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Battle of Uman occurred at the end of July - beginning of August 1941, during the offensive of the Wehrmacht Army Group South on the territory of the USSR. Led to the encirclement (the so-called “Uman cauldron”) and the subsequent death of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front and individual parts Southern Front of the Red Army.

Previous Events

On July 10, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred overall command of the Red Army units operating in the South-Western direction to Marshal Budyonny. His task was to coordinate the actions of the two fronts. Thus, under the command of Budyonny there were troops with a total number of about 1.5 million people, located in the space from the Polesie swamps to the Black Sea. By this time, the 1st Tank Group, under the command of Kleist, had wedged itself between the 5th and 6th armies of the Southwestern Front, occupying Zhitomir and Berdichev and posing a threat to Kyiv. Thus, Kleist’s units hung over the right flank of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies retreating from the Lvov ledge. At the same time, from the front and from the left flank, these armies experienced continuous pressure from the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - General Stülpnagel). In addition, the 11th Army under the command of General von Schobert was advancing from the south, from the border with Romania. [ ]

Actions of the parties

Failed encirclement near Vinnitsa

At the same time, having broken through the front of the 12th Army at the Letichev-Bar line, the command of the 17th Army tried to encircle and destroy Ponedelin’s troops in the Vinnitsa area. Already July 17 From the south, units of the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division of the 49th (Mountain) Corps approached the city and took the crossing over the Southern Bug under fire. At the same time, the 4th Mountain Jaeger Division from the west carried out a frontal attack on the retreating units, and the 24th Infantry Division was supposed to complete the encirclement with a blow from the north. After this, all that remained was to destroy the troops pressed to the river, which the Germans estimated at 50 thousand people. However, units of the Red Army regrouped and launched a counterattack with the forces of the 45th Tank and 99th Rifle Divisions. In addition, they managed to transfer the fresh 60th Mountain Rifle Division from the Southern Front to the 12th Army zone. Thanks to this, the troops of the 12th Army avoided encirclement, held back attacks on Vinnitsa until July 20, and by the morning of July 21, they had basically completed the crossing of the Southern Bug. [ ]

The withdrawal was carried out in accordance with the Supreme Command Headquarters Directive No. 00411. Even on the night of July 18 Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction Budyonny in his report accurately characterized the emerging situation: the enemy had finally broken through the front of the 12th Army, divided it and created a threat to the rear of the 6th Army; in turn, the gap between the 6th Army and its neighbor on the right near the town of Belaya Tserkov (26th Army) is 90 km and “is gradually being filled by the enemy.” The general conclusion was as follows:

1. It is not possible to restore the situation that existed before the start of the main breakthrough with the available front forces.
2. Further resistance by the 6th and 12th armies on the occupied lines may lead in the next 1-2 days to their encirclement and destruction in parts.
The stated situation forces me to ask Headquarters to allow the commander of the Southwestern Front to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies to the front of Belaya Tserkov, Tetiev, Kitay-Gorod. In accordance with this, withdraw the right flank of the Southern Front to the line (claim) Kitay-Gorod, Trostyanets, Kamenka

At 16-00 July 18 The headquarters agreed on the retreat, indicating intermediate boundaries. The withdrawal was to be carried out over three nights from July 21, under the cover of rearguards and aviation, at a rate of 30-40 km per day. At the same time, the Headquarters demanded that three rifle corps organize a strike on the flank of the enemy operating against the 6th Army (1st Tank Group). [ ]

Failed encirclement west of Uman

OKW Directive No. 33 of July 18 stated that “The most important task is to destroy the enemy’s 12th and 6th armies with a concentric offensive west of the Dnieper, preventing them from retreating across the river.” But the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, already doubted that it would be enough to strike in the direction of Uman. In his opinion (supported by the command of Army Group South), the 1st Tank Group was supposed to advance southeast in the direction of Krivoy Rog, sending only part of the forces of the right flank to Uman. Thus, the northern enveloping group of German troops was weakened. In the south, the Germans urgently lacked powerful mobile formations, and the coverage was carried out mainly by infantry units of the 17th and 11th armies. After the crisis arose near Vinnitsa, the Soviet command hastily transferred the 18th Mechanized Corps to this direction, which covered the gap between the 12th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 18th Army of the Southern Front and ensured their withdrawal. The 2nd mechanized corps under the command of Yu. V. Novoselsky was advanced to the area north of Uman from the Southern Front. [ ]

In the evening July 21 troops of the 6th and 12th armies struck at the extended 16th in the Oratov-Zhivotov area tank division Germans. Other units of the 1st Panzer Group were constrained by active actions Soviet troops and failed to create a dense barrier on the retreat route of the two armies. German data confirms the success of the night offensive:

Thanks to superior forces, they [the troops of the 6th Army] managed to make a breakthrough 15 km wide, the defenders were defeated and scattered, the headquarters retreated, the remnants without leadership had no idea where they were own positions where they should break through. […] The 16th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 16th Motorcycle Regiment were re-formed in Breslau

- Werthen W. Geschichte der 16. Panzer-Division 1939–1945, s.53-54

In the following days, the troops of the two armies continued to fight their way to the east, also entering the battle with the 16th Motorized Division of the Wehrmacht, which was located in the second echelon of the 48th Corps. The 37th and 49th Rifle Corps of the 6th Army advanced a total of 20 km. To the south, the 24th Mechanized Corps (almost without tanks) of the 12th Army, with the support of the 2nd Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, drove out units of the 16th Tank Division from Monastyrische, thereby restoring railway communication. At the same time, in the west, Soviet troops continued to hold back the onslaught of the infantry divisions of the 17th Army. The strike in the Oratov-Zhivotov-Monastyrische area was only partially successful - it was not possible to close the front with the 26th Army, but the 16th Tank Division and the 16th Infantry Division of the 48th Corps were drawn into fierce battles and were unable to continue moving towards Uman . However, the 11th Panzer Division, which managed to advance further to the east, was not exposed to attacks by the 6th and 12th armies, and could continue to move south, completing the encirclement. The situation was saved by a counterattack by the 2nd Mechanized Corps. The formation on July 20 had more than 400 tanks, including 10 KV and 46 T-34. The bulk of the tank fleet consisted of BTs, but only a small part of them were on the move (20 out of 120 in the 11th TD, 75 out of 161 in the 15th MD). July 22 The 2nd Mechanized Corps attacked the 11th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and pushed it north of the line on July 23 railway, connecting Khristinovka and Talnoye. The 15th Infantry Division also attacked the 16th Wehrmacht TD, which contributed to the success of the 24th Mechanized Corps at Monastyrische. July 24-25 The 2nd Mechanized Corps continued its attacks, but did not achieve significant progress; the assigned task - to connect with the troops of the 26th Army and restore a continuous front line - remained unfulfilled. However, the offensive of the 48th Motorized Corps on Uman was thwarted; the troops of the 6th and 12th Armies continued to retreat, bypassing the German mobile units that had gone on the defensive. [ ]

Formation of the "boiler"

