Battle of Uman. Uman defensive operation Uman tragedy 1941

The stubborn resistance of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts slowed down the advance of Army Group South. While the troops of Army Group Center captured Vitebsk, crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev and threatened a breakthrough to Smolensk, Army Group South, contrary to plans, only advanced detachments of the 13th tank division reached the approaches to Kyiv. The main forces of the 1st Panzer Group of Colonel General von Kleist were located 100–200 km from the Dnieper, and the infantry formations of the 6th and 17th field armies were several days' marches behind them. The successes of German and Romanian troops in Moldova turned out to be even more modest. They managed to make only slight progress in the direction of Balti, Soroka and break through to Mogilev-Podolsky, and on July 9 they were stopped between the Prut and Dniester rivers.

Back on July 5, the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, decided that the Kleist group, after capturing Zhitomir and Berdichev, would turn its two corps to Kirovograd, using the road to Odessa, in order to deeply cover the main forces of the Soviet troops in the Right Bank Ukraine and in the east. Moldova and not give them the opportunity to retreat beyond the Dnieper. The Third Corps was to seize bridgeheads on the Dnieper near Kyiv. The 6th field army of General von Reichenau, divided into two parts, was supposed to attack Kiev with the northern group, and the southern group - to the south, so that in cooperation with the main forces of Kleist's tank group and von Schobert's 11th field army advancing towards it from the south encircle and destroy the troops of the Southwestern Front. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be pushed out from the west by the 17th Field Army of General von Stülpnagel.

So, the German command concentrated its main efforts on encircling Soviet troops in the Vinnitsa region, southwest of Kyiv, while both the command of the Southwestern Front and the Supreme High Command Headquarters considered the Kiev direction to be the most dangerous. Therefore, they tried at all costs to stop the enemy near Kiev and cut off the tip of the German “spear” - tank formations - from the “pole” - infantry divisions. For this purpose the 5th Army Major General tank troops M.I. Potapova, who had retreated to the Korosten fortified area, was ordered to unleash all her forces on the enemy who had broken through from the north, and from the south, towards her, the 6th Army of the Red Army was planned to attack.

However, war has its own logic. 6th Soviet army was unable to accomplish what she had planned, because she herself found herself in a difficult situation: its right flank was deeply encircled from the north, and the center could hardly hold back attacks from formations of the 6th and 17th German field armies. And yet, the troops of General M.I. Potapov caused a lot of trouble to the enemy. They repeatedly intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky - Zhitomir road, threatening the rear of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group. In response, he had to allocate more and more forces and resources to secure his left flank.

On July 12, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, brought the command of the 26th Army into reserve in order to, under his leadership, unite the formations concentrated east and northeast of Bila Tserkva. They had to advance from the southeast towards the 5th Army of M.I. Potapov. Rundstedt had to turn the entire northern group against the 5th Army, and two corps of the southern group against the 26th Army, that is, temporarily abandon the assault on Kyiv.

Only on July 15, when the enemy, having pushed back parts of the 16th mechanized corps (the 16th mechanized corps of the Red Army under the command of division commander A.D. Sokolov consisted of the 15th and 39th tank divisions, the 19th motorcycle regiment, the 546th separate communications battalion, 78th separate motorized engineering battalion), captured Kazatin and cut the only railway running along the front, the Soviet command began to speculate that the enemy was trying to shift its main efforts to the south in order to cut off Soviet troops from the Dnieper. Moreover, the head of intelligence of the Southwestern Front reported: German tank and motorized divisions from the Zhitomir region suddenly turned southeast, to Popelnya. Other formations of this enemy group bypassed the right flank of the 6th Army east of Kazatin. The commander of the Southwestern Front ordered strikes against the advancing German troops from three directions: the 16th Mechanized Corps - from the Kazatin area to Zhitomir, the 5th Army and the 27th Rifle Corps - from the north to Brusilov and Zhitomir, the 5th Cavalry and the 6th Rifle Corps - from the south to Brusilov and Popelnya.

The 5th Cavalry Corps of Major General F. M. Kamkov, which delivered the main blow to the southwest, before the war consisted of the 3rd and 14th cavalry divisions of the Red Army. These cavalry divisions were strong both in composition and in the number of personnel (wartime staff - about 9 thousand people), as well as in equipment (the staff included 64 BT tanks, divisional, regimental anti-aircraft artillery).

Awarded in November 1939 for participation in liberation campaign to Western Ukraine with the Order of Lenin, the formations of the 5th Cavalry Corps had the following composition: 3rd cavalry regiment - 34th, 60th, 99th, 158th cavalry regiment, 44th tank regiment; 14 cd - 31, 76, 92, 129th cavalry regiment, 29th tank regiment.

However, at the time of the counterattack, in addition to the command and control, the cavalry corps included only one cavalry division, and even then it was not in in full force. Therefore, this formation was reinforced by the battle group (detachment) of General F.N. Matykin and the motorized regiment of the 16th mechanized corps.

Before the war, the 6th Rifle Corps of Major General I. I. Alekseev consisted of the 41st, 97th and 159th Rifle Divisions, the 209th and 229th Corps Artillery Regiments. Despite the fact that all rifle divisions were of “main composition” (that is, according to the staff, 4/100 had at least 10,300 people. - Note auto), the 6th Rifle Corps had already been in battles with the Germans and suffered significant losses in personnel.

It was decided that the actions of the 6th Rifle and 5th Cavalry Corps would be led directly by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko. He was ordered to move with his headquarters from Pereyaslavl to Boguslav and by the end of the day to firmly take control of the troops transferred to his disposal.

On the morning of July 15, General Kostenko summoned the head of the operational department of the Southwestern Front, Colonel I. Kh. Bagramyan, to the apparatus. He asked to report to the front commander that it was necessary to postpone the start of the offensive by at least one or two days: after all, the 5th Cavalry Corps was assembled, as they say, “from forest to pine,” from scattered units that still need to be pulled together from different places into one area .

“It’s nine o’clock now,” said the general, “and I’m ordered to take Fastov and Popelnya today.” Explain that this is impossible. I still don’t know where my corps are and whether they will be able to go on the offensive.

Kostenko has always been distinguished by his diligence. And Bagramyan understood that only the unreality of the received order forced him to make such a request. General Kirponos was in Kyiv at that time, and the head of the operations department promised Kostenko to talk with the chief of staff, since the order was signed by him.

However, the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, decisively rejected all the arguments and confirmed the original order.

