There is still debate about the cause of the explosion. Perhaps it was an accidental electrical spark. Or maybe someone's cigarette worked as a detonator, because one of the passengers could well go out to smoke at night ...

But how did the gas leak come about? According to the official version, even during construction in October 1985, the pipeline was damaged by an excavator bucket. At first it was just corrosion, but a crack appeared over time from constant loads. It opened just 40 minutes before the accident, and by the time the trains passed, a sufficient amount of gas had already accumulated in the lowland.

In any case, it was the pipeline builders who were found guilty of the accident. Responsibility was borne by seven people, among whom were officials, foremen and workers.

But there is another version, according to which the leak occurred two to three weeks before the disaster. Apparently, under the influence of "stray currents" from the railway, an electrochemical reaction began in the pipe, which led to corrosion. First, a small hole formed through which the gas began to leak. Gradually, it expanded to a crack.

By the way, the drivers of the trains passing this section reported about the gas contamination a few days before the accident. A few hours before it, the pressure in the pipeline dropped, but the problem was solved simply - they increased the gas supply, which further aggravated the situation.

So, most likely, the main cause of the tragedy was elementary negligence, the usual Russian hope for "maybe" ...

The pipeline was not restored. Subsequently, it was liquidated. And on the site of the Ashina disaster in 1992, a memorial was erected. Every year relatives of the victims come here to honor their memory.

At about five o'clock in the evening on February 17, 1982, Muscovites who worked near the Aviamotornaya station were heading home. As always at this time, the metro filled with people and the station attendant turned on the backup escalator so as not to create a crowd. Less than half an hour later, one of the most tragic events in the history of the Moscow Metro took place.

Due to the breakdown of the trolley mechanism, the stairs lost their grip on the engine, and the escalator abruptly crept down, picking up speed. The stairs were rushing at a speed 2.5 times higher than the norm.

People lost their balance and fell down, sliding down the stairs and blocking the passage at the lower exit platform.

The total weight of the passengers on the escalator was 12 tons, and almost all of them formed a mountain of bodies at the bottom of the escalator in a few seconds.

The tragedy lasted 110 seconds. At 17.10 the entrance to the station was restricted, at 17.35 it was blocked. Ten minutes later, the station itself was closed, trains passed by without stopping. An ambulance was called to the station.

In the 1980s, newspapers didn't talk much about such things. The next day, Vechernyaya Moskva published only a note in a few lines: “On February 17, 1982, an escalator accident occurred at the Aviamotornaya station of the Kalinin radius of the Moscow Metro. Among the passengers there are victims. The cause of the accident is under investigation."

But word of mouth worked fine.

The city was filled with rumors about hundreds of dead who fell into the engine room under the escalator and were torn apart by working mechanisms, about the station covered in blood.

“It should be noted that the floor of Aviamotornaya is really paved with reddish-colored marble, reminiscent of gore,” writes Matvey Grechko, author of the book Secret Moscow Metro Lines in Schemes, Legends, Facts. “Realizing that it is quite difficult to remove any contamination from porous marble, and completely forgetting that the floor of the station looked exactly the same as a year ago, Muscovites considered these “blood stains” to be proof of the veracity of the most terrible gossip. Many, not wanting to walk on blood, began to avoid the strange station, and Aviamotornaya became deserted and deserted for a long time.

A few months later, in April 1982, the Novoe Russian word” very colorfully described what happened:

“According to eyewitnesses, as a result of a break in an overcrowded escalator, several hundred people fell into a mechanism that continued to rotate, dozens were crushed, more than a hundred were crippled. All this happened in front of people moving on a parallel escalator. There was a panic among them, which caused additional casualties: several people died in the crowd.

In fact, of course, no one was drawn into the mechanisms. People were injured and died in the ensuing stampede. Some passengers, trying to get out of it, climbed onto the balustrade. Thin, only 3 mm, plastic cladding could not stand it and collapsed, but below there were not terrible mechanisms that turned respectable citizens into bloody minced meat, but stable concrete foundations. People who fell from a height of two meters received bruises, but survived.

