7. Sometimes what is lacking in proper flank support is made up for by an intricate lunge to the rear. This is dangerous, because troops making such a detour, stuck on the line, create a jam and the enemy can cause great damage by setting his artillery at the corner of two extended lines. A powerful retreat behind the flank in dense columns, guarded to avoid attack, seems to satisfy the necessary conditions better than an intricate maneuver, but the nature of the terrain always becomes a decisive factor in choosing between the two methods. All details on this issue are given in the description of the battle near Prague (Chapter II of the Seven Years' War).

8. We must try in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but, as often happens, there are difficult situations in other sectors of the front, for example, such as a forced attack by the enemy on the center. Such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense, as was demonstrated at Malplac (1709) (at Malplac in Belgium on September 11, 1709, during the War of the Spanish Succession, a battle took place between the French army of Marshal Villars (90 thousand) and the Anglo-Austro -Dutch army of Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough (117 thousand).The French repelled all attacks of the enemy, who lost 25-30 thousand killed and wounded (French losses 14 thousand).However, Villar, himself seriously wounded, was forced to retreat, therefore it is believed that the allies won (all the more so since Villard was unable to release Mons, taken in October). Ed.) and Waterloo (1814). Large obstacles are not essential for this purpose, since the slightest difficulty on the ground is enough: for example, the insignificant river Paplot forced Ney to attack the center of Wellington's position, and not the left flank, as he was ordered.

When the defense is carried out in such a position, care must be taken to prepare for the movement of units hitherto covered by the flanks, so that they can take part in the fighting, instead of remaining idle observers.

However, one cannot fail to see that all these means are nothing but half-measures; and for an army on the defensive, it is best know how to go on the offensive at the right time, and go on the offensive. Among the satisfactory conditions for a defensive position is mentioned that which allows a free and safe withdrawal; and this brings us to the study of the question posed by the Battle of Waterloo. Would it be dangerous to withdraw an army with its rear in the woods and with good roads behind the center and each of its flanks, as Napoleon imagined, if it lost the battle? My personal opinion is that such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than a completely open field; it is impossible for a defeated army to cross the field without being exposed to great danger. Undoubtedly, if the withdrawal turns into a disorderly flight, the part of the artillery left in the battery in front of the forest will, in all probability, be lost; however, the infantry and cavalry and most of the artillery will be able to withdraw as easily as they would across the plain. Indeed, there is no better cover for a routine retreat than a forest. This assertion is made on the assumption that there are at least two good roads behind the front line, that proper withdrawal measures are taken before the enemy has the opportunity to press too close, and finally that the enemy does not manage to get in front of retreating army at the exit from the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden (here, in Bavaria, not far from Munich, on December 3, 1800, the French Army of the Rhine Moreau (56 thousand) defeated the Austrian Danube army of Archduke John (60 thousand). - Ed.). The retreat will be safer if, as at Waterloo, the forest forms a concave line behind the center, because this re-entry will become a bridgehead, which the troops will occupy and which will give them time to proceed in a given order along the main roads.

When discussing strategic operations, various possibilities were mentioned that open up two systems - defensive and offensive; and it was seen that, especially in strategy, an army that takes the initiative into its own hands has a great advantage in bringing up its troops and striking where it thinks it best to do so. At the same time, an army that operates on the defensive and expects an attack is ahead in any direction, is often taken by surprise and must always adapt to the actions of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages are not so noticeable, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller area, and the side that takes the initiative in its hands cannot conceal its movements from the enemy, who, having reconnoitered and quickly assessed the situation, can immediately counterattack with good reserves. Moreover, the side advancing on the enemy shows him all the shortcomings of his position, arising from the difficulties of the terrain, which he must pass before reaching the enemy's front. And even if it be a flat area, there are always such uneven terrain as ravines, dense forest areas, fences, individual farm houses, villages, etc., which must either be occupied or must be passed by them. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy batteries, whose fire must be endured, and the disorder which always accompanies the greater or lesser extension of the troop formations, exposed to constant enemy rifle or artillery fire. Considering the issue in the light of all these factors, we agree that in tactical operations, the advantage as a result of taking the initiative into one's own hands balances on the verge of disadvantages.

However, however undoubted these truths may be, there is another, even greater manifestation of them, which was demonstrated by the greatest events of history. Every army that strictly adheres to the defensive concept must, if attacked, at least be driven out of its position. Meanwhile, using all the advantages of the defensive system and being ready to repel an attack, if one occurs, the army can count on the greatest success. A general who stays in place to meet the enemy, adhering strictly to defensive combat, may fight just as bravely, but he will have to yield to a well-placed attack. The situation is different with the general, who, of course, expects the enemy, but with the intention of attacking him at the right moment in an offensive action. He is ready to wrest from the enemy and transfer to his own troops the morale that is always present when moving forward and is doubled by the introduction of the main forces into battle at the most important moment. This is absolutely impossible if only defensive actions are strictly adhered to.

In fact, the general who takes up a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has the advantage of watching the approach of the enemy. His forces, suitably arranged beforehand in position, supported by batteries placed so that their fire is most effective, can make the enemy pay dearly for his advance into the space between the two armies. And when the attacker, having suffered heavy losses, meets with a powerful attack at a moment when victory, it would seem, is already in his hands, in all likelihood, he will no longer have the advantage. For the morale of such a counterattack by the forces of the defending enemy, which is supposed to be almost defeated, is certainly sufficient to overwhelm the bravest troops.

Consequently, the general can use either the offensive or the defensive system with equal success in such battles. However, in the first place, far from being limited to passive defense, he must definitely know how to go on the offensive at a favorable moment. Secondly, his eye gauge must be faithful, and his composure is beyond doubt. Thirdly, he must be able to fully rely on his troops. Fourthly, in resuming the offensive, he should in no case neglect the application of the main principle that would regulate his battle schedule if he did so at the beginning of the battle. Fifth, he strikes at the decisive point. These truths are demonstrated by Napoleon's actions at Rivoli (1797) and Austerlitz (1805), as well as by Wellington at Talavera (1809), Salamanca (1812) and Waterloo (1815).

We understand by offensive battles those which an army wages by attacking another army in position. An army forced to resort to strategic defense often goes on the offensive by making an attack, and an army that meets an attack may go on the offensive in the course of the battle and gain the advantages associated with it. There are numerous examples of each of these types of battles in history. If in the previous paragraph defensive combat was discussed and the advantages of defense were pointed out, now we will move on to a discussion of offensive operations.

It must be admitted that the attacker as a whole has a moral advantage over the one who is attacked, and he almost always acts more intelligibly than the latter, who has to be in a state of greater or lesser uncertainty.

Once the decision has been made to attack the enemy, the order to attack must be given; and this is what I suppose it should be called combat schedule.

Quite often it also happens that a battle has to be started without a detailed plan, because the enemy's position is completely unknown. On the other hand, it should be well understood that on every battlefield there is a decisive point, the possession of which, more than any other, helps to secure victory, enabling him who holds it to properly apply the principles of war - therefore, preparation must be made for delivering a decisive blow on this point.

The decisive point of the battlefield is determined, as has already been pointed out, by the character of the position, the relation of the various sections of the terrain to the intended strategic goal, and, finally, by the disposition of the contending forces. For example, suppose that the enemy's flank is placed on a high ground from which access to his entire front line is open, then the occupation of this dominant high ground is tactically more important, but it may turn out that access to this position is very difficult and it is located so that which is the least important strategically. In the Battle of Bautzen (Bautzen) (here in Saxony, 8–9 (20–21) May 1813, the Russian-Prussian army of Wittgenstein (96 thousand, 636 guns) fought with the troops of Napoleon (143 thousand, 350 guns). Napoleon could not encircle and defeat the allies, who nevertheless withdrew beyond the river Lebau.The French lost 18 thousand, the allies 12 thousand, Napoleon was forced to conclude a truce (23.05 (4.06) - 29.07 (10.08) 1813), which became his big strategic mistake, because Austria and Sweden joined the anti-French coalition. Ed.) the left flank of the allies (Russians and Prussians) was located on the rather steep slopes of the low mountains of the Bohemian Forest, near the border of Austria (Bohemia was part of it), which at that time was more neutral than hostile. It seems that tactically the slope of these mountains was a decisive point in order to hold it when it was quite the opposite. The fact is that the allies had only one direction of retreat - to Reichenbach and Görlitz, and the French, putting pressure on the right flank, which was located on the plain, could cut this direction of retreat (Ney, who had a great superiority in strength, could not do this succeeded) and drive the allies into the mountains, where they could lose all military equipment and a significant part of the army personnel.

This course of action was also easier for them, taking into account the differences in the nature of the terrain, led to more important results and would reduce obstacles in the future.

The following truths may, I think, sum up what has already been said: 1) the topographic key to the battlefield is not always its tactical key; 2) the decisive point of the battlefield is definitely one that combines strategic and tactical advantages; 3) when the difficulties of the terrain do not greatly threaten the strategic point of the battlefield, then this is the most important point on the whole; 4) nevertheless it is true that the definition of this point depends very much on the disposition of the opposing forces. Thus, in overly extended and divided battle positions, the center will always be a suitable place to attack. In well-covered and interconnected positions, the center will be the strongest place, since, regardless of the reserves stationed there, it is easy to support it from the flanks - the decisive point in this case, therefore, will be one of the edges of the front line. When the numerical superiority is significant, an attack can be carried out simultaneously on both sides, but not in the case when the forces of the attackers are equal or inferior to those of the enemy. It is therefore evident that all combinations in battle consist in such application of available forces as to secure the most effective action in respect of whichever of the three points mentioned has the greatest chance of success. This point is fairly easy to determine by applying the analysis just mentioned.

The purpose of an offensive engagement can only be to drive the enemy out of position or to cut his front line, unless the strategic maneuver involves the complete destruction of his army. The enemy can be driven out either by knocking him over somewhere in his front, or by going around his flank so as to attack him from the flank and rear, or by using both of these methods at the same time, that is, by attacking him in the forehead, while one flank is covered and his front line is bypassed.

In order to achieve these various goals, it becomes necessary to select the most appropriate battle formation for the method to be used.

At least twelve battle formations can be listed, namely: 1) a simple linear order; 2) linear order with a defensive or offensive "hook"; 3) order with reinforced one or both flanks; 4) order with a reinforced center; 5) a simple oblique formation, or an oblique formation with a reinforced attacking wing; 6, 7) perpendicular order on one or both flanks; 8) concave order; 9) convex order;

10) echelon order on one or both flanks;

11) echelon order in the center; 12) order as a result of a powerful combined attack in the center and along the edges at the same time. (See Figure 5-16.)

Each of these formations can be used by itself or, as indicated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column with the intention of outflanking the enemy's front line. In order to properly assess the merits of each of them, it becomes necessary to test each of these orders by applying the main principles already stated.

For example, it is quite obvious that the linear order (Fig. 5) is the worst of all, because it does not require the skill of fighting one front against another, here battalion fights against battalion with equal chances of success for each side - no tactical skill in such no battle needed.

Rice. 5

However, in one essential case this order is suitable. This occurs when the army, taking the initiative in its own hands in large strategic operations, succeeds in attacking enemy communications and, cutting off the enemy's line of retreat, at the same time covers its own. When a battle takes place between them, the army that has gone behind the other can use a linear order, because, having effectively applied a decisive maneuver before the battle, it can now direct all its efforts to frustrate the enemy's attempts to open a way for itself to withdraw . With the exception of this single case, the linear order is the worst. I do not mean to say that the battle cannot be won using this order, because one side or the other must win if the confrontation continues. Then the advantage will be on the side of the one who has the best troops who knows best when to bring them into battle, who manages his reserve better and who is more likely to be lucky.

Linear formation with a hook to the flank (Fig. 6) is most often used in a defensive position. It can also be the result of an offensive combination, but the hook is directed to the front, while in the case of the defense it is directed to the rear. Battle near Prague (April 25 (May 6), 1757, here Frederick II defeated Brown's Austrians. - Ed.) is a very remarkable example of the danger to which such a hook is exposed if properly attacked.

A line formation with one flank reinforced (Fig. 7) or with a center (Fig. 8) to break through the corresponding sector of the enemy is much more favorable than the two previous ones, and even more so in accordance with the above fundamental principles. Despite this, if the opposing forces are approximately equal, then that part of the front line, which is weakened in order to strengthen its other part, will itself be threatened if it is located in one line parallel to the positions of the enemy.

Rice. 6

Rice. 7

Rice. eight

Rice. nine

Rice. ten

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The oblique formation (Fig. 9) is best when weaker forces attack outnumbered troops, because in addition to the advantage of concentrating the main forces on one section of the enemy’s front line, he has two equally significant advantages. The fact is that the weakened flank is not only pulled back to avoid an attack by the enemy, but also plays a dual role, supporting the positions of the part of its front line that is not under attack, and being at hand as a reserve to support, if necessary, leading the battle. flank. This order was applied by the illustrious Epaminondas in the battles of Leuctra (371 BC) and Mantinea (in 362 BC; Epaminondas, having won the victory, was mortally wounded. - Ed.). The most brilliant example of its use in modern times was that given by Frederick II the Great at the Battle of Leuthen on November 24 (December 5), 1757. (See Chapter VII of the Treatise on the Great Operations.)