It was still not possible to organize the offensive of the 26th Army that day. Only the 6th Rifle Corps and the combined border detachment (94th border detachment, 6th and 16th motorized rifle regiments), which had 3 artillery pieces and 2 light tanks. And they had no time for attacks: they were holding back the onslaught of the 9th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

When it became clear that only these small forces came into contact with the enemy on July 15, the front commander had to give the 26th Army a new order. The start of the offensive was postponed until the next morning. According to this order, by the end of the day, Soviet troops were to reach the line of Fastov, Krasnolesi, Dulitskoye (south of Fastov). Once again an impossible task was set. After all, this meant in a day not only to defeat the advancing enemy tank and motorized divisions, but also to advance several tens of kilometers to the northwest. The necessary forces and means to complete this task were still not available. Although Kostenko’s 26th Army was transferred from the front reserve to the 64th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General A.D. Kuleshov (165th, 175th Rifle Divisions, 394th, 596th Corps Artillery Regiments), so far everyone has fought with the enemy the same weakened rifle corps and border guards. F.N. Matykin’s detachment had not yet approached the front line, and the 64th Rifle Corps had an even longer journey ahead - it arrived from the North Caucasus District and was located on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Throwing it across the river and pulling it to the battlefield in the face of incessant enemy air strikes was a very difficult task and took time.

Neither 15, nor 16, nor even 17 July, the reserves transferred to the commander of Army 26 had time to reach the starting line, and without them it was simply impossible to launch a counterattack.

During this period, in the Kozatin area, the enemy further pushed the right-flank units of the 6th Army to the southwest, and the position of the 16th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army became simply “overcritical.” Disappointing news also came from the 12th Army - German tanks They broke through the front in four places and rushed to Zhmerinka and Vinnitsa.

Having learned about this, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal S. M. Budenny, demanded decisive action from the front-line command and ordered, first of all, to throw all our aviation against the advancing enemy troops. At the same time, he announced that he was transferring three reserve rifle divisions, which were heading to the Cherkassy and Kanev areas along railway.

When Kirponos was informed of the newly received order from the commander-in-chief, he became even more gloomy and immediately connected by telephone with the commander of the front air force (Lieutenant General of Aviation F.A. Astakhov. - Note auto).

Comrade Astakhov! On the left wing of the front, the situation has become sharply complicated, Colonel Bagramyan will report to you about this in detail. Gather everything you can and strike at the enemy tank columns near Bila Tserkva and northeastern Kozatin. Detain them. The main task is to disrupt the enemy maneuver.

After hanging up, Kirponos said quietly, as if thinking out loud:

And those three divisions that the commander-in-chief handed over will not arrive soon. By this time, the enemy will push our 6th Army even further to the south. Kleist will probably try to break through to the Dnieper. Consequently, the arriving divisions will have to be used to cover the crossings: after all, with the withdrawal of the 6th Army, the approaches to the Dnieper are completely exposed.

The next day, General Astakhov sent most of his bombers and attack aircraft against the enemy groups that had broken through. They made their way through the screens of enemy fighters and attacked tank columns, but, naturally, could not stop the enemy, who launched an offensive along almost the entire front.

On July 17, a detachment of General F.N. Matykin, after a bold attack, broke into Fastov. In a fierce battle, our troops defeated German units and captured the city. The battle for Bila Tserkva broke out with renewed vigor. The enemy barely repulsed the attacks of the 6th Rifle Corps. Having brought up reserves, the Germans resumed their offensive. General Kostenko had to think not about the return of Bila Tserkva, but about how to maintain positions east of the city. The divisions of the corps and units of the combined border detachment, as before, with the greatest fortitude repelled the onslaught of enemy tanks and motorized infantry. Once again, the border guards who stood to the death between Fastov and Bila Tserkva covered themselves with immortal glory. Many of them fell from enemy bullets, were killed under the tracks of tanks, but the survivors continued to fight.

By July 18, the gap between the right-flank divisions of the 6th Army and the 6th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army reached almost a hundred kilometers. Enemy troops flowed into this new gap in a continuous stream. After the report on the state of affairs, General Kirponos sat for a long time over the map. Outwardly, as always, he was calm, but excitement was evident in his even, dull voice:

It is urgently necessary to report to the commander-in-chief (South-Western direction. - Note auto). There can be no further delay in withdrawing the armies.

But General Kirponos himself never dared to approach Headquarters with a proposal to withdraw troops beyond the Dnieper.

It was known that S. M. Budyonny was already very concerned about the position of the troops of the left wing of the Southwestern Front. Even at night, General A.I. Shtromberg from Budyonny’s headquarters conveyed to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front that the commander-in-chief telegraphed to Headquarters: there are no reserves in the 6th and 12th armies at all, and the divisions are so depleted that they can hardly hold their occupied line; there is nothing to prevent the flow around the flanks of the armies; If we do not begin to retreat, our troops will be surrounded.

Only on July 18, when the 11th German Army had already crossed the Dniester near Mogilev-Podolsk and Soroki (in Moldova), the Headquarters itself realized the danger of a two-way envelopment of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts. She ordered the withdrawal of the 6th, 12th and 18th armies, but not beyond the Dnieper, but to the line Belaya Tserkov, Kitai-Gorod, Gaisin, which is 100 km or more west of this river. Army General I.V. Tyulenev, who commanded the Southern Front, was instructed to send the 2nd mechanized corps (10 KV, 46 T-34, 275 BT-7, 38 T-26, 9 chemical tanks, 13 T-37) to the Uman region /38 on July 17, 1941) in order to detain the enemy in the event of a breakthrough to the rear of the troops of the Southern Front.

At 16:40, General Sharokhin from the General Staff conveyed to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front a directive from Headquarters: during three night marches, withdraw the 6th and 12th armies so that by the morning of July 21 they would occupy the front of Belaya Tserkov, Tetiev, Kitay-Gorod. In three nights the troops had to cover 60–90 kilometers.

The decision was clearly half-hearted, but it was too late, since on July 18, Soviet troops abandoned Bila Tserkva, and a significant part of the planned withdrawal line of the 6th, 12th and 18th armies was already in the hands of the Germans. On July 21, Kleist's divisions approached Tarashcha and Uman, having managed to deeply envelop the main forces of the 6th and 12th armies. The commander of the Southwestern Front, General Kirponos, ordered the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, to continue attacks to the southwest to ensure the withdrawal of the 6th and 12th armies.

Between the armies of the left wing and the front headquarters there was a wide strip occupied by the enemy. There was no wire connection with them. But the headquarters of the Southwestern Front did not dare to transmit such an important order by radio. Therefore, Generals Panyukhov and Podlas flew to army headquarters.

Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the left-flank armies, the Headquarters demanded that the command of the Southwestern Front launch coordinated attacks from the north, reach the Zhitomir, Kazatin, Tetiev line and thereby close the gap and restore a common front with the retreating troops. If we could solve this problem, then it would be possible to eliminate the danger both for Kyiv and for the armies of our left wing of the front. But this required incomparably more forces than the Soviet command had at its disposal. On the morning of July 19, the offensive began. The 5th Army, striking with part of its forces along the Korosten-Zhitomir highway, moved towards Chernyakhov. The 27th Rifle Corps resumed attacks south of Radomyshl. The 26th Army, with one division of the 64th Rifle Corps and a detachment of General F.N. Matykin, struck from the Fastov area to the north-west, towards the 27th Rifle Corps, and with two divisions of the 5th Cavalry Corps - towards Tarasha. The 6th Rifle Corps had no time to attack that day. His divisions had to repel fierce attacks from enemy tank and motorized formations.