Nine months later, at a meeting of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, the exact number of victims was named: 30 wounded and eight dead.

As the investigators found out, the reason was the incorrect operation of the new brakes installed on the Aviamotornaya escalators in December 1981. Metro employees, not familiar with the new requirements, regulated their work according to the old instructions. As a result, the escalators worked for three months in emergency mode. During the accident, one of the steps broke, and, passing the lower comb of the escalator, she deformed and destroyed it. The protection worked, and the electric motor turned off. But the emergency electromagnetic brake was able to develop the necessary braking torque only when the braking distance was more than 11 m. And the mechanical emergency brake did not work because the speed of the web did not reach the threshold value.

A very difficult situation has developed for the leadership of the subway. The escalators of this series have already been repeatedly complained about, and, of course, after what happened, it was necessary to check them all. But then almost two dozen stations would have to be closed, which would paralyze the operation of the metro and lead to a scandal.

As a result, it was decided to close only Aviamotornaya. The repair lasted three weeks and went around the clock, teams of 70 people worked at the station in three shifts, seven days a week. At the rest of the stations, the escalators were repaired gradually, strengthening the steps, modernizing the brakes, changing the main drive shafts and balustrade shields.

IN 16 hours 30 minutes due to the beginning influx of passengers returning from work, escalator No. 4 of the Aviamotornaya station was turned on for descent. For several minutes the escalator worked without passengers. Soon, the escalator was opened and the first passengers stepped onto the stairs. Fifteen minutes later, as a result of a breakdown of the mechanism, the clutch of the ladder carts with the engine was lost, and the escalator, under the weight of people, began to move down, picking up speed.

From the conclusion of the examination:

“At 17 o’clock on February 17 of this year. during the operation of the escalator for the descent of passengers, the right handrail came off the guides, the blocking device worked, and the electric motor of the main drive turned off. As a result of the committed violations, the service brake that was put into operation did not develop the braking torque and did not ensure the stop of the stairway. Under the weight of the passengers (about 12 tons), there was an accelerated movement of the stairway, but the emergency brake that was disabled earlier also did not stop the escalator.”

The stairway developed a speed 2-2.4 times higher than the nominal one, about a hundred people could not stay on their feet and began to fall, blocking the passage in the area of ​​the lower exit platform. In a few seconds, almost all the passengers who were on the escalator rolled down.

The tragedy lasted 110 seconds. The duty officer on the escalator did everything in his power, but was powerless. Noticing the abnormal movement of the stairs, he tried to stop the car with the service brake from the console in his cab, but to no avail. Jumping out of the cab, the attendant rushed to the balustrade to apply the emergency brake, but this did not help either ... At 17:10, the entrance to the station was limited, at 17:35 it was blocked, and ten minutes later the station was completely closed. Trains passed without stopping.

The news of the disaster spread throughout the city instantly. Vecherka, almost the only newspaper, published a laconic message, which noted: “On February 17, 1982, an escalator accident occurred at the Aviamotornaya station of the Kalinin radius of the Moscow Metro. Among the passengers there are victims. The cause of the accident is under investigation." Only nine months later, at a meeting of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, the exact number of victims was named: 8 dead and 30 wounded.

Contrary to the rumors that flooded the city, people did not fall into the engine room, and no one was dragged into the mechanisms. All eight people who died were crushed by a mass of people who piled on them. Some passengers, trying to escape, jumped onto the balustrade of the escalator. The plastic sheets of the cladding broke down and collapsed (that's where the rumors come from), but those who failed escaped with only minor bruises, since there is a concrete base just a few meters under the balustrade itself and there are no moving parts.

