the censorship authorities.

1804-1807 - in St. Petersburg, the Horse Guards arena is being built for all-season and all-weather training of riders

In 1805, the Berezina water system was completed, as a first approximation, connecting the Western Dvina with the tributary of the Dnieper by the Berezina River in the Vitebsk region. A continuous waterway appeared "from the Varangians to the Greeks" from the Baltic Sea up the Western Dvina (Daugava), then through the locks of the Berezina system down the Berezina River to the Dnieper and further downstream to the Black Sea.

1805 - unification of artillery - "Arakcheev" system via

1807 - Alexander and Napoleon in Tilsit sign a peace treaty (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...) and a secret one about an offensive and defensive alliance. The famous top-secret negotiations between the two emperors strictly alone on a raft in the middle of the Neman.

1808 - Another meeting of Alexander and Napoleon took place in Erfurt, where a secret convention was signed.

1809 - Prince George of Oldenburg, who arrived from England (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...), heads the "Expedition of water communications", which, together with him, moves from St. Petersburg as close as possible to Muscovy - to Tver, which Alexander called "our third capital". For service in the expedition, a "corps of engineers" was established under martial law. To streamline shipping and to supervise this, a special "Police team" was assigned. On the Tvertsa River, the construction of a towpath for the movement of barge haulers was completed, and the deepening of the Ladoga Canal began, the Vyshnevolotsk system (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...) was brought into working condition in both directions. Karamzin periodically in Tver read out to Prince Georgy of Oldenburg the “History of the Russian State” created by him.

In 1809, the mentioned Institute of Railway Corps Engineers was opened in Russia. Its first issue took place in 1812; One group of graduates voluntarily went to combat units, and 12 people went to the disposal of the commander in chief of the armies. Thus, already at the beginning of the campaign of 1812, engineers of the corps of communications were seconded to the active army, in fact, military engineering troops were created, for some reason there was no need for them before. (more about the military engineering service in the war of 1812 http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...)

In 1809-1812. in St. Petersburg, 5 albums for standard construction are published: "A collection of facades, highly approved by His Imperial Majesty for private buildings in the cities of the Russian Empire." All five albums contained about 200 residential, commercial, industrial, commercial and other buildings and over 70 designs of fences and gates. Only one principle was rigidly pursued: to preserve the unchanging stylistic unity of all the buildings included in the albums. via

Since 1810, on behalf of Alexander-1, Arakcheev has been testing the technology of organizing military settlements on the basis of the Prussian landwehr, which will be required later in the colonization of the occupied lands - the troops remain to live in the occupied territory, which solves several problems at once: there is no need to solve the problems of their export and subsequent deployment , the troops are at least self-sufficient, they maintain order, the natural loss of men during the war is replenished, etc. "Military settlements - the system of organizing troops in Russia in 1810-1857, combining military service with productive labor, primarily agricultural."

about the military settlements of Arakcheev from the magazine "World Illustration" 1871

Also in 1810, an independent government department was created - the Main Directorate of Spiritual Affairs of various (foreign) confessions with the right to create or liquidate churches, appoint heads of monastic orders, approve heads of confessions, and so on. via

1810 - the Mariinsky water system began to work. From 1810 to 1812, an additional reconstruction of the Berezinsky water system was carried out under the guidance of the famous engineer Devolant.

From 1810 to 1812, by decree of Alexander-1, two new most modern fortresses were built with incredible speed - Dinaburg on the Western Dvina and Bobruisk on the Berezina, the existing fortress at the mouth of the Dvina - Dinamunde was modernized, all the fortresses on the waterway Western Dvina - Dnieper were perfectly armed, replenished with ammunition and food supplies.

