Chapter 4. SEVASTOPOL FORTRESS DURING THE WAR OF 1877-1878 Contrary to the lamentations of our historians, the revival of the Sevastopol fortress, as well as the fleet, was not hindered in the least by the articles of the Peace of Paris. There was also money in the treasury. The only thing that got in the way was the stupidity of the ministers and generals, and not least -

Chapter 6. SEVASTOPOL FORTRESS IN WAR AND REVOLUTION On June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo, high school student Gavrila Princip fired seven bullets from a revolver at the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife. At first, this terrorist attack did not arouse much interest in the world,

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Sevastopol defense (September 1854 - August 1855)

Reflection of the bombardment of the Anglo-French fleet from the Alexander Battery on October 5, 1854. Artist F. A. Roubaud. 1905

During the events of the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853 - 1856. The main place is occupied by the heroic defense of Sevastopol. For more than 11 months, Russian soldiers and sailors defended Sevastopol in the fight against a numerically superior enemy, showing heroism, courage and courage.

After Turkey declared war on Russia on October 4 (16), 1853, active operations were carried out on land and at sea. On the Danube, Russian troops unsuccessfully fought battles at Oltenica on October 23 (November 4), but repulsed the Turks on December 25, 1853 (January 6, 1854) at Cetati. In the Caucasus, in the battle of Akhaltsikhe on November 14 (26), 1853, the 7,000-strong garrison of General I.M. Andronikov drove back the 15,000-strong army of Ali Pasha; on November 19 (December 1), near Bashkadyklar, the 10,000-strong detachment of General V.O. Bebutov defeated the 36,000-strong army of Akhmet Pasha.

The fighting at sea went well. A particularly severe blow to Turkey was dealt in the Battle of Sinop, where on November 18 (30), 1853, a squadron under the command of a vice admiral of 8 ships during the Battle of Sinop destroyed the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha of 16 ships.

The defeat of Turkey was accelerated by the entry into the war of Great Britain and France. On December 23, 1853 (January 4, 1854), the Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea. On February 9 (21), Russia declared war on Great Britain and France. On March 11 (23), 1854, Russian troops crossed the Danube at Brailov, Galati and Izmail and concentrated in Northern Dobruja. On April 10 (22), the Anglo-French squadron bombarded Odessa. In June - July, Anglo-French troops landed in Varna, and the superior forces of the Anglo-French-Turkish fleet (34 battleships and 55 frigates, including most steam ships) blocked the Russian fleet (14 linear sailing ships, 6 frigates and 6 steamships). frigates) in Sevastopol.

At the end of August, the combined fleet of England and France, consisting of 89 warships and 300 transports, approached Yevpatoria. On September 1 (13), the Allies freely began the landing of an expeditionary force of 28 thousand French, 24 thousand British, 7 thousand Turks with 122 guns. The landing lasted 6 days.

The commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in Crimea, Prince A.S. Menshikov, decided to give battle to the enemy army at a pre-selected position on the Alma River - on the way from Evpatoria to Sevastopol. Up to 30 thousand Russian troops with 96 guns were concentrated near the Alma River. On September 8 (20) a battle took place, which the Russians lost.

Having been defeated on Alma, Menshikov and his army first withdrew to Sevastopol, but then, fearing that the enemy would cut him off from the central regions of Russia, and also for the purpose of freedom of maneuver and the ability to threaten the flank and rear of the enemy, on September 12 (24) he withdrew his troops to Bakhchisarai . Almost simultaneously, the Allies launched a flank march to Balaklava, from where they intended to launch an attack on Sevastopol.

By the evening of September 12 (24), the allied army approached the Belbek River and from here the next day began a flank movement to the southern side of the city. On the morning of September 14 (26), the French took positions on the Fedyukhin Heights, and the British occupied Balaklava. The Allied fleet entered Balaklava harbor.

With the departure of Menshikov's army from Sevastopol, a terrible danger loomed over the city. Sevastopol sailors, led by Kornilov and Nakhimov, left without army support in the face of a possible attack from the enemy army and navy at any moment, began preparing the defense of the city on their own.

Sevastopol is located on both sides of the Big Bay (roadstead). Three bays jut into the southern coast: Artilleriyskaya, Yuzhnaya, on both sides of which the city stretches, and Kilen Bay. The southern part of the city is divided by the South Bay into the city side, which lies to the west of the bay, and the ship side, to the east of it. The area located south of the Big Bay and the city is known as the Chersonesos Peninsula. It ends with the steep cliffs of Sapun Mountain. There are three dominant points here: Malakhov Kurgan, the mound in front of it and Mikryukov Height. In the western part of the Chersonesos Peninsula there is the Quarantine Balka, from which the Kamyshevaya Balka extends to the west. To the northeast of the Big Bay there is a ridge that forms an almost impregnable position facing the Baydar Valley and Balaklava, where towards the Big Bay rise the Mekenzi Heights (named after Rear Admiral Mekenzi, the founder of Sevastopol), and even further - the Inkerman Heights height.

Plan of the Sevastopol fortress. "Atlas of fortresses of the Russian Empire"

View of Sevastopol. Album "Eastern War". Florence, 1856

Between the Balaklava Mountains, the position on the Mekenziev and Inkerman Heights and the cliffs of Sapun Mountain lies the valley of the Black River. The Fedyukhin Heights adjoin the left bank of the Black River, and higher up, to Sapun Mountain, stretches a ridge called the Semyakin and Gasforto Heights.

The terrain on which Sevastopol is located is convenient for organizing strong defense from the sea and inconvenient for defense from land.

To defend the northern side of the city and the roadstead, the Northern fortification was built back in 1818, which had the appearance of an octagonal fort with 4 small bastions. The fort had 50 guns.

The defense of the Sevastopol raid from the sea consisted of 8 strong stone and earthen batteries. By the spring of 1854, coastal defenses were strengthened. It had 14 batteries with 610 guns, including 28 bomb guns. Regarding the defense of Sevastopol from land, there was an opinion about the impossibility of a large landing and, therefore, the impossibility of an attack on Sevastopol by large forces from land. On the southern side, Sevastopol was weakly fortified. In the southern defensive position, instead of the planned 6 bastions of 12 guns each, only the 6th bastion was actually ready. In total, on the 7 km long southern defensive line there were only 145 guns installed in unfinished fortifications.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Anglo-French command did not dare to attack Sevastopol on the move, urgent measures were taken to strengthen the city’s defense. On September 11 (23), in order to prevent enemy ships from breaking through to the inner Sevastopol roadstead, it was decided to scuttle 5 sailing battleships and 2 frigates across the entrance to the bay. Other sailing ships, all steamships and steamship-frigates were left for the defense of Sevastopol and withdrawn to the bay under the protection of batteries. Artillery and ship crews (about 18 thousand people) were taken ashore from them, from which 22 battalions were formed.

On September 13 (25), 1854, a state of siege was declared in Sevastopol. The defense of the city was led by a vice admiral, who was officially considered the chief of the defense staff. His closest assistants were the squadron commander, Vice Admiral Nakhimov, appointed head of the South Side, and the rear admiral (chief of the defense of Malakhov Kurgan). The general management of engineering work was carried out by an engineer-colonel. The garrison of Sevastopol after the field army left for Bakhchisarai, together with naval officers and sailors written off ashore, numbered more than 16 thousand people.

The leaders of the defense inspired the soldiers and sailors of Sevastopol, and the entire population of the city, to resist the enemy. An ardent patriot of his Motherland, Kornilov put all his soul, all his knowledge and energy, and his extraordinary organizational skills into the defense of Sevastopol. Strict and demanding in business, but caring and fair in his relations with his subordinates, he enjoyed universal respect and love. According to contemporaries, Kornilov was the creator of that military spirit, enthusiasm, courage and dedication that did not leave the defenders of Sevastopol until the last days of the siege.

On September 15 (27), Kornilov made a speech in front of the Sevastopol garrison: “Comrades, we have the honor of defending Sevastopol, defending our native fleet! We will fight to the last! We have nowhere to retreat, the sea is behind us. I forbid all unit commanders to beat the all-clear; the drummers must forget this battle!...”

The defenders of Sevastopol, including women and children, worked tirelessly day and night. The construction of fortifications on the northern approaches to the city was led by Kornilov himself. Everything that could be used was brought ashore from the ships. In his letters dated September 14 (26) and September 16 (28), Kornilov wrote: “We fortified the city all day long... Work is in full swing on the fortifications; we know neither sleep nor fatigue; even the prisoners are zealous... Meanwhile, the enemy is approaching Sevastopol... We are not discouraged here, we are strengthening ourselves as best we can, as our means allow. A chain of redoubts, bastions and various types of batteries will soon present an uninterrupted line of cannon fire.” On the southern side of the city, work was led by Vice Admiral Nakhimov.

People worked in three shifts, even at night by the light of lanterns. Every day from 5 to 6 thousand people went to work in the morning, others replaced them in the evening.

Gallery of underground war. Defense of Sevastopol

Men dug rocky soil, and women carried earth from afar in baskets and bags. A battery also appeared in Sevastopol, which was built by women alone. She began to be called “Maiden”. As a result of the selfless work of the defenders of Sevastopol, the city was prepared to repel enemy attacks. “... We did more in a week than we previously did in a year,” Kornilov wrote about this feat of the Sevastopol residents in his diary.

The fortification defense near Sevastopol consisted of 4 positions. 3 positions were equipped on the South side and one on the North.

The fortifications of the land (southern) front were (from east to west): 1st, 2nd bastions, Malakhov Kurgan (Kornilovsky bastion), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 bastions. This was the main defensive line. During the siege, a number of fortifications (advanced and intermediate) were built to strengthen this main line. The most important of them were: in front of the 2nd bastion - the Selenga and Volyn redoubts, in front of the Malakhov Kurgan - the Kamchatka lunette, between the Malakhov Kurgan and the 3rd bastion - the Gervais battery, and between the 3rd and 4th bastions - the Schwartz redoubt.
The redoubts and bastions of the main defensive line were connected by trenches. For the first time in history, a zone of continuous artillery and rifle fire (200 m deep) was created in front of the main defensive line, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire in given directions. The fire system was supplemented by a system of engineering obstacles (ditches, mines, landmines, wolf pits).

