Fights for Tsaritsyn Civil 245 Regiment. Defense of Tsaritsyn

Article d.h.s. Ganina about the role of Stalin in the defense of the city of Tsaritsyn, about how he exposed the White Guard underground and did not allow the surrender of the city and the front.

First of all, the whites' testimonies about Stalin are interesting, as well as the refutation of common tales that "white officers were drowned in barges near Tsaritsyn."
Well, Nosovich himself was a rather cunning and dodgy person who led the Reds by the nose for a long time, until Comrade Stalin crossed his path.

A few years ago in France, the author of these lines discovered a unique personal archive of a white agent in the Red Army, General Anatoly Leonidovich Nosovich (1878-1968). The officer's documents made it possible to lift the veil of secrecy over the events of the defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918 and the confrontation between the commissars led by I.V. Stalin and white underground workers at the headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District.

A.L. Nosovich (sitting second from left) and A.E. Snesarev (sitting third from left) at the front. March 1917

Tsaritsyn underground

In the spring and summer of 1918, a combat-ready Red Army was gradually created in Soviet Russia. In May 1918, a system of military districts emerged, among which was the North Caucasian. Located in a strategically important region, this district extended to the entire South of Russia, covering vast territories not occupied by the Germans from the Azov-Black Sea coast and the borders of Ukraine to the Volga region. The district headquarters was in Tsaritsyn. The value of the district was exceptional. It was within its borders that armed clashes with the Don Cossacks and the Volunteer Army took place, the main front of the Civil War, the South, was born. The successes of the Whites on this front subsequently almost led to the collapse of the Bolshevik regime.

Qualified military specialists, former officers of the old army, were involved in the creation of the district administration and leadership of the troops. So, the experienced former general A.E. became the military leader of the district. Snesarev, who later proved himself well in the Red Army. The headquarters of such a significant district inevitably attracted the attention of the enemy. On the instructions of the Moscow white underground, former General A.L. Nosovich, who occupied the most important post of chief of staff of the district. To implement his plan, Nosovich took advantage of friendly ties with Snesarev, which he had developed even before the revolution. Nosovich attracted a number of other underground officers as his assistants. First of all, the adjutant, former second lieutenant L.S. Sadkovsky and secretary, former lieutenant S.M. Kremkov.

L.S. Sadkovsky (standing) with his mother and brother

The fates of these people are like a detective. Sadkovsky fled to the Whites, then was captured by the Reds, chose the church path and became a bishop, died in 1948 in the Pskov-Caves Monastery. Kremkov stayed with the Reds, hid his underground work, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, made a career, later became chief of staff of the corps, was arrested in the Spring case, spent several years in camps, and in 1935 shot himself. For many years, the former white underground worker was in love with the famous revolutionary L.M. Reisner.

The position for assignments under Nosovich was taken by the former second lieutenant P.A. Tarasenkov. Comrade Nosovich, former Colonel V.P. Chebyshev, took over as head of the district artillery department. A former captain of the 2nd rank P.Ya. arrived from Petrograd. Lokhmatov, who became Chebyshev's assistant. Another assistant to Nosovich turned out to be former Colonel A.A. Sosnitsky, who joined the organization already in Tsaritsyn. An acquaintance of Nosovich, former Colonel A.N. Kovalevsky, received the position of head of the mobilization department, but the degree of his involvement in underground work remains in question.

Snesarev suspected something was wrong. On May 18, 1918, he wrote in his diary: "In Soviet[s?] circles, the version is that Nosovich is gathering his guards[s], relatives, counter-revolutionaries ... This is a lie, and isn't he the author?" Over time, suspicions strengthened, but Snesarev did not betray his employee.

The underground workers maintained contact with Moscow with the help of couriers. Nosovich made contact with Colonel Khristich from the Serbian military mission and the French consul Charbaud, through whom he received information from the French military mission in Moscow.

The chief of staff of the district was entrusted with the task of forming five divisions. But for two and a half months he did not organize a single military unit. Seeing in the events that took place the continuation of the First World War and seeing German agents in the Bolsheviks, Nosovich fought against the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the Germans. According to the testimony of the underground, during the period of the emergence of the Red Army, the very demand for discipline and legality introduced disorganization into the control system. Involuntary assistants were the commander of the Tsaritsyn Front I.V. Tulak and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Tsaritsyno Council Ya.Z. Erman. They, according to Nosovich, had a difficult relationship with the district headquarters, and the white agent skillfully fomented the conflict.

Nosovich’s work was as follows: “I had to not be late to bring discord and confusion by the time of the offensive, and the second was to hold out fruitful work in case the offensive was late until the last opportunity and at the right time to move from covert work at headquarters to active field work, providing direct assistance to the attackers with the help of counter-revolutionary action".

At the end of July 1918, Nosovich handed over to the Cossacks a plan to capture the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya, recommending the optimal direction of the counterattack. To organize an uprising in Tsaritsyn, a connection with the local officer underground was required. By the beginning of July, such a connection was established, it was possible to count on 500-600 officers. To arm the rebels, Chebyshev organized at the Tsaritsyn station an untouchable mobile reserve for 1000 rifles and 10-20 machine guns with ammunition.

I.V. Stalin. 1918

"Smart Commissar Dzhugashvili"

Of course, underground workers could not carry out subversive activities, remaining unexposed for a long time. Moreover, on May 31, 1918, a member of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Nationalities I.V. was sent to Tsaritsyn. Stalin as the general head of the food business in the South of Russia, endowed with emergency powers.

The arrival of Stalin complicated the work of the underground, and subsequently led to the removal of Nosovich and his arrest. Stalin did not confine himself to food matters, but took all the questions of the defense of the South into his own hands, in connection with which a confrontation with the military could not but arise. Nosovich, in a report to the white command, noted that the work was hindered by the appearance of "the energetic and intelligent commissar Dzhugashvili, who solved my problem and, having arrested me, Kovalevsky and the entire artillery department, snatched the initiative from my hands. Stalin guessed about my work, but the general ... the situation did not give him enough material for my condemnation.

The white intelligence officer testified that the suspicions of the commissars were justified: “Of course, our activities, although from the point of view of the letter of the law, are quite correct, caused a lot of complaints from the command staff, and especially from the former Tsaritsyn leaders and, it must be admitted, that in spirit and instinct they were absolutely right. Terrible words: counter-revolutionaries and White Guards had long been uttered. Anonymous and open friendly warnings to rush and leave Tsaritsyn were not uncommon. But, I repeat, events were brewing. We had to remain at our post to the end. By the actions of [I. V.] Stalin and [S.K.] Minin, I was almost completely out of work, but their too energetic and, no doubt, against the established rules of the center, created strained relations between the commissariat of the North Caucasus, which, with their appearance, remained , in fact, out of business."

Indeed, having found a number of shortcomings in the work of the district military commissariat, from the second half of July 1918, Stalin and his associates, contrary to the military policy of the center, took a number of steps to eliminate the district headquarters.

As a result of Stalin's pressure, Snesarev was summoned to Moscow on July 19 to report to the Supreme Military Council, and was de facto recalled from the district. In connection with the departure of Snesarev, Nosovich became an acting director. military instructor. This made the white agent, as he wrote, "the sovereign arbiter of the fate of Tsaritsyn, remaining de jure subordinate to my commissars [K.Ya.] Zedin and [A.G.] Selivanov. During this period, I could surrender Tsaritsyn to the white forces at any given moment But I repeat ... There was not a word or a word about volunteers. And the Don command did everything not to take this necessary junction of routes and communications with the forces advancing from Siberia. "

N.A. County Commissioners Anisimov and K.Ya. Zedin were sent on long business trips. The management of operations passed to the Military Council of the district, consisting of I.V. Stalin, S.K. Minin and A.N. Kovalevsky (temporarily).

Chief of Staff of the 4th Rifle Corps S.M. Kremkov (left) and corps commander I.S. Kutyakov in Kislovodsk. October 1929

"Barge Policy"

The Military Council on August 4, 1918 "in order to improve the supply of the front" liquidated the district artillery department, and the district headquarters was also liquidated, replaced by the operational department under the Military Council. The next day, employees of the artillery department were arrested, who were placed in a floating prison on barges in the middle of the Volga. Allegations of barge sinking are fiction. After Tsaritsyn was occupied by the Whites in 1919, the Special Commission to Investigate the Atrocities of the Bolsheviks, which was under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, examined the barges and compiled a detailed description of these floating prisons. In particular, the difficult conditions of keeping those arrested on barges with the onset of cold weather in the autumn of 1918 were specially noted, but there was no talk of flooding.

