The Second Treaty of Paris On November 8(20), 1815, the Allies signed the second Treaty of Paris. There was no longer any talk of keeping France within its former borders. Negotiations to determine the future of the kingdom were long and difficult. The Prussians and representatives of the German states tried

The Paris Report How much Thomas Mann naturally avoided "developing" in this new turn towards the West is confirmed by the diary of his trip to Paris in January 1926. The trip bore the features of a state visit, a spiritual Locarno, and Thomas Mann himself described it as such. His

Napoleon's secret negotiationsIIIwith AlexanderIIabout the world. In mid-October 1855, Alexander II first received the news that Napoleon II would like to start "direct" relations with him. In other words, the emperor of the French, on the one hand, made it clear that he was not in the least constrained by an alliance with England, and on the other hand, that he, too (like Alexander) was not very pleased with the Vienna conferences.

Very soon after Sweden's refusal to join the coalition, Napoleon III came to the conclusion that he had no need to fight further, and there was little chance of success. The British would like to continue the war. "We are threatened by the world" Palmerston wrote candidly to his brother. English diplomacy was not averse, firstly, to seize the entire Crimea to Perekop and “return” it to Turkey, then land in the Caucasus, take Georgia, take away the entire southeastern Caucasus, create “Circassia” for Shamil, and turn Shamil himself into a Turkish-protected and England as a vassal, called upon to block the way for Russian advance into Persia. But Napoleon III did not at all want such a strengthening of England; on the contrary, in Russia he already seemed to be beginning to see a useful counterbalance to the British in some cases. To shed French blood in the Caucasus in order to secure India from the Russian invasion seemed to Napoleon III completely unnecessary. And he gave permission to the Earl of Morny to enter into "private" relations with Russia. Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, was visited one fine day by the head of the large Sipa banking house and told him that he had received a letter from his Parisian friend and also a banker, Erlanger, in which Erlanger reports an interesting conversation that he had with the Earl of Morny. The count finds that it is time for the French and Russians to stop the useless slaughter. Gorchakov immediately notified the tsar of this and, without even waiting for an answer, told the banker Sipa that he could write the following to his friend Erlanger in Paris on his behalf. He, Gorchakov, believes that not only peace, but also direct rapprochement between France and Russia after the conclusion of peace can be extremely useful for these powers. But the conditions of peace should not affect the feelings of Russia's national dignity. Morny understood that this was a direct allusion to the demand threatening Russia for the mandatory limitation of the navy in the Black Sea. He answered Gorchakov with a mild refusal: one cannot demand from Napoleon III and from England, after all the sacrifices they have suffered near Sevastopol, that they should renounce this demand. This first mutual probing was followed by official, albeit secret, negotiations in Paris itself. But here the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode committed a tactlessness from the very beginning, which greatly damaged the cause. He informed the Viennese court about the beginning of relations between Russia and Paris. Why he did this is hard to understand. Apparently, Nesselrode stubbornly consoled himself with the illusion that the solidarity of the powers of the Holy Alliance continued to exist, and believed that it was not good to conspire behind the back of "friendly" Austria. Of course, Franz Joseph and Count Buol were very alarmed when they learned about the sudden change of mood of Napoleon III and that he could negotiate with Alexander without the participation of Austria. Such a turn of affairs threatened Austria with the most dangerous isolation. Buol immediately informed Napoleon III of Austria's complete readiness to finally join the Western powers and present Russia with something like an ultimatum. Napoleon III was surprised and annoyed by the strange frankness of Russian diplomacy and interrupted the negotiations that had begun.

All this significantly worsened the diplomatic position of Russia. From now on, it became even more difficult for Napoleon III than before to impede the aggressive aspirations of England. Buol was in a hurry, and already in mid-December the Austrian proposals were handed over to Nesselrode.

Austrian ultimatum to Russia. In these proposals, Russia made the following demands:

1) replacement of the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia by a protectorate of all the great powers; 2) the establishment of freedom of navigation in the mouths of the Danube; 3) preventing the passage of someone's squadrons through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to the Black Sea, the prohibition of Russia and Turkey to keep a navy on the Black Sea and have arsenals and military fortifications on the shores of this sea; 4) Russia's refusal to patronize the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan; 5) the concession by Russia in favor of Moldova of the section of Bessarabia adjacent to the Danube. These conditions were much harder and more humiliating for Russia than the previous "four points", to which neither Nicholas I nor Alexander II agreed at the time. The Austrian "proposals" were presented as an ultimatum, although without specifying an exact date. But it was categorically given to understand that non-acceptance of the terms would entail Austria's declaration of war on Russia.

A few days after the presentation of the Austrian note, Alexander II received a letter from Friedrich Wilhelm IV. The Prussian king wrote at the clear instigation of Buol and Franz Joseph. The letter, written in pleasant tones, contained a direct threat: the king invited the tsar to weigh "the consequences that may occur for the true interests of Russia and Prussia itself" if Alexander rejected the Austrian proposals. So, it was foreseen that not only Austria, but also Prussia would join France and England.

What was to be done?

On the evening of December 20, 1855, a meeting convened by him took place in the tsar's office. Nine people were present: Alexander II, Grand Duke Konstantin, Nesselrode, Vasily Dolgorukov, P. D. Kiselev, M. S. Vorontsov, Alexei Orlov, Bludov and Meyendorff.

The debate was not very long. Everyone, except Bludov, spoke out in favor of the decisive need to conclude peace as soon as possible. The king did not express his opinion clearly. They settled on agreeing to the conditions presented, except for the concession to Bessarabia. They also did not agree to accept the vague, but fraught with consequences, article of the Austrian note, which spoke of the right of the Allies to present Russia, in addition to the "four points", "special conditions", if this is required by the "interest of Europe". On January 10, Buol received a Russian reply in Vienna, and since it was he who included the point on Bessarabia, he resorted this time to a formal ultimatum: he declared that if after six days (after January 10) Russia did not accept all the presented her conditions, then the Austrian emperor will break off diplomatic relations with her. Alexander II convened a secondary meeting on January 15. At this meeting, Nesselrode read a note in which this time he placed all his hopes on the location of Napoleon III; he waved his hand at Austria, realizing at last, much belatedly, that she was no less an enemy of Russia than England. The assembly unanimously decided to accept the ultimatum as preconditions for peace.

The position of France at the Paris Congress. Alexander II sent Count Orlov to Paris for a peace congress, giving him Baron Brunnov, the former Russian ambassador in London, as an assistant. From the first to the last moment of his stay in Paris, Orlov based his entire diplomatic activity on rapprochement with the French emperor and on the support that Napoleon III began to provide to the Russian commissioner from the very beginning of the negotiations.

The Congress of Paris began on February 25 and ended with the signing of a peace treaty on March 30, 1856. Count Walewski, French Foreign Minister, son of Napoleon I by Countess Walewska, presided. From the very first meetings of the congress, it became clear to all its participants that Walevsky would support the British only formally. And soon, in diplomatic circles, they also learned about the intimate conversations that Emperor Napoleon III had with Count Orlov immediately after Orlov's arrival in Paris.

This count belonged to the number of people most gifted with diplomatic abilities, which were at the court of Nicholas, and then Alexander P. Orlov loved diplomacy. At one time, without hesitation, for reasons of career, he accepted the post of chief of gendarmes after the death of Benckendorff. But he did not personally deal with espionage. Out of disgust and laziness, he left everything to Dubelt. He had a brother Vladimir, close to the Decembrists, and Orlov did not renounce him, but supported him in difficult times. He also ordered to remove supervision from Herzen and issue him a foreign passport, at the request of O. A. Zherebtsova, whose granddaughter Orlov was married.

Arriving in Paris, Orlov managed from the very first conversation to agree with Napoleon III that from now on a close rapprochement between Russia and France is possible, between which there are essentially no fundamental contradictions. Orlov's interlocutor was inclined to fully meet him halfway. Napoleon III achieved everything he wanted: Turkey was saved from Russian capture; the arms of France are covered with new glory; taken "revenge" for 1812; the French emperor strengthened his throne inland and took first place in Europe. Napoleon III did not need anything more from Russia.

The position of England at the Congress. But this was not at all the case with England. Even before the opening of the congress, Palmerston, to his great chagrin, was convinced, firstly, that Napoleon III did not intend to continue the war and, secondly, that at the congress he would behave evasively and ambiguous in relation to its ally - England. Palmerston realized this when, in January and February 1856, there was a dispute about whether or not to admit Prussia to the Congress. Alexander II desired her presence, because he counted on her friendly support. But that is precisely why Palmerston refused to admit the Prussian representatives. He explained this by the fact that Prussia did not take any part in the war and did not even want to act like Austria did. In this very sensitive issue, Napoleon III supported Palmerston extremely languidly. Prussia, it is true, was not admitted, but Palmerston had already realized before the meetings began that a difficult game lay ahead in Paris. His worst fears were justified.

Napoleon III did not compromise his “friendship” with the “allies” in front of Orlov with a single word and did not say anything that Orlov could then, with reference to him, use in front of the British. But Orlov did not need this at all: what mattered to him was not what Napoleon said, but how he listened to the Russian representative, why he did not interrupt him, at what moments he was silent, but when he smiled. In fact, in two or three afternoon conversations in the imperial office face to face with Napoleon III, over a cup of coffee, Orlov did all the work, and the solemn meetings of the plenum of the congress did not and could not change anything. Orlov's strength lay precisely in what Palmerston irritably saw as his weakness: Orlov knew that England would not continue the war one-on-one. Consequently, on all those points on which there is a unity of views between England and Napoleon III, Russia has to yield; on the other hand, on all questions on which there is a difference between them, the Russian representatives must persist and refuse to sign, and the British will do absolutely nothing with them. Orlov chose his assistant very well: it was Baron Brunnov, who had long served as the Russian ambassador in London. The roles were distributed as follows: where the decisive work of diplomatic thought was required, Orlov spoke; where it was necessary to patiently listen and challenge the enemy, defending the interests of Russia step by step, the main role fell to the lot of Brunnov, a very intelligent, although too self-confident, but experienced, hardworking dignitary who turned gray in diplomatic affairs. Everything fundamentally important that Orlov achieved in secret conversations with Emperor Napoleon III was transferred by Orlov to Baron Brunnov, and he, already standing on firm ground, knew how to talk to the British at the solemn meetings of the Congress.

Thus, for example, Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley, the British representatives, demand the demolition of Russian fortifications along the Black Sea coast. Orlov flatly refuses. The English are threatening. Orlov again refuses. The Austrian delegate Buol wholeheartedly joins the British. Orlov refuses for the third time. Chairman Count Walewski says he supports the British and Austrians. But not only Valevsky knew what the position of Napoleon III was on this issue - Orlov also knew this. Therefore, Orlov again refuses, and Valevsky helplessly makes a helpless gesture. In the end, Orlov wins. Further, the question arises of the neutralization of the Black Sea. Here Orlov, knowing the opinion of Napoleon, yields; but when the British raise the question of neutralizing the Sea of ​​Azov as well, Orlov refuses. The same comedy with Valevsky is repeated, and again Orlov wins. The question of Moldavia and Wallachia is raised. The Russians have already left, but Orlov does not want these provinces to remain occupied by Austria. Both Russian interests and unwillingness for Austria to receive such an award for its behavior during the Crimean War - all this forced Alexander II and Orlov to resist the demand of the Austrian commissioner Buol. Orlov, knowing that Napoleon III did not want to give Moldavia and Wallachia to Austria, opposed Buol's demand at the congress. If Russia had to cede Bessarabia, then Austria also had to say goodbye forever to the dream of a bloodless acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. To his greatest fury, exactly three days before the end of the congress, Buol was convinced that Orlov and Brunnov had achieved their goal. Buol deliberately delayed the question of the Danubian principalities; he hoped somehow between times, already at the departure, to wrest from the congress the desired permission - to leave unchanged the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Austrian troops. And suddenly, the chairman of the congress, Valevsky, on March 27, in a cold, strictly official tone, invited Buol to inform the congress: when exactly would the Austrians liberate Moldavia and Wallachia from their troops? There was nothing to do. Austria withdrew from the congress without having received payment from the allies for its ultimatum to Russia of December 2, 1855. Orlov understood better than Buol what the true significance of participation in the congress of the Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Cavour, was.

Peace conditions. The return of Kars, taken by the Russians at the end of 1855, the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of Bessarabia - these were the main losses of Russia. Orlov agreed to the abolition of the exclusive Russian protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia and Serbia without objection. Contemporaries attributed the relatively tolerable peace conditions not only to the turn in the policy of Napoleon III, who did not want to further weaken Russia and thus help England, but also to the strong impression that the heroic defense of Sevastopol, which lasted almost a year, made on the whole world. This was also reflected in the fact that at that time the most powerful monarch in Europe, Napoleon III, immediately after the signing of the Peace of Paris on March 30, 1856, began to seek an alliance with Russia.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND LAW

COURSE WORK

4th year students of the correspondence department

Fefelova Svetlana Vladimirovna

By discipline International law

On the topic : "Paris Congress of 1856"

Moscow, 2011

Introduction

The Congress of Paris in 1856 ended the Crimean War. Russia was losing the role of hostess on the Black Sea, with the loss of the Danube, the Danube Flotilla turned out to be superfluous, the gunboats of which were relocated to Nikolaev, where they were broken into firewood. The career sailors of the fleet were knocked out on the bastions of Sevastopol, and they were replaced by soldiers of the Modlin regiment. Russia did not have the right to build not only powerful ships, but even frigates to protect its coasts.

On March 30 (March 18 O.S.), 1856, the Treaty of Paris was concluded, ending the Crimean War.

Since mid-March, the editorial committee of the congress plunged into the rather difficult work of working out the final text of the peace treaty. Each article was submitted by the committee for approval by the plenum of the congress, and here Orlov complained about the "nitpicking" of the British that slowed things down. But the British delegates, who had long since unraveled Napoleon's secret game, did not believe either him, or Valevsky, 1 or Orlov 2 and Brunnov 3 and, knowing the overwhelming influence that Valevsky, chairman of the congress, had on the editorial committee, looked for a catch in every phrase of every article.