Behind the main defensive line there was a second line, which served to withdraw troops during the artillery shelling. The third line, which ran partly within the city, consisted of houses adapted for strongholds and served to shelter the main reserves.

At the second position, as well as at the main one, bastions and redoubts were erected to support the operations of individual artillery batteries.

During the first 3 weeks of the Sevastopol defense, under the leadership of E.I. Totleben, V.P. Polzikov, A.V. Melnikov and other military engineers, the defenders of the city built over 20 fortifications (batteries), and the number of artillery on the South Side alone was increased to 341 guns (including 118 heavy ones) versus 144 the enemy had. In Sevastopol, a deeply layered defense was created in a short time, based on the ideas of the outstanding Russian fortification theorist A. Z. Telyakovsky. However, the residents of Sevastopol, taking a creative approach to Telyakovsky’s provisions, developed them further. The defense they created made it possible to effectively use all forces and means, including naval and coastal artillery. The basis of the defense was the bastions.

The defense created near Sevastopol was the best example of field fortification of that time. It fully met the terrain conditions and tactical requirements.

On September 18 (30), Anglo-Franco-Turkish troops (67 thousand people, of which 41 thousand French, 20 thousand British, 6 thousand Turks) reached the approaches to Sevastopol from the south. The enemy fleet consisted of 34 battleships and 55 frigates, including 4 battleships and 50 frigates.

The garrison of Sevastopol by this time numbered 36,600 people. The increase in the number of troops stationed in Sevastopol was explained by the fact that Menshikov and his army moved from Bakhchisarai to Sevastopol. At the same time, part of the forces was allocated to strengthen the city’s defense. There were 16 sailing battleships, 6 steam and 4 frigates in the Sevastopol roadstead. In total, 3,904 guns, 1 million shells and 325 thousand charges of gunpowder were concentrated in Sevastopol.

On October 3 (15), Kornilov gave his last order. It said: “From the first day of the investment of Sevastopol by an enemy superior in strength, the troops intended to defend it expressed a decisive readiness to die, but not to give up the city... Over the course of a short time, through the tireless activity of everyone - both officers and lower ranks - strong fortifications rose from the ground , and the guns of old ships are placed on these formidable strongholds.”

October 5 (17), 1854 at 6 o'clock. 30 min. The first bombardment of the fortress began. The enemy opened fire on all defenses with 126 heavy guns, and by midday they were joined by another 1,340 ship guns. He hoped to destroy the land fortifications of the fortress with powerful bombardment from sea and land and take it by storm.

The Sevastopol residents responded with powerful artillery fire from 250 guns. Here is what a direct participant in Sevastopol, Slavoni, writes about this battle: “A terrible battle began to boil: the earth groaned, the surrounding mountains trembled, the sea began to gurgle... and at the same time, hellish fire broke out from our batteries. Enemy ships and steamers fired volleys at our batteries; bombs, red-hot cannonballs, grapeshots, firebrands... rained down in hail; crashes and explosions were ubiquitous; all this merged into a terrible and wild roar; it was impossible to distinguish the shots, only a wild and terrifying bubbling sound could be heard; the earth seemed to be shaking under the weight of the fighters... And this fierce battle did not stop for a minute, lasted exactly 12 hours and stopped only when it was completely dark.” The city's defenders managed to achieve close fire interaction between naval and fortress artillery.

The defenders of Sevastopol showed great resilience and courage. So, for example, on the 3rd bastion the gun servants changed three times, but the people continued to do their duty. Around the 10th battery, in just one day, October 5 (17), 2,700 cannonballs and unexploded bombs were collected, but it continued to fire. Russian artillerymen, despite being wounded, did not leave the battlefield. On this day, many defenders of Sevastopol died, and among them the talented organizer and head of the city’s defense, Admiral Kornilov. At the place where he was killed, the sailors made a cross from the cannonballs.

The sailors and the city's population spent the entire night from October 5 (17) to October 6 (18) working hard to repair the damage. To the amazement of the enemy, by the morning of October 6 (18), the Sevastopol fortifications had been restored and were ready to repel new enemy attacks.

Defense of Sevastopol. Artist F. A. Rubo. 1904

Defense of Sevastopol 1854 - 1855

The enemy's first attempt to capture Sevastopol failed. The plan of the Anglo-French command was thwarted by the heroic defense of the Russian troops.

After the death of Kornilov, the defense of Sevastopol was headed by Vice Admiral Nakhimov. Under his direct leadership, work was carried out to strengthen the defensive lines, to build additional coastal batteries and protect them, and combat battalions of sailors were formed. He knew everything that was happening on the bastions: who needed shells, where reinforcements needed to be sent, and always provided assistance on time. He spent the night wherever he had to, slept, often without undressing. I gave up my apartment for use as an infirmary. The admiral enjoyed enormous authority and love among the defenders of Sevastopol. Nakhimov was everywhere, inspiring with his example, helping in word and deed. Hero of Sinop, favorite of the sailors and the entire population of Sevastopol, an ardent patriot of his Motherland, he was the soul of the heroic defense of Sevastopol.

The bombardment of the city from land with siege batteries continued for several more days, but to no avail: the Sevastopol residents managed to repair during the night everything that had been broken during the day. Thanks to the tireless work of the talented Russian engineer Polzikov and Rear Admiral Istomin, who led the defense of Malakhov Kurgan, it was turned into a powerful fortification, which remained the main stronghold of the Sevastopol defense until the end.

The stubborn resistance of the garrison forced the English commander-in-chief Raglan and the French general Canrobert to postpone the assault and switch to a slow siege. The allied command planned to begin a new assault on Sevastopol in two weeks.

The enemy was preparing for a new assault on Sevastopol, moving ever closer to the line of its fortifications. After the won battle on the Black River on August 4 (16), 1855, the allied forces began to actively prepare for a general assault on Sevastopol. The Anglo-French command, represented by generals J.-J. Pelissier and J. Simpson carried out another bombardment of the city with 800 guns, which was carried out from August 5 (17) to August 8 (20). During this time, the enemy fired 56,500 shells, and the Russians - 29,400. The next, sixth, and most powerful bombardment of Sevastopol with 807 guns, including 300 mortars, was carried out from August 24 to 27 (September 5 - 8). Up to 150 thousand shells were fired into the city. Malakhov Kurgan was subjected to especially heavy bombardment, against which 110 guns were fired, including 40 mortars. This incredible cannonade, shaking and crushing Russian fortifications, showered their defenders with a hail of bombs, grenade shots and bullets. In addition to ordinary shells, the enemy fired rockets and threw barrels filled with gunpowder. Everything that science, art and the experience of centuries have created and discovered in destruction - everything was exhausted to the bottom, for the destruction of the Sevastopol fortifications and for the death of their defenders.

As a result of many days of fierce shelling, the 2nd and 3rd bastions and the fortifications of the Malakhov Kurgan were destroyed. Russian losses amounted to 7,561 people killed, 89 guns and 113 machine tools.

On August 27 (September 8) at 12 noon, 13 enemy divisions and one brigade began the final assault on Sevastopol. The enemy directed the main attack on the 2nd bastion and Malakhov Kurgan. 57,500 people were allocated for the assault. They were opposed by 40 thousand defenders of Sevastopol.

After the artillery shelling, French troops (about 39 thousand bayonets) attacked the Ship side (they were commanded by General Bosquet). The assault was carried out simultaneously along the entire defensive line of Sevastopol. 10 thousand French suddenly attacked the Malakhov Kurgan, on which there were only 1,400 soldiers and 500 artillerymen. Meanwhile, the French forces kept growing. Soon all the commanders in the Russian regiments were killed or wounded, however, having lost control, the soldiers continued to fight. The defenders of Malakhov Kurgan, after fierce battles, were forced to retreat under pressure from superior enemy forces.

All this time, enemy attacks continued on the 2nd bastion, where 7 thousand Russians fought with 18 thousand French. These enemy attacks were repulsed three times by the defenders of the bastion until fire from enemy guns mounted on the Malakhov Kurgan forced the defenders to retreat. The assault on the 3rd bastion was led by the British (11 thousand people). However, after the first unsuccessful attack, the British did not resume their attack. Also unsuccessful for the enemy was his offensive against the City side of Sevastopol, which began after Malakhov Kurgan was taken.

Thus, the French managed to capture the Malakhov Kurgan and the second bastion. At other points, all attacks were repulsed. But with the loss of the Malakhov Kurgan and the 2nd bastion, the defense line of Sevastopol was broken through precisely at the point on which its strength as a whole depended. The capture of Malakhov Kurgan, which represented a key position in the defense system of Sevastopol, was a turning point in the course of the siege.

Gorchakov, having familiarized himself with the state of affairs, decided to abandon further struggle for the city and ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the Northern side. On August 27 (September 8), Russian troops, having blown up warehouses and fortifications on the South Side, crossed partly on ships, partly along a constructed floating bridge to the North Side, and then united with Menshikov’s army. Simultaneously with the crossing of the troops, the remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet were scuttled in the bay. The organized withdrawal of the entire Russian army with artillery and rear forces within one night was a unique case in the history of wars.

Sevastopol. Monument to lost ships. Sculptor A. G. Adamson, architect V. A. Feldman and military engineer F. O. Enberg. 1905

Thus ended the heroic defense of Sevastopol. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. The Russian army in Crimea survived and was ready for further battles.

"Brave comrades! It is sad and difficult to leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but remember what sacrifice we made on the altar of the fatherland in 1812. Moscow is worth Sevastopol! We left it after the immortal battle of Borodino. The 349-day defense of Sevastopol surpasses Borodino! But not Moscow, a pile of stones and ashes fell to the enemy in the fateful year of 1812. So it was not Sevastopol that we left to our enemies, but only the flaming ruins of the city, set on fire by our own hand, holding behind us part of the defense, which our children and grandchildren will proudly pass on to distant posterity,” said the order of the commander-in-chief dated August 3 (15), 1855. The Allies lost about 73 thousand people during the Sevastopol defense (not counting the sick and those who died from disease). Russians - 102 thousand people. During the siege, the enemy fired 1,356 thousand artillery rounds. In addition, the French fired more than 26 million rounds of ammunition. On the Russian side, 1027 thousand shells were spent.