There was a reason to arrest artillerymen. According to Nosovich, their activities can be characterized as active sabotage. White subsequently confirmed the fact of a conspiracy of gunners.

Nosovich was removed from his post, and K.E. was introduced to the Military Council of the district instead of Kovalevsky on August 4. Voroshilov. The defeat of the district military commissariat did not stop there - on August 6, the district economic department was liquidated. On August 10, 1918, Nosovich and Kovalevsky were arrested.

A.N. Kovalevsky

However, they did not hit the barge.

By this time, the center began to take measures to curb Tsaritsyn's arbitrariness. Some of the Tsaritsyn Bolsheviks also did not agree with Stalin's actions. On August 10, 1918, the Supreme Military Council decided to stop the liquidation of the district's institutions. On the spot, the line of the center was carried out by representatives of the Higher Military Inspectorate N.I. Podvoisky, as a result of whose intervention, on August 13, Nosovich and Kovalevsky were released on bail by the inspectorate. Their failure to complete their tasks was attributed to the sabotage of local authorities and the unresponsiveness of the center. The military experts were to be sent for interrogation to Balashov and further to Moscow, from where they were appointed.

On the same day, Nosovich and Kovalevsky, together with the inspection on the steamer "Groza", left for Kamyshin, which saved them.

Was Stalin right?

The Tsaritsyn arrests in August 1918 were carried out out of Stalin's desire for full power in the North Caucasus and due to distrust of the military experts. But, despite a different background, the figures of the anti-Bolshevik underground, including Nosovich himself and his employees, were under arrest. On the night of August 18, the Tsaritsyn Cheka arrested members of the underground officer organization of engineer N.P. Alekseev, with whom Nosovich had a connection (the Chekists did not know about this). At least 23 people (mostly junior officers) were shot. Had Nosovich lingered in Tsaritsyn, his fate would have been unenviable.

Often there are statements that in Tsaritsyn I.V. Stalin showed excessive cruelty, conspiracy cases were fabricated, military experts were unreasonably terrorized, and that the Tsaritsyn experience was the first test of the subsequent methods of Stalin's repressive policy. But such assessments contradict White's evidence.

The inhospitable Tsaritsyn Nosovich, who left during interrogations, confused the representatives of the Higher Military Inspectorate and did not give himself away. He denied connection with the underground, stating that "the post is almost a permanent temporary military instructor in such a way that, in any case, I'm not talking about 2 heads, so that, being the chief of staff, I can hold any threads of a conspiracy in my hands." Suspicions were removed from the military experts, and Nosovich received a new high appointment as assistant commander of the Soviet Southern Front.

Nosovich was an adventurous person. Having exhausted the possibilities of secret work, on October 24, 1918, he stole an official car, captured the commissar and went over to the side of the whites, passing them important information. The Stalinist group in the RCP(b) presented the incident as proof that their leader was right.

Nosovich tried to pass off his escape as a capture, so as not to let down his comrades in the underground. But this attempt was not crowned with success. Already on November 10, A.N. was arrested. Kovalevsky, November 14 - P.Ya. Lokhmatov and V.P. Chebyshev. According to some reports, Chebyshev managed to escape to the Whites, was promoted to general, but in the summer of 1919 he died under the same Tsaritsyn. According to other sources, he was shot. Lokhmatov and Kovalevsky were shot.

The fate of Nosovich himself turned out well - he emigrated to France and lived in Nice until 1968.

Tsaritsyn defense 1918-19, operations of the Soviet troops to defend Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd) from the White Cossack army of General P. N. Krasnov in July 1918 - February 1919, during the Civil War in Soviet Russia. The strategic importance of Tsaritsyn was determined by the fact that it was an important communications hub that connected the central regions of the Republic with the Lower Volga region, the North Caucasus and Central Asia and through which the center was supplied with food, fuel, etc.

Tsaritsyn defense 1918-19, operations of the Soviet troops to defend Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd) from the White Cossack army of General P. N. Krasnov in July 1918 - February 1919, during the Civil War in Soviet Russia. The strategic importance of Tsaritsyn was determined by the fact that it was an important communications hub that connected the central regions of the Republic with the Lower Volga region, the North Caucasus and Central Asia and through which the center was supplied with food, fuel, etc. For the White Cossack command, the capture of Tsaritsyn created the possibility of connecting with the troops of the chieftain A. I. Dutov and provided the right flank of the White Cossack army in the main Voronezh direction for Krasnov. In July 1918, Krasnov’s Don Army (up to 45,000 bayonets and sabers, 610 machine guns, and over 150 guns) launched the first offensive against Tsaritsyn: Colonel Polyakov’s detachment (up to 10,000 bayonets and sabers) had the task of striking from the south ; the operational group of General K. K. Mamontov (about 12 thousand bayonets and sabers), concentrated in the Verkhnekurmoyarskaya - Kalach region, was to attack Tsaritsyn with the main forces; the task force of General A.P. Fitskhelaurov (about 20 thousand bayonets and sabers) struck from the Kremenskaya, Ust-Medveditskaya, Chaplyzhenskaya area to Kamyshin. Soviet troops in the Tsaritsyno sector (about 40 thousand bayonets and sabers, over 100 guns) consisted of scattered detachments; the most combat-ready were detachments from the 3rd and 5th Ukrainian armies, which retreated here under the onslaught of the German invaders. On July 22, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District was created (chairman I. V. Stalin, member K. E. Voroshilov and S. K. Minin). The Communist, 1st Don, Morozov-Donetsk and other divisions and units were formed. On July 24, the Soviet troops were divided into sections: Ust-Medveditsky (headed by F.K. Mironov, about 7 thousand bayonets and sabers, 51 machine guns, 15 guns), Tsaritsynsky (headed by A.I. Kharchenko, about 23 thousand bayonets and sabers, 162 machine guns, 82 guns) and the Salsk group (headed by G. K. Shevkoplyasov, about 10 thousand bayonets and sabers, 86 machine guns, 17 guns); in Tsaritsyn there was a reserve (about 1500 bayonets and sabers, 47 machine guns, 8 guns). On the approaches to Tsaritsyn, 2-3 km to the north-west, west and south-west. from the ring railway branches (Gumrak - Voroponovo - Sarepta) 2-3 lines of trenches with wire fences were built. Zh.-d. a branch in the rear of the position made it possible to quickly maneuver along the front and support the troops with the fire of armored trains. The flanks of the Soviet troops were covered by the fire of the ships of the Volga military flotilla.

At the end of July, in connection with the capture of the Trade and Grand Dukes by the Whites, Tsaritsyn's connection with the North Caucasus was interrupted. In early August, Fitskhelaurov's group broke through the front north of Tsaritsyn, occupied Erzovka and Pichuzhinskaya, and reached the Volga, disrupting Tsaritsyn's communications with Moscow. On August 8, Mamontov's group went on the offensive in the central sector and on August 18-20 started fighting on the near approaches to the city, but was stopped. On August 20, the Soviet troops with a sudden blow threw back the enemy to the north of the city and by August 22 they liberated Yerzovka and Pichuzhinskaya. On August 26, they launched a counteroffensive on the entire front, and by September 7, they threw back the White Cossack troops, who had lost about 12 thousand killed and captured, beyond the Don.

In September, the White Cossack command decided on a new offensive against Tsaritsyn and carried out additional mobilization. The Soviet command took measures to strengthen the defense and improve command and control. By order of the RVS of the Republic of September 11, 1918, the Southern Front was created (commander P. P. Sytin, member of the RVS I. V. Stalin until October 19, K. E. Voroshilov until October 3, K. A. Mekhonoshin from October 3, A. I. Okulov since October 14). On October 3, Soviet troops in the Kamyshin and Tsaritsyn directions were brought together in

10th Army (commander K. E. Voroshilov), in the Voronezh direction - in the 8th, in the Povorinsky and Balashov directions - in the 9th and in the North Caucasus - in the 11th Army. On September 22, the main forces of Krasnov's Don Army went on the offensive against Tsaritsyn for the second time. The White Guard command created 2 operational groups: General Fitskhelaurov (20 thousand bayonets and sabers, 122 machine guns, 47 guns, 2 armored trains), which attacked Yelan, Krasny Yar, Kamyshin, Kachalino, Dubovka, Tsaritsyn, and General Mamontov (25 thousand people). bayonets and sabers, 156 machine guns, 93 guns, 6 armored trains), operating on the directions of Voroponovo - Tsaritsyn and Sarepta - Tsaritsyn. In the rear, the White Cossacks had a reserve of about 20 thousand people. "young army" (from recruits). The Soviet 10th Army consisted of about 40 thousand bayonets and sabers, about 200 machine guns, 152 guns, 13 armored trains.