Perpendicular order on one or two flanks, as seen in fig. 10 and 11 can only be considered as a formation to indicate the direction in which the first tactical movements in battle can be made. The two armies will never long occupy the relatively perpendicular positions shown in these figures, because if Army B were to take up its first position on a line perpendicular to one or both of the edges of Army A, the latter would at once change the front of its front line. Even if army B, as soon as it reaches edge A or beyond it, must, of necessity, turn its columns either to the right or to the left in order to draw them up to the enemy’s front line and thereby bypass it, as in point C, the result become two oblique lines, as shown in Fig. 10. The conclusion is that one division of the attacking army will take up a position perpendicular to the flank of the enemy, while the rest of the army will approach him from the front in order to commit harassing actions; and this always brings us back to one of the skew orders shown in fig. 9 and 16.

An attack on both flanks, whatever the type of attack being undertaken, can be very advantageous, but only if the attacker is clearly outnumbered. For if the fundamental principle is to bring the main body up to the decisive point, the weaker army will break it by directing an attack with divided forces against the superior forces of the enemy. This truth will be clearly illustrated below.

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Rice. 12a

The order, concave in the center (Fig. 12), found adherents from the day when Hannibal, using it, won the battle of Cannae. This order can indeed be very good when the course of the battle itself leads to it, that is, when the enemy attacks the center, which retreats in front of him, and the enemy himself finds himself flanked. But if this order is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of rushing to the center, will need to attack only the flanks, the edges of which protrude, and they will be relatively in exactly the same situation as if they were attacked in the flank. Therefore, such an order will hardly ever be used, except against an adversary who has adopted a convex order for fighting, as will be seen later.

The army rarely forms a semicircle, preferring a broken line with a retreating center (Fig. 12a.). According to some authors, such a formation ensured the victory of the British in the days of the famous battles of Crecy (Cressy) (1346) and Agincourt (1415). This formation is, of course, better than the semi-circle, as it does not open the flanks much to attack, while at the same time allowing advance in echelon and retaining all the advantages of concentrated fire. These advantages disappear if the enemy, instead of unwisely rushing to the retreating center, is content with observation from afar and throws all his forces on one flank. Esling in 1809 is an example of the advantageous use of a convex front, but it should not be concluded that Napoleon made a mistake in attacking the centre. After all, the fighting army, behind which was the Danube and which could not move without the cover of its bridges through which communications passed, cannot be judged as if it had complete freedom of maneuver.

A convex formation with a protruding center (Fig. 13) meets the requirements of the battle immediately after the crossing of the river, when the flanks must be withdrawn and left on the river to cover the bridges, and also when the defensive battle is fought with the river located in the rear, which needs to be forced, and cover the transition, like at Leipzig (1813). Finally, this formation can become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave front line. If the enemy directs his efforts to the center or to one flank, this order can lead to the defeat of the entire army.

Rice. thirteen

The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and it was successful, because the Prince of Coburg, instead of making a powerful attack on the center or edge, divided his attack into five or six divergent lines, and even more so in relation to two flanks at once. Almost the same convex order was adopted at Esling (Aspern) (1809) and on the second and third days of the famous battle of Leipzig. In the latter case, the result was as expected.

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The order of the echelon attack on both flanks (Fig. 14) is the same kind as the perpendicular order (Fig. 11), but better than that, because the echelons are at the closest distance from each other in the direction of where the reserve. In this case, the enemy would be less able, both due to lack of space and time, to throw forces into the gap in the center and threaten this area with a counterattack.

Rice. fifteen

The echelon formation in the center (Fig. 15) can be used especially successfully against an army that is too dispersed and stretched out, because in this case its center is somewhat isolated from the flanks and can easily be overturned. Thus, an army split in two is likely to be destroyed. But from the point of view of the same fundamental principle, this order of attack will prove less promising for success against an army with a connected and unbroken front line. Because the reserve, mostly located close to the center, and the flanks, able to act, either by concentrating their fire or moving against the forward echelons, could well repulse their attack.

If this construction to a certain extent reflects the famous triangular wedge or “pig” of the ancients and Winkelried’s column (obviously, this is Winkelried, who ensured the victory of the Swiss at the Battle of Sempach (1386): taking several enemy spears of the defending Habsburg warriors in an armful, he plunged them into his own chest and fell, and his comrades broke into the enemy line. Ed.), it also differs significantly from them. Indeed, instead of forming one dense mass, which is impractical today, given the use of artillery, it assumed a large open space in the middle, which facilitated movement. This formation is suitable, as already stated, for driving into the center of an overextended front line, and can be just as successful against an inevitably fixed line. However, if the flanks of the attacked front are brought up in time against the flanks of the advanced echelons of the attacking wedge, the consequences can be disastrous. The line formation, greatly reinforced in the center, may perhaps turn out to be a much better formation (Fig. 8, 16), because the linear front in this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to the place of attack and would prevent the flanks from attacking the echeloned flank center. The echelon order was adopted by Laudon to attack the Bunzelwitz camp fortified with trenches (Treatise on Great Operations, chapter XXVIII). In this case, it is quite suitable, because then it is clear that the defending army is forced to remain on its fortifications, there is no danger of its echelons attacking the flank. But this formation has the disadvantage of indicating to the enemy the place of his front which one wishes to attack, in which case a feigned attack on the flanks should be made in order to mislead him as to the true place of the attack.

Rice. sixteen

The battle order of attack in columns in relation to the center and at the same time to the edge (Fig. 16) is better than the previous order, especially in attacking a tightly united and inseparable enemy front line. It can even be called the most expedient of all battle formations. The attack of the center, with the support of the flank while enveloping the enemy from the flank, does not allow the attacked side to fall on the attacker and strike him in the flank, as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Sachs. The flank of the enemy, which is pinned down by attacks from the center and edge and forced to resist almost all the forces of the opposing side, will be routed and probably destroyed. It was this maneuver that secured Napoleon's victories at Wagram in 1809 and Ligny in 1814. He wanted to try to carry it out at Borodino, where he had only partial success due to the heroic actions of the Russian left flank and, in particular, Paskevich's division (26th Infantry) on the famous central redoubt (Raevsky's battery. - Ed.), and also because of the arrival of Baggovut's corps on the flank, which Napoleon hoped to bypass.

He also used it at Bautzen (Bautzen) in 1813, where unprecedented success could have been achieved, but due to an accident as a result of a maneuver on the left flank with the intention of cutting off the allies from the road to Wurshen (this "accident" is the heroic defense of Barclay's troops -de Tolly and Lanskoy on the right flank of the position of the allied army, which did not allow Napoleon to carry out what was planned (with the overwhelming numerical superiority of Ney's French here). Ed.) all subsequent actions were based on this fact.

It should be noted that these various orders are not to be understood exactly in the same way as the geometrical figures which reflect them. The commander who thinks that he will build his front as smoothly as on paper or on the parade ground will make a big mistake and, most likely, will be defeated. This is especially true of the battles that are being waged now. In the time of Louis XIV or Frederick II it was possible to form a front line almost as level as geometric figures. The reason is that the armies set up tent camps, almost always closely adjacent to each other, and saw each other for several days, thus giving enough time for the roads to be opened and space cleared to allow the columns to be at a measured distance from each other. . But in our day, when armies bivouack, when their distribution among several corps gives much greater mobility, when they take up position close to each other, obeying orders given to them and at the same time out of sight of the commander, when there is often no time for careful study enemy positions, and finally, when different branches of the troops are mixed on the front line, in such circumstances any battle formations are inapplicable. These figures have never been anything but an indication of the approximate alignment of forces.

If each army were a solid mass capable of moving under the influence of the will of one man, and as fast as thought, the art of winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most advantageous battle formation, and the general could rely on the success of a pre-planned maneuver. But the facts speak quite differently; the great difficulties with tactics in battles always force the unconditional simultaneous introduction into hostilities of many detachments, the efforts of which must be combined in such a way as to carry out a planned attack, since the will in the execution of the plan gives more opportunities to hope for victory. In other words, the main difficulty is to get these detachments to combine their efforts in carrying out a decisive maneuver, which, in accordance with the original plan of battle, is designed to lead to victory.

Inaccurate transmission of orders, how they will be understood and carried out by subordinates of the commander-in-chief, excessive activity among some, lack of it among others, incorrect assessment of the situation - all this can interfere with the simultaneous introduction into battle various parts not to mention unforeseen circumstances that may delay or disrupt the arrival of troops at their designated location.

From this we can deduce two undoubted truths: 1) the simpler the decisive maneuver, the greater the certainty of success; 2) unexpected maneuvers, timely made during the fighting, are more likely to lead to success than those determined in advance, unless the latter are linked to previous strategic movements that bring up columns designed to decide the outcome of the day in those places where they presence will provide the expected result. Evidence of this is Waterloo and Bautzen (Bautzen). From the moment that the Prussians of Blücher and Bülow reached the height of Fishemont at Waterloo, nothing could prevent the defeat of the French in the battle, and they only had to fight to make it not so crushing. Similarly, at Bautzen (Bautzen), as soon as Ney captured Clix (on the river Spree), only the withdrawal of the Allies on the night of May 21st could save their troops, because on the afternoon of the 21st it would have been too late. And if Ney had acted better and done what he was advised to do, a great victory would have been won.

As for maneuvers to break through the front line and calculations for the interaction of columns moving from the general front of the army, with the intention of carrying out large detour maneuvers into the enemy's flank, it can be argued that their result is always in doubt. The fact is that it depends on such exact execution of carefully drawn up plans, which is rare. This subject will be dealt with in paragraph XXXII.

In addition to the difficulties that depend on the exact application of the order of battle adopted in advance, it often happens that battles begin even without a sufficiently precise object of attack by the attacker, although a collision is quite expected. This uncertainty is the result either of the circumstances preceding the battle, the neglect of the position and plans of the enemy, or the fact that part of the army's forces are still expected to arrive on the battlefield.

From this, many conclude that it is not possible to escape to different systems of formations of battle formations, or that the adoption of any of the battle formations at all can affect the outcome of hostilities. In my opinion, this conclusion is erroneous, even in the above cases. Indeed, in battles begun according to some elaborate plan, there is a possibility that at the beginning of hostilities the armies will take up almost parallel and more or less fortified positions in some place. The side operating on the defensive, not knowing where the assault will fall on it, will keep a significant part of its forces in reserve, to be used if circumstances so require. The attacking side must make the same effort to ensure that its forces are always at hand. However, as soon as the object of attack is determined, a large mass of its troops will be directed against the center or one of the flanks of the enemy, or against both at once. Whatever the resulting construction, it will always reflect one of the figures presented above. Even in unexpected combat actions the same thing will happen, which will hopefully be sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of various systems of battle formations is neither fantastic nor useless.

There is nothing even in the Napoleonic Wars to disprove my assertion, although they can be represented less than any other as neatly laid out lines. However, we see that at Rivoli (1797), at Austerlitz (1805) and Regensburg (1809), Napoleon concentrated his forces towards the center in order to be ready to attack the enemy at an opportune moment. In the Battle of the Pyramids in Egypt in 1798, he formed an oblique square line in the echelon. Under Leipzig (1813), Esling (1809) and Brienne (1814) he applied a kind of very similar convex order (see Fig. 11). Under Wagram (1809) his order was very similar (see Fig. 16), pulling two masses of troops to the center and right edge, while at the same time pulling back the left flank. And he wanted to repeat the same thing at Borodino in 1812 and at Waterloo in 1815 (before the Prussians arrived to help Wellington). Although at Preussisch-Eylau (1807), the course of the battle was almost unpredictable, given the very unexpected return and offensive actions of the Russians. Here Napoleon flanked their left edge almost perpendicularly, while in another direction he sought to break through the center, but these attacks were not simultaneous. The attack on the center was repulsed at eleven o'clock, while Davout did not attack the Russian left flank vigorously enough until the center was attacked. At Dresden in 1813, Napoleon attacked with two flanks, perhaps for the first time in his life, because his center was covered by fortifications and a camp fortified with trenches. In addition, the attack on its left edge coincided with Vandam's attack on the direction of the enemy's withdrawal.

Under Marengo (1800), if we talk about the merit of Napoleon himself, his chosen oblique order, with the right flank located at Castelcheriole, saved him from an almost inevitable defeat. The battles of Ulm (1805) and Jena (1806) were battles won by strategy before they began, and tactics had little to do with it. At Ulm there was not even an ordinary battle.