The heroic 349-day defense of Sevastopol was an important stage in the development of military art. It became an example of the skillful organization of active defense, based on the joint actions of the ground forces and navy in the defense of a seaside fortress. Despite the enemy's superiority in the number of troops, artillery and the quality of weapons, a deeply layered defense that combined maneuver with fire and reliance on engineering structures, the adopted system of artillery and rifle fire, and mine warfare allowed the defenders to successfully repel enemy attacks. The combination of fire with the trench system marked the beginning of positional warfare. Russian soldiers demonstrated high moral and combat qualities and wrote a glorious page in the military chronicle of the army and navy.

The Cathedral of St. Prince Vladimir Equal to the Apostles in Sevastopol is an Orthodox church, the burial place of Russian admirals and naval officers - a monument of architecture and history.
Architects K. A. Ton and A. A. Avdeev

Worthy successors and continuers of the heroic exploits of the Sevastopol residents were the soldiers of the Red Army during the second Sevastopol defense of 1941 - 1942. They not only repeated the feat of those who fought on the bastions of the famous Russian city in 1854 - 1855, but also showed even greater steadfastness and mass heroism in the fight against the Nazi invaders.

Leaving Sevastopol, Gorchakov positioned his troops on the Inkerman and Mekenzi heights. Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the engineering defense of the Northern side. Together with the arriving reserves, Gorchakov had about 50 thousand people and was ready to continue the fight.

Colonel Dmitry Vorobiev,
Deputy Head of the Research Department
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

In 1853, the contradictions between Russia and the allied countries of England and France reached their climax. The war has begun. In 1854, Türkiye entered this war, supporting England and France. The Allies decided to destroy the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. In September 1854, enemy ships appeared off the coast of Evpatoria. In total, the Allies sent 89 large warships to this region, as well as more than 800 transport ships. A landing force of the allied army, numbering 63 thousand people, landed in Crimea. In Sevastopol there were 50 thousand people, of which only 22 thousand were military.

The defense of Sevastopol from 1853 to 1856 did not promise anything good. The Russian army was armed with outdated guns that only fired at 100-120 meters. The Allies were armed with modern weapons that allowed them to shoot at a range of 500-700 meters. The Russian fleet consisted of outdated models of ships, which were inferior in all respects to the allied fleet.

The landing indicated that the defense of Sevastopol in 1853 - 1856 should be carried out in two directions: from the sea and from land. The problem was that Sevastopol is a port city. All the city's cannons are pointed towards the sea. The land was not fortified. As a result, the Russian obsolete ships had to be scuttled, which after the sinking closed the entrance to the bay for English ships. Those guns that were removed from the ships were installed in the city, along the entire perimeter. The Allies were preparing for the assault on Sevastopol, and even began shelling the city with artillery. But the Russian artillery responded with massive and accurate strikes, which disabled many of the attackers. The assault was postponed.

Throughout the winter, the Allies increased the number of their contingent in Sevastopol. At the same time, the weather and the desperate resistance of the sailors kept them from the assault. Minor clashes between the opponents continued for more than six months, until on June 18, 1855, the allied forces of England, Turkey and France decided to storm. A day before the offensive, artillery preparation for the attack began. At dawn the assault began. The battle lasted for more than two hours. The allied troops were driven back by the Russian army more than 700 meters from the fortress. Subsequently, the attacks continued repeatedly. The defense of Sevastopol from 1854 to 1856 ended in August. Artillery bombardment destroyed many of the city's fortifications. The Russian commander-in-chief Gorchakov gave the order to destroy all remaining fortifications and retreat. The defense of Sevastopol from 1853 to 1856 lasted 349 days. The sailors defended themselves with honor, but were forced to retreat. This defeat cost the Russian government defeat in the war.

The reasons for the failure in the defense of Sevastopol are obvious. Responsibility for the defeat lies with officials of the tsarist government and Nicholas 1 personally. Sevastopol was, as it were, in isolation. There were practically no access roads there. As a result, the besieged sailors received virtually no help from the state. Towards the end of the siege, small reinforcements began to arrive, which could not radically change the course of the battle. The Russian army had very little ammunition, gunpowder and, most importantly, provisions. Supplies of food and medicine in Sevastopol were very limited. Even before the start of the war, tsarist officials stole most of them. From the very first days of the war, famine began in Sevastopol.

The defense of Sevastopol from 1853 to 1856 is an example of the courage of a Russian soldier. For 11 months, the sailors, receiving virtually no support from land, resisted greatly superior enemy forces. They defended to the last. Even after giving Sevastopol to the enemy, the Russian army did everything so that the enemy received a destroyed city, a city without fortifications.

The European powers were more interested in the struggle for national interests rather than the ideas of monarchy. Emperor Nicholas continued to view Russia as a guarantor of the preservation of the previous order in Europe. Unlike Peter the Great, he underestimated the significance of technical and economic changes in Europe. Nicholas I was more afraid of revolutionary movements there than of the growth of the industrial power of the West. In the end, the desire of the Russian monarch to ensure that the countries of the Old World lived in accordance with his political convictions began to be perceived by Europeans as a threat to their security. Some saw in the policy of the Russian Tsar the desire of Russia to subjugate Europe. Such sentiments were skillfully fueled by the foreign press, primarily the French.

For many years, she persistently created the image of Russia as a powerful and terrible enemy of Europe, a kind of “evil empire” where savagery, tyranny and cruelty reign. Thus, the ideas of a just war against Russia as a potential aggressor were prepared in the minds of Europeans long before the Crimean campaign. For this, the fruits of the minds of Russian intellectuals were also used. For example, on the eve of the Crimean War, articles by F.I. were readily published in France. Tyutchev about the benefits of uniting the Slavs under the auspices of Russia, about the possible appearance of a Russian autocrat in Rome as the head of the church, etc. These materials, which expressed the personal opinion of the author, were announced by the publishers as the secret doctrine of St. Petersburg diplomacy. After the revolution of 1848 in France, Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew, Napoleon III, came to power and was then proclaimed emperor. The establishment on the throne in Paris of a monarch who was not alien to the idea of ​​revenge and who wanted to revise the Vienna agreements, sharply worsened Franco-Russian relations. The desire of Nicholas I to preserve the principles of the Holy Alliance and the Viennese balance of power in Europe was most clearly manifested during the attempt of the rebel Hungarians to secede from the Austrian Empire (1848). Saving the Habsburg monarchy, Nicholas I, at the request of the Austrians, sent troops into Hungary to suppress the uprising. He prevented the collapse of the Austrian Empire by maintaining it as a counterweight to Prussia, and then prevented Berlin from creating a union of German states. By sending his fleet to Danish waters, the Russian emperor stopped the aggression of the Prussian army against Denmark. He also sided with Austria, which forced Prussia to abandon its attempt to achieve hegemony in Germany. Thus, Nicholas managed to turn wide sections of Europeans (Poles, Hungarians, French, Germans, etc.) against himself and his country. Then the Russian emperor decided to strengthen his position in the Balkans and the Middle East by putting hard pressure on Turkey.

The reason for the intervention was a dispute over holy places in Palestine, where the Sultan gave some advantages to Catholics, while infringing on the rights of Orthodox Christians. Thus, the keys to the Bethlehem Temple were transferred from the Greeks to the Catholics, whose interests were represented by Napoleon III. Emperor Nicholas stood up for his fellow believers. He demanded from the Ottoman Empire a special right for the Russian Tsar to be the patron of all its Orthodox subjects. Having received a refusal, Nicholas sent troops into Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the nominal authority of the Sultan, “on bail” until his demands were met. In response, Turkey, counting on the help of European powers, declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. In St. Petersburg they hoped for the support of Austria and Prussia, as well as the neutral position of England, believing that Napoleonic France would not dare to intervene in the conflict. Nicholas counted on monarchical solidarity and international isolation of Bonaparte's nephew. However, European monarchs were more concerned not with who sat on the French throne, but with Russian activity in the Balkans and the Middle East. At the same time, Nicholas I's ambitious claims to the role of an international arbiter did not correspond to Russia's economic capabilities. At that time, England and France sharply moved forward, wanting to redistribute spheres of influence and oust Russia into the category of secondary powers. Such claims had a significant material and technical basis. By the middle of the 19th century, Russia's industrial lag (especially in mechanical engineering and metallurgy) from Western countries, primarily England and France, only increased. So, at the beginning of the 19th century. Russian cast iron production reached 10 million poods and was approximately equal to English production. After 50 years, it grew 1.5 times, and the English one - 14 times, amounting to 15 and 140 million poods, respectively. According to this indicator, the country dropped from 1st to 2nd place in the world to eighth. The gap was also observed in other industries. In general, in terms of industrial production, Russia by the middle of the 19th century. was inferior to France by 7.2 times, to Great Britain - by 18 times. The Crimean War can be divided into two major stages. In the first, from 1853 to the beginning of 1854, Russia fought only with Turkey. It was a classic Russian-Turkish war with the already traditional Danube, Caucasian and Black Sea theaters of military operations. The second stage began in 1854, when England, France, and then Sardinia took the side of Turkey.

This turn of events radically changed the course of the war. Now Russia had to fight a powerful coalition of states that together exceeded it by almost twice the population and more than three times the national income. In addition, England and France surpassed Russia in the scale and quality of weapons, primarily in the field of naval forces, small arms and means of communication. In this regard, the Crimean War opened a new era of wars of the industrial era, when the importance of military equipment and the military-economic potential of states increased sharply. Taking into account the unsuccessful experience of Napoleon's Russian campaign, England and France imposed on Russia a new version of the war, which they had tested in the fight against the countries of Asia and Africa. This option was usually used against states and territories with an unusual climate, weak infrastructure and vast spaces that seriously hampered progress inland. The characteristic features of such a war were the seizure of coastal territory and the creation there of a base for further actions. Such a war presupposed the presence of a strong fleet, which both European powers possessed in sufficient quantities. Strategically, this option had the goal of cutting off Russia from the coast and driving it deep into the mainland, making it dependent on the owners of coastal zones. If we consider how much effort the Russian state spent in the struggle for access to the seas, then we must recognize the exceptional significance of the Crimean War for the fate of the country.