There were still some difficulties. For example, Clarendon 4 did not immediately agree to the permission of Russia and Turkey to keep six large steamships and four light warships on the Black Sea, which Orlov insisted on. In the end, an agreement was reached, but in some ways Clarendon still managed to modify the original draft of these ships, drawn up by Valevsky and the Russian representatives.

Already on March 20, Orlov received a telegram from Nesselrode 5: "The Emperor approves of everything you said and did ... It is important for us to stop expensive preparations early." On the original of the telegram, Alexander II wrote: "To be according to this."

In the last days of the congress, it became clear that not only Counts Orlov and Walevsky, but also Lords Clarendon and Cowley 6 definitely wanted a speedy conclusion of peace. This affected the eventual victory of Orlov in a dispute (instigated by Palmerston) about the armament and size of several warships that Russia and Turkey could henceforth keep on the Black Sea: Clarendon relented. This was expressed in a quick and favorable solution to the question of lifting the British blockade of Russian commercial ports even before the ratification of the peace treaty, etc. At the same time, Alexander II allowed the free export of grain from Russian ports. In the same way, even before ratification, Britain and France ordered the evacuation of their troops from Kerch, Yenikale, Kinburn and Evpatoria. Representatives of both governments declared their desire to complete the evacuation as soon as possible. As for the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the Danubian principalities, this was announced solemnly and officially in the very first days after the signing of the peace treaty.

On the morning of March 30, 1856, all participants in the congress, on behalf of the powers they represented, signed the Treaty of Paris. One hundred and one cannon shots heralded this historic event in the capital of France. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the congress in full force went to the Tuileries to the emperor. Napoleon III very graciously received those who came, and everyone noticed how especially affectionately and for a long time he spoke with Count Orlov, singling out and distinguishing him from everyone.

At 10:52 pm on the same day, Alexander II received a telegram from Orlov informing the tsar of the great event. The long bloody war, which began in 1853, finally receded into the realm of history.

In Europe, diplomatic circles believed that Russia got off with relatively insignificant concessions.

The French ambassador in Vienna, Baron de Bourquene, spoke of the Paris Treaty in the following way: “It is impossible to figure out, after reading this document, who is the winner and who is the loser” 7 .

Russia's defeat in the war led to a serious infringement of its rights and interests. The main unfavorable point for Russia was the decision to neutralize the Black Sea, which deprived our country of the Black Sea Navy.

The key result of the Paris Congress from the point of view of international law was the raising of the issue and the detailed development of the foundations of maritime law 8 .

The purpose of the course work is to study the Paris Congress from the point of view of international law.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks are solved:

The development of international law in the period of the 17th -18th centuries is considered;

The Paris Congress is being studied, general information;

The secret negotiations of Napoleon III with Alexander II about peace are given;

The Austrian ultimatum to Russia is being considered;

The position of France and England at the Paris Congress is being studied;

The conditions of the world are being studied;

The results of the Paris Congress are formulated from the point of view of international law.

Chapter 1. International negotiations to end the Crimean War

1.1. Paris Congress, general information

Paris Congress - multilateral international negotiations to end the Crimean War, culminating in the signing of the Paris Treaty; opened on February 13 (25) 1856 in the capital of France.

It was attended by plenipotentiaries of Russia, France, England, Austria, Sardinia, the Ottoman Empire, and Prussia. The meetings were chaired by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, cousin of Emperor Napoleon III, Count A. Walevsky. Russia was represented by the first authorized count A.F. Orlov and the second - F.I. Brunnov, who had long served as the Russian ambassador to London . England was represented by Lord Clarendon (George Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon) and Cowley (Henry Wellesley, 1st Earl Cowley). Austria - Buolem, Kingdom of Sardinia - Cavour.

The decision of the Russian Emperor Alexander II to enter into peace negotiations was made at a meeting in winter palace 3 ( 15 ) January 1856, at which the ultimatum presented to Russia by the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph was discussed for the second time (only Count D.N. Bludov opposed the acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum); By that time, Napoleon III, behind the back of his allied England, was already conducting secret negotiations with St. Petersburg about the possibility of concluding a peace, to which he himself was inclined, not seeing for himself an interest in continuing the war.

The most irreconcilable position towards Russia in Paris was taken by England and Austria; their line subsequently softened under the influence of Napoleon III. England, who initially did not want such a speedy peace at all, now frankly sought to weaken Russia in the basin Black Sea , to undermine its positions in the Caucasus, insisted on the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. With the support of the Austrians, the British even demanded the complete demolition of the Russian fortifications along the Black Sea coast, however, thanks to the support of Napoleon III, Orlov won in this matter. Austria demanded that all of Bessarabia be torn away from Russia and counted on the annexation of the Danubian principalities to its possessions. The former allies, however, did not support the Danubian Empire in any way, and the Austrians left the congress without receiving any payment for their ultimatum of December 2, 1855.

Turkey at the congress was forced to agree with the allies even when their opinion was clearly at odds with its interests. Particularly (but without any serious consequences) at the congress, the question of the need for a future political unification of the Danubian principalities was considered.

As a result, on March 18 (30), 1856, peace treaty, which until 1871 determined the political system in Europe.

1.2. Secret peace negotiations between Napoleon III and Alexander II

In mid-October 1855, Alexander II first received the news that Napoleon II would like to start "direct" relations with him. In other words, the emperor of the French, on the one hand, made it clear that he was not in the least constrained by an alliance with England, and on the other hand, that he, too (like Alexander) was not very pleased with the Vienna conferences 9 .

Very soon after Sweden's refusal to join the coalition, Napoleon III came to the conclusion that he had no need to fight further, and there was little chance of success. The British would like to continue the war. “Peace threatens us,” Palmerston frankly wrote to his brother. English diplomacy was not averse, firstly, to seize the entire Crimea to Perekop and “return” it to Turkey, then land in the Caucasus, take Georgia, take away the entire southeastern Caucasus, create “Circassia” for Shamil, and turn Shamil himself into a Turkish-protected and England as a vassal, called upon to block the way for Russian advance into Persia. But Napoleon III did not at all want such a strengthening of England; on the contrary, in Russia he already seemed to be beginning to see a useful counterbalance to the British in some cases.

To shed French blood in the Caucasus in order to secure India from the Russian invasion seemed to Napoleon III completely unnecessary. And he gave permission to the Earl of Morny to enter into "private" relations with Russia. Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, was visited one fine day by the head of the large Sipa banking house and told him that he had received a letter from his Parisian friend and also a banker, Erlanger, in which Erlanger reports an interesting conversation that he had with the Earl of Morny. The count finds that it is time for the French and Russians to stop the useless slaughter.

Gorchakov immediately notified the tsar of this and, without even waiting for an answer, told the banker Sipa that he could write the following to his friend Erlanger in Paris on his behalf. He, Gorchakov, believes that not only peace, but also direct rapprochement between France and Russia after the conclusion of peace can be extremely useful for these powers.

But the conditions of peace should not affect the feelings of Russia's national dignity. Morny understood that this was a direct allusion to the demand threatening Russia for the mandatory limitation of the navy in the Black Sea. He answered Gorchakov with a gentle refusal: one cannot demand from Napoleon III and from England, after all the sacrifices they have suffered near Sevastopol, that they should give up this demand.

This first mutual probing was followed by official, albeit secret, negotiations in Paris itself.

But here the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode committed a tactlessness from the very beginning, which greatly damaged the cause. He informed the Viennese court about the beginning of relations between Russia and Paris. Why he did this is hard to understand.

Apparently, Nesselrode stubbornly flattered himself with the illusion that the solidarity of the powers of the Holy Alliance continued to exist, and believed that it was not good to conspire behind the back of "friendly" Austria.

Of course, Franz Joseph and Count Buol were very alarmed when they learned about the sudden change of mood of Napoleon III and that he could negotiate with Alexander without the participation of Austria.

Such a turn of affairs threatened Austria with the most dangerous isolation. Buol immediately informed Napoleon III of Austria's complete readiness to finally join the Western powers and present Russia with something like an ultimatum. 1.2. Secret negotiations between Napoleon III and Alexander II about peace 7
1.3. Austrian ultimatum to Russia 9
1.4. French position at the Congress of Paris 11
1.5. England's position at Congress 13
1.6. Peace terms 15
Chapter 2. Development of international law 16
2.1. The influence of the rapid growth of industry and trade on the development of international law in Western Europe in the 16th–17th centuries. sixteen
2.2. The influence of the French Revolution on the development of international law in Western Europe in the 16th–17th centuries. sixteen
2.3. Influence of the Paris Congress of 1856 on the development of international law in Western Europe in the 16th–17th centuries. 17
Conclusion 21
LIST OF USED SOURCES AND LITERATURE 26
Appendix 1 Treaty of Paris 28

PROBING OF NAPOLEON III

The news that on March 2, 1855, shortly after noon, in St. Petersburg, in the Winter Palace, Emperor Nicholas I died, came to Paris by telegraph in the evening of the same day. This news sounded in the Tuileries like a thunderbolt in a clear sky, since no one in the entourage of Napoleon III knew that the 58-year-old tsar, always distinguished by good health, had spent the last two weeks in bed, suffering from a severe cold, which brought him down. to the grave.

Meanwhile, 70,000 French, British, and Turks, who were soon to be assisted by a 15,000-strong Piedmontese corps, were besieging Sevastopol in the Crimea. Behind the backs of the allies there was already a victory at Alma, ahead of them was the capture of Balaklava, Inkerman and Evpatoria, but near Sevastopol at the end of September 1854 they ran into fierce resistance from the Russians. The attempt to storm the city-fortress failed, and the siege that began was dragged on for an indefinite period, which extremely unnerved the French emperor, who wanted to quickly - but, of course, not earlier than the city was taken - to put an end to the ruinous for the treasury and costly in terms of losses war1 .

The nephew of the great Napoleon dreamed of only one thing - revenge for the national humiliation of 1812-1815. His plans included neither the separation of the Caucasus from Russia, which the head of the British Cabinet, Lord Palmerston, would have desired, nor the liquidation of Catherine II's acquisitions in the Northern Black Sea region, which the Port sought, nor the excessive weakening of the Russian Empire, which was dangerous for breaking the European balance. It was enough to persuade Russia to peace immediately after the fall of Sevastopol. At one time, Napoleon III even intended to go to the Crimea to personally lead the command of the troops, but for a number of reasons, in particular, out of fear of a republican coup in Paris during his absence, he was forced to abandon this idea2.

“Public opinion in France rebelled against a distant and ruinous war in which English interests were more directly involved than French ones,” wrote one of the first historians of the Crimean War, a prominent Russian diplomat, Baron A. G. Jomini, a contemporary of the events. - The parties were worried, and this circumstance was one of the reasons why the trip of Emperor Napoleon was postponed. It was argued to him that his absence would serve as a signal for a revolutionary movement against his dynasty.”3

1 The main losses of the allied expeditionary force in the Crimea were from infectious diseases - dysentery, cholera and typhoid. Daily mortality in the ranks of the Allies averaged 250 people.

2 Castelot A. Napoleon III. L'aube des Temps modernes. Paris, 1999, p. 250 - 265.

3 Jomini A. Russia and Europe in the era of the Crimean War. - Bulletin of Europe, 1886, book. 10, p. 562.

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The fears were not unfounded. April 28, 1855, when the emperor was heading for a walk in the Bois de Boulogne, he was assassinated. A certain Giovanni Pianori, a former Garibaldian who emigrated to France, fired twice at Napoleon, but missed. The Italian Carbonari sentenced to death accepted her with the words: “Vive la Republique!”, which was perceived by society as a direct challenge to the Bonapartist empire. One way or another, but the trip of the emperor to the Crimea did not take place.

The news of the death of Nicholas I caused a violent reaction at the Paris Stock Exchange, which had been in protracted apathy since the beginning of the war. Quotes of stocks and bonds, especially Russian ones, jumped sharply in price. Rumors spread about the imminent end of the war. The optimism of the financiers quickly spread to journalists and politicians, including those in the opposition. Many of them claimed that the young Russian emperor, while still heir to the throne, opposed the war, disapproving of his father's policy. Parisian journalists, apparently proceeding from the opposite, unconditionally endowed Alexander with qualities opposite to those that were characteristic of Nicholas I - gentleness, humanity, pliability and indecision, bordering on weakness of character, and finally, natural peacefulness, which in the circumstances seemed to be the most important .

While the political beau monde of the Second Empire was building all sorts of, often fantastic, assumptions about Alexander II, the French emperor already on March 3 undertook a secret sounding in order to find out the moods and intentions of the new tsar: is he inclined to continue the Eastern War or is he ready to stop it. Napoleon invited the Saxon envoy L. von Seebach to the Tuileries for a confidential conversation. Napoleon asked Seebach to urgently find a way to convey to his father-in-law, and through him to Emperor Alexander, his sincere condolences on the death of Emperor Nicholas, for whom he, Napoleon, allegedly always had the most sincere sympathy and about the break with which in 1854 he sincerely regrets .

The signal sent from the Tuileries soon reached the Winter Palace, where it was duly received, as the French emperor had counted on. Alexander II instructed Nesselrode, through Seebach, to bring to the attention of Napoleon III that the sovereign was very touched by his attention to the grief that befell Russia and the imperial family, and that, for his part, he also regretted the break in relations between the two countries and courts. However, Alexander asked to be conveyed, this matter is reparable, since “the peace will be concluded on the same day, as Emperor Napoleon wishes”4.

Louis Napoleon accepted Alexander's reaction to his initiative with satisfaction, but took a wait-and-see attitude. First, the French tricolor was supposed to rise above the bastions of the besieged Sevastopol. Only after that, having received complete moral satisfaction, was the French emperor ready to offer peace negotiations, even if contrary to the wishes of the British ally, who longed for the continuation of the war, as well as Porta, despite the extreme weakness, which hoped during the summer campaign of 1855 in the Caucasus to unblock the besieged Russian Kars and then push them out of Georgia. In this intention, the Turks energetically encouraged Palmerston, who persuaded the Emperor of France to send significant reinforcements to the Caucasus to help the army of Omer Pasha. “Napoleon III,” Academician E.V. Tarle rightly noted on this occasion, “did not at all want to spend his divisions in the Caucasian mountains without the slightest benefit for France, only to strengthen the approaches to Herat and English India against Russia”5.