On September 27-30, fierce battles unfolded in the central sector near the Krivomuzginskaya station. At the end of September, the White Cossacks struck south of Tsaritsyn, captured Gniloaksayskaya on October 2, and Tinguta on October 8. They managed to cross to the left bank of the Volga, create a threat from the rear to the Soviet troops, and by October 15 break through to the suburbs of Tsaritsyn - Sarepta, Beketovka and Otradnoye. Soviet troops in stubborn battles, supported by the fire of an artillery group of 21 batteries (about 100 guns) and armored trains, stopped the advance of the enemy and inflicted heavy losses on him. An important role was played by the Steel Division of D.P. Zhloba, which approached from the North Caucasus and attacked the White Cossacks from the rear. The 10th Army was greatly assisted by the active actions of the 8th and 9th armies, which diverted a significant part of Krasnov's troops. As a result of the joint efforts of the 10th and 9th armies, by October 25 the enemy was driven back beyond the Don.

January 1, 1919 Krasnov launched a third attack on Tsaritsyn. By mid-January, the White Cossacks, having broken the stubborn resistance of the 10th Army (commander A. I. Egorov since December 26), again captured the city in a semicircle. On January 12, they struck north of Tsaritsyn and captured Dubovka. To eliminate the breakthrough, the Soviet command removed B. M. Dumenko’s Consolidated Cavalry Division from the southern sector and transferred it to the north. Taking advantage of the weakening of the southern sector, the White Cossacks captured Sarepta on January 16, but this was their last success. On January 14, Dumenko's division drove the White Cossacks out of Dubovka, and then, under the command of S. M. Budyonny (due to Dumenko's illness), made a deep raid on the rear of the enemy. The 8th and 9th Armies, which went on the offensive, began to threaten the Tsaritsyn group of White Cossacks from the rear. In mid-February, the enemy was forced to withdraw from Tsaritsyn.

In the Tsaritsyn defense. the Soviet command skillfully organized the engineering support of the defense, the close interaction of various branches of the military, skillfully carried out bold maneuvers of the troops and counterattacks, combining them with stubborn defense in fortified positions. An outstanding role in the Tsaritsyn defense was played by the workers of Tsaritsyn, who replenished the ranks of the defenders and provided the troops with weapons. On May 14, 1919, the Soviet government awarded Tsaritsyn the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner and on April 14, 1924, the Order of the Red Banner.

Sources: Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922). Sat. documents, vol. 1, M., 1971; Southern front. Sat. documents, Rostov n / D., 1962; Vodolagin M.A., Bastions of Glory, M., 1974.

In the spring of 1918, Stalin first appears on the front of the civil war. This happened in May near Tsaritsyn, when the echelons of the retreating Fifth Ukrainian Army under the command of Voroshilov were building crossings across the Don. Stalin arrived as the Extraordinary Commissar for the Food Affairs of the South of Russia. Later, helpful historians will turn the Tsaritsyno site into a decisive front civil war, and Stalin himself will be proclaimed the main organizer of the Red Army. But Stalin does not yet know about his destiny. On July 7, 1918, he wrote to Lenin: “I drive and scold everyone I need. I hope we will soon restore [railway communication with the Center]. You can be sure that we will not spare anyone - neither ourselves nor others, but we will still give bread.

Stalin on the Tsaritsyn front, 1918

In Tsaritsyn, Stalin is a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District (SKVO). Using his high position as a member of the government (he remains People's Commissar for Nationalities), he immediately begins to interfere in purely military issues, which he cannot understand due to lack of knowledge and experience. Stalin himself thinks otherwise. From the same note to Lenin: “If our military “specialists” (shoemakers!) had not slept and were not idle, the [railway] line would not have been interrupted, and if the line is restored, then not thanks to the military, but in spite of them. It is immediately noticeable that the son of a shoemaker, Comrade Stalin, does not appreciate the military experts for a penny, in any case, he intends to stand above them.

On May 2, 1918, lieutenant general of the tsarist army Andrey Evgenyevich Snesarev, an experienced military leader and an outstanding orientalist, was appointed military instructor (commander of the troops) of the North Caucasus Military District on May 2, 1918. He voluntarily joined the Red Army and arrived in Tsaritsyn at the end of May with a mandate from the Council of People's Commissars signed by Lenin. In the conditions of rampant partisanship, very poorly organized party and Soviet work (report of Commissar K. Ya. Zedin), Snesarev sets about creating regular units.

Stalin in Tsaritsyn. bloody chaos

The actions of the military instructor put pressure on a pet peeve for many. First of all, they were not to the liking of a group of party workers headed by K. E. Voroshilov and S. K. Minin, who did not yet understand what a regular army was for. They recognized dashing partisans, rallies, elective command staff as the only method of revolutionary struggle, and they considered the establishment of military discipline as a return to "royal order". The same views were held by the commanders of numerous detachments, all these commanders-in-chief and commanders (usually the leader of a detachment of bayonets in 200 called himself commander or commander-in-chief of troops in a given territory) - for the most part soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the old army. The power they inherited over people, almost uncontrolled, they valued very highly. They intuitively felt that in the regular army they had no chance to stay at the top: there, elementary knowledge and literacy were necessary to occupy command positions. History has shown that these fears were exaggerated. The old party members who got into military work, like Voroshilov and Minin, at that moment thought less about a career, but they felt class distrust of the tsarist officers.

Stalin instantly understood the situation and supported the partisans. He was always repelled by people like Snesarev, who stood at a higher intellectual level.

Under these conditions, the creative work of Snesarev and the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District progressed slowly. Cossack units of the general advanced on Tsaritsyn Krasnova. At the cost of enormous efforts, Snesarev managed to avert this threat and restore communication with the Center. At this moment, in mid-July, Stalin, with the assistance of Voroshilov and Minin, arrested almost all the staff officers and imprisoned them in a floating prison. Soon Snesarev was also taken into custody. The accusations of sabotage were unfounded, they were not confirmed by the local Cheka. But Stalin already in 1918 knew that real guilt did not play a role. Enemies should be declared those who now need to be removed from the road.

The repressions affected not only staff officers. Here is how Stalin reacted to the news of the disclosure of the monarchist organization:

Stalin's resolution was short: Shoot. Engineer Alekseev, his two sons, and with them a significant number of officers who part were in the organization and part only by suspicion in complicity with her, were captured by the Cheka and immediately, without any trial, shot.

The quote is taken from the Donskaya Volna magazine. One could not believe the White Guard organ, but Voroshilov cites precisely this excerpt, depicting the Stalinist style of revolutionary work.

Moscow did not believe Stalin's accusations. A commission of the Higher Military Inspectorate headed by A.I. Okulov was sent to the place. Upon learning of this, Stalin gave the order to destroy the arrested. The barge-prison was brought to a deep place and flooded in the Volga. A few days later, the Okulov commission arrived, which established the groundlessness of the charges against Snesarev. He was released and transferred to another front. The drowned officers were written off as the costs of the civil war. No one was brought to justice, which was a common thing for that time.

The White Cossack regiments, rushing towards Tsaritsyn, were somehow held back by the leader of the Red Cossacks, Philip Mironov, uniting around himself a part of the countrymen who believed in Bolshevism. Stalin, however, saw in the capable leader of the people Mironov, above all, a dangerous personal competitor. On August 4, Joseph Vissarionovich wrote to Lenin:

“... the Cossack units, calling themselves Soviet, cannot, do not want to fight against the Cossack counter-revolution; entire regiments of Cossacks crossed over to the side of Mironov in order to receive weapons, to get acquainted on the spot with the location of our units and then lead entire regiments towards Krasnov; Mironov was three times surrounded by the Cossacks, who knew the whole ins and outs of the Mironov section and, of course, utterly defeated him.