Although the forces participating in the counterattack were not enough, in the following days the fighting along the entire front near Kiev became very fierce. Our troops persistently attacked in some areas, and responded to enemy pressure with counterattacks in others. The front line on the left flank of the 5th Army and in the zone of action of the 27th Rifle Corps was constantly moving in one direction or the other. Here 3 army corps of the 6th German Army were pinned down. The German command later had to transfer here from the Berdichev area the fourth corps in a row - the 55th Army.

The battles also developed successfully in the zone of the 26th Army. True, our actions here were complicated by the fact that due to the violation of secrecy measures by the army headquarters, the enemy learned about the impending counterattack a day before. The command of Army Group South was so concerned about the information about the upcoming offensive of the Soviet 26th Army that German Headquarters became aware of it. Colonel General Halder (Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. - Note auto) wrote in his diary: “The actions of the command of Army Group South are constrained by the anticipation of the upcoming offensive of the 26th Army.”

The enemy hastily turned motorized and tank divisions, which had previously been concentrated near Kyiv, to this direction. And yet, a decisive blow from the troops of our 26th Army forced him to retreat. The greatest success was achieved by two divisions of the 5th Cavalry Corps, led by experienced Major General F.V. Kamkov. In the Tarashchi area they surrounded and defeated significant forces German troops.

The counterattack of General Kostenko’s troops, despite its limited results (this is partly explained by the fact that the Soviet command failed to create a powerful group and the formations were scattered over a 100-kilometer area), brought great benefits. Halder, who continued to closely monitor events in the Kyiv area, noted with annoyance: “The main forces of the 1st Panzer Group are still constrained by the attacks of the 26th Army...”

The troops of the Southwestern Front were unable to complete the task of reaching the target line, closing the gap and closing the flanks of the 26th and 6th armies. Part of the tank and motorized divisions of General Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, not constrained by our counterattack, continued to advance along the retreat route of the 6th Army. Instead of moving east, to Bila Tserkva, its divisions were forced to deviate to the southeast, moving further and further away from the rest of the front forces. At the same time, the 6th Army unwittingly pushed its neighbor, the 12th Army, to the southeast, as a result of which there was not a rapprochement, but a further divergence of the two front groupings. It took a lot of resourcefulness and tenacity to fend off threats from the front and rear. On July 22, for example, when the 49th Rifle Corps of the 6th Army, covered from the front by units of the 16th Mechanized Corps, approached Oratov (southwest of Tetiev), this place was already captured by the enemy. The troops of the 49th Corps of General I. A. Kornilov decisively attacked German group, capturing 100 cars, 300 motorcycles and 80 prisoners. And at this time, the 80th Rifle Division of General V.I. Prokhorov of the neighboring 37th Rifle Corps broke into the town of Osichka and destroyed a large German headquarters there. It was under these conditions that the retreat of the 6th Army continued. It was no easier for the troops of the 12th Army, whose left flank also remained under threat of being outflanked all the time.

The attacks of the 26th Army until July 25 pinned down Kleist's main forces (3rd and 14th motorized corps), but the formations of the 48th corps managed to leave the battle on July 20th and move to Uman. By the end of the same day, they reached the Monastyrische area, in other words, to the rear of the 6th and 12th armies. Only the units of the 2nd Mechanized Corps under Lieutenant General Yu. V. Novoselsky who arrived in time did not allow the 48th Corps to connect with the 17th Army and encircle the Soviet troops east of Vinnitsa. The introduction of the 2nd Mechanized Corps into battle was also due to the German offensive in the defense zone of the Southern Front.

On July 21, the 11th and 16th tank divisions, as well as units of the SS division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” from the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht broke into the territory of the Cherkasy region. They approached Uman from the north and created a threat to capture the Khristinovka station, where there were up to 1 thousand wounded waiting for evacuation, ammunition and fuel depots. A threat was created to the right flank and rear of the 18th Army of the Southern Front. To eliminate it, the commander of the Southern Front from the Khristinovka area launched a counterattack on July 22 against the Uman enemy group with 2 MK forces, which were transferred here from Kotovsk on an accelerated march.

The 2nd Mechanized Corps of the Red Army as a whole was a combat-ready formation, consisting of the 11th and 16th tank divisions, 15th motorized division, 6th motorcycle regiment, 182nd separate communications battalion, 49th separate motorized engineering battalion , 102nd Independent Aviation Squadron, 243rd Field Post Office. On July 20, 1941, the corps included 358 tanks (10 KV, 46 T-34, 215 BT, 87 T-26) and 168 armored vehicles. However, the equipment of the 11th and 16th tank divisions moving to Uman turned out to be scattered along the entire 200 km route and they had to enter the battle on the move, which, of course, weakened the power of the 2nd mechanized corps.

From July 22 to July 29, 1941, formations of the 2nd mechanized corps of the Red Army fought fierce battles with units of the approaching 9th and 11th tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, advancing from the area (as of July 29, 1941 - Note auto) Ivanovka, Justingrad with the support of 200 tanks, aircraft and infantry, holding back the German offensive on the positions of the 6th and 12th armies.

By the end of the month, it seemed that the limit had been reached. The enemy attacked from various directions. His aircraft literally committed atrocities, meeting almost no resistance. The state of logistics was well reflected in reports on the rear of the headquarters of the Southern Front: “The supply of ammunition and fuel is close to zero, there are absolutely no mountain and corps artillery rounds, the remaining artillery rounds are 5-10 pieces. for the gun, there is no fuel, fuel and lubricants - 0.25 refueling. There is no fuel connection for tanks and aircraft. Attempts over the last 2 days to supply supplies by road transport were not successful, and supply by air was also unsuccessful.”

The threat of encirclement loomed over the 6th and 12th armies. As of July 21, they included 24 divisions, 1 airborne and 2 anti-tank artillery brigades. Since the beginning of the war, during fierce battles and long marches, both armies have lost 46,844 people, 27,667 of whom were missing. People's strength was running out, units were irregularly supplied with bread, and there was no need to talk about other products. Uniforms and shoes were very worn, some soldiers were barefoot.

And 13 divisions and 4 brigades acted against them. Unfortunately, German historians do not even mention the number of their troops on this section of the front. Authors of the work " German Reich and the Second World War” refer, for example, to the report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army (OKH) to Hitler on July 23. It stated that the combat capabilities of infantry divisions had decreased by an average of 20%, and tank and motorized divisions by 50%. Based on these data, it can be assumed that by the beginning Uman operation German divisions alone, excluding Slovak and Hungarian brigades, as well as reserve units of the main command, could number over 100 thousand people, about 3 thousand guns and mortars, and more than 200 tanks.