Literally two days before the accident, it was inspected, adjusted and the brake was tested. The work was done by master Zagvozkin. On the morning of February 17, after a night of sludge, the driver Krysanov tested the car with a measurement of the braking distance. The results were satisfactory.

The investigation that began revealed that in December 1981, service brakes of the new system were installed on four escalators of the Aviamotornaya station, which had to be adjusted in compliance with the requirements of the “Instructions for the operation of tunnel escalators ET-2 and ET-3 T-65215IE”, developed by SKB escalator construction of the Leningrad production association "Escalator". However, the foreman for the operation of the escalators of this station, V.P. Zagvozkin did not adjust the service brakes according to the specified instructions he had, but according to the instructions related to another type of escalators (LT-4), which he previously served.

Therefore, the investigation concluded that in the period from December 1981 to the day of the disaster, inclusive, all four Aviamotornaya escalators were operated in emergency mode.

The immediate cause of the accident was a break in stage No. 96. The damaged step during the passage of the lower entrance platform caused deformation and destruction of the comb, while the protection of the rise of the steps of the bottom and the entrance platform worked. When the protective devices were triggered, the main drive electric motor turned off and the service brake electromagnet turned on, but due to insufficient braking torque, the braking distance significantly exceeded the set value and amounted to about eleven meters. The emergency brake did not turn on, because the speed of the stairway did not reach the value of the emergency brake sensor, and the control of the service brake status of this series of escalators was not provided for by the electrical circuit.

The tragedy resulted from the imposition of both the design flaws of the escalator and the notorious "human factor".

After the accident, the leadership of the subway found itself in difficult situation. On the one hand, it was necessary to immediately check all the ET series escalators, since there were more than enough complaints about them, but for this it would have been necessary to close more than a dozen stations, and the Kalinin line completely.

Yu.V. Senyushkin, head of the Moscow Metro, sent letters to the City Committee of the CPSU and the executive committee of the Moscow City Council with a request to resolve the issue of the complete closure of the Kalinin line for the duration of the repair:
“Given that, according to the conclusion of the forensic technological examination, the operation of steps with melt-through electro-riveted joints seems dangerous and they should be replaced immediately, I ask for the dismantling of the steps of the escalators at the Aviamotornaya, Highway Entuziastov, Ploshchad Ilyicha and Marxistskaya stations and strengthening allow them to close the Kalinin line at the Mintyazhmash plant.

Naturally, neither the city authorities, nor, moreover, the party authorities, could make such a scandal. Only the Aviamotornaya station was closed for three weeks, from 12 to 28 May. The work was organized around the clock, in three shifts, in teams of 70 people, seven days a week. The shifts were led by experienced specialists, engineers from the Metropolitan Administration and the Main Metropolitan Administration of the Ministry of Railways spent the day and night at the station. Repair personnel were delivered by special buses, free food was organized. Coordination of work was carried out by a special headquarters. Escalators at other stations were repaired gradually.

After the accident at the Aviamotornaya station, Mintyazhmash, together with the Ministry of Railways, outlined urgent measures to improve the reliability of the ET series escalators. Made strengthening steps, modernization of service brakes with a change in the electrical circuit; the main drive shafts were replaced, the balustrade shields were changed from 3 mm to 8-10 mm.

In conclusion, let us recall the names of people who paid for our safety at the cost of their lives:

Komashko Larisa Ivanovna
Kuzma Elizaveta Yurievna
Mulkidzhan Grigory Alexandrovich
Pavlov Alexander Yurievich
Romaniuk Valentina Nikitichna
Skobeleva Alexandra Alekseevna
Uvarov Viktor Petrovich
Ulybina Lidia Kuzminichna.

Used information from an article in the Moscow Industrial Newspaper No. 19 (184) May 23 - 29, 2002.

Collision of freight and passenger trains at the station of the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in Rostov region called the largest in the post-war history of the USSR, and in terms of the number of human casualties - the second after the 1989 disaster in the Chelyabinsk region.

