There is an undeclared war against Russia. undeclared war undeclared war

] think that undeclared war differs from a simple military intervention "in scope".

On the other hand, to undeclared wars often include non-combat actions:

  • provocations at the border;
  • show of force, other buildup of military presence, threat of force;
  • support for separatist and nationalist movements.

History

During the next discussion of the project of the tunnel under the English Channel in 1881-1882, the question arose in the British government about the military danger of an attack without warning. J. Maurice (English)Russian, who was commissioned to prepare a report on the subject, was surprised to find that "nations have sometimes ignored all the duties of declaring war and, in the midst of deep peace, have abused the gullibility of their neighbors." C. Eagleton Clyde Eagleton) in 1938 noted that in the time of Maurice, the purpose of waging an undeclared war was to use the advantage of surprise, but since then new, much more powerful factors have arisen: there has been a revolution in military affairs, the interdependence of states has become more complex, international organizations and related organizations have appeared obligation to declare and wage war. Eagleton therefore doubted that any wars would be declared at all in the future, because "some people look at the declaration of war as an anachronism that should be discarded."

the USSR

  • Arab-Israeli Wars
  • Conflicts and wars in Africa

According to the team of authors led by G. F. Krivosheev, the losses of the USSR in undeclared wars and conflicts were: China (before and after World War II) - 1163; Korea - 315; Vietnam - 16; Cuba - 69; Middle East - 52; Algeria - 25; Angola - 11; Mozambique - 8; Ethiopia - 33.

USA

See also

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Notes

Literature

  • . // Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2013.
  • Brown, Philip Marshall. undeclared wars. // American Journal of International Law (1939): 538-541. (English)
  • Kenneth B. Moss. Undeclared war and the future of U.S. foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008. 298 p. (English)
  • Brien Hallett. The Lost Art of Declaring War. University of Illinois Press, 1998. (English)
  • Eagleton, Clyde. . // The American Journal of International Law, 32 (1938): 19. (Eng.)
  • John Frederick Maurice. . H.M. Stationery Office, 1883. (English)

An excerpt characterizing the Undeclared War

- Yes, at the end, to the big one, how can you not see! This is our house, - said Rostov, - after all, this is our house! Denisov! Denisov! We'll come now.
Denisov raised his head, cleared his throat, and said nothing.
“Dmitry,” Rostov turned to the lackey in the box. “Is this our fire?”
- So exactly with and with daddy in the office glows.
- Haven't gone to bed yet? BUT? how do you think? Look, don’t forget, get me a new Hungarian at once, ”added Rostov, feeling his new mustache. “Come on, let’s go,” he shouted to the driver. “Wake up, Vasya,” he turned to Denisov, who lowered his head again. - Come on, let's go, three rubles for vodka, let's go! Rostov shouted when the sleigh was already three houses from the entrance. It seemed to him that the horses were not moving. Finally the sleigh was taken to the right to the entrance; above his head, Rostov saw a familiar cornice with broken plaster, a porch, a sidewalk pillar. He jumped out of the sleigh on the move and ran into the passage. The house also stood motionless, unfriendly, as if it didn't care who came to it. There was no one in the vestibule. "My God! is everything all right?" thought Rostov, stopping for a minute with a sinking heart, and at once starting to run further along the passage and the familiar, crooked steps. The same doorknob of the castle, for the uncleanliness of which the countess was angry, also weakly opened. A single tallow candle burned in the hallway.
Old man Mikhail was sleeping on the chest. Prokofy, the visiting lackey, the one who was so strong that he lifted the carriage by the back, sat and knitted bast shoes from the hems. He glanced at the open door, and his indifferent, sleepy expression suddenly changed into ecstatic fright.
- Fathers, lights! Count young! he exclaimed, recognizing the young master. – What is it? My dove! - And Prokofy, shaking with excitement, rushed to the door to the living room, probably in order to announce, but apparently again changed his mind, returned back and leaned on the shoulder of the young master.
– Healthy? Rostov asked, pulling his hand away from him.
- Thank God! All thanks to God! just ate now! Let me see you, Your Excellency!
- Is everything all right?
- Thank God, thank God!
Rostov, completely forgetting about Denisov, not wanting to let anyone warn him, threw off his fur coat and ran on tiptoe into a dark, large hall. Everything is the same, the same card tables, the same chandelier in a case; but someone had already seen the young gentleman, and before he had time to run to the living room, something swiftly, like a storm, flew out of the side door and hugged and began to kiss him. Another, third, similar creature jumped out of another, third door; More hugs, more kisses, more cries, more tears of joy. He could not make out where and who is dad, who is Natasha, who is Petya. Everyone was screaming and talking and kissing him at the same time. Only his mother was not among them - he remembered that.
- But I didn’t know ... Nikolushka ... my friend!
- Here he is ... ours ... My friend, Kolya ... He has changed! No candles! Tea!
- Kiss me then!
- Darling ... but me.
Sonya, Natasha, Petya, Anna Mikhailovna, Vera, the old count, embraced him; and people and maids, having filled the rooms, sentenced and gasped.
Petya hung on his feet. - And then me! he shouted. Natasha, after she, having bent him to her, kissed his whole face, jumped away from him and holding on to the floor of his Hungarian, jumped like a goat all in one place and squealed piercingly.
From all sides there were tears of joy shining with tears, loving eyes, from all sides there were lips looking for a kiss.
Sonya, red as red, also held on to his hand and beamed all over in a blissful look fixed on his eyes, which she was waiting for. Sonya was already 16 years old, and she was very beautiful, especially at this moment of happy, enthusiastic animation. She looked at him, not taking her eyes off, smiling and holding her breath. He looked at her gratefully; but still waiting and looking for someone. The old countess hasn't come out yet. And then there were footsteps at the door. The steps are so fast that they couldn't have been his mother's.
But it was she in a new dress, unfamiliar to him, sewn without him. Everyone left him and he ran to her. When they came together, she fell on his chest sobbing. She could not raise her face and only pressed him against the cold laces of his Hungarian coat. Denisov, not noticed by anyone, entered the room, stood right there and, looking at them, rubbed his eyes.
“Vasily Denisov, your son’s friend,” he said, introducing himself to the count, who looked at him inquiringly.
- Welcome. I know, I know,” said the count, kissing and hugging Denisov. - Nikolushka wrote ... Natasha, Vera, here he is Denisov.
The same happy, enthusiastic faces turned to the shaggy figure of Denisov and surrounded him.
- My dear, Denisov! - Natasha squealed, beside herself with delight, jumped up to him, hugged and kissed him. Everyone was embarrassed by Natasha's act. Denisov also blushed, but smiled and took Natasha's hand and kissed it.
Denisov was taken to the room prepared for him, and the Rostovs all gathered in the sofa near Nikolushka.
The old countess, without letting go of his hand, which she kissed every minute, sat next to him; the rest, crowding around them, caught his every movement, word, glance, and did not take their eyes off him with enthusiastic love. The brother and sisters argued and intercepted places from each other closer to him, and fought over who would bring him tea, a handkerchief, a pipe.
Rostov was very happy with the love he was shown; but the first minute of his meeting was so blissful that it seemed to him that his present happiness was not enough, and he kept waiting for something more, and more, and more.
The next morning the visitors slept off the road until 10 o'clock.
In the previous room, sabers, bags, carts, open suitcases, dirty boots were lying around. The cleaned two pairs with spurs had just been placed against the wall. Servants brought washstands, hot water for shaving, and washed dresses. It smelled of tobacco and men.
- Hey, G "bitch, t" ubku! shouted the hoarse voice of Vaska Denisov. - Rostov, get up!
Rostov, rubbing his eyes that were stuck together, lifted his tangled head from the hot pillow.
- What's late? “It’s late, 10 o’clock,” answered Natasha’s voice, and in the next room there was a rustle of starched dresses, a whisper and laughter of girlish voices, and something blue, ribbons, black hair and cheerful faces flashed through the slightly open door. It was Natasha with Sonya and Petya, who came to see if he got up.
- Nicholas, get up! Natasha's voice was heard again at the door.
- Now!
At this time, Petya, in the first room, seeing and grabbing sabers, and experiencing the delight that boys experience at the sight of a warlike older brother, and forgetting that it is indecent for sisters to see undressed men, opened the door.
- Is that your sword? he shouted. The girls jumped back. Denisov, with frightened eyes, hid his shaggy legs in a blanket, looking around for help at his comrade. The door let Petya through and closed again. There was laughter outside the door.
- Nikolenka, come out in a dressing gown, - Natasha's voice said.
- Is that your sword? Petya asked, “or is it yours?” - with obsequious respect he turned to the mustachioed, black Denisov.
Rostov hurriedly put on his shoes, put on a dressing gown and went out. Natasha put on one boot with a spur and climbed into the other. Sonya was spinning and just wanted to inflate her dress and sit down when he came out. Both were in the same, brand new, blue dresses - fresh, ruddy, cheerful. Sonya ran away, and Natasha, taking her brother by the arm, led him into the sofa room, and they started talking. They did not have time to ask each other and answer questions about thousands of little things that could interest only them alone. Natasha laughed at every word that he said and that she said, not because what they said was funny, but because she had fun and was unable to restrain her joy, expressed in laughter.
- Oh, how good, excellent! she said to everything. Rostov felt how, under the influence of the hot rays of love, for the first time in a year and a half, that childish smile blossomed in his soul and face, which he had never smiled since he left home.
“No, listen,” she said, “are you quite a man now? I'm awfully glad you're my brother. She touched his mustache. - I want to know what kind of men you are? Are they like us? Not?
Why did Sonya run away? Rostov asked.
- Yes. That's another whole story! How will you talk to Sonya? You or you?
“How will it happen,” said Rostov.
Tell her, please, I'll tell you later.
- Yes, what?
- Well, I'll tell you now. You know that Sonya is my friend, such a friend that I would burn my hand for her. Here look. - She rolled up her muslin sleeve and showed on her long, thin and delicate handle under her shoulder, much higher than the elbow (in the place that is sometimes covered by ball gowns) a red mark.
“I burned this to prove my love to her. I just kindled the ruler on fire, and pressed it.
Sitting in his former classroom, on the sofa with pillows on the handles, and looking into those desperately animated eyes of Natasha, Rostov again entered that family room, children's World which made no sense to anyone but him, but which gave him some of the best pleasures in life; and burning his hand with a ruler, to show love, seemed to him not useless: he understood and was not surprised at this.
– So what? only? - he asked.
- Well, so friendly, so friendly! Is this nonsense - a ruler; but we are forever friends. She will love someone, so forever; but I don't understand it, I'll forget now.