The mobile corps (“Mobile Corps” of the Hungarian Army - Gyorshadtest), which participated in the Uman operation, included the 1st motorized brigade (1st, 2nd, 3rd motorized infantry battalions, 9th tank battalion, 10th bicycle battalion , 1st reconnaissance battalion, 1st motorized artillery group), 2nd motorized brigade (4th, 5th, 6th motorized infantry battalions, 11th tank battalion, 12th bicycle battalion, 2nd reconnaissance battalion, 2 1st motorized artillery group), 1st cavalry brigade (3rd, 4th cavalry regiments, armored cavalry squadron, 14th bicycle battalion, 1st cavalry motorized artillery group), 2nd cavalry brigade (1st, 2nd cavalry regiments, 15th, 16th bicycle battalions, 2nd cavalry motorized artillery group).

Tank battalions had 3 tank companies of 18 vehicles each, with the 1st company considered a training reserve. The armored cavalry squadron had 2 mixed companies with CV 3/35 tankettes and Toldi-I light tanks. In total, the “mobile corps” consisted of 81 Toldi-I tanks in the first line. This formation was under the operational command of the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht.

As part of Army Group South in July-August 1941, there was also a Slovak mobile group (later the mobile brigade - Rychle Divizje), consisting of tank, motorized infantry and engineer battalions, as well as an artillery division. The tank battalion included 2 companies (30) of light tanks LTvz.35, as well as several light tanks LTvz.38 (Pz.Kpfw.38(t) Ausf.S) and LTvz.40 (the latter were equipped only with machine guns).

Soviet troops by July 20 they had about 130 thousand people, more than a thousand guns and mortars, 384 tanks. To this it should be added that the air was completely dominated by German aviation. The enemy's supply had so far been fairly tolerable, while the Soviet troops were in dire need of vehicles, which means they lacked the most necessary things for battle - ammunition and fuel.

To ensure the fulfillment of the task set by the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 6th and 12th armies (commanders, respectively, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko and Major General P.G. Ponedelin) launched strikes in the eastern direction - towards the 26th Army. According to the German command, their actions were organized and caused considerable damage to Kleist’s tank divisions. Concerned about the state of affairs, he himself arrived at the 48th Corps and additionally reinforced it with two infantry divisions and a motorized regiment from the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler unit.

Increased enemy resistance, heavy losses and lack of ammunition forced generals Muzychenko and Ponedelin to stop the offensive. The situation was becoming critical. General P. G. Ponedelin, who led the cut-off troops, reported to the Front Military Council: “The situation is amazing... The army troops are in extremely difficult condition and on the verge of complete loss of combat capability.” The divisions had no more than a quarter of their regular artillery left, and each division had only 1 to 4 thousand people. The troops and rear of the two armies were mixed up, many wounded accumulated in the rear, fortunately, evacuated (3,620 people) by the time the enemy ring closed on August 2.

On the morning of July 25, the commander of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny sent a telegram to the Chief of the General Staff with the following content: “All attempts of the 6th and 12th armies to break through to the east and northeast were unsuccessful. The situation requires the fastest possible withdrawal of these armies in a south-eastern direction. For this purpose, I consider it necessary to reassign the 6th and 12th armies to the commander of the Southern Front and demand that he withdraw them to the Talnoe, Khristinovka, and Uman areas. In addition to the need to organize interaction between the 6th and 12th armies with the right flank of the Southern Front, this event is caused by the need to improve logistics management. I ask Headquarters to authorize this decision.”

The response from Headquarters, as usually happened when the solution to the issue fell into the hands of G.K. Zhukov, followed immediately: to transfer the 6th and 12th armies to the Southern Front.

On the same day, Army General I.V. Tyulenev (commander of the Southern Front) received an order to withdraw the armies to the line of Zvenigorodka, Talnoe, Khristinovka, Uman, that is, to fight their way to the east. Thus, they had to break through the divisions of the 48th Motorized Corps and the formations attached to it. At the same time, in the southeast, at the junction with the 18th Army of the Southern Front, there remained almost 100 km of space not yet occupied by the enemy. It could be used to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies. But the command of the South-Western direction, like Headquarters, did not take advantage of this circumstance and still demanded to break through to the east. In turn, General Tyulenev strove to exactly fulfill the task set by Moscow: to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies to the east. But after July 26, this task lost all meaning, since due to lack of strength, Kostenko’s army stopped attacks towards the retreating troops.

The transfer of the 6th and 12th armies to the Southern Front had a detrimental effect on their fate. On the third day after their formal subordination to Tyulenev, the headquarters of the Southern Front reported to Headquarters: “It is impossible to establish the exact position of the units of the 6th and 12th armies due to lack of communication...” The situation in the area of operation of the transferred armies could only be clarified on the 29th.

Ignorance of the situation was the reason for subsequent wrong decisions. In fact, the directive signed by General Tyulenev on the evening of July 28 repeated the task assigned to the 6th and 12th armies by Headquarters back on July 25. And in general, the command of the Southern Front was more concerned about the fate of its 18th Army, on the flanks of which the enemy threatened a breakthrough. Unfortunately, the Headquarters also underestimated the danger of encircling the armies of Muzychenko and Ponedelin, believing that the enemy was trying to push them south in order to seize crossings on the Dnieper, between Kiev and Cherkassy, for a further attack on the Donbass. In this regard, on July 28, she demanded that the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts not allow the enemy to reach the Dnieper. And the enemy continued to overwhelm the loop from the east and southwest, without weakening the onslaught from the north and west.

The stubborn resistance of General Ponedelin's troops in the Uman region delayed Kleist's divisions for almost eight days. He failed to encircle the Soviet troops with a blow towards the 17th Army. Meanwhile, Kleist feared that, retreating to the southeast, they might avoid encirclement. On July 29, he ordered the 48th Motorized Corps, bypassing Uman from the east, to advance on Pervomaisk. The corresponding task was assigned to the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps by the commander of the 17th Army, General Stülpnagel: the corps turned to the southeast. This enemy maneuver seemed to give Soviet troops precious time to eliminate the threat of encirclement and reach the southeast.

The command of the Southern Front missed this last opportunity provided by fate. It still required the 6th and 12th armies to retreat to the east.

August 1 was a turning point in the Battle of Uman. In the morning, Generals P. G. Ponedelin and I. N. Muzychenko reported by radio to the Front Military Council and Headquarters: “The situation has become critical. The encirclement of the 6th and 12th armies is complete. There is a direct threat of the disintegration of the general battle formation of the 6th and 12th armies into two isolated centers with the centers of Babanka and Teklievka. There are no reserves. We ask you to clear the Ternovka, Novo-Arkhangelsk area with the introduction of new forces. There is no ammunition. Fuel is running out." By this time, the 26th Army had retreated beyond the Dnieper, holding the Rzhishchevsky and Kanevsky bridgeheads on its right bank. The 18th Army, the southern neighbor of Ponedelin’s group, also began to retreat to the southeast. Pala Uman. Most of the 2nd Mechanized Corps, based on the directive of the commander of the Southern Front KA No. 0024/op dated July 25, 1941, was also withdrawn from the battle. As of July 31, the 2nd Mechanized Corps had 147 tanks and armored vehicles: 1 KV, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flamethrower tanks, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20. However, a significant part of the armored vehicles of the 11th Tank Division of Major General G.I. Kuzmin (at least 50 tanks and armored vehicles) remained in the enemy ring. In addition to parts of the 2nd mechanized corps, the remnants of the 16th mechanized corps, which on July 31 included 5 T-28s, 11 BA-10s, and one BA-20, were cut off from the main forces.