TO July 25 on the northern face of the potential “cauldron” the situation has stabilized. Neither side could achieve significant progress. However, Wehrmacht infantry divisions gradually arrived from the west. They replaced mobile units, which, thanks to the unclosed gap with the 26th Army, were able to shift the direction of the attack to the east. On July 25, it was planned to replace the 16th Wehrmacht Infantry Division with the 68th Infantry Division. In turn, the 16th infantry division was supposed to free up the 16th tank division of the 48th (motorized) corps, whose task was to regroup, strike in the direction of Uman and finally cut off the escape routes of Ponedelin’s group. However, the active actions of the Soviet units disrupted the planned regrouping. Ultimately, it was the 16th Motorized Division that was transferred to the left flank of the corps with the task of attacking Talnoye and Novoarkhangelsk, and the 16th Tank Division was transferred to reserve, much to the chagrin of the command of the 48th Corps. On July 25, the SS brigade Leibstandarte also arrived in the zone of the 48th Corps. It filled the gap between the 16th and 11th Panzer Divisions and subsequently attempted to attack with them in the direction of Uman. Despite a number of local successes, the advance of the brigade, like the rest of the corps units, was stopped, and within July 25-28 the front north of Uman remained generally stable. [ ]

However, in the zone of the 49th (mountain) corps of the Wehrmacht, which carried out frontal pressure on the troops of the 12th Army, events occurred that had catastrophic consequences. The command introduced the fresh 125th Infantry Division into battle, which in a bloody battle knocked out Soviet units from the city of Gaysin. These were mainly formations of the 18th Mechanized Corps of the 18th Army, which after this defeat was dismembered into parts, was unable to restore the situation, and after the battles of July 26-27 actually ceased to exist as a full-fledged combat unit. After occupying Gaisin, the 125th Division continued to advance in the Ivangorod-Uman direction, but encountered fierce resistance and advanced slowly, with difficulty repelling counterattacks. In the battle for Krasnopolka on July 28, the 421st regiment of the division lost 115 people killed and 235 wounded. The strike of the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division of the 49th Corps, which took advantage of the success of the 125th Infantry Division in the battle for Gaisin, turned out to be more successful and swift. The division command formed the Lang group, equipped with vehicles, which in one day July 26 made a breakthrough 70 kilometers in a south-eastern direction, advancing from Gaisin to the village of Teplik and finding itself deep in the rear of the Soviet troops. Following the Lang advance group, other divisions of the division soon moved, and then the 4th Mountain Jaeger Division. For several days this breakthrough was essentially not noticed by the Soviet command. [ ]

On July 25-27, the control of Soviet troops in the Uman region was disorganized. Due to the fact that the gap in the front with the 26th Army could not be closed, the 6th and 12th Armies found themselves separated from the main forces of the front. On July 25, the military council of the Southwestern Front took the initiative to transfer the 6th and 12th armies to the Southern Front. This was supposed to facilitate supply and management, as well as ensure closer communication between the armies and the right wing of the Southern Front. This offer was considered justified, and with 20-00 July 25, according to Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 00509, the 6th and 12th armies were transferred to the Southern Front and were supposed to retreat to the Zvenigorodka-Talnoe-Khristinovka line. However, at the same time, responsibility for the fate of the armies was not removed from the command of the Southwestern Front; the left wing of the 26th Army was supposed to ensure communication between the two fronts with a strike on Zhashkov and Talnoe. After the withdrawal of the 6th and 12th armies, the 18th army was supposed to occupy the Khristinovka-Kodyma-Rashkov line (and the last two points had already been captured by the Germans). The order of the commander of the Southern Front ordered the withdrawal of the 12th Army from the battle and take up defense with a front to the north along the “Art. Zvenigorodka, Sokolovochka, (lawsuit) Art.  Potash, Zelenkov, Pavlovka”, as well as prepare a cut-off position on the eastern bank of the Sinyukha River. The 6th Army was supposed to defend the line “(legal) Potash, Dobra, Khristinovka, Uman.” The dividing line on the left was set settlements“(claim) Kitay-Gorod, Ivangorod, Krasnopolye, Novo-Ukrainka.” It was also ordered to withdraw the 2nd Mechanized Corps from the battle to the front reserve and concentrate it in the area of ​​Novoarkhangelsk, Podvysokoye, Tishkovka. The command of the Southern Front received reliable information about the state of the armies only in the afternoon of July 27; for almost three days, virtually no one led the troops of the 6th and 12th armies. The matter was aggravated by the fact that the 6th and 12th Armies, as a result of their transfer to the Southern Front, were deprived of air support: the 44th and 64th Air Divisions, which had previously covered them, remained part of the Southwestern Front and even formally withdrew from July 30 from the subordination of Muzychenko, switching to support of the 26th Army. In turn, no new air formations were transferred to replace those that had left, and the aviation of the Southern Front provided assistance only sporadically, mainly at the junction with the 18th Army.

July 29 The 1st Mountain Jaeger Division occupied the village of Ladyzhinka (about 20 km south of Uman), cutting off the Uman-Odessa highway. Division commander Lanz proposed continuing the offensive to Novoarkhangelsk, which would make it possible to complete the encirclement of Ponedelin’s group, but the command of the 49th Corps did not dare to take such a step. The division stopped, pulling up the lagging units and repelling attacks by Soviet troops from the south (18th Army). The 125th Infantry Division resumed the offensive on July 29 and achieved major success, capturing Ivangorod and the Khristinovka station (~20 km northwest of Uman). The 295th Infantry Division, operating to the left, hastily advanced in the direction of Khristinovka to help the 125th Division. The 4th Mountain Jaeger Division advanced between the 125th Infantry and 1st Mountain Jaeger Divisions, its task on July 30 was to advance from Teplik to Rossosh and further to Uman. The Soviet command did not respond in a timely manner to the capture of the station. Khristinovka.

On July 29, the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Mechanized Corps from the front of the 48th (Motorized) Corps of the Germans finally began. The command of the Southern Front demanded that the corps be withdrawn to reserve on July 25, then on July 28 it repeated the order, changing its location. Now the corps was supposed to concentrate not in the Novoarkhangelsk area, but south of Uman, in the Ostrovets - Ladyzhinka - Krasnopolye area (that is, where mountain rangers were already operating on July 29). However, the corps was involved in repelling German attacks and was slow to withdraw, since the exhausted units of the 6th and 12th armies, also involved in the fighting, did not have time to reliably occupy new positions. The withdrawal of the corps on July 29 disrupted the integrity of the Soviet defense north of Uman. At the same time, the corps did not receive the task of attacking the enemy (1st Mountain Jaeger Division) south of Uman and, in fact, was inactive. The change in corps deployment also allowed units of the German 1st Tank Group to advance unhindered in the direction of Novoarkhangelsk.

