Military space activities implies the use of astronautics in military affairs, as well as, if necessary, the use of outer space or its individual areas as a theater of military operations.
Various countries are currently using spacecraft for satellite reconnaissance, early warning of ballistic missiles, communications, and navigation. Military space activities are led by Russia and the United States.
satellite intelligence
For these purposes, use reconnaissance satellite(informally called spy satellite) is an earth observation satellite or communications satellite used for reconnaissance.
The functions of reconnaissance satellites include:
- specific reconnaissance(photography with high definition);
- electronic intelligence(listening to communication systems and determining the location of radio facilities);
- tracking for the implementation of the ban on nuclear testing;
- missile warning system(detection of missile launches).
First generation satellites (American corona and Soviet "Zenith") took photographs, and then released containers with the captured film, which descended to the ground. Later spacecraft were equipped with photo-television systems and transmitted images using encrypted radio signals.
Vision reconnaissance satellites : photographic(have Russia, USA, China), optoelectronic(have Israel, Russia, USA, China), radar(have Russia, USA, Germany, China).
Radio engineering(electronic) reconnaissance - the collection of intelligence information based on the reception and analysis of electromagnetic radiation (EMR). Electronic reconnaissance uses both intercepted signals from communication channels between people and technical means, and signals from various devices. According to its features, electronic intelligence refers to the technical types of intelligence.
Monitoring the implementation of the ban on nuclear tests is associated with the implementation the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was adopted by the 50th session of the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996 and opened for signature on September 24, 1996.
In accordance with Article I of the Treaty:
- each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion and any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion in any place under its jurisdiction or control;
- Each State Party undertakes to further refrain from from inciting, encouraging or otherwise participating in the conduct of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
Missile attack warning system designed to detect a missile attack before the missiles reach their targets. It consists of two echelons - ground-based radars and an orbital constellation of early warning satellites.
Anti-satellite weapon systems
Anti-satellite weapons- types of weapons designed to destroy spacecraft used for navigation and reconnaissance purposes. D
This weapon is divided into two main types:
1. Satellites - interceptors.
2. Ballistic missiles launched from ground installations, ships or aircraft.
interceptor satellites
In the USSR, the concept of an interceptor satellite was chosen as an anti-satellite weapon. The apparatus in orbit performed an orbital rendezvous maneuver with the target satellite and hit it with a detonation of a warhead with shrapnel submunitions. In 1979, this anti-space defense system was put on alert.
Currently, the United States is armed with the Aegis ship-based missile defense system. The RIM-161 (SM-3) missile, which is part of it, has the ability to hit satellites, which was demonstrated in practice on February 21, 2008, when the SM-3 missile successfully hit the US military satellite USA-193, which entered an undesignated low orbit.
Anti-satellite ballistic missiles
The United States began such developments in the late 1950s. From May 1958 to October 1959, 12 test launches were carried out, which showed the inefficiency of the system. Another similar project involved launching a rocket from a B-58 Hustler bomber. The program was closed after a failed launch. The next generation of anti-satellite ballistic missiles was based on the use of high-yield nuclear warheads. Since 1982, when it became known that the USSR had effective anti-satellite weapons (IS interceptor satellites), the USA launched a program to develop a new generation of highly mobile anti-satellite missile ASM-135 ASAT. This two-stage solid rocket was launched from an F-15 fighter; guidance method - inertial; detachable warhead weighing 13.6 kg, having an infrared guidance head was not equipped with an explosive and hit the target with a direct hit.
In the 1980s, the USSR also carried out a program to develop an anti-satellite missile launched from a MiG-31 aircraft.
Currently, the United States is armed with the Aegis ship-based missile defense system. The missile can hit satellites, which was demonstrated in practice on February 21, 2008, when an SM-3 missile successfully hit the US military satellite USA-193, which entered an undesignated low orbit.
Russian Space Forces
Aerospace Defense Troops(VVKO) - a separate branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, created by decision of President Dmitry Medvedev (previously they were called space troops). The first duty shift of the command post aerospace defense troops took up combat duty on December 1, 2011.
Creation Aerospace Defense Troops it was necessary to combine the forces and means responsible for ensuring the security of Russia in space and from space with military formations solving the tasks of air defense (air defense) of the Russian Federation. This was due to the objective need to integrate under a single leadership all the forces and means capable of fighting in the air and space spheres.
Objects aerospace defense troops located throughout Russia - from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka, as well as beyond its borders. In the countries of the near abroad - Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, objects of systems for warning of a missile attack and control of outer space are deployed.
HISTORY REFERENCE.
From the very beginning, the US military was interested in the opportunities that opened up with the advent of communications satellites, navigation and meteorological satellites, and in particular intelligence and early warning systems for ballistic missiles. After the end of World War II, the Army, Navy and Air Force began to develop ballistic missiles, meaning not only to destroy their targets, but also to launch satellites into low Earth orbits, from where they could support military operations. see also ROCKET WEAPONS; ROCKET; .
In the late 1950s, the Air Force became the main US military space service. Their plan for launching satellites, developed in 1956, provided for the performance of both reconnaissance functions (observation from space of objects of a possible enemy) and early detection of ballistic missiles. Satellites equipped with photographic equipment and IR sensors were supposed to be launched into polar orbits in order to provide continuous global surveillance.