On August 2, on the Sinyukha River, near Dobryanka, the 1st Panzer Group and the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht closed the encirclement ring, and the next day the 16th Panzer Division and the Hungarian Corps united in Pervomaisk, creating another ring. However, the command of the Southern Front did not even think that its troops found themselves in a double “cauldron”. Believing that Ponedelin was opposed from the east only by tank and motorized divisions, General Tyulenev ordered him “to destroy the enemy who had broken through with active actions in the eastern direction, to occupy and firmly hold the line of Zvenigorodka, Brodetsky, Novo-Arkhangelsk, Ternovka, Krasnopolye.” In reality, against Ponedelin’s group only from the east were two corps of the 1st Panzer Group consisting of six divisions, as well as two infantry divisions, attacking, and from the west and north-west - part of the forces of the 6th Army, formations of the 17th Army and the Hungarian movable body.

Since August 4, the surrounded people were completely left to their own devices. True, the command of the Southern Front tried to airlift ammunition to them, but, according to the testimony of the Germans who took part in the battles near Uman, a significant part of the dropped cargo fell into their hands. The group's command did not lose control of the troops and persistently tried to break out of the encirclement. The most decisive and successful actions were on the night of August 6: the 12th Army made its way to the east, and the 6th to the south. However, the enemy grouping, especially in the south, was so deep that it was impossible to overcome it with such small forces. Desperate attacks in the early hours of the morning, and even in the pouring rain, led the Germans into confusion for some time, which allowed the Soviet troops to advance several kilometers. But the Germans soon came to their senses: the attackers, under pressure from superior forces, had to turn back to the Podvysokoye area with heavy losses. And here they continued to fight. The historian of the 49th Mountain Infantry Corps, whose divisions experienced the fierce attacks of those surrounded near Uman, wrote that the enemy, “despite the hopeless situation, did not think about captivity.”

Near settlement Babanka units of the 11th Panzer Division of the Red Army took their last battle. Those who escaped the encirclement saw more than 50 of our tanks and armored vehicles in this area. Damaged and burned, they stood facing west. Near them were many of our dead tankers and infantrymen.

The last attempt was made on the night of August 7. Soviet troops managed to break through the defenses of the 1st Mountain Infantry and 24th Infantry Divisions. The German command turned the 16th Motorized Division and the SS Westland Regiment to the direction of the breakthroughs. During the day, the resistance was mostly broken, although even before August 13, in the forest east of Kopenkovatoe, according to the Germans, a group of commanders and Red Army soldiers continued to fight.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to restore the true scale of losses of Soviet troops in the battle of Uman due to the lack of documents. It is only known that on July 20, the 6th and 12th armies numbered 129.5 thousand people. And according to the headquarters of the Southern Front, on August 11, 11 thousand people managed to escape encirclement, mainly from the rear units. Judging by German sources, 103 thousand Soviet Red Army soldiers and 46 commanders were captured near Uman, and the number of killed Russians, according to daily reports from the Wehrmacht High Command, reached 200 thousand people.

It follows from this that the information currently available to historians is very contradictory, but, be that as it may, the tragedy that unfolded near Uman resonated with deep pain in the hearts of many Soviet people who lost their relatives and friends there. The southwestern direction lost two armies. Their commanders, generals P.G. Ponedelin and I.N. Muzychenko, 4 corps commanders and 11 division commanders were captured. 2 corps commanders and 6 division commanders were killed. But the enemy’s losses, by his own admission, were unexpectedly great. Unfortunately, the author does not have information about the total losses of German troops near Uman; it is known that the 4th Mountain Infantry Division alone lost 1,778 people killed.

The fate of those captured near Uman is tragic. They were first placed behind barbed wire in the open air and only with the onset of winter were they transferred to unheated barracks. Those who still managed to survive the hell of fascist captivity, after the end of the war, had to drink another bitter cup - upon returning to their homeland.

The fate of Major General P. G. Ponedelin is indicative in this regard. In August 1941, when Stalin learned that the commander of the 12th Army had surrendered, he ordered his trial. Ponedelin was sentenced to death in absentia.

The order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army No. 270, signed on August 16, is directly related to the tragedy near Uman. Contrary to the truth, it said that Ponedelin “had every opportunity to break through to his own, as did the overwhelming majority of parts of his army. Ponedelin did not show the necessary persistence and will to win, succumbed to panic, became cowardly and surrendered to the enemy, deserted to the enemy, thus committing a crime before the Motherland as a violator of the military oath.”

After the war, General Ponedelin was again in prison, this time in his homeland, and five years later he was shot. The pretext was a note he wrote during the first days of captivity in the Rivne prison. In it, the former commander showed the position and number of his troops on August 4–5, 1941, but this information had already lost any value for German command.

A similar fate befell the commander of the 13th Rifle Corps, General N.K. Kirillov, also noted in order No. 270.

On the afternoon of August 7, in Berdichev, Rundstedt’s headquarters, where Hitler and Antonescu, the commander-in-chief of the Romanian troops, were at that time, received a message about the victory near Uman. The Fuhrer rejoiced. To celebrate, he presented Antonescu with the highest military award - the Knight's Cross and assured him that even before the onset of autumn bad weather, German troops would have time to capture the most important centers of the USSR, including Moscow and Leningrad.

Bagramyan I. Kh. This is how we went to victory. M., Voenizdat, 1988, p. 136.

Munzel O. Panzer-Taktik. Nekargemuend, 1959, s. 71, 72.

TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 2539, no. 36, pp. 205, 206.

Steets H. Gebirgsjaeger bei Uman, s. 91.

TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 701, no. 47, pp. 55, 56, 74, 75.

TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 701, d. 58, l. 139.

Das Deutshe Reich und der Zweit Weltkrieg, Bd. 4, s. 485; Haupt W. Kiew - die groesste kesselschacht der Geschichte. Bad Nauheim, 1964, s. 15.