On July 29, a new offensive by the 48th Corps began. This time the main target was not Uman. and Novoarkhangelsk. On this day, the 16th Infantry Division of the 48th Corps, acting on the left flank, captured Talnoe. The 11th TD also advanced successfully, crossing the railway line between Talnoye and Khristinovka. Only the Leibstandarte attacks on the right flank of the corps ended in failure. [ ]

The German command also made unsuccessful decisions, one of which was the turn of the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division to the south. Instead of continuing to move in the direction of the village of Podvysokoye (which allowed the shortest route to connect with the 48th (motorized) corps, moving towards Novoarkhangelsk), the division was given the task of attacking Golovanevsk. Its place was supposed to be taken by the 4th Mountain Jaeger Division, but its promotion was late. Thus, for Ponedelin’s group, which united the troops of the 6th and 12th armies, as well as the 2nd MK, it remained possible to avoid encirclement. [ ]

July 30 The infantry divisions of the 49th (mountain) corps resumed their attack on Uman from the west, but did not achieve major successes. In turn, the counterattacks of the Soviet troops, who sought to push back the enemy and return, among other things, the Khristinovka station, were also unsuccessful. Under the cover of counterattacks, a hasty withdrawal of troops of the 6th and 12th armies began through Uman to the south and east. [ ]

The command of the 12th Army planned to strike in the northeast direction on July 30. Units of the Leibstandarte and the 11th Panzer Division in fierce battles repulsed all attacks by weakened Soviet units, but were unable to develop the offensive and were late in regrouping their infantry units. The 16th Motorized Division achieved great success, which bypassed the main forces of the Soviet troops and during July 30 advanced from Talny to Novoarkhangelsk, taking up defense on a 30-kilometer front. The German command planned to strike further at Pervomaisk (another 70 km to the south), but strong attacks on the positions of the 16th Infantry Division, repulsed only by the full effort of all forces, forced this plan to be temporarily abandoned. [ ]

During the battles July 30-31 The 1st Mountain Jaeger Division captured Golovanevsk and repelled all counterattacks by Soviet troops. To the north 4th Mountain Jaeger Division July 31 captured the village of Dubovo, 20 km southeast of Uman, cutting off another possible escape route. Thus, the front of the Soviet troops was torn apart and its restoration along the Uman-Golovanevsk line planned by the Soviet command became impossible. By the evening of July 31, the command of the 17th Army finally abandoned attempts to encircle the main forces of the 18th Army; the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division received orders to advance from Golovanevsk in an eastern direction and complete the encirclement of the Ponedelin group. At this time, the 125th Division reached the near approaches to Uman and was preparing to storm the city. [ ]

On July 31, the command of the Southern Front ordered Ponedelin’s group to clear the Talnoye-Novoarkhangelsk area of ​​the enemy and connect with the 212th Division of the 26th Army at Zvenigorodka. However, German troops repulsed most of the attacks. Moreover, the approach of the infantry divisions allowed them to gradually liberate the mobile formations on the northern front of the almost formed “cauldron.” By the evening of July 31, the 11th Tank Division captured the villages of Legedzino and Talyanki (~25 km northeast of Uman). The 16th Infantry Division continued to hold the Talnoe-Novoarkhangelsk line, although it was forced to leave its positions near the village of Kameneche under the attacks of the 60th State Guards Division. Gradually, additional forces were pulled up in this direction - the Westland regiment of the SS Viking division, as well as the 9th tank division of the 14th motorized corps, which by the evening of July 31 reached Olshanka (~ 20 km east of Novoarkhangelsk), forming an outer ring of encirclement Ponedelina group. [ ]

TO August 1 the only area of ​​the future “cauldron” not occupied by enemy troops was in the southeast. In the south there was a relatively weak screen consisting of two mountain ranger divisions. However, the command of the Southern Front, instead of urgently withdrawing Ponedelin’s group, did not lose hope of restoring the situation and even using a joint strike with the 26th Army to defeat the enemy who had broken through, who, in their opinion, was moving towards the Dnieper. The task of the 12th Army was to break through the encirclement and connect with the relief units. The 6th Army was supposed to prevent the “cauldron” from shrinking. As a result, the armies had to take up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the Sinyukha River. The 17th Rifle Corps of the 18th Army was supposed to strike from the south. However, during the battles on August 1, his attacks were stopped at Golovanevsk, troops of the 52nd Corps, as well as the 8th Hungarian Corps, were advancing from the west, and the commander of the 18th Army decided to retreat to Pervomaisk. The 1st Mountain Jaeger Division not only repelled the attack of the 17th Corps, but also advanced east, cutting the Pokotilovo-Novoselka highway (one of the last possible escape routes for the Ponedelin group in a southerly direction). On August 1, the 125th Infantry Division, without encountering serious resistance, captured the city of Uman. The advance of the 4th Mountain Jaeger Division on Podvysokoe was stopped by the troops of the 6th Army, but the actions of the mountain rangers prevented the Soviet troops from striking towards the 18th Army. [ ]

On the Legedzino-Talnoye-Sverdlikovo front on August 1, German troops with great difficulty repelled the attacks of the 12th Army, but generally held their positions. However, units of the 16th Infantry Division were driven out of Novoarkhangelsk by attacks from the 44th State Guards Division and the group of General V.V. Vladimirova. To restore the situation, the command of the 48th (motorized) corps was forced to use the Leibstandarte brigade. After being replaced by infantry units, the brigade advanced to Novoarkhangelsk with the task of capturing the village of Ternovka (another 15 km to the south), which actually meant the complete encirclement of Ponedelin’s group. Instead, the SS men entered the battle for Novoarkhangelsk and by the evening knocked out the Soviet troops, but were forced to abandon further advance. [ ]

Based on the results of the battles on August 1, the leadership of the 6th and 12th armies came to the conclusion that a breakthrough in the northeastern and eastern directions was impossible. At 00-20 August 2 General Muzychenko asked the command of the Southern Front for permission to make an independent breakthrough in a south-eastern direction through Ternovka-Pokotilovo, since “delay will exhaust the army and lead to disaster.” Without waiting for an answer, he began to gather army troops into the area of ​​​​the proposed breakthrough. Commander-12 Ponedelin, in turn, used the gap in the German positions to bypass the Leibstandarte units fortified in Novoarkhangelsk. With the attack of the 211th Airborne Brigade, Ternovka was cleared of advanced enemy units. Thanks to this convenient bridgehead, units of the 10th NKVD Division and the 49th Tank Division crossed the Sinyukha River. In addition, during August 2-3, part of the rear of the encircled armies managed to escape through Ternivka. However, the command of the Southern Front regarded Muzychenko’s report as panicky and did not authorize a general breakthrough in this direction, repeating the order to break through to the east, where at that time the main forces of the 48th and 14th motorized corps were already concentrated. All attacks in this direction were repulsed, although in some cases with great difficulty. Thus, one of the battalions of the 16th Infantry Division lost 61 people killed and 42 wounded during the day.

The 4th Mountain Jaeger Division, having failed to break through the defenses of the 189th Infantry Division and the 21st Cavalry Regiment of the NKVD on the Yatran River, began moving south in order to strengthen the positions of the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division in the direction of a likely breakthrough. However, near the village of Polonistoe, the Germans unexpectedly discovered unguarded bridges. The bridgehead was quickly captured and the rangers began advancing to the villages of Kopenkovatoe and Podvysokoye, but on the approaches to these points they encountered columns of retreating Soviet troops. Fierce fighting began and lasted for several days. [ ]

Meanwhile, during the day August 2 The 1st Mountain Jaeger Division broke through 15 km east from the village of Troyanka to the village of Korytno on the banks of the Sinyukha. At this time, the advanced units of the 9th Panzer Division of the 14th Motorized Corps appeared on the opposite bank, which advanced east of the 48th Corps without being attacked by Ponedelin’s group. Thus, the complete encirclement of the group was completed, although the ring was still loose; in fact, the Germans could only block some main directions. However, liberated units of the 11th and 16th tank divisions gradually approached from the north, and south face Infantry divisions of the 17th Army were being brought up to the “cauldron”. [ ]

Encircled fighting and breakout attempts

The following formations were surrounded east of Uman (data for July 30 - August 1, 1941): [ ]