For comparison, on the left, the Berlin fortress in the 18-19 centuries and on the right, the Bobruisk fortress of 1812, are made according to the latest fortification science, with a broken line of the wall, bastions, redoubts, etc. for effective cross and multi-tiered artillery fire:

Berlin 1685 fortress (above) Bobruisk fortress (below)

At the same time, the fortifications of Smolensk, Moscow, the Volokolamsk Monastery and others in Muscovy remained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov, that is, they were not originally designed for the massive use of artillery by both attackers and defenders. Naturally, Alexander-1 was not going to modernize these obsolete enemy fortresses ;-) See "Collective farm" 200 years without a harvest "or is Boris Godunov to blame for everything?" (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

straight fortress walls of Smolensk and Vyazma:

scheme Smolensk Vyazma scheme of the fortress

1811 - the Ministry of Police is created, among the powers of "censorship control" - supervision of the censorship committee and publications already passed for printing and distribution, i.e. censorship has become double. To avoid terminological confusion, it should be clarified that the Ministry of the Interior, created in 1802, belonged to the economic department, the main task of which was the development of industry, agriculture, domestic trade, post, construction and maintenance of public (public) buildings.

During the war of 1812 and the subsequent hostilities of 1813–1814, the Ministry of Police was entrusted with the task of providing the army with food (!?), recruiting and forming a militia, and the Ministry of the Interior organized the supply of troops with uniforms and equipment.

1811 - To restore order after the war in the vast occupied territories, Alexander-1, for the first time in world history, creates a special organization "Internal Guard Corps" with the tasks of escorting prisoners and arrested persons, eliminating mass riots, and for the first time in history, the use of weapons against the civilian population is legally regulated . This corps, being part of the army, simultaneously carried out the order of the Minister of Police. Functionally, the "Internal Guard Corps" corresponds to modern Internal Troops MIA.

1811 - the Tikhvin water system was put into operation (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...)

By 1812, the reconstruction of the Berezinsky water system was completed (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...) and from that moment all waterways are ready for the invasion army.

index The most important figure of silence: the sea and river fleet in the war of 1812 (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...) about the actions of which there is amazingly scarce information, although the effective movement of troops and supplies between the chain of fortresses on the water the paths of the Western Dvina - the Berezinsky system - the Dnieper could only be provided by water transport: A huge river fleet of invasion in the war of 1812 was discovered (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

Expressing the importance of the fleet in the war, the first Lord of the English Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, regarded the land army as just a projectile, a cannonball fired at the enemy by the fleet. In contrast, the prevailing stereotype of depicting the war of 1812 in Russia depicts only land battles, cavalry, wagons and infantry. It turns out something like this: since Leo Tolstoy did not write about the fleet, therefore the fleet did not exist in 1812 ... One gets the impression that the mention of the fleet and any water transport was under a censorship ban.

May 1812 - Kutuzov signed a peace treaty with Turkey, the southern group of troops was freed, now everything is ready for the invasion of Muscovy, the troops begin to move towards Smolensk.

1812, June - Napoleon's troops arrive on the Neman, Alexander is waiting for him in Vilna, part of Alexander's troops has already arrived by water from St. Petersburg.

1812 - Napoleon's troops, instead of immediately rushing along the shortest strategic corridor along the sea to St. Petersburg, which was "protected" by one of Wittgenstein's infantry corps, it is now clear why they prefer to follow Alexander's troops in a friendly "wake column".

1812, August - all the troops of both Alexander and Napoleon, clearly on schedule, united near Smolensk, which was a key point on the path "from the Varangians to the Greeks."

Little attention is paid to the battle of Smolensk in general, although an elementary question arises - why, at Borodino, in an open field, the Bagration Flushes were built, and here the fortress built already under Boris Godunov holds the defense, but "neither the walls nor the fortifications had the necessary fortifications to accommodate artillery, so defensive battles occurred mainly in the suburbs. "By the way, it was after Smolensk that Kutuzov emerged from the shadows, who, for some reason, suddenly received the title of His Serene Highness Prince of Smolensky, although according to the official version, at that time he was in charge of the assembly militia(a very worthy occupation for a military leader of this rank ;-). (See Some riddles of Smolensk in 1812 http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...) and Why is Kutuzov Prince of Smolensk and not Borodino? (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru /news/...)