Battle of Uman



	German victory


Commanders
S. M. Budyonny M. P. Kirponos I. V. Tyulenev I. N. Muzychenko P. G. Ponedelin	Gerd von Rundstedt Ewald von Kleist Karl von Stülpnagel Werner Kempf
Strengths of the parties
6th Army, 12th Army, separate units of the 26th Army and 18th Army	48th Motorized Corps of the Kleist Tank Group 17th Army

About 65 thousand people and 242 tanks were surrounded. From August 1 to 8, up to 11,000 people and 1,015 vehicles with military equipment emerged from the encirclement. According to German (probably inflated) data, 103 thousand prisoners and 317 tanks were captured.	Based on 10 days of reports on their own losses, the Germans lost (17A, 1TA) for 07.20-08.10.41: Killed: 4610 Sanitary losses: 15458 Prisoners/missing: 785 Total losses: 20853

Battle of Uman(late July - early August 1941) occurred during the offensive of Army Group South. Led to the encirclement and subsequent death of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front and individual parts Southern Front of the Red Army.

Previous Events

In the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group South, moving east, occupied the cities of Lvov (June 30), Ternopil, Vinnitsa and Zhitomir (July 10). During the battle near Lutsk - Rivne - Brody, units of the 4th, 15th and 16th, as well as the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps of the Red Army, from the Southwestern Front, were defeated. These groups of corps attacked the advancing Wehrmacht troops in the area of the city of Dubno from the south and north, respectively. However, despite superiority in tanks, these attacks were unsuccessful. In terms of the number of armored vehicles, the clash was comparable only to the Battle of Kursk. By June 29, the battle was over and German troops continued their offensive.

On July 10, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred overall command of the Red Army units operating in the South-Western direction to Budyonny. His task was to coordinate the actions of the two fronts. Thus, under the command of Budyonny there were troops with a total number of about 1.5 million people, concentrated in the areas of Uman and Kyiv. However, Budyonny barely had time to take command when the 1st Tank Group, under the command of Kleist, wedged between these groups, occupying Berdichev (July 15) and Kazatin (July 16). Thus, parts of Kleist ended up north of Uman. At the same time, Uman was bypassed from the south by the 17th Wehrmacht Army (commander - General Stülpnagel). In addition, from the south, from the border with Romania, the 11th Army under the command of General von Schobert was advancing on Uman.

Actions of the parties

Headquarters and the command of the Southern Front mistakenly assumed that the Germans intended to reach the Dnieper between Kiev and Cherkassy with the aim of further attacking Donbass, and underestimated the danger of encirclement. On July 28, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts received orders to retreat to the east in order to cut off the Germans’ access to the Dnieper. As a result, the opportunity to avoid encirclement by retreating to the southeast was lost.

On August 2, Kleist's group linked up with the 17th Army, completing the encirclement. The next day, the encirclement was reinforced by a second ring formed by the 16th Panzer Division and the Hungarian Corps. By August 8, the resistance of the surrounded units of the Red Army had generally ceased. German troops were given the opportunity to conduct an operation to encircle the Southwestern Front.

Consequences

20 divisions of the 6th and 12th armies from the Southern Front were surrounded. Their commanders, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko and Major General P.G. Ponedelin, were captured. Also captured were:

commander of the 49th Rifle Corps S. Ya. Ogurtsov
commander of the 13th Rifle Corps N.K. Kirillov
8th Rifle Corps M. G. Snegov
commander of the 16th mechanized corps A. D. Sokolov
commander of the 80th Red Banner Donetsk Division, Major General V. I. Prokhorov
Chief of Staff of the 192nd Mountain Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel Svechnikov Vasily Ivanovich

commander of the 44th tank division V. P. Krymov
commander of the 8th tank division P. S. Fotchenkov
Commander of the 24th Mechanized Corps, Major General V. I. Chistyakov

Soviet prisoners of war were placed in a concentration camp created on the territory of a quarry near the city of Uman, unofficially called the “Uman pit” ( on the picture). Many died there due to poor living conditions. In the battlefields and in the camp, the Germans and their accomplices shot Jewish prisoners of war, commissars, “political fighters,” the wounded and weakened.

Plan:

1 Previous Events
2 Actions of the parties
3 Consequences

Introduction

Battle of Uman occurred at the end of July - beginning of August 1941, during the offensive of Army Group South of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR. Led to the encirclement and subsequent death of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front and individual units of the Southern Front of the Red Army. Formally, it is part of the Kyiv strategic defensive operation (July 7 - September 26, 1941, Southwestern Front), the Defensive Operation in Moldova (7/1-26/41, Southern Front) and the Tiraspol-Melitopol Defensive Operation (7/27/9/28/41). 41, Southern Front). Accordingly, the losses suffered by the Red Army in the Battle of Uman are included in the statistics of Red Army losses in these 3 operations.

1. Previous events

2. Actions of the parties

On August 2, Kleist's tank group linked up with the 17th Army, completing the encirclement. The next day, the encirclement was reinforced by a second ring formed by the 16th Panzer Division and the Hungarian Corps. By August 8, the resistance of the surrounded units of the Red Army had generally ceased. German troops were given the opportunity to conduct an operation to encircle the Southwestern Front.

3. Consequences

commander of the 49th Rifle Corps S. Ya. Ogurtsov
commander of the 13th Rifle Corps N.K. Kirillov
8th Rifle Corps M. G. Snegov
commander of the 16th mechanized corps A. D. Sokolov
commander of the 80th Red Banner Donetsk Division, Major General V. I. Prokhorov
Chief of Staff of the 192nd Mountain Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Svechnikov

commander of the 44th tank division V. P. Krymov
commander of the 8th tank division P. S. Fotchenkov
Commander of the 24th Mechanized Corps, Major General V. I. Chistyakov

Literature

Christian Zentner: Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, Unipart-Verlag 1986. ISBN 3-8118-1761-2
Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M.: AST; Transitbook, 2004.
Dolmatovsky E. A. Green Brama: A documentary legend about one of the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. M.: Politizdat, 1989.
New recruit V. A. “Notes of a military intelligence officer” (Published in the journal “Military Historical Archive” N: 4(52) −12(60), 2004 - 1(61)-3(63), 2005)
Valentin Runov. 1941. Hitler's victory parade. The truth about the Uman massacre. Series: War and us. Publishers: Yauza, Eksmo, 2010, 416 pp. ISBN 978-5-699-42582-2

Notes

1 2 Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov - M.: AST Publishing House LLC: Transitkniga Publishing House, 2004 - militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av3/.
Sergey Pereslegin. World War II. War between realities. Publisher: Eksmo, Yauza, 2007, 544 pp. ISBN 5-699-15132-X,978-5-699-15132-5. page 121. Circulation: 5000 copies.
Human Losses in World War II Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group, 1941, BA/MA RW 6/556, 6/558 - ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec41.html
Albert Seaton "Russo German War, 1941-45 (Paperback)", Presidio Press; Reprint edition (June 1, 1993) ISBN 0-89141-491-6, ISBN 978-0-89141-491-9
I remember. Heroes of the great Patriotic War. Participants of the Second World War. Book of memory. - Mortar men. Adamsky Izo Davydovich. Project I Remember. Hero of the Second World War - www.iremember.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=390&Itemid=21