Napoleon's gaze was focused exclusively on Sevastopol, the siege of which, meanwhile, had entered its final stage. On August 16, 1855, the allies inflicted

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4 Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (hereinafter - AVPRI), f. office, op. 469, 1855, d. 175, l. 40-42.

5 Tarle E. V. Op. in 12 t. M., 1959, vol. IX, p. 481.

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zhenie Russian troops under the command of General M. D. Gorchakov near the Chernaya River, southeast of Sevastopol. Following this, the French, having lost 7,500 killed and wounded in the battle, managed to capture the Malakhov Kurgan dominating the city, which forced the Russian garrison to leave Sevastopol on September 8, flooding the last ships and blowing up the remaining fortifications. With the fall of Sevastopol, hostilities in the Crimea actually ceased.

For some time they continued in the Caucasus, where at the end of November 1855 the Turks surrendered the besieged Kars with all the weapons to General N. N. Muravyov. A 16,000-strong Turkish garrison, which included many "foreign immigrants" - Hungarians, Poles, etc., was captured by the Russians. The capture of Kars actually ended the war in the Caucasus. Finally exhausted Turkey was no longer able to continue it. Only Lord Palmerston, the head of the cabinet of Queen Victoria, discovered the belligerent moods.

Meanwhile, in European diplomatic circles, since November 1855, increasingly persistent rumors began to circulate about some kind of secret contacts between Napoleon III and Alexander II. Particular anxiety was found in London, where they still hoped to keep the French ally in the orbit of the war.

The rumors were true. The initiator of confidential contacts was Napoleon, who considered that with the capture of Sevastopol he received full satisfaction. On September 13, a thanksgiving service was served in the Notre Dame Cathedral in the presence of the emperor. Monsignor Sibur, Archbishop of Paris, who was celebrating Mass, addressed the parishioners and announced that an honorable and lasting peace would soon be concluded.

Napoleon clearly did not want to continue the war, in which France had already lost 95,000 men6, largely for the sake of implementing Palmerston's ambitious geopolitical plans. “Napoleon felt that he had reached the climax of his policy,” Baron Jomini wrote on this occasion, “he had a choice between the path of adventure, leading by prolonging the war to the shock of Europe and altering its map with the help of England and the revolution, or by a conservative policy, based on peace and rapprochement with Russia. He appears to be leaning towards the latter. In addition to internal and financial difficulties ... he seemed weary of complicity with England. He did not refuse an alliance with a powerful neighbor, but political instinct told him that England would never sincerely support any French national interest. Until now, in the Eastern War, he acted more in favor of England than France.

Now the emperor decided to act solely in his own interests. Shortly after the fall of the Turkish fortress of Kars, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, was informed by the Austrian financier Sinu that his Parisian business partner Erlange (Erlanger) asked him to convey the opinion of the Count de Morny, the half-brother of Napoleon III, about the desirability of starting peace negotiations with Russia. Gorchakov immediately informed St. Petersburg of this demarche and, without waiting for an answer, through the same channel - Sin and Erlange - informed the Comte de Morny that he shared his opinion on the desirability of a direct dialogue with France8.

“I am convinced,” wrote Gorchakov, that Emperor Louis Napoleon, enlightened by experience and led by the spirit of common sense and moderation, would not want to embark on the path of endless conquests, as his great uncle did. Let me remind you, - continued the Russian ambassador, - that the peak of the power of Napoleon I was the time of his close

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6 Actually, the combat losses of the French in the Crimea during the period of hostilities amounted to 20 thousand people. The remaining 75 thousand died from epidemic diseases. See Gouttman A. La guerre de Crimee 1853-1856. Paris, 1995, p. 479.

7 Bulletin of Europe, 1886, book. 10, p. 586.

8 About de Morny, see P. P. Cherkasov. Comte de Morny - Napoleon III's ambassador to St. – New and recent history, 2011, N5.

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unity with Russia. Without thinking of returning to these heroic times, I believe that Monsieur de Morny and I, to the best of our ability, could contribute to the greatness of our two countries through their steady rapprochement. It is only necessary that the foundations of this rapprochement correspond to the mutual dignity of the two peoples”9. Gorchakov meant that Russia would have the right to hope for France's assistance in working out the terms of a peace treaty that would be more acceptable to her.

In a reply letter, Morny agreed in principle with Gorchakov, but asked him to take into account that France, no matter how much one wanted, was not free to determine the terms of the peace. She is bound by allied obligations with England, not to mention Turkey, Sardinia, and also Austria, which signed an agreement in December 1854 with Paris and London on protection from Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia. In addition, after the capture of Sevastopol, the French emperor cannot agree to conditions that are softer than those that were put forward at the very beginning of the war10. The only thing that could be achieved in the current situation, wrote Morny, was to replace the restrictions of Russian naval forces in the Black Sea basin with the "neutralization" of the Black Sea. Such an alternative, he believed, seemed less offensive to Russia's national vanity11.

Anticipating possible objections, Morny clarified his thought: “What is this measure? Let's turn to history. When, after a military defeat, large monetary sacrifices are demanded from one or another power (i.e., indemnities. - P. Ch.), then this causes significant financial damage to it. When territorial concessions are imposed on it, its significance decreases and, perhaps, even forever. But when, in essence, only such illusory conditions as the limitation of forces are prescribed to it, then, since it needs peace, it should not reject them. This is not the first time such conditions are included in a peace treaty,” Morny soothed and added: “How long have they been observed? Only a few years will pass, and everything will change: interests will change, hatred will disappear, good relations will be restored, the blessings of peace will heal the wounds of war, and such treaties will die of themselves, having no application. It often even happened that the very country that insisted on the limitation of forces was the first to propose their abolition”12.

Everything went to the point that Gorchakov was to meet privately with Baron de Bourkenet, the French representative at the conference of ambassadors, convened in Vienna in the autumn of 1854 to discuss the prospects for a peaceful end to the war. The possibility of a personal meeting between Gorchakov and Morny in Dresden was not ruled out. However, at this time, in mid-December 1855, an unexpected order from Chancellor Nesselrode came from St. Petersburg to the Russian embassy in Vienna to cut off contacts with Morny. The chancellor informed the ambassador that from now on he would conduct confidential negotiations himself, but not with Morny, but with the French Foreign Minister, Count A. Walevsky. He intended to do this through the mediation of his son-in-law, the already mentioned Saxon diplomat von Seebach.

Nesselrode's interference could be explained by his long-standing dislike of Gorchakov. For a long time he hindered the career of a talented diplomat, keeping him in secondary posts, and in June 1855 objected to his appointment as an ambassador.

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9 Morny, Duc de. Extrait des Memoires. Une ambassade en Russie, 1856. Paris, 1892, p. 10 - 11.

10 It's about about the so-called “four points of Napoleon III”, formulated on July 18, 1854. They included a joint protectorate of France, England, Austria, Russia and Prussia over the Danubian principalities, temporarily occupied by Austrian troops; equal patronage of the five aforementioned powers over all Christians in the Ottoman Empire; collective five-sided supervision and control of the mouth of the Danube; revision of the 1841 agreement between the European powers and Turkey on the passage of ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

11 Morny, Duc de. Op. cit., p. 19 - 22.

12 Ibid., p. 22-23.

13 Ibid., p. 26 - 27.

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scrap in Vienna, but Alexander II insisted on his own. Now that Gorchakov began to grope for a worthy way out of the war for Russia, Nesselrode apparently considered it unfair that the laurels of a peacemaker would go not to him, a well-deserved veteran of European politics, but to Gorchakov.

There is another explanation for Nesselrode's actions - his ineradicable predilection for a long-decayed alliance with Austria. Meanwhile, from the end of 1854, Vienna became a de facto ally of Paris and London, revealing treachery and ingratitude towards Russia, which saved the Habsburgs in 1849. the solidarity of the powers of the Holy Alliance continues to exist, and believed that it was not good to conspire behind the back of “friendly” Austria”14.

One way or another, Count Nesselrode, experienced in all the intricacies of the diplomatic game, allowed "leakage" of information about covert contacts with France. The Austrian emperor Franz Joseph and the head of his cabinet, Count K. F. von Buol, were the first to learn about this, who were extremely concerned that Austria would not be forgotten at the peaceful end of the war. They urgently set about making a diplomatic “bomb”. Her explosion was supposed to change the unfavorable situation for Austria.

Meanwhile, Nesselrode sent his Saxon son-in-law to Paris with three proposals: the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should remain closed; the navy of "foreign" powers cannot be allowed into the Black Sea, with the exception of ships that the coastal states consider it possible to admit there; the number of these courts will be determined by Russia and Turkey on a bilateral basis, without external mediation.

While Seebach was on his way to Paris, the Tuileries experienced something of a shock when they learned that Russia had not kept secret the Franco-Russian consultations that had begun on the terms of ending the war. Count Walevsky was visited by the Austrian ambassador, Baron von Huebner, who discovered awareness of Morny's tacit contacts with Gorchakov and impressed the head of French diplomacy with a message that Austria was completely ready to join the anti-Russian military coalition and even present Russia with something like an ultimatum.

Napoleon III found himself in a very delicate position and had every reason to be indignant at the behavior of the Russians. Walevsky was instructed not to enter into negotiations with Seebach and to let the St. Petersburg emissary know about his displeasure.

The Austrian preparation “exploded” a few days before the new one, in 1856, when the Austrian envoy Count W. L. von Esterhazy, who had just arrived from Vienna, appeared at the reception of Chancellor Nesselrode and handed him the ultimatum demands (“communiqué”) of the emperor Franz Josef on the conditions for ending the war, the rejection of which will entail the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia. Repeating the well-known “four points” of Napoleon III of 1854, the Austrian ultimatum supplemented them with a demand for the complete neutralization of the Black Sea and a ban on maintaining sea fortresses and other military arsenals on the coast. The document also stipulated the right of the members of the anti-Russian coalition to present new demands to Russia “for the common benefit of Europe”15. Russia had to accept the terms of peace presented to it before January 18 (n.s.). Otherwise, the anti-Russian coalition would have expanded due to the entry of Austria into it.

Shortly after the demarche made by Esterhazy in St. Petersburg, Count Buol in Vienna invited Prince Gorchakov to his place and announced to the ambassador that, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations, the ultimatum should be accepted in its entirety, without any exceptions. Thus, the Russian side was not even left

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14 History of Diplomacy, 2nd ed., rev. and additional, vol. I. M., 1959, p. 664.

15 On the History of the Peace of Paris in 1856 - Red Archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 58-59.

16 History of Russia's foreign policy. First half of the 19th century. From the wars of Russia against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856. M., 1995, p. 412.

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minimum room for diplomatic manoeuvre. The fact that the ultimatum came from a recent and closest ally deeply wounded the pride of Alexander II and came as a complete surprise to Chancellor Nesselrode, the main champion of the Austrian orientation.

As a result of two meetings held on January 1 and 15, 1856, with the sovereign with the participation of his closest associates - Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, Count K. V. Nesselrode, Minister of War Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, Minister of State Property Count P. D. Kiselyov, Adjutant Generals Prince M. S. Vorontsov and Count A. F. Orlov, as well as Secretary of State Count D. N. Bludov and Baron P. K. Meyendorff, the former envoy in Vienna, it was decided to agree with the presented conditions for a formal end to the war. Unable to continue it due to the depletion of material resources, Russia could try, as Nesselrode said at the meeting, “to disperse a coalition composed of heterogeneous and antipathetic elements and bound only by the demands of a common struggle”18.

Most likely, even then, Russian diplomacy intended to place the main stake in achieving this goal on France - the only one of the coalition powers that showed peaceful intentions.

On January 16, the State Chancellor announced to the Austrian envoy that he had accepted the preliminary peace conditions put forward by the court of Vienna. On the same day, Esterhazy informed his government by telegraph of Russia's consent, and on January 20, at a conference of ambassadors in Vienna, a protocol was signed according to which the belligerent powers undertook to send their representatives to a peace congress in Paris within three weeks to conclude an armistice and sign a peace treaty.

Alexander II appointed his Adjutant General Count A.F. Orlov, head of the Third Department of the Own E.I.V. Chancellery, as the chief commissioner from Russia. To help him, an experienced diplomat, Baron F.I. Brunnov, was given the status of the second commissioner.

COUNT A. F. ORLOV AND BARON F. I. BRUNNOV

A. F. Orlov (1786 - 1861)20 belonged to a noble family that came to the fore at the beginning of the reign of Empress Catherine II. Her ascension to the throne in 1762 was actively promoted by the brothers Orlov-Grigory, Alexei, Vladimir, Ivan and Fedor.

Alexey Fedorovich, like his brother, Mikhail, was the illegitimate son of Lieutenant General F. G. Orlov, who received from Catherine recognition for his “pupils” of all the rights of the nobility, the surname and coat of arms of the Orlovs.

During the Patriotic War, A.F. Orlov participated in many battles, and received seven wounds near Borodino. From January 1813, he was adjutant of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich and fought bravely near Lützen, Bautzen, Kulm and Dresden, for which he was promoted to colonel, and then took part in a campaign in France. In 1814 he retired, but a year later he returned to the service, having received the rank of general in 1817. Unlike his older brother Mikhail, who participated in secret Decembrist societies, Alexei was a firm opponent of all liberalism, did not tolerate disobedience to the authorities, although, obeying the then fashion, he did not avoid a brief

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17 See Tatishchev S. S. Emperor Alexander II. His life and reign. M., 2006, p. 146-150.

18 Bulletin of Europe, 1886, book. 10, p. 601.

19 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 12.