The battle of Borodino, which at first was perceived by me as a kind of artificially created symbol and the world's first museum historical reconstruction, formed on the initiative of Emperor Nicholas-1 since 1839, unexpectedly turned out to be a truly important event at the fork in the waterways. see "Borodino. Oddities and mysteries of the battle". (http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...)

Instead of using the maps of historians helpfully drawn with arrows, you can put only the places of battles on an empty map as the main reliably established facts, then we will see a completely clear turn of the traces of blood just after Borodino to the south, to Kaluga:

1812_Russia_battles

(for details, see "A Simple Diagram of the Essence of the War of 1812"- http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

"Fire in Moscow" - the second extremely publicized virtual episode of the war (see the comic-thriller "The Great Virtual Fire of Moscow of 1812" http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/publ/...) to explain what followed after the war 30 years of construction (allegedly "restoration"), because from the point of view of waterways at that time there could not be anything significant, but from the point of view of overland highway and railway communication in a straight line from St. Petersburg necessarily through Tver, then big Moscow should was built in this place:

1851 Petersburg-Moscow road

(for details see "Ancient Moscow" built by St. Petersburg in the 19th century"- http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

If, however, to argue from the point of view of classical history, it was as if opponents, and not allies, fought, then after the withdrawal of the troops of Alexander-1 to the south, towards Kaluga, Napoleon has a Second Strategic Chance, in my opinion the only one in world history when it was possible to capture three capitals: the "old capital" Moscow, the "third capital" Tver and the "new capital" Petersburg! But we now understand why Napoleon did not do this, but, according to a predetermined plan, followed Alexander's troops in order to jointly crush the remnants of Muscovy's troops in the upper reaches of the Oka basin. (See "Why Napoleon did not go to ...").

"The Flight of Napoleon's Army" - the third highly publicized virtual big episode of the war, is made as follows: the real battles marked on the diagram shown earlier are dated "dotted line, through one" - part during the offensive period, and part during the supposedly "retreat" so that there is no shadows of the thought that the occupying army conquered and remained. Mass death from frost and other factors, as it were, writes off a greatly overestimated number, that is, at the same time answers are given to the question: "Where did such a huge army of Napoleon go if it did not return to Europe."

"Peace death of Napoleon's army"(below) the visualization of the army's decline according to the testimony of memoirists is considered. Anyone who is not lazy can read various memoirs regarding chosen city and marvel at how much they are "confused in the testimony", it is clear that the manual for writing memoirs was corrected several times, or the "eyewitness memoirists" were inattentive, but this is not noticeable to the general reader, he perceives generalized stories in school textbooks and does not doubt the reliability of the primary sources of his awareness.

1812, November 14 - The highest rescript of Emperor Alexander-1 on the production by specially authorized military officials of the search for abandoned and hidden weapons and property in those territories where hostilities were fought. Of the 875 artillery pieces found and brought to Moscow by January 10, 1819, a symbolic stupid Tsar Bell was cast and so on. (see "The Moscow Tsar Bell was cast in the 19th century" - http://igor-grek.ucoz.ru/news/...)

1812, December 6 - following the results of the war in Muscovy, Kutuzov was granted the title "Smolensky" as if they are going home, although in fact the occupying troops remained to clean up the area and form military settlements. Alexander issues a decree on the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (the first temple in history dedicated specifically to Christ!)

1813, January - a branch of the British Bible Society is created in St. Petersburg, renamed in 1814 into the Russian Bible Society. The official task is to translate the Bible into the languages ​​of the peoples (was it not relevant before?), The total circulation of published books is at least half a million copies. The most interesting thing is that the Bible was eventually translated into ordinary Russian only at the end of the 19th century. What were they really doing there?

"Peace death of Napoleon's army"Visualization" Memoirs of participants in the war of 1812 in Russia", 1869, Paris, genre: drama, thriller, fantasy.

In 1869, a visual presentation of the dynamics of the disappearance of Napoleon's "Great Army" was published, extremely popular until now in Europe. The French engineer Minard used data from the memoirs of Segur, Chaumbray and others, displaying the current size of the army with thick lines on a scale of 1 mm = 10 thousand people. Below is a graph of temperature changes (according to the then Réaumur scale) during the retreat of Napoleon's army:

1812 minard napoleon Russia

Everything is very beautiful and understandable only at first glance. But then questions arise, of course, not to the work of Minard, but to memoirists-storytellers, whose testimonies have to be used only because almost all the documents of Napoleon's army allegedly disappeared while crossing the Berezina.