In fact, there was no triple defeat of Mironov by the Whites. Stalin composed it in order to justify himself for the general difficult situation in the Tsaritsyn region, which arose because of the Stalinist-Voroshilov special-mindedness and flagrant illiteracy. By the way, it was Stalin, who actively destroyed the officers loyal to the Bolsheviks in the ranks of the Red Army, who overlooked the formal traitor Nosovich, and when he fled to the Whites, he appointed Denikin's agent Kovalevsky as military instructor. There is no need that Mironov did not carry out the dubious orders of Nosovich. Moscow was inclined to believe Stalin, a member of the Central Committee, and not the Cossack and Lieutenant Colonel Mironov, who never received the requested reinforcements.

In the final strategic sense, Stalin's activities in Tsaritsyn led to a real disaster. In the spring of 1918, the Soviet government had two main enemies in the south: the Don Cossacks and volunteer officer detachments of generals L. G. Kornilov and M. A. Alekseeva retreating to the Caucasus.

Tired of the war, the Cossacks did not want to fight with anyone, including the Soviets. When in April the newly elected ataman Krasnov proclaimed independent Don state, which, along with the original Cossack lands, included the Taganrog, Tsaritsyn and Voronezh districts, the villagers reacted sluggishly. As Krasnov himself testifies, the Cossacks were not up to conquering new lands. But grain requisition policy, which the Bolsheviks had been carrying out since the spring of 1918, forced them to take up arms.

White Volunteer army turned out to be a natural ally of the Cossacks. However, the Volunteers, like Krasnov, had very few forces. In May 1918, Krasnov had 17,000 soldiers (many unreliable among them) and 21 guns. He was opposed by the following forces of the Reds: Southern Veil - 19,820 bayonets and cavalry, 38 guns; 10 army - 39,465 units. and sub., 240 guns. In February, there were about 3.5 units in volunteer detachments. and sab., of which almost a thousand were sick and wounded. The offensive of the Reds forced them on February 22, 1918 to leave Rostov-on-Don for the famous ice hike. They had to move to the Kuban, where significant red forces blocked their path: the Kalnin group (30 thousand units and sab.), the Taman army (30 thousand) and the 11th army (80-100 thousand). Thus, the superiority of the Red Army was overwhelming. All these troops were subordinate to the North Caucasus Military District, whose headquarters, due to the Cossack danger, was transferred from Rostov to Tsaritsyn.

On April 13, 1918, during an unsuccessful attempt to storm Yekaterinodar, General Kornilov died. The new commander of the Volunteer Army, General Denikin, led his troops from the Kuban back to the Don. It seemed that in the current situation, the Reds could quickly finish off the enemy. This, however, was prevented by the lack of completeness of power in the hands of the commander and the super-revolutionary activity of the District Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Stalin, who had just arrived in time. We have already covered its content, it remains to point out the results.

While Stalin and his comrades are at war with the headquarters of their army, Krasnov and Denikin are building up strength and acting. Although relations between them are strained, nevertheless, in the summer of 1918, opponents of Soviet power achieve serious success. In August, Krasnov's army consists of 40,000 reliable fighters, and his authority extends to the entire Don Cossack Region. In May, the Volunteer Army, formed from officer detachments, included 5 thousand units. and sub. In June, Denikin defeated ( Second Kuban campaign) Kalnin's group, occupied the villages of Torgovaya and Velikoknyazheskaya, and on July 13 - Tikhoretskaya. The strategic position of the Soviet troops in the North Caucasus became critical. Now the Dobrarmiya is an impressive force - 20 thousand fighters - and is continuously replenished with officers, mainly from the South.

The successes of the Don and Volunteer armies are developing against the background of Stalin's usurpation of the military leadership in Tsaritsyn and largely due to this circumstance. Stalin autocratically controls the North Caucasus Military District for two months, starting with the removal of Snesarev (mid-July). Just at this time, Denikin was successfully advancing and increasing the number of his troops. August 16, 1918 he took Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar). By the end of September, there were already 40 thousand fighters under the white banner.

After getting rid of Snesarev, Stalin arbitrarily changed the Tsaritsyn defense plan. Thanks to this, in the autumn there was a real threat of the fall of the city and disruption of the interaction of the Reds throughout the South. In addition, Stalin again came into conflict - this time with the former General P.P. Sytin, who was appointed commander of the Southern Front.

It was a difficult time for the Soviet Republic. Wounded Lenin lay in his apartment in the Kremlin. The work of the government apparatus was led by Sverdlov and Tsyurupa. On September 2, a new body of command and control of troops is created - Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic headed by L. D. Trotsky, appointed Commander-in-Chief - I. I. Vatsetis. A merciless Red Terror has been declared throughout the country. The defensive measures of the Soviet government are assuming new forms. New fronts and armies are being created. The Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars approved, and the Revolutionary Military Council ordered the appointment of front commanders. Sytin became the head of the Southern Front, formed on the basis of the North Caucasus Military District. Stalin did not obey the directive of Moscow. First, he sabotaged the order to relocate the front headquarters to Kozlov, then, by decision of the RVS Front, he removed Sytin as a former general and replaced him with Voroshilov. Stalin, of course, was not worried about Sytin's past, but about the power that he received as commander of the troops. Comrade Stalin always treated questions of power with the utmost seriousness. By this time, the situation near Tsaritsyn and throughout the North Caucasus had become so threatening that the center finally had to intervene ... On October 6, an angry exchange of telegrams took place between Sverdlov and Stalin, after which the Central Committee recalled Stalin from the Southern Front and moved the RVS. Voroshilov and Minin were withdrawn, their places were taken by K. A. Mekhonoshin, B. V. Legrand and P. E. Lazimir.

The new front-line leadership began to disentangle the Stalinist mess. The Cossacks approached Kamyshin, and the Soviet command transferred part of the forces from the Eastern Front to save Tsaritsyn. Sytin defended Tsaritsyn, but nothing could be saved in the North Caucasus. The collapse of the front began there. Encouraged by the example of the Revolutionary Military Council, the commanders of a lower rank acted in the same order. The commander of the Tamanskaya Matveev refused to obey the decision of the Kuban-Chernomorsk Central Executive Committee, for which he was shot by the local commander-in-chief Sorokin. In turn, Sorokin sabotaged the formation of regular units of the 11th army, arrested and shot members of the Kuban-Black Sea government. He was outlawed, fled, but was captured by one of Matveev's friends, who paid him off for his commander. The brigade commander Kochubey, surrounded by Denikin's troops, went over to the side of the enemy with part of his forces, but on the orders of the general Lukomsky was hanged.

The entire North Caucasus fell into the hands of the Dobrarmia. Denikin grew into a formidable enemy, with whom he had to fight desperately for another two years.

The whole experience of the class struggle teaches, V. I. Lenin pointed out, that a revolution is worth something only when it knows how to defend itself. During the terrible years of the civil war, the Soviet government defeated the White Guards and the interventionists, thus confirming the correctness of that Leninist proposition.

Along with the Eastern Front, where there was a fierce struggle against the White Czechs, White Guard formations and rebellious kulak gangs, the Southern Front was also important, and in particular Tsaritsyn, which occupied a strategically advantageous position. It was a kind of watershed between the forces of two counter-revolutionary White Guard groups - the southern (in the Don region, the North Caucasus) and the eastern (in the region of the Middle Volga, Uralsk, Orenburg). It was here, in Tsaritsyn, that the counter-revolution planned to unite. The German command, which had contacts with Ataman Krasnov, also linked far-reaching plans with our city. General Eric Ludendorff wrote: "In order to implement the plan of attack with the help of the southern Cossacks on Moscow, we need to secure the right flank, which could only be achieved after the capture of Tsaritsyn." Tsaritsyn was the center of attraction for all Red Partisan and Red Army forces in the southeast of Soviet Russia. From here, the revolutionary detachments received help with weapons, ammunition, equipment, and people.

On May 18, 1918, Krasnov sent a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm II with a request to help him with weapons, ammunition, equipment, guaranteeing, in turn, the supply of bread, livestock, and food to Germany. It is known that power and military authority are strengthened only by victories. Meanwhile, Krasnov's forces were clearly not enough for independent and successful actions. Therefore, the chieftain is trying to negotiate with Denikin on joint actions. In his memoirs “The Great Don Army”, Krasnov, describing the meeting and negotiations with Denikin in the village of Manychskaya, recalls that he raised the question of creating a unified command of the counter-revolutionary forces, of the entry of Don units into the Volunteer Army.