Many Americans living in North Carolina still remember January 24, 1961 with a shudder. This day could go down in the history of the United States and all mankind as one of the greatest disasters of the 20th century. And so it was. A B-52 strategic bomber, alerted from Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, carrying two 24 megaton nuclear bombs, crashed 15 miles north of Goldsboro. The experts of the Ministry of Defense who arrived in the area of ​​the accident were amazed. Of the six safety mechanisms that are sequentially activated to set off a chain reaction in a lethal charge, five (!) Worked when the aircraft exploded. Only a miracle saved the inhabitants of the state from the horror of Hiroshima.

For many years, the normal life of the population in the area of ​​​​the Italian town of Seveso, north of Milan, was disrupted. On June 10, 1976, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant owned by a multinational corporation. About two kilograms of a chemical substance escaped into the atmosphere - a defoliant, similar in composition to those used by the American military in South Vietnam. Experts estimate that the airborne chemical was enough to cause the death of 100,000 people. But the inhabitants of the Italian province were “lucky”! The defoliant dissipated in the atmosphere... However, even dozens of people suffered, among them especially many children. With face burns, eczema, ulcers, they were taken to the hospital. Hundreds of dogs, cats, rabbits, chickens, swallows, and many other animals and birds perished. The area of ​​the accident was cordoned off by troops. The population was evacuated.

So, case by case... But there are many such regions on Earth now, where the prerequisites for environmental disasters of various scales are ripening! And these conditions are created step by step by humanity itself, or rather, by those of its representatives who have made profit and interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples to ensure this profit the main motive of their activities.

It is common knowledge that weapons have been and remain one of the main instruments of imperialist policy. It is well known that his power is growing. And although it is already clear that the decision to use modern weapons in political confrontation is tantamount to madness, imperialism continues the arms race. And to justify this process in the West, there was even a theory that it was the destructive power of modern weapons, the fear of it, that held back the outbreak of war. This power itself, its build-up, turns out to be a guarantee of peace on Earth... The absurdity of such a theory has long been proven. But the likelihood that the very build-up of weapons, the arms race itself is fraught with environmental disasters deserves close consideration.

The two cases that we have described already make it possible to see the danger to which the planet's biosphere is exposed even in peacetime through the fault of the military-industrial complexes. The danger arising at various stages of the development and production of new types of weapons, as well as during their testing, transportation and storage ...

What does environmental warfare look like?

The last decade has replenished the sad experience of wars with another "innovation". Before me are photographs of some regions of South Vietnam, taken at the very beginning of the 70s. The surface of the earth is dotted with craters and resembles a lunar landscape, vegetation has been destroyed in large areas ... It seems that a serious disaster. However, this impression is erroneous.

In the period 1965-1973 alone, 17 million aerial bombs were dropped on the territory of South Vietnam, and 217 million artillery shells were detonated here. According to the estimates of the American scientist A. Westing, the total weight of explosives used for shelling, disturbing vegetation, and destroying irrigation systems amounted to over 7 million tons. However, these figures and facts far from exhaust the picture of the general damage to nature, nor do they give a complete description of the arsenal of means used to influence the environment.

The area, dotted with bomb craters and made unsuitable for economic use, amounted to 365,700 acres. At least 4 million acres, that is, about one tenth of the entire territory of South Vietnam, were subjected to repeated "treatment" with defoliants - weapons of destruction of vegetation. The tactical goal of the operation was announced - the removal of forest cover, so that it would be more difficult for the partisans to hide and move. But the facts show that behind this declared task, there was also a certain super-task - to try to upset the balance natural environment, and work out the techniques and means of "ecological warfare".

Here is a far from complete list of means and methods of using environmental weapons: the use of chemicals to destroy the foliage of trees and vegetation; the use of aerial bombs in the jungle; the use of "bundles" of 33-ton bulldozers to remove the surface layer, after which the soil becomes unsuitable for agriculture (the so-called "Roman plow"); artificial cloud formation and inducing rain by "seeding" clouds with chemicals; acidification of the atmosphere by spraying substances into it that cause rain with an acid reaction; firestorms - spraying chemicals that cause severe fires in the jungle; destruction of dams and irrigation facilities. Thus, a deliberate war was waged against the nature of another country, there was a genuine destruction of the habitat of the present and future generations of an entire people.

It should be recalled that only one deforestation on the territory of Poland by fascist troops during the Second World War was qualified by the Nuremberg Tribunal as a war crime. It is worth remembering something else. In the early 1950s, British colonial troops used chemical substances to destroy crops in Malaya; the Portuguese colonizers used the same tricks in Angola; cases of impact on the natural environment during military campaigns in the Middle East are known. Former employee Pentagon L. Pont recently reported that in 1969-1970 the United States attempted to influence clouds moving towards Cuba in order to deprive the sugar cane plantations on Liberty Island of the necessary amount of moisture, cause drought and thereby cause economic damage to the neighboring state. damage.

Here it does not hurt to note the circumstances that make the situation more confusing and more dangerous. In Vietnam, there was a deliberate destruction of nature. But pesticides are known to dissipate! And, applied in Vietnam, they then entered the atmosphere, with flowing waters they left for the oceans. Where and how will it echo? Unknown. But it is quite possible that the long-term consequences of this local "ecological war" will be quite tangible for other peoples, perhaps even for the American one.

And one more circumstance. At the end of 1975, the Norwegian government made a strong protest to the countries of the "Common Market" in connection with the continuing poisoning of the air basin over Norwegian territory by the products of the industrial activity of the states of the "Common Market", primarily England. The fumes and gases carried across the North Sea have already caused significant damage to forestry and fisheries in southern Norway, and they also threaten public health.

A new type of aggression, which, it seems, cannot even be called aggression... Of course, the neighboring countries were not going to destroy the nature of their NATO ally. But does this not open up a tempting opportunity for the military to have a disguised impact on the natural environment of other countries? The aforementioned experience of "geophysical aggression" against Cuba speaks of the reality of such a scenario. Further improvement of military science could increase this danger.

On the brink of disaster

The American atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a destructive power equivalent to 20,000 tons of conventional explosive (TNT). Its explosion killed 78 thousand people, another 84 thousand civilians were injured. Experts from the Center for Defense Information estimate the power of the US nuclear potential as of mid-1975 at 8,000 megatons. This is 400,000 times more than the charge of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

There is a saying about a gun that fires itself once a year. And the danger of such a spontaneous "shot" grows with the accumulation of weapons.

Back in 1956, a B-36 bomber taking off from Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, unexpectedly dropped an atomic bomb on a plain near the launch sites. Well, the bomb didn't explode...

On January 17, 1966, American B-52 and K-135 aircraft collided in the Palomares region in Spain during refueling in the air. The B-52 bomber had four hydrogen bombs on board. Two of them, when they fell, caused radioactive contamination in an area with a large population.

In January 1968, a strategic bomber accident occurred near Thule, Greenland: four hydrogen bombs were lost.

When President Kennedy ordered an investigation into yet another disaster, he was informed that there had already been over sixty "accidents" in the handling of atomic weapons, including two accidental launches of nuclear missiles.

On April 21, 1964, an artificial Earth satellite was launched at the Vandernberg airbase under the Transit project, which is administered by the US Navy. On board the satellite, in addition to instruments and equipment, there was a SNEP-9a radioisotope power plant operating on plutonium-238. The launch was unsuccessful: the satellite did not go into orbit and burned up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. As a result, on high altitude a cloud of tiny particles of radioactive material formed. There was a threat of infection in a number of areas of Africa. Although the goal of the Transit project is not to create space weapons, but only to ensure the navigation of ships, the consequences of this accident turned into a danger of real damage to the population and the natural environment.

Alas, this is not all.

"Time Bombs"

“A radioactive time bomb has been planted under Ireland,” wrote the Irish Independent, describing the situation in the North Atlantic, some hundreds of kilometers from the coast of the country. The fact is that for a number of years the member states of the European Atomic Energy Agency have been using this water area for a "nuclear dump". In 1976 alone, over 6 thousand tons of deadly radioactive waste. In words, these states are taking precautionary measures: they say that radioactive waste is flooded in special containers. However, as another Irish newspaper points out, The Irish Times, the service life of containers does not exceed ten years. And for natural neutralization radioactive substances longer time is required. This means that the "nuclear dump" off the coast of Ireland could eventually become a source of radioactive contamination marine environment, cause irreparable damage to flora and fauna, affect the economy of a number of states.

We note in passing that during the entire period of the use of atomic energy in the United States, the production of bombs produced 700 times more radioactive waste than all nuclear power plants.

But the "radioactive mine" is far from the only one.

Several dozen human lives were claimed by an epidemic of an unknown disease that broke out in the US state of Pennsylvania. It must have happened that the victims of this epidemic were participants in the traditional convention of the far-right organization American Legion, held at the end of 1975 in Philadelphia. American journalists dubbed the mysterious disease "legionnaires' fever." Comparing the available data, doctors are inclined to believe that the most likely cause of it was the germs of Lassa fever, which, in all likelihood, “escaped” from the laboratory for the production of bacteriological weapons at Fort Detrick, located in neighboring Maryland.

More than a thousand sheep died in one night in January 1971 on a ranch 150 miles southeast or the American town of Skull Valley. The area was already the scene of tragedy in 1968, when 6,400 sheep died as a result of a nerve gas leak from a secret Pentagon test site. Although the War Department subsequently stopped testing potent gases in the area, a lethal dose of these substances is still contained in the vegetation. This is what caused the second case of death of animals.