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Battle of Uman (late July - early August 1941). Occurred during the offensive of Army Group South. Led to the encirclement and subsequent death of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front and individual units of the Southern Front of the Red Army

Map of military operations at the end of July - beginning of August 1941. The yellow circle shows the area of encirclement of the 6th and 12th armies near Uman

Previous events.
In the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group South, moving east, occupied the cities of Lviv (June 30), Ternopil, Vinnitsa and Zhitomir (July 10). During the battle near Lutsk-Rovno-Brody, units of the 4th, 15th and 16th, as well as the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps of the Red Army, from the Southwestern Front, were defeated. These groups of corps attacked the advancing Wehrmacht troops in the area of Dubno from the south and north, respectively. However, despite superiority in tanks, these attacks were unsuccessful. PIn terms of the number of armored vehicles, the clash was comparable only to the Battle of Kursk. By June 29, the battle was over and German troops continued their offensive.
On July 10, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred overall command of the Red Army units operating in the South-Western direction to Budyonny. His task was to coordinate the actions of the two fronts. Thus, under the command of Budyonny there were troops totaling about 1.5 million people, concentrated in the areas of Uman and Kyiv. However, Budyonny barely had time to take command when the 1st Tank Group, under the command of Kleist, wedged between these groups, occupying Berdichev (July 15) and Kazatin (July 16). Thus, parts of Kleist ended up north of Uman. At the same time, Uman was bypassed from the south by the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - General Stülpnagel). In addition, from the south, from the border with Romania, the 11th Army under the command of General Schobert was advancing on Uman.

Fighting surrounded is one of the hardest jobs for a soldier.

Actions of the parties.
Headquarters and the command of the Southern Front mistakenly assumed that the Germans intended to reach the Dnieper between Kiev and Cherkassy with the aim of further attacking Donbass, and underestimated the danger of encirclement.
On July 23, by order of the commander of the Southwestern Front, the 6th and 12th armies were united under the overall command of General P.G. Monday.
On July 25 they became part of the Southern Front. From an operational point of view, this was quite expedient, since our troops fought shoulder to shoulder with the troops of this front and were far from the main forces of the Southwestern Front. In the evening of the same day, a directive was received from the commander of the Southern Front troops about the withdrawal of the 6th and 12th armies to the Zvenigorodka, Khristinovka, Teplik line.
From July 26 to July 30, the troops of these armies, covered on three sides, fought heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces and retreated to the Novo-Arkhangelsk, Krasnopolka, Peregonovka line, with the city of Uman at the center of their operational formation. During these days, our small but strong-willed formations and units not only pinned down significant enemy forces, but also inflicted great damage on them. The fighting was furious and brutal. Many items changed hands several times.

In all-round defense

On July 31, fascist German troops managed to close the encirclement. On the night of August 1, by order of the front commander, the troops of Ponedelin’s group left Uman and retreated to the line of the Sinyukha River. On the morning of August 1, a combat order was received by radio to firmly hold this line. Having received the order to switch to a tough all-round defense, the group’s troops dug deep into the ground, strengthened and camouflaged their positions, set up anti-tank barriers, in a word, prepared to give the enemy a worthy rebuff. The Nazis sought to dismember the group’s defenses. However, all their attempts, despite their multiple numerical superiority, invariably ended in failure.
On August 4, the group received a combat order by radio from the commander of the Southern Front, I.V. Tyuleneva: “Organize a way out of the encirclement using our own resources.”
Part of the forces escaped the encirclement, but the enemy closed the gap with strong counterattacks, and by the middle of the day on August 5, he had significantly narrowed the encirclement. It was decided that the remaining forces would again try to get out of the encirclement, in a northerly direction with a further turn to the east. If an organized breakthrough fails, destroy heavy material, vehicles and make your way to your own in small groups.

Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko (1901-1970) commanded the 6th Army in 1941. In August 1941, near Uman, the 6th and 12th armies of the Southern Front were surrounded. While trying to escape the encirclement, Army Commander Muzychenko was wounded and captured. Until 1945 he was in German captivity, April 29, 1945 liberated by American troops.

The troops of the 6th and 12th armies in these 46-day intense battles contributed to the disruption of the “lightning war” plan with their heroic military actions. fascist Germany. By pinning down a large enemy group, they inflicted enormous damage on him, destroying more than one thousand of the most trained and combat-ready soldiers and officers.
Consequences.
20 divisions of the 6th and 12th armies from the Southern Front were surrounded. Their commandersLieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko and Major General P. G. Ponedelin were captured. Also captured were:commander of the 49th Rifle Corps S. Ya. Ogurtsov, commander of the 13th Rifle Corps N. K. Kirillov, 8th Rifle Corps M. G. Snegov, commander of the 16th Mechanized Corps A. D. Sokolov, commander of the 80th 1st Red Banner Donetsk Division Major General V.I. Prokhorov, Chief of Staff of the 192nd Mountain Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel Svechnikov Vasily Ivanovich
Died: commander of the 44th Tank Division V.P. Krymov, commander of the 8th Tank Division P.S. Fotchenkov, commander of the 24th Mechanized Corps, Major General V.I. Chistyakov.

Soviet prisoners of war were placed in a concentration camp created on the territory of a quarry near the city of Uman, unofficially called the “Uman pit”. Many died there due to poor living conditions. In the battlefields and in the camp, the Germans and their accomplices shot Jewish prisoners of war, commissars, “political fighters,” the wounded and weakened.

The main “cauldrons” of 1941, if we take the largest ones, include Minsk, Smolensk, Uman (which probably few people know about), Kiev, Vyazma, Rzhev, Bryansk, the Sea of Azov (where about a hundred thousand people were surrounded) , Roslavl.

What is a "boiler"? This is a tracing paper from the German “kessel”. In relation to military affairs, a “cauldron” is an encirclement, the entry of military formations into the enemy’s ring.

The “boilers” near Kiev and Vyazma became disasters for the Red Army

It would seem that what’s terrible is if, say, several armies that have tanks, guns, planes, mortars, etc. fall into the “cauldron”, great amount equipment and weapons? The Germans were also surrounded three times during the war. The first time (and quite successfully) was the Demyansk “cauldron”, when they actually defended in this “cauldron” for a year and Theodor Eicke’s “Totenkopf” division demonstrated completely inhuman ability to fight. The second “cauldron” they found themselves in was Stalingrad, where the “Demyan trick” failed because the scale was no longer the same. And the third time the Germans found themselves in the “cauldron” was in 1944, when they finally managed to escape from it - not completely, abandoning a significant part of the equipment, but nevertheless they succeeded.

With us in 1941 and 1942, if you don’t take small “kettles”, only large ones, this happened eight times. Why? Let's start from the very beginning. So, some dry statistics.