The generals failed to create a united front, because Denikin's plans at that time did not include a campaign against Tsaritsyn, which Krasnov wanted. It was decided that the Volunteer Army, together with the Kuban White Cossacks, would go to Yekaterinodar. And only after that will be able to move on Tsaritsyn. While the Don and Volunteer armies diverged in two opposite directions: the first went north, to Moscow, the second - south, to Mineralnye Vody. Summing up the meeting with Denikin in Manychskaya, Krasnov emphasizes that "the Don Army stood alone before the enormous task of freeing itself from the Bolsheviks ..."

In his “Essays on Russian Troubles,” Denikin points out that an immediate advance to the north was still unfavorable for the command of the Volunteer Army, since it could fall into a vice from all sides: from the north and south - the Bolsheviks, from the west - the Germans, from the east - Volga. He considered it unacceptable to leave in the hands of the Soviets the richest regions of the North Caucasus and the rejection of the human reserves that flowed to him from Ukraine and southern Russia.

Indeed, here the interests of the two White Guard groups diverged. As already noted, Krasnov and the Cossack elite advocated an "independent" Don, and Denikin and his entourage - for a "united and indivisible Russia." The squabbling between the White Guard generals was to the benefit of the Soviet Republic. And yet the onslaught of the counter-revolution intensified.

So, the civil war came close to Tsaritsyn. By the way, this was reminded by the letter of the Central Executive Committee of the Don Soviet Republic to the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of July 2, 1918 on the martial law on the Don and in the Tsaritsyn region. “The Don Soviet government,” noted in a letter from the Don TsIK of July 2, 1918, “considers it its duty to point out to the Council of People’s Commissars the formidable situation in which the Don region and the Tsaritsyn region are now ... We authorize E. A. Trifonov, highlighting the actual state of affairs, to intercede with the central Soviet government:

1. Establish a unified command and control of the armed forces on all fronts of the Don theater of war from st. Povorino to st. Bataysk.

2. To supply the troops of the Don Front with all the necessary technical and financial means, weapons, uniforms, and ammunition. Only with the immediate supply of the army with everything necessary and with the immediate centralization in the reliable hands of the management of all fronts, it is possible to avoid a catastrophe and save the cause of the revolution in the south.

The main danger for Tsaritsyn was the Don army. Krasnov announced the mobilization of 25 ages. In addition, in exchange for bread, cattle, wool, food, the German command gave him 11651 rifles, 64 guns, 88 machine guns, 109104 artillery shells, 11594721 rifle cartridges to the army. True, some of this remained with Denikin.

Krasnov's operational-strategic plan provided for the speedy establishment of a counter-revolutionary regime in the Don region, and then the capture of cities such as Tsaritsyn, Kamyshin, Balashov, Novokhopersk, Kalach, and Liski.

The occupation of Tsaritsyn was planned as the main operation of the Don Army in August 1918. The Cossack troops were reorganized: regular regiments and divisions were formed, the old Cossack uniform was introduced, charters were issued. In the center of the Don region, in Novocherkassk, officer military schools and colleges were opened. The Cossack units were not burdened with large headquarters and convoys. For economic purposes, several merchant Cossacks from the kulak elite were attracted to the relevant units and subdivisions. They were given the right to distribute the loot. The Don army did not burden itself with prisoners, it destroyed them without exception. Corresponding was the ideological indoctrination, which was carried out by the agitators directed by the "Circle of the Don's Salvation". Driving around the villages and farms, they called on the Cossacks to carry "sacrifices on the altar of the motherland."

The Don Army included operational groups Alferov, Mamontov, Fitskhelaurov, Semenov, Kireev, Bykodorov. By August 1918, that is, by the beginning of the offensive on Tsaritsyn, it consisted of 27 thousand infantry, 30 thousand cavalry, 175 guns, 610 machine guns, 20 aircraft and 4 armored trains. In addition, the so-called “young permanent Cossack army” was hastily formed, into which 19-20-year-old Cossacks were called up, from this army, then a plastun and infantry brigades, three cavalry divisions, a sapper battalion, technical units, horse artillery were formed.

On June 7, 1918, a city party conference took place in Tsaritsyn, which called on all working people to prepare to repulse the enemy. Mobilization into the Red Army began. On June 15, 1918, the Borba newspaper came out with an appeal: “Comrades! All who cherish the interests of the working people, all conscious comrades, workers, peasants and Cossacks, go and enlist in the ranks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Army! All under the Red Banner of the struggle for socialism!” On June 16, 1918, a citywide conference of trade unions and factory committees made a similar appeal. Workers, peasants, working Cossacks at numerous meetings expressed their readiness to stand up for Red Tsaritsyn. Thus, the tanners wrote in the resolution: "Let us stand in close ranks in defense of Soviet power." On June 16, 1918, the III Congress of Soviets of the Ust-Medveditsky District declared that it "recognizes only one power, the power of the Soviets, the power of the working people, which it will defend with arms in hand." The congress decided "to declare all farms and villages, volosts and villages in the position of rebels" and called on "the entire population to take up arms and deliver a decisive blow to the counter-revolution with a unified onslaught." In the decision of the meeting of the workers of the French factory, which took place on June 17, 1918, it is written: “We are going to defend all the gains of the revolution and we ask the front-line soldiers to go with us and show those who encroach on the people's right. Long live the revolution! All to arms! Forward, comrades! Long live the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies!

On June 19, 1918, an emergency meeting of the executive committee of the Tsaritsyno Council, the headquarters of the Defense, the Council of National Economy, representatives of factory and factory committees and military units was held. “The Executive Committee, together with representatives of the factory committees, having discussed the question of the defense of the city of Tsaritsyn,” the resolution of the emergency meeting said, “decided: all comrade workers, Cossacks and peasants who know how to wield rifles and who are voluntarily ready to defend the workers’ and peasants’ revolution, create combat units and sent to the front; for all other worker comrades, general military training is introduced. First of all, urgently put 3,000 fighters to hold the front. Martial law was declared in the city.

Workers' and peasants' regiments and battalions were formed in factories and factories, in the surrounding villages, villages, farms. This was also facilitated by the appeal of the Tsaritsyno Council, adopted by them together with representatives of the factory committees of the trade unions on June 30, 1918 “Worker! Farmer! Honest, free Cossack! - It was said in it. - Don't let the Red Banner be desecrated. In it is your strength, in it is your honor, in it is the liberation of all working people! Of great importance was the decision of the Presidium of the Tsaritsyno Committee of the RCP(b) of June 20, 1918 on the organization of party cells in the emerging units of the Red Army.

On July 4, the city party meeting considered the issue of protecting Tsaritsyn and decided: “1. To send representatives of the revolutionary part of the proletariat to the ranks of the Red Army and for this purpose to call up all members of the RCP into the army. 2. Strengthen the regional party cells and organize those in the trade unions, factory committees. 3. Deepen and expand the revolutionary activity of the Soviets by increasing the ranks of Soviet workers, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The city party organization at that time numbered 2,000 people.

From among the party members and members of the Union of Working Youth of the III International, the Communist Battalion named after the Council of People's Commissars was formed, which included about 900 people. At the same time, other parts were formed. So, the 1st Novo-Nikolsky workers' regiment, the Beketovsky workers' regiment, the 1st and 2nd workers' regiments of the Gruzoles, detachments of the metallurgical and gun factories, urban sawmills and other units were created. In total, there were six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment in Tsaritsyn, artillery units, four armored trains; it housed warehouses of weapons, ammunition, equipment. Mobilization, carried out in 107 volosts of the newly created Tsaritsyno province, gave the Red Army 23,826 fighters.

Tsaritsyn was greatly assisted by communists from among the former prisoners of war (Wagner, Melcher and others). They created the Union of Foreign Workers and Peasants. The newspaper "Internationalist" began to appear (in Czech, Serbian, Polish, Hungarian, German). At the initiative of the Union, the 1st Serbian Revolutionary Regiment, the 4th International Regiment, the Consolidated Detachment (780 people) and separate international companies were formed. The total number of Red Army internationalists was 4,000 people.

In addition, revolutionary units from Ukraine, Donbass, Don flocked to the city. For example, under the command of K. E. Voroshilov, units of the 5th Ukrainian and the remnants of the 3rd Ukrainian armies arrived in 80 echelons. They were joined by partisan detachments of E. A. Shchadenko, I. M. Mukhoperets, N. V. Kharchenko and others. The so-called “comrade Voroshilov group” was formed (up to 25 thousand people). In addition, military units under the command of R. F. Sievers and V. I. Kikvidze made their way from Ukraine through Povorino towards Tsaritsyn; detachments of B. M. Dumenko, S. M. Budyonny, and S. K. Timoshenko retreated from the south to Tsaritsyn.