An equally dangerous episode occurred in December 1970 at a test site in Nevada, where the US military is conducting underground nuclear weapons tests. Suddenly, a radioactive cloud shot up over one of the sites of the test site. Under the influence of the wind, it began to move north. Measures were taken - 600 people were evacuated. However, radioactivity was subsequently discovered in the state of Minnesota and in twenty other American states. As Melvil Carter, director of the Southwestern Radiological Laboratory, was forced to admit, if radioactive dust crossed the border with Canada, the United States would be violating the Moscow Treaty on the Ban on Nuclear Tests in Three Environments.

Angry protests sparked reports of Department of Defense operations to sink nerve gas containers 250 miles off the coast of Florida. In the same way, they tried to "get rid" of 13 thousand tons of toxic substances that were accumulated at a military base located on the Japanese island of Okinawa. They were supposed to be delivered to Johnston Atoll, 700 miles from Honolulu. Not to mention the fact that such burials pose a threat to the flora and fauna of the World Ocean, which is the property of all mankind, the very transportation of such goods by rail, their loading on ships in seaports is fraught with mortal danger for the population, wildlife and vegetation of the state that has toxic substances.

Another "time bomb" was discovered in Alaska in January 1971. As it turned out, two hundred cylinders of potent nerve gas were dumped in the winter of 1966 on the ice of a small lake. Due to the criminal negligence of the US military authorities, the deadly cylinders were forgotten, and in May, when the snow melted, they were at the bottom. There was no order to destroy the gas, since it was listed as "missing", and only one drop of the contents of the cylinders was enough to cause the death of a person. Nevertheless, representatives of the military department did not even take the trouble to notify the inhabitants of the northern regions of Alaska about the threat looming over them ...

There is no other way

Geneva. Palace of Nations. May 18, 1977 Representatives of 33 states put their signatures under the convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of means of influencing the natural environment. The Convention outlaws the means and methods of damaging the weather and climate, the use of technical methods for creating earthquakes and tsunamis, and the impact on atmospheric processes, soil, and vegetation over vast areas.

The significance of the convention, which opened up a new direction in the field of disarmament, lies precisely in the fact that it is a real step towards preventing intentional damage to the biosphere. Now the conclusion seems to be quite obvious that the preservation of the natural environment suitable for normal life and work of living and future generations, to a large extent in general, depends on how successfully the broad and comprehensive process of arms limitation and disarmament develops.

Now the protection and enhancement of natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations of the Soviet people have been proclaimed by the draft Constitution of our country among the most important tasks and duties of a citizen of the USSR. But we share our only planet with other nations and states. Therefore, we are far from being indifferent not only to the problems of the world, but also to the attitude to the nature of other states. International cooperation on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, respect for environment, limiting all forms of damage that militarism inflicts on it is an urgent task of today. Nature is one, irreplaceable, and even the covered muzzles of guns are more and more dangerous for her.

G. Khozin, candidate of historical sciences

Despite the fact that the operational decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was made just 13 days before it began, individual units began to arrive there as early as December 1979. However, the purpose of this action was not explained.

To coordinate the activities of representatives of all Soviet departments in Afghanistan, the Soviet apparatus and troops, on December 13, 1979, an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev, who immediately left for Kabul. There, Soviet military representatives got acquainted with the situation in more detail and approved the entry plan.

His plan was to carry out the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan along two ground and one air routes, the rapid occupation of all vital regions of the country and the success of the next coup d'état.

Before the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, the plan for the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was finalized on December 13 in the office of the commander of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov. By this time, the backbone of the administration and headquarters of the army was formed from the officers and generals of the headquarters and services of the Turkestan military district. Major General A.V. was appointed a member of the Military Council - the head of the political department of the association. Toskaev, Chief of Staff, Major General L.N. Lobanov, head of intelligence, Major General A.A. Korchagin. Wasting no time, they began intensive preparation of troops for the upcoming entry, which took place almost openly. The assigned staff was mobilized. At the training grounds, combat coordination of units was continuously going on: in the Temrez region, crossings across the Amu Darya were being prepared.

The general directive for mobilization and readiness was not given. The troops were put on alert by separate orders after receiving the appropriate oral instructions from the USSR Ministry of Defense. In total, about 100 formations, units and institutions were deployed and understaffed to full staff. For this, more than 50 thousand officers, sergeants and soldiers were called up from the reserve. First of all, combat formations and units were completed; the rear and repair units and bodies of the 40th army were mobilized last, some already during the beginning of the introduction of troops. For the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, this was the largest mobilization deployment in all the post-war years. Transition time state border The Minister of Defense of the USSR was set at 15.00 Moscow time (16.30 Kabul time) on December 25, 1979.

By the appointed time, everything was ready. The day before, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L., First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, arrived at the command post of the 40th Army from Moscow. Sokolov. The commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov. They gave the commander a signal about the beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

In the evening twilight, the vanguard battalion approached the crossings across the Amu Darya. motorized rifle regiment on the infantry fighting vehicle of the 108th motorized rifle division (commander - Colonel V.I. Mironov), which almost immediately overcame the pontoon bridge and went deeper into the territory of the neighboring state. It was followed during the night by the main body of the division. Having made a march, by the end of December 27 they concentrated in the areas of Baghlan, Kunduz, Puli-Khurmi, Deshi. At this time, unexpectedly, the formation was given a new task - to change the route of movement and enter Kabul by 17.00 the next day. By air, the transfer of the main forces of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division under the command of I.F. Ryabchenko. A parachute regiment was sent to Bagram.

At 19.30, the paratroopers seized all the key political and military facilities in Kabul and on its outskirts, thus preventing the approach of troops loyal to Amin to the capital. The arriving Soviet troops strengthened the protection of important administrative facilities, airfields, radio and television centers. On the night of December 28, another, the 201st motorized rifle division, entered Afghanistan in the Herat direction, parts of which took control of the highway connecting the cities of Herat and Shindad, and subsequently its area of ​​​​responsibility expanded to Kandahar.

By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, airborne assault brigades and two separate regiments were fully concentrated on the territory of Afghanistan. In their composition, there were approximately 52 thousand people. It was assumed that this amount would be enough to ensure the life of Afghanistan. It was believed that when entering and disposing, Soviet troops would not have to conduct fighting, since the very presence of Soviet troops will have a sobering effect on the rebels. Soviet military assistance was then regarded as a moral factor in supporting the people's power.


The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan served as a signal and ensured the successful implementation of the government coup. On December 27, Amin was overthrown and executed by a small group of conspirators. Prime Minister of the Republic and general secretary The Central Committee of the PDPA became Babrak Karmal. The first step of the new government was the release of 15 thousand political prisoners from prisons and calls for refugees to return to their homeland. However, these measures did little to normalize the situation in the country, the majority of whose population did not enthusiastically accept the arrival of foreign troops. This was immediately taken advantage of by the opposition, which in the person of B. Karmal saw not only a political opponent, but also a protege of Moscow. Linking the two causes together, the oppositionists stepped up their activities throughout almost the entire territory of Afghanistan, soon bringing it to open armed uprisings, primarily against the Soviet troops.

According to the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the peculiarities of the armed struggle, the combat operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods. The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, its placement in garrisons, the organization of protection and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military and economic facilities, as well as the conduct of military operations to ensure solutions to these problems.

Already during the introduction and deployment of Soviet troops were forced to engage in hostilities with the enemy. A direct participant in those events, Lieutenant Colonel Mamykin Nikolai Ivanovich, recalls: “At the first stage of their stay in Afghanistan, Soviet troops were in garrisons and did not take part in hostilities. However, they were subjected to shelling by the opposition. Even without taking part in the hostilities, the units suffered losses and were forced to return fire. The Afghan servicemen believed that in the conditions of the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in the country, all responsibility for the fate of the revolution should fall on them. Such sentiments were also expressed by B. Karmal, who from the very beginning asked the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense to involve Soviet troops in active hostilities, since he did not rely on his own army. These requests have taken their toll. The command of the Soviet troops was ordered to start hostilities together with the Afghan units. It was believed that the main task in defeating the opposition should be solved by the Afghan army, and the Soviet troops should contribute to the fulfillment of this task.

The winter of 1980 was difficult for the Soviet soldiers. Hopes that the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition will be solved by the Afghan army have not justified themselves. Despite a number of measures to increase its combat readiness, the government army remained weak and incapacitated. Therefore, the Soviet troops bore the brunt of the fight against the armed opposition detachments. The rebel formations acted against the Soviet troops with relatively large forces and did not avoid direct confrontation with them. This made it possible to defeat large counter-revolutionary groups in the areas of Faizabad, Talikan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities.



The leaders of the Afghan opposition, faced with a powerful real force, quickly came to the conclusion that if large groups remain unchanged, they will be defeated. Abandoning the tactics of large forces, they divided all their formations into groups and detachments of 20 to 100 people and switched to partisan operations. In this regard, the questions of the use of forces and means in the fight against small, extremely mobile groups of dushmans who used maneuver tactics of action arose before the Soviet troops in a new way. Attempts by the command to organize an attack on the detachments of dushmans by large military formations according to the rules of classical warfare and the pursuit of their effect did not bring.

There were flaws in the preparation of Soviet troops on a number of issues. Own great experience in the fight against the Basmachi in Central Asia was completely forgotten. The later rich experience of fascist Germany during the 2nd World War and the armies of other countries in carrying out counter-guerrilla operations in local wars has hardly been studied. Therefore, the Soviet soldiers sent to Afghanistan were forced, through trial and error, to reshape the military art of fighting an enemy they were not used to. This reduced the effectiveness of military operations, led to unjustified losses. So, according to the memoirs of the former assistant to the operational department of the division, Nikolai Ivanovich Antonov, during the operation in February 1980, the enemy skillfully used the miscalculations made by the Soviet command. Thus, the absence of side guards on the march in the mountains when advancing to the place of the operation turned into significant losses. The enemy, having let the reconnaissance group and one of the companies of the battalion, which was moving behind the reconnaissance group, attack the company, which was in the center of the column. The shelling was carried out from two sides. According to the intensity of the fire, it was determined that the enemy grouping consisted of 60-80 people. The actions of the enemy were so unexpected that the commanders of all levels showed confusion and no command was given to open at least return fire. And then, when such a command was given, the enemy left his positions and left with impunity.