The tragedy occurred on August 7, 1987 at 01:31 Moscow time. A freight train at full speed crashed into the tail cars of the Rostov-on-Don-Moscow passenger train, which was standing at the Kamenskaya South-Eastern Railway station (now the North Caucasus Railway).

What preceded the disaster, why it became possible and who was punished for what happened - in the chronology of events restored by AiF-Rostov.

Inattentive inspectors, inexperienced driver

August 7, 1987 00 hours 23 minutes, Likhaya station. Inspectors A. Trusov and N. Puzanov inspected freight train No. 2035, formed at the Armavir station. It was a three-section locomotive VL80s-887/842 and 55 hopper cars with grain, with a total weight of more than 5.5 thousand tons. The workers did not pay attention to the fact that the end valve of the brake system between the 6th and 7th cars was closed.

IN 00:55 passenger train No. 335 "Rostov-on-Don - Moscow" departed from Likhaya station in the direction of Kamenskaya station. The distance between the points is 24 kilometers, and the elevation difference - the road goes downhill - 200 meters.

Behind the passenger 01:02, sent commodity number 2035. The locomotive crew (engineer S. Batushkin and his assistant Yu. Shtykhno) checks the brakes at the appointed place and notes their poor efficiency, but does not take any measures.

From the place the train moved with difficulty, with some inhibition. However, the driver drove trains of such a large mass for the first time and therefore suggested that such a start-up is quite normal for heavy trains.

The first monument to the victims of the disaster (wooden). Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / GennadyL

Loss of control

Shortly after leaving Likha, the driver of train No. 2035 tried the brakes. The train slowed down, but the braking distance was not 300 meters, as required by the regulations, but about 700. Thus, the train continued to accelerate until after eight kilometers a long descent began, leading to the valley of the Seversky Donets River to the central part of the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky .

The driver applied several stages of service braking, but the speed of the train not only did not fall, but grew.

There were ten kilometers to Kamenskaya when the locomotive crew reported to the dispatcher that a heavy freight train with faulty brakes was approaching the station at high speed.

And there, all the tracks were occupied by various trains, including those with dangerous goods.

The dispatcher decides to let train No. 335 pass without stopping, but he failed to contact the locomotive crew: the driver's assistant held the microphone in his hands, so the broadcast was drowned out by the noise of the radio station.

Train No. 335 consisted of 15 cars and an electric locomotive, which was operated by a locomotive crew from the Likhaya depot: driver Britsyn and assistant driver Panteleichuk (names unknown - ed.). The brigade was waiting for the entrance traffic light, and under the clearing lights (two yellow) the train arrived on the fifth track of the Kamenskaya station in 01:28 . Passengers boarding has begun.

It was impossible to move the arrows so that the unmanaged train went to another track: all other tracks were busy, and the blocking does not allow setting the route to an already occupied canvas.

Catastrophe

When an uncontrolled freight train was approaching the station, the driver's assistant left the cab, laying out the microphone from his hands. Thanks to this, the dispatcher finally contacts the driver and, briefly explaining the criticality of the situation, orders to leave the station immediately.

IN 01:29 the train started moving, but the conductor of car No. 10 G. Turkin, according to the instructions, tore off the stopcock. The driver's assistant ran to the car, but it was already impossible to change anything.

IN 1 hour 30 minutes Freight train No. 2035 drove into Kamenskaya station at a speed of about 140 km/h - instead of the prescribed 25 km/h.

At railroad switch No. 17 in 01:31 there was a break in the automatic coupler between the first and second wagons of the freight train, the second wagon derailed. The rest of the hoppers (self-unloading hoppers on wheels) ran into each other, listing to the left side, and formed a blockage. Then it becomes clear that this saved the passenger train from complete destruction.

An electric locomotive with one grain car with a total weight of 288 tons remained on the rails and proceeded to the fifth track. He drove 464 meters and at a speed of over 100 km / h caught up with the passenger train "Rostov-on-Don - Moscow".