August 3 The 16th Tank Division captured Pervomaisk and the next day linked up with Hungarian units, while part of the 18th Army was also surrounded. The 11th Panzer Division was moving forward to relieve the 9th Panzer Division at the junction with the 49th (Mountain) Corps. The 297th Infantry Division replaced units of the 16th Infantry Division, tightening the inner front of the encirclement. Soviet troops continued to attempt a breakthrough, but their attacks weakened, and the lack of ammunition began to have an acute effect. Back on August 2, Ponedelin reported, “The shells are not arriving. There are two or three shots left." By August 3, the command of the South-Western direction, realizing the futility of attempts to break through to the east, gave the order to withdraw to the south, to link up with the 18th Army. But the commander of the Southern Front continued to demand from Ponedelin’s group a breakthrough in the eastern direction, ordering on August 4 to advance in the direction of Novoukrainka (~60 km east of Ternovka). [ ] At the same time, the command of the Southern Front gave a completely derogatory description of its subordinates:

Ponedelin’s group continues to remain in the same position, and the slowness in carrying out the repeated orders to withdraw its units to the river is completely incomprehensible. Sinyuha... A radiogram of panic content was received from Ponedelin that an organized exit from the battle without destroying one’s material unit or without immediate outside help was supposedly impossible. This assessment of the situation by Ponedelin is incorrect, and there is no continuous front. There are gaps of up to 10 kilometers or more. Trampling in Ponedelin’s place cannot be explained by anyone else other than confusion, lack of management, and lack of energy.

Collection of military documents of the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 9. P. 172.

August 4 The strike of the 9th and 11th TDs, the Leibstandarte and the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division liquidated the bridgehead near the village of Ternovka on the eastern bank of the Sinyukha River, where the group of General N.I.  Proshkin (units 44, 58th Civil Guards Division, 45th, 49th TD, 211th Airborne Brigade, a total of 3.4 thousand active bayonets, 30 guns, 2-3 combat-ready tanks). The group tried to attack east towards Tishkovka, but was defeated in a counter battle with German tank divisions, was driven back to Ternivka, pressed against the river and attacked from the rear by the 1st Mountain Jaeger Division. The result was the complete defeat of the group, Major General Proshkin (commander of the 58th Guards Division) was captured. The 44th State Duma was also defeated; by the morning of August 5, the Germans had completely occupied the eastern bank of the Sinyukha River, destroying the Soviet troops who had previously managed to cross. [ ]

At Headquarters at this time they were already thinking more about creating a new defensive line than about the fate of the encircled armies, although the command of the South-Western direction still demanded to organize an attack on Uman and Zvenigorodka. On this occasion, J.V. Stalin said to General Kirponos: “I consider Budyonny’s directive to be timely and useful for the common cause. However, the main thing is to develop proposals for a new line of defense.”

On August 5 the command of the 6th and 12th armies planned a new offensive. This time the main blow was delivered in a southern direction (although the 8th Rifle Corps was tasked with recapturing Ternovka and moving to the southeast). General direction Pervomaisk was indicated, where it was supposed to connect with the 18th Army, which was driven out of the city on August 3. The command of the 49th (mountain) corps of the Wehrmacht, in turn, planned on this day to break the resistance of the encircled troops with a concentric offensive. [ ] All day there was a fierce oncoming battle, both sides did not achieve their goals, but units of the 49th (mountain) corps completely held their positions, moved forward and even reached the near approaches to the village of Podvysokoye, directly attacking the headquarters of the Ponedelin group. Staff members took part in repelling the attack, and the head of the 1st department of the 6th Army's operational department, Colonel B.K. Andreenko, was killed.

By August 5, the territory still held by the encircled was only 10 by 10 km, it was completely under fire from the enemy, and there were no reserves of fuel, ammunition and food. The only way out was an immediate breakthrough from the encirclement, and on the night of August 5-6, the most decisive attempt was made. The main blow was delivered by units of the 6th Army, as well as the only combat-ready unit of the 12th Army, the 8th Rifle Corps. Transport columns were formed, but artillery preparation was not carried out. Having reached the enemy’s defensive positions, the fighters dismounted, broke through the defenses, loaded onto their vehicles again and continued to move forward. General Muzychenko with part of the headquarters moved on tanks in a “column special purpose", which, after breaking through the first line of defense, had to independently move to join the 18th Army. A critical mistake was underestimating the width of the enemy's defense, which had to be overcome. According to the commander of the 16th Mechanized Corps, Divisional Commander Sokolov, it was 5-10 km, the command of the 6th Army believed that only the 4th Mountain Jaeger Division was opposing them, and that Soviet troops were already located north of Pervomaisk. The command of the Southern Front did not inform its subordinates that the city had long been lost.

At 4 o'clock in the morning August 6 Soviet troops attacked the positions of the 1st and 4th mountain ranger divisions. The division commands lost control of the troops and were unable to stop the breakthrough; the Red Army soldiers moved forward, regardless of losses and over and over again crushing the barriers in their path. The defense of the 49th Corps was broken through to its full depth, and rear units and long-range artillery positions came under attack. Captured guns were immediately used to support strike groups. During the breakthrough, Soviet troops captured Golovanevsk and the village of Emilovka, thus advancing almost 20 km and completing the assigned task. However, instead of units of the 18th Army, here they encountered divisions of the German 52nd Army Corps and were largely stopped. During the movement, the columns going for a breakthrough came under fire, were divided into parts, and got stuck at crossings and off-road. At dawn they found themselves under artillery and air strikes, resulting in vehicles were finally destroyed. The Red Army soldiers continued to break through on foot, but only a few small groups managed to do this. A major role in thwarting the breakthrough attempt was played by German air defense units, which covered the rear and crossings, were armed with powerful fire weapons and had the ability to shoot columns emerging from the encirclement. [ ]

By noon on August 6, control of the mountain ranger divisions was restored and the German command again tried to complete the defeat of the encircled group. As a result of the actions of the 125th Infantry Division, 97th Light Infantry Division, 1st and 4th Mountain Jaeger Divisions of the 49th (Mountain) Corps, as well as the 24th and 297th Infantry Divisions of the 44th Army Corps, with the support "Leibstandarte", the defense of the Soviet units broke up into isolated pockets. However, the attempt to storm the village of Podvysokoe was thwarted, and the village of Kopenkovatoe passed from hand to hand. The main shelter for those surrounded was the adjacent forests, including the Green Gate, but they could not save the Germans from heavy artillery fire. [ ]

On the night of August 7 The surrounded troops made a last centralized attempt to break out. The direction of the strike was changed again. The 12th Army mainly broke through from Podvysokye in an eastern direction, to the Sinyukha River, through the positions of the 1st Mountain Jaeger and 297th Infantry Divisions. The army headquarters was dissolved, the chief of staff was General B.I.  Arushanyan allowed his subordinates to choose on their own. The 2nd mechanized corps with part of the rifle formations (remnants of the 140th and 197th divisions) concentrated on the northern edge of Green Brama, preparing to strike to the northeast, through the positions of the 24th and 125th infantry divisions. General Novoselsky also disbanded the headquarters, but sent workers to the rifle chains going to break through, and he himself did the same. At this time, the remnants of the shock groups of the 6th Army were still holding out in the Emilovka area, preparing to continue the breakthrough at night, but the “special purpose column” was defeated on the evening of August 6, General Muzychenko and a number of other commanders were captured. [ ]