Nevertheless, in the first period, most of the forces and means of the Soviet troops were involved in solving problems related to the protection of sensitive zones and communications. This task was performed by up to 35% of OKSV. The next task was related to the protection and defense of objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation, the protection of airfields and the wiring of columns. As we can see, all tasks were specific. The Soviet troops had neither the experience nor the knowledge to carry them out, since the performance of such functions was not and is not envisaged in the process of training officers. There are no recommendations in the statutes and manuals on these issues, so these tasks had to be solved practically by trial and error.

Great difficulties in solving various operational and tactical tasks arose in connection with the unsettled life of the Soviet troops. Due to the fact that the base for the deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was not prepared in advance, at the beginning of 1980 only a small part of the arriving units and subunits was able to settle in more or less comfortable military camps. Most of the troops remained in the field in tent cities. To prevent a surprise attack by the enemy, outposts were posted and mining was carried out in threatened directions.



Practical redeployment of troops from one area to another was practiced. At the same time, due to the fact that minefields were not always removed, there were cases when Soviet soldiers were blown up on their own mines.

The second period of the OKSV's stay in Afghanistan (March 1980 - April 1985) is characterized by the introduction of active large-scale hostilities, mainly on their own, as well as together with Afghan formations and units. It began with the fact that the 40th Army was reinforced by the 5th Guards. motorized rifle division and two separate regiments. The total number of Soviet troops reached 81.8 thousand people (including 61.8 thousand people in combat units of the ground forces and the Air Force). These forces included about 600 tanks, 1500 infantry fighting vehicles, 2900 armored personnel carriers, 500 aircraft and helicopters, 500 artillery pieces of various calibers.

The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period of the war, moved the main groupings of its troops to hard-to-reach mountainous regions, where it became practically impossible to use modern equipment. In addition, they skillfully began to hide among the local population. The rebels skillfully used various tactics. So, when meeting with superior forces of the Soviet troops, they, as a rule, evaded the battle. At the same time, the dushmans did not miss the opportunity to deliver a sudden blow, mainly using small forces. In fact, during this period, the detachments of the armed opposition abandoned the positional struggle and maneuver actions were widely used. And only in those cases when the situation forced them, battles were fought. This happened when defending bases and base areas, or when the rebels were blocked and they had no choice but to take the fight. In this case, the blockaded detachments went into close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and sharply narrowed the possibilities for using artillery, especially from closed firing positions.

Under these conditions, the Soviet troops were required to look for new forms and methods of defeating the enemy. It was determined that only the elimination of base areas could lead to certain results. The focus was on this issue. True, its implementation required a significant amount of manpower and resources. Considering that a large percentage of the troops were involved in solving other tasks, it was difficult to complete such a task with the forces of one formation. Most often, it was required to combine the efforts of several formations and create a single operational control link (army headquarters). This form of military action was called "combat operation", or, in a broader sense of the word, simply "operation".

The modern military-scientific interpretation of the term "operation" means a set of battles, battles and strikes, coordinated and interconnected in purpose, place and time, carried out in a theater of operations (theater of operations) or a strategic (operational) direction according to a single concept and plan for solving strategic and operational tasks. According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the minimum number of troops participating in the operation was 70-100 thousand people. In Afghanistan, "operation" was understood as somewhat different methods and forms of troop action. Depending on which formations the forces were involved in and who led their combat operations, operations were divided into army, divisional, and even regimental ones. To conduct an army operation, as a rule, the forces of one or two motorized rifle, as well as landing, artillery, engineering and combat units and subunits were involved - a total of 10-15 thousand people. It was planned by the headquarters of the army, and the leadership of the fighting was carried out by the army command. Divisional and regimental operations were carried out mainly by forces of formations and units under the leadership of their commanders. The fighting covered most of Afghanistan. They were especially active along the main highway and near the eastern Afghan-Pakistani border.



Transition from 1981–1982 mainly to raid maneuver operations as part of separate reinforced battalions with wide application coverage and detours and landing by helicopters of air assault groups was evidence of the accumulated experience and increased combat skills of commanders and troops. But they often did not give the desired results. Major Petrov S.N., who repeatedly participated in such operations during this period, recalls that mobile small detachments of dushmans, who knew the area well and enjoyed support among the local population, as a rule, found ways and opportunities to get out of the blow in advance. So, for example, the commander of the parachute regiment was given the task of destroying a well-armed group of rebels numbering up to 40 people in the province of Parwan. The regiment commander decided to carry out this task with the forces of the 3rd paratrooper battalion. On the night of March 20, 1982, the battalion commander decided to covertly advance to the area of ​​the village of Arkhalkheil and, blocking it with two paratrooper companies, combed the village with one company. It was planned to have one parachute company in the reserve. With the outset of the battle, the battalion supported an artillery battalion and two pairs of Mi-24 helicopters.

On the night of March 20, the battalion began to march along the route Bagram - Arkhalkheil. In front of him, at a distance of 300 m, a combat reconnaissance patrol advanced. The route passed along a wide straight road, along which a duval stretched on the left, and on the right a concrete canal 5 m wide and up to 2.5 m deep. the survivors seek salvation in the canal. From the house, located 150 meters from the ambush site, a machine gun opened fire along the canal. The battalion column stopped, and its commander called in artillery fire and helicopters. And only after the rebels ceased fire, was a maneuver carried out by units in order to cover the enemy, including the reserve. But the enemy, having opened hurricane fire, took advantage of the system of karezes and carried out a retreat. The pursuit and continuation of hostilities no longer made sense.

At this time, a number of shortcomings of heavy military equipment, which turned out to be of little use in mountainous terrain. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery mounts were tied to the roads and had no operational space for their use. Modern high-speed jets were often unable to effectively support ground troops with air strikes. The use of combat helicopters, which at first became the most effective means of combating dushmans in the mountains, was significantly limited with the advent of the latest Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. All this was not long in affecting the effectiveness of operations and battles, which often did not achieve their intended goals.

For the Soviet command, it became more and more obvious that it would not be possible to completely defeat the rebels in a short time by the forces of the OKSV. The main reasons for military failures, the persistence and even a certain expansion of the scale of the guerrilla war of the Afghan Mujahideen lay not in the military sphere, but in the political one. The Parchamists who came to power, headed by Barbak Karmal, did not justify the hopes placed on them. Having rehabilitated those convicted by Amin, the new leadership itself embarked on the path of violence and oppression. Ill-considered and premature transformations in the countryside led to an increase in discontent. The Afghan army, despite its numerical increase and the saturation of units with Soviet military equipment and weapons, remained almost incapacitated in the conditions of political instability in the country. Therefore, the very logic of circumstances drew the Soviet troops deeper and deeper into the course of the civil war.

Having sent its troops into the territory of Afghanistan, the Soviet government and the Soviet military command did not take into account the national-historical factors of this country, its centuries-old history of struggle against various conquerors. The notion that any foreigner who enters the country with a weapon is a foreign occupier who must be fought is firmly entrenched in the mind of an Afghan. The military command made another mistake. Initially, among the fighters of the Soviet units introduced into Afghanistan, a large percentage were representatives of the Central Asian peoples. Obviously, the command proceeded from considerations that the soldiers of these nationalities would find greater understanding among the kindred inhabitants of Afghanistan. However, this actually had the opposite effect. The Pashtun tribes, which have become an active part of the anti-government movement, have historically always been at enmity with national minorities from the north. The appearance of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens was an additional irritating factor, which was skillfully used by agitators and propagandists of the counter-revolution. The forces of the armed opposition grew. So, if in 1981-1983. On the territory of Afghanistan, the number of active armed formations of the Mujahideen was about 45 thousand people, then in 1985 it was already 150 thousand people. They controlled all the main agricultural areas of the country. The combined Afghan-Soviet armed forces operating in Afghanistan, numbering about 400 thousand people (of which about 100 thousand were Soviet troops), mainly controlled the cities and the highways connecting them.

The scale and intensity of the armed struggle of the opposition was constantly growing, which more and more often took the form of maneuverable offensive and defensive actions of large semi-regular formations. From the second half of 1984, attempts were made to create "Islamic regiments" consisting of 3-5 battalions on the basis of individual bands of the Mujahideen. The total strength of the regiment was 500–900 men. Regiments were sometimes combined into "fronts", in which there were from one to several thousand people. In service, in addition to small arms, there was mountain artillery, mortars, rockets. In the hard-to-reach mountainous terrain, the rebels created base areas with a well-organized multi-tiered system of fire and engineering barriers to accommodate their formations.

The main force of the rebels were regional groups and detachments. Their goals, organizational forms and tactics of warfare were determined by local tribal and religious authorities - "field commanders", and the zone of action was limited to the areas of residence of the Mujahideen. These formations, as a rule, did not have a permanent composition and organization. In case of danger, dushmans dissolved among the local residents, which made their identification almost impossible. The composition of detachments and groups in socio-ethnic terms was heterogeneous. Such formations included residents of one national-ethnic group. In most cases, their commanders did not have constant contact with foreign organizations of the Afghan counterrevolution, but the main advantage was the active support of the local population.



Semi-regular formations were usually created at the bases and in the camps of Pakistan and Iran from Afghan refugees. They had good military revenue and were sufficiently armed. The actions of these formations were not tied to one area and were highly maneuverable. Detachments and groups received specific tasks, after which, as a rule, they returned to their bases for understaffing, rearmament and rest. According to Western sources, their number was no more than 5-8% of the total number of forces of the Afghan opposition. These groups included many declassed elements, and the actions themselves were predominantly violent in relation to the local population (forced conscription, robberies, murders, etc.). By their actions, they erected a wall of a certain alienation between the opposition and the Afghan people. The formations of this category were emigrant opposition organizations of different class composition, political goals and platforms, torn apart by internal contradictions and ideological struggle, due to which their main weakness was the lack of coordination, and often even military confrontation among themselves. The terrorist groups operating in the cities were also an integral part of the armed formations of the counterrevolution. They possessed an extensive network of deeply hidden cells. Along with the implementation of terrorist acts, sabotage, sabotage, instigation of mass riots, the leaders of the underground had the task of infiltrating the party state apparatus, the army and special services in order to undermine state power from within.