The shaping of the US military space program during the Cold War was essential to intelligence gathering on the Soviet Union. The leading role in the collection of this kind of intelligence was played, of course, by the CIA, which from 1956 conducted flights of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the USSR. In August 1960, President D. Eisenhower created the Directorate of Missile and Satellite Systems, which was later renamed the National Intelligence Agency - NRU. He was assigned the respective tasks of the CIA, Air Force and Navy. By early 1961, it was given responsibility for national programs for both operational and strategic intelligence, and the Air Force was given responsibility for "semi-open" programs in the military field, which included communications, meteorology, navigation, and early warning.
Operational Intelligence.
The return of the film to Earth.
Flights of reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union came to a discouraging final on May 1, 1960, when a U-2 piloted by F. Powers was shot down. This attracted interest in satellite systems. The program for the return of exposed film from satellites to Earth (codenamed CORONA) was carried out under the "roof" of the Discoverer program in conditions of the highest secrecy. The first successful return of a filmed film to Earth was from the Discoverer 14 satellite, launched into orbit on August 18, 1960. After the return capsule was released from the satellite on its 17th orbit, a C-130 transport aircraft caught it in the air from the third run using a special trawl.
Between August 1960 and May 1972, 145 satellites were successfully launched and operated under the CORONA program, which collected many photographic images of interest to strategic intelligence and cartography. The first KH-1 satellites provided terrestrial object resolution of approx. 12 m (KH - short for the code name KEYHOLE - keyhole). Then several more advanced versions of the KH series satellites appeared, the last of which gave a resolution of 1.5 m. The KH-5 mapping system (seven satellites) and the KH-6 enhanced resolution system (one satellite) were also included in the CORONA program.
All of these satellites belonged to the category of platforms for wide coverage panoramic photography, since the resolution of their cameras made it possible to obtain an image of a territory measuring 20 × 190 km in each image. Such photographs turned out to be extremely important for determining the state of strategic weapons in the USSR. see also WAR NUCLEAR.
Since July 1963, the operation of the first series of satellites equipped with equipment for close-up photography began. The KH-7 satellites produced images with a resolution of 0.46 m. They existed until 1967, when they were replaced by the KH-8, which operated until 1984 and made it possible to obtain images with a resolution of 0.3 m.
Electronic transmission in real time.
Although these early space systems provided valuable information, they had several disadvantages in terms of the way the information was transmitted to Earth. The most significant of them was a long period of time from shooting to delivery of photographic information to specialists. In addition, after the capsule with the return film was separated from the satellite, the expensive equipment remaining on it became useless. Both problems were partially solved by equipping satellites, starting with KH-4B, with several film capsules.
At the end of the 1980s, improved satellites of the KH-11 series (weighing approx. 14 tons) operating in the IR region of the spectrum began to be operated. Equipped with a main mirror having a diameter of 2 m, these satellites gave a resolution of approx. 15 cm. A smaller auxiliary mirror focused the image onto a charge-coupled device that converted it into electrical impulses. These pulses could then be sent directly to ground stations or portable terminals or relayed via SDS communications satellites in highly inclined elliptical orbits to the equatorial plane. The large fuel supply on these satellites allowed them to operate in space for at least five years.
Radar.
In the late 1980s, NRU operated the Lacrosse satellite, which was equipped with synthetic aperture radar. "Lacrosse" provided a resolution of 0.9 m and had the ability to "see" through the clouds.
Radio intelligence.
In the 1960s, the US Air Force, with the assistance of the NRU, launched several satellites designed to collect information about electronic signals emitted from the territory of the Soviet Union. These satellites, flying in low earth orbits, were divided into two categories: 1) electronic intelligence devices, i.e. small satellites, usually launched together with photo reconnaissance satellites and designed to collect data on the emissions of radar stations, and 2) large Elints electronic strategic intelligence satellites, intended mainly to collect data on the operation of communications equipment.
Satellites "Canyon", aimed at listening to Soviet communications systems, began to operate in 1968. They were placed in orbits close to geostationary. In the late 1970s, they were gradually replaced by the Chalet and then Vortex satellites. The Rayolite and Aquacade satellites operated in geostationary orbit and were designed to track telemetry data from Soviet ballistic missiles. The operation of these satellites began in the 1970s, and in the 1980s they were replaced by the Magnum and Orion satellites, launched from a reusable transport spacecraft ( cm. SPACE SHUTTLET).
Under the third program, called "Jumpsit", the satellites were launched into highly elongated and highly inclined orbits, providing them with a long stay over the northern latitudes, where a significant part of the Soviet fleet operated. In 1994, all three programs were terminated, giving way to new and much larger satellites.
Satellites for radio-technical strategic intelligence are among the most secret systems of the military department. The intelligence they gather is analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA), which uses powerful supercomputers to decipher communications and missile telemetry. The satellites in question had a span of 100 meters and, in the 1990s, were sensitive enough to receive walkie talkie transmissions in geostationary orbit. Cm. RADIO FOR PERSONAL AND SERVICE RADIO.
In addition to these systems, the US Navy began deploying the White Cloud system in the mid-1970s, a series of small satellites designed to receive communications and radar radiation from Soviet warships. Knowing the position of the satellites and the time of reception of radiation, the operators on the ground could determine the coordinates of the ships with high accuracy.
Far detection.