Communists I.I. Leonov, I.V. Tulak, V.I. Chalov, A.S. Kivgila, N.I. Karpov, I.S. Kuvshinov, N.K. Stepanyatov, V. S. Kovalev, A. Ya. Parkhomenko, N. A. Rudnev, F. A. Sergeev, K. E. Voroshilov and others. G. K. Ordzhonikidze, I. V. Stalin, S. K. Minin, R. Ya. Levin, S. S. Litvinenko and others were engaged in political work. The leadership of the revolutionary forces in Tsaritsyn was carried out by several military bodies, which, naturally, introduced discord and inconsistency in their actions. In addition, after the capture of Rostov by the Whites in May 1918, the headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District moved to the city.

The People's Commissar for Military Affairs issued an order: “In view of the discovered inconveniences of the current organization of the North Caucasian District, it is decided:

1. The leadership of all military organizations passes from the hands of the military commissar to the hands of the Military Council of the North Caucasus District as part of Comrades. Stalin and Minin and the military leader, who seems to be temporarily appointed comrades. Stalin and Minin.

2. Military instructor Snesarev is immediately ordered to leave for Moscow to report to the Supreme Military Council.

By order No. 1 of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District dated July 22, 1918, the former colonel of the tsarist army, Kovalevsky, was temporarily appointed as military instructor of the district; Colonel Nosovich, also from the "former" became the chief of staff of the district. At the same time, Kovalevsky was introduced to the military council of the district. However, already on August 4, he was dismissed from all positions, since he considered the defense of the district a hopeless affair. On August 10, 1918, the clearly anti-Soviet-minded Nosovich was also removed from the post of chief of staff of the district. Later, both of them went over to the side of the whites. On August 5, 1918, K. E. Voroshilov, commander of the troops of the Tsaritsyn Front, was appointed a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District. The Tsaritsyno Committee of the RCP(b) sent ML Rukhimovich, A. Ya. Parkhomenko and others to work in the North Caucasian Military District.

Among the measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of Tsaritsyn and the creation of a column of 14 armored trains under the command of Alyabyev, and the formation of the Volga-Caspian military flotilla, staffed by Black Sea sailors and Volga rivermen. The flotilla consisted of 12 river steam tugs, equipped in a military way at the Tsaritsyno factories.

The struggle for bread became especially acute; without it, under the conditions of the imperialist blockade of Soviet Russia, imminent death threatened. And only Tsaritsyn, located in the grain-growing regions of the Lower Volga and Don, could to some extent alleviate the situation of the country.

On May 29, 1918, the People's Commissar I.V. Stalin was appointed by the Council of People's Commissars as the general head of the food business in the South of Russia. The Extraordinary Regional Food Committee (CHOKPROD) was located in Tsaritsyn, and A.S. Yakubov became its chairman. CHOKPROD was supposed to organize the procurement and delivery to Moscow of 10 million poods of grain and 10,000 head of cattle. In response to a request from Lenin, Stalin telegraphed: “In Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan and Saratov, the monopoly and fixed prices have been abolished by the Soviets, bacchanalia and speculation are going on. He achieved the introduction of a rationing system and fixed prices in Tsaritsyn. The same must be achieved in Astrakhan and Saratov, otherwise all the bread will flow through these valves of speculation ... The study showed that eight or more block trains can be run along the Tsaritsyn - Povorino - Kozlov - Ryazan - Moscow line a day. Now busy with the accumulation of trains in Tsaritsyn. In a week we will announce a “bread week” and start up about a million pounds at once with special escorts from the railway workers, about which I will inform you in advance.”

Soon, all stocks of grain were taken into account in Tsaritsyn, a monopoly of the Council on grain products, sugar, salt, matches, tobacco and other supplies was introduced, the fight against speculation was intensified, and fixed prices for essential goods were established. The peasants were obliged to sell bread only to those who had the appropriate permission from the Soviet authorities. Commissars were sent to the stations to organize uninterrupted work on the railway. The communists, as part of food detachments, were sent to the countryside to purchase and prepare bread.

On June 13, 1918, Stalin telegraphed Lenin about the plan to send food in the near future. “The railway transport is improving,” the telegram said. - ... Thanks to emergency measures, the Tsaritsyno junction is now able to release 150 cars, 30 per train, in total 5 trains daily. Things are not so good with regard to water transport, in view of the delay of steamships in connection with the action of the Czechoslovaks ... According to the planned order of the Commissariat of Food for June, you demand from us about 6.5 million poods. If we take into account that the plan does not take into account railway workers, some southern provinces and Baku with districts, then we must count 7 million, that is, 230 thousand poods daily. From June 1 to June 10, Chokprod released only 500,000 poods by water and land, 50,000 poods a day. At the present moment, water and dry transport could certainly withstand 230,000 poods daily, but the point is that procurement has so far lagged behind transport by four times and will still lag at least twice. In view of the lack of workers, trucks, manufactory, in view of the intervention of the regional food committees, in view of the terrible development of bagging ... Now at the Aleksikovo station there is a hitch in transport due to the influx of trains in connection with the performance of the Cossacks on Uryupino. In a day, the hitch will disappear, and we will immediately move 300 thousand pounds by block trains to Moscow.

Gradually, the procurement and shipment of bread to Moscow began to improve, albeit with enormous difficulties. Summing up the work for the month, Yakubov reported to the People's Commissariat of Food and Drug Administration Tsyurupe: “In June, bread and other food products were sent to the province in wagons: to Petrograd - wheat - 51, barley - 35, rye - 3, sunflower oil - 9, flour - 1, different kinds of bread - 13, cattle - 95".

Yet the threat of starvation continued to persist. V. I. Lenin on July 24, 1918, in a conversation over a direct wire with Stalin, reported: “Then I must say about food that today they do not give out at all either in St. Petersburg or in Moscow. The situation is quite bad. Let me know if you can take emergency measures, because, except from you, there is nowhere to get it. Vladimir Ilyich also asked Tsaritsyn to send fish, meat, vegetables, in general, all products that were possible and as much as possible.

At the same time, the producers were sent not only to the Don and the North Caucasus, but also to the Saratov and Samara provinces. Despite the kulak terror, the fierce White Guards, the procurement continued, the bread was sent, although Tsaritsyn himself experienced great food difficulties. From June to November 1918, 5393 wagons of food were sent.

Meanwhile, the military situation of Tsaritsyn became more and more dangerous. Krasnov succeeded in cutting off the Tsaritsyn-Novorossiysk railway and thereby depriving the city of communication with the North Caucasus. At the end of July, the Don army went on the offensive. The White Cossacks managed to capture the stations of Lipki, Log, Ilovlya and cut the Tsaritsyn-Povorino railway. On August 11, the Krasnovites occupied the Krivomuzginekaya station, on August 15 - Voroponovo and Kotluban, on August 22 - Pichuga and Erzovka. The fighting was already on the near approaches, in Beketovka and Sadovaya. A member of the party since 1917, P. S. Rubanov recalled the battles with the White Guards at the Voroponovo station: “The enemy made one attack after another ... But, despite the destructive fire, rain and mud, the soldiers of the 1 resolutely moved forward. Here are the trenches of the whites. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The strength of the working hand of the Gruzoles workers turned out to be stronger than that of the White Guards. The enemy could not stand it, trembled and fled, leaving the dead and wounded on the battlefield.

During this tense period, the Chekists uncovered a conspiracy that was being prepared under the leadership of engineer Alekseev. The special issue of the newspaper "Soldier of the Revolution" reported: "August 21, 1918 at 17:00. in Tsaritsyn, a conspiracy of the White Guards is uncovered. Prominent participants in the conspiracy were arrested and shot. The conspirators found 9 million rubles. The conspiracy was utterly thwarted by the measures of the Soviet government.

The conspirators expected that at least three thousand people would take part in the rebellion, they had 6 machine guns and 2 guns. The British vice-consul Barry, the consuls of France - Charbot, Serbia - Leonard participated in the preparation of the plot. Later, speaking at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), V. I. Lenin would say: “It is the merit of the Tsaritsytsy people that they discovered this conspiracy of Alekseev.”