The soldiers of the 12th Army managed to crush the enemy’s defenses with a night attack and, in separate groups, broke through to the Sinyukha River, but there they were met by the 11th Panzer Division and the SS Leibstandarte; the breakthrough attempt ended in complete failure. Only a detachment of the 99th Infantry Division under the command of the division commander, Colonel I.D. Romanov, broke through relatively successfully. The tank in which General Ponedelin broke through was hit and he was captured along with the commander of the 13th Rifle Corps N.K. Kirillov. General N.V. managed to break through and reach his 12th Army commanders. Gavrilenko and Chief of Staff Arushanyan. [ ]

The breakthrough in the northeast direction was more successful. Several groups made their way through the battle formations of the 125th Division. In the zone of the 24th Infantry Division, in the opinion of the command of the 44th Corps, a major breakthrough also took place; to fend it off, the 16th Infantry Division, the SS Westland Regiment and the Leibstandarte reconnaissance battalion were hastily returned to their old positions on the eastern bank of the Sinyukha, thus their regrouping was disrupted. However, the Red Army soldiers who broke through divided into small groups and left the encirclement without getting involved in battles. The commander and commissar of the 2nd mechanized corps successfully reached their own, but only after a few months. [ ]

A combined group from the remainder of the breakthrough detachments of the 6th Army, united under the command of Divisional Commander Sokolov, made its way from Emilovka to Novoselka on the night of August 7, almost defeating the headquarters of the 466th Regiment of the 257th Infantry Division and destroying a battery of 155-mm guns. Sokolov’s group was finally defeated only on the eastern bank of Sinyukha by the forces of the 9th Tank Division, the division commander himself was captured seriously wounded and soon died. However, his chief of staff, Major General

The Uman cauldron became one of the least studied episodes of the first six months of the war; suffice it to say that in Soviet era A single scientific work was devoted to him - the report of a retired general (by the way, S.I. Iovlev was not a witness to the events, he fought in Belarus). There were also about a dozen memoirs, published diaries and a documentary story by Evgeniy Dolmatovsky “The Green Gate”. But the renaissance of military historical literature in the last two decades and access to Western archives and research nevertheless broke through the veil of obscurity, and the candidate, who devoted about two decades to researching the battle historical sciences and Associate Professor of UFU Oleg Nuzhdin in 2011 published the first decent study about the Uman Cauldron in a microscopic edition of 300 pieces. I got it out of my stingy and unbudgetary habit of buying everything in short circulation about the Second World War; I had never read anything on this topic before.

What's in the content? This is a day-by-day description of the fighting from July 25 to August 7, 1941, preceded by the operational situation in Right-Bank Ukraine at the beginning of this period and ending with the results of the Battle of Uman, written with an emphasis on Soviet and German sources, in approximately equal proportions. Only naturally, as with many descriptions of the environments of 1941-42, last days organized resistance are given mainly on the basis of German combat reports, because the cessation of headquarters activities and communications with higher command leaves historians in the future with only the memories of survivors. Plus interrogation protocols for prisoners Soviet officers and a list of command personnel in the appendix. The only drawback of the entire study I found was the total absence of at least one battle map on the pages of the book. As a result, I found on the Internet about a dozen maps of individual stages of the battle of varying quality and sometimes contradictory information, including scans from Runov’s dubious creative work, and based on them, I was reading a book on my laptop.

At the level of the theater of operations, the Uman cauldron is interesting primarily because the German “Cannes” were qualitatively different from other large encirclements of the 41st. If near Bialystok, Minsk, Luga, Vyazma, German mobile troops - tank groups, mechanized corps or separate tank and motorized divisions broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and united in the rear of the defenders, and behind them the backbone of the blitzkrieg went into the breakthrough - the German infantry units that surrounded defenders and finished off the cauldron. As a rule, escapes from encirclement with heavy losses in personnel and equipment were successful at a time when the tankers and panzergrenadiers of the Wehrmacht had not yet been replaced by denser infantry corps and divisions, and the battle order of those around them remained with holes. Plus also personal habits like frantically pushing forward and forward like Guderian in Belarus-41. Uman is interesting because the first tank group of von Kleist formed only north face encirclement and closed the ring from the east. The Germans generally planned to surround all three soviet armies in the South-West of Ukraine west of the Dnieper, while Panzergruppe-1 played the role of a hammer, approaching the Dnieper crossings in a large bend of the river, and the 7th and 11th Wehrmacht infantry armies coming from the borders played the role of a ram-anvil. It was not possible to encircle everyone when, after the capture of Vinnitsa, German tank units moving almost along the compass directly to the east began to evade to the southeast, going to the rear of the 6th and 12th Soviet armies. From the west, the Soviet armies were supported by the 17th Army, and the role of the enveloping southern claw was played by the 1st Mountain Division (often called the “Edelweiss” by its emblem) and the lesser-known “Gentian” - the 4th GSK Division, who came from the Alpine lands of Bavaria and Austria. They made a high-speed race deep into the fragmented Southern Front, encountering virtually no organized resistance. On July 30, 1941, the 4th Civil Defense Division set almost an absolute record for an infantry march of World War II, covering 45 kilometers across neutral territory, which was very fast by the standards of even motorized troops. Of course, the light equipment of the rangers, their youth and endurance required for fighting in the mountains also played a role, but nevertheless I do not remember such agility anywhere else. By the standards of pre-war Wehrmacht exercises, a day's march usually covered 28-30 kilometers; the same 45 kilometers were designated as the maximum in the Soviet PU-42. It’s not just walking, but with full combat gear, carrying a weapon or a 12-kg MG-34.

The organizational chaos of the Soviet side in the 6th and 12th armies, and in the Southern Front as a whole, seems to have done everything to lead more than a hundred thousand people into encirclement. From not figuring out the German plan for moving parts, to “peeking” the exit of German mountain riflemen on the escape route from the command side. It was possible to withdraw the troops from the attack. But personal competition and conflict between army commanders Ponedelin and Muzychenko, hostility arose after the order from headquarters to unite the remnants of the two armies into the so-called. Ponedelina group. All this increased the confusion and disorganization of the troops, and the commander of the Southern Front, Tyulenev, openly “beat” Budyonny’s command to withdraw everyone, but he could not carry out the hatched operation to close the flanks of the armies, and then relieve the encirclement. But he promised a lot, and the troops from the cauldron mainly made their way in a southern direction through dense formations of German infantry opposite the imaginary attack of the Southern Front troops. While the few examples of a breakthrough to the north, through German mobile formations, were much better. It’s painful to read how Muzychenko gathered the remaining tanks in the cauldron, disembarked the tankers, command staff and went for a breakthrough, essentially throwing subordinate troops at Ponedelin. He didn’t go far, the Germans destroyed the column and captured the general. Ponedelin was captured later, but in a twist of fate he was shot in 1950 for the surrender and defeat of the entrusted troops, and Muzychenko was rehabilitated and died of natural causes in 1970.

(Nestor Ivanovich Makhno died 80 years ago. He died in Paris in 1934. He was buried in the Père Lachaise cemetery - one of the largest museums of tombstone sculpture in the world. Moliere and Balzac, Isadora Duncan and the famous marshals of Napoleon are buried there. Next to them " shaggy bandits”, as the Makhnovists showed us, were never buried there).

Chapter from the novel “Nestor Makhno”.