I think that we can conclude from this that, even if it seems absurd to want to place battle formations on the ground in such regular lines with which they were indicated on the diagram, an experienced commander can nevertheless keep the above orders in mind and can place his troops in this way on the battlefield that their arrangement would be similar to one of these battle formations. He should strive in all his combinations, in an arbitrary or accepted arrangement along the way, to come to a sound conclusion regarding the key point of a particular battlefield. And this can only be done by carefully considering the direction of the enemy's battle formation and acting in the direction that the strategy requires of him. Then the general will turn his attention and efforts to that point, using a third of his strength to control the enemy or follow his movements, while at the same time throwing two-thirds of his strength on the point, the possession of which will ensure his victory. Acting in this way, he will be satisfied with all the conditions that the science of grand tactics places on him, and will apply the principles of the art of war in the most irreproachable manner. The method of determining the decisive point of the battlefield is described in the previous chapter (paragraph XIX).

After considering twelve formations of battle, it occurred to me that it would be appropriate to answer some of the statements in General Montolon's Memoirs of Napoleon. The famous military leader seems to regard the oblique order as a modern invention, an opinion which I do not at all share, because the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I myself have seen it used. This statement of Napoleon seems more remarkable, because Napoleon himself boasted that he used it under Marengo - the very order, the existence of which he now denies.

If we understand that the oblique order must be applied strictly and precisely, as General Rüchel suggested (crushed in 1806 near Jena. - Ed.) in the Berlin school, Napoleon was, of course, right in considering this an absurdity. But I repeat that the battle position has never been a regular geometric figure, and when such figures are used in the discussion of tactical combinations, this can only be done in order to express an idea in a certain way, using a known symbol. It is true, however, that every battle formation which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy must necessarily be oblique. If one army attacks the flank of another army, then the attacking flank is reinforced by a large mass of troops, while the weakened flank is kept drawn back, avoiding attack. The direction of the combat disposition, by necessity, must be somewhat oblique, since one end of it will be closer to the enemy than the other. The oblique formation is so far from a flight of fancy that we see that it is used in a layered battle formation on one flank (Fig. 14).

With regard to the other battle formations discussed above, it cannot be denied that at Esling (Aspern) in 1809 and Fleurus in 1794, a concave line corresponded to the general formation among the Austrians and that among the French it was convex. In these formations, parallel lines may be used in the case of straight lines, and they will be classified as belonging to a linear order of battle when neither section of the line is filled more than the other and is not closer to the enemy than the other.

Postponing for the time being further consideration of these geometric figures, it can be seen that for the purpose of conducting combat according to science, the following provisions cannot be avoided:

1. The offensive battle formation should have as its goal the expulsion of the enemy from his position by expedient means.

2. The maneuvers indicated in the art of war are those carried out with the intention of taking possession of only one flank, or the center and one flank at a time. The enemy can also be driven out by enveloping (flanking) maneuvers and bypassing his position.

3. These attempts have a high probability of success if they remain hidden from the enemy until the very last moment of the attack.

4. Attacking the center and both flanks at the same time, in the absence of a significant superiority of forces, will be completely contrary to the rules of the art of war, unless one of these attacks is very powerful, without too much weakening the front line elsewhere.

5. The oblique battle formation has no other purpose than to unite at least half of the forces of the army in an overwhelming attack on the flank of the enemy, while the rest of the forces are drawn back from the danger of attack, and are organized either in echeloned battle formation or deployed in a single oblique line.

6. Various battle formations: convex, concave, perpendicular or otherwise - they can all differ in the presence of positions of the same strength along their entire length or the concentration of troops in one place.

7. The purpose of the defense, which is to frustrate the plans of the attacking side, the organization of the corresponding defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the defensive position and to keep a strong reserve at hand, well hidden and ready to fall at the decisive moment on the place where the enemy least expects this.

8. It is difficult to say with certainty what method is best used to force the enemy army to leave their positions. An impeccable order of battle will be one that combines the double advantage of firepower and the morale of an attack. A skillful combination of deployed battle formations and columns acting alternately, as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. In the practical application of this system, many variations may arise due to differences in the eye. (coup-d "oeil) commanders, the morale of officers and soldiers, their knowledge of the maneuvers carried out and the conduct of all types of fire, due to differences in the nature of the terrain, etc.

9. Since in offensive combat the main task is to dislodge the enemy from his position and cut him off as thoroughly as possible from the escape routes, the best way to accomplish this task is to concentrate as much manpower and equipment against him as possible. However, it sometimes happens that the benefit of the direct use of the main body is doubtful, and the best results can be obtained by maneuvers to envelop and bypass the flank closest to the enemy's line of retreat. He can, in the event of such a threat, retreat and fight stubbornly and successfully if attacked by the main body.

There are many examples in history of the successful implementation of such maneuvers, especially when they were used against weak generals, and although the victories achieved in this way are on the whole less significant, and the enemy army was not so much demoralized, such successful, although incomplete actions, are of no small importance. value and should not be neglected. The experienced general must know how to use the means at his disposal to achieve these victories when an opportunity arises for this; and especially he should combine envelopment and detours with the attacks of the main body.

10. A combination of these two methods - namely, an attack on the center with the main body and a flanking maneuver - will bring victory rather than using each of them separately. But in any case, too extended orders of movement should be avoided, even in the presence of an insignificant enemy.

11. The method of driving the enemy out of his position by the main forces is as follows: confusing his troops with strong and well-aimed artillery fire, intensifying his confusion with energetic cavalry actions and consolidating the advantage gained by moving forward large masses of infantry, well covered in front by arrows in the chain and cavalry from the flanks.

But while we can expect success following such an attack on the first enemy line, the second has yet to be overcome, and after that - the reserve. In this phase of hostilities, the attacking side usually encounters serious difficulties, the morale impact of defeating the enemy on the first line does not necessarily lead to his retreat from the second line, and as a result, the commander of the troops often loses his presence of mind. Indeed, the attacking troops usually advance somewhat erratically, however victoriously, and it is always very difficult to replace them with those who advance in the second echelon, because the second line usually follows the first at gunshot range. Therefore, in the heat of battle, difficulties always arise in replacing one division with another - at a time when the enemy is exerting all his strength to repel the attack.

These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the troops of the defending army are equally active in their duty and keep their presence of mind, if there is no threat to their flanks and the direction of withdrawal, in the next phase of the battle the advantage will usually be on their side. However, in order to achieve and consolidate this result, the second echelon and the cavalry of the defenders must at the right moment be thrown against the successfully operating enemy battalions. After all, the loss of a few minutes can become an irreparable mistake, and the confusion of the first echelon that has been attacked can spread to the second echelon.

12. From the foregoing facts, the following indisputable conclusion can be drawn: "The most difficult to apply, as well as the surest of all means that an attacker can use to win, consists in the strong support of the first line by the troops of the second line, and this last - reserve. And also in the skillful use of cavalry detachments and artillery batteries to provide support in delivering a decisive blow to the enemy's second line. This is the greatest of all the problems of tactics in combat.

At this important turning point in battles, theory becomes a vague guide because it is no longer suited to the urgency of the situation and can never be compared in value to natural warfare talent. It will not be a full-fledged replacement for that intuitive, acquired in many battles. eye, which is characteristic of a commander distinguished by his courage and composure.

The simultaneous engagement of a large number of all branches of the armed forces, with the exception of a small reserve from each of them, which must always be at hand, will, therefore, at the critical moment of the battle, be a problem that every experienced general will try to solve and to which he should give his whole attention. . This critical moment usually comes when the front lines of both sides have entered the fray and the rivals are exerting all their efforts, on the one hand, to complete the matter with victory, and on the other, to take it away from the enemy. It hardly needs to be said that in order to strike the decisive blow most thoroughly and effectively, it is very advantageous to simultaneously attack the enemy's flank.

13. In defense, small arms fire can be used much more effectively than in an offensive. March to the defensive position of the enemy with simultaneous firing can be carried out only by arrows in a chain, but for the main masses of the advancing troops this is impossible.

Since the purpose of the defense is to break and confuse the attacking troops, the fire from rifles and artillery will be a natural defensive means of the first line, and if the enemy approaches too close, columns of the second line and part of the cavalry should be thrown against him. Then there will be a high probability that the attack will be repulsed.

We have spoken in the previous paragraph of the maneuvers to envelop and outflank the front of the enemy on the battlefield, and of the advantages to be expected from them. It remains to say a few words about the wide detours into which these maneuvers sometimes turn, which lead to the failure of so many seemingly well-planned plans.

It can be deduced as a principle that any movement is dangerous, which is so extended as to give the enemy the opportunity, if it appears, to break the rest of the army into position. However, since the danger largely depends on the speed and decisiveness of the strike of the opposing commander with verified accuracy, as well as on the manner of fighting to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind fail some commanders and succeed others. , and also why such a movement, which would be dangerous in the presence of Frederick II, Napoleon, or Wellington, could be completely successful against a general of limited ability who cannot launch an attack at the right moment, or who himself is in the habit of making movements in such a manner. It therefore seems difficult to lay down a rigid rule on the subject. The following instructions are all that can be given. Keep large masses of troops on hand and ready to act at the right moment, but be alert to avoid the danger of amassing troops in too large formations. A commander with these precautions in mind will always be ready for any eventuality. If the commander of the enemy side shows less skill and tends to be fond of extended movements, his opponent can be considered lucky.

A few examples from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements and show him how much the results of these extended movements depend on the character of the general and the armies involved in them.

AT Seven Years' War Frederick II won the Battle of Prague (1757) because the Austrians left a thinly defended gap of a thousand yards between the right flank and the rest of the army. The latter remained motionless while the right flank was attacked. This omission was all the more unusual since the Austrian left had a much shorter distance to support the right flank than Frederick, who was supposed to attack it. The fact is that the right flank of the Austrians had the shape of a hook, and Frederick had to move along the arc of a large semicircle in order to get to it. On the other hand, Frederick almost lost the Battle of Torgau (November 3, 1760) because he overstretched (almost six miles) his left flank, which was disunited in its movement, bypassing the right flank of Marshal Daun with few forces. Mollendorf drew up the right flank in a concentric movement towards the heights of Siplitz, where he joined up with the king, whose position was thus rearranged.

The Battle of Rivoli (1797) is a notable example in this regard. Everyone who is well acquainted with this battle knows that Alvintzi and his chief of staff, Weyrother, wanted to encircle Napoleon's small army, which was concentrated on the Rivoli plateau. Their center was destroyed, while the troops of their left flank massed in the ravines near the Adige, and Lusignan with his right flank made a wide detour to reach the rear of the French army, where he was immediately surrounded and taken prisoner.

No one will forget the day at Stockach in 1799, when Jourdan had the absurd idea of ​​attacking a combined army of sixty thousand men with three small divisions of seven or eight thousand men, separated by several leagues. Meanwhile, Saint-Cyr, with a third of his army (thirteen thousand men), had to go twelve miles behind the right flank and go to the rear of this sixty thousandth army, which inevitably emerged victorious over these divided detachments, and of course with the capture of part of them in his rear. That Saint-Cyr managed to retreat was truly a miracle.

We may recall how the same General Weyrother, who wanted to encircle Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver in 1805 at Austerlitz, in spite of the harsh lesson he had learned. The left flank of the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right wing in order to cut it off from Vienna (where he was not eager to return), by a circular maneuver of almost six miles opened a gap of one and a half miles in his front line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, attacked the center and surrounded the left flank of the Russian-Austrian army, which was completely squeezed between the lakes Telnitz and Melnitz.

Wellington won the Battle of Salamanca (1812) in a maneuver very similar to that of Napoleon, because Marmont, who wanted to cut off his retreat to Portugal, opened a gap of a mile and a half in his line, seeing which the English general completely destroyed Marmont's unsupported left flank.

If Weyrother at Rivoli or Austerlitz had opposed not Napoleon but Jourdan, he could have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering a complete defeat in each case. For a general who, at Stockach, attacked a force of sixty thousand soldiers with his four military formations so scattered that they were unable to give each other mutual support, could not know how to gain sufficient advantage from the wide flanking maneuver carried out with his participation. . Similarly, Marmont was unlucky - he met an enemy at Salamanca, whose main advantage was quick to use and verified tactical eye gauge. With the Duke of York or Moore as opponents, Marmont would probably have emerged victorious.

Among the detours that have become successful in our day, the most brilliant in results were those made at Waterloo (1815) and Hohenlinden (1800). The first of these was almost entirely a strategic operation, and it was accompanied by a rare coincidence of favorable circumstances. As for Hohenlinden, we shall search in vain in military history another example of when a brigade alone ventured into the forest and found itself among the enemy’s fifty thousand troops, which did not prevent it from performing the same impressive feat as the French general Rishpans did in the Matenpoet Gorge, where, in all probability, one could expect that he will lay down his arms.