The entry of the leading powers of Europe into the war significantly expanded the geography of the conflict. The Anglo-French squadrons (their core consisted of steam-powered ships) carried out a grandiose military attack on the coastal zones of Russia (on the Black, Azov, Baltic, White Seas and the Pacific Ocean) at that time. In addition to capturing coastal areas, such a spread of aggression was intended to disorient the Russian command regarding the location of the main attack. With the entry of England and France into the war, the Danube and Caucasus theaters of military operations were supplemented by the Northwestern (the area of ​​the Baltic, White and Barents seas), the Azov-Black Sea (the Crimean peninsula and the Azov-Black Sea coast) and the Pacific (the coast of the Russian Far East). The geography of the attacks testified to the desire of the warlike leaders of the Allies, if successful, to tear away from Russia the mouth of the Danube, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Finland (in particular, this was envisaged by the plan of the English Prime Minister G. Palmerston). This war demonstrated that Russia has no serious allies on the European continent. So, unexpectedly for St. Petersburg, Austria showed hostility, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Wallachia. Due to the danger of expanding the conflict, the Danube Army left these principalities. Prussia and Sweden took a neutral but hostile position. As a result, the Russian Empire found itself alone, in the face of a powerful hostile coalition. In particular, this forced Nicholas I to abandon the grandiose plan of landing troops in Constantinople and move on to the defense of his own lands. In addition, the position of European countries forced the Russian leadership to withdraw a significant part of the troops from the theater of war and keep them on the western border, primarily in Poland, in order to prevent the expansion of aggression with the possible involvement of Austria and Prussia in the conflict. Nikolaev's foreign policy, which set global goals in Europe and the Middle East without taking into account international realities, was a fiasco.

Danube and Black Sea theaters of military operations (1853-1854)

Having declared war on Russia, Turkey advanced a 150,000-strong army under the command of Omer Pasha against the Danube Army under the command of General Mikhail Gorchakov (82 thousand people). Gorchakov acted passively, choosing defensive tactics. The Turkish command, using its numerical advantage, took offensive actions on the left bank of the Danube. Having crossed at Turtukai with a 14,000-strong detachment, Omer Pasha moved to Oltenitsa, where the first major clash of this war took place.

Battle of Oltenica (1853). On October 23, 1853, the troops of Omer Pasha were met by a vanguard detachment under the command of General Soimonov (6 thousand people) from the 4th Corps of General Dannenberg. Despite the lack of strength, Soimonov resolutely attacked Omer Pasha's detachment. The Russians had almost turned the tide of the battle in their favor, but unexpectedly received an order to retreat from General Dannenberg (who was not present on the battlefield). The corps commander considered it impossible to hold Oltenica under fire from Turkish batteries from the right bank. In turn, the Turks not only did not pursue the Russians, but also retreated back across the Danube. The Russians lost about 1 thousand people in the battle near Oltenica, the Turks - 2 thousand people. The unsuccessful outcome of the first battle of the campaign had an adverse effect on the morale of the Russian troops.

Battle of Chetati (1853). The Turkish command made a new major attempt to attack on the left bank of the Danube in December on the right flank of Gorchakov’s troops, near Vidin. There, an 18,000-strong Turkish detachment crossed to the left bank. On December 25, 1853, he was attacked near the village of Chetati by the Tobolsk infantry regiment under the command of Colonel Baumgarten (2.5 thousand people). At the critical moment of the battle, when the Tobolsk regiment had already lost half of its strength and shot all the shells, General Bellegarde’s detachment (2.5 thousand people) arrived in time to help it. An unexpected counterattack by fresh forces decided the matter. The Turks retreated, losing 3 thousand people. The damage to the Russians amounted to about 2 thousand people. After the battle at Cetati, the Turks made attempts at the beginning of 1854 to attack the Russians at Zhurzhi (January 22) and Calarasi (February 20), but were again repulsed. In turn, the Russians, with successful searches to the right bank of the Danube, managed to destroy the Turkish river flotillas in Ruschuk, Nikopol and Silistria.

. Meanwhile, a battle took place in Sinop Bay, which became the most striking event of this unfortunate war for Russia. On November 18, 1853, the Black Sea squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov (6 battleships, 2 frigates) destroyed the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha (7 frigates and 9 other ships) in Sinop Bay. The Turkish squadron was heading to the Caucasus coast for a large landing. Along the way, she took refuge from bad weather in Sinop Bay. Here it was blocked by the Russian fleet on November 16. However, the Turks and their English instructors did not allow the thought of a Russian attack on the bay protected by coastal batteries. Nevertheless, Nakhimov decided to attack the Turkish fleet. The Russian ships entered the bay so quickly that the coastal artillery did not have time to inflict significant damage on them. This maneuver also turned out to be unexpected for the Turkish ships, which did not have time to take the correct position. As a result, the coastal artillery could not fire accurately at the beginning of the battle for fear of hitting its own. Undoubtedly, Nakhimov took risks. But this was not the risk of a reckless adventurer, but of an experienced naval commander, confident in the training and courage of his crews. Ultimately, the decisive role in the battle was played by the skill of the Russian sailors and the skillful interaction of their ships. At critical moments of the battle, they always bravely went to help each other. Of great importance in this battle was the superiority of the Russian fleet in artillery (720 guns against 510 guns on the Turkish squadron and 38 guns on coastal batteries). Of particular note is the effect of the first-time bomb cannons that fire explosive spherical bombs. They had enormous destructive power and quickly caused significant damage and fires on the wooden ships of the Turks. During the four-hour battle, Russian artillery fired 18 thousand shells, which completely destroyed the Turkish fleet and most of the coastal batteries. Only the steamship Taif, under the command of the English adviser Slade, managed to escape from the bay. In fact, Nakhimov won a victory not only over the fleet, but also over the fortress. Turkish losses amounted to over 3 thousand people. 200 people were captured (including the wounded Osman Pasha).

The Russians lost 37 people. killed and 235 wounded."The extermination of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by the squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet... I express my sincere gratitude... to the gentlemen commanders of ships and frigates for the composure and precise ordering of their ships according to this disposition during heavy enemy fire... I express gratitude to the officers for their undaunted and precise performance of their duty, I thank the teams who fought like lions,” these were the words of the Nakhimov order dated November 23, 1853. After this, the Russian fleet gained dominance in the Black Sea. The defeat of the Turks at Sinop thwarted their plans to land troops on the Caucasus coast and deprived Turkey of the opportunity to conduct active military operations in the Black Sea. This accelerated the entry of England and France into the war. The Battle of Sinop is one of the most striking victories of the Russian fleet. It was also the last major naval battle of the sailing ship era. The victory in this battle demonstrated the powerlessness of the wooden fleet in the face of new, more powerful artillery weapons. The effectiveness of Russian bomb guns accelerated the creation of armored ships in Europe.

Siege of Silistria (1854). In the spring, the Russian army began active operations beyond the Danube. In March, she moved to the right side near Brailov and settled in Northern Dobruja. The main part of the Danube Army, the general leadership of which was now carried out by Field Marshal Paskevich, was concentrated near Silistria. This fortress was defended by a 12,000-strong garrison. The siege began on May 4. The assault on the fortress on May 17 ended in failure due to the lack of forces brought into the battle (only 3 battalions were sent to attack). After this, the siege work began. On May 28, 72-year-old Paskevich was shell-shocked by a cannonball under the walls of Silistria and left for Iasi. It was not possible to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. The garrison could receive help from outside. By June it had grown to 20 thousand people. On June 9, 1854, a new assault was planned. However, due to the hostile position of Austria, Paskevich gave the order to lift the siege and retreat beyond the Danube. Russian losses during the siege amounted to 2.2 thousand people.

Battle of Zhurzhi (1854). After the Russians lifted the siege of Silistria, the army of Omer Pasha (30 thousand people) crossed in the Ruschuk area to the left bank of the Danube and moved to Bucharest. Near Zhurzhi she was stopped by Soimonov's detachment (9 thousand people). In a fierce battle near Zhurzha on June 26, he forced the Turks to retreat across the river again. The damage to the Russians amounted to over 1 thousand people. The Turks lost about 5 thousand people in this battle. The victory at Zhurzhi was the last success of Russian troops in the Danube theater of military operations. In May - June, Anglo-French troops (70 thousand people) landed in the Varna area to help the Turks. Already in July, 3 French divisions moved to Dobruja, but an outbreak of cholera forced them to return. Disease caused the heaviest damage to the allies in the Balkans. Their army was melting before our eyes not from bullets and grapeshot, but from cholera and fever. Without taking part in the battles, the Allies lost 10 thousand people from the epidemic. At the same time, the Russians, under pressure from Austria, began evacuating their units from the Danube principalities and in September finally retreated across the Prut River to their territory. Military operations in the Danube theater ended. The main goal of the Allies in the Balkans was achieved, and they moved on to a new stage of military operations. Now the main target of their onslaught has become the Crimean Peninsula.

Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations (1854-1856)

The main events of the war unfolded on the Crimean Peninsula (from which this war got its name), or more precisely on its southwestern coast, where the main Russian naval base on the Black Sea was located - the port of Sevastopol. With the loss of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia lost the opportunity to control the Black Sea and pursue an active policy in the Balkans. The Allies were attracted not only by the strategic advantages of this peninsula. When choosing the location of the main attack, the allied command counted on the support of the Muslim population of Crimea. It was supposed to become a significant help for the allied troops located far from their native lands (after the Crimean War, 180 thousand Crimean Tatars emigrated to Turkey). To mislead the Russian command, the allied squadron carried out a powerful bombardment of Odessa back in April, causing significant damage to coastal batteries. In the summer of 1854, the allied fleet began active operations in the Baltic Sea. For disorientation, the foreign press was actively used, from which the Russian leadership drew information about the plans of its opponents. It should be noted that the Crimean campaign demonstrated the increased role of the press in the war. The Russian command assumed that the Allies would deliver the main blow to the southwestern borders of the empire, in particular Odessa.