During this period, one of the main tasks in the fight against the armed opposition was to deprive it of sources - replenishment by returning Afghan refugees to their homeland. But the resolution of this problem directly depended on the fidelity of the chosen general political course of the government. In practice, as a result of gross errors, the number of refugees not only did not decrease, but even increased and amounted to about 5 million people in the second period. All attempts made to block the entry of fresh Mujahideen into the territory of Afghanistan by military means did not give success.

The realization that the main means of combating the armed opposition should not be the military actions of regular troops, but the thoughtful socio-economic, political, organizational and propaganda measures of the authorities, led to a well-known modification of the tactics of the actions of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan - their refusal to conduct numerous "field "operations against individual detachments and groups of dushmans and focusing the main efforts on holding strategically important areas and providing communications, on which the issues of supplying the local population with necessary products and goods directly depended.

However, in practice, this policy did not always give the desired results, mainly due to the weakness of local government. The result of many operations of the Soviet and Afghan troops was the creation in the counties and volosts of state authorities, called orgyadry. They included representatives of the PDPA, ministries of state security, internal affairs, some other departments, as well as persons from among the leading employees of public organizations, representatives of the clergy who support the government of Afghanistan. To ensure the safety of the work of the organizational unit, it included an army unit (as a rule, up to a platoon). The trouble with such an organization was that it was small in number and did not have real power. Its leaders did not know how to conduct political work with the local population, they did not enjoy authority. The influence of the orgyadr was limited, as a rule, to the village in which it was located.

After the completion of the operation, the troops left the occupied area and returned to their places of permanent deployment or moved to other areas of combat operations. In their place, the surviving rebels returned, rebuilt their bases and drove out or destroyed the orgyadra. This was repeated many times. For example, in the valley of the Panjshir River in the second period, 6 military operations were carried out, but government power in this area was not consolidated. By the end of 1981, the activity and results of hostilities were to a certain extent affected by a large separation of personnel, about 40% of which was thrown into solving the tasks of protecting objects and normalizing the life and life of a limited contingent of Soviet troops. First of all, it was necessary to build and improve numerous military camps. This required a large number of building materials and other equipment, which was mainly delivered from the territory of the USSR. The flow of goods has increased sharply. To cope with the tasks of ensuring the construction and replenishment of all necessary supplies for the OKSV, a large number of support battalions are deployed. So, by December 1, 1981, eight separate support battalions operated in the army, which were located in Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Surubi, Shindad, Kabul, Ghazni and Kunduz. But these forces, as practice has shown, were not enough. In March 1984, two separate support battalions were additionally formed in Kabul and Kunduz. Consequently, taking into account a separate support battalion located in Kabul, and an army material support brigade located in the city of Puli-Khurmi back in the first period, by the end of the second period these forces turned out to be sufficient to cope with the tasks assigned to them. This is eloquently evidenced by such facts as the arrangement of the garrisons of the location of the OKSV. In almost every garrison, conditions were created not only for normal rest, but also other issues of life were successfully resolved (washing facilities, libraries, clubs, etc. were deployed). The security system of the troops in the garrisons was improved. For this purpose, the approaches to the garrisons were covered by minefields, security guards were posted on the access roads, in addition, the protection of objects inside the garrisons was established.

During the third period of their stay in Afghanistan (April 1985 - January 1986), the troops of the 40th Army came out, having the most numerous composition. The grouping of their ground troops included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. As part of these forces, there were about 29 thousand units of military equipment, of which up to 6 thousand tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles.

To ensure the actions of troops from the air, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments at his disposal. The total number of OKSV personnel reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. It was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but views on their use have changed significantly.

In connection with the change of leadership in the USSR, for the first time they spoke openly about the Afghan war as a harmful phenomenon imposed on the country and people by a small group of old politicians. In this regard, there has been a tendency towards the constant elimination of Soviet troops from active combat activities, a decrease in the frequency and scale of their operations and battles, and the narrowing of the boundaries of controlled areas. Frequent operations began to be carried out by Afghan units, and the Soviet side carried out their aviation, artillery and engineering support. Only in exceptional cases did the Soviet command go to large-scale operations. An example of this is the operation carried out in 1986 to defeat a well-equipped Mujahideen base in the Khost district.

During this period, the Afghan leadership began work on the creation of armed self-defense units through negotiations with local tribal leaders and elders. Where it was possible to achieve this, anti-government activity ceased and the inhabitants, tired to the limit from the fratricidal war, happily returned to peaceful work. The great political success of the government was the establishment of peace with a number of Pashtun tribes on the border with Pakistan. There were positive results in negotiations with local leaders and religious authorities in a number of other parts of the country, especially in the north.

Along with these measures, a lot of work continued to strengthen the armed forces. Measures were taken to strengthen military discipline, a decisive struggle against desertion began, and complete freedom of religion was proclaimed. The regular positions of mullahs were introduced in the army and courses for their training were opened.



The reaction of the government opposition to the reduction in the combat activity of the Soviet troops was ambiguous. On the one hand, they took advantage of this to expand their spheres of influence in the country, primarily by peaceful, ideological means. On the other hand, fearing a way out of the struggle of large masses of the peasantry, tired of the war and striving to return to peaceful life, the Dushman leaders were forced to constantly maintain tension in the country, fanning the flames of civil war. The main active groups were located in the province of Lagar, Nangarhar, Paktia. And in May 1986, under the leadership of the army commander, Major General V.P. Dubynin, a number of operations are being carried out in these provinces, in which Soviet and Afghan troops took part. In the same year, an operation was carried out in the Khost district to defeat the opposition's base area. This operation was planned to be carried out only by the forces of the Afghan troops with the support of Soviet aviation. Major General Nabi Azimi, Deputy Minister of Defense of the DRA, was appointed the head of the operation. During the operation, it became clear that, for a number of reasons, the Afghan troops would not be able to solve the problem on their own, and this would lead to a further decline in their morale and authority. And the Soviet troops took part in this operation, covering the flanks and rear of the Afghan group, supporting them with their own fire. When destroying small opposition groups, Afghan troops acted independently.

The main event of the third period of the war was the withdrawal from Afghanistan in the second half of 1986 of six regiments of the 40th Army (two motorized rifle, tank and three anti-aircraft missiles). As a result, the number of personnel decreased by 15 thousand people, tanks - by 53 units, infantry fighting vehicles (APC) - by 200 units.

The beginning of the fourth period was laid in December 1986 by the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it became clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. The adoption of the course of "national reconciliation" reflected the real situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve an end to the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after the implementation of a whole range of preliminary measures at the initiative of the Soviet Union, which created the necessary ground for this. The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government, agreed with the Afghan leadership, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the cessation of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries. The new political thinking, which provides for the rejection of military methods of resolving controversial international issues, which was put forward by the Soviet Union, brought the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the negotiating table in Geneva with the participation of the USSR and the USA. The result of these negotiations was the signing of the Geneva Accords on the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

Beginning in January 1987, Soviet troops practically ceased offensive combat operations and fought only if they were attacked by rebels. The exception is the largest joint operation of the Soviet and Afghan troops "Magistral" in the province of Paktia in 1987, carried out in 1987 to deliver national economic goods from Gardez to Khost, with the defeat of large rebel forces blocking the road, in which the forces of five divisions participated . Subsequently, the actions of the Soviet troops were reduced to control over the main vital sections of the roads, preparing and securing the exit from Afghanistan.

In 1988, the Najibullah government searched frantically for ways to implement the policy of national reconciliation. In party life, the main task was to strengthen and consolidate the ranks of the PDPA. In foreign policy, a course was taken to develop relations with all countries, non-alignment with any blocs. In the military field, measures were continued to turn the army into a force capable of independently protecting the existing power in the country. However, none of the measures taken in practice brought the end of the war closer.

The opposition to the calls of the government's policy of national reconciliation refused. Its leaders declared that they would continue the "jihad" until the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan. They intensified agitation work among the local population, increased the intensity of the armed struggle, and carried out a series of terrorist acts.

A complex and intractable task in the policy of reconciliation and a ceasefire was the issue of relations with Shiite Iran and the armed detachments of its adherents and co-religionists in Afghanistan itself. Iran did not recognize the Four-Party Geneva Agreement, refusing to sign it as a fifth interested party. He did not succumb to the influence of - international authorities and was not going to refuse military assistance to the opposition, as well as liquidate centers for the training of the Mujahideen on his territory. Under these conditions, on April 7, 1988, the Soviet government decided on the complete withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The withdrawal was carried out in two stages. At the first (from May 15 to August 16, 1988), the number of troops was halved. Then, after a three-month break, necessary to solve a number of organizational problems, the second stage began, lasting three months (from November 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989).

The withdrawal of troops at both stages was planned and carried out as a large-scale army operation, in which a large number of forces and means participated. Thanks to this, the withdrawal of troops was carried out successfully. The armed formations of the opposition, preparing for a large-scale struggle for power within the country, did not prevent the formations and units of the 40th Army from leaving. On February 15, 1989, the last part left the territory of Afghanistan. Thus, another page in the history of the long-suffering Soviet people was turned, conceived and started by several politicians in the Kremlin, and written with the blood and sweat of many thousands of ordinary people on the land of Afghanistan.


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An arc of instability stretched across the East. In Syria, the government of Bashar al-Assad is fighting the Islamists, in Iraq, the militants of the newly created Islamic Caliphate are moving towards Baghdad, and Iran is ready to send troops to a neighboring state to support fellow Shiites. In Afghanistan, NATO forces are preparing to withdraw, and few experts doubt that after their departure, a new large-scale Taliban offensive will begin. Restless in Pakistan, news of terrorist attacks in Chinese Xinjiang comes regularly. What is happening now in Asia is often called the Great Game, the rules of which have not changed in recent centuries.