20 About him, see: Petrov A.A. Orlov Alexey Fedorovich. - Russian biographical dictionary. M., 1905 (reproduced. M., 1997); Orzhehovsky I. V. Autocracy against revolutionary Russia(1826 - 1880). M., 1982; Kudryavtseva E. P. Favorite of Emperor Nicholas I. A. F. Orlov and his mission in the Middle East. – Russian diplomacy in portraits. M., 1992; Chukarev A. G. Secret police of Russia 1825 - 1855. M., 2005.

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stay in the Masonic lodge, where he fell under the influence of his father-in-law, General A. A. Zherebtsov.

In 1819 Orlov was appointed commander of the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment, in 1820 he became Adjutant General, and a year later he was given command of the 1st Brigade of the Guards Cuirassier Division, leaving behind him the command of the Cavalry Regiment. In 1820, he participated in the suppression of an uprising in the Semenovsky regiment, and on December 14, 1825, he was the first of the regimental commanders to come to the aid of Nikolai Pavlovich and personally led the horse guards in attacks on the rebels' square. Orlov’s behavior on that critical day for the young emperor was noted by Nicholas I. On December 25, 1825, he elevated Orlov to the dignity of a count and, condescending to his entreaties, freed Mikhail Orlov, who had been implicated in the December “malice”, from prosecution. This was the only case when Nikolai forgave a direct, and also a prominent participant in the conspiracy.

In subsequent years, a lieutenant general (from 1833 - a cavalry general), and from 1836 a member of the State Council, A.F. Orlov became one of the closest dignitaries of Emperor Nicholas, who entrusted him with responsible missions of a military and diplomatic nature. On behalf of the sovereign Orlov repeatedly replaced A.Kh.

Enjoying the unlimited confidence of the emperor, Count Orlov, as Chief Head of the Third Section and chief of the gendarmes, toughened the fight against the penetration of liberal revolutionary trends into Russia from Europe and increased pressure on literature in the sincere conviction that Russian writers should not “clean linen in public”. This meant that nothing should appear in the press that could directly or indirectly compromise the power and the order prevailing in the empire. The discovery in April 1849 of the so-called “Petrashevsky case” is also connected with the name of Orlov, in which, among others, the novice writer Fyodor Dostoevsky was held. In a word, in liberal circles, the chief of the gendarmes, Count Orlov, a staunch conservative, had a very definite reputation.

It was shared by individual members of the foreign diplomatic corps. Thus, Chargé d'Affaires of France in St. Petersburg, Ch. Bodin, in a secret note to Paris, called Orlov "an uneducated person", endowed with a "mediocre mind", "incorrigibly lazy", "experiencing deep contempt and even outright hatred for the ideas of humanism." “As a statesman, he is a complete zero,” the French diplomat categorically stated, and added that Orlov allegedly “is under the boundless influence of his wife”21.

It is difficult to explain such a frank prejudice and, let us add, an obvious injustice: Orlov was respected in all European capitals, and in particular in Paris, which will be discussed later.

The example of Count Orlov shows that another person is more meaningful than his reputation in certain social circles. In fact, the “uneducated” and “limited” Orlov was a passionate admirer of the work of I. A. Krylov. On November 13, 1844, the formidable head of the Third Section was among those who carried the coffin with the body of the famous fabulist out of the church. When visiting Moscow, the chief of gendarmes always called on a friend of his disgraced brother Mikhail P. Ya. Chaadaev, who was officially declared insane, and had long confidential conversations with him on a variety of topics.

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21 See Archives des Affaires Etrangeres (hereinafter AAE), Memoires et Documents. Russie, v. 45. fol. 89 recto verso, 90 recto. S. Bodin's testimony dates back to 1858, when a discussion of the question of the emancipation of the peasants began in the environment of Alexander II and in society. Orlov took a very conservative position here, which, apparently, earned him the reputation of a complete retrograde in the eyes of a liberal-minded French diplomat.

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According to contemporaries, he respected and even loved Chaadaev for his independent character and originality of judgments.

Orlov took a close part in mitigating the fate of the Decembrist G.S. Batenkov, who spent 20 years in solitary confinement and was on the verge of insanity. He obtained from the emperor his transfer to the settlement and provided the “state criminal” with a significant amount of 500 silver rubles for settling in Tomsk. Subsequently, Batenkov recalled with gratitude the humane attitude of Orlov towards himself. “No one read my papers before Orlov joined,” Batenkov wrote. - He tore them apart. Therefore, since 1844, my situation has completely changed. The Count assigned money from himself for my maintenance; subscribed to me newspapers and magazines and, announcing that he would visit me as a relative, thereby already gave me significance”22.

To this we can add that when in 1856 the young Emperor Alexander II appoints Count Orlov the head of the Russian delegation at the Paris Peace Congress, the chief of gendarmes, to the surprise of his entourage, will invite the famous dissident defector N. I. Turgenev, taking refuge in France. On the rare free evenings he liked to converse with him as frankly and confidentially as he had with Chaadaev in his time. “Such conversations,” A. G. Chukarev, a modern researcher in the history of the Third Division, notes on this occasion, “characterize A. F. Orlov quite positively as an enlightened, honest and decent person who served Nicholas I not out of fear, but out of conscience. It was for this boundless devotion that the king valued him.”23

The faithful royal servant was always attracted to people of a free mind, who had their own judgments about the reality around them, and he did not deny himself the pleasure of communicating with them.

Contrary to Baudin's assertions, Count Orlov established himself not only as a brave cavalryman, military leader, and later as a fighter against the "pernicious" influence of the West, but also as a skilled diplomat. For the first time, his diplomatic talent was revealed in 1829, when, on behalf of Nicholas I, Orlov held successful negotiations with Turkey, culminating in the signing of the Adrianople Peace Treaty, after which the emperor appointed him as his ambassador to Constantinople - with the mission to achieve strict compliance with the terms of the agreement from the Sultan. Count Orlov coped with the highest order in less than a year of his stay in the embassy post.

The second, strictly confidential, diplomatic mission was entrusted to him in August 1830. Nicholas I sent him to Vienna to discuss with the Austrian emperor possible joint actions against Louis Philippe, who, as the tsar believed, “usurped”, the Bourbon throne in France. This time, Count Orlov did not have time to show his abilities, since even before his arrival, the Vienna court, following England and Prussia, officially recognized the king of the French.

On the other hand, a resounding success fell to Count Orlov in 1833, when he conducted negotiations with great skill in Constantinople, culminating in the conclusion of the Unkar-Iskelesi defensive alliance with Turkey, and the ambassadors of the European powers in the Ottoman Port learned about these negotiations only after the signing of the treaty.

In the same 1833, he accompanied Nicholas I to a meeting with the Austrian Emperor Franz I in Munichgritz, where, together with Count K.V. Nesselrode and D.N. dynasties. In essence, the convention was directed against the eastern policy of France, which supported the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali. When Emperor Franz died at the beginning of 1835, Nicholas I sent Orlov to the funeral in Vienna as his personal representative. Two years later, as a personal envoy of the Tsar Orlov, he attended the coronation of Queen Victoria. In the future, he constantly accompanied the sovereign on his trips around Russia and abroad.

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22 Batenkov G.S. Works and letters. T. 1. Letters (1813 - 1856). Irkutsk, 1989, p. 245.

23 Chukarev A. G. Secret police of Russia. 1825 - 1855 M., 2005, p. 180.

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zu, and in 1839 he accompanied the heir-tsarevich Alexander Nikolaevich on a trip abroad, whose mentor he was appointed after the death of Prince Kh. A. Liven. Count Orlov was the first to whom during this trip the Tsarevich told that he was in love with the Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt and intended to link his fate with her, if, of course, the august parents would approve of his choice. As you know, the desire of young Alexander came true in 1841. His chosen one, having converted to Orthodoxy, became Grand Duchess Maria Alexandrovna, the future empress and mother of another Russian autocrat, Alexander III.

In 1852, Orlov took part in secret negotiations between Nicholas I and the Austrian emperor and the Prussian king in Olmutz and Berlin.

Saying goodbye to the heir to the throne on his deathbed, Nikolai Pavlovich “bequeathed” to his son his faithful friend, an indispensable assistant in all state affairs. It is Count Orlov, despite his 70 years, that Alexander II will send to the Paris Peace Congress, designed to draw a line under the ill-fated Crimean War for Russia. The young emperor did not doubt for a moment that his former mentor would do everything possible and even impossible to protect Russian interests. And, as we will see, he was not mistaken in his choice.

Alexander II approved Baron Philip Ivanovich Brunnov (1797 - 1875), a student of Count Nesselrode, as the second authorized representative for the Paris Congress. As a young diplomat, he took part in the Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822) congresses of the Holy Alliance, was the secretary of the Russian delegation at the negotiations with Porte, which ended in 1829 with the signing of the Adrianople Peace Treaty, then served as a senior adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1840 he was appointed envoy to London. In this post, Brunnov participated in the preparation of the London Convention on Egypt (1840) and the Convention on the Black Sea Straits (1841), and also took an active part in the work of the London Conference of 1843 on Greek affairs. In terms of bilateral relations, he prepared and on behalf of Russia signed in 1849 a trade agreement with England.

During the aggravation of the Eastern crisis that preceded the Crimean War, Brunnov actually disoriented Nicholas I, supporting him in his conviction that the union of England and France was unreliable. In justification of Brunnov, it can be noted that his position was no exception. His colleague in Paris N. D. Kiselev acted in the same direction. Nevertheless, after the break in diplomatic relations between England and Russia in February 1854, which led to the declaration of war, Brunnov continued to successfully move up the ranks, taking the post of envoy to the German Union. Nesselrode remembered his protégé when the question arose of the second representative of Russia at the Paris Peace Congress. Brunnov was versed in all the intricacies of the diplomatic game and was known as an indispensable compiler of notes, dispatches and reports. In addition, he gained a stable reputation as a witty and interesting interlocutor, which was of no small importance, especially in complex multilateral negotiations.

In choosing the delegates to the Paris Congress, Alexander II and Chancellor Nesselrode, apparently, took into account the fact of personal (for Brunnov) and correspondence (for Orlov) acquaintance with Napoleon III, which was important for ensuring the success of the mission. Brunnov's acquaintance with Louis Napoleon took place as early as 1847, when the baron served as an envoy in England, and the future emperor was hiding there from French justice. As you know, in 1846, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte managed to escape from prison, where he was serving a life sentence for trying coup d'état. In 1847, he hoped to receive political and financial support from Nicholas I in realizing his plans in France. Through Brunnov, with whom he met several times, he tried to establish a channel of communication with the closest associate of the tsar, Count Orlov, and for some time even kept confidential correspondence with him24.

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24 See about this: Cherkasov P.P. Unknown correspondence between Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and Count

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Napoleon's attempts to find understanding in St. Petersburg were unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas refused to deal with state criminal, which at that time Bonaparte, who had escaped from prison, was considered.

Who knew that just four years later, Louis Napoleon would become Emperor of the French? And who could have imagined that in 1856 the preservation of the dignity of Russia, defeated in the Crimean War, would largely depend on his goodwill?

On February 11 (January 30, O.S.), 1856, Count Orlov received instructions from the chancellor regarding the goals that the Russian delegates were to achieve at the peace congress25. The most important of these was the achievement of peace on the terms of the five points formulated by the Vienna Conference of Ambassadors, to which Emperor Alexander agreed. Nothing else, let alone redrawing the political map of Europe, was out of the question. The instruction ordered the Russian representatives to proceed from "the difference in interests and passions of our enemies." In an additional instruction dated February 29 (17), Nesselrode clarified: “Not being able to divide our enemies, we must enter into a special agreement with those of them, on whose decision the restoration of peace will depend”26.

St. Petersburg continued to consider England the main "enemy" of Russia. It seemed extremely difficult to reach an agreement with it on terms acceptable to Russia,27 but such a possibility was not ruled out in principle. As well as the possibility of making certain concessions to British interests in order to isolate Austria, whose treacherous behavior led to the formation of a pan-European coalition against Russia, was not ruled out. Austria, according to Alexander II, in any case should be punished, and Chancellor Nesselrode was forced to agree with this. “The course of action followed by the Austrian cabinet from the very beginning of the present crisis caused extreme irritation in Russia,” Nesselrode stated in a confidential note dated February 11 addressed to Count Orlov. “It is not so easy to forgive the betrayal of an ungrateful friend. It is not in the interests of Austria that this feeling should be intensified, that the hostilities should continue. It may pay for this in the face of those surprises that are always possible in the present, still unsettled position of Europe.”28

The most promising was the search for mutual understanding with France, despite its close allied relations with England. The unequivocal demarches of Napoleon III in relation to Russia, which followed the death of Nicholas I, gave certain hopes for the success of such searches. Napoleon's interests in the war, as was believed in St. Petersburg, were fully satisfied. “Having received from the alliance with England all the benefits that he could derive,” read the main instruction given to Orlov, “the ruler of France cannot follow her in her warlike designs, where only the unknown awaits him. And this cannot be included in the goals of such a cold and prudent person as Louis Napoleon. He will not want, of course, to end the present war by breaking his alliance with England. Moreover, he does not want to be at enmity with her. But, on the other hand, it is natural that he will try to get rid of the dependence in which he is to some extent in relation to her ... France's insufficient interest in contributing to the goals of England pursued by her in Asia, as well as the prospect that opens up for the French emperor - to become, thanks to alliances, a firm foot on the continent,” the instructions emphasized, “will find themselves in

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A. F. Orlov, head of the Third Department (1847 - 1848). From the funds of the GA RF. - Russia and France of the XVIII-XX centuries, no. 9. M., 2009.

25 These are three documents dated February 11: a general instruction and “confidential notes” addressed to A. F. Orlov. See Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 13 - 18.

26 Ibid., p. 27.

27 "England is and will be our real and inexorable enemy." From the instructions of February 11, 1856 - Ibid., p. fourteen.

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in the hands of our representatives during the conference as a means of bringing about in the policy of France the turn necessary for England to abandon her warlike designs.

Such were the general goals of Russian diplomacy in relation to France at the peace congress that opened on February 25, 1856 in Paris30. It should be noted that the choice of the venue for the congress largely depended on Russia, as on the defeated side. Supporting Napoleon in his insistent desire to hold a congress in the capital of France, Alexander II acted prudently, ensuring, as it soon became clear, the most favorable working conditions for the Russian delegates. Russia's unequivocal wish to see A. Walevsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, in the role of chairman of the congress was also fully supported by Russia.