The Midas satellite-based ballistic missile launch and detection system has nearly doubled the warning time for an enemy ballistic missile attack and, in addition, has provided the military with a number of other advantages. The Midas satellite, equipped with an infrared sensor for detecting a torch when a rocket is launched, makes it possible to determine its trajectory and final target. The Midas system was used from 1960 to 1966 and included at least 20 satellites launched into low Earth orbits.
In November 1970, the first geostationary satellite was launched into orbit under the DSP program, which had a large IR telescope. The satellite rotated at a speed of 6 rpm, which allowed the telescope to scan the Earth's surface. The satellites of this system, one located off the east coast of Brazil, the second - near the coast of Gabon (west of equatorial Africa), the third - over the Indian Ocean and the fourth - over the western Pacific Ocean, and one more in a reserve orbit (over the eastern part of the Indian Ocean) , proved very useful during the 1991 Gulf War, warning of Iraqi Scud missile attacks (although they were not originally intended to detect the relatively low thermal radiation of tactical ballistic missiles). In the late 1980s, advanced DSP satellites had an average lifespan of about 6 years.
Connection.
In June 1966, the Titan-3C launch vehicle launched seven communications military satellites into orbit close to geostationary under the IDCSP program. This system, limited in its capabilities, was replaced in November 1971 by a system of geostationary satellites of the second generation DSCS II. DSCS II satellites could use smaller ground terminals. see also COMMUNICATION SATELLITE.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the number of US military communications satellites grew rapidly. Many of these communications satellites remained in orbit for up to 10 years. Since 1994, the US Air Force began to put into orbit satellites of the Milstar series operating in the extremely high frequency band (EHF). At such frequencies, higher resistance to enemy interference and interception is provided. The Milstar satellites were originally intended to be used during a nuclear attack. However, when they finally began to be put into service, the Cold War ended.
Meteorology.
One of the first tasks of DMSP military meteorological satellites was to determine the thickness of the cloud cover over possible targets for satellites performing photo reconnaissance. The DMSP series satellites used in the mid-1990s, although with some secret hardware, were basically the same as the NOAA satellites. In 1994 NOAA and the US Department of Defense agreed to combine their systems to reduce costs and invited the European meteorological satellite organization EUMETSAT to participate in the program.
Navigation.
The US Navy, which needed reliable navigation information for submarines armed with Polaris ballistic missiles, led the development of satellite navigation systems in the early years of the space age. Early versions of the Transit Navy satellites used equipment that used the Doppler effect. Each satellite broadcast a radio signal that was received by ground receivers. Knowing the exact signal transit time, the earth projection of the satellite trajectory and the height of the receiving antenna, the ship's navigator could calculate the coordinates of his receiver with an accuracy of 14–23 m. Despite the development of an improved version, called Nova, and the widespread use of this system by civilian ships world, in the 1990s it ceased to exist. The system turned out to be insufficiently accurate for land and air navigation, had no protection against noise interference, and navigation data could only be received when the satellite was at the zenith. see also AIR NAVIGATION.
Since the early 1970s, the development of a global satellite positioning system (GPS) has been ongoing. In 1994, this system, consisting of 24 medium-altitude satellites, became fully operational. Each satellite has an atomic clock. At least three satellites of this system can be seen from anywhere in the world at any time.
The DGPS differential satellite system further increased the accuracy of positioning, bringing the error to 0.9 m or even less. DGPS uses a terrestrial transmitter whose position is known exactly, and this allows the receiver to automatically eliminate the errors inherent in the GPS system.
Detection of nuclear explosions.
Between 1963 and 1970, the US Air Force launched 12 Vela satellites into very high circular orbits (111,000 km) to detect nuclear explosions from space. Since the early 1970s, DSP early warning satellites have been equipped to detect nuclear explosions on the ground and in the atmosphere; later, sensors were installed on satellites to detect explosions also in outer space. Since the 1980s, such sensors have been installed on GPS navigation satellites.
Anti-satellite weapons.
In the 1960s, the United States created the ASAT anti-satellite missile and nuclear system. However, this system had limited capabilities, since it only began to work when the target was within reach. In the 1980s, the US Air Force began developing the ASAT missile, which could be launched from an F-15 fighter plane almost anywhere in the world. This missile was equipped with a target infrared homing device.
Other programs.
The US military branches also carried out numerous works in space, but their results were much less convincing. Since the mid-1980s, the Strategic Defense Initiative has launched small satellites to test various systems for detecting and destroying ballistic missiles during their flight. see also STAR WARS.
Despite early successes in launching large payloads into orbit, the Soviet Union was inferior to the United States in terms of the pace of development and the diversity of the military space program. The Kosmos-4 satellite, which was supposed to be the first Soviet reconnaissance satellite, was launched on April 26, 1961 using the Vostok-D spacecraft, the same as the ship on which Yuri Gagarin flew. Unlike American satellites, which provided for the return of the film to the ground, the satellites of the Vostok-D series used a larger capsule for re-entry into the atmosphere, containing both cameras and film. The third generation satellites performed the usual tasks of remote sensing and mapping. The satellites of the fourth generation were assigned the tasks of reconnaissance from low-altitude orbits. Both generations of satellites were still in service in the 1990s. In December 1982, the Soviet Union launched a fifth-generation satellite into orbit, which apparently used electronic data transmission, providing real-time intelligence information.
Connection.