It happened in 01:32. An electric locomotive of a heavy locomotive crashed into the tail of a passenger train, completely crushing cars No. 15 and 14. Car No. 13 was half destroyed. 106 people died instantly - two conductors and passengers.

The 107th dead was the electrician Tkachenko, who began to eliminate the consequences of the crash and received a fatal electric shock.

The movement of trains at Kamenskaya station was interrupted: on the first track - for 1 hour 30 minutes, and on the second - for 82 hours 58 minutes.

Train crash at Kamenskaya station, August 7, 1987 Photo: Wikipedia

Cleanup

01:36. In service rapid response received the first signal of a disaster.

IN 01:42 Four ambulances arrived at the Kamenskaya station. 13 victims were taken to the city hospital. Among them are the assistant driver of train No. 2035 Yuri Shtykhno and the driver Sergei Batushkin, who miraculously survived.

As a result of the crash, the broken electric locomotive of the freight train ended up on the last carriages of the passenger train. At the odd neck of the station there was a blockage about 15 meters high. The inertia of the train during the crash was such that the cars also dug into the ground, some of them by almost ten meters.

03:05 - Broken cars were uncoupled from train No. 335, and the rest were sent to Glubokaya station.
03:50 - personnel raised on alarm military units stationed in Kamensk, recovery trains, bulldozers, tractors and cranes were sent to the scene of the tragedy. The crash site was cordoned off.
03:55 - began to open the walls of two crumpled cars. 06:00 - p began to dismantle the rubble from the wagons with grain.

As a result of the tragedy, two sections of the electric locomotive, 54 freight and three passenger cars were completely destroyed, 300 meters of track, two turnouts, eight poles of the contact network and a thousand meters of contact wires were damaged, 330 tons of grain were lost.

Of the passengers of the last two cars, nine people survived: some were standing on the platform, others were thrown out of the cars upon impact. 114 people were injured.

Personalities three dead at the time of the disaster the man was never identified. The bodies were buried as unidentified.

Material losses amounted to about one and a half million Soviet rubles.

Memorial cross to the victims of the disaster. Delivered August 9, 2010. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / GennadyL

Guilty "switchmen"

A government commission was investigating the causes of the disaster. Having studied all the materials of the case, she found out that signs of prolonged braking were observed on many cars of the freight train. But at the same time, the brake pads of the locomotive turned out to be almost completely worn off, the same picture took place on the first few cars.

Upon further inspection, it turned out that between the 6th and 7th cars, the end valve of the brake line was blocked. That is, 49 cars out of 55 turned out to be disabled in a braked state. The conducted investigative experiment proved that this was the cause of the tragedy.

Among the accused were dispatchers of the Kamenskaya station, who did not prepare a safe route for an uncontrolled train, car inspectors who checked the operation of the brakes of train No. a passenger train in a timely manner, and the conductor of car No. 10, who tore off the stop crane.

However, during the investigation, some were acquitted as they did not know about the danger, and others - the locomotive crew of train No. 2035, out of humane motives, it was decided not to judge: the driver's assistant was seriously injured, and the driver became completely disabled.

As a result, the "switchmen" turned out to be the inspectors of the wagons. They were sentenced to 12 years in prison. The head of the South-Eastern Railway lost his position, and the Likhov branch was transferred to the jurisdiction of the North Caucasus Railway.

On August 7, 1987 at 1:35 a.m. at the Kamenskaya station of the Likhovsky branch of the South-Eastern Railway, a passenger train No. 335 of the Rostov-Moscow message crashed with casualties. This train was sent from Likhaya-Kamenskaya station, followed by freight train No. 2035 following the auto-blocking signals.