This choice will turn out to be just as successful for Russian diplomacy as it is unfortunate for the British and Austrian sides, who, not without reason, considered Valevsky a biased arbiter.

“RUSSIAN ASSISTANT” COUNT A. VALEVSKY

Alexander Florian Joseph, Count Colonna Walewski was born in 1810 on his mother's estate in the Duchy of Warsaw31. He was the natural son of Emperor Napoleon I and the Polish Countess Maria Walewska32, i.e. belonged to Napoleon III cousin. In 1812 Valevsky received the title of Count of the Empire with the rights of succession in a straight line. In January 1814, together with his mother, he visited his father on the island of Elba. Later he lived with her in Geneva. In December 1817, when Countess Walewska died, seven-year-old Alexander was raised by his maternal uncle. In 1824 he took the boy to Russian Poland (the Kingdom of Poland).

The son of Napoleon attracted the attention of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, who invited the young man to join the Russian army. Brought up in the spirit of Polish patriotism, Walewski turned down the offer. Never hiding his commitment to the idea of ​​Polish independence, he soon becomes the object of close attention from the Russian secret police. Nevertheless, he manages to illegally leave Poland and move to England, and from there to Paris, where he establishes contacts with Polish emigration. The Russian embassy in France is instructed to extradite Valevsky, but despite the trusting relationship with Peter

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29 Ibid., p. 14 - 15.

30 Coverage of the work of the Paris Peace Congress and evaluation of its results are beyond the scope of this study, which is dedicated to the behind-the-scenes interaction of Russian and French diplomacy at the congress. On the Paris Congress and the world, see: Jomini A. Decree soch., p. 606 - 619; Martens F. Collection of treatises and conventions concluded by Russia with foreign powers. T. XV. Treatises with France. 1822 - 1906. St. Petersburg, 1909; On the History of the Peace of Paris in 1856 - Red Archive, 1936, N2 (75); Tarle E.V. Crimean War. - Tarle E. V. Op. in vol. 12, vol. 8; Marinin O.V. Diplomatic activity of Russia at the final stage of the Crimean War. Paris Peace Congress of 1856. M., 1987 (Abstract of Candidate of Diss.); Gourdon E. Histoire du Congres de Paris. Paris, 1857; Monicault G. La question d'Orient. Le Traite de Paris et ses suites (1856 - 1871). Paris, 1898; Charles-Roux F. Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III, 2-eme ed. Paris, 1913; Echard W. Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe. Louisiana State University Press, 1983; Le Congres de Paris (1856). Un evenement fondateur. Paris, 2009; Gouttman A. Op. cit.; Sedouy, J.-A. de. Le Concert europeen. Aux origines de l'Europe 1814 - 1914. Paris, 2009.

31 On him see: Bernardy F. de. Walewski, le fils polonais de Napoleon. Paris, 1976. The Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has his official file. - AAE, Personnel, 1-er serie, N4158.

32 Maria Valevskaya was 50 years younger than her husband, with whom she had long maintained only formal relations. Nevertheless, the 74-year-old Count Walewski generously acknowledged his “son”.

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Burg, the cabinet of Charles X refuses this request, although the son of Napoleon demonstrates oppositional sentiments in Paris, having become close to the opponents of the Restoration regime - the liberals.

With the victory of the July Revolution of 1830, Walevsky, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Sebastiani, was sent on a secret mission to rebellious Poland, where he joined the ranks of the rebels and took part in the battle of Grochow. For his valor, he receives the Order of Virtuti militari. The Polish national government then sends Count Walewski to London to enlist England's support against Russia. Here he meets the charming Miss Caroline, Lord Montagu's daughter, and marries her.

After the capture of Warsaw by the Russian troops and the suppression of the uprising, Walevsky and his wife leave London and leave for Paris, where Alexander takes French citizenship and is appointed to the position of an officer for assignments under Marshal Gerard. In April 1834, at the age of 25, his wife suddenly died. Almost simultaneously, one by one, their young children, a daughter and a son, also die. The inconsolable Valevsky is enrolled in the newly created Foreign Legion and, with the rank of captain, goes to Algeria, where military operations have been going on since 1830 to “pacify” this recalcitrant territory, which King Louis Philippe declared the French governor general.

Upon his return from Algeria, Walevsky continued for some time military service as part of the 4th Hussars, and in 1837 he retired, deciding to devote himself to literary pursuits. He published two pamphlets, "Un mot sur la question d'Alger" (1837) and "L'alliance anglaise" (1838). In the first, Walevsky develops his view on the Algerian problem, and in the second, on the Franco-English alliance. Then he tries the pen like a playwright. In January 1840, a comedy based on his play was staged in one of the Parisian theaters, but it was not successful, after which the count began to think about another change of occupation.

At this time, he meets a 20-year-old actress, Mademoiselle Rachel (Elizabeth Rachel Felix), who has already become famous on the Parisian stage in the roles of tragic heroines. Their romance culminated in the birth of a son, named Alexander, in honor of his father. Subsequently, Valevsky recognizes him, and in 1860, with the consent of Emperor Napoleon, he officially adopts him, gives his name and title. After parting with Rachel, Alexander in 1846 marries the daughter of Count Ricci, who will bear him four children, but the first-born girl will die in infancy.

However, let us return to the beginning of 1840, when the unlucky playwright found himself at a crossroads: what should he devote himself to? Soon he had a good opportunity to show his abilities in the diplomatic field. In the summer of 1840, the then head of Louis Philippe's cabinet and at the same time Foreign Minister A. Thiers, who knew Valevsky closely, entrusted him with a delicate diplomatic mission, sending him to Egypt to the local ruler Muhammad Ali. Contrary to previous encouraging promises from France, now Paris wanted to persuade him to accept the ultimatum of the great powers on the return to the sultan of the territories conquered by the Egyptian Pasha (the so-called London Convention of 1840).

The second diplomatic mission at the end of 1847 was already entrusted to Valevsky by F. Guizot, the last head of the government of the July Monarchy. He sent it to Argentina. There, in Buenos Aires, Walevsky received news of the February Revolution in Paris. Considering himself free from fulfilling the orders of the overthrown government, he hastened to return to France, where he joined Louis Napoleon, the leader of the Bonapartists.

With the election of Napoleon as President of the Republic, Valevsky's rapid diplomatic career began. In 1849 he was appointed envoy to Florence, in 1850 - ambassador to Naples, a year later - to Madrid, and then - to London. With the proclamation of the Second Empire in France on December 2, 1852, Count Walevsky was instructed to

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It was necessary to achieve the speedy recognition of Napoleon III by the European powers, with which he coped very successfully.

At the end of April 1855, Napoleon recalled Walevsky from London and appointed him a senator, and a few days later he made him minister of foreign affairs. The emperor entrusted him to represent France at the Paris Peace Congress, designed to put an end to the Crimean War. This choice was filled with deep meaning. It was Valevsky, the son of Napoleon I, who was elected chairman at the triumphant peace congress for the Second Empire, which, among other things, symbolized the funeral of the Vienna system of 1814-1815, which was humiliating for France. all its participants had to agree to this. Russia most readily accepted his proposal to transfer the discussion of the question of ending the war from Vienna, where the conference of ambassadors was held, to Paris. In the capital of France, it was possible to avoid the oppressive Austrian guardianship, which so annoyed the Russian diplomats in Vienna.

The first of the Russian commissioners to Paris arrived Baron Brunnov, who immediately upon arrival, twice - on February 14 and 16 - was received by Count Walevsky. On February 19, Brunnov detailed his first impressions of these meetings, as well as of the expected position of England and Austria at the Congress, in a dispatch to Chancellor Nesselrode.

“The Emperor Napoleon,” he wrote, “definitely desires to conclude peace as soon as possible. He highly appreciates the feeling that prompted our august sovereign to transfer the negotiations to Paris. He attaches great importance to their success. Consequently, he will make every effort to remove difficulties that may either slow them down or render them ineffectual. The difficulties to be foreseen will not come from France, but from England on the one hand, and from Austria on the other.

The first from the very beginning did not show much desire to contribute to the conclusion of peace. She would have preferred to try her luck in a third campaign to restore Britain's military reputation, which had been damaged by the first two campaigns. Moreover, considerations of a parliamentary character, on which the fate of the government in power depends, give Lord Palmerston great apprehension as to the strength of his power after the conclusion of a peace, which will not be popular in the eyes of the English if it does not justify the hopes that the government of Great Britain had imprudence. excite the supporters of the war.

The French Cabinet, not without difficulty, overcame England's hesitation and obvious unwillingness. And he succeeded only because of his perseverance. Personally, Lord Clarendon is favorably disposed. But he is completely at the mercy of public opinion, being under the influence of newspapers, he is afraid of falling short of the dominant role that he considers himself called to play in the eyes of Europe. He is extremely sensitive to everything that concerns the Anglo-French alliance; he sees a threat to its continued existence in the relations that may be established between the representatives of Russia and France. Hence the urgent need for the French Cabinet to avoid anything that might arouse the suspicion and distrust of the British Cabinet. Giving him cause for distrust puts the success of the negotiations at risk. Count Walewski emphasized this difficulty with particular emphasis.

“The Emperor Napoleon,” he told me, “certainly wishes to preserve the ties that bind him to England. Of necessity, he has to be extremely careful in dealing with her. He will be extremely obliged to you if you keep this in mind during negotiations. If difficulties arise, then to overcome them, he will stop at such methods, which, in his opinion, will be most suitable for this purpose, acting with extreme caution and without offending anyone. Having set himself the task of achieving reconciliation, he will fulfill it without any doubt with great tact and skill. You can be sure of it””34.

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33 In this case, we are only interested in Brunnov's assessment of France's position.

34 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 18 - 19.

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It followed from Brunnov's message that French diplomacy at the congress would by all means seek to end the war as soon as possible, which was in the interests of Russia, but at the same time ran counter to the goals of England, which wanted the ultimate weakening of the defeated enemy. At the same time, the peacemaker Napoleon did not want to question the stability of the Franco-British alliance. The Emperor of the French hoped for a corresponding understanding on the part of Russia, which could count on his assistance in its worthy exit from the war.

At the end of February 21, the first Russian plenipotentiary, Adjutant General Count Orlov, arrived in Paris, accompanied by an impressive retinue. The very next day, he was invited to Count Walevsky, who informed him of an audience scheduled for February 23 with Emperor Napoleon, who wished to talk with Orlov face to face at the end. He reported this first meeting with Napoleon in detail to Count Nesselrode in a dispatch dated March 2.

Orlov clearly outlined to Napoleon the three main positions of Russia: the mouth of the Danube must remain free and open for trade of all states, for which Russia and Turkey will agree on the destruction of their fortifications in this area; The Black Sea will be declared neutral; the boundary line between Moldavia and Bessarabia will be established only after a detailed discussion and with a common agreement.

From a conversation with Napoleon, Orlov concluded: the main thing that interests the French emperor at the end of the Eastern War is the abolition of the terms of the Peace of Vienna in 1815, which were humiliating for France, and their recognition as invalid. In addition, he became convinced that Napoleon had plans for Italy, and this threatened a conflict with Austria, which traditionally considered the area to be its sphere of influence. Finally, the mention of “poor Poland” testified to France's continued interest in the Polish issue, which was extremely painful for Russia, which was fraught with inevitable complications in Russian-French relations. But the most important thing for Russian diplomacy at that moment was Napoleon's unequivocal intention to help Emperor Alexander with dignity get out of the difficult situation in which Russia found itself as a result of the ill-fated Crimean War.

The favorable position of Napoleon III towards Russia was revealed from the very first day of the congress, which opened on February 25 under the chairmanship of Count Walevsky, who skillfully pursued a conciliatory line prescribed by his position as an arbitrator, as well as the instructions of the emperor. Napoleon himself, ignoring the ill-concealed discontent of the allies, showed affection for Orlov, often inviting him to the Tuileries for confidential conversations, the content of which the rest of the congress participants could only guess.

“Until today, all the behavior and speeches of Emperor Napoleon confirmed his desire to complete the peace negotiations,” Orlov wrote on March 11 to Nesselrode. - If he did not want this, he would not try to moderate the demands of England ... Our refusal to agree to the unjust claims of the British government would put an end to the negotiations, and the responsibility for breaking them would not fall on the emperor Napoleon. In a word, if he wanted not peace, but war, then it would be enough for him to remain silent. He didn't want it.

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35 The arrival of Count Orlov in Paris created a sensation there. The newspapers responded to this with a series of publications about his life, about participation in the war against Napoleon, about his stay in Paris in the spring of 1814 as part of the Russian army, about friendship with the late Emperor Nicholas. Journalists did not fail to remind readers that Count Orlov has been heading the secret police of the Russian Empire for more than 10 years and is one of the most trusted persons of the young Tsar Alexander. Lithographic portraits and color popular prints of General Orlov were exhibited in showcases bookstores and newsstands. In a word, he became a Parisian celebrity. None of the participants in the peace congress received such attention from the press as General Orlov.

36 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 27-30.

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He actively, skillfully, persistently intervened, seeking to moderate both the exclusive claims of England and the selfish calculations of Austria. He used his mediation not only to help restore peace to the best of his ability, but also to give just satisfaction to our just interests.

Count Valevsky understood this idea and carried it out with great tact and skill. At the conference, I repeatedly noticed his desire not to arouse the displeasure of the British representatives, which was explained by the clearly expressed desire of France not to abruptly break off its ties with England. Outside the conference, in our confidential conversations, he always showed an invariably peaceful mood, I would even say friendly. He always treated us not as an enemy, but as an accomplice. He himself used this term and behaved accordingly during all the negotiations”37.