To protect the southwestern borders, large forces of 180 thousand people were concentrated in Bessarabia. Another 32 thousand were located between Nikolaev and Odessa. In Crimea, the total number of troops barely reached 50 thousand people. Thus, in the area of ​​the proposed attack, the Allies had a numerical advantage. They had even greater superiority in the naval forces. Thus, in terms of the number of warships, the allied squadron exceeded the Black Sea Fleet three times, and in terms of steam ships - 11 times. Taking advantage of significant superiority at sea, the allied fleet began its largest landing operation in September. 300 transport ships with a 60,000-strong landing party, under the cover of 89 warships, sailed to the western coast of Crimea. This landing operation demonstrated the arrogance of the Western Allies. The plan for the trip was not fully thought out. Thus, there was no reconnaissance, and the command determined the landing site after the ships went to sea. And the very timing of the campaign (September) testified to the Allies’ confidence in finishing Sevastopol in a matter of weeks. However, the rash actions of the allies were compensated by the behavior of the Russian command. The commander of the Russian army in Crimea, Admiral Prince Alexander Menshikov, did not make the slightest attempt to prevent the landing. While a small detachment of allied troops (3 thousand people) occupied Yevpatoria and was looking for a convenient place for a landing, Menshikov with an army of 33 thousand was waiting for further events in positions near the Alma River. The passivity of the Russian command allowed the allies, despite bad weather conditions and the weakened condition of the soldiers after the sea motion, to carry out a landing from September 1 to 6.

Battle of the Alma River (1854). Having landed, the allied army under the general leadership of Marshal Saint-Arnaud (55 thousand people) moved along the coast to the south, to Sevastopol. The fleet was on a parallel course, ready to support its troops with fire from the sea. The first battle of the Allies with the army of Prince Menshikov took place on the Alma River. On September 8, 1854, Menshikov was preparing to stop the Allied army on the steep and steep left bank of the river. Hoping to take advantage of his strong natural position, he did little to strengthen it. The inaccessibility of the left flank facing the sea, where there was only one path along the cliff, was especially overestimated. This place was practically abandoned by troops, also due to fear of shelling from the sea. The French division of General Bosquet took full advantage of this situation, which successfully crossed this section and rose to the heights of the left bank. The Allied ships supported their own with fire from the sea. Meanwhile, in other sectors, especially on the right flank, there was a hot frontal battle. In it, the Russians, despite heavy losses from rifle fire, tried to push back the troops who had forded the river with bayonet counterattacks. Here the Allied onslaught was temporarily delayed. But the appearance of Bosquet's division from the left flank created a threat to bypass Menshikov's army, which was forced to retreat.

A certain role in the defeat of the Russians was played by the lack of interaction between their right and left flanks, which were commanded by generals Gorchakov and Kiryakov, respectively. In the battle on Alma, the superiority of the Allies was manifested not only in numbers, but also in the level of weapons. Thus, their rifled guns were significantly superior to Russian smoothbore guns in range, accuracy and frequency of fire. The longest firing range from a smoothbore gun was 300 steps, and from a rifled gun - 1,200 steps. As a result, allied infantry could hit Russian soldiers with rifle fire while being out of range of their shots. Moreover, rifled guns had twice the range of Russian cannons that fired buckshot. This made artillery preparation for an infantry attack ineffective. Having not yet approached the enemy within the range of an aimed shot, the artillerymen were already in the zone of rifle fire and suffered heavy losses. In the battle on Alma, the Allied riflemen without much difficulty shot down the artillery servants in the Russian batteries. The Russians lost over 5 thousand people in battle, the allies ~ over 3 thousand people. The Allies' lack of cavalry prevented them from organizing an active pursuit of Menshikov's army. He retreated to Bakhchisarai, leaving the road to Sevastopol unprotected. This victory allowed the allies to gain a foothold in Crimea and opened the way for them to Sevastopol. The battle on Alma demonstrated the effectiveness and firepower of new small arms, in which the previous system of formation in closed columns became suicidal. During the battle on Alma, Russian troops for the first time spontaneously used a new battle formation - a rifle chain.

. On September 14, the allied army occupied Balaklava, and on September 17 approached Sevastopol. The main base of the fleet was well protected from the sea by 14 powerful batteries. But from land, the city was weakly fortified, since, based on the experience of past wars, the opinion was formed that a large landing in the Crimea was impossible. There was a 7,000-strong garrison in the city. It was necessary to create fortifications around the city just before the Allied landing in Crimea. The outstanding military engineer Eduard Ivanovich Totleben played a huge role in this. In a short time, with the help of the defenders and the population of the city, Totleben accomplished what seemed impossible - he created new bastions and other fortifications that surrounded Sevastopol from the land. The effectiveness of Totleben’s actions is evidenced by the entry in the journal of the city’s defense chief, Admiral Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, dated September 4, 1854: “They did more in a week than they previously did in a year.” During this period, the skeleton of the fortification system literally grew out of the ground, which turned Sevastopol into a first-class land fortress that managed to withstand an 11-month siege. Admiral Kornilov became the head of the city's defense. “Brothers, the Tsar is counting on you. We are defending Sevastopol. Surrender is out of the question. There will be no retreat. Whoever orders a retreat, stab him. If I order a retreat, stab me too!” were the words of his order. In order to prevent the enemy fleet from breaking through into the Sevastopol Bay, 5 battleships and 2 frigates were sunk at the entrance to it (later a number of more ships were used for this purpose). Some of the guns arrived on land from the ships. 22 battalions were formed from naval crews (24 thousand people in total), which strengthened the garrison to 20 thousand people. When the Allies approached the city, they were greeted by an unfinished, but still strong fortification system with 341 guns (versus 141 in the Allied army). The Allied command did not dare to attack the city on the move and began siege work. With the approach of Menshikov’s army to Sevastopol (September 18), the city garrison grew to 35 thousand people. Communication between Sevastopol and the rest of Russia has been preserved. The Allies used their firepower to capture the city. On October 5, 1854, the 1st bombardment began. The army and navy took part in it. 120 guns fired at the city from land, and 1,340 ship guns fired at the city from the sea. This fiery tornado was supposed to destroy the fortifications and suppress the will of their defenders to resist. However, the beating did not go unpunished. The Russians responded with accurate fire from batteries and naval guns.

The hot artillery duel lasted five hours. Despite the enormous superiority in artillery, the allied fleet was severely damaged and was forced to retreat. And here the Russian bomb guns, which had proven themselves well at Sinop, played an important role. After this, the Allies abandoned the use of the fleet in bombing the city. At the same time, the city's fortifications were not seriously damaged. Such a decisive and skillful rebuff of the Russians came as a complete surprise to the allied command, which had hoped to take the city with little bloodshed. The city's defenders could celebrate a very important moral victory. But their joy was overshadowed by death during the shelling of Admiral Kornilov. The defense of the city was led by Pyotr Stepanovich Nakhimov. The Allies became convinced that it was impossible to quickly cope with the fortress. They abandoned the assault and moved on to a long siege. In turn, the defenders of Sevastopol continued to improve their defense. Thus, in front of the line of bastions, a system of advanced fortifications was erected (Selenga and Volyn redoubts, Kamchatka lunette, etc.). This made it possible to create a zone of continuous rifle and artillery fire in front of the main defensive structures. During the same period, Menshikov's army attacked the allies at Balaklava and Inkerman. Although it was not able to achieve decisive success, the allies, having suffered heavy losses in these battles, ceased active operations until 1855. The allies were forced to winter in the Crimea. Unprepared for the winter campaign, the Allied troops suffered dire needs. But still, they managed to organize supplies for their siege units - first by sea, and then with the help of a laid railway line from Balaklava to Sevastopol.

Having survived the winter, the Allies became more active. In March - May they carried out the 2nd and 3rd bombings. The shelling was especially brutal on Easter (in April). 541 guns fired at the city. They were answered by 466 guns, which lacked ammunition. By that time, the Allied army in Crimea had grown to 170 thousand people. against 110 thousand people. among the Russians (of which 40 thousand people are in Sevastopol). After the Easter Bombardment, the siege troops were led by General Pelissier, a supporter of decisive action. On May 11 and 26, French units captured a number of fortifications in front of the main line of bastions. But they were unable to achieve more due to the courageous resistance of the city’s defenders. During the battles, ground units supported with fire the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that remained afloat (steam frigates “Vladimir”, “Khersones”, etc.). General Mikhail Gorchakov, who led the Russian army in the Crimea after the resignation of Menshikov, considered resistance useless due to the superiority of the allies. However, the new Emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on February 18, 1855) demanded that the defense be continued. He believed that the quick surrender of Sevastopol would lead to the loss of the Crimean Peninsula, which would be “too difficult or even impossible” to return to Russia. On June 6, 1855, after the 4th bombardment, the Allies launched a powerful assault on the Ship side. 44 thousand people took part in it. This onslaught was heroically repulsed by 20 thousand Sevastopol residents, led by General Stepan Khrulev. On June 28, while inspecting positions, Admiral Nakhimov was mortally wounded. The man under whom, according to contemporaries, “the fall of Sevastopol seemed unthinkable,” has passed away. The besieged experienced increasing difficulties. They could respond to three shots with only one.

After the victory on the Chernaya River (August 4), the allied forces intensified their attack on Sevastopol. In August they carried out the 5th and 6th bombings, from which the losses of the defenders reached 2-3 thousand people. in a day. On August 27, a new assault began, in which 60 thousand people took part. It was reflected in all places except the key position of the besieged ~ Malakhov Kurgan. It was captured by a surprise attack at lunchtime by the French division of General MacMahon. To ensure secrecy, the allies did not give a special signal for the attack - it began on a synchronized clock (according to some experts, for the first time in military history). The defenders of Malakhov Kurgan made desperate attempts to defend their positions. They fought with everything they could get their hands on: shovels, picks, stones, banners. The 9th, 12th and 15th Russian divisions took part in the frantic battles for Malakhov Kurgan, which lost all the senior officers who personally led the soldiers in counterattacks. In the last of them, the head of the 15th division, General Yuferov, was stabbed to death with bayonets. The French managed to defend the captured positions. The success of the case was decided by the firmness of General MacMahon, who refused to retreat. To General Pelissier’s order to retreat to the starting lines, he responded with the historical phrase: “I am here and I will stay here.” The loss of the Malakhov Kurgan decided the fate of Sevastopol. On the evening of August 27, 1855, by order of General Gorchakov, the residents of Sevastopol left the southern part of the city and crossed the bridge (created by engineer Buchmeyer) to the northern part. At the same time, powder magazines were blown up, shipyards and fortifications were destroyed, and the remains of the fleet were flooded. The battles for Sevastopol are over. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. The Russian armed forces in Crimea survived and were ready for further battles. "Brave comrades! It is sad and difficult to leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but remember what sacrifice we made on the altar of the fatherland in 1812. Moscow is worth Sevastopol! We left it after the immortal battle under Borodin.