At Wagram, the corps under the command of Davout, covering the flank of the enemy, greatly contributed to the successful outcome of the day, but if the center of the Austrian troops under the command of MacDonald, Oudinot and Bernadotte did not provide timely support with an energetic attack, it is not at all necessary that a similar result would have been achieved in the end. success.

Such a multitude of contradictory results may lead to the conclusion that no rule can be deduced on the subject. However, this opinion is erroneous; it is obvious that by making it a rule to use a well-knit and well-coordinated order of battle, the general will be ready for any emergency and little is left to chance. But it is especially important for him to have a correct assessment of his opponent's character and his usual style of fighting - this will allow him to adapt his own actions to this style of fighting. In the case of superior numbers or superior discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent if the forces or abilities of the commanders were equal. The flank and flank maneuver should be combined with other attacks and the possibility of timely support that the rest of the army on the enemy front could try to provide, either against the flank and flank or against the center. Finally, strategic operations to cut off the enemy's line of communication before giving him battle, and an attack in his rear, the advance of an army covering his own line of retreat, are most likely to be successful and effective, and moreover, they do not require during the battle isolated maneuver.

The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives rise to one of the most impressive episodes in the war.

In most battles, one side awaits its opponent in a pre-selected position, which is attacked after reconnaissance carried out as close to the enemy as possible and as carefully as possible. However, it often happens, especially when the war is already underway, that two armies approach each other, and each of them intends to suddenly attack the opponent. The clash follows unexpectedly for both armies, since each of them finds the other where it does not expect to meet it. One army can also be attacked by another that has prepared a surprise for it, as happened to the French at Rosbach (1757).

Accidents of this kind require from the general all his genius of an experienced commander and warrior capable of controlling events. It is always possible to win a battle with brave troops, even where the commander may not have great abilities, but victories like those won at Lützen (April 20 (May 2), 1813) Napoleon, having 150-160 thousand against 92 thousand of the Russian-Prussian army, won an inexpressive victory (losses of killed and wounded 15 thousand from Napoleon and 12 thousand from the allies).The allied army retreated under pressure from a numerically superior enemy, covering its flanks. Ed.), Luzzare (1802, where the French (Duke of Vendôme) managed to stop the Austrians. – Ed.), Preussisch-Eylau (in this battle in 1806, both sides called themselves winners. The Russians lost 26 thousand, Napoleon - 23 thousand. - Ed.), Abensberg (1809) can only be won by brilliant geniuses with great composure and using the smartest combinations.

The probability of such random battles is so great that it is not at all easy to state the exact rules corresponding to them. But this is the case when it is necessary to see clearly before one's eyes the fundamental principles of the art and the various methods of applying them in order to properly arrange a maneuver, the decision on which must be made instantly and amid the roar and clang of weapons.

Two armies, marching as usual with all their camp equipment, and suddenly meeting each other, at first can do nothing better than turn their vanguard to the right or left of the road they are passing through. In each of the armies, the forces must be concentrated in such a way that they can be thrown in a suitable direction, taking into account the purpose of the march. It would be a grave mistake to deploy the whole army behind the vanguard, because even if the deployment were made, the result would be nothing more than a badly organized parallel order. And if the enemy made a sufficiently energetic attack on the vanguard, the result could be a disorderly flight of the troops lining up (see the account of the battle of Rosbach, "Treatise on great military operations").

In the modern system, when armies move more easily, march along several roads, and are divided into groups of troops that can act independently, this disorderly flight is not to be especially feared, but the principles remain unchanged. The vanguard must always be stopped and brought into battle order, and then the bulk of the troops must concentrate in the direction that is best suited to achieve the goal of the march. Whatever maneuvers the enemy then tries to take, everyone will be on alert to meet him.

I shall not here speak of the surprises created by small detachments, which are among the main features in partisan and flying warfare to which the Russian and Turkish light cavalry are so accustomed. I will confine myself to considering surprises for entire armies.

Before the invention of firearms, the surprise factor was more easily effective than it is at present, because artillery and rifle shots are heard at such a great distance that it is almost impossible for an army to be surprised. Unless the primary duty, the combat protection of the main forces, is forgotten, and the enemy is among the army units before his presence is detected due to the lack of advanced posts that should sound the alarm.

The Seven Years' War provides an unforgettable example of the sudden action at Hochkirch (1758) (the Austrians defeated Frederick II, and had it not been for the subsequent slowness of their commander Daun, they could have completely destroyed his army. - Ed.). They show that surprise does not consist simply in attacking troops who are sleeping or poorly observing, but that it can be the result of a combination of surprise attack and encirclement of the edge of the army. Indeed, to take an army by surprise, it is not at all necessary that its troops should not even leave their tents unknowingly, it is important to attack it with a significant force in a certain place before preparations can be made to repel the attack.

Since armies these days seldom camp in tents when they march, prepared surprises are rare and difficult to carry out, because in order to plan such an attack, it becomes necessary to have accurate knowledge of the enemy camp. Under Marengo, Lützen and Preussisch-Eylau there was something of a surprise, but the term should only be applied to a completely unexpected attack. The only big surprise that can be cited as an example was the incident near Tarutin (on the Chernishna River on October 6 (18) in 1812, where Murat (26 thousand) was suddenly attacked and defeated by Bennigsen. To justify his carelessness, Murat pretended that there was a short truce, but in fact there was nothing of the kind, and he was taken by surprise because of his negligence (it could have been much worse if it were not for the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian columns that got lost in the forest. - Ed.).

Obviously, the most successful way to attack an army is to fall on its camp just before dawn, at a moment when nothing like this is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly occur, and if the attacker has accurate knowledge of the locality and can give the right tactical and strategic direction to the masses of his troops, he can count on complete success, unless unforeseen events occur. This is the kind of operation that should by no means be neglected in war, though rare and less remarkable than the grand strategic combination that secures victory even before the battle has begun.

For the same reason that advantage must be gained from all possibilities of taking the enemy by surprise, the necessary precautions must be taken to prevent the same attacks. In the regulations for the management of a well-organized army, measures should be indicated to prevent them.

There are many places with fortifications, which, although not ordinary fortresses, are considered safe from surprise attacks, but nevertheless they can be taken by escalade (i.e., with the help of assault ladders), or by assault, or by making breaches. This is quite burdensome, since the fortifications are so steep that the use of ladders or some other means is required to reach the parapet. When attacking this kind of place, almost the same combinations appear as when attacking a camp fortified with trenches, because both of them belong to the class surprise attacks. This type of attack will differ depending on the circumstances: firstly, on the strength of the structures; secondly, from the nature of the area on which they are erected; thirdly, on how isolated they are from each other or communicate with each other; fourth, on the morale of the parties involved. History gives us examples of all their diversity.

Examples include the trenched camps of Kehl, Dresden and Warsaw, the positions of Turin and Mainz, the field fortifications of Feldkirch, Scharnitz and Assietta. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with different circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the field fortifications were better connected and better built than at Warsaw. There really was a bridgehead almost equal to a permanent fortification, because the Archduke considered that he must besiege it in accordance with all the rules and it was extremely dangerous for him to go on an open attack. Near Warsaw, the buildings were scattered, but quite impressive and had as a citadel Big City, surrounded by walls with loopholes, with appropriate weapons and protected by a detachment of desperate soldiers. In Dresden in 1813, a fortified fortress wall was used as a citadel, part of which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than that suitable for field structures. The camp itself was protected by simple redoubts at a considerable distance from each other. They were built very mediocre, with the expectation of the citadel as the only powerful fortification.

Mainz and Turin had solid circumvalence lines, but in the first case they were heavily fortified, and they were certainly not the same at Turin, where at one of the important points there was a slight parapet rising three feet, and a ditch of appropriate depth. . In the latter case, the defensive lines were caught between two fires, as they were attacked from the rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene of Savoy stormed them from the outside. At Mainz, the lines were attacked head-on, only a small detachment managed to bypass the right flank.

There are few tactical measures taken when attacking field fortifications. It seems probable that the defenders of the fortification could be taken by surprise if attacked shortly before daylight; it is entirely appropriate to try this. However, if this operation can be recommended in the event of an attack on an isolated fortification, it cannot be expected that a large army occupying a trenched camp will allow itself to be taken by surprise, considering that the regulations of all services require armies to be in combat readiness at dawn. Since an attack by the main body seems to be a possible method to be applied in such a case, the following simple and expedient guidelines are given:

1. Silence the cannons of the fortification with powerful artillery fire, which simultaneously has the effect of suppressing the strength of the defenders' morale.

2. Provide the troops with all the necessary equipment (such as fascines and short ladders) to enable them to cross the ditch and climb the parapet.

3. Direct three small columns towards the fortification to be taken, with skirmishers in line ahead of them, and with reserves at hand to support them.

4. Take advantage of every uneven ground to cover troops and keep troops under cover as long as possible.

5. Give detailed instructions to the leading columns as to their tasks, when the fortification will be taken, and how to attack the troops occupying the camp. Designate units of cavalry to support the attack of these troops, if the terrain permits. When all these organizational measures have been taken, there is nothing else left but to throw troops into the attack as vigorously as possible, while one detachment makes an attempt to break through at the gorge (rear part of the fortification. - Ed.). Hesitation and delay in such a case are worse than the most desperate vehemence.

Those gymnastic exercises are very useful, which prepare soldiers for escalades and overcoming obstacles; and military engineers may profitably devote their attention to providing means to facilitate crossing the ditches of field works and climbing their parapets.

Among the organizational measures in cases of this kind that I have studied, there was no better than those adopted for the assault on Warsaw and the fortified camp near Mainz. Tilke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions for attacking the Bunzelwitz camp. Although this attack was never carried out, the disposition provides an excellent model for instruction. The assault on Warsaw (September 6-8, 1831, according to a new style) can be cited as an example as one of the brilliant operations of this kind, and does honor to Field Marshal Paskevich and the troops who carried it out. As another example (not to follow) it is necessary to recall the organizational measures taken for the attack on Dresden in 1813 (leading to the defeat of the allied army. - Ed.).

Among the attacks of this type we can mention the unforgettable assaults or escalades of the port of Mahon on the island of Menorca in 1756 and Bergenop Zoom in 1747. Both were preceded by sieges, but still there was a brilliant surprise attack, for in neither case was the breach large enough for a conventional assault.

Continuous lines of trenches, though at first sight better communicated with each other than lines of divided fortifications, are much easier to take, because they can extend for several leagues, and it is almost impossible to prevent the attackers from breaking through them at any point. The capture of the defense lines of Mainz and Wissembourg, which is described in the History of the Wars of the Revolution (chapters XXI and XXII), and the defense lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, can be considered excellent lessons for study.

This famous case of Turin, which is so often referred to, is so familiar to all readers that it is not necessary to return to its details, but I cannot pass it by without noticing how easily the victory was bought and how little was to be expected from it. The strategic plan was, of course, admirable, and the march from the Adige through Piacenza to Asti on the left bank of the Po, leaving the French at the Mincio, was excellently prepared, but extremely slow in execution. If we turn to operations near Turin in 1706, we must recognize that the victors should rather thank luck than their wisdom. It did not take a great effort of genius from Prince Eugene of Savoy to prepare the order he gave to his army. The prince must have had a strong feeling of contempt for his opponents, marching with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand French on one side and the Alps on the other, and passing around their camp for forty-eight hours in the most remarkable flanking march that has ever been attempted. The order to attack was so brief and so devoid of direction that any staff officer in our day would have made a better order. Directing formations of eight columns of infantry, brigade-by-brigade, into two lines, giving them the order to take the fortifications and make gaps in them for the cavalry to pass into the camp - all these actions constituted the whole set of art demonstrated by Eugene in order to carry out his hasty enterprise. It is true that he chose a weak point of fortification, where it was too low and covered only half the torso of his defenders. But I am getting away from my subject and must return to the measures most appropriate to take when attacking positions. If they (the defenders) have enough obstacles prepared to make it difficult to storm them, and if, on the other hand, they can be outflanked or outflanked by a strategic maneuver, it is much better to follow the above course of action than to try to make a dangerous assault. . If, however, there is any reason for preferring an assault, it must be made towards one of the flanks, because the center is the point most easily supported. There have been times when an attack on one flank was expected by the defenders, and they were misled by a feigned attack of that place, while the real attack was in the center and succeeded simply because it was unexpected. In such operations, the terrain and the nature of the fighting commanders must be of decisive importance in determining what course of action is to be followed.

The attack can be carried out in such a way as it was described for camps fortified with trenches. However, sometimes it happens that these lines have barriers characteristic of permanent fortifications; and in this case the escalade would be very difficult, unless it is old earthen fortifications, the slopes of which have been flattened with time and made accessible to infantry with moderate activity. The ramparts of Ishmael and Prague are of this nature; so was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevich defended so brilliantly from Ney, because he preferred to take a position in the ravine ahead, and not take cover behind a parapet with a slope of barely thirty degrees.