Here is how the former chairman of the gubchek A. I. Chervyakov described these events: “Back in June, at the station of the South-Eastern Railway. A special train of Glavkoneft arrived from Moscow, consisting of 9 cool wagons. The train was then transferred to the Caucasus Station, from where it was supposed to follow to Baku. It also housed the engineer Alekseev, authorized by Glavkoneft with government powers on the development of the oil industry. He had a staff of young engineers... Alekseev had nine million rubles at his disposal, supposedly intended for use in the oil industry upon arrival in the Caucasus... Through Alekseev, a plan was carried out to establish a connection between the Moscow landowner-capitalist circles and the White Guards of the Don... The counter-revolutionaries were sure that that the hour of the capture of Tsaritsyn is near. Many former officers who served in the Red Army, as well as the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Kotov, who was a district commissar under the Provisional Government, were involved in the conspiracy.

From August 15 to 20, the battles near Tsaritsyn acquired a particularly fierce character. Parts of the Red Army and workers' regiments repelled the onslaught of the Krasnovites and launched a counteroffensive. On August 29, 1918, they liberated Kotluban and Karpovka, and on September 6, Kalach. The front moved 80-90 miles to the west. A serious role in the defeat of the Whites was played by the armored trains of F. N. Alyabyev. The sailors of the Volga military flotilla under the command of K. I. Zedin were active. On September 6, 1918, on behalf of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District, Stalin telegraphed to the Council of People's Commissars: “The offensive of the troops of the Tsaritsyno region was crowned with success ... The enemy was utterly defeated and driven back beyond the Don. The position of Tsaritsyn is strong. The attack continues."

In these battles, the Red Army defeated four Krasnov divisions. The Whites lost 12,000 killed and captured, 25 guns, and more than 300 machine guns. The offensive of the White Cossacks on Voronezh - Moscow was weakened. On September 19, 1918, V. I. Lenin sent a telegram of congratulations to the defenders of Tsaritsyn: “Soviet Russia notes with admiration the heroic deeds of the communist and revolutionary regiments of Khudyakov, Kharchenko and Kolpakov, the cavalry of Dumenko and Bulatkin, Alyabyev’s armored trains. Volga Flotilla. Hold the Red Banners high, carry them fearlessly forward, eradicate the counter-revolution of the landowners and generals mercilessly and show the whole world that socialist Russia is invincible.”

An open armed struggle against the White Guards was combined with painstaking work to neutralize the counter-revolutionary forces in the city itself. Chekists managed to uncover Moldavsky's plot. Order No. 56 of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District reported: “On the night of September 7-8, a group of traitors to the Russian people, led by a bribed Moldavian, fraudulently brought a part of the Gruzolesovites against the Military Council into the street ... At 12 o’clock. At night, an uprising opened with shots from the guns of the gruzolesovites in the city. The military council, protecting the front and guarding the power of the people in Tsaritsyn, took urgent measures and mobilized a revolutionary uprising. The rebels have already been disarmed." Moldavsky was shot.

In commemoration of the successes achieved at the front, on September 10, the Red Banners were presented in Tsaritsyn “From the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District. For valor in battle." The 1st Communist Lugansk Regiment and the 2nd Revolutionary Ukrainian Siversky Regiment were noted. These regiments also received banners from the Tsaritsyn organization of the RCP(b).

The scope of hostilities in the south of Russia called for the organized improvement of the Red Army. On September 11, 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council formed the Southern Front. Six days later, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front was formed. The units operating in the Bryansk, Kursk, Voronezh directions were reduced to the 8th Army. Parts of the Kamyshin and Tsaritsyn directions made up the 10th Army. The troops of the Povorinsky and Balashov directions were included in the 9th Army. The troops of the North Caucasus were merged into the 11th Army. Preparations were underway to repel a new offensive by Krasnov, whose army consisted of 45 thousand bayonets and 40 thousand sabers, 150 guns, 3 armored trains, 267 machine guns, 68 aircraft. Soviet troops - 93 thousand bayonets and 15 thousand sabers, 200 guns, 400 machine guns, 13 armored trains and 6 aircraft.

On September 11, 1918, the commander of the Don Army, General Denisov, issued a directive: "At present, the main task of the Don Army is to secure the region from the east, which can only be achieved by taking Tsaritsyn." On the Kamyshin, Kachalinsky, Voroponovsky and Sarepta directions, the enemy pulled together 12 cavalry and 8 infantry divisions; On September 17, 1918, he launched a new offensive. He managed to capture a number of settlements on the outskirts of Tsaritsyn. From September 27 to 30, fierce battles were fought in the area of ​​​​Krivomuzginskaya station, the enemy was defeated and driven back beyond the Don. The Whites had to shift the direction of the main attack south of Tsaritsyn, they managed to capture the Zhutovo station and cut off the 1st Don and Kotelnikovskaya divisions of the 10th Army. The fighting unfolded in the area of ​​Sarepta, Beketovka, Otrada. Tsaritsyn was covered by a white Cossack arc from Pichuga in the north to Sarepta in the south. The defenders of the city were in dire need of ammunition and uniforms. On September 27, a memorandum to the RVS reported: “... At present, there are: 1) no shells in the Tsaritsyno warehouses (150 pieces remain); 2) there is not a single machine gun; 3) no uniforms (500 sets left); 4) no cartridges (only a million cartridges left). We declare that if you do not meet the requirements as soon as possible (they are minimal in terms of the total number of troops on the Southern Front), we will be forced to stop hostilities and retreat to the left bank of the Volga.

On October 16, 1918, the newspaper "Soldat of the Revolution" called: "The revolution is in danger! Red Tsaritsyn is threatened by Krasnov's black bands. Soldiers of the revolution, don't let the enemy win. Prove your strength with courage and perseverance. V. I. Lenin and Ya. M. Sverdlov, concerned about the situation of Tsaritsyn, telegraphed to the RVS of the republic: “We propose to take urgent measures to give assistance to Tsaritsyn, to convey the execution.”

In battles with the Krasnovites, the defenders of the city showed examples of courage. When on October 15, 1918, the White Cossacks broke through our defenses in the Beketovka-Sarepta sector, N. A. Rudnev led the reserve brigade and liquidated the breakthrough with it. But he himself was mortally wounded. The situation at the front improved with the arrival of the Steel Division of D.P. Zhloba from the North Caucasus. Having passed a 600-kilometer path through the waterless steppes, the division reached Bolshoy Chapurniki. “At noon on October 15, our forward detachments started a battle with enemy forces,” says P. F. Ryzhenko, a former fighter of the division. - The cavalry turned around and attacked the White Cossacks. Her attack was supported by artillery and machine gun fire. The division defeated the 1st Astrakhan and 1st Ukrainian volunteer officer regiments of the Whites. Six regiments of the 2nd Don Cossack division and the plastun brigade were crushed and put to flight. On the battlefield near Chapurniki, the White Cossacks left 1,400 corpses of officers and soldiers. 60 people were taken prisoner and 49 machine guns, thousands of rifles, 6 guns with charging boxes, more than 200 thousand rounds of ammunition were captured. The steel division suffered losses of 13 soldiers killed, 153 people were wounded. Then the Steel Division struck at the rear of the enemy, connected with the brigade of T. P. Kruglyakov. On the night of October 21, the Zhlobins united with parts of the Sal group that were leaving the encirclement.

The Krasnovites continued to furiously attack the positions of the 10th Army in the central sector. On October 16, they again captured Voroponovo and went to the Sadovaya station. The command of the 10th Army concentrated 27 artillery batteries (200 barrels) and 10 armored trains in this sector. On October 17, the psychic attack of the drunken White Cossacks failed completely. On October 18, the Red Guards went on the offensive and drove the whites to the Don. Another attempt of the counter-revolution to capture Tsaritsyn failed. Thus, the defenders of Tsaritsyn did not allow the Don Army to join the Astrakhan and Ural White Cossacks, diverted Krasnov's significant forces, preventing them from achieving decisive successes in the main - northern - direction.

At the same time, the defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918 also revealed a number of significant shortcomings in the organization of the entire struggle against the White Guard forces in the Don and the North Caucasus. The opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to the Don Army was not fully used, although the 10th Army had a numerical superiority. As a result, units of the Red Army in the North Caucasus did not receive assistance. The transition from partisanship to the creation of a regular army in the south was extremely difficult and protracted. V. I. Lenin at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) sharply criticized the leaders of the defense of Tsaritsyn, supporters of the military opposition.