The name of the tributary of the Dnieper - the river Berezina in French was fixed in the meaning of "complete and crushing failure." C'est la Bérézina - "this is the Berezina" for the French is approximately the same as for the Germans "this is Stalingrad", and for the Russians "this is peace death" (those who do not understand the insolent language, peace death is pronounced "pis des" and here in loosely translated means "peaceful death" or "non-combat losses").

And yet, why did the French Berezina become a symbol of collapse? Hardly because of the army archives. Maybe because of the loss of personnel? Kutuzov, in his report to the tsar, estimated the losses of the French during the crossing of the Berezina at 29 thousand people. It follows from the Minar graph that the loss is 32 thousand people (50 thousand "before" and 28 thousand "after"). By the way, the losses of the French at Borodino are no less. Segur determined them at 40 thousand soldiers and officers, although many Russian historians consider his estimate to be tendentiously overestimated and agree on about 25 thousand. But the French read their Segur, Chambray, not Russian historians. And all the same, Borodino is not quoted by them, and Berezina is very much so.

So, if you look closely at the Minar diagram, you can clearly see where the peace death of Napoleon's "Great Army" is coming - non-combat losses in the interval from Vitebsk to Smolensk alone amounted to 165 thousand people! If we exclude the troops shown, which went in the amount of 22 thousand to Riga and 60 thousand to Polotsk, then we see how the remaining 340 thousand after Vitebsk, but even before the first serious battle - the siege of Smolensk, these 165 thousand people miraculously evaporated - as many as three "Berezina" and "Borodino" combined or five "Berezinsky catastrophes"!

One gets the full impression that the authors of the memoirs sought to explain by any means where such a mass of troops disappeared, but focusing on the retreat, low temperature (translated into the Celsius scale, the minimum temperature on the graph is -37.5 degrees), although this is not main question, then only 15-20% of the original population remained. The main one - where did 75-80% disappear when it was still warm?

The trouble is not even in the memoirs of the "participants", but in the fact that phantoms continue to multiply and this is understandable to any normal person who reads and analyzes, and does not stupidly memorize what is written. Minar in 1869 gave out the number of Napoleon's army at 422 thousand people, and in the 1983 textbook there are already 600 thousand virtual soldiers. How scary to live, what will happen next?

Of the greatest number of doubts in the network about the data of history and attempts to at least somehow calculate something, I will quote only Sergei Leksutov: "In the history textbook recommended for the history departments of pedagogical institutes -" History of the USSR from ancient times to 1861 "( Enlightenment Publishing House, 1983) - it is written in black and white that six hundred thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers crossed the Russian border.

130,000 - 135,000 reached Borodin. Losses amounted to about 150,000. After reading such a stunning message, I suspected that the gentlemen of historians were not good with arithmetic, and then I realized that historians did not really think about the meaning of the primary source that fell into their hands. So, adding up two numbers in a column, we get - 280,000 people. The question is, where did the rest of the 320,000 soldiers and officers go? Lost in the vastness of Russia?

It is well known that Napoleon did not leave large garrisons anywhere, simply, there was no need - all combat-ready Russian troops retreated to Moscow. There were garrisons in Jekabpils, Vilnius, Volokovysk, Minsk, Borisov, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk and Smolensk, but not 320,000 people! If this were so, then the retreating Napoleonic army, like a snowball, would wrap them around itself, and not 30,000 people, but 300,000 would go to the Berezina! However, this did not happen. If all these disappeared, plus recorded losses, are the true losses of the Napoleonic army, then this means that the losses amounted to 80% of the personnel.