If one edge of the front line is on the river, it seems absurd to think of penetrating its flank, because the enemy, gathering his forces, a large mass of which will be near the center, can crush the columns advancing between the center and the river, and completely destroy them. However, this ridiculous situation sometimes led to success, because the enemy, pushed behind his lines, rarely thinks of counterattacking the attacker, no matter how advantageous his position may seem. The general and the soldiers who seek shelter behind the lines are already half defeated, and the idea of ​​going on the offensive does not occur to them when their fortifications are attacked. In spite of these facts, I cannot advise such a course of action, and a general who will take such a risk and share the fate of Marshal Talar at Höchstätt (Hochstädt) in 1704 will have no reason to complain about fate.

There are not so many options for defending trench-fortified camps and positions. First of all, you should make sure that there are strong reserves located between the center and each of the flanks, or, more precisely, to the right of the left flank and to the left of the right flank. With the adoption of these measures, support can be easily and quickly given to the threatened point, which could not be done if there were only one central reserve. It has been argued that three reserves will not be too many if the fortification is very extended, but I am strongly inclined to the view that two will suffice. One more recommendation can be given, which has great value. It consists in conveying to the troops that they should never despair at any place in a defensive position that may be under pressure, because if a good reserve is at hand, the attacker can be counterattacked with him and successfully driven out. him from a fortification he believed was under his control.

These are bold undertakings undertaken by an army detachment with the aim of attacking the garrisons of disputed points of varying degrees of fortification or importance. Despite the fact that surprise attack as if it were an entirely tactical operation, its importance, of course, depends on the strategic importance of the strongholds being captured. It is therefore necessary to say a few words with reference to surprise attacks in paragraph XXXVI, speaking of detachments. However tedious such repetitions may seem, I am obliged to describe here the method of carrying out these operations, since it is obvious that this is part of the topic of attacking field fortifications.

I do not mean to say that the rules of tactics apply to these operations, because the name itself, sudden attack, suggests that the usual rules do not apply to them. I just wanted to draw attention to them and refer my readers to the various works, both historical and didactic, in which they are mentioned.

Before that, I noted that important results can often be the consequence of these enterprises. The capture of Sozopol by the Russians in 1828, the unsuccessful attack by General Petrash Kehl in 1796, the brilliant surprise operations at Cremona in 1702, at Gibraltar in 1704 and at Bergenop-Zom (Holland) in 1814, as well as the escalades at the port of Mahon (the island of Menorca) and Badajoz, give an idea of ​​the various types surprise attack. Some of them give effect with their suddenness, others - with an open onslaught of forces. Skill, cunning, courage on the part of the attackers, and the fear that grips those who are attacked are some of the factors that influence the successful outcome. surprise attack.

Once the war is started, the capture of a fortified point, however strong, is no longer as important as before, unless it directly affects the results of a large strategic operation. The capture or destruction of a bridge protected by fortifications, a large convoy, a small fort blocking important passages, and finally, the capture of a point even without fortifications, but used as a large warehouse of food and ammunition, so necessary for the enemy - such are the enterprises that justify the risk that the detachment participating in them may be subjected. Examples are the two attacks made in 1799 against Fort Lucisteig in Grisen and the capture of Loisach and Scharnitz by Nehm in 1805; finally, the capture of a point, even without fortifications, but used as a large depot of food and ammunition, much needed by the enemy - such are the enterprises that justify the risks to which the detachment marching on them may expose itself.

The fortified points were captured with the ditches sometimes filled with fascines, sometimes with wool sacks; even manure was used for the same purpose. Ladders are basically necessary and should always be ready. The soldiers held in their hands and attached hooks to their boots, with the help of which they climbed onto the rocks that dominated the fortification. In Cremona, the troops of Prince Eugene of Savoy penetrated through sewer pipes.

In reading about this, we should draw lessons from these events, not rules, because what has already been done can be done again.

Topic: “Napoleon’s War Strategy and Defense Tactics of the Russian Troops.”

In Europe, from the end of the 18th century, there was a series of continuous wars. They began when a coalition of European powers led by England opposed republican France. In a bloody struggle, France defended its right to choose the form of government. The decrepit feudal-aristocratic regimes of continental Europe were defeated by the French army, born in the revolution and hardened in the struggle against the invaders. Unfortunately, this army did not notice the border, having crossed which, having suppressed the freedom of its own people, it turned into an instrument for the enslavement of neighboring countries. In France, General Napoleon Bonaparte came to power, proclaiming himself emperor. France was now essentially waging wars for world domination.

The fire of European wars captured more and more new countries. Russia was gradually involved in the struggle. In 1805 she entered into a military alliance with England and Austria against France. At the end of the same year, the Russian and Austrian troops suffered a heavy defeat from the Napoleonic army in the battle of Austerlitz.

After these events, the Turkish government, incited by French diplomacy, closed the Bosphorus to Russian ships. In 1906, a protracted Russian-Turkish war began. Moldavia, Wallachia and Bulgaria became the theater of military operations.

Meanwhile, a coalition was formed against France, consisting of England, Russia, Prussia, Saxony and Sweden. The main force of the coalition were the armies of Russia and Prussia. The allies acted inconsistently, and in 1806-1807. Napoleon dealt them a series of serious blows. In June 1807 the Russian army was defeated near Friedland. A few days later, in the town of Tilsit (on the territory of what was then East Prussia), a meeting took place between Alexander I and Napoleon. A peace treaty was also signed there.

Under this agreement, Russia did not suffer territorial losses, but was forced to join the continental blockade, i.e. break off trade relations with England. Napoleon demanded this from all the governments of the European powers with which he concluded agreements. In this way he hoped to upset the English economy. By the end of the first decade of the 19th century, almost all of continental Europe was under the control of the French emperor.

Joining the blockade put Russia in hostile relations with England. Sweden, on the other hand, refused to stop trading with England and break off the alliance with her. There was a threat of an attack on Petersburg. This circumstance, as well as pressure from Napoleon, forced Alexander I to go to war with Sweden. Hostilities continued from February 1808 to March 1809. Sweden was defeated and forced to cede Finland to Russia.

Alexander 1 granted autonomy to Finland (under the rule of the Swedish king, she did not use it). In addition, Vyborg, which had been in the possession of Russia since the time of Peter 1, was included in Finland. The Grand Duchy of Finland became a separate part of the Russian Empire. It minted its own coin and had a customs border with Russia.

The continental blockade was unprofitable for Russia. Russian grain merchants suffered losses, the treasury did not receive taxes on exports. In the end, bypassing the agreement with Napoleon, trade with England began to be carried out on American ships, and a customs war broke out between Russia and France. Proud Alexander 1 was weary of the Tilsit peace imposed on him and rejected Napoleon's attempts to dictate his will to him. Napoleon saw that Russia did not submit. Its crushing followed by dismemberment into several semi-independent states was, according to the plan of the French strategists, to complete the conquest of continental Europe and open up tempting prospects for a campaign in India.

Relations with France deteriorated rapidly. At the same time, a significant part of the Russian army was involved in the south, where the war with Turkey continued. In 1811, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed commander of the army here. He managed to win a number of victories. Then, having shown outstanding diplomatic skills, Kutuzov persuaded the Turkish representatives to sign a peace treaty. The border with Turkey was established along the Prut River, Bessarabia was ceded to Russia. Serbia, which was under Turkish rule, received autonomy. This marked the beginning of its complete independence.

In May 1812, less than a month before the French army invaded Russia, the military conflict with Turkey was settled. Thus, Napoleon, having not yet begun a new war with Russia, suffered his first (diplomatic) defeat in it.

At dawn on June 12, 1812, Napoleon's "Great Army" (640 thousand people), having crossed the Neman, invaded the Russian Empire. The Russian army numbered 590 thousand people. It was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration and A.P. Tormasov). Alexander 1 was at the headquarters of Barclay's army. “I will not lay down arms,” he declared, “until not a single enemy warrior remains in my kingdom.”

The rapid advance of the powerful French army overturned the plans of the Russian command to detain it with the forces of Barclay's army and hit the flank with the forces of Bagration. The strategic situation required the speedy connection of the two armies, and this forced them to retreat. The numerical superiority of the enemy raised the question of an urgent replenishment of the army. But in Russia there was no universal military service. The army was completed by recruiting sets. And Alexander 1 decided on an unusual step. On July 6, while in a military camp near Polotsk, he issued a manifesto calling for the creation of a people's militia. On the same day, Alexander left the army and left for Smolensk. In Smolensk, the tsar met with the local nobility, who asked for permission to arm themselves and arm the peasants. Having approved this petition, Alexander turned to the Bishop of Smolensk Irenaeus with a rescript, in which he charged him with the duty of encouraging and persuading the peasants to arm themselves as much as they could, not give the enemies shelter and inflict “great harm and horror” on them. The Rescript legalized the peasant war. But the peasants who left their homes and went into the forest knew nothing about him. Their struggle against the invaders unfolded independently of the royal rescripts. In August, the first partisan detachments were already operating on Smolensk land.

Leaving barriers against flank attacks, losing soldiers as a result of quick marches and skirmishes with partisans, the “Great Army” was melting before our eyes. Only 200 thousand people approached Smolensk under the leadership of Napoleon.

At this time, Alexander 1 was already in Moscow. The population of the ancient capital was embraced by a patriotic upsurge. “Napoleon cannot defeat us,” said ordinary Muscovites, “because for this you need to kill us all in advance.”

Alexander 1 in those days behaved unusually modestly, even timidly. Passing through the Kremlin, he bowed to the people, asked them not to push the people crowding around him. Before going out to the nobility and delivering a speech, he “gathered courage” for a long time. The fate of his reign hung in the balance, but he already caught the mood of the people, realized that the war was acquiring a popular character and that only this could save him in the fight with Napoleon. Someone dared to ask what he intended to do if Bonaparte captured Moscow. “Make a second Spain out of Russia,” Alexander answered firmly. In Spain at that time there was a popular struggle against the French occupiers.

At the end of July, the Russian armies managed to unite near Smolensk. Alexander, who had returned to St. Petersburg by that time, hesitated to appoint the commander in chief. The general leadership of the armies was entrusted to Barclay de Tolly, who served as Minister of War. A good strategist and courageous warrior, he was silent, withdrawn, inaccessible, almost never spoke to the soldiers. The army did not like him. Bagration, a supporter of more active actions, openly expressed disagreement with Barclay's tactics. The generals did not get along with each other. In the inconsistency of their actions, many saw the reason that, after a bloody battle, the Russian troops left Smolensk. The retreat lowered the morale of the army, cases of looting became more frequent, and rumors of treason spread. In the army and society, they started talking about the fact that Barclay was "taking a guest to Moscow."

In the meantime, having victoriously ended the war with Turkey, M.I. Kutuzov returned to St. Petersburg. At that time he was in his 67th year. A student and colleague of Suvorov, he possessed broad strategic thinking, was an experienced military leader and diplomat. They immediately started talking about Kutuzov as the only person capable of taking the post of commander in chief. The Moscow and St. Petersburg militias elected Kutuzov as their chief, and in St. Petersburg he was elected unanimously, and in Moscow he bypassed Rostopchin. Alexander 1 did not like Kutuzov, but in the current situation he had to give in. “The society desired his appointment, and I appointed him,” he said in his hearts, “I myself wash my hands.” In the future, the tsar thought more than once about replacing Kutuzov with Barclay, but did not dare to do this.

In fairness, it must be said that Alexander 1 was firm in the fight against Napoleon and made a considerable contribution to it. After difficult negotiations with the Swedish king, he managed to keep him from an alliance with the French emperor. Thus, another diplomatic victory was achieved in this war.

On the way to the army, Kutuzov often repeated: “If only I find Smolensk in our hands, then the enemy will not be in Moscow.” Behind Torzhok, he learned that Smolensk had been abandoned. “The key to Moscow has been taken,” Kutuzov said with chagrin.

On August 17, near the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, Kutuzov arrived in the army, greeted with general rejoicing. But still, having understood the situation, he gave the order to continue the retreat: it was necessary to restore order in the army and connect with the approaching reserves. Along with decisive measures, Kutuzov improved the supply of the army, stopped looting, and tightened discipline. The commander-in-chief pinned great hopes on the militia that was being formed in Moscow.

Moscow these days lived an unusual life. Most of those who could bear arms were enrolled in the militia. Solemn farewell to the Moscow militia took place on August 14. The remarkable Russian poet V.A. Zhukovsky, who left with the militia, was not a military man at all. He wrote that he went “under the banner not for rank, not for the cross, and not by choice, but because at that time everyone had to be a military man, even without a desire.” The Moscow militia participated in the Battle of Borodino.

In St. Petersburg, from August 27, accelerated training of 13 thousand warriors was carried out on three parade grounds for five days. Subsequently, the Petersburg and Novgorod militia were used to reinforce the troops covering Petersburg. Somewhat later, other militias, as well as Kalmyk, Tatar and Bashkir regiments, joined the hostilities.