A group of Red Army soldiers surrenders near Uman, August 1941

On June 24, Kaunas was quickly captured, and on June 26, Daugavpils. (In fact, no “cauldrons” arose there.) June 28, that is, just six days after the start of the war - Minsk. June 30 - Lviv. And on July 2, that is, literally two days after Lvov, Pskov was already in the “cauldron”. On September 19, Kyiv was surrounded. But before Kyiv there was also the Uman “cauldron”, which we will dwell on separately. Actually, what happened?

We have already said that a “cauldron” is an environment in which an army or several armies find themselves. And it’s as if the enemy forces surrounding them are depriving them of the opportunity to transport ammunition and supplies, disrupting their communications and simply starting to squeeze them. But with competent leadership of the surrounded troops, the “cauldron” plays the role of a kind of magnet, to which certain forces are attracted, blocked and cannot be used by the enemy in other, more or less important directions.

Near Uman, 103 thousand of our soldiers were captured by the Germans

What happened in the “cauldrons” of 1941? The pattern was that in all cases when “cauldrons” were formed, with the exception of one, the high command located in them abandoned their subordinates, as well as the officers, and literally a few days after the group found itself surrounded, it was simply a mass of uncontrollable soldiers whom no one, in fact, tried to take out anywhere. This was the general trend. There were, of course, exceptions: before Kyiv fell, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos died, the circumstances of whose death are not entirely known.

As an example, consider the Uman “cauldron”, which formed before Kyiv was taken. The 48th German motorized corps reached the Uman area on July 20, and a group of German troops began encircling the 6th and 12th armies, commanded by Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko and Major General Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin. In general, the situation was not yet catastrophic: the 26th Army was moving towards them from the east, which was supposed to help them break through this “cauldron”, but nevertheless this did not happen.

Captured Soviet generals Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin and Nikolai Kuzmich Kirillov talk with German officers in the Uman area, August 1941

What were the forces that were in this “cauldron”? 24 divisions in the 6th and 12th armies. 13 divisions and 4 German brigades acted against them. Yes, in addition to these 24 divisions, Muzychenko and Ponedelin also had an airborne and two anti-tank brigades. In general, enough a large number of of people. However, finding themselves in a “cauldron” created by 13 divisions, they were unable to escape from it, despite the fact that the 26th Army tried to break through to their aid from the outside.

German forces numbered 100 thousand people, about 3 thousand guns and mortars and only 200 tanks. Soviet troops had 130 thousand people, more than a thousand guns and mortars and 384 tanks, that is, they had 184 tanks more than the Germans. Nevertheless, the latter somehow managed to close a ring around our troops, and despite all attempts to unblock it, nothing happened.

The most paradoxical thing is that, having received the order to break through to the east, the forces of Muzychenko and Ponedelin could leave this “cauldron”, because in the southeast, at the junction with the 18th Army of the Southern Front, there was an almost hundred-kilometer “corridor” that the Germans did not controlled. However, the army commanders received an order from the higher leadership to break through precisely in the direction that was assigned to them, and, thus, the opportunity to get out of the “cauldron” in a civilized manner was simply lost. Our troops tried to break through where it was impossible - through the 48th Mechanized Corps, which by this time Kleist had strengthened.

August 1 was a turning point in the battle for Uman. The 26th Army retreated beyond the Dnieper, and no one could support these troops, surrounded in a “cauldron.” Well, on August 2, the German 1st Tank Group and the 17th Field Army closed the encirclement ring. Thus, the issue was resolved.

What were the losses in the Uman “cauldron”? On July 20, that is, when the encirclement began, our forces near Uman numbered about 130 thousand people. According to the headquarters of the Southern Front on August 11, only 11 thousand people emerged from the encirclement. That is, out of 130 thousand - only 11 thousand. According to German data, 103 thousand people were captured, including army commanders (Muzychenko and Ponedelin), four corps commanders, and eleven division commanders. These were the sad statistics.

Order No. 270: “Those who surrender to the enemy are considered malicious deserters”

What was the main reason for the formation of “boilers”? Many researchers call the principle of the Headquarters a tough defense. The troops, virtually deprived of contact with the Center, not very well trained, did not show the proper initiative, but received only the instruction - “not a step back, stand to the death.”

On the other hand, this is the attitude of military leaders to their own military duty. Take, for example, the Demyansk “cauldron,” which the Germans held for almost a year. Yes, they are surrounded, yes, it is unpleasant, yes, they have to supply the troops by air, they are hungry, there is not enough ammunition, but the command of the Demyansk group did not run away anywhere, control of the troops was not lost. In our case, the opposite trend was observed: would-be commanders abandoned their troops and ceased to control them. This is what Rokossovsky and other commanders wrote about, who collected “fugitives” and tried to send them back to carry out their immediate duties.

What did we get as a result? In the “cauldron” near Minsk, the Germans captured about 330 thousand people and captured more than 3,300 tanks. Near Roslavl, relatively few people were captured in terms of the scale of that war - 38 thousand, 250 tanks. Near Smolensk - 310 thousand people, 3000 tanks. Near Gomel - 78 thousand people. Near Kiev there are over 600 thousand people (a gigantic figure), almost a thousand tanks, a huge number of guns. In the area of the Azov Sea - 100 thousand people. Near Vyazma - more than 600 thousand people, a large number military equipment. The totality turns out to be monstrous. After a thorough analysis of all sources, it was determined that over 5 million of our military personnel were captured during the war years. The main figure came from 1941, as well as the two “boilers” of 1942.

Soldiers of the SS division "Totenkopf" deliver ammunition on a drag in the forest in the Demyansk "cauldron", 1942

In August 1941, Stalin issued order No. 270 “On the responsibility of military personnel for surrendering and leaving weapons to the enemy,” according to which every commander or political worker was obliged to fight to the last opportunity. Violators of the order could be shot on the spot. At the same time, they were recognized as deserters, and their families were subject to arrest and deprived of all government benefits and support.

"Commanders and political workers<…>those who surrender to the enemy are considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as families of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland.

Oblige all higher commanders and commissars to shoot such deserters on the spot...

The families of Red Army soldiers who surrendered will be deprived of state benefits and assistance.”

By the way, as it turned out later, Stalin turned out to be even kinder, since he did not insert capital punishment into this order. Comrade Zhukov, who bore the nickname “Stalin’s fist,” proposed much cooler solutions. For example, when he commanded the Leningrad Front, he ordered the execution of the families of military personnel who surrendered.

During the Second World War, over 5 million Soviet troops were captured

It is worth mentioning one more reason for the formation of “boilers”. Since until June 1941, during the exercises, mainly the offensive course of operations was practiced, the orders that the troops began to receive in the front-line districts in the first days of the war almost all began with the need to counterattack. That is, there was no ideology of creating a qualified defense and conducting combat operations in defensive conditions.

For the Germans, everything was different. If we recall the same Hans von Luck, a career Wehrmacht officer: a battalion on the offensive - a battalion on the defensive, a regiment on the offensive - a regiment on the defensive, and so on. That is, for German military leaders these are standard things. For our commanders, the state of the encirclement was, of course, a very big surprise, since no one had really prepared for it.