Before dawn, timid ringed turtle doves suddenly fell from the branches where they had spent the night and darted about wildly in the darkness. An unheard of explosion shook the hills near the Yatran River, forests, fields, and even reached Uman. It was the team of Alexei Chubenko who detonated two thousand sea mines on a hill near the village of Peregonovka. That was news to all regiments about the attack on the whites.

The night before, the rebels struck them to the north. But the commander of the Simferopol officer regiment, Gvozdakov, who had recently been promoted to general for his steadfastness, reported: the attacks were again successfully repulsed and the Makhnovists were fleeing to the west.

“Well, thank God,” thought Yakov Slashchev at night, who was at the head of the entire operation to destroy the bandits. “They’re not going anywhere.” The mousetrap has slammed shut.” However, this did not please the general. He was burdened by the insignificant role that fell to him.

Yakov Alexandrovich - a graduate of the Imperial Military Academy, wounded five times, received the St. George's weapon and the orders of all degrees of St. Anne with swords and the inscription "For bravery", St. Svyatoslav with bows, St. Vladimir and the Holy Great Martyr and Victorious George! How many people have such awards at thirty-three?

Should he, a guards general, chase a gang of robbers when red Moscow is about to fall? But what can you do – discipline! And apparently, it’s not destiny to become famous. Yes, now this turmoil is over. They will scatter the rebels, kick worthless Petliura in the ass and make peace with the Poles. Slashchev thought about his wife, sighed, rubbed cologne into his armpits and fell asleep...

The officer for special assignments, Staff Captain Ershov, woke him up:
- Your Excellency, Yakov Alexandrovich. Explosion!
- Where? – the general did not understand.
- From the Makhnovists. I wouldn't bother you, but there's terrible thunder! At Peregonovka. Maybe ours blew up their convoy of shells?
- That would be nice. Anu, go there, captain, and find out everything. Most likely, the bandits themselves destroy their supplies to make it easier to escape.

The lieutenant galloped to the front line. While still in the bare steppe, I heard the growing sounds of battle: artillery barked, machine guns rattled. Ershov spurred his horse, but did not find the commander of the Simferopol regiment Gvozdakov in Peregonovka. The headquarters could not really explain the cause of the explosion. The village was flooded with carts.

Which part? – Ershov asked the first sergeant he came across.
- Feodosia, next to the Kerch-Yenikalsky regiment.

Blue morning shadows stretched along the fences. Horsemen rushed along the street.
- Fifth! Officer's here! - demanded the colonel, sitting on a hot black horse. Ershov drove up, introduced himself, and asked:
- What kind of explosion was that?
- But the devil knows. It’s with them, on the other side. The hurricanes are scary and crawl like locusts. Yes, you are closer, take a closer look! – the colonel got angry. - Fifth! Follow me! - and he galloped off.

The guarantor's path was blocked by carts. There were machine guns with threaded ribbons on them. Soldiers were running nearby. And the wounded were already being transported back; sisters of mercy were walking in white headscarves. There were cannons in the garden on the right. Jumping up, they hit with direct fire.

Off your horse, captain! - Ershov heard. - From the horse! Otherwise they'll cut it off!
He climbed into the attic and through the crack saw how the Makhnovists were driving across the blue river in carts, running in crowds towards Peregonovka. In the roar of guns, in the whistling, groaning, one could only understand that a stupid bulk offensive by bandits was underway. Will the defenders hold out?

An hour later, the Makhnovists finally ran out of steam and rolled back, running back in droves. Now, the entruster decided, it was time to return and report to the general that the ridiculous attacks were successfully repulsed...

And the chief of staff Rebel Army Victor Bilash was calm. Together with Nestor Ivanovich and experienced commanders, they brainstormed this large military operation down to the smallest detail. The troops of the vaunted Slashchev will be defeated here, and 50,000 bayonets and sabers will rush to the east, where they will cut off all the rear of the white army. She won't see Moscow!

Now the chief of staff was waiting for news. The Crimean Corps was advancing in the southern sector. Experienced guys. One iron regiment of Polonsky is worth something! He was opposed by recruits from Odessa: all sorts of high school students, Mishka Yaponchik’s urkagans and other trash. To scatter them and hit the officers in the rear here, along the Yatran River - that was the task.

However, the first to arrive was a messenger from the north:
- Uman our! – he reported joyfully. - A cloud of prisoners, and thousands of whites were cut down. The rest fled. We drive the horses into darkness!

A couple of hours later a messenger arrived from the south.
- Odessa trash is ticking!
- Bachiv himself? – asked the chief of staff.
- That shob mani came out!

Soon, countless squadrons of rebels arrived, mixed with carts and guns, and moved towards Peregonovka. Victor Bilash gave the final orders as he walked. This furious avalanche could not be stopped. She rushed through Yatran and, flashing her sabers, rushed towards Denikin’s men.

They fought back steadfastly, but still retreated. Part of the Makhnovist cavalry surrounded the Labinsky regiment. The Kubans stuck their bayonets into the ground. They were spared. The Lithuanian regiment did not surrender and was completely cut down.

Another part of the rebel cavalry captured Peregonovka on the left. The Simferopol and Feodosians, retreating, tried to slip into the woods, but it was already occupied by the Makhnovists. We had to go through the fields to the east. The officers were followed on their heels and fired at direct fire with buckshot. People were losing their minds. But thank God, the water ahead turned blue.

Let's get there... and swim! – battalion commander Hattenberger encouraged the officers. Of the five hundred of them, only about sixty remained. Everyone quickened their pace. Here is the river-savior! But on the other side... It would be better not to see.

Come here! – the rebels called loudly, waving their blades in the sun.
Hattenberger took the revolver out of the holster, stood for a minute, put the muzzle to his heart and pulled the trigger...

General Slashchev, whom many remember from the film “Running,” later taught courses for red commanders and explained to them... the strategy of Nestor Makhno!

Reviews

Thank you Victor, it’s very relevant...now there is a war in Rus'! Civil!
and a civil war is, first of all, a fratricidal war.
the scenarios of these wars have been developed and known in detail (instructions are in old testament... so that any “order” of any civil war can be renamed the Order of CAIN of some degree!...) The concept of the “cult of death” came to Rus' with Judeo-Christianity, worship as a dead god (namely, a dead - crucified ..) began. .) and all burial rituals, which later became a profitable business... I think our ancestors treated death as a due transition, a qualitative transition from one state of consciousness to another. They were not afraid of death, but prepared for it in dialogues with God (or Gods), and He spoke to His children in the language of life circumstances and did not force them even with the truth...
All wars on earth are a harvest of “riploids”...they don’t happen,” they are prepared by specialists with a university education...

They create it public opinion, create "HEROES" and "ANTIHEROES". in order to then pit their apologists against each other... the same principle of “DIVIDE AND CONTROL”
me with early childhood I had to face this - thanks to my last name, I learned for myself how the polarity of the attitude towards the person “Hero” changed Civil War“Makhno (Mikhnenko) Nestor Ivanovich... what they didn’t say about him, it’s better not to remember, but now they “made” him a hero and made a “massed” film about him”... But they can’t talk about him simple life somehow they didn't work out...
therefore it is better to read his memoirs or poems -

"Curse me, curse me"

Curse me, curse me
If I lied to you even a word,

I fought for the truth, for you.

For you, oppressed brotherhood,
For the people deceived by the authorities.
I hated swagger and lordship,
I had a machine gun with me.