Other military space programs of the USSR were similar to those carried out by the United States, although there were differences in several aspects. Due to the peculiarities of the country's location and the insufficient number of overseas allies, the USSR launched many satellites into highly elongated elliptical orbits, which had a large inclination of the plane to the plane of the equator. Communication satellites "Molniya" flew in such orbits. The Soviet Union also made extensive use of small satellites. Such satellites recorded and stored information transmitted from the Earth in order to then relay it to a ground station when flying over it. This system proved to be quite acceptable for providing non-emergency communications.
Early warning.
The Soviet Union launched Oko early warning satellites into orbits of the type used by the Molniya satellites, which allowed these satellites to simultaneously have American ballistic missile bases and a Soviet ground station in view. However, to ensure constant coverage of both objects, it was necessary to have an entire constellation of nine satellites in space. In addition, the Soviet Union launched Prognoz satellites into geostationary orbit to provide early warning of the start of a US ballistic missile attack.
Ocean watching.
A satellite-based radar reconnaissance system over the oceans used synthetic aperture radar ( cm. ANTENNA). Between 1967 and 1988 more than thirty of these satellites were launched into space, each with a 2 kW nuclear power source for radar. In 1978, one such satellite (Kosmos-954), instead of moving to a higher orbit, entered the dense layers of the atmosphere and its radioactive fragments fell on vast areas of Canadian territory. This event prompted Soviet engineers to improve the security systems on existing radar reconnaissance satellites and begin developing a more powerful Topaz nuclear power source, allowing the satellite's equipment to operate in a higher and safer orbit. Two satellites with Topaz power sources operated in space in the late 1980s, but their operation was discontinued due to the end of the Cold War.
Attack weapon.
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Soviet Union launched operational anti-satellite weapons into space, placing them in the target's orbit and using radar to guide them to the target. When the satellite came within range of the target, it fired two short bursts of damaging pulses at it. In the early 1980s, the USSR began to develop a small two-seat aerospace aircraft designed to attack a reusable transport spacecraft, but after the Challenger accident ( cm. SPACE FLIGHTS (MANNED) work on this project was terminated.
Post-Cold War period.
Soviet satellites were generally less sophisticated and did not last as long in space as their American counterparts. To compensate for this shortcoming, the USSR launched a much larger number of satellites into space. By the end of the Cold War, the service life of Soviet satellites in orbit had increased, and the satellites themselves had become significantly more advanced. By the mid-1990s, the leaders of the Russian space agency, forced to look for foreign sources of income, came up with a proposal to sell their technology and experience abroad. They also launched a wide sale of high-resolution photographs of virtually any part of the earth's surface.
OTHER COUNTRIES
Europe.
By the early 1990s, some countries other than the US and the USSR had developed their own relatively small military space programs. France advanced the furthest. The beginning was laid in the 1980s with the creation of a combined military-commercial satellite communication system "Syracuse". On July 7, 1995, France launched its first reconnaissance satellite, Elios IA, developed with the participation of Italy and Spain, into orbit. French space engineers in the mid-1990s also developed the Osiris radar surveillance satellite, similar to the American Lacrosse satellite, designed the Ekut satellite for electronic intelligence and explored the possibility of creating an early warning satellite Alert.
The UK in the 1990s used its own specialized military communications satellite operating in the microwave frequency band (SHF) to communicate with the fleet. Italy also had the Sircal satellite microwave military communications system, which, like Syracuse, was implemented as an additional payload of another satellite. NATO used space communications through its satellite NATO-4, which operated in the microwave band and was very similar to the American satellite "Skynet-4".
Other programs.
The PRC has occasionally launched operational photo-reconnaissance satellites with footage returned to Earth, and had several other systems used for both military and civilian purposes. Despite Israel's access to American space imaging sources, the country launched its own experimental reconnaissance satellite in 1995.
Literature:
Handbook of Satellite Communications and Broadcasting. M., 1983
Arbatov A.G. and etc. Space Weapons: The Security Dilemma. M., 1986
The perceptions of states about military threats related to space activities are expressed in two aspects: threats using space systems and threats against space systems. International discussions about this intensified in the 2000s in connection with the American program for the creation of strategic missile defense systems and in connection with the Chinese and American experiments to destroy their satellites in 2007 and 2008, respectively. However, the real economic, technical and political possibilities of the military use of outer space differ from the commonly used rhetorical figures.
Military space activities traditionally include space access, reconnaissance, communications, navigation and movement control on land, at sea, in the air and in space, including missile attack warning systems.
Today, the United States, Russia, China have the most developed military space programs.: 147, 84 and 58 out of 352 military vehicles in orbit, respectively. This is due to foreign policy interests that go far beyond their borders. The European members of NATO together have a little over 30 military satellites, the rest belong to other states.
At the same time, there are more than 1420 vehicles in orbit. And commercial communications and earth remote sensing devices can also be used by the military of those states in whose jurisdiction the owner companies are located.
Orbital maneuver
One of the most promising areas is the creation of satellites capable of maneuvering in near-Earth orbit. It is important to understand that with the development of ion engines, more and more advanced microsatellites receive this option. Between 2005 and 2010, the United States launched several experimental vehicles with this capability. In 2014, Russia also launched a small satellite that traveled independently in Earth orbit. Orbital maneuvering will make it possible to create flexible satellite systems: to concentrate them over a conflict zone, to modernize their components without replacing entire satellites, and so on.
At the same time, international public opinion is entrenched in the idea that maneuvering satellites in conflict situations can be used to destroy enemy satellites. There are no fundamental technical restrictions for such a step, but this idea seems to be completely meaningless for developed countries - the resources expended with a hypothetical result and its political consequences are not justified in any way.