At the end of August, the numerical superiority was still on the side of the French. But Kutuzov knew that it was impossible to hold back the army rushing into battle for too long. Moreover, Russian society demanded decisive action and was ready to do everything for victory.

On the evening of August 22, the main forces of the Russian army stopped at Borodin on the New Smolensk road, 110 km from Moscow. To the south of the village, five kilometers away, was the village of Utitsa - on the Old Smolensk road. Turning between them on a hilly area, the Russian army blocked the enemy's path to Moscow.

The French approached Borodino the very next day, but were detained near the village of Shevardino. On August 24, the enemy stormed the Shevardinsky redoubt, which was defended by a small detachment of Russian troops. At this time, fortifications were hastily erected on the Borodino field. In the center of defense, at the Kurgan height, a battery of 18 guns was deployed. She was part of the corps, which was led by General N.N. Raevsky. Subsequently, it began to be called the Raevsky battery. To the left of it, not far from the village of Semenovsky, earthen fortifications (flashes) were dug, on which 36 guns were placed. It was a key point of defense of the left flank, commanded by P.I.Bagration. His name stuck in the name of flashes.

August 26, 1812 at half past five in the morning began the famous Battle of Borodino. Napoleon intended to break through the Russian positions in the center, bypass the left flank, push the Russian army back from the Old Smolensk road and clear the way to Moscow. But the roundabout maneuver failed: the French were stopped near Utitsa. The main blow Napoleon brought down on Bagration's flushes. Their assault continued almost continuously for six hours. Bagration was seriously wounded, the command of the flank passed to Lieutenant General P.P. Konovnitsyn. Around noon, at the cost of huge losses, the French took possession of the fortifications. Russian troops retreated to the nearest hills. An attempt by the French cavalry to drive the Russians from their new position was not successful.

At the same time, two French attacks on Raevsky's battery were repulsed. While the third attack was being prepared, the Russian cavalry, led by the Cossack ataman M.I. Platonov and General F.P. Uvarov, turned out to be in the rear of the French. Several hours passed before the French organized a rebuff. Kutuzov used this time to transfer reinforcements to “hot spots”. The third, decisive, French attack on Raevsky's battery was made at about two o'clock in the afternoon. The fight lasted over an hour and a half. Under the pressure of superior forces, the Russians were forced to withdraw. Napoleon sent cavalry after them. But the Russian cavalry responded with a counterattack and the French were stopped. Wedged into the defense of the Russian troops, they could not achieve a breakthrough. The way to Moscow was still closed for them. The day ended with the roar of artillery. The cannonade of the Battle of Borodino was said to have been heard at the Moscow outposts. With the onset of darkness, Napoleon ordered to leave a number of captured heights, including the Raevsky battery.

The attacking side usually suffers larger losses. In the battles of August 24-26, Napoleon lost 58.5 thousand soldiers and officers. The losses of the Russian army were not much less - 44 thousand. This was due to the fact that in the course of the battle the armies repeatedly changed roles - the Russians knocked out the French from the captured positions. French troops suffered heavy losses from enemy artillery. In the battle of Borodino, the Russian army had a slight advantage in the number of guns, but the French fired more concentrated fire. The actions of the Russian artillery were affected by the death of its commander, General A.I. Kutaisov, in the midst of the battle. The Russian army lost about a thousand officers and 23 generals. The brave Bagration died from a wound.

In view of the heavy losses and taking into account that Napoleon had an untouched reserve (the Old Guard), Kutuzov ordered on the morning of August 27 to withdraw from the battlefield.

The army approached Moscow, in which by that time about a quarter of the population remained. On September 1, a military council was held in the village of Fili near Moscow, at which Kutuzov raised the question of whether to give another battle under the walls of the ancient capital or retreat without a fight. A number of generals (Benigsen, Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn) insisted on a battle. Barclay objected: in the event of an unsuccessful outcome, the army would not be able to quickly retreat through the narrow streets of the big city and disaster would occur. Kutuzov was also not pleased with the position taken by the Russian army. “As long as the army still exists and is able to resist the enemy,” he said, “until then there will still be hope to end the war with honor, but with the destruction of the army, not only Moscow, but all of Russia would be lost.”

The question arose which way to retreat. Barclay suggested going to the Volga: "The Volga, flowing through the most fertile provinces, feeds Russia." If this proposal were accepted, they would have to retreat along the Vladimir road. But Kutuzov did not agree: “We should now think not about the regions that feed Russia, but about those that supply the army, and therefore we should take a direction to the midday (southern) provinces.” It was decided to go along the Ryazan road. Closing the council, Kutuzov said: “Whatever happens, I accept responsibility to the sovereign, the Fatherland and the army.”

The next day the Russian army left Moscow. When it was possible to break away from the enemy, Kutuzov ordered to leave the Ryazan road and by country roads, through Podolsk, go to Kaluga. Food warehouses necessary for the army were concentrated in Kaluga and its environs. In the evening of the same day, passing troops noticed a huge glow rising over Moscow.

Marauders from the “Great Army” and ordinary robbers were operating in Moscow abandoned by the Russian troops and depopulated. The French command at first did not attach any importance to the fires that began in different places. But in dry and warm weather, the fire spread quickly. And now the Arbat and Zamoskvorechye were completely on fire, the wooden houses on Mokhovaya flared up. The fire engulfed the malls of Kitay-gorod. Barges with hay on the Moskva River turned into huge fires. Moscow burned for six days. The fire destroyed three-quarters of the city's buildings and food stores. The French army immediately found itself on the verge of starvation.

The ring of fire was shrinking around the Kremlin, where Napoleon stopped. Late in the evening, the emperor with his retinue left the Kremlin and moved along the burning Tverskaya to the Petrovsky country palace.

Kutuzov was drinking tea and talking to peasants when he was informed of the fire. After a pause, he said: "It's a pity, really, but wait, I'll break his head."

The Russian army was located near the village of Tarutina, 80 km from Moscow, covering the Tula arms factories and the fertile southern provinces. Reserves were pulled up, wounds healed. Settled in Moscow, Napoleon believed that the campaign was over and waited for offers of peace. But no one sent ambassadors to him. The proud conqueror himself had to make inquiries to Kutuzov and Alexander 1. Kutuzov answered evasively, referring to the lack of authority. However, the army he led was strongly opposed to peace negotiations. And at the court there was a behind-the-scenes struggle. Empress Dowager Maria Feodorovna, the tsar's brother Konstantin and the tsar's favorite Arakcheev led the court clique that demanded peace with Napoleon. Chancellor N.P. Rumyantsev joined them. Tensions arose between the army and the court, and the generals brought to the attention of the tsar their wish for Rumyantsev's resignation. Alexander considered such an act the greatest audacity, but suppressed his anger. Rumyantsev remained as chancellor. But the tsar refused to enter into negotiations with Napoleon.

The position of the Napoleonic army was rapidly deteriorating. Breaking away from its rear bases, it existed by confiscating food from the local population. Foragers and marauders rampaged everywhere. The peasants of the Moscow Region, as before, the Smolensk ones, went to the forests. On Smolensk land and in the Moscow region, a partisan movement unfolded. The partisan detachments were led by soldiers who had escaped from French captivity, local landowners, especially authoritative peasants. So, under the command of the serf Gerasim Kurin, over 5 thousand foot and 500 horse peasants fought in the Moscow region. In the Smolensk province, the headman Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment of adolescents and women, became widely known. The partisans hunted down and destroyed individual small groups of Napoleonic soldiers.

Kutuzov, who quickly appreciated the significance of the guerrilla war, began to send cavalry detachments behind the enemy. Using the support of the population, they delivered sensitive blows to the enemy.

The cold weather was approaching, and Napoleon realized that it would be madness to spend the winter in the ashes of Moscow. In early October, a battle took place between the French avant-garde and units of the Russian army near the village of Tarutina. The French retreated with heavy losses. As if in order to “punish” the Russians, Napoleon on October 7 withdrew his army from Moscow. The advanced units of the two armies met at Maloyaroslavets. While the city was passing from hand to hand, the main forces approached. The question arose before Napoleon: whether to give a general battle in order to break through to the Kaluga road, or to retreat along the Smolensk road, where plundered villages and an embittered population awaited him. This time Napoleon decided not to tempt fate and gave the order to retreat to Smolensk.

The retreating French troops were attacked by Cossacks, flying partisan detachments, and partisans. Horses fell from starvation - artillery had to be abandoned, cavalry dismounted. Kutuzov's army moved parallel to Napoleon's, all the while threatening to break ahead and cut off the retreat. Because of this, Napoleon could not stay in Smolensk for more than four days. With the onset of cold weather, the position of the French army became critical. Only the guard and the two corps that joined it remained combat-ready. The French army suffered huge losses while crossing the Berezina River on November 14-16. Shortly thereafter, Napoleon secretly left for Paris, leaving the army behind. In mid-December, its pitiful remnants crossed back across the Neman. The Russian army pursuing Napoleon also suffered heavy losses - not only in battles, but also from cold, poor nutrition, illness, and exhausting marches. Only half of the army that stood at Tarutin came to the banks of the Neman.

By the spring of 1813, a significant part of Poland was liberated from the Napoleonic troops. The Russian army under the command of M.I. Kutuzov entered the territory of Prussia. The Prussian king, who was afraid of Napoleon like fire, insisted on continuing the alliance with him. But the Prussian army announced the cessation of hostilities against the Russian troops. A popular movement against the occupiers unfolded throughout Germany. In the rear of the French troops, partisan detachments operated.

In February 1813, Russia and Prussia signed an alliance treaty, and then the French were expelled from Berlin. Napoleon, however, raised a new army that outnumbered the troops operating against him. In April Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov died. After that, the Russian-Prussian troops suffered a series of defeats. There was a pause in hostilities and a diplomatic struggle unfolded.

Napoleonic diplomacy, which showed intransigence, could not prevent the formation of a new anti-French coalition consisting of Russia, England, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. In October 1813, the grand battle of Leipzig (“battle of the peoples”) took place. More than half a million people participated in it from both sides. Napoleon was defeated, but due to the inconsistency of the actions of the allies, he managed to get out of the encirclement. In late 1813 - early 1814, the allied armies entered the territory of France. On March 18 (30) Paris capitulated.

Napoleon was exiled to Fr. Elba in the Mediterranean. But a year later he unexpectedly returned to France and entered Paris without firing a shot. This time his reign lasted only one hundred days. In June 1815, in a battle in the potato fields near the village of Waterloo in Belgium, he suffered a decisive defeat from the combined forces of the English, Dutch and Prussian armies.

Bibliography.

Russian history. From the beginning of the 18th to the end of the 19th century. Moscow, 1996.

The history of homeland. Moscow, 1985.

Soviet encyclopedic dictionary. Moscow, 1983.

Waging a series of continuous wars, Emperor Napoleon I ensured that almost all the states of Western and Central Europe were subordinate to France. In these battles, the military art of the French army was developed and constantly improved.

Napoleon's military strategy was based on three main principles. One of them was misleading the enemy. The commander attached great importance to the study of the enemy with whom he was to fight. For these purposes, he actively used the service of secret intelligence and counterintelligence, and bribery and provocation were also practiced.

So, there is a case when Napoleon deliberately wrote laudatory reviews about an Austrian general, who, by the way, was repeatedly beaten by him, and through an agent network allowed these fabrications to reach the Vienna cabinet. As a result, a man with very mediocre military qualities occupied the commanding position. Later, his army was easily defeated, and the general himself was taken prisoner. There is also a known case when, during the Egyptian campaign, Napoleon ordered the commanders of formations to indicate in daytime reports one third more distributed stocks than it was in reality, thereby creating a false idea for the enemy about the number of his troops.

But the strategy of the “little Corsican” was not based on cunning and intrigue alone. Being a very prudent person, and believing that the battle is the decisive act of war, Napoleon tried not to get involved in battles where there was not at least a 70% chance of success, at the same time he always tried to create a numerical superiority in the main directions. Their commander knew how to calculate very skillfully. Therefore, unlike Suvorov, whose troops had an advantage in only two or three battles, Napoleon's army always outnumbered the enemy. “In order to win,” he said, “it is necessary to be stronger than the enemy at this point and at this moment.” Such tactics allowed the French army, noticing the dispersion of enemy troops and indecisiveness in actions, quickly and skillfully maneuvering, appear in the right direction and break the enemy in parts. A good example is the battle with the Prussian army in 1806 near Jena and Auerstedt, when, as a result of his actions, Napoleon prevented the Russian troops from coming to the aid of the allies in time.