And a cart flying like a bullet,
The sabers shine in a stunned way.
Why did they turn away from me?
You, to whom did I give my life?

There are no words of reproach in my song,
I don’t dare to reproach people.
Why do I feel so lonely?
I can’t tell or understand.

You'll forgive me who's on the attack
He walked with me and was struck by a bullet,
I should have cried for you,
But I see the eyes of your wives.

Here they will win you back, pay you back
And the lamps will not be extinguished...
Well, daddy can’t do otherwise,
He knows how not to cry, but to take revenge.

Remember me, remember me
I fought for the truth, for you...

(1921)
"The poem is interesting not only as the personal repentance of a battle-hardened anarchist still fighting. It is - at least to my knowledge - also a unique, emotional expression of regret for the deaths that occurred as a result of his actions. Are there other leaders revolution or counter-revolution during the Civil War, which would so publicly and emotionally ask for forgiveness?
..................................................."
Nestor Makhno

LOVELY MEMORY TO NESTOR IVANOVICH AND A LOW BOW!

Smiles and JOY of humility and patience
take care of yourself RUSICHES!
Sincerely
Mahno

Battle of Uman
	German victory
Commanders
S. M. Budyonny M. P. Kirponos I. V. Tyulenev I. N. Muzychenko P. G. Ponedelin	Gerd von Rundstedt Ewald von Kleist Karl von Stülpnagel Werner Kempf
Strengths of the parties
6th Army, 12th Army, separate units of the 26th Army and 18th Army	48th Motorized Corps of the Kleist Tank Group 17th Army
About 65 thousand people and 242 tanks were surrounded. From August 1 to 8, up to 11,000 people and 1,015 vehicles with military equipment emerged from the encirclement. According to German (probably inflated) data, 103 thousand prisoners and 317 tanks were captured.	Based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost (17A, 1TA) for 07.20-08.10.41: Killed: 4610 Sanitary losses: 15458 Prisoners/missing: 785 Total losses: 20853

Battle of Uman(late July - early August 1941) occurred during the offensive of Army Group South. Led to the encirclement and subsequent death of the troops of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front and individual units of the Southern Front of the Red Army.

Previous Events

In the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group South, moving east, occupied the cities of Lvov (June 30), Ternopil, Vinnitsa and Zhitomir (July 10). During the battle near Lutsk - Rivne - Brody, units of the 4th, 15th and 16th, as well as the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps of the Red Army, from the Southwestern Front, were defeated. These groups of corps attacked the advancing Wehrmacht troops in the area of ​​the city of Dubno from the south and north, respectively. However, despite superiority in tanks, these attacks were unsuccessful. In terms of the number of armored vehicles, the clash was comparable only to the Battle of Kursk. By June 29, the battle was over and German troops continued their offensive.

On July 10, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred overall command of the Red Army units operating in the South-Western direction to Budyonny. His task was to coordinate the actions of the two fronts. Thus, under the command of Budyonny there were troops totaling about 1.5 million people, concentrated in the areas of Uman and Kyiv. However, Budyonny barely had time to take command when the 1st Tank Group, under the command of Kleist, wedged between these groups, occupying Berdichev (July 15) and Kazatin (July 16). Thus, parts of Kleist ended up north of Uman. At the same time, Uman was bypassed from the south by the 17th Wehrmacht Army (commander - General Stülpnagel). In addition, from the south, from the border with Romania, the 11th Army under the command of General von Schobert was advancing on Uman.

Actions of the parties

Headquarters and the command of the Southern Front mistakenly assumed that the Germans intended to reach the Dnieper between Kiev and Cherkassy with the aim of further attacking Donbass, and underestimated the danger of encirclement. On July 28, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts received orders to retreat to the east in order to cut off the Germans’ access to the Dnieper. As a result, the opportunity to avoid encirclement by retreating to the southeast was lost.

On August 2, Kleist's group linked up with the 17th Army, completing the encirclement. The next day, the encirclement was reinforced by a second ring formed by the 16th Panzer Division and the Hungarian Corps. By August 8, the resistance of the surrounded units of the Red Army had generally ceased. German troops got the opportunity to conduct an operation to encircle the Southwestern Front.

Consequences

20 divisions of the 6th and 12th armies from the Southern Front were surrounded. Their commanders, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko and Major General P.G. Ponedelin, were captured. Also captured were:

• commander of the 49th Rifle Corps S. Ya. Ogurtsov
• commander of the 13th Rifle Corps N.K. Kirillov
• 8th Rifle Corps M. G. Snegov
• commander of the 16th mechanized corps A. D. Sokolov
• commander of the 80th Red Banner Donetsk Division, Major General V. I. Prokhorov
• Chief of Staff of the 192nd Mountain Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel Svechnikov Vasily Ivanovich

• commander of the 44th tank division V. P. Krymov
• commander of the 8th tank division P. S. Fotchenkov
• Commander of the 24th Mechanized Corps, Major General V. I. Chistyakov

Soviet prisoners of war were placed in a concentration camp created on the territory of a quarry near the city of Uman, unofficially called the “Uman pit” ( in the photo). Many died there due to poor living conditions. In the battlefields and in the camp, the Germans and their accomplices shot Jewish prisoners of war, commissars, “political fighters,” the wounded and weakened.

On Ukrainian soil, perhaps only Babi Yar can compare with the Uman Pit - one of the first concentration camps on the territory of the USSR.

One of the key battles of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War - the Battle of Uman - ended in a heavy defeat for the Red Army.

At the same time, exactly 77 years ago, one of the most terrible places of extermination of Soviet prisoners of war appeared - the Uman Pit. There will be many similar places on Ukrainian soil, but perhaps only Babi Yar can compare with the Uman Pit.

Photo from the website mil.ru

In both cases, the European “European integrators” clearly explained to the Soviet people what awaits him from European integration - mass shootings, extrajudicial executions for any reason and the situation not even of second-class people, but of powerless two-legged cattle. With whom the occupiers did whatever they wanted.

Until the Red Army kicked the Germans and their allies out of Ukraine, German supermen regularly replenished their albums with photographs against the backdrop of gallows, with raped and murdered women, with the corpses of executed Soviet people, and all with joyful smiles.

In the USSR, the Germans very quickly proved and showed that the process of transforming a so-called cultured European into an animal does not take that much time. However, to compare the Nazis with animals is to insult the latter.

Even though Battle of Uman ended with the defeat of the Red Army, a clear, clearly audible bell rang for the Wehrmacht already in August 1941. Then this call, and the subsequent ones too, will develop into the ringing of a funeral bell for dozens of German divisions and entire armies.

If the Germans, or rather their leaders, had been a little smarter, they would have quickly realized after the battles near Uman that they had invaded the wrong country. It was in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Holland and France that citizens in general were not very outraged by the fact of occupation.

They were not so indignant that they even volunteered to join SS battalions to fight for the future of Hitler’s Europe. But in the USSR, things didn’t work out right away for the Germans. And that's putting it mildly.

Yes, in the Battle of Uman the Red Army was defeated: the 6th and 12th armies were surrounded and defeated, army commanders I. Muzychenko and P. Ponedelin were captured, generals S. Verzin, V. Chistyakov, S. Zygin died in battle , I. Belov.

A little more than 10 thousand soldiers and part of the vehicle fleet escaped from the encirclement, all heavy weapons were lost and about 60 thousand soldiers and officers were captured and thrown into one of the first concentration camps on the territory of the USSR - the Uman Pit.