Indeed, the similarity is obvious: the interweaving of political intrigues resembles a game with complex and incomprehensible rules, which takes place on a board the size of half a continent. Those who do not know the rules have a hard time: yesterday's enemy can turn into a true friend in a moment, and an ally caressed and overwhelmed with gifts tomorrow will stick a knife in your back just because you accidentally offended a relative of his relative who died hundreds of years ago. Half-forgotten legends can become reality at any second.

The big game has been going on for more than a century, game after game. Some players leave and others take their place. The term itself is not so many years old: in the 19th century it was introduced by Arthur Connolly, a British officer, intelligence officer and diplomat, whose ashes rest in an unknown grave in the city park of Bukhara. The Great Game in the narrow sense is believed to have begun at the very beginning of the century before last. Many of the cataclysms that are now shaking Asia originate precisely there, in the events of two centuries ago. It seems that Rudyard Kipling was right when he wrote in his "Kim": "The Great Game will not be over until everyone is dead." How did it start?

Call of the South

There is an erroneous opinion about the supposedly unchanging Russophobia of the British. Meanwhile, in the period from Ivan the Terrible to Peter I, Russophilia rather reigned in England: merchants traded for mutual benefit, and the geopolitical interests of Moscow and London did not intersect anywhere. FROM early XVII centuries, the British East India Company was mastering the Hindustan peninsula with might and main, while Russia moved further and further east, colonizing Siberia.

The situation began to change when Peter the Great ascended the throne. Under his leadership, Russia became part of the European system of states, and, willy-nilly, in one place or another, the interests of St. Petersburg and London began to clash. It was under Peter the Great that the Russian Empire took its first steps to the south: an expedition of Bekovich-Cherkassky was sent to Khiva, which, among other things, was supposed to explore the trade route to the Indian principalities. The expedition was slaughtered by the Khivans, and the agent sent by Bekovich was detained in Persia. A few years later, Peter tried to gain a foothold on the shores of the Caspian Sea with the same goal - to open a trade route to India. Although Russia acquired large territories as a result of the Persian campaign, after Peter's death, his heirs returned them to Tehran in exchange for a short-term alliance against the Turks.

Throughout the 18th century, Petersburg and London were either friends, or were at enmity, or were friends again. All this time, both the Russians and the British stubbornly continued to colonize Siberia and India, respectively. The British expelled the Dutch and won the single combat with the French. The key moment of the rivalry between London and Paris was the Battle of Plassey, which took place in 1757, four years before the Russians began to colonize the Kuril Islands. After the defeat of the French, the East India Company gradually established itself as the only major force in India, and by the 1830s, its troops reached the borders of Afghanistan.

Ironically, the first shots of the Great Game were fired in the Caucasus just as Napoleon was approaching Moscow. After Alexander signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, relations between Russia and England deteriorated sharply. In 1809, British officers arrived in Persia, which had already been at war for five years against its northern neighbor. They entered the Shah's service and engaged in the modernization of the Persian army. Napoleon's invasion of Russia changed everything: in the autumn of 1812, the British ambassador withdrew all his compatriots from the Persian army, except for three officers and thirteen sergeants, whom he left at the urgent request of Prince Abbas Mirza. When Major General Kotlyarevsky's detachment defeated the Persian army at Aslanduz in October, among the thousands of dead Persian soldiers and officers was the British captain Charles Christie, who thus became the first victim of the Great Game.

Afghan trap

After the end of the war with Napoleon, the rivalry between Russia and Britain in the East flared up with renewed vigor. The attempt of the Persians, on the advice of the English, to take revenge ended in failure: after a series of humiliating defeats, the Shah's government signed the Turkmenchay peace with Russia. The following year, Russia defeated Turkey, taking away the eastern coast of the Black Sea from it.

Russia's successes caused understandable anxiety in England. From the north, a thunderstorm was approaching the overseas possessions of Britain, which had to be stopped. British officers again and again visit the Central Asian khanates, painting the greatness of the island kingdom to the rulers there and encouraging them to resist possible Russian expansion. In India, intelligence training is carried out under the auspices of the Large Trigonometric Survey: more and more agents, including local residents, the so-called pandits, trained to survey the terrain, disperse to neighboring countries and regions, describing and sketching everything they see.

In 1837, a Russian envoy appeared in Kabul - Lieutenant Vitkevich, who quickly entered into the confidence of Emir Dost Mohammed and signed an agreement beneficial for Russia with him. Petersburg, not wanting to aggravate relations with London, recalled Vitkevich and disavowed the agreement. Nevertheless, the following year, British troops invaded Afghanistan and took Kabul, placing their protege, Shah Shuja, on the throne. But soon a rebellion broke out in Afghanistan. The detachment of General Elphinstone retreating from Kabul was defeated, those of the soldiers who did not die were captured. Only one European managed to slip out of the death trap - Dr. William Bryden. And although the British then undertook a punitive expedition and again took Kabul, freeing all the prisoners who had survived by that time, they eventually had to leave Afghanistan. The defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War cost the lives of two more participants in the Great Game: inspired by the successes of the Afghans, the Emir of Bukhara executed two British officers who came to him for negotiations. One of them was Arthur Connolly - the same person who coined the phrase "Great Game".

They took a breath in London only after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, which undermined its international positions. Immediately after the end of this war, the British in a fleeting clash defeated Persia, which at that time was friendly to Russia. Moreover, when the sepoy uprising broke out in India, St. Petersburg was unable to take advantage of the favorable situation.

Pushing the boundaries of the empire

But only ten years passed, and Russia moved south again. The empire was looking for its borders - a long cordon line did not provide security, moreover, rich trading cities lay in Central Asia, which were so attractive to Russian merchants. In 1864, General Chernyaev took Chimkent, the next year - Tashkent, and did this against the will of St. Petersburg. In order not to aggravate relations with the British, Chernyaev was recalled, he was replaced by General Romanovsky, who in the same year stormed Khujand and Jizzakh. Instead of him, General Kaufman was appointed, who took Samarkand in 1868 and made Bukhara a protectorate of Russia. The “party of war” at court was strong, the Russian columns marched through the sands slowly but inevitably. Khiva soon became a Russian protectorate, and in 1875 Kaufman's soldiers put an end to the Kokand khan. Panic began in London and Calcutta: the Russians were moving straight to India.

In 1878, when the results of the last Russian-Turkish war were being summed up, Russia moved its troops to the very border: before the Berlin Congress, Tsar Alexander decided to scare the British. Twenty thousand people prepared to throw on Chardzhui, Balkh and Chitral, General Stoletov, who had distinguished himself in the battles on Shipka and had recently been transferred to Turkestan, left for the Afghan emir on a diplomatic mission. Emir Shir-Ali received Stoletov with honors. The Berlin Congress ended in a compromise, the campaign was cancelled.

Nevertheless, the Russian diplomatic mission alarmed the British. The British demanded that the emir accept their envoys, he, following the advice of Stoletov, refused. The Second Anglo-Afghan War began. Despite a series of defeats, the British eventually won. Afghanistan lost the right to hold an independent foreign policy, including receiving foreign diplomats. Britain seemed to have secured the northern border from a Russian invasion and decided to go on the offensive itself, especially since Shir-Ali's successor Abdurrahman was not averse to trying the skin of a Russian bear.

The Great Game of all time never resulted in a direct clash of empires. The only fight that brought " cold war”to the brink of hot, - a skirmish on Kushka in 1885, when the Russian detachment of Komarov met with the Afghans in the battle for the Penjde oasis. A minor clash that ended in Russian victory brought the Russian and British empires to the brink of war. The crisis was resolved only through the efforts of diplomats - the battle was attributed to a border misunderstanding, and the Russians and the British delimited the border between the Russian Empire and Afghanistan. At the same time, no one was interested in the opinion of the Afghans themselves.

In the late 1880s, there was less and less talk in the General Staff about a rush to India, dreams give way to a more sober and realistic approach. Petersburg understands that the game is not worth the candle: even if they manage to penetrate the Afghan passages with fighting, there is no guarantee that the Indians will enthusiastically meet the Russian troops. In Turkestan, officers and later drew plans for an invasion of a throw across the Himalayas, but it already became clear: they were never destined to come true.

History with geography

The big game was originally played on several fields, one of which was the research field. Operational planning depended on how accurately the mountain passes and heights were mapped: would the Russians be able to break through Afghanistan or the western regions of China to India, and if so, with what forces? Will the British be able to transfer a large contingent to the north if the Afghans need help in the war with the Russians? Accurate geographic data turned into a strategic advantage, allowing more accurate planning of operations and changing the border in their favor.

By the 1890s, the white spot on the map between the two empires was getting smaller, shrinking to the size of the Pamirs. British scouts penetrate there from the south, Cossack detachments from the north, and Chinese patrols from the east. Soon the Pamir crisis broke out: in order to prevent the capture of the Pamir by the Afghans and the Chinese, Russia sends several expeditions to the region, it comes to skirmishes. In 1895, as a result of an exchange of notes, the Pamirs were divided into three parts: Russian, Bukhara and Afghan. Afghanistan received the so-called Wakhan Corridor, a long narrow strip of land jutting out to the northeast. She, like a buffer, divided the British and Russian territories.

Ironically, just when the Russian Empire stopped its expansion in the south, decisive countermeasures were finally taken care of beyond the Himalayas. Appointed in 1902 as commander-in-chief in India, Lord Kitchener, already famous in battles with the Sudanese tribes and the Boers, found that in the event of a likely Russian invasion through Afghanistan, the Anglo-Indian forces would not be able to withstand the blow. Kitchener began to reform, breaking up the army into nine divisions, each of which was a well-trained and equipped small force capable of conducting operations both as part of the army and in isolation from it.

In parallel with the Kitchener reforms, the British fended off another threat from the north: they heard rumors that the Russians were actively working in Kashgar and even appeared in Tibet. This was not without reason - Agvan Labsan Dorzhiev, a native of Russia, became the first minister of the Dalai Lama. Anglo-Indian troops invaded Tibet, where only individual Europeans had previously managed to penetrate, and took Lhasa.

The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 put an end to the Great Game. A new century was approaching, another player intervened in Eastern affairs - Germany, whose ideas about the construction of the Berlin-Bosporus-Baghdad road and the growing activity in the Persian and Afghan directions equally worried both London and St. Petersburg. In addition, after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia could no longer pursue its policy in the East with the same energy.