However, such tactics would have made little sense if Bonaparte had not noteworthy building up their troops. The infantry of the Napoleonic army was built in columns, which were considered the main striking force, a loose system was also used, which was a chain of shooters, and a deployed system two or three lines deep. The Napoleonic infantry successfully resisted the enemy cavalry, lining up in a square. The emperor deployed his own cavalry in lines or built columns. The loose formation was used only by light cavalry, which was located separately in certain parts of the position. Napoleon, unlike his opponents, tried to avoid mixing cavalry with infantry columns. He explained this as follows: "Such a mixed formation deprives the cavalry of its inherent mobility and reduces its striking power." As for the artillery, it was located in the intervals of the first line of infantry and cavalry, as well as at the most important points of attack, exposing the enemy to bombardment with concentrated fire. For batteries of 100 or more guns, artificial elevations were built over the terrain ahead, thereby allowing the guns to fire in all directions and depriving the enemy of the opportunity to escape from the shelling.

In cases of linear tactics Bonaparte built long continuous lines of infantry, the flanks of which were covered by cavalry. The battalions, together with the voltigeurs, formed the first rifle line and carried out salvo fire. Also, if necessary, these battalions could form columns (squares) or, together with the voltigeurs, conduct aimed fire, act in loose formation. If the situation forced the use of shock tactics, then the corps and divisions were secretly located behind villages or hills, from where, using the effect of surprise, they struck.

Thanks to his progressive views on warfare and the art of taking a position, Napoleon I did not allow the enemy to look out or fire, as well as flank and envelop his troops, leaving this advantage to himself. Properly applying the basic principles of his strategy, he forever inscribed his name in the hall of fame of the great generals of world history.

Russian positions on the Borodino field were distributed in such a way that the right flank and center were occupied by units of the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly, and the left flank near the village of Semenovskaya with the fortifications built there - the Semenov Flesh - was covered by the 2nd Army of Bagration. Between the positions of the 1st and 2nd armies there was a height on which the so-called kurgan battery was located, commanded by General N. N. Raevsky. In front of the left flank of the Russian army, near the village of Shevardino, a fortification was also built - the Shevardino redoubt, which played the role of an advanced fortification. It was on him that the first blow of the French, who reached the Borodino field on August 24, fell. During the day, the Shevardinsky redoubt was captured by the enemy, recaptured and captured again. This battle delayed the advance of the French troops and enabled the Russians to complete the construction of fortifications. The next day was largely spent preparing both armies for battle. Napoleon had the opportunity to carry out a roundabout maneuver and try to encircle the Russian army, but he correctly calculated that in this case Kutuzov would retreat again and the general battle might not take place.

Some historians believe that the location of the Russian troops forced Napoleon to direct his main attack on the left, the most fortified flank. Others, on the contrary, believe that such an arrangement was a mistake of Kutuzov, who until the last moment did not know where the blow would be directed, and as a result, significantly weakened the left flank. The reserves that were sent there already during the battle were late due to the too long front line, which ultimately led to the death of the 2nd Army, whose courage and heroism, however, saved the army as a whole from disaster. In Kutuzov's justification, it should be noted that the battle in the early morning of August 26 (September 7, according to a new style) really began with an attack on the right flank of the Russian army, where the French soon occupied with. Borodino. However, immediately after this, the center of the battle was moved to the left flank.

Within a few hours, Napoleon attacked the Semyonovsky flashes and the Raevsky battery several times with huge forces, which passed from hand to hand. Despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, the Russian soldiers held out here for several hours, but by noon the flushes were nevertheless taken by the French, and the Russians were forced to retreat. During one of the attacks, P. I. Bagration was seriously wounded. Raevsky's battery continued to defend for some time after the capture of the flashes. At this time, Kutuzov sent the cavalry corps of F. P. Uvarov and the Cossacks of M. I. Platov to the rear of the enemy. Historians disagree on this raid. Some believe that he was successful, because thanks to him they managed to delay the decisive French attack on the kurgan battery for several hours, making it possible to avoid breaking through the front during the retreat of the Russian army from the Semenov Heights. Other historians, referring to the opinion of Kutuzov himself, believe that the cavalrymen and the Cossacks did not complete the task. One way or another, at two o'clock in the afternoon Napoleon again attacked Raevsky's battery, and by four o'clock it was taken by the French. By evening, the Russian troops were withdrawn to a new line of defense, and the enemy made no more attempts to attack them.

There is a statement in the literature that on the night of August 26-27, the French troops were withdrawn to the positions they occupied on the eve of the battle. However, this is not true: the French spent the night on the battlefield, which, therefore, actually remained with them. Napoleon, like most Russians, for that matter, expected the battle to resume the next day. But Kutuzov gave the order to retreat.

The question of who won the Battle of Borodino has been causing controversy among historians for more than a hundred and fifty years. Before getting acquainted with the various points of view on this problem, let's turn to the facts. One of them is data on the losses of the parties. And there is no unity among historians in this. So, speaking of the losses of the French, most Soviet historians give the figure of 58.5 thousand people, taken from documents published back in 1812. However, according to the historian A. A. Vasiliev, who analyzed French documents, the losses of Napoleon's Great Army at Borodino amounted to 30-34 thousand people. As for the losses of the Russian army, the figure cited by historians ranges from 38.5 to 44 thousand people. As you can see, in absolute terms, the losses of the Russians were more significant. As for the percentage, the French lost about 23% of their personnel, and the Russian army at least 25%. If we take into account that the French were the side of the attacker, that is, the one that usually suffers more losses, then we must admit that this indicator speaks in favor of Napoleon's victory.

Which of the parties managed to fulfill the tasks set on the eve of the battle and how? It is quite obvious that Kutuzov failed to either defeat the Napoleonic army or stop its advance. Moreover, the French kept their reserves in the form of a guard of about 20 thousand people who did not participate in the battle, and the next day received reinforcements in the form of a fresh division of 6 thousand people. The reserves of the Russian army were practically exhausted. On the other hand, Napoleon also failed to destroy the Russian army or force the Russian command to ask for peace. Despite heavy losses, the Russian army was saved and was able to continue the campaign. Numerous sources testify that Napoleon himself was struck by the courage and stamina of the Russian soldiers, their obvious readiness to die rather than retreat. As time went on, victory did not approach, and the French army suffered more and more losses, the conqueror who conquered all of Europe became more and more gloomy ...

Napoleon, who so much desired a big battle, thinking that it would put Russia at his feet, showed himself to Moscow as hesitant, indecisive ... His victory was not complete, he made very little use of it, did not pursue the greatly weakened Russians ... Russians left and then reinforced their troops and "brought them into battle order." Napoleon, following his routine system, imagined that he had won everything by taking the capital.

The results of the Battle of Borodino were incomparably lower than what the data available to Kutuzov allowed us to hope for. He achieved that he was not utterly defeated. By evening, all our positions were in the hands of the French: the enemy had twenty thousand completely intact reserves, while the second of the Russian armies did not exist at all, and the first was almost completely upset. On the next day of the battle, Napoleon turned out to be twice as strong as Kutuzov ... The reason was extremely stupid the location of the Russian troops, crowding needlessly in a small space, so that the enemy nuclei could beat all four lines of our corps, right down to the reserves. When Kutuzov was presented with the first calculations at night and when he saw that half of the Russian army had been exterminated that day, September 7, he categorically decided to save the other half and give Moscow without a new fight. This did not stop him from proclaiming that Borodino was a victory, though he was dejected. The moral victory was undeniable. And in the light of subsequent events, it can be argued that, strategically, Borodino turned out to be a Russian victory, after all, more than a French one.

The battle of Borodino was an outstanding victory for Russia, once again demonstrating the superiority of the Russian army over the French and the military art of Kutuzov over the military art of Napoleon. Borodino did not yet mean the complete defeat of the Napoleonic army, but it was a defeat that prepared it to a large extent. It was a moral victory, but the problem of material victory over the army that invaded Russia still remained unresolved. Borodino did not give a decisive advantage to either side, and therefore, in the current situation, could not prevent the abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army.

The Battle of Borodino marked a crisis in the Napoleonic strategy of a general battle. On the Borodino field, for the first time, the inconsistency of the Napoleonic theory of achieving victory in one pitched battle, which became a kind of recipe for victory, was revealed with particular force.

Neither Napoleon nor Kutuzov achieved the main goals. The French commander intended to defeat the Russian army and force Russia to conclude a peace favorable to him. Kutuzov set the task of defending Moscow. Napoleon perfectly understood the situation, saw the bitterness with which the soldiers of the Russian army fought, which is why he did not bring his guard into the battle. Of course, this was a victory for Napoleon, a tactical victory "on points." The fact that the French did not defeat the Russian army at Borodino is not surprising. Given the balance of power that had developed before the battle, Napoleon could hardly count on any other result. At the cost of enormous efforts, his troops managed to push the Russian army back from its original position, capture most of the enemy's field fortifications and inflict heavy losses on the latter. But they did not have the strength to maneuver widely, to bypass or encircle Kutuzov's army. In addition, Napoleon was well aware of the resilience of Russian soldiers. All of the above does not detract from the valor and selfless stamina of Russian soldiers and officers, shown by them at Borodino. It is unlikely that any other army, except for the Russian one, could withstand such a terrible artillery fire, such a powerful onslaught and not flinch.

“Oh, how this young Bonaparte walks! He is a hero, he is a miracle hero, he is a sorcerer!<...>

As soon as he embarked on the path of military leadership, he cut the Gordian knot of tactics.

Not caring about the number, he attacks the enemy everywhere and smashes him completely.

He knows the irresistible force of the onslaught - no more needed. His opponents will

to persist in their sluggish tactics, subordinated to armchair pens; and he has a military

advice in my head.<...>Here is my conclusion: as long as General Bonaparte maintains

presence of mind, he will be victorious.<...>But if, to his misfortune, he rushes

into a political whirlwind, if he betrays the unity of thought, he will perish!

Paradoxically, Napoleon himself brought little that was new to the art of war. The main ideas that distinguish Bonaparte as a commander originated in his head during his studies at military school in Brienne, where he studied the experience of Frederick the Great from books, and also read the works of modern French military theorists who were looking for ways to fight the Prussians. But, borrowing other people's techniques, Napoleon had a brilliant ability to improvise in a constantly changing environment. Almost repeating the words of Suvorov, Napoleon said: "The main thing is to get into a fight, and then we'll see."

11 a.m. October 14, 1806. Auerstedt. The Prussian infantry has taken up defensive positions and is waiting for a French attack. A rumor has just passed - the commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, has been wounded. The soldiers clutch their guns as they watch the line of French light infantry approach. The faces of many are pale, their uniforms spattered with mud and the blood of their dead comrades - all morning they have been unsuccessfully attacking the village of Hassenhausen under the devastating fire of the French infantrymen who have settled among the houses and hedges. Prussian officers and non-commissioned officers carefully monitored that the companies kept the formation and fired according to all the rules of military science: lining up in a line of three ranks, approaching the enemy at a short distance and firing in volleys. So they won 50 years ago, under Frederick the Great. But now nothing worked. These French, whom the officers called nothing more than ragged sans-culottes, fought somehow not like that. They did everything against the rules - they fired from a distance, their voltigeurs surrounded the Prussian lines with a dense curtain, did not allow the Prussians to come closer and fire a concentrated salvo. French shots were snatched from the Prussian ranks one by one. The Prussians are good soldiers, they know it, they do not take courage, but, seeing how their ranks are thinning, they are no longer sure that they can stop these "ragamuffins".

Suddenly the chain of voltigeurs diverges to the sides, behind it a dense column of French infantry is shown. The Prussian infantrymen are tensely waiting for the command of the officers, taking their guns at the ready. The French are approaching to the beat of a drum, soon you will be able to see their faces. The command “Ready!” sounds, and the Prussians throw their guns up, cocking the hammers with fingers numb from the October wind. The French are getting closer, the officer shouts out a command - and the forest of guns descends, aimed at the French column. Swing a sword - and with a deafening roar a volley is heard, covering everything around. Fountains of flame fly out of the gun barrels, the French column is not visible in the bluish smoke, and only by the cries of the wounded does it become clear that the volley hit the target. Finally! Finally they do what they were taught! But the smoke clears, and it suddenly becomes clear that the French, ignoring the devastating volley, approached the Prussian line almost point-blank. Here they stop, and the Prussians realize with horror that the first line of the French opens fire - random, but no less deadly for this. The Prussian infantrymen fall as if they had been mowed down in the October mud, clutching their discharged guns. Suddenly the French stop firing and shouting Vive la France! rush into the center of the Prussian line, bristling with bayonets. In a matter of seconds, the line is pressed through and sags under the pressure of the enemy, who, it seems, did not notice the volley. The Prussians are trying to somehow keep the line, but the most frightened jump out of the line, throw their guns, run to the rear. A couple more minutes of fierce bayonet slaughter, and the entire Prussian line takes to flight ...

This episode of the battle of Jena and Auerstedt, as presented by the British historian David Chandler, clearly demonstrates the helplessness of linear tactics based on the concepts of Old Fritz, Frederick the Great, in front of the methods of the leading commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte.