More than a hundred prisoners died there every day, mostly wounded; the Germans did not provide medical care, normal food or even water. The prisoners drank water from a huge puddle at the bottom of the pit, which is why widespread dysentery immediately began, and typhus, as expected, began in the fall.

It was a typical Hitlerite death camp; it was in such camps that a significant part of the Red Army prisoners of war would die in 1941 and 1942.

Photo from wikipedia.org/

Liberal historians, talking about the catastrophic losses of our army in the war, they deliberately keep silent about one point- the large loss of personnel was not so much in battle as in captivity. No other army except the Red Army suffered such terrible losses in captivity.

Even the Wehrmacht, which was completely captured in the spring of 1945, did not irrevocably lose as many soldiers as the Red Army did in 1941-1942. Stalin had a chance to pay back both prisoners and civilians and “even the score” in 1945, especially since he knew very well the numbers of our people’s losses from Hitler’s invasion.

But instead, an order was given to the army for the humane treatment of prisoners and civilians on German territory. Failure to comply with the order was punishable by execution, and this penalty was often carried out. However, all this does not prevent some “historians” from claiming two million German women were raped at the end of the war.

And who did the Germans shoot from among their own behind the Uman pit? Come on, for the pit, ten hospitals were surrounded near Uman and immediately the executions of seriously wounded people began, the rape of nurses, the murder of doctors.

The hospital medical staff suffered no less losses than the regular army, which once again gives reason to draw parallels between the Nazis and the beast.

Photos of shot Soviet wounded and grinning Nazi faces can easily be found on the Internet, as can photos of raped and murdered nurses. With the same joyful smiles of the “European integrators”.

It is worth noting that the death of the 6th and 12th armies was more fatal for the Third Reich than for the USSR. Strange as it may sound.

Yes, the losses of the Red Army were large; not only regular, experienced officers died, but also some of the best formations, for example, the 99th Rifle Division, which was considered the best in the Red Army. But the dead Soviet soldiers and officers, at the cost of their lives, delayed the Wehrmacht’s advance, gained precious time, which made it possible to evacuate part of the industry to the east of the country and did not allow the Germans to capture Kyiv outright.

And for the Germans, the battles in Ukraine did not look like an easy walk, despite the memoirs of Hitler’s military leaders and their post-war followers.

In these memoirs, the summer of 1941 is described as a series of brilliant victories for the Wehrmacht and a total collapse of the Red Army, but it is not clear why throughout December 1941 the Wehrmacht was already running away from the Soviet troops, and Hitler was forced to use barrier detachments at the front to stop the flight of his valiant soldiers.

And this flight began in July-August 1941 near Uman. It was then that the Germans should have realized that the blitzkrieg promoted by the leaders of the Reich would sooner or later end in disaster, the contours of which were outlined near Moscow in December, and then it still happened seventeen months later near Stalingrad.

Although already on July 30, 1941, near the Ukrainian village of Legedzino, all the signs of the impending catastrophe were evident. It was on this day that the combined battalion of border guards of the Kolomyia commandant’s office under the command of Major R. Filippov attacked German units.

Covering the retreat of the headquarters column, Filippov threw border guards and service dogs into battle - a battle unprecedented in the history of world wars. Yes, this attack was suicidal, but after this the Germans should have thought - what awaits them next? What awaits them in a country where everything is fighting against them - both people and animals - and where every bush is shooting? It is clear that nothing good.

Just a couple of months later after the end of the Uman battle, the Germans were surprised to discover that despite the shift of the front line deep into the USSR, the war continued in the rear.

A significant part of the surrounded Soviet soldiers and officers were not captured, but formed partisan detachments that would wage a merciless fight against the occupiers, right up to the liberation of the territory of Ukraine from the “European integrators.”

Every day the partisans will destroy enemy personnel and traitors who have gone into the service of the enemy, wage a rail war, and commit sabotage at industrial facilities.

The most interesting thing is that the occupation authorities will call on the population to fight the “bandits,” as they called the partisans. It’s very European to come to a foreign country, kill millions of citizens, drive hundreds of thousands into slavery, and then wonder why these ungrateful people, “blessed with European values,” shoot in the back and derail trains?

In general, near Uman, despite the death of the 6th and 12th armies, already in August 1941 the answer was given to the question that was then tormenting the whole world - will Hitler win? No, under no circumstances would Hitler have won the war.

Even if the Germans reached the planned Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, this would only extend the existence of the Third Reich by several months.

The Red Army could be completely destroyed only if the Germans surrounded and defeated its last combat-ready units somewhere near Vladivostok. Which could not happen in principle. And since this could not happen, then Hitler must be recognized as an enchanting idiot, who for some reason decided that the war could be both easily started and easily ended. Which also does not happen in principle.

Going on a campaign to the East, the “brilliant” Fuhrer not only did not appreciate the scale of the upcoming campaign, but also such “little things” as colossal territories that must not only be occupied, but also controlled, did not take into account the will and resistance of the people, who, unlike from the French, Czechs and Danes, he did not want to meekly endure the Nazi yoke, and did not appreciate the capabilities of Soviet industry.

By and large, Hitler did not appreciate anything at all, once again proving to the whole world that he was not a genius at all, but simply a cheap adventurer. When the Khrushchevites-thaw workers, with a simple suggestion from their boss, laugh at Stalin, claiming that he led the war using a globe, then Hitler, it seems, did not even have a globe at hand. His Nazi friends did not give him an item so necessary for the leader of the thousand-year-old Reich.

Look, otherwise maybe the upstart corporal would have realized that he was going to attack a country stretching from the Baltic to Pacific Ocean and that there may simply not be enough German people to conquer such territories.

Even with Finns, Italians and Hungarians in addition. Well, Hitler himself didn’t want to hear anything about the partisans. What does the experience of some Napoleon matter to him? Themselves with a mustache, there will be no winter, the partisans are a trifle, the USSR is a colossus with feet of clay.

The realization of his own stupidity came to Hitler too late. Then the time came to shoot, hearing the clanging of the Thirty-Four tracks a kilometer from the Reich Chancellery.

There was no other way out - Hitler really did not want to be brought to Red Square in a cage. And the likelihood of this was high, given Stalin’s not very hidden love for spectacular scenes, let us remember, for example, the passage of captured Germans through Moscow, accompanied by watering machines and throwing the banners of the defeated German units to the Mausoleum.

It is possible that Hitler in a cage would have been given a kind of “tour” with visits to Auschwitz, Treblinka, Babyn Yar and the same Uman pit. Well, then they could have brought him to Nuremberg and then strung him up along with his accomplices.

Although Churchill suggested that Stalin should not complicate the trial of the Nazis with “complex legal procedures.” And he was right - they had to be treated the same way as they did with the occupied peoples of Europe and the USSR. They fully deserved it, having personally renounced the right to be like people, and therefore humanism towards this beast, which placed itself outside human laws, was truly unnecessary.

And the Uman battle, like the Uman pit, should always be a reminder to all of us of the two poles of human nature.

One pole is military valor, mass heroism and self-sacrifice, and at the other pole are the dark, bestial instincts of “racially correct” subhumans who imagine themselves better than the rest of humanity.

Unfortunately, even in our time, the latter often defeats the former. Confirming the well-known truth that history teaches what it teaches nothing.