For any army, this is a disaster, equivalent to a complete defeat. Yes, in general, and 60% loss is also tantamount to a disaster. Isn't it easier to assume that the number of Napoleon's army was 280,000 people? Or even less. Judging by the ratio of losses, it turns out two hundred and thirty thousand. The two active Russian armies had a total strength of 200,000 men. 120,000 people went to Borodin. (Some documents mention the figure - 157,000 people). Napoleon, of course, had to suffer heavy losses, because an advancing army always suffers heavy losses.

Why was the size of the Napoleonic army more than doubled? And by whom? Perhaps even by Kutuzov himself. After all, it is believed that he was a diligent student of Suvorov. It is known that after the assault on Ishmael, one of the officers asked the commander how many dead Turks should be indicated in the report? To which Suvorov, with his usual humor, replied: “There is nothing to regret about the Basurmans, write more ...” So such a perfect, such a rounded number appeared to the world - 100,000.

The identity of Suvorov himself is very mysterious - in the states he is known as George Washington (photo from a museum in the USA)

Count Suvarov of Rymnik. Imperial, Royal Field Marshal and General Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial (TROOPS) in Italy.

This is what the inscription on the portrait says. Did you notice anything unusual? The field marshal is imperial, tsarist, and what kind of power the tsar-emperor is not specified .. Why? Because it is already clear to everyone - one power, global peace?(blog author)

Although, perhaps this is taken from jokes about Suvorov - how could so many people be accommodated in Izmail? Or maybe later, long after the war, someone, in order to stick out the genius of Kutuzov, exaggerated the size of the Napoleonic army? This mystery is among other mysteries associated with the personality of Kutuzov.

Further, in the same textbook we read that 50,000 Napoleonic soldiers died on the Borodino field. 130,000 minus 50,000 turns out to be 80,000. And suddenly we read further that 100,000 Frenchmen are already retreating from Moscow, and 40,000 wagons with looted goods are following them. Where did another 60,000 soldiers come from if Napoleon did not receive reinforcements from France, and the roads to Moscow were cut by Russian troops, assuming that the stragglers pulled up.

In general, all these questions are rhetorical, since the entire history of the war of 1812 is built on memoirs, which in essence are lies, ... here and bred. And there are no other primary sources ...

I did not notice that I opened the unfinished note for reading. Thanks to those who asked perplexed questions: "It turns out that the army of Alexander Napoleon lost?"

No, the army of Alexander Napoleon DEFEATED the old power of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland (for those who read carefully, it’s easy to guess for themselves) and part of it remained in the occupied territory. But it is necessary to explain why Napoleon's army did not return from Russia, so the memoirists drew deranged nonsense, trying to virtually "kill" as many personnel as possible.

The invasion armies of Alexander and Napoleon go one after the other, in both the officers speak French, everyone has a terribly similar uniform (now experts distinguish nuances, but you won’t understand when you first see it). On the left is the "Russian" uniform of the troops of Alexander-1, on the right is the "French" uniform of the troops of Napoleon-1:

How many will immediately guess whose form it is:

And the peasants, in general, don’t care: the whites came - they rob, the reds came - they rob, and the blue ones also rob. And the peasants did not write memoirs, otherwise we would have learned something different from the opinions of those who are shown on the right and left.

Now it is clear why, before the war, Arakcheev, on the instructions of Alexander-1, tried the organization of military settlements? If the soldiers were local, from the militia, then after the war they can be sent back to their villages. And what about the excess of foreigners after the conquest, where do you order to go? Only in military settlements a la "military state farms". And there is nothing to sharpen a tooth on Arakcheev, he did everything right.

Murat could well have been Murad, some kind of local military leader who participated in the "cabal" .. For euphony, in the French manner, they changed the letter from U to Yu - it turned out to be quite nothing ..

Bagration - God Rati He(Kungurov's version) or Napoleon - On the field he(folk) that is - perhaps many names are taken from nowhere, from the lips, folk traditions, not names but titles, designations of figures .. Like Christ - not a name but a title, the Anointed One, or Genghis Khan, not a name but a title - Great Ruler.

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"ON THE POSOSHOK"- Pragmatics without lyrics, calculations (NOT) of the possibilities of the official version of the war of 1812.