In the process of following a long descent by the locomotive crew of a freight train, the absence of a braking effect was revealed, which subsequently caused a significant increase in the speed of movement. The measures taken by the locomotive brigade did not rule out a collision with a passenger train that had stopped at Kamenskaya station. As a result, two passenger cars, 53 grain carriers and an electric locomotive were smashed, and the movement of trains was interrupted for a long period. The reason for the failure of the brakes in the freight train is being investigated, which will be announced later.

An emergency situation was also created on a number of other railways, including in passenger traffic. Numerous cases of marriage, each of which is potentially a crash or an accident, lead to large moral and material losses, cause indignation Soviet people. The reason for this state of emergency lies, first of all, in the irresponsible attitude of the commanding, auditing and instructor staff and direct executors transportation process to fulfill their duties to ensure traffic safety.

The Ministry of Railways requires all transport commanders to bring to the attention of each railway worker the emergency of the current situation with ensuring traffic safety, to immediately conduct additional briefings in all shifts, brigades and workshops and mobilize labor collectives for accident-free work.

Telegram
The railway department, by its telegram No. 4-URB dated 10/05/88, informs that the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR has completed the investigation of the criminal case on the crash of passenger and freight trains at the Kamenskaya station on 08/07/87 and sent a submission to the Ministry of Railways in connection with this.

The prosecutor's office, as well as the commission of the Ministry of Railways, which conducted the investigation, came to the conclusion that the cause of the crash was the departure of train No. 2035 from the Likhaya station with the brake line valve blocked between the cars. At the same time, the investigation established the following: the end valve was closed between the first and second cars when the electric locomotive was uncoupled by the assistant driver of the locomotive brigade, which brought the composition of the specified train to Likhaya station. This is caused by a malfunction of the crane of the first car on the side of the locomotive. The blocking of the brake line was revealed by inspectors-repairmen Trusov and Puzanov, who, during the maintenance of the train in violation of the requirements of the PTE, Instructions, did not fully test the brakes, as it should be when changing locomotives, or even reduced their testing with checking the condition of the brake line by the action of the tail brake wagon, did not conduct.

The wagon inspector also did not comply with the requirement of clause 3.10 of the Instructions for the Operation of Rolling Stock Brakes and, without finding out the result of measuring the density of the brake network, arbitrarily indicated in the certificate form VU-45 the standard density value corresponding to this series of locomotive and the length of the train.

The machinist Batushkin and his assistant Shtykhno, who showed complete indifference and indifference to the preparation of train No. 3035 for the voyage, are directly related to these gross violations.

The People's Court of the RSFSR began hearing a criminal case on the fact of this crash. The submission of the USSR Prosecutor's Office indicated the unsatisfactory use of the rheostatic brake in the operation of the corresponding series of electric locomotives and the unpreparedness of locomotive crews for its use. It was also noted that at present, many railway workers associated with the movement of trains have not yet been trained in the procedure for acting in non-standard situations.

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission found out that during technological operations in the head cars of train No. 2035, an unknown person blocked the end valve of the brake air line between the fifth and sixth cars. This malfunction was to be identified and eliminated by the inspectors of the cars of the station Likhaya Trusov and Puzanov. They did not do this, for which they were brought to trial under article 35 of part 1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. They were sentenced to 12 years. Quite obvious is the wine locomotive brigade of freight train No. 2035.

At the Kamenskaya station there was no catching dead end, there was no normal communication between the drivers and the station duty officer, there was no developed instruction on how to behave in emergency situations.

On August 7, 1987, at 1:30 a.m., one of the biggest tragedies in the history of railways occurred at the Kamenskaya station of the Likhovsky branch of the South-Eastern Railway. There was a collision with freight train No. 2035 (three-section electric locomotive VL80 ° -887/842, locomotive depot driver Rossosh Batushkin SV., assistant driver Shtykhno Yu., 55 wagons, more than 5 thousand tons of Kuban grain), following from Armavir. Freight train No. 2035 completed the section from Likhaya station to Kamenskaya station for 24 kilometers at great speed. At the entrance arrow number 17, the cars did not fit into the turn.