Russia recognized that Afghanistan is in the British sphere of influence, pledging to maintain contacts with Kabul only through the British, as long as they guarantee the safety of the existing regime; London, in turn, undertook to prevent Afghan incursions into Russian territory. The parties declared that they would promote the neutrality of Tibet and maintain its territorial integrity, agreeing that they would enter into relations with the Dalai Lama only through the mediation of the Chinese emperor as his overlord (by this agreement, modern People's China, in particular, justifies its rights to Tibet). Persia was divided into three spheres of influence: northern - Russian, southern - British and intermediate - neutral.

Figures of the Great Game

Those who played the Great Game sat in London, Delhi, St. Petersburg and Tashkent. For them, Asia was a huge chessboard on which the game was played. But the language does not dare to call those impudent officers and agents who risked their lives, step by step moving deeper into the unknown, pawns.

Some people are more fortunate, some less so. Some of the participants in the Great Game, like the exiled Pole Yana Vitkevich, were written by venerable authors, including Yulian Semyonov. Someone, like the Kazakh Chokan Valikhanov, is considered a national hero of his people. We know Semenov-Tyan-Shansky and Przhevalsky as famous geographers and naturalists. Others because of their participation in the White movement, like Yudenich and Kornilov, were declared enemies, and their efforts in the Great Game were forgotten for many years. Those who ended up on the side of the Bolsheviks, like the famous descriptor of Bukhara, General Logofet, or Andrei Evgenievich Snesarev, one of the researchers in Afghanistan, settled in the headquarters, where their knowledge was in demand. Many of them did not survive the repressions of the thirties. And someone, like the ethnic Pole Bronislaw Grombchevsky, who became famous in the Pamir expeditions, remained forever abroad.

The British were more fortunate in this regard: those who did not disappear without a trace in the snowy passes and mountain gorges and were not executed by suspicious local kings received well-deserved fame among contemporaries and descendants. But information about many dozens, if not hundreds, of unknown agents, of which only an alphanumeric cipher remained, is still stored in archives in London and Delhi, waiting for historians to get to them.

With the signing of the agreement of 1907, the Great Game ended, as it then seemed - forever. A new time was coming, a new enemy was awakening in Europe, and old enemies extended the hand of friendship to each other. But less than a dozen years later, it turned out that only the first round of the Great Game had actually ended. The second one started, but it was completely different people who had to play this game.

Undeclared air war between the USSR and the USA (according to RGASPI materials)

The Historik magazine publishes a memorandum by Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov about the Soviet Il-12 transport aircraft shot down in 1953 by American fighters and other documents about air conflicts between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War.

Map showing the route and place of the crash of the Il-12 aircraft, published in the Pravda newspaper on August 2, 1953 - CREDIBLE RGASPI

On the morning of July 27, 1953, the Soviet Il-12 transport aircraft took off from the Port Arthur naval base and headed for Vladivostok. The flight route ran through the territory of China, there were 21 people on board the aircraft: 6 crew members and 15 officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who were on their way to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation. At 6:28 Moscow time (11:28 Beijing time) near the city of Huadian, which is 120 km from the Korean-Chinese border, an Il-12 was attacked by four American fighters and shot down.

All on board were killed. The destruction of the aircraft, which made a regular flight away from the combat zone (despite the fact that there were only a few hours left before the official end of the Korean War and the parties announced the signing of a truce scheduled for July 27 the day before), was rightly regarded Soviet authorities as "crime" and "pirate attack".

The Chinese statement of protest said that on July 27, 324 American military aircraft were recorded in the airspace of Northeast China, four of them were "for the purpose of reconnaissance and creating disturbance" in the area of ​​the city of Huadian at the time of the death of the Il-12.

The Americans did not admit guilt, putting forward a version according to which the Soviet plane was shot down much to the south, in the sky over North Korea, eight miles from the Yalu River. And two days after the death of the Il-12 near Askold Island near Vladivostok, two MiG-15 aircraft stopped an attempt to violate the USSR border by a US Air Force RB-50 bomber. When approaching for identification, Soviet fighters were fired upon, after which they returned fire and destroyed an American aircraft. Of the 17 crew members of the RB-50, only one survived.

Thirty-seven dead as a result of two crashes that occurred two days apart, the list of shot down, dead and missing in that undeclared war that unfolded in the airspace of the Soviet Union and adjacent territories is far from exhausted. The exact number of victims of this confrontation, which began even before the end of World War II, is unknown, but, apparently, we are talking about more than a hundred victims. The culmination was the story of the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft shot down over the Urals on May 1, 1960, which led to a high-profile diplomatic scandal and the disruption of the meeting of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev with US President Dwight Eisenhower.

The causes of conflicts, as a rule, were violations of the state border of the USSR by American aircraft, which were collecting information about Soviet weapons, carrying out, according to the head of intelligence of the US Air Force S.P. Cabell, an aggressive "reconnaissance program in order to obtain maximum information about the electronic weapons of foreign states" . Aviation reconnaissance with violations of the Soviet border was carried out from all directions - from the Baltic states and Transcaucasia to the Arctic and the Kuril Islands.

However, and Soviet pilots were not limited solely to the protection of the state border. So, on September 7, 1950, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the issue of the death of the A-20Zh aircraft in the area of ​​the Port Arthur naval base. This decree limited the area for Soviet aviation flights in the region and reprimanded high-ranking military officers for "wrong and frivolous" ordering a Soviet aircraft to photograph an "unidentified destroyer" in the border zone, which provoked an attack by 11 American fighters and the death of the A-20Zh crew.

The peak of the air confrontation between the two superpowers of the post-war world came in the 1950s. After the incident with the U-2, spy flights by American aircraft over the USSR were sharply reduced, which was also affected by the emergence of more advanced reconnaissance equipment (spy satellites Korona, Samos, Midas).

The published documents of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) are taken from the personal fund of V.M. Molotov (F. 82); one document (No. 8) was taken from the inventory containing the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (F. 17. Op. 3). Documents are arranged in chronological order and reproduced with the preservation of the stylistic features of the sources. Geographical names, aircraft names and transcriptions of foreign names are given in the edition of documents, missing parts of words and endings are enclosed in square brackets.

No. 1. Reference "Noted correspondence on violation by American aircraft and submarines of the state border and territorial waters of the USSR in the Far East"

Item No.

Soviet notes to Americans

Response Notes of the Americans

I. Border Violation by American Aircraft

In Note No. 374 of December 1, 1947, the Foreign Ministry informed the US Embassy in Moscow about three cases of border violations, protested and expressed the hope that the US government would give the necessary instructions to prevent violations of the Soviet border in the future. There was no answer.
2 In Note No. 5 of January 5, 1948, the Foreign Ministry, informing the US Embassy in Moscow about one case of border violations, protested again and insisted that the US government take urgent measures to eliminate border violations in the future. In Note No. 88 dated February 19, 1948, the US Embassy denied the violation of the border.
3 In Note No. 261 dated January 5, 1948, the USSR Embassy in the United States informed the State Department about one case of border violation and, on behalf of the USSR government, asked to investigate it and take measures to prevent such violations in the future. In a note dated April 20, 1948, the State Department denied the violation and reported that American aircraft were under constant instructions to avoid any violation of the Soviet border.
4 In note No. 126 dated July 8, 1948, the USSR Embassy in the United States confirmed the authenticity of the case of violation of the border cited in the note of the embassy dated January 5, 1948, reported another case of violation of the border and, on behalf of the USSR government, insisted on a thorough investigation and expressed the hope that the US government will take steps to prevent similar violations in the future. In a note dated October 14, 1948, the State Department denied the said violation.

II. Violation of the territorial waters of the USSR by American submarines

1 In Note No. 166 of November 2, 1948, the Foreign Ministry informed the US Embassy in Moscow about one case of violation of territorial waters and expressed the hope that the American authorities would take the necessary measures to prevent such violations in the future. In Note No. 778, dated December 13, 1948, the US Embassy denied the said violation.

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1316. L. 108.

Copy. Typescript

No. 2. Reference "Correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow regarding violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation (overflights by American aircraft of Soviet ships)"

Notes of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Embassy

Reply Notes of the US Embassy

1 In Note No. 20 dated January 30, 1948 (about 13 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, stated that it expected the US government to give the necessary instructions to the appropriate US military authorities to prevent future violations of the freedom of merchant navigation.

In note No. 316 dated May 25, 1948, the US Embassy, ​​in response to 3 notes from the Foreign Ministry, reported that the US government considers the actions of the American authorities as lawful measures arising from the duties of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan in accordance with the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945 and not violating the freedom of merchant navigation.

2 In Note No. 34 dated March 4, 1948 (about 8 cases of overflights), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the USSR government, insisted that the US government immediately take measures to eliminate unacceptable violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation.
3 In note No. 44 of April 9, 1948 (about 34 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, for the third time, drawing the attention of the US government to unacceptable violations of the freedom of merchant navigation by American aircraft, insisted on taking immediate measures to eliminate such violations.
4 In note No. 116 of July 7, 1948, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the USSR government rejected as untenable the US government's reference to the Moscow Agreement, qualified the flights of American aircraft over Soviet ships as a clear arbitrariness, confirmed the protest of the Soviet government against violations of the freedom of merchant navigation by American aircraft, and insisted on the immediate cessation of these violations.

No answer.

5 In note No. 9 dated February 15, 1949 (about 22 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, reaffirming its earlier statements regarding the inadmissibility of violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation on the high seas, reported that it expected the US government to take appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future.

No answer.

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1316. L. 109.

Copy. Typescript

No. 3. Memorandum of the head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.A. Kuznetsova V.M. Molotov about the flight of the P-38 aircraft in the Arctic

Deputy Chairman

Council of Ministers of the USSR

Comrade Molotov V.M.

I report:

the head of the Wellen polar station reported by telegram that on July 23, 1950, at 03:20 Moscow time, a P-38 type aircraft arrived at an altitude of 1500 meters 5 kilometers from the station at an altitude of 1500 meters and left along the strait on a southeasterly course.