When Lord Clarendon tried, it was, to raise the question of the independence of the North Caucasian tribes from Russia at the congress,38 Valevsky, acting on the direct instructions of Napoleon, opposed the discussion of this topic, referring to the fact that it was beyond the approved agenda. Nor did they receive support from France and the demands of the Austrian commissioner, Count Buol, that Russia agree to the cession of all Bessarabia to Turkey39. Buol had every reason to express dissatisfaction with the line pursued by Valevsky on this issue, rightly seeing in it signs of an emerging Franco-Russian rapprochement40.

The active assistance of Count Walevsky helped to overcome sharp disagreements on the issue of demilitarization of the Åland Islands and in the development of the declaration of the Paris Congress on international maritime law, which, as Orlov and Brunnov insisted, confirmed the basic principles formulated back in 1780 by Catherine II41. Valevsky managed to convince Lord Clarendon of the validity of the claims defended by Orlov42.

In St. Petersburg, where, according to the tradition inherited from the previous reign, of which Chancellor Nesselrode continued to be a living embodiment, they were not inclined to place too much trust in the goodwill of France. However, the behavior of Emperor Napoleon and his representative at the peace congress, emphatically loyal to Russia, prompted even Count Nesselrode to correct his established view of France. “We must conclude,” he wrote to Orlov on March 15, “that one of the reasons that prompted him (Napoleon. - P. Ch.) to firmly take the matter of restoring peace into his own hands was the hope of establishing closer relations with Russia. So, we think that the more we keep him in faith in the success of this, the stronger will be his desire to prevent the failure of the negotiations due to those unforeseen difficulties that England may raise.

Moreover, Orlov was allowed to make it clear to Napoleon III that Russia would not interfere with his innermost desire to have the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna of 1814 regarding the Bonaparte dynasty deprived of all rights to supreme power in France recognized as invalid. “It seems to you to decide for yourself,” wrote

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37 Ibid., p. 37 - 38.

38 As is known, during the war, British diplomacy made persistent attempts to establish interaction between Shamil's detachments in the North Caucasus and the Turkish army.

39 In connection with the sharp contradictions on the question of the Danubian Principalities, which were revealed at the Congress, it was decided to form a special commission to determine the general principles for the future structure of these principalities. In 1858 a conference will be convened in Paris on this subject.

40 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 38 - 39.

41 The basic principles of international maritime law were formulated by Catherine II in a declaration of March 9 (February 27), 1780. For the text of the declaration, see On Armed Maritime Neutrality. SPb., 1859, p. 64-66.

42 On this, see Martens F. Decree. cit., vol. XV, p. 288 - 291.

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on this occasion, Nesselrode, - how much can a hint on your part that we are sympathetic to this issue contribute to the success of the negotiations ”43.

Just at this time, a convenient opportunity presented itself to express gratitude to the emperor of the French for the benevolent position of France at the peace congress. This was done in a very non-trivial way. On March 16, 1856, the long-awaited heir was born to Emperor Napoleon and Empress Eugenia. The French troops in the Crimea marked this event with fireworks. The Russian army, located at the front in front of the battle formations of the French, followed their example, saluting in honor of the birth of the imperial prince, and in the evening arranged an illumination on the adjacent mountains, which their opponents could admire along with the Russians.

This action, carried out even before the signing of the peace treaty, made the most favorable impression in France. The emperor hastened to express his sincere gratitude to Count Orlov and announced that he was immediately sending his Adjutant General Count E. Ney, grandson of the illustrious marshal, who was shot by the Bourbons in 1815, to St. . – P. Ch.) heart”44.

The disposition of Napoleon and Valevsky towards Russia, of course, was far from altruistic. Actively promoting a peaceful settlement, the French side at the same time firmly defended its interests, for the sake of which in 1854 it involved itself in the conflict between Turkey and Russia. This was revealed during the discussion of the problem of neutralizing the Black Sea, in particular, in the question of the elimination of fortifications and other military installations on the coast. The French representatives insisted on the return of Kars, taken by the Russian army, to Turkey, and also rejected Russia's long-standing claims to the sole protection of the rights of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects, advocating joint guarantees by the great powers of the rights of all Christians in the Ottoman Porte45. On these issues, Walevsky spoke in solidarity with Clarendon at the congress.

The skillful mediation of Valevsky, who was effectively supported by Napoleon in the most difficult situations, allowed the parties to soon reach an agreement and sign the Paris Peace Treaty on March 3046. By all accounts, it turned out to be less harsh and humiliating for Russia, which lost the war, than one might expect. In essence, it contained only those provisions with which Russia had previously agreed when the congress was convened.

Napoleon III experienced the greatest satisfaction with the results of the war, recorded in the Paris Peace Treaty. “The spring of 1856 was a time of true flowering for the emperor and for France,” notes the contemporary History of French Diplomacy. - Outside the French army, which bore the brunt of collective operations, having shown the ability to operate for several months in conditions of extreme remoteness, proved that it was the best army in the world at that time. Paris has replaced Vienna and even London as the pivot of the European concert... Although the victory and the (peaceful. - P. Ch.) Congress did not bring direct significant benefits to France, they gave it an obvious halo. If Napoleon's goal was to break what was still called the Northern Alliance, then he is completely realistic.

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43 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 43.

44 From Orlov's telegraph dispatch dated March 29, 1856, addressed to Nesselrode. - AVPRI, f. Office, he. 469, 1856, d. 148, l. 70 - 70rev.

45 Charles Roux F. Op. cit., p. 90 - 96. A few days before the opening of the congress, Sultan Abdulmecid, under pressure from England and France, issued a manifesto (hatti-sheriff), proclaiming the freedom of all Christian denominations in the territory of the Ottoman Porte. This allowed Clarendon and Walevsky to insist on the inclusion of a mention of this manifesto in a special article of the Paris Peace Treaty.

46 For the text of the treaty, see Martens F. Decree op., vol. XV, p. 307 - 328.

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called his idea. From now on, Austria and Russia will never again be able to act together, especially against France.

Indeed, without receiving any territorial and material advantages, Napoleon III achieved more - both for France and for the Bonaparte dynasty. Moral revenge was taken for the humiliation of 1814-1815. The Holy Alliance, which had previously dominated the continent, was replaced by the “European concert”, in which France took the leading role, and the emperor of the French became the true arbiter of Europe48.

Feeling the dissatisfaction of his allies with the signs of his interest in Russia that appeared at the congress and not wanting to compromise the Franco-British alliance, Napoleon III was forced to meet the insistent wishes of the St. James and Vienna courts for additional guarantees of Turkey's territorial integrity. On April 15, 1856, two weeks after the closing of the peace congress, Count Walewski, Lord Clarendon and Count Buol signed a tripartite convention on the guarantees of the Ottoman Empire.

When Valevsky informed Orlov about this, who had begun preparations for his return to St. Petersburg, he expressed to the French minister his extreme surprise at this act, the anti-Russian orientation of which, as he did not fail to notice, did not cause him doubts. In a dispatch addressed to the State Chancellor, Orlov commented on France’s behavior in this matter as follows: “Austria and England probably put forward this combination on purpose in order to compromise France in front of us and thereby spoil our relations, the manifestation of cordiality of which was already beginning to disturb the Vienna and London courts. 49.

Alexander II agreed with this interpretation, but at the same time strengthened the idea that Napoleon should not be completely trusted. On Orlov’s dispatch, the sovereign made a note: “This behavior of France towards us is not very loyal and should serve us as a measure of the degree of trust that N. (Napoleon. – P. Ch.) can inspire in us”50.

Apparently, Napoleon himself experienced some embarrassment from his own actions. He invited Orlov to his place and expressed his deep regret over the signed convention. This decision, he explained, was forced, as it followed directly from the Allied agreement on guarantees for Turkey, concluded at the Vienna Conference. In addition, he said, he was under strong pressure from England and Austria.

Orlov, with his characteristic frankness, which seemed to always appeal to Napoleon, replied that he, of course, perfectly understands the motives for the actions of England and Austria, but cannot understand why France succumbed to their pressure in making a decision that had an obvious anti-Russian orientation. In the light of the emerging friendly relations between Russia and France, Orlov added, it was all the more strange that they tried to hide from him the very fact of negotiations on this issue.

Responding to his frank rebuke, the emperor tried to shift the responsibility to his foreign minister. “When I learned through Walevsky that the treaty had not yet been communicated to you,” Napoleon said, “I expressed my dissatisfaction with this to him, since it looks like a trick that I am not capable of. I ask you to assure your august sovereign of this. However, I have ordered that you be informed of all the documents in question.”51

Indeed, a few days later, Valevsky presented Orlov with copies of the Vienna Memorandum (November 14, 1855) and the April Convention of 1856, after which Orlov did not

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47 Histoire de la diplomatic francaise. Presentation de Dominique de Villepin. T. 2. De 1815 a nos jours. Paris, 2007, p. 104 - 105.

48 Sedouy J.-A. de. Le concert europeen. Aux origines de l'Europe 1814 - 1914. Paris, 2009, p. 321.

49 Red archive, 1936, N2 (75), p. 52.

51 Ibid., p. 56

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restrained himself and declared that he had always considered Count Valevsky an honest man and therefore did not understand why it was necessary to behave in such a way towards Russia52.

Until Orlov's departure from Paris, Napoleon III used every opportunity to smooth over the unpleasant impression of France's participation in the April 15 convention, and even resorted to the help of Empress Eugenie. At the end of one of the official dinners at the Tuileries, where Orlov was present, the empress took him aside and said that the emperor, her husband, was extremely upset that he might be suspected of insincerity in connection with the signing of the April Convention. Count Walevsky, who joined the Empress and Orlov, hastened to inform him confidentially that in secret negotiations, Clarendon and Buol insisted on a clear definition of all casus belli in the defense of Turkey. However, Napoleon authorized him, Walewski, to decisively reject these demands, agreeing only to the general obligation of the three powers, leaving each to determine independently and at its own risk whether there was a casus belli or not. After politely listening to the Empress and Valevsky, Orlov left their assurances and confessions without comment.

On May 12, Emperor Napoleon gave him a farewell audience. After listening to Orlov's words of gratitude for the constant friendly assistance that he felt from the emperor and his minister - the chairman of the congress - in defending the legitimate interests of Russia, Napoleon expressed hope for the successful development of mutual understanding and cooperation between France and Russia, which emerged during the work of the peace congress. He added that he hoped for full agreement with Emperor Alexander. “This is the feeling of my heart,” Napoleon said at the end of the audience.

Conveying the content of this farewell meeting in a dispatch, Orlov noted that Napoleon seemed to him quite sincere in his desire to develop relations with Russia. “All this would be very good if it were sincere,” Alexander II wrote on the margins of the dispatch, apparently continuing to have some doubts about this54.

His doubts were fueled by one topic that was extremely painful for the Russian autocrat - Poland. The perseverance, even if polite and cautious, with which Napoleon III raised the Polish problem from time to time, was alarming. With her, by the way, he began his personal acquaintance with Count Orlov, as already mentioned. When the peace congress was coming to an end, Napoleon, once again receiving Orlov, in a conversation over a cup of coffee, expressed his wish to discuss the question of Poland at one of the last meetings, stipulating that it could only be a humanitarian one (about “mercy and generosity ”), and not about the political aspect of this problem. Orlov made it clear to the emperor that such a discussion was completely unacceptable for the dignity of his sovereign. As a result, the Polish question was not even mentioned in congressional documents. “I am quite pleased with the fact,” wrote Orlov, “that I did not have to hear the name of Poland pronounced at meetings in the presence of representatives of the great powers of Europe”56. Napoleon again returned to the Polish theme at a farewell audience given to Orlov, but this time the emperor was extremely correct. “He spoke to me about Poland,” Orlov reported, “but in a sense that was completely consistent with the intentions of our august sovereign.”57

Orlov left Paris and went to Petersburg, where he was greeted as a hero who saved Russia from humiliation. He was showered with royal favors, elevated to princely dignity and appointed chairman of the State Council. The second Russian plenipotentiary, Baron Brunnov, continued for some time to remain in Paris in the role of envoy extraordinary. He waited there for the appointment of a new ambassador.

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54 Ibid., p. 294.

55 Orlov's dispatch dated April 19, 1856 - AVPRI, f. office, op. 469, 1856, d. 148, l. 257-259.

56 Op. Quoted from: Tatishchev S. S. Decree op., p. 162.

57 AVPRI, f. office, op. 469, 1856, d. 148, l. 475.

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RESIGNATION OF COUNT NESSELRODE. PRINCE GORCHAKOV

By the time Orlov returned to St. Petersburg, important changes had taken place in the leadership of Russian diplomacy, reflecting the change in the foreign policy priorities of the new reign.

On April 27 (15), 1856, the 76-year-old Nesselrode was resigned from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, retaining the title of State Chancellor. On the same day, an imperial decree followed on the appointment of Prince A. M. Gorchakov, who held the post of Russian ambassador in Vienna, as the new minister.

The Congress of Paris was the last page in the long career of Count Nesselrode, one of the creators of the Vienna system and the Holy Alliance, who “ordered a long life” as a result of the Crimean War. Leaving Russian and European politics, he left something like a will, in which he briefly outlined his thoughts and views on the new international position of Russia. This document - "Note" - was compiled by Nesselrode on the eve of the opening of the Paris Congress, dated February 11 (s.s.), 1856, and was first published only in 1872.58

In a brief four-page "Note" one can easily notice the influence of the ideas inspired by the chancellor by Emperor Alexander, who was in constant communication with him. Nesselrode has always been an obedient executor of royal aspirations - both under Alexander I, and under Nicholas I, and under Alexander II. The latter intended, and the chancellor felt this before others, to turn the helm of the state ship in the direction of deep reforms. The Paris Congress had not yet opened, and Nesselrode had already written: “Russia will have to assimilate a foreign policy system different from that which it has hitherto been guided by. Extreme circumstances make it a law for her.

By "extreme circumstances" he meant Russia's latest military defeat. “The war,” he wrote, “caused an urgent need for Russia to take care of its internal affairs and the development of its moral and material forces. This internal work is the first need of the country, and any external activity that might interfere with this must be carefully eliminated”60. And in this thesis one can also feel the direction of the thoughts of Emperor Alexander, subsequently so successfully embodied by Nesselrode's successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire.