The three-hundred-and-forty-nine-day defense of Sevastopol is superior to Borodino!” said the army order dated August 30, 1855. The Allies lost 72 thousand people during the Sevastopol defense (not counting the sick and those who died from diseases). Russians - 102 thousand people. In the glorious The chronicle of this defense includes the names of admirals V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov, engineer E.I. Totleben, surgeon N.I. Pirogov, General S.A. Khrulev, captain G.A. Butakov, sailor P.M. .Cats, officer A.V. Melnikov, soldier A. Eliseev and many other heroes, united from that time on by one valiant name - "Sevastopol". The first sisters of mercy in Russia appeared in Sevastopol. Participants in the defense were awarded the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol". The defense of Sevastopol was the culmination of the Crimean War, and after its fall the parties soon began peace negotiations in Paris.

Battle of Balaclava (1854). During the Sevastopol defense, the Russian army in Crimea gave the allies a number of important battles. The first of these was the battle of Balaklava (a settlement on the coast, east of Sevastopol), where the supply base for British troops in the Crimea was located. When planning an attack on Balaklava, the Russian command saw the main goal not in capturing this base, but in distracting the allies from Sevastopol. Therefore, rather modest forces were allocated for the offensive - parts of the 12th and 16th infantry divisions under the command of General Liprandi (16 thousand people). On October 13, 1854, they attacked the advanced fortifications of the Allied forces. The Russians captured a number of redoubts that were defended by Turkish units. But further onslaught was stopped by a counterattack by the English cavalry. Eager to build on their success, the Guards Cavalry Brigade, led by Lord Cardigan, continued the attack and arrogantly delved into the location of the Russian troops. Here she ran into a Russian battery and came under cannon fire, and was then attacked in the flank by a detachment of lancers under the command of Colonel Eropkin. Having lost most of his brigade, Cardigan retreated. The Russian command was unable to develop this tactical success due to the lack of forces sent to Balaklava. The Russians did not engage in a new battle with additional allied units rushing to help the British. Both sides lost 1 thousand people in this battle. The Balaklava battle forced the Allies to postpone the planned attack on Sevastopol. At the same time, he allowed them to better understand their weak points and strengthen Balaklava, which became the sea gate of the allied siege forces. This battle received wide resonance in Europe due to the high losses among the English guards. A kind of epitaph for Cardigan’s sensational attack were the words of the French General Bosquet: “This is great, but this is not war.”

. Encouraged by the Balaklava affair, Menshikov decided to give the Allies a more serious battle. The Russian commander was also prompted to do this by reports from defectors that the Allies wanted to finish off Sevastopol before winter and were planning an assault on the city in the coming days. Menshikov planned to attack English units in the Inkerman Heights area and push them back to Balaklava. This would allow the French and British troops to be separated, making it easier to defeat them individually. On October 24, 1854, Menshikov’s troops (82 thousand people) gave battle to the Anglo-French army (63 thousand people) in the Inkerman Heights area. The Russians delivered the main blow on their left flank by detachments of generals Soimonov and Pavlov (37 thousand people in total) against the English corps of Lord Raglan (16 thousand people). However, the well-conceived plan was poorly thought out and prepared. The rough terrain, lack of maps, and thick fog led to poor coordination between the attackers. The Russian command actually lost control over the course of the battle. The units were brought into battle in parts, which reduced the force of the blow. The battle with the British broke up into a series of separate fierce battles, in which the Russians suffered heavy damage from rifle fire. By firing from them, the British managed to destroy up to half of some Russian units. General Soimonov was also killed during the attack. In this case, the courage of the attackers was dashed by more effective weapons. Nevertheless, the Russians fought with unrelenting tenacity and eventually began to press the British, knocking them out of most positions.

On the right flank, General Timofeev’s detachment (10 thousand people) pinned down part of the French forces with its attack. However, due to the inaction in the center of General Gorchakov’s detachment (20 thousand people), which was supposed to distract the French troops, they were able to come to the rescue of the British. The outcome of the battle was decided by the attack of the French detachment of General Bosquet (9 thousand people), who managed to push the Russian regiments, who were exhausted and suffered heavy losses, back to their original positions. “The fate of the battle was still wavering when the French who arrived to us attacked the enemy’s left flank,” he wrote London correspondent of the Morning Chronicle - From that moment on, the Russians could no longer hope for success, but, despite this, not the slightest hesitation or disorder was noticeable in their ranks. Struck by the fire of our artillery, they closed their ranks and bravely repelled all the attacks of the allies... Sometimes a terrible battle lasted for five minutes, in which the soldiers fought either with bayonets or rifle butts. It is impossible to believe, without being an eyewitness, that there are troops in the world who can retreat as brilliantly as the Russians... This is the retreat of the Russians Homer would compare it to the retreat of a lion, when, surrounded by hunters, he retreats step by step. Shaking his mane, turning his proud brow towards his enemies, and then again continues on his way, bleeding from the many wounds inflicted on him, but unshakably courageous, undefeated." The Allies lost about 6 thousand people in this battle, the Russians - more than 10 thousand people. Although Menshikov was unable to achieve his intended goal, the Battle of Inkerman played an important role in the fate of Sevastopol. It did not allow the Allies to carry out their planned assault on the fortress and forced them to switch to a winter siege.

Storm of Evpatoria (1855). During the winter campaign of 1855, the most significant event in Crimea was the assault on Yevpatoria by Russian troops of General Stepan Khrulev (19 thousand people). In the city there was a 35,000-strong Turkish corps under the command of Omer Pasha, which threatened the rear communications of the Russian army in Crimea from here. To prevent the offensive actions of the Turks, the Russian command decided to capture Yevpatoria. The lack of allocated forces was planned to be compensated by a surprise attack. However, this was not achieved. The garrison, having learned about the assault, prepared to repel the onslaught. When the Russians launched an attack, they were met with heavy fire, including from the ships of the allied squadron located in the Yevpatoria roadstead. Fearing heavy losses and an unsuccessful outcome of the assault, Khrulev gave the order to stop the attack. Having lost 750 people, the troops returned to their original positions. Despite the failure, the raid on Yevpatoria paralyzed the activity of the Turkish army, which never took active action here. The news of the failure near Evpatoria, apparently, hastened the death of Emperor Nicholas I. On February 18, 1855, he died. Before his death, with his last order, he managed to remove the commander of the Russian troops in Crimea, Prince Menshikov, for the failure of the assault.

Battle of the Chernaya River (1855). On August 4, 1855, on the banks of the Chernaya River (10 km from Sevastopol), a battle took place between the Russian army under the command of General Gorchakov (58 thousand people) and three French and one Sardinian divisions under the command of Generals Pelissier and Lamarmore (about 60 thousand in total). people). For the offensive, which had the goal of helping the besieged Sevastopol, Gorchakov allocated two large detachments led by generals Liprandi and Read. The main battle broke out on the right flank for Fedyukhin Heights. The assault on this well-fortified French position began due to a misunderstanding, which clearly reflected the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian command in this battle. After Liprandi’s detachment went on the offensive on the left flank, Gorchakov and his orderly sent a note to Read “It’s time to start,” meaning to support this attack with fire. Read realized that it was time to start attacking, and moved his 12th division (General Martinau) to storm the Fedyukhin Heights. The division was introduced into battle in parts: the Odessa, then the Azov and Ukrainian regiments. “The swiftness of the Russians was amazing,” a correspondent of one of the British newspapers wrote about this attack. “They did not waste time shooting and rushed forward with extraordinary impetus. French soldiers.. "They assured me that the Russians had never before shown such ardor in battle." Under deadly fire, the attackers managed to cross the river and canal, and then reached the advanced fortifications of the Allies, where a hot battle began. Here, on the Fedyukhin Heights, not only the fate of Sevastopol was at stake, but also the honor of the Russian army.

In this final field battle in the Crimea, the Russians, in a frantic impulse, sought for the last time to defend their dearly purchased right to be called invincible. Despite the heroism of the soldiers, the Russians suffered heavy losses and were repulsed. The units allocated for the attack were insufficient. Read's initiative changed the commander's initial plan. Instead of helping Liprandi's units, which had some success, Gorchakov sent the reserve 5th Division (General Vranken) to support the assault on the Fedyukhin Heights. The same fate awaited this division. Read brought the regiments into battle one by one, and separately they also did not achieve success. In a persistent effort to turn the tide of the battle, Read led the attack himself and was killed. Then Gorchakov again shifted his efforts to the left flank to Liprandi, but the allies managed to pull up large forces there, and the offensive failed. By 10 o'clock in the morning, after a 6-hour battle, the Russians, having lost 8 thousand people, retreated to their original positions. The damage to the Franco-Sardinians is about 2 thousand people. After the battle on Chernaya, the allies were able to allocate the main forces for the assault on Sevastopol. The Battle of Chernaya and other failures in the Crimean War meant the loss for almost a whole century (until the victory at Stalingrad) of the sense of superiority previously won by the Russian soldier over Western Europeans.

Capture of Kerch, Anapa, Kinburn. Sabotage on the Coast (1855). During the siege of Sevastopol, the Allies continued their active attack on the Russian coast. In May 1855, a 16,000-strong Allied landing force under the command of generals Brown and Otmar captured Kerch and plundered the city. Russian forces in the eastern part of Crimea under the command of General Karl Wrangel (about 10 thousand people), stretched along the coast, did not offer any resistance to the paratroopers. This success of the allies cleared the way for them to the Sea of ​​Azov (its transformation into an open sea zone was part of England's plans) and cut off the connection between Crimea and the North Caucasus. After the capture of Kerch, the allied squadron (about 70 ships) entered the Sea of ​​Azov. She fired at Taganrog, Genichevsk, Yeisk and other coastal points. However, local garrisons rejected offers of surrender and repelled attempts to land small troops. As a result of this raid on the Azov coast, significant reserves of grain that were intended for the Crimean army were destroyed. The Allies also landed troops on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, occupying the Anapa fortress abandoned and destroyed by the Russians. The last operation in the Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations was the capture of the Kinburn fortress by General Bazin's 8,000-strong French landing force on October 5, 1855. The fortress was defended by a 1,500-strong garrison led by General Kokhanovich. On the third day of the bombing he capitulated. This operation became famous primarily for the fact that armored ships were used for the first time. Built according to the drawings of Emperor Napoleon III, they easily destroyed the stone Kinburn fortifications with gun fire. At the same time, shells from Kinburn’s defenders, fired from a distance of 1 km or less, crashed against the sides of the battleships without much damage to these floating fortresses. The capture of Kinburn was the last success of the Anglo-French troops in the Crimean War.