In conditions when there are hundreds of devices around the Earth, and the enemy uses dozens of them, including commercial satellites that do not belong to him, the destruction of several satellites cannot affect the situation in any way. Moreover, regardless of the political situation and at a sufficient level of accuracy, global navigation systems can be used to solve military problems. GPS(USA), GLONASS(Russia) and the system created by the Europeans Galileo.
Consequently, a much more effective way to deprive the enemy of access to space systems will not be their destruction, but the suppression of communication channels between satellites and its receiving devices in the conflict zone. And often it is much more convenient to do this with the help of ground-based systems, and not through the deployment of special satellites.
We emphasize once again that the described argumentation works for countries that are responsible participants in the system of international relations, are involved in world trade and have modern armed forces. But this argument does not work in relation to political regimes like North Korea, whose driving motives are to keep power by the ruling group and break the existing international rules of the game.
Such regimes themselves have little dependence on space systems, and therefore the destruction of satellites of other states can be a good opportunity for them to use foreign policy blackmail. Considering the cheapening of platforms for the creation of small satellites and access to space, such a threat from outsiders international relations should be kept in mind. And here, active measures to protect space systems, including maneuvering in space, may be required.
Near-Earth Space Control
In recent years, space systems for monitoring near-Earth space have acquired high importance, allowing to get a complete picture of the space activities of different states, as well as convert this into increased security and foreign policy capital. The championship here also belongs to the American side.
The United States, in addition to a developed terrestrial infrastructure located in different parts of the world and allowing it to control the near-Earth orbit, has three satellite systems. Among them: the orbital system of space observation ( Space based Surveillance System, SBSS), space tracking and surveillance system ( Space tracking and Surveillance System, STSS) and geosynchronous satellites of the system for detecting space objects ( Geosynchronous Space situational Awareness program, GSSAP). At the same time, by 2020, the US Air Force plans to replace the only existing satellite SBSS, located in a sun-synchronous orbit, with three new small-sized geosynchronous vehicles.
System STSS consists of three satellites, two of which serve as technology demonstrators and are integrated with the maritime component of the American missile defense. Accordingly, the main objects for her are ballistic missiles and warheads, which she can track in all parts of the flight.
System GSSAP today is the newest - in July 2014, both of its satellites were launched. Their peculiarity lies in the possibility of orbital maneuvering, which allows them to study at a relatively close distance spacecraft of interest, launched by other countries into geosynchronous orbits. Of course, in this case we are talking about situations where these same countries have not announced the appointment of new space objects.
With the development of technology and industry, the emergence of similar systems is likely in other major participants in space exploration, moreover, this does not require the deployment of large satellite constellations. However, such systems become necessary when the economic and political activities of a country and its key partners are critically dependent on that country's satellite systems. Today, this is relevant only for the United States and the European countries dependent on them for security.
Thus, there is no need for Russia yet to spend limited resources on creating its own satellite system for global control of outer space. It is enough to maintain control of the orbit over its territory with the help of ground-based systems.
The idea of a military "shuttle"
An experimental vector for the development of military activities in space since 2010 has been demonstrated by the American reusable unmanned spacecraft X-37 B . This device is capable of staying in near-Earth space for many months, changing its orbit due to the engines, landing at an airfield and, after the necessary maintenance, again going into space.
Another merit X-37 B- the presence of a compartment where equipment is installed depending on the tasks performed by the ship. Thus, the spaceplane can play the role of a heavy reconnaissance and communications satellite, can act as a carrier of microsatellites and, hypothetically, an automatic repair ship.
However, at present X-37 B serves as a scientific laboratory for the US Air Force, a technology demonstrator, and it is premature to talk about its routine use in the coming years. Also, the talk that the spaceplane can become a carrier of high-precision weapons and / or a means of destroying satellites seems unfounded. The arguments here are the same as for maneuvering satellites - the discrepancy between the resources expended and the likely result.
Do you need "hypersound"?
Attempts to create hypersonic aircraft have become another experimental area of military space activities. Such devices move in the upper layers of the airspace and along a suborbital trajectory and are controlled using space systems. In this case, the launch can be carried out using a light-class launch vehicle.
It is hypersonic motion that opens the way to the practical implementation of the concept of a fast global non-nuclear strike ( Prompt Global Strike), formulated in the 2000s in the United States. In 2010-2011, the Americans tested vehicles over the Pacific Ocean twice HTV-2 , the purpose of which was to collect telemetry and other data on flights in the atmosphere at speeds up to 20M. After the experiments, research work in this direction has returned to the laboratory for the time being. In the field of hypersonic aircraft, which virtually erase the boundary between the atmosphere and space, research programs today have Russia and China.
It also poses the problem that any current and future missile defense systems must counter all suborbital targets. And as far as one can judge, hypersonic technologies are interesting for modern Russia, first of all, in the context of increasing the capabilities of its strategic forces to overcome anti-missile systems.
As for China, this country conducted three flight experiments with hypersonic vehicles in 2014. wu-14 , whose speed reached 10M. In the context of the creation of the Chinese global navigation system and the gradual build-up of the national constellation of satellites by Beijing, this may mean a desire to acquire the capabilities of a global non-nuclear strike in the coming decades. Probably, Chinese technology will be inferior to American, but will be sufficient to solve military problems outside the PRC.