One of the first wagons derailed, and all the other wagons piled on top of it. The detached locomotive rushed along the station tracks and, having traveled 464 m, collided with passenger train No. 335 on the Rostov-Moscow route (electric locomotive ChS4t-489, locomotive depot driver Likhaya Britsyn, assistant driver Panteleichuk, 13 cars). The tail cars turned into an accordion. Destroyed three passenger cars and two sections of the electric locomotive to the extent of exclusion from the inventory. When leaving, 54 grain-carrier cars were destroyed to the extent of exclusion from the inventory. 300 m of track, 2 turnouts, 8 contact network supports, 1000 m of contact wires were damaged. 106 people died. The movement of trains on the loaded direction on the even track was interrupted for 82 hours 58 minutes, on the odd one for 90 minutes.

Passenger train No. 335 departed from Likhaya station at 0055 hours, following passenger train No. 347 on the Krasnodar-Moscow route, which left Likhaya station at 0045 hours. Freight train No. 2081 followed ahead of these passenger trains, which, due to improper brake control by the machinist of the depot Rossosh Serobabin, overestimated the travel time by 5 minutes. This caused passenger train No. 347 to stop before the entrance signal of the Kamenskaya station for two minutes. Passenger train No. 335 following it also stopped at the closed entrance! signal. Following train No. 335 at 1:02 a.m., freight train No. 2035 was sent from Lihaya station. This train was replaced in Lihoyu! electric locomotive. Having attached a new locomotive to the train, the team had to check the operation of the brakes. To do this, the driver turns on the brake, and two sles-rai-carriages must go along the train and make sure that the brake pads are pressed against the wheel rims of all cars.

But the workers of the car depot Trusov A and Puzanov N. showed criminal carelessness: they made an abbreviated test of the brakes, and not from the head of the train, but from the eighth car and did not find a closed air valve of the brake line, which actually paralyzed it. Having handed the driver Batushkin a certificate of form VCh-45 on providing the train with brakes, they went on a direct violation of the PTE. The driver was also directly responsible for the crash. He could have prevented the tragedy twice. At the Likhaya station, he withdrew himself from a complete brake test, agreeing to a simplified test by wagon drivers. And when he left Likhoi, he did not pay attention to the slowness of the movement, although he felt the heavy start of the train. Then, at high speed, when the action of the brakes was checked on the move, he noted their poor effectiveness, but did not raise an alarm, did not apply emergency braking. Shtykhno, an assistant driver, said: “The brakes were tested at a speed of 40 km / h at a designated place. Nothing disturbing was noticed. Before the Kamenskaya protracted slope (11 thousandths). When the train reached him at a speed of 65 km / h, the driver gave the first stage of service braking. There was no effect. Gave an additional discharge: no change. Applies emergency braking: the train picks up speed. Twice they tried to apply rheostatic braking, countercurrent: all to no avail. At the entrance to the Kamenskaya station, the speed reached 140 km/h.” 10 kilometers before the station, the driver called the dispatcher. Batushkin shouted over the radio: “The train has lost control, the brakes do not work. Take to the free path." But they were not in Kamenskaya. Skuredina, the station attendant, and Litvinenko, the dispatcher, were in real danger of a crash. They decided to let train 335 through without stopping, regardless of the output signal. However, it was not possible to contact the crew of the passenger train. Train number 335 stopped at 1 hour 28 minutes on track 5. There is bewilderment: how could it be possible to take a train that lost control to the passenger platform, and not to any other track, although it was occupied by a freight train. After standing for a minute (according to schedule No. 335, it costs 5 minutes), the train, on the order of the station attendant, set off on the yellow signal of the exit traffic light H-5. At this time, the conductor of car 10 G. Turkin, not knowing the situation, tore off the stop crane in order to disembark passengers and take new ones, as required by the instructions. It was at this moment that the collision took place.