The Caucasian theater of military operations was somewhat in the shadow of the events that unfolded in Crimea. Nevertheless, actions in the Caucasus were very important. This was the only theater of war where the Russians could directly attack enemy territory. It was here that the Russian armed forces achieved the greatest successes, which made it possible to develop more acceptable peace conditions. The victories in the Caucasus were largely due to the high fighting qualities of the Russian Caucasian army. She had many years of experience in military operations in the mountains. Its soldiers were constantly in the conditions of a small mountain war, had experienced combat commanders aimed at decisive action. At the beginning of the war, Russian forces in Transcaucasia under the command of General Bebutov (30 thousand people) were more than three times inferior to Turkish troops under the command of Abdi Pasha (100 thousand people). Using their numerical advantage, the Turkish command immediately went on the offensive. The main forces (40 thousand people) moved towards Alexandropol. To the north, on Akhaltsikhe, the Ardagan detachment (18 thousand people) was advancing. The Turkish command hoped to break through to the Caucasus and establish direct contact with the troops of the mountaineers, who had been fighting against Russia for several decades. The implementation of such a plan could lead to the isolation of the small Russian army in Transcaucasia and its destruction.

Battle of Bayardun and Akhaltsikhe (1853). The first serious battle between the Russians and the main forces of the Turks marching towards Alexandropol took place on November 2, 1853 at Bayandur (16 km from Alexandropol). Here stood the vanguard of the Russians, led by Prince Orbeliani (7 thousand people). Despite the significant numerical superiority of the Turks, Orbeliani boldly entered the battle and was able to hold out until Bebutov’s main forces arrived. Having learned that fresh reinforcements were approaching the Russians, Abdi Pasha did not get involved in a more serious battle and retreated to the Arpachay River. Meanwhile, the Ardahan detachment of Turks crossed the Russian border and reached the approaches to Akhaltsikhe. On November 12, 1853, his path was blocked by a half-size detachment under the command of Prince Andronnikov (7 thousand people). After a fierce battle, the Turks suffered a heavy defeat and retreated to Kars. The Turkish offensive in Transcaucasia was stopped.

Battle of Bashkadyklar (1853). After the victory at Akhaltsikhe, Bebutov’s corps (up to 13 thousand people) went on the offensive. The Turkish command tried to stop Bebutov at a powerful defensive line near Bashkadyklar. Despite the triple numerical superiority of the Turks (who were also confident in the inaccessibility of their positions), Bebutov boldly attacked them on November 19, 1853. Having broken through the right flank, the Russians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish army. Having lost 6 thousand people, she retreated in disarray. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The Russian success at Bashkadiklar stunned the Turkish army and its allies in the North Caucasus. This victory significantly strengthened Russia's position in the Caucasus region. After the Battle of Bashkadyklar, Turkish troops did not show any activity for several months (until the end of May 1854), which allowed the Russians to strengthen the Caucasian direction.

Battle of Nigoeti and Chorokh (1854). In 1854, the strength of the Turkish army in Transcaucasia was increased to 120 thousand people. It was headed by Mustafa Zarif Pasha. Russian forces were brought to only 40 thousand people. Bebutov divided them into three detachments, which covered the Russian border as follows. The central section in the Alexandropol direction was guarded by the main detachment led by Bebutov himself (21 thousand people). On the right, from Akhaltsikhe to the Black Sea, Andronikov’s Akhaltsikhe detachment (14 thousand people) covered the border. On the southern flank, to protect the Erivan direction, a detachment of Baron Wrangel (5 thousand people) was formed. The first to take the blow were units of the Akhaltsikhe detachment on the Batumi section of the border. From here, from the Batum region, Hassan Pasha's detachment (12 thousand people) moved to Kutaisi. On May 28, 1854, his path was blocked near the village of Nigoeti by a detachment of General Eristov (3 thousand people). The Turks were defeated and driven back to Ozugerty. Their losses amounted to 2 thousand people. Among those killed was Hassan Pasha himself, who promised his soldiers to have a hearty dinner in Kutaisi in the evening. Russian damage - 600 people. The defeated units of Hassan Pasha's detachment retreated to Ozugerty, where Selim Pasha's large corps (34 thousand people) was concentrated. Meanwhile, Andronnikov gathered his forces into a fist in the Batumi direction (10 thousand people). Without allowing Selim Pasha to go on the offensive, the commander of the Akhaltsikhe detachment himself attacked the Turks on the Chorokh River and inflicted a severe defeat on them. Selim Pasha's corps retreated, losing 4 thousand people. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The victories at Nigoeti and Chorokhe secured the right flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.

Battle at Chingil Pass (1854). Having failed to break into Russian territory in the area of ​​the Black Sea coast, the Turkish command launched an offensive in the Erivan direction. In July, a 16,000-strong Turkish corps moved from Bayazet to Erivan (now Yerevan). The commander of the Erivan detachment, Baron Wrangel, did not take a defensive position, but himself stepped out to meet the advancing Turks. In the scorching heat of July, the Russians reached the Chingil Pass with a forced march. On July 17, 1854, in a counter battle, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Bayazet Corps. The Russian casualties in this case amounted to 405 people. The Turks lost over 2 thousand people. Wrangel organized an energetic pursuit of the defeated Turkish units and on July 19 captured their base - Bayazet. Most of the Turkish corps fled. Its remnants (2 thousand people) retreated to Van in disarray. The victory at the Chingil Pass secured and strengthened the left flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.

Battle of Kyuryuk-dak (1854). Finally, a battle took place on the central sector of the Russian front. On July 24, 1854, Bebutov’s detachment (18 thousand people) fought with the main Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Zarif Pasha (60 thousand people). Relying on numerical superiority, the Turks left their fortified positions at Hadji Vali and attacked Bebutov’s detachment. The stubborn battle lasted from 4 a.m. to noon. Bebutov, taking advantage of the stretched nature of the Turkish troops, managed to defeat them piecemeal (first on the right flank, and then in the center). His victory was facilitated by the skillful actions of the artillerymen and their sudden use of missile weapons (missiles designed by Konstantinov). The losses of the Turks amounted to 10 thousand people, Russians - 3 thousand people. After the defeat at Kuryuk-Dara, the Turkish army retreated to Kars and ceased active operations in the Caucasian theater of military operations. The Russians received a favorable opportunity to attack Kars. So, in the campaign of 1854, the Russians repelled the Turkish onslaught in all directions and continued to maintain the initiative. Turkey's hopes for the Caucasian highlanders also did not materialize. Their main ally in the Eastern Caucasus, Shamil, did not show much activity. In 1854, the only major success of the mountaineers was the capture in the summer of the Georgian town of Tsinandali in the Alazani Valley. But this operation was not so much an attempt to establish cooperation with Turkish troops as a traditional raid with the aim of seizing booty (in particular, princesses Chavchavadze and Orbeliani were captured, for whom the highlanders received a huge ransom). It is likely that Shamil was interested in independence from both Russia and Turkey.

Siege and capture of Kars (1855). At the beginning of 1855, General Nikolai Muravyov, whose name is associated with the greatest success of the Russians in this theater of military operations, was appointed commander of the Russian forces in Transcaucasia. He united the Akhaltsikhe and Alexandropol detachments, creating a united corps of up to 40 thousand people. With these forces, Muravyov moved towards Kars with the goal of capturing this main stronghold in eastern Turkey. Kars was defended by a 30,000-strong garrison, led by the English general William. The siege of Kars began on August 1, 1855. In September, Omer Pasha's expeditionary force (45 thousand people) arrived from Crimea to Batum to help Turkish troops in Transcaucasia. This forced Muravyov to act more actively against Kars. On September 17, the fortress was stormed. But he was not successful. Of the 13 thousand people who went on the attack, the Russians lost half and were forced to retreat. The damage to the Turks amounted to 1.4 thousand people. This failure did not affect Muravyov's determination to continue the siege. Moreover, Omer Pasha launched an operation in Mingrelia in October. He occupied Sukhum, and then got involved in heavy battles with the troops (mostly police) of General Bagration Mukhrani (19 thousand people), who detained the Turks at the turn of the Enguri River, and then stopped them on the Tskheniskali River. Towards the end of October it began to snow. He closed the mountain passes, dashing the garrison's hopes for reinforcements. At the same time, Muravyov continued the siege. Unable to withstand hardships and without waiting for outside help, the garrison of Kars decided not to experience the horrors of winter sitting and capitulated on November 16, 1855. The capture of Kars was a major victory for the Russian troops. This last significant operation of the Crimean War increased Russia's chances of concluding a more honorable peace. For the capture of the fortress, Muravyov was awarded the title of Count of Karsky.

Fighting also took place in the Baltic, White and Barents Seas. In the Baltic Sea, the Allies planned to capture the most important Russian naval bases. In the summer of 1854, an Anglo-French squadron with a landing force under the command of Vice Admirals Napier and Parseval-Duchenne (65 ships, most of them steam) blocked the Baltic Fleet (44 ships) in Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The Allies did not dare to attack these bases, since the approach to them was protected by minefields designed by Academician Jacobi, which were first used in combat. Thus, the technical superiority of the Allies in the Crimean War was by no means total. In a number of cases, the Russians were able to effectively counter them with advanced military equipment (bomb guns, Konstantinov missiles, Jacobi mines, etc.). Fearing the mines at Kronstadt and Sveaborg, the Allies attempted to seize other Russian naval bases in the Baltic. The landings in Ekenes, Gangut, Gamlakarleby and Abo failed. The only success of the Allies was their capture of the small fortress of Bomarsund on the Åland Islands. At the end of July, an 11,000-strong Anglo-French landing force landed on the Åland Islands and blocked Bomarsund. It was defended by a 2,000-strong garrison, which surrendered on August 4, 1854 after a 6-day bombardment that destroyed the fortifications. In the fall of 1854, the Anglo-French squadron, having failed to achieve its goals, left the Baltic Sea. “Never before have the actions of such a huge armada with such powerful forces and means ended with such a ridiculous result,” the London Times wrote about this. In the summer of 1855, the Anglo-French fleet under the command of Admirals Dundas and Pinault limited themselves to blockading the coast and shelling Sveaborg and other cities.