In this regard, it must be taken into account that the concept of a rapid global strike in the American, Chinese or any other version may not be realized. But the accumulated new knowledge and technologies will definitely be used in the creation of new generations of aerospace equipment for military and commercial purposes. This means that Russia needs to continue precisely fundamental research in this area and, possibly, without being tied to the creation of specific systems.
Again, missile defense
The American missile defense program is associated with military space activities. Strategic missile defense systems can be classified as space activities, since they involve the interception of warheads flying along a suborbital or low-orbital trajectory. In addition, it performs its tasks, relying on satellites and ground-based means of controlling outer space.
At the same time, despite the experiment conducted in 2008 to destroy a satellite descending from orbit using an anti-missile system “ Aegis" (Aegis), it is wrong to consider missile defense as a means of destroying satellites. A huge part of the satellites are beyond the reach of any anti-missile systems, and the Chinese experiment demonstrated the negative consequences of destroying a satellite directly in orbit in 2007. Then, as a result of being hit by a specially launched ballistic missile, the satellite turned into a large cloud of space debris, which for several years posed a danger to other devices. And for the international reputation, not to mention long-term foreign policy goals, such actions are only fraught with damage.
At the same time, as mentioned above, for states, the destruction of individual enemy satellites does not affect security in any way and does not create any military superiority in the event of a conflict. And given the fact that only economically and politically developed countries can afford anti-missile systems, the risk of combat, rather than experimental, use of these systems as anti-satellite weapons can be considered close to zero.
Space starts on earth
Military space activities also include the improvement and sustainability of terrestrial space infrastructure. It is the ground infrastructure that ensures the operation of satellites, and the satellites themselves are used in the interests of consumers located on land, at sea and in the air, and are connected to them through satellite navigation chips, phones, etc.
The most urgent threats here are the creation of radio-electronic interference for such devices, for the communication channels of the satellite with the Earth and the destruction of ground stations, which has already been mentioned in passing above. By and large, today and in the foreseeable future, the most effective and widespread methods of combating space systems will be those that are in no way connected with the concepts of "space weapons" or "anti-satellite weapons."
In this context, the example of the American system is very indicative. Raiders, designed to recognize extraneous effects on communication channels with satellites. In the spring of 2013, the deployment of this system, consisting of five mobile antennas, was completed in different parts of the world, including the launch site at Cape Canaveral, Hawaii, Japan, Germany (the location of another antenna was not indicated).
This system is designed to protect communications through commercial satellites, as well as communications channels for US troops abroad, which are also often used by commercial space systems. And it is clear that the interception of information passing through satellites, the suppression of communication channels or strikes on ground-based space infrastructure are available to a much larger number of states and non-state players than the creation and use of their own satellites.
Moreover, the United States, as the country most dependent on space systems, is forced to spend the most resources to protect its advantages. At the same time, all other players (with the exception of the American allies), depending on the likelihood of an armed conflict with the United States, are or may be interested in reducing these advantages.
From this it becomes clear that the most likely are "space battles" that take place exclusively on the earth's surface. The ratio of resources expended, military and political costs and the predicted result here seems to be optimal.
In the context of all of the above, we can conclude that the current stage in the development of military space activities has several main vectors. Firstly, it is an increase in the stability and flexibility of satellite systems - due to orbital maneuvering technologies, automatic reusable vehicles, etc. Secondly, it is the development of space control systems. Thirdly, this is the development of electronic warfare systems and counteraction to such systems. Fourth, these are studies of hypersonic motion and the improvement of anti-missile technologies, which will make it possible in the future to deal with vehicles moving at hypersonic speeds.
As you can see, there is still no talk of some kind of "Star Wars". However, there may be exceptional situations where the destruction of a spacecraft or large pieces of space debris may be deemed necessary because of their threat to other satellites, the orbital station, manned spacecraft or people on Earth. But it is precisely the exclusivity of such a development of events that emphasizes the fact that the special creation of space weapons today is not a rational step. For such circumstances, equipment created or created for other purposes will be used.
In the light of the foregoing, the following approach seems optimal for Russia to its own military space program:
- Focus on improving the reliability of our own satellite systems;
- To create conditions for the development of commercial space systems, which, if necessary, can be used by the military. This will reduce the cost of providing the armed forces with space systems;
- Make fundamental scientific research in the space sector a priority, which will improve Russian military security in the future.
The value of military space parity in itself leads to unjustified costs. Russia needs to proceed from the idea that the size of the military satellite constellation is directly proportional to the level of the country's economic development and the role of space systems in its economic activity.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 1(1-2)/1997
ColonelI.N. GOLOVANEV,
candidate of technical sciences
Colonel V.V.URYADOV
Lieutenant colonel S.V.CHERKAS ,
candidate of technical sciences
Lieutenant colonel I.V.VASIN
MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES (VKD) occupies a special place in ensuring the defense capability of Russia and maintaining its prestige in the international arena. As a rule, military space activities are understood as a set of measures and works on the exploration and use of outer space, carried out in the interests of military departments: space communications and reconnaissance, warning of ballistic missile launches, navigation, topogeodesic and meteorological support using space systems, military applied scientific research in outer space, solving individual problems of anti-satellite warfare and anti-missile defense.