Of course, the faithful follower of Metternich understood that there was a final collapse of the very system that they had jointly created for several decades. But, we must give him his due: Nesselrode was able to recognize the inevitability of a break “with the political system that had been maintained for forty years”, although he did this with certain reservations61. They boiled down to two of his statements: “In the reasonable interests of Russia, our policy should not cease to be monarchist and anti-Polish”62. Obviously, in the mind of one of the creators of the policy of the Holy Alliance, the break with the past was not final. “It would be extremely imprudent to undermine our good relations with Prussia or to inflame those that we have with Austria and for the preservation of which, for the sake of necessity, we paid the price of so many sacrifices,” argued Nesselrode.

He proved this idea by the continuing community of interests of the former members of the Holy Alliance in relation to Poland. “From the partition of Poland between Russia, Austria

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58 Note by Chancellor Count KV Nesselrod on the political relations of Russia. - Russian archive, 1872, N2.

59 Ibid., p. 341.

61 Ibid., p. 344

63 Ibid., p. 343.

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and Prussia, - wrote the chancellor, - mutual protection of interests was established, the observance of which, of these three powers, is the most necessary for us. The Polish uprising (1831 - P. Ch.) served as sufficient proof of this. Yes and in recent times coalition called under the pretext eastern war, did it not threaten to unite even more strongly by joining the question of Polsky to it?”64.

The greatest concern for Nesselrode was the tendency towards rapprochement with France, which emerged after the death of Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich. “To enter with her (France. - P. Ch.) immediately into a positive and close alliance would mean prematurely changing our new system,” the author of the “Note” argued. “Confident in our support, Napoleon III would have seen it as an encouragement to embark on new enterprises in which it might be unprofitable for us to accompany him to the extent that he wished.”65

In addition to the foreign policy threats arising for Russia from an alliance with France, Nesselrode also pointed to the “ideological” incompatibility of the regimes existing in the two countries. “Does it not seem careless and untimely,” warned the old Chancellor, “to base the political system on close alliance with a country which, since 1815, and apart from all European guarantees, has been the field of three revolutions, one more violent and democratic, among which collapsed in 24 hours, two dynasties, apparently more firmly established than Napoleonic”66.

It is difficult to say with certainty whether Nesselrode's views on the Second Empire fully reflected the opinion of Alexander II at that time, but it seems that the emperor was inclined to share the old chancellor's distrust of Napoleon III. It began to smooth out with the coming to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, free from many of the prejudices of his predecessor.

A. M. Gorchakov67 belonged to an ancient aristocratic family. He was born on June 4 (15), 1798 in the town of Gapsal (Haapsalu), Estland province, in the family of Major General Prince M. A. Gorchakov.

In the summer of 1811, Alexander successfully passed the entrance examinations and was admitted to the newly established Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, designed to train the future ruling elite of Russia from the offspring of noble families. Young Gorchakov ended up in the first set of lyceum students along with Alexander Pushkin, with whom he would become friends. Subsequently, Pushkin dedicated several poems to him68.

After graduating from the lyceum in 1817, 19-year-old Gorchakov was released from there with a certificate of merit and, with the rank of titular adviser, entered the service of the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he soon became the closest assistant to the second secretary of state, Count I. Kapodistrias. Apparently, it was the proximity to Kapodistrias that became the root cause of the persistent hostility towards Gorchakov on the part of another Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs - Count Nesselrode, Kapodistrias' rival and ill-wisher. For several years they ran the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together: Kapodistria was in charge of eastern affairs, including the Balkans, and Nesselrode, as the first state secretary

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64 Ibid., p. 343 - 344.

65 Ibid., p. 342.

66 Ibid., p. 344.

67 An extensive literature is devoted to the life and work of AM Gorchakov. From works of a generalizing nature, see: B. L. Modzalevsky. To the biography of Chancellor Prince A. M. Gorchakov. M., 1907; Bushuev S. K. A. M. Gorchakov. M., 1961; Semanov S. N. A. M. Gorchakov - Russian diplomat of the 19th century. M., 1962; Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov: 200 years since the birth. Ed. E. M. Primakova. M., 1998; Kesselbrenner G.L. Most Serene Prince. M., 1998; Andreev A.R. The Last Chancellor of the Russian Empire. Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov. Documentary biography. M., 1999; Gorchakov Alexander Mikhailovich – Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. T. 3. Biographies of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 1802 - 2002. M., 2002; Chicherin G. V. Historical sketch of the diplomatic activity of A. M. Gorchakov. Comp. and comm. V. L. Telitsyn. M., 2009.

68 See Pushkin A.S. Full. coll. op. in 10 volumes, 3rd ed. M., 1962 - 1966; vol. 1, p. 56, 259, 378 - 379, etc.

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retar, was responsible for the European direction. In May 1822, Kapodistrias was dismissed, and Nesselrode became the sole head of the ministry.

Gorchakov's impeccable secretarial work at the congress of the Holy Alliance in Laibach (May 1821) was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree, and in December 1822, a collegiate assessor, Prince Gorchakov, was appointed to the post of secretary of the embassy in London, where he served until 1827 under the command of Count H. A. Lieven. Gorchakov had a very low opinion of the lack of initiative after, calling him a "stupid" and even a "corpse." Such unflattering comments reached Lieven's ears, and Gorchakov was transferred to Rome, to a less prestigious embassy.

At the beginning of 1825, while on vacation, Gorchakov met with Pushkin, who was serving his exile in Mikhailovsky. At the request of the ill Gorchakov, who was visiting his uncle, the marshal of the nobility of the Pskov province, Pushkin visited him at the Lyamonovskoye estate and spent the whole day with his lyceum friend, reading to him excerpts from Boris Godunov. Later, in the poem “October 19,” the poet writes:

You, Gorchakov, are lucky from the first days,

Praise to you - fortune shine cold

Didn't change your free soul:

All the same you are for honor and friends.

We are assigned a different path by strict fate;

Stepping into life, we quickly dispersed:

But by chance a country road

We met and fraternally embraced.

In 1828, Gorchakov was appointed counselor of the embassy in Berlin, and in December of the same year he was sent as chargé d'affaires in Florence. Here he will have to serve for almost five years.

A new stage in Gorchakov's career began with his appointment in November 1833 as an adviser to the embassy in Vienna. While in the Austrian capital, he was personally convinced of the duplicity of Metternich's diplomacy. Apparently, not without the influence of information received from Gorchakov, who was supported by Ambassador D. P. Tatishchev, Nicholas I had serious doubts about the sincerity of Metternich's assurances of eternal friendship with Russia. But for Vice-Chancellor Nesselrode, a friend and follower of Metternich, Gorchakov's persistent signals from Vienna only caused growing irritation, but he had to reckon with the mood of the emperor.

In the summer of 1838, an important event took place in the life of the 40-year-old Gorchakov, who had a reputation as a convinced bachelor, although a connoisseur of female beauty. For the first time, he truly, deeply and passionately fell in love. The subject of his passion was Countess M. A. Musina-Pushkina (nee Princess Urusova), the young widow of the chamberlain of the court E. I. V. I. A. Musin-Pushkin. Gorchakov made her an offer, she accepted it.

The marriage turned out to be successful for the career of a diplomat. His father-in-law, Prince A. I. Urusov, head of the Moscow Palace Office, became an influential defender and intercessor for his son-in-law against the intrigues of Nesselrode, who created absolutely unbearable working conditions for Gorchakov in the embassy, ​​surrounded by spies and harassed by constant nit-picking.

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69 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 275.

70 A second, even more passionate love overtook Prince Gorchakov at the age of 65, when he fell in love with his 24-year-old great-niece N. S. Akinfova, who had a husband and two children. The minister will settle her in his house as a mistress, and her husband will be given the title of chamber junker for her uncomplaining behavior. Gorchakov's romance with Akinfova will last four years until the chancellor finds out about her betrayal with His Highness Prince N. M. Romanovsky, Duke of Leuchtenberg, a member of the Imperial family. It is curious that the cruelly deceived Gorchakov found the strength to come to terms with the blow of fate. He even generously assisted his unfaithful mistress in the implementation of her plans for marriage with the Duke of Leuchtenberg. - Ekshtut S. A. Nadin, or the Novel of a high society lady through the eyes of the secret political police. Based on unpublished materials from the Secret Archive of the III Branch. M., 2001.

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When the off-balance Gorchakov defiantly submitted his resignation in the summer of 1838, hoping to draw the attention of the sovereign to the conditions created for the embassy adviser through the efforts of Nesselrode, the chancellor, experienced in intrigues, managed to get the emperor to satisfy this petition.

Metternich, finally freed from the vigilant control of the Russian diplomat, took Gorchakov's departure from Vienna with great relief.

For more than a year, Gorchakov was out of work, until, through the efforts of his father-in-law and other influential intercessors, he was returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In December 1841, he was appointed envoy to the kingdom of Württemberg. His first important business in Stuttgart was the arrangement of the marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna, daughter of Nicholas I, with the Crown Prince of Württemberg, Karl-Friedrich-Alexander. Gorchakov successfully coped with the responsible task, earning the gratitude of the sovereign. At his post in Württemberg, he served 12 years, receiving numerous awards, including the Order of St. Anna 1st degree.

In 1852, Gorchakov was sent to France for several months, where at that time the Second Republic, the anemic brainchild of the February Revolution of 1848, was being degenerated into the Second Empire. With the assistance of N. D. Kiselev, the Russian envoy to Prince-President Louis Napoleon, Gorchakov studied the political situation in Paris and established useful contacts.

When the Eastern Crisis flared up in 1853, Gorchakov, who returned to Germany, considered it expedient for Russia to behave more restrainedly in relations with Turkey so as not to provoke England and France to come out in defense of the latter, but due to the modest position he then occupied, he could not restraining influence on Nicholas I.

At the height of the Eastern Crisis in Baden-Baden, Gorchakov's wife died. Her death shocked the prince so deeply that he fell into despair. Gorchakov sought and found consolation only in prayers, withdrawing from business and avoiding society.

From a seclusion that had lasted for several months, he was brought out by a message about the beginning Russian-Turkish war. While in Germany, Gorchakov made strenuous efforts to prevent Prussia from joining the anti-Russian coalition. At this time, the treacherous policy of Austria towards Russia was clearly revealed, about which he warned back in the 1830s.

The Habsburg Empire, saved in 1849 by Nicholas I from collapse, was thinking about the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia, where Russian troops were introduced. Although Metternich, “gone with the wind” of the revolution of 1848, was long gone from the helm of Austrian foreign policy, his successor, Count Buol, encouraged the young Emperor Franz Joseph to take action against Russia. In this regard, the post of head of the Russian diplomatic mission in Vienna acquired fundamental importance. Its former leader, Baron P. K. Meyendorff, who was closely related to Count Buol, was recalled “on leave”, and he needed a suitable replacement. Nicholas I, remembering Gorchakov's long-standing warnings, insisted on his appointment to Vienna, despite the objections of Nesselrode.

Upon arrival at the new duty station, Gorchakov launched energetic work to prevent Austria from entering the war. He managed to neutralize Buol's warlike aspirations and convince Franz Joseph to refrain from participating in the war. Gorchakov's actions were highly appreciated by Emperor Nicholas I.

Selecting a new team of associates and executors of his reformist plans, Alexander II saw Prince Gorchakov as the future Minister of Foreign Affairs. And as soon as a peace treaty was signed in Paris, the emperor invited him to take this responsible post.

Gorchakov, without a moment's hesitation, accepted highest offer, having previously acquainted the emperor with his vision of the foreign policy tasks that confronted Russia after the end of the war. Alexander II found that Gorchakov's views fully corresponded to his own ideas about what Russia's new foreign policy should be. The personal rescript on Gorchakov's appointment stated: “Diplomatic abilities, knowledge in this area, acquired

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Your long stay at various courts of Europe as Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister, and especially your actions in the continuation of the Vienna Conferences of 1855, decided Our choice of appointing you Minister of Foreign Affairs. You entered into its administration at that important time when the fulfillment of the terms of the newly concluded Peace of Paris required vigilant vigilance and foresight. The misunderstandings that soon arose in this respect could again overshadow the barely cleared political horizon of Europe; but You, guided by experience and comprehending Our sincere desires to strengthen the general calmness, were able to prudently avert the consequences of those misunderstandings and establish friendly relations between Russia and all powers”71.

The contours of Gorchakov's foreign policy program will be outlined by him in circulars dated September 24 (August 12) and September 2 (August 21, SS), 1856, addressed to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad72. The key phrase from this circular received a noisy echo in Europe: "Russia is not angry, it is concentrating."

It followed from Gorchakov's program that after the end of the war Russia intended to refrain from active interference in European affairs. At the same time, she considers herself free to choose her future friends and will no longer sacrifice her interests for the sake of the principles of the Holy Alliance. It contained an unambiguous allusion to the ingratitude and betrayal of Austria. While declaring Russia's peaceful intentions, Gorchakov did not rule out a return to an active European policy in the near future. Without disclosing his, as they would say now, strategic plans, Prince Gorchakov initially proceeded from the main task - to achieve the lifting of the restrictions imposed on Russia by the Paris Peace Treaty.

The principle of the free choice of allies declared in Gorchakov's program aroused heightened interest in Paris, where, since the congress was held, the idea of ​​the need for rapprochement with Russia had become stronger.

And what did Gorchakov himself think about relations with France? After all, he was well aware of the stable attachment of Emperor Alexander to special relations with Prussia.

In this matter, the testimony of Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of France in Russia Ch. Baudin73, who was sent to St. Petersburg at the end of June 1856, after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, is very valuable. Coincidentally, the French diplomat ended up on the same ship en route from Stettin to St. Petersburg as Prince Gorchakov, who was returning from Vienna via Berlin and Dresden after presenting his letters of recall to Emperor Franz Joseph. As a result, Baudin was fortunate enough to get to know Gorchakov74 and his foreign policy views during the three-day trip.