This type of aircraft is in service with the US Air Force.

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 622. L. 55.

No. 4. Memorandum of the head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.A. Kuznetsova V.M. Molotov about the flight of an American aircraft in the Arctic

Deputy Chairman

Council of Ministers of the USSR

Comrade Molotov V.M.

I report:

according to the report of the head of the polar station on Ratmanov Island in the Bering Strait on July 25 this year. At 04:00 Moscow time, a twin-engine American aircraft flew over the island heading northeast.

Head of the Main Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kuznetsov

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 622. L. 56.

Script. Typewritten text, signed by A.A. Kuznetsova

No. 5. Memorandum of the Minister of War of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky and Chief of the General Staff S.M. Shtemenko I.V. Stalin about the raid of American aircraft on the Dry River airfield in Primorye

Comrade Stalin

We are reporting on a raid by two American planes on our airfield in Primorye.

Today, October 8, at 4:17 p.m. local time, two American Shooting Star (F-80) jet fighters approached at a strafing flight from the sea to the airfield of the 5th Naval Fleet Dry River, located on the seashore 35 km southwest of Vladivostok and 100 km from the Soviet-Korean border, machine-gunned our aircraft located at this airfield.

As a result of the shelling, one Aero-Cobra aircraft burned down and six aircraft of the same type were damaged. There are no human casualties.

The duty flight of aircraft of the 5th Navy of the Aero-Cobra type, which rose three minutes after the signal, could not catch up with the American aircraft.

An on-duty flight of fighters of the 5[th] Navy is constantly based at the Dry River airfield, and at the time of the raid, at the airfield, in addition, a fighter regiment was sitting on Aero-Cobra aircraft of the 54th Air Army of the Primorsky Military District, which on October 7 flew to this airfield from its permanent base to participate in corps exercises to be held in this area, according to the autumn combat training plan.

Most likely, American aircraft could carry out this raid from an aircraft carrier, since this type of aircraft has a flight radius of about 700 km with external tanks and cannot reach the Vladivostok area either from Japan or from Korea. The aircraft is armed with six machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber, its speed is about 900 km/h.

The weather in the Vladivostok region is bad, overcast with a height of 200 meters, fog.

Vasilevsky

Shtemenko

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 832. L. 13–14.

Certified copy. Typescript

Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov to the Minister of Defense N.A. Bulganin about the Il-12 aircraft shot down by American fighters in July 1953 - PROVIDED BY RGASPI

No. 6. Memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky and Naval Minister of the USSR N.G. Kuznetsova I.V. Stalin on strengthening the intelligence activities of American aviation in the Far East

Top secret

Comrade Stalin I.V.

We report:

During the five months of 1952, the reconnaissance activity of American aviation in the Far East increased significantly.

During the five months of 1952, there were 42 cases of violation by American military aircraft of our state border, 31 of them in the region of the Kuril Islands.

Flights of American military aircraft along the Soviet coast, at a distance of 15-20 miles from the coastline on the approaches to Peter the Great Bay, in the regions of the Tatar Strait and the southern part of Sakhalin Island, have sharply become more frequent.

During this period, radio technical posts in these areas recorded 87 cases of flights by American military aircraft.

If in 1951 American military aircraft flew mainly in the central part of the Sea of ​​Japan and, as a rule, single aircraft, then in the first half of 1952 they fly in groups of 2-4 aircraft in the northeastern part of the Sea of ​​Japan and in the Tatar Strait.

The number of cases of flights by American military aircraft over the transports and ships of the Ministry of the Navy, the Ministry of the Fisheries Industry and the Department of the Navy has increased especially sharply. During five months of 1951, 113 transports were inspected by American military aircraft in the Yellow and Japan Seas; during the same period of 1952, they examined 328 transports; in May alone, 1952, 93 transports were examined by American aircraft.

When examining transports this year, the planes descended to a height of 40–60 meters above sea level, made circles above them, flew at a low level, and in some cases defiantly swooped down on them.

Thus, in 1952, the Americans sharply increased the intensity of aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet coast, transport routes, and tightened control over the regime of our maritime transport in the Far East.

A. Vyshinsky

N. Kuznetsov

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1318. L. 165–166.

Copy. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs of A.Ya. Vyshinsky, N.G. Kuznetsova

No. 7. Memorandum of the Minister of War of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky and Chief of the General Staff V.D. Sokolovsky I.V. Stalin about the violation by an American plane of the state border of the USSR in the area of ​​Yuriy Island

Top secret

Comrade Stalin

We report:

October 7 p. At 15:30 Khabarovsk time, in the southeastern part of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, two La-11 fighters of the 369th Fighter Aviation Regiment of Air Defense shot down an American B-29 aircraft, which violated our state border 12–15 km south of -west of Yuriy Island.

Aircraft B-29 at 14:31. was discovered by a radio technical post in the immediate vicinity of our state border, in connection with which an on-duty pair of fighters piloted by pilots Senior Lieutenant Zheryakov and Senior Lieutenant Lesnov was raised from the Yuzhno-Kurilsk airfield.

At 15:29, the B-29 plane violated the border and flew over the territorial waters of the USSR in the direction of Yuriy Island, where at 15:30 it was attacked by our fighters, and the intruder opened fire first.

As a result of the attack, the B-29 aircraft caught fire, crashed and sank in our territorial waters, three kilometers southeast of Yuriy Island.

Boats of the 114th Border Detachment in the area where the plane crashed picked up a headless corpse with a loose parachute, a map of Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands, a fragment of an unknown document with the signature "James Smith - Captain Officer of Intelligence of the US Armed Forces", four gas tanks and a torn inflatable boat .

Documents were found in the clothes of the corpse in the name of the senior lieutenant of the American army Bumkhen John Robertson.

During October 8, from dawn to noon, American F-84 fighters in groups of four to eight aircraft patrolled along our state border southwest of Yuriy Island, and individual aircraft from these groups violated the border three times at high speeds and passed over the area where the downed aircraft fell.

Measures have been taken to increase the combat readiness of the entire system of the Sakhalin-Kuril border air defense area.

Vasilevsky

Sokolovsky

RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1318. L. 182–183.

Copy. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs of A.M. Vasilevsky, V.D. Sokolovsky

Scheme of the flight of the American B-29 aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters near Yuriy Island in October 1952 - PROVIDED RGASPI

No. 8. Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on a protest to the US government in connection with the violation of the state border of the USSR

From the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 89.

p. 360 - On the protest to the US government in connection with the violation of the state border of the USSR.

Resolved:

Approve the draft note of protest submitted by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US government in connection with the violation by an American military aircraft of the USSR state border in the area of ​​Yuriy Island (attached).

Appendix

Protest Note of the Government of the USSR to the Government of the United States

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States of America as follows.

According to a verified report from the competent Soviet authorities, on October 7 this year. At about 3:30 p.m. Vladivostok time, a four-engine B-29 bomber with US markings violated the USSR state border in the vicinity of Yuriy Island. The rising two Soviet fighters demanded that the American bomber follow them to land on the nearest airfield. Instead of complying with the legal requirement of the Soviet fighters, the intruder opened fire on them. After the return fire of Soviet fighters, the American bomber withdrew towards the sea.

The Soviet government expresses its strong protest against this new case of violation of the USSR state border by an American military aircraft and insists that the US government take measures to prevent violations of the USSR state border by American aircraft.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1096. L. 75, 159.

Script. Typescript

No. 9. Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov to the Minister of Defense of the USSR N.A. Bulganin about the downed Il-12 aircraft of the Pacific Fleet

Copy

Top secret

Minister of Defense of the USSR

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Comrade Bulganin N.A.

I report:

According to the report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, on July 27 at 06:28 Moscow time, four American fighters shot down an Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet on Chinese territory, 120 km from the Korean-Chinese border near the settlement Huadian (130 km southwest of Dunhua).

The plane, piloted by pilot Captain Glinyany, was returning from Port Arthur to Vladivostok along the route through Mukden, Dunhua, at an altitude of 2400 meters.

There were 21 people on the plane, of which 6 people were the crew of the aircraft and 15 officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who were on their way to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation.

Representatives of the Chinese administration at the scene found a burned-out plane and three corpses.

Through the General Staff, instructions were given to our military adviser in China to urgently investigate and report the circumstances of the incident, the condition of the aircraft and crew, and also take measures to provide assistance to the victims and protect the aircraft.

Appendix: List of persons who were on the Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet during the flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok on July 27, 1953

Appendix

Top secret

List of persons who were on the Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet during the flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok

Aircraft crew - 6 people

1. Pilot - Captain Clay.
2. The second pilot is senior lieutenant Ignatkin.
3. Navigator - Captain Munin.
4. Flight engineer - Captain Golovachev.
5. Radio operator - foreman Konovalov.
6. Flight mechanic - senior sergeant Vilinkok.

Officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who went to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation - 15 people

1. Lieutenant colonel of the medical service Larionov.
2. Lieutenant colonel of the medical service Subbotovsky.
3. Major of the medical service Drobnitsky.
4. Captain of the technical service Voloshin.
5. Senior Lieutenant Zhigulin.
6. Senior Lieutenant Frain.
7. Senior Lieutenant Sabinov.
8. Senior lieutenant of the technical service Lazarev.
9. Senior Lieutenant Lekah. The text of N.A.’s resolution is printed at the top of the document. Bulganin: “Send to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 28/VII.1953”. To the Secretariat V.M. The Molotov note arrived on July 28. Autograph resolution by V.M. Molotov says: “Introduce [comrade] Comrade Gromyko.” Also on the copy received by V.M. Molotov, there are office notes I.I. Lapshova: “In business. 29.VII"; “A copy was sent to Comrade Gromyko for review. 29.VII"; "Hand over to the archive. 19.XI. On the back of the first page of the document is a list of persons to whom copies of N.G.'s memorandum were sent. Kuznetsov; in order: G.M. Malenkov (specimen No. 1), V.M. Molotov (surname underlined), K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, M.G. Pervukhin (specimen No. 8).

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