The events of recent years convincingly testify to the growing role of the EVA in maintaining strategic stability and ensuring international security (control of the process of nuclear missile disarmament, the use of space assets in the course of local wars and military conflicts). The absence of combat (strike) space systems deployed in outer space has for many years served as a kind of demarcation line, which has been effectively used to prevent a large-scale strategic arms race. At the same time, military space assets, having a key stabilizing property - the ability to promptly and reliably detect events occurring in any area of the world - are capable of significantly influencing the combat potential of the armed forces. Therefore, the EVA, due to its uniqueness and significance in terms of its impact on international and national security, is subject to international legal regulation (see figure).
Radical changes in the geopolitical situation in the world, the rapid development of rocket and space technology and its widespread use among the troops have put on the agenda a number of issues related to the need to further improve international legal regulation and domestic legislative support for EVA.
Modern problems of international legal regulation of EVA are concentrated in several main areas.
Limitation of space weapons. The main thing here is a systematic analysis of the features of the modern interpretation of the norms of international law in relation to outer space (good faith in observing the norms, the so-called peaceful purposes in outer space, the conditions for the denunciation of relevant treaties and agreements with the outbreak of war, including the right to preventive self-defense in this new sphere of armed struggle ), in the development of a conceptual apparatus for a common understanding of the problems being solved at the international level, the development of legal aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (the etymology of the term "space weapons" and approaches to the classification of the latter, the criteria of "defensiveness" and "offensiveness", issues of limiting systems ensuring the use of space weapons), in the study of the verification process regarding the limitations of space weapons and related political and legal aspects of “immunity of space objects”, space inspection, as well as the special legal status of aerospace osmic funds.
Prevention of the emergence of weapons systems in space in the context of a radical reduction in strategic offensive weapons and an increase in the urgency of missile defense issues. The main thing is a comprehensive analysis of the impact of military space assets on strategic stability, the possible strategic consequences of creating space weapons systems, Russian-American agreements in the field of limiting strategic offensive weapons, as well as an assessment of the immediate prospects for military space activities in the world in its key aspects (the creation of space echelon of missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, the development of military space systems designed to maintain a military-strategic balance). The problems of using space assets for the control of strategic offensive and space weapons are of independent military applied importance.
Full-scale testing of space weapons in real conditions of outer space. Such a specific type of activity is not sufficiently streamlined by international law, since there are no specific criteria for its regulation. Very indicative in this regard are the many years of Russian-American discussions related to the creation and full-scale testing of missile defense space components.
According to the American side, the ban on the creation of space-based missile defense components (according to the 1972 ABM Treaty) applies to activities carried out only after one or another component, after laboratory development, enters the stage of field tests. It follows that experiments in space to test individual elements of space-based missile defense components (at the so-called sub-component level) are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
The Russian side is of the opinion that the position of the dividing line (in relation to what tests and experiments in space are prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty) depends on the ability of national technical controls to determine whether the systems undergoing testing will be able to create in the future the technical basis of the components missile defense.
Distribution of the radio frequency resource and protection of frequency-orbital assignments of radio-electronic means of military space systems. Behind the engineering nature of this problem lies a tense struggle for the right to own one or another part of the electromagnetic spectrum, especially the frequency resource of geostationary orbits. Lack of proper attention to it can lead to a disruption in the performance of tasks due to a violation of the electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic means, to dissatisfaction with the applications of new spectrum consumers, etc.
The use of military space facilities in the interests of environmental monitoring of the Earth and space. At present, this is very important both in the conversion and in the universal human aspect. The rapid development of such ideas opens up scope for active military action to establish monitoring activities using a wide range of military space assets. However, this can lead to uncontrolled dissemination of the results of space intelligence and its technologies, and, consequently, to negative consequences in relations between states, violation of military-political stability, regional and international security. The legal aspects of the problem of space ecology in its military-applied perspective also remain insufficiently studied.
The urgency of solving the listed international legal problems is due to: the importance of continuing effective space activities for the development of the country; the need for unconditional observance in the course of its legal norms in order to exclude the possibility of violating the military-strategic balance that has developed in the world; the intensification of the law-making process related to space activities and its military component both in our country and at the international level.
The impact of legal norms on the maintenance of strategic stability and military security can be illustrated by the following example. At present, the United States is intensively developing the concept of using high-precision weapon systems in combat operations of various types of tasks to be solved. It is also known that with the widespread use of the space information component, the effectiveness of the use of weapons increases several times. Therefore, further improvement of the US orbital constellations of supporting spacecraft should be assumed. Considering the current indifference of international space law to the development of information space complexes, one can expect the United States to achieve strategic superiority in space by the beginning of the 21st century.
It is obvious that a comprehensive consideration of the international legal aspects of military space activities in the practice of military and state building will make it possible to form balanced proposals of the Russian delegation at bilateral and multilateral negotiations on space, to determine appropriate options for the development of space weapons and EVA in general, and to work out issues of the national space policy of the Russian Federation for the short and long term, including the establishment of international cooperation in the field of military-applied use of outer space.
The legal regulation of military space activities at the national level presupposes, first of all, the formation of key areas of domestic legal regulation of space activities and its military component in the leading countries of the world.
The severity of legal problems for Russia is due to the fact that the USSR, which occupied a leading position in space exploration, for a long time remained the only power that did not have formalized national legal norms that would regulate space activities. Of course, there were (and still are) intradepartmental documents that ensure, to a certain extent, the fulfillment of this task. The issue of developing national space legislation was not seriously raised until the end of the 1980s, which undoubtedly had negative consequences in terms of both organizing effective activities in the exploration and use of space in the country and building a state of law.