The revolutionary wars of France, which gave the young artillery officer Napoleon Bonaparte the opportunity to prove himself, began in 1792. The armies of the French Republic, in contrast to the professional armies of Austria and Prussia, as well as the former royal army, consisted for the most part of volunteers - brave men who were sorely lacking in training.

The professionals of that time fought according to the canons of linear tactics, which consisted in deploying infantry battalions in a line and in conducting salvo fire on enemy units. Having caused significant damage with rifle fire, the battalions went on the attack, which rarely reached a bayonet fight - usually the enemy, unable to withstand heavy fire, rolled back on his own. In order to fight successfully in linear battle formations, a long and complex training of soldiers was required, which was precisely what the revolutionary armies did not have. The French generals were forced to seek opposition to linear tactics and invented the so-called battalion column. Due to the great depth of formation, the battalion column pierced the thin lines of battalions deployed in line, and was also less vulnerable to rifle fire from the front. The tactics of the soldiers of the revolution were simple: to get close to the minimum distance with the enemy, withstanding his fire, to answer with his own volley and then rush into the bayonet. This invariably worked against the Prussians and Austrians, but it required great courage and high morale, which the revolutionary soldiers had in abundance, which cannot be said about their opponents.

General Bonaparte skillfully combined linear battle formations with column tactics. He began to form columns from a larger number of formations, and actively used chains of light infantry to cover their deployment. The arrows, operating in chains, fired at the enemy’s linear formations, choosing officers and sergeants as their targets in the first place, in order to deprive the enemy of command and break his system. Then columns of line infantry appeared on the scene, breaking through enemy lines.

Images from the film by Sergei Bondarchuk "War and Peace".

1. Battalion square (left): enemy priority targets are hidden inside a living wall - a banner platoon, officers and musicians, without which control in the roar of battle is impossible

2. The battalion column is moving on the attack (right). In reality, the construction was much denser. In order not to get tired, the soldiers carried their guns on their shoulders until they entered the battle: the hammers were cocked only before the shot, even if the gun was loaded, so as not to weaken the lock spring. From the “on hand” position shown in the illustration, it is inconvenient to cock the trigger, since its spring is quite powerful.

An artilleryman by education, Napoleon quickly appreciated all the advantages that the massive use of guns gives. An integral part of his tactics was the use of colossal artillery batteries, numbering dozens, if not hundreds of guns. Few enemy were able to withstand the hurricane fire of so many guns. After a massive artillery preparation and a distracting flank maneuver, dense columns of infantry rushed into the center of the enemy army, wedging into the enemy's disordered battle formations, after which the cavalry rushed into the gap. Torn into two parts, the enemy army lost control, the soldiers and commanders were demoralized, losing the will to resist, and enemy formations either fled or were destroyed piecemeal.

However, Bonaparte did not stop at such a standard model. As the situation developed, so did the battle plan. A diversionary strike could become the main one, artillery was transferred from one sector of the front to another. This made Napoleon an extremely dangerous opponent, especially for the Prussian and Austrian generals, who were accustomed to detailed, unhurried maneuvers, long meetings and battles “by the rules”. Napoleon's victories made such a vivid impression that even his enemies tried to imitate him: his short hairstyle, borrowed from the tragedian Talma in the role of the tyrant-fighter Brutus, from about 1807 was forever established in all the armies of the world. It turned out to be more difficult to adopt the military art of Bonaparte.

No one before Napoleon formed such large-scale columns and collected so many infantry and cavalry in the direction of the main attack. In fact, Bonaparte created a huge living ram, which with its own mass pierced the enemy’s battle line.

But even such an indestructible force had a terrible enemy - artillery.

9 o'clock in the morning, August 26, 1812, Semyonovskie flushes. The yellow disk of the sun breaks through the gray veil of powder smoke. The Russian artillerymen crouched near their guns, watching through the embrasures how dense columns of enemy infantry were deployed in a wide, overgrown with high, unmowed grass space. Copper plaques sparkle in the sun, the wind sways multi-colored sultans. A young artillery lieutenant is studying the enemy through a telescope, leaning out almost halfway above the parapet. The gunners are ready and waiting for his command. "It's time guys! Pali!" - the officer shouts, and smoldering overcoats fall to the guns. Shots rumble and the cannons spit back in flames. Through a spyglass, you can see how the cannonballs, hitting the ground, raise fountains of dust and, ricocheting, fly further, crashing into a column of French infantry. Several people in the first line are blown clean, you can only see how the details of their ammunition scatter in all directions. The nuclei jump and jump like rubber balls, tearing off the legs, arms, heads of the French soldiers, making deep furrows in the columns from the dead and wounded. The French, struck by the cannonballs, fall as if they had been cut down, screaming in pain, shedding blood. Meanwhile, the gunners are rolling new charges into the barrels of their guns.

This description of the second attack on Bagration's flashes is reproduced from the memoirs of the Russian artilleryman Nikolai Lyubenkov, a participant in the Battle of Borodino. It would not be an exaggeration to say that cannons dominated the battlefields of those times. The range of a direct shot of the then ground guns rarely exceeded one and a half kilometers, but this did not make them any less formidable weapons. They did not act quite the way most of our contemporaries imagine. If today's gunners hit the target, achieving a direct hit on it by a projectile, then the gunners of the era of the Napoleonic Wars acted differently. They aimed their guns so that when fired, the cannonball hit the ground long before reaching the target, ricocheted like a stone thrown into water, and flew further in a large arc, sweeping away everything in its path. This allowed not only to increase the range of fire, but also to inflict significant losses on the enemy. Getting into the infantry formation, the core tore people in its path, tore off limbs and continued to jump further. The importance of ricochet firing was so high that Napoleon postponed the start of the Battle of Waterloo until the ground dries out, otherwise his artillery would be ineffective, the cannonballs would simply get stuck in the mud, not reaching the enemy. And on dry soil, even a stopped cannonball was dangerous: it still rotated by inertia and could tear off an arm or leg to anyone who touched it.

10 o'clock in the morning on August 26, 1812, between the village of Semyonovskoye and Kurgan height. The battalions of the Pernovsky regiment, built in columns, occupy the position intended for them. The soldiers were not yet in combat today, but they already saw an endless stream of wounded moving to the rear, to field hospitals. Everything around is drowning in a monstrous roar, the cannonballs are buzzing over the heads of the Russian infantrymen, some of the recruits crouches in fright, looking around. The soldiers are laughing: “What, are you bowing to the adversary?” Someone addresses the core, raising the shako: "Say hello back there!"

Suddenly, shouts are heard in the front ranks: “Brothers, cavalry!” Commands are not heard in the roar, but the non-commissioned officers begin to push the soldiers aside with the butts of their guns, shouts are heard: “In a square, in a square!” The battalion is being rebuilt, the head company is deployed in three lines, the other two are attached to its flanks, and the rear is built in the rear, forming a regular square - a square. It is located so that the corner is facing the front of the enemy - then the cavalry will not be able to break through it. In the center of the square, the battalion banner is lazily flapping, now fluttering, now curling up in a light breeze. The soldiers of the first ranks get on one knee, resting the butts of their rifles with fixed bayonets on the ground. In the rest of the ranks, without a command, they begin to load their guns - the soldiers do not need to be explained what to do when the cavalry appears. The command “Battle fire!” is passing along the ranks in a wave. This means that everyone can aim and shoot not on command, but at their own discretion. More and more cannonballs fly over the battalion, one of them passes very low, knocking the shako off the drummer. In the flank company it is not visible what is happening ahead, where the enemy should appear from, only one can hear how the rumble grows, the earth trembles under thousands of hooves - the enemy cavalry is approaching.

A young lieutenant in a cap, in a hurry, follows the line and repeats: “Brothers, let them come closer, let them come closer ...” The old gray-haired non-commissioned officer looks after him reproachfully: “It’s as if we don’t know ourselves!” The tramp of horses is getting closer, and even through the roar of gunfire, the sharp high notes of a cavalry trumpet break through. Somewhere from the other flank, a haze of shots appears, then the company from the front is also enveloped in smoke. The young soldiers are nervous, but noticing that the old soldiers are calm, they only tighten their grip on their guns. Suddenly, one rider with a pike in his hand appears near their bayonets, a second, a third ... Someone throws up a gun and shoots, the rider falls to one side with the horse. Immediately, the rumble of battle is blocked by the crackle of shots - the whole company begins to shoot at the approaching lancers, who, as if stumbling upon an invisible wall, suddenly fly out of their saddles or fall along with the horses. Some of the lancers are trying to get closer and get the infantrymen with a lance, but they pull him out of the saddle and finish him off with bayonets.

The cavalry has been spinning around the square for ten minutes now, trying to break through the formation, when suddenly Russian dragoons appear on the flank of the French, sparkling in the sun with copper helmets and steel broadswords. The lancers turn around and try to avoid the dragoons when one of the companies of the Pernovsky regiment begins to move. The infantrymen tilt their guns, and the line, exploding with cries of "Hurrah!", rushes to the lancers. The whole square rushes forward, a thunderous “hurray” is heard over the space littered with dead people and horses. Not reaching the fleeing cavalrymen with bayonets, the angry Pernovians begin to throw their guns at them like darts. The Lancers roll back in surprise and confusion.

This battle, known to us from the memoirs of the artilleryman Ilya Rodozhitsky, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, demonstrated how invulnerable to the attacking cavalry was the infantry, who managed to reorganize in a square in time.

The Russian infantry square was formed in the 18th century during clashes with the Turkish irregular cavalry - bashi-bazouks. The brave but poorly disciplined Turkish armies had something in common with the French. They taught the Russians to fast marches and long marches, and the threat to rear communications, which caused panic attacks in the Prussian or Austrian generals, was an everyday thing in the fight against the Turks. This Napoleon did not want to notice. In general, the main miscalculation of the great commander was that he denied the enemy the ability to learn.

However, in the Russian army of that time, everyone learned from mistakes, from junior officers to the emperor himself. Alexander I tried to lead the battle of Austerlitz, which led to fatal consequences. And a year and a half later, he already left the army at the complete disposal of the commander-in-chief Leonty Bennigsen and left for the capital, saying: "Do as you please." And Bennigsen on February 8, 1807, at Preussisch-Eylau, lined up his troops in columns, like the French. The commander of horse artillery, Alexander Kutaisov, unexpectedly for the enemy, assembled a battery of 36 guns in the sharpest direction, no less than the French "large batteries". And if at Austerlitz only the heroic counterattacks of the Russian guards saved the Allied army from complete annihilation, then the battle of Preussisch-Eylau ended in a draw. The steadfastness of the Russians in a bayonet battle impressed Napoleon, who said that it was not enough to kill a Russian soldier - you also had to knock him down.

The most disastrous for Bonaparte's tactics was the Battle of Borodino. Kutuzov took all possible measures to force Napoleon to act in a way that was most beneficial to the Russian troops. Relying on the natural terrain, which did not allow the enemy to organize a united front of attack, as well as on the system of earthen fortifications that provided cross artillery fire, the Russian army forced the French to storm its positions in the forehead, dooming the enemy to huge losses.

The result of the battle was ambiguous, however, Bonaparte failed to achieve the desired goal - to break through the Russian line and thereby defeat the enemy. The "big batteries", so beloved by Napoleon, had to be deployed under fire. The massive cavalry attacks did not help to break through - one after another they crashed against the walls of the bayonets of Russian infantry squares. Thus, Borodino became the first general battle during which Napoleon failed to fulfill any of his primary tasks. This battle was the beginning of the decline of his military star. On the Borodino field, the entire color of the Great Army fell. The loss of experienced soldiers and veterans was irreplaceable for Napoleon. Losses at Borodino were unprecedented, up to a third of each of the opposing armies. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the best military minds of Russia, analyzing the experience of past battles, came to the conclusion that the tactics used in the recent past require significant revision. Despite their effectiveness, the columns with each battle became more vulnerable to both rifle and artillery fire, although the weapons used themselves remained, in general, the same. The scale of wars has changed radically. If even in the 18th century the size of the army rarely exceeded 50,000-60,000 people, then in 1814 it was no longer just troops that fought, but, in fact, armed nations. The Allies in 1815 put up an unheard of number of soldiers against France - up to a million people. The density of fire on the battlefields increased, and the battalion columns began to suffer too heavy losses, before they even had time to get close to the enemy.

The value of a soldier who had been trained for years was too high to waste his life in vain. Having studied the experience of the campaigns of 1812-1814, Barclay de Tolly in 1818 proposed to Emperor Alexander I to replace the battalion columns on the battlefields with dense rifle chains, more mobile, more maneuverable and, most importantly, not such a good target. However, Barclay did not have time to implement such a radical change in tactics - he soon died. There was no other such far-sighted and influential commander in Russia, so the Russian infantry continued to be trained according to the old charters. The idea of ​​Barclay de Tolly was implemented by the British and French in the Crimean War, and it cost the Russian army dearly.