If Bodin's report addressed to Valevsky is to be believed, Gorchakov confessed to him that from the very beginning he was against the war and "tried to prevent it by all means available to him"; the war, in his opinion, was not inevitable, it was the result of “a misunderstanding that happened between Napoleon III and Nicholas I in 1853”; Gorchakov considered the conclusion of the Peace of Paris "the starting point of a new policy for Russia, adopted by the party to which he, Prince Gorchakov, belongs, and that in this respect his appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very significant." The minister assured the French diplomat that he had always “been sympathetic to France and considered it highly desirable to conclude an alliance between the two countries”75.

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71 Russian archive, 1905, book. 7, p. 482.

72 AVPRI, f. office, op. 469, 1856, d. 42, l. 201-210.

73 33-year-old S. Baudin was the closest collaborator of Count Walevsky when the latter was ambassador to England. It was to him that Valevsky, having become a minister, entrusted the mission of resuming diplomatic relations with Russia in anticipation of the arrival of the ambassador. For Baudin's service file, see AAE, Personnel, 1-re serie, N269.

74 They first met a few days earlier in Berlin, where they both happened to be passing through. Their acquaintance was arranged by the French ambassador to the Prussian court, the Marquis de Mustier.

75 AAE, Correspondence politique, Russie, 1856, v. 212, fol. 22-23.

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“It is not yet very clear what this new policy will be,” Baudin summed up in a dispatch to Valevsky on July 10, 1856. “I hope to sort it out, but it is already clear that Russia will be inclined to less active interference in foreign affairs.” To a much greater extent, Baudin noted, the young king is concerned internal state his empire, and he intends "to focus on administrative and social matters, as well as on the improvement of various branches of state administration in order to raise Russian agriculture and industry." The French diplomat presciently suggested that “in all likelihood, they will even begin to study the possibilities and means for the abolition of serfdom”76.

Judging by the subsequent development of events, the information communicated by Baudin corresponded to the actual moods and intentions of the new Russian Foreign Minister. Gorchakov was quite sincere with the French diplomat. By the way, having returned to St. Petersburg on July 10, the minister immediately began to confirm his disposition towards France by deeds.

The very next day, Baudin, as charge d'affaires, was accredited to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His status did not imply an official royal audience, but Alexander II, on the advice of Gorchakov, neglected the protocol and received Baudin in the Winter Palace, which testified to a special attitude towards the representative of the French emperor, even if this representative was in a modest secretarial rank.

Since that time, Baudin, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of France, officially took up his duties at the St. Petersburg court. His first priority will be to prepare for the arrival of the French ambassador to Russia. But behind all these, for the most part, technical troubles, he also found time for a deep study of pre-reform Russia, trying to understand the direction of the actions of Emperor Alexander and his new government team. Bodin's dispatches and memoirs sent to Paris were notable for their sober and objective view of the events unfolding in Russia on the eve of the Great Reforms77.

Gorchakov's assurances about his disposition towards close rapprochement with France were confirmed both in his subsequent policy, which will be discussed later, and in closed reports addressed to the emperor. Gorchakov was convinced that in the international situation that had developed after the war, an alliance with France was most preferable for Russia.

“Located at the two ends of the European continent, the two countries did not touch anywhere, their interests did not clash anywhere. United, they would have gained the opportunity to influence Central and Southern Europe. The obvious evidence of the effectiveness of such an alliance would be the constant fear that it would inspire in other governments, Gorchakov believed and referred to the fact that for almost a century it was the fear of a rapprochement between Russia and France that had a restraining effect on all European politics, ”notes a modern researcher of the Gorchakovskaya diplomacy O. V. Serov78.

This conclusion is confirmed by many documents issued by Gorchakov himself. The most important documents of this kind can be considered the annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled by Gorchakov for the emperor. The first of these was a report for 1856. In it, the new minister quite definitely stated that "an agreement with France would provide us with such guarantees, which we did not have in those old alliances to which our policy has hitherto been tied." “Both empires,” continued Gorchakov, “are organically and geographically in relations that contain neither rivalry nor confrontation.” Both on the continent itself and on the seas, the minister noted, between Russia and France there is no

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76 Ibid., fol. 24 recto verso.

77 The activities of Charles Baudin in his post in St. Petersburg will be highly appreciated in Paris. In December 1857, he will be appointed minister plenipotentiary in Kassel (Hesse).

78 Serova O. V. Russian-French relations in the assessment of Prince A. M. Gorchakov. - Russia and France of the XVIII-XX centuries, no. 3. M., 2000, p. 134.

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no disagreements, which serves as a reliable basis for strengthening their further rapprochement. “Only their agreement can restore the balance on the seas disturbed by England and guarantee the continent from all surprises with which the threat of English domination is fraught”79.

Denoting the line of the new Russian diplomacy in relation to France, Prince Gorchakov emphasized: “Gradually reduce the distance that has separated us from the French nation over the past 25 years; to encourage in it the tendencies of sympathy (for us. - P. Ch.), which arose during the war; draw her to us wherever our interests coincide; give her the opportunity to rely on us in order to free herself from dependence on England; finally, to lay the foundations for stable harmony, which would serve as a guarantee of security for (all. - P. Ch.) Europe and greatness for two (ours. - P. Ch.) countries”80.

Definitely speaking in favor of rapprochement with France, Gorchakov perfectly saw the possible obstacles on this path. One of them was determined by the origin and nature of the power of Napoleon III, which did not have clear principles, the stability of which depended to a decisive extent on external successes. “Success is his (Napoleon III. – P. Ch.) only goal,” Gorchakov believed81, and this goal could inspire the French emperor to risky ventures, in which Russia cannot be his assistant.

Another potential danger, according to Gorchakov, was the continued attachment of Napoleon III to an alliance with England, which it would be desirable to weaken. Napoleon, as Gorchakov believed, understood that "if England can do a lot to the detriment of France, then Russia can do a lot - in her favor." Hence the desire of the Emperor of the French to balance the alliance with England with the alliance with Russia. But such a "triangle" does not meet the interests of Russia - it prefers a bilateral union, without British participation. An attempt should be made to tear France away from England, although this seems to be a difficult undertaking, given the extent of London's influence on Paris.

What, according to Gorchakov, should Russia's policy towards France be under these conditions?

His considerations boiled down to the following: “Responding to the openness of Emperor Louis Napoleon, we could encourage his disposition towards us and follow the path of consent that meets our interests ... But at the same time, we would have to protect ourselves from (him. - P. Ch.) ambitious hobbies, the limits of which are unknown to us, as well as from the inconstancy inherent in the French nation in determining its fate. In a word, - Gorchakov summed up, - we must not do: neither too much nor too little. The former would be fraught with the subordination of our own interests to attempts from which we could derive no advantage for ourselves; the second might scare away from us the sovereign, who has great influence and endowed with a strong will, pushing him to seek support from others. So we accept his advances made with sincere intentions, but we do not assume any obligations.”83

Such were the intentions of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs towards France. They were also shared by Alexander I. True, following the example of Napoleon, who stubbornly held on to an alliance with England, he wanted to combine rapprochement with France with his ineradicable Prussophilism.

Mutual soundings and contacts, carried out in strict confidentiality between Russian and French diplomats at the final stage of the Crimean War, reflected the mutual desire of Alexander II and Napoleon III not only for reconciliation, but also for rapprochement between the two countries, which was developed in subsequent years.

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79 AVPRI, f. MFA Reports, op. 475, 1856, d. 40, l. 244 - 245.

80 Ibid., l. 246.

81 Ibid., l. 246 - 246rev.

82 Ibid., l. 247 - 247rev.

83 Ibid., l. 248 - 249.

New and recent history. - 2012. - No. 1. - C. 200-224

Cherkasov Petr Petrovich - doctor historical sciences, chief researcher at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Paris Congress - took place from 25. II to 30. III. The Treaty of Paris, signed as a result of the P. to., ended the Crimean War.

In 1853, after the start of the war between Russia and Turkey, the European powers took a hostile position towards Russia. The head of the British cabinet, Aberdeen, and Napoleon III declared that England and France would not remain neutral and would take Turkey under their protection. After the Battle of Sinop (XI 30, 1853), these statements were reinforced by the appearance of the Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea with the officially declared goal of preventing the Russian naval forces from attacking the Turkish shores. In reality, the combined squadrons of England and France entered the Black Sea with aggressive goals. Austria and Prussia refused to support Russia, and after England and France declared war on Russia (27 March 1854), they signed an alliance treaty in Berlin (20 April 1854), essentially directed against Russia; soon Austria signed an alliance treaty with France and England (2. XII 1854). The ring around Russia closed: she waged war with Turkey, England and France (and from January 1855 with Sardinia) in the absence of any support from Prussia and the clearly hostile attitude of Austria.

Back in the summer of 1854, the Allies developed the so-called. "four conditions" for a future peace treaty with Russia: Russia's cleansing of Moldavia and Wallachia and the replacement of the Russian protectorate over the principalities by a common protectorate of the great powers; freedom of navigation on the Danube; the transfer into the hands of all the great powers of the patronage of the Christian subjects of Turkey; revision of the London convention of 1841 (see) about passages. These conditions formed the basis of the negotiations at the Vienna Conference of 1855 (see). Since Russia rejected the demands of the allies put forward during the negotiations (including the prohibition of Russia to keep a navy on the Black Sea and the disarmament of Sevastopol), the Vienna Conference did not lead to an agreement.

After the fall of Sevastopol (8. IX 1855), the defeat of Russia was finally determined, and the new emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on 2. III 1855) had to agree to the opening of peace negotiations on the basis of "four conditions" with the inclusion of a clause on the neutralization of the Black Sea . The severity of the conditions presented to Russia was aggravated by the addition of a new condition put forward by England and Austria: the right to present new claims to Russia during future negotiations. The vagueness of this clause presented Russia with the opportunity to face the far-reaching demands of her opponents. However, the continuation of the war threatened with such dire consequences that this danger had to be neglected.

At the suggestion of the allies, Paris was appointed as the place for peace negotiations. In February 1856, the Russian commissioners Count A. F. Orlov (see) and Baron F. I. Brunnov arrived there. Even before the opening of the P. to., in conversations with Russian representatives, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the congress, Valevsky, as well as Napoleon III himself, made it clear that the French emperor was conciliatory towards Russia and would moderate British and Austrian demands. This position of France met the desire of Alexander II and Orlov to get closer to Napoleon III, discarding any attempts to rely on an old ally, now an enemy, Austria. The rapprochement between Russia and France, which began in this way and subsequently intensified, was a defining moment in the work of the P. to. and the development of peace conditions.

The first real expression of this rapprochement was the refusal of Napoleon III to support the British demands for the granting of independence to the Caucasian possessions of Russia (this, as Orlov's negotiations with Valevsky showed, was the content of the new condition added to the previous ones). In the same way, Napoleon III was not inclined to fully support Austria, which demanded that Russia cede Bessarabia to Turkey.

The meetings of the Paris Congress proceeded relatively calmly. Part of the questions did not cause controversy: the Russian commissioners quickly agreed to Russia's refusal to fortify the Aland Islands, just as the British commissioners (Lord Clarendon and Cowley) did not insist on Russia's refusal from the Caucasus.

The participants in the P. to. without difficulty agreed to declare complete freedom of commercial navigation along the Danube. In order to ensure this principle, it was decided to create a special commission of representatives from Russia, Austria, France, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey (European Danube Commission).

The issue of transferring patronage over the Christian subjects of Turkey into the hands of all European powers was resolved by the Sultan's rescript of 18. II. 1856, drawn up under the dictation of England and France, in which the freedom of all Christian denominations was declared, and P. K. decided to mention this rescript in a special article contracts. Less smoothly passed the question of the Danubian principalities. Russia renounced the protectorate over them and agreed to the formation of a special commission of representatives of the contracting parties to develop principles for the future structure of the principalities. At the same time, the Russian representatives insisted on the merger of Moldavia and Wallachia into one state, which caused sharp objections from the Austrian representatives (Buol and Huebner), who hoped, with the separate existence of the principalities, the possibility of joining part of them to Austria. However, Austria was forced to abandon its plans for the principalities, because Napoleon III supported Orlov and Brunnov. To resolve the issue of the position of the Danubian principalities, the Paris Conference was convened in 1858 (see).

On the question of Serbia, it was decided that the contracting parties jointly guarantee its complete internal autonomy while maintaining the supreme power of the Sultan over it.

Disputes broke out over the issue of correcting the border of Bessarabia. Turkish representative Ali Pasha (see), incited by the British and strongly supported by the Austrians, demanded significant territorial concessions from Russia. At the suggestion of Valevsky, these requirements were reduced, but still Russia had to abandon part of southern Bessarabia.

Russia was asked to return to the Turks Kars, which had been occupied during the war. Agreeing to this concession, the Russian representatives demanded compensation for it, but, not having received the support of Napoleon III in this matter, they were forced to abandon their demands and agreed that the contract should indicate the return of Kars to the Turks in exchange for Sevastopol and other cities in the Crimea .

The most difficult condition for Russia was the neutralization of the Black Sea, but it was decided to accept this requirement at meetings with Alexander II in St. Petersburg. Therefore, this issue did not cause controversy. The P.C. decided that the Black Sea was declared neutral, and the passage of military ships of the European states through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was prohibited. Russia cannot keep in the Black Sea more than 6 steam ships of 800 tons and 4 ships of 200 tons (the same restrictions were set for the Turkish fleet) and should not, like Turkey, have naval arsenals on the Black Sea. When discussing the last point, Clarendon tried to oblige Russia to destroy the naval shipyards in Nikolaev, but met Orlov's firm resistance and was forced to give in.

In connection with the discussion of the issue of the straits and the neutralization of the Black Sea, it was decided to admit a representative of Prussia to the Paris Congress on the grounds that Prussia signed the London Convention of 1841 on the straits and now cannot but participate in the development of a new decision on this issue.

The Paris Congress also adopted several other resolutions: the prohibition of privateering and the provision of neutral merchant ships from attack by warring countries; a recommendation to powers between which there are serious disagreements to seek the mediation of a friendly power in order to avoid armed conflict; recognition of Turkey as a state participating "in the benefits of common law and the union of European powers", etc.