As you know, in 1993 the Law “On Space Activities” was finally adopted, which determined and consolidated the organizational and legal foundations of the space activities of the Russian Federation. For the first time, it adopted a system of restrictions imposed on activities in the exploration and use of outer space from the point of view of the country's strategic and environmental security, as well as a system of bodies providing guidance and implementation of the EVA.
Thus, the definition of a national space policy, the development of legislative acts implementing it, and control over the implementation of the Federal Space Program are within the competence of the State Duma. General management of the implementation of space policy is the prerogative of the President, while direct management of space activities and the development of specific measures to protect Russia's interests in this area are the functions of the Government.
It is also interesting to share responsibility for EVA issues between the Ministry of Defense (MO) and the Russian Space Agency. The Ministry of Defense carries out space activities in the interests of defense and security - develops the necessary regulatory and technical documentation, drafts of a long-term program and annual work plans for the creation and use of military space technology, forms and places a state order for their implementation, carries out the targeted use of military rocket and space technology destination, space infrastructure, etc.
The Russian Space Agency, within the competence determined by the Government, participates in the implementation of space activities in the interests of defense and security, including, together with the Moscow Region, developing draft long-term programs and annual work plans for the creation and use of dual-use space technology, forms and places a state order for these jobs. Other departments, together with the Ministry of Defense, ensure the safety of space activities, the maintenance and development of ground-based and other objects of space infrastructure, and participate in the certification of space technology.
At the same time, the adopted law could not eliminate all the problems of ensuring the space activities of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the range of these problems is rapidly expanding due to the ongoing political and economic transformations in the country. For example, the general procedure for the relationship between various government agencies in the implementation of space activities, determined by law, is specified in various departmental by-laws. However, the desire to streamline it through provisions, orders and instructions does not always achieve the goal, both because of the ambiguity in the interpretation of a number of provisions of the law and their inconsistency with previously adopted documents, and due to clashes of departmental interests. Circumstances of this kind may adversely affect the process of development and production of space assets in the interests of ensuring the defense and security of Russia. The problem, in our opinion, is caused by the lack of a clearly established and legally established mechanism for interdepartmental coordination and the development of military-political decisions.
Another group of problems is caused by inconsistencies between the emerging legal regime for the exploration and use of outer space and the list of necessary rights of organizations operating objects of space infrastructure. Thus, according to the Decree of the Government of December 24, 1994 No. 1418, the licensing of space activities in the Russian Federation is carried out by the Russian Space Agency. At the same time, neither the Decree nor the Law says a word about the participation of the Ministry of Defense in the licensing process. As a result, a paradoxical situation arises - the Russian Space Agency, which in no way bears direct responsibility for the defense capability of the state, establishes a licensed regime for the maintenance, operation and development of space infrastructure for the agency responsible for ensuring defense capability.
The considered examples show that in order to implement an effective EVA, the space legislation of Russia should be improved, and first of all, in terms of clarifying the role of each department, organization and institution in the process of both the implementation of a specific type of such activity, and the preparation and introduction into practice of contractual and legal norms governing relations between individual departments, states or international organizations.
It should be noted that there have been certain trends towards the intensification of domestic lawmaking in relation to space activities in general and its military component in particular. Thus, in 1995, the State Duma carried out a wide range of measures aimed at developing measures to improve the legal foundations of domestic cosmonautics (special hearings, the work of an interdepartmental commission). The result was the preparation and consideration of amendments and additions to the Law of the Russian Federation "On space activities", as well as the draft law "On the study and use of space facilities in the interests of defense and security." These documents quite clearly define the functions of the military departments in the exploration and use of outer space.
An important aspect of the domestic legal regulation of space activities was the approval by the Government in May 1996 of the "Concept of National Space Policy", which is a unified state system of views on the prospects for the country's space activities, priorities in the development of rocket and space technology and weapons.
Russia's cooperation with the CIS countries should be considered an independent problem of EVA regulation. Its separation from the international legal field is connected with the specifics of Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics, on the territories of which many objects of space infrastructure and industry remain, which are used by our country to this day.
As part of solving this problem of legal regulation, the following questions are required: the formation of a balanced space policy of the CIS (including its military component) in the face of severe economic restrictions and political instability; relations between states on the territory of the former Soviet Union arising from the need to carry out space (military space) activities of Russia; coordinating the activities of interested CIS member states in the operation of space systems that ensure the collective security of the Commonwealth (for example, early warning systems); management of the still not dead rocket and space industry of the former USSR, including the issues of determining the prospects for its development, taking into account the interests of both Russia and other CIS member states; organization of production of means of rocket and space technology, development (including testing) of their promising samples; preservation, efficient use and development of space infrastructure facilities located outside the territory of Russia, including military units that launch and control spacecraft for military and national economic purposes, eat and process the information received from them. The solution of these and other tasks is possible within the framework of a unified interstate space program, the development and approval of which today complement the range of problems of national support for the space activities of the Russian Federation. In conclusion, we note that the further development of the military space technosphere and the involvement in space activities of an increasing number of countries inevitably leads to the emergence of new legal problems of military astronautics both at the international and national levels. In order to exclude an avalanche-like growth of contradictions in the area under consideration, "blank spots" in the legal support of military space activities should be eliminated today. Otherwise, the world community will face a real threat of violating strategic stability.
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