On the White Sea, several English ships tried to capture the Solovetsky Monastery, which was defended by monks and a small detachment with 10 cannons. The defenders of Solovki responded with a decisive refusal to the offer to surrender. Then the naval artillery began shelling the monastery. The first shot knocked out the monastery gates. But the attempt to land troops was repulsed by fortress artillery fire. Fearing losses, the British paratroopers returned to the ships. After shooting for two more days, the British ships set off for Arkhangelsk. But the attack on him was also repelled by the fire of Russian cannons. Then the British sailed to the Barents Sea. Joining French ships there, they mercilessly fired incendiary cannonballs at the defenseless fishing village of Kola, destroying 110 of the 120 houses there. This was the end of the actions of the British and French in the White and Barents Seas.

Pacific Theater of Operations (1854-1856)

Particularly worth noting is Russia’s first baptism of fire in the Pacific Ocean, where the Russians, with small forces, inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy and worthily defended the Far Eastern borders of their homeland. Here the garrison of Petropavlovsk (now the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky), led by the military governor Vasily Stepanovich Zavoiko (over 1 thousand people), distinguished itself. It had seven batteries with 67 guns, as well as the ships Aurora and Dvina. On August 18, 1854, an Anglo-French squadron (7 ships with 212 guns and 2.6 thousand crew and troops) under the command of Rear Admirals Price and Fevrier de Pointe approached Petropavlovsk. The Allies sought to capture this main Russian stronghold in the Far East and profit from the property of the Russian-American company here. Despite the obvious inequality of forces, primarily in artillery, Zavoiko decided to defend himself to the last extreme. The ships "Aurora" and "Dvina", turned by the city's defenders into floating batteries, blocked the entrance to the Peter and Paul harbor. On August 20, the Allies, having a triple superiority in cannons, suppressed one coastal battery with fire and landed troops (600 people) ashore. But the surviving Russian artillerymen continued to fire at the broken battery and detained the attackers. The artillerymen were supported by fire from guns from the Aurora, and soon a detachment of 230 people arrived at the battlefield, and with a bold counterattack they dropped the troops into the sea. For 6 hours, the allied squadron fired along the coast, trying to suppress the remaining Russian batteries, but itself received heavy damage in an artillery duel and was forced to retreat from the coast. After 4 days, the Allies landed a new landing force (970 people). captured the heights dominating the city, but his further advance was stopped by a counterattack by the defenders of Petropavlovsk. 360 Russian soldiers, scattered in a chain, attacked the paratroopers and fought them hand-to-hand. Unable to withstand the decisive onslaught, the allies fled to their ships. Their losses amounted to 450 people. The Russians lost 96 people. On August 27, the Anglo-French squadron left the Petropavlovsk area. In April 1855, Zavoiko set out with his small flotilla from Petropavlovsk to defend the mouth of the Amur and in De Castri Bay won a decisive victory over a superior British squadron. Its commander, Admiral Price, shot himself in despair. “All the waters of the Pacific Ocean are not enough to wash away the shame of the British flag!” one of the English historians wrote about this. Having checked the fortress of Russia's Far Eastern borders, the allies stopped active hostilities in this region. The heroic defense of Petropavlovsk and De Castri Bay became the first bright page in the annals of the Russian armed forces in the Pacific.

Parisian world

By winter, fighting on all fronts had subsided. Thanks to the resilience and courage of the Russian soldiers, the offensive impulse of the coalition fizzled out. The Allies failed to oust Russia from the shores of the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean. “We,” wrote the London Times, “have found a resistance superior to anything hitherto known in history.” But Russia could not defeat the powerful coalition alone. It did not have sufficient military-industrial potential for a protracted war. The production of gunpowder and lead did not even half satisfy the needs of the army. The stocks of weapons (cannons, rifles) accumulated in the arsenals were also coming to an end. The Allied weapons were superior to the Russian ones, which led to huge losses in the Russian army. The lack of a railway network did not allow for the mobile movement of troops. The advantage of the steam fleet over the sailing fleet made it possible for the French and British to dominate the sea. In this war, 153 thousand Russian soldiers died (of which 51 thousand people were killed and died from wounds, the rest died from disease). About the same number of allies (French, British, Sardinians, Turks) died. Almost the same percentage of their losses were due to disease (primarily cholera). The Crimean War was the bloodiest conflict of the 19th century after 1815. So the Allies’ agreement to negotiate was largely due to heavy losses. PARISIAN WORLD (03/18/1856). At the end of 1855, Austria demanded that St. Petersburg conclude a truce on the terms of the allies, otherwise threatening war. Sweden also joined the alliance between England and France. The entry of these countries into the war could cause an attack on Poland and Finland, which threatened Russia with more serious complications. All this pushed Alexander II to peace negotiations, which took place in Paris, where representatives of seven powers (Russia, France, Austria, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey) gathered. The main terms of the agreement were as follows: navigation on the Black Sea and Danube is open to all merchant ships; the entrance to the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles is closed to warships, with the exception of those light warships that each power maintains at the mouth of the Danube to ensure free navigation on it. Russia and Turkey, by mutual agreement, maintain an equal number of ships in the Black Sea.

According to the Treaty of Paris (1856), Sevastopol was returned to Russia in exchange for Kars, and the lands at the mouth of the Danube were transferred to the Principality of Moldova. Russia was prohibited from having a navy in the Black Sea. Russia also promised not to fortify the Åland Islands. Christians in Turkey are compared in rights with Muslims, and the Danube principalities come under the general protectorate of Europe. The Paris peace, although not beneficial for Russia, was still honorable for her in view of such numerous and strong opponents. However, its disadvantageous side - the limitation of Russia's naval forces on the Black Sea - was eliminated during the life of Alexander II with a statement on October 19, 1870.

Results of the Crimean War and reforms in the army

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War ushered in the era of the Anglo-French redivision of the world. Having knocked the Russian Empire out of world politics and secured their rear in Europe, the Western powers actively used the advantage they had gained to achieve world domination. The path to the successes of England and France in Hong Kong or Senegal lay through the destroyed bastions of Sevastopol. Soon after the Crimean War, England and France attacked China. Having achieved a more impressive victory over him, they turned this country into a semi-colony. By 1914, the countries they captured or controlled accounted for 2/3 of the world's territory. The war clearly demonstrated to the Russian government that economic backwardness leads to political and military vulnerability. Further lag behind Europe threatened with even more serious consequences. Under Alexander II, the reform of the country begins. The military reform of the 60s and 70s occupied an important place in the system of transformations. It is associated with the name of Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin. This was the largest military reform since the time of Peter, which led to dramatic changes in the armed forces. It affected various areas: organization and recruitment of the army, its administration and armament, training of officers, training of troops, etc. In 1862-1864. The local military administration was reorganized. Its essence boiled down to weakening excessive centralism in the management of the armed forces, in which military units were subordinated directly to the center. For decentralization, a military-district control system was introduced.

The country's territory was divided into 15 military districts with their own commanders. Their power extended to all troops and military institutions of the district. Another important area of ​​reform was changing the officer training system. Instead of cadet corps, military gymnasiums (with a 7-year training period) and military schools (with a 2-year training period) were created. Military gymnasiums were secondary educational institutions, similar in curriculum to real gymnasiums. Military schools accepted young men with secondary education (as a rule, these were graduates of military gymnasiums). Junker schools were also created. To enter they were required to have a general education of four classes. After the reform, all persons promoted to officers not from schools were required to take exams according to the program of cadet schools.

All this increased the educational level of Russian officers. Mass rearmament of the army begins. There is a transition from smooth-bore shotguns to rifled rifles.

Field artillery is also being re-equipped with rifled guns loaded from the breech. The creation of steel tools begins. Russian scientists A.V. Gadolin, N.V. Maievsky, V.S. Baranovsky achieved great success in artillery. The sailing fleet is being replaced by a steam one. The creation of armored ships begins. The country is actively building railways, including strategic ones. Improvements in technology required major changes in troop training. The tactics of loose formation and rifle chains are gaining an increasing advantage over closed columns. This required increased independence and maneuverability of the infantryman on the battlefield. The importance of preparing a fighter for individual actions in battle is increasing. The role of sapper and trench work is increasing, which involves the ability to dig in and build shelters for protection from enemy fire. To train troops in methods of modern warfare, a number of new regulations, manuals, and teaching aids are being published. The crowning achievement of the military reform was the transition in 1874 to universal conscription. Before this, a recruiting system was in effect. When it was introduced by Peter I, military service covered all segments of the population (excluding officials and the clergy). But from the second half of the 18th century. it limited itself only to the tax-paying classes. Gradually, among them, buying off the army from rich people began to be an official practice. In addition to social injustice, this system also suffered from material costs. Maintaining a huge professional army (its number has increased 5 times since the time of Peter) was expensive and not always effective. In peacetime, it outnumbered the troops of the European powers. But during the war, the Russian army did not have trained reserves. This problem was clearly manifested in the Crimean campaign, when additionally it was possible to recruit mostly illiterate militias. Now young people who had reached the age of 21 were required to report to the recruiting station. The government calculated the required number of recruits and, in accordance with it, determined the number of places that conscripts were drawn by lot. The rest were enlisted in the militia. There were benefits for conscription. Thus, the only sons or breadwinners of the family were exempted from the army. Representatives of the peoples of the North, Central Asia, and some peoples of the Caucasus and Siberia were not drafted. The service life was reduced to 6 years; for another 9 years, those who served remained in the reserve and were subject to conscription in case of war. As a result, the country received a significant number of trained reserves. Military service lost class restrictions and became a national affair.

"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.