The bottom line is that I. V. Stalin, S. K. Minin, K. E. Voroshilov and other military leaders refused to use military specialists, thereby violating the party line on this issue. Not only did they not show the necessary perseverance in the fight against partisanism, but in fact they themselves acted as its defenders and guides. On October 7, 1918, more than fifty prominent party, Soviet, trade union and military workers of Tsaritsyn at their meeting, chaired by Minin, adopted an unprecedented resolution in which they criticized the policy of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) regarding military specialists. The resolution proposed to reconsider the issue of admitting former generals to the ranks of the Red Army, demanded that a congress be convened to review and evaluate the policy of the center. During direct wire talks with Stalin, Voroshilov and Minin informed him of the contents of the resolution. He didn't mind in any way.

The criminal attitude towards military specialists is evidenced by the fact that many of them were sent to a special barge (floating prison), which the governor kept for hostages from the local bourgeoisie. As a rule, few people returned from there. Stalin arrested on a false charge of conspiracy almost the entire staff of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, and the staff members ended up on a barge. The military instructor of the North Caucasus Military District Snesarev was also kept. The inspection sent from the center, headed by a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A.I. Okulov, sought the release of Snesarev. However, some military experts from the district headquarters had already been shot. Stalin himself, after the civil war, with complacency told how once he had a dispute with the military who arrived from the center on the use of cavalry. He arrested them and sent them to prison for a month so that they could understand that war is unthinkable without cavalry. Is it not from here that Stalin's methods of reprisal against dissidents, which he subsequently applied so widely in his practice, originate?

On November 26, 1918, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted a resolution demanding that the RVS of the republic, the command of the Southern Front, all army communists, fighters and commanders achieve decisive success in the fight against the White Guard. 2,500 communists and several newly formed units were sent to the Southern Front. By the end of the year, the balance of forces in the south had developed in favor of the Red Army, and by this time there had been changes in the command of the 10th Army. Due to serious omissions, Stalin, Minin and Voroshilov were recalled at different times and transferred to another job. By order No. 153 of December 26, 1918, A. I. Egorov was appointed commander of the 10th Army, and L. L. Klyuev was appointed chief of staff of the army.

The southern front went on the offensive. The 8th and 9th armies fought successfully. On the site of the 10th Army, the situation was alarming: on January 17, 1919, the Krasnovites approached the city and crossed to the left bank of the Volga. There was an immediate threat to Tsaritsyn. In addition, the city experienced an acute shortage of food. During January - March, residents did not receive bread at all, only pumpkin seeds were given out in scanty quantities. And only from April 1, 1919, it became possible to give out 50 g of bread per person per day.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army issued Order No. 27, which stated: "All power in the city of Tsaritsyn and its region is transferred to the Military Revolutionary Committee." The Revolutionary Committee carried out a new mobilization of workers and communists, from which detachments with a total number of up to 5,000 people were formed; they joined the 10th Army. In February, the 10th Army launched a counteroffensive. A strong blow to the White Cossacks was dealt by the newly formed cavalry division of S. M. Budyonny; breaking through the front, the red cavalry made a raid on the enemy's rear. The division defeated the cavalry corps of General Guselyshchikov and a number of other units, capturing a lot of weapons, ammunition and several thousand prisoners. Pursuing the Krasnov troops, the 10th and 11th armies crossed to the Don. Thus, the third assault on Tsaritsyn was also repulsed, the city received a short respite. However, the decisive turning point in the hostilities did not occur. The unlucky ataman Krasnov was forced to resign.

During the respite, life in the city revived. Party and Soviet bodies made efforts to provide the front with everything necessary, carried out a great deal of organizational and political work. Komsomol members and youth did a lot. “Young factory workers devoted all their energies to fulfilling the orders of the 10th Army,” recalls V. G. Savkin, one of the organizers of the Tsaritsyno Komsomol, “fought the enemy in battles and still found time to put on plays, arrange discussions on various issues, learn revolutionary songs. Once I went to a vocational school. There were gun shops here. They repaired weapons for the army. I hear the chief of artillery of the army, Kulik, swearing:

Is it the timing? So the whites will capture the city, and they will kill us unarmed. You are saboteurs. And explains:

I hand over the weapon for repair, and they tell me: you will receive it in 12 days. 12 days! For the Republic of Soviets every hour is precious!

He consulted with the Komsomol members and said to Kulik:

We will do everything in 4-5 days!

If only they could do it in a week...

Well, let's see!

The Komsomol kept their word. The weapon was repaired perfectly.

Factories and factories worked without interruption, although there was not enough raw material and fuel. In April, representatives of the metallurgical plant, engineer Maym and worker Gostyushkin, left for Moscow. They visited V. I. Lenin, at whose suggestion the Defense Council allocated 30,000 poods of fuel oil and 8,000 poods of oil from its meager reserves to Tsaritsyn.

Socio-political and cultural life improved. A drama theater, a symphony orchestra, workers' and youth clubs worked in the city, and new libraries were opened. There was a redistribution of the housing stock among the working people.

The city party organization repeatedly declared itself mobilized during the difficult days of the siege, the communists, with weapons in their hands, went to defend Tsaritsyn. Repeated checks, re-registration of members and candidate members of the party testified that there were no self-seekers, alarmists, cowards in the organization. During the 13 months of defense, 29 mobilizations were carried out, as a result of which 58 thousand people passed through the military registration and enlistment offices. In addition, the army received 12,250 horses, 406 camels, and 635 wagons. 9 labor mobilizations were carried out. To meet the needs of the front, there were two military-drawn tracts, designed to pass 40,000 carts.

The answer of the Tsaritsyno Committee of the RCP(b) to the Central Committee of the party noted: “Until January 1919, the Tsaritsyno organization carried out work not only among the working masses, but also among the military units located in the city. The work of the committee and the political department of the 10th Army were merged. The number of party members by the end of 1918 increased to three thousand.” In the Tsaritsyn party organization, there were three district party committees: in the City District, as well as at the metallurgical and gun factories. The city committee of the party was divided into sections, each member of the committee had his own specific area of ​​\u200b\u200bwork. For example, under the chairmanship of S. S. Litvinenko, a cultural and educational commission operated, which was engaged in staging performances, holding concerts, rallies, lectures both in Tsaritsyn itself and at the front.

The respite obtained in the winter of 1919 proved to be short-lived. Already in March, the White Guards, supported by the interventionists, launched a new offensive on all fronts. The main blow is again delivered on the Eastern Front, where Kolchak operated. From the south threatened Denikin, from the west - Yudenich, from the north - Miller. On the Tsaritsyn direction, the enemy went on the offensive on May 4, on the Don - on May 19, 1919. It cannot be said that he was not expected. On April 1, speaking at a city party conference, the chairman of the city committee, I.F. Pavlyukov, said: “... We worked to strengthen the front, took part in mobilization ... Now we need to increase attention to the Don region, otherwise will be lost to us."

The White Guards were outnumbered. For 73 thousand fighters of the Southern Front, there were 100 thousand Denikin, they were especially superior in cavalry. The Caucasian army of Baron Wrangel, newly formed by the whites, was advancing on Tsaritsyn, the whites managed to capture the Torgovaya station (now Salsk) and reach the line of the Aksai river by June 1. The 10th Army, having not had time to recover, did not have sufficient forces to stop the advance of the enemy. The neighboring 9th and 11th armies also found themselves in a difficult situation, a large gap formed between them. The counterattacks of the red cavalry were local in nature and could not change the general situation. Red Tsaritsyn faced the threat of a fourth encirclement. On June 11, the Whites managed to capture Sarepta, less than 30 miles remained to the city. The Tsaritsyno Committee of the RCP(b) again mobilizes workers and prepares for defense.

On June 8, 1919, a city party conference took place. “In the days of the formidable battle of the proletarian revolution as a whole and the Tsaritsyn proletariat as its detachment,” the adopted resolution said, “the conference decides:

2) to give the committee the right to put the members of the Party under arms at any moment;

3) to strain all the forces and means of the Tsaritsyn proletariat and its organizations to fight the enemy;

4) oblige the committee to fight by all means against the elements that have attached themselves to the party and Soviet power and are dishonoring the revolution;

5) to assist Soviet organizations in drawing the middle peasant into the ranks of supporters of the proletarian revolution and a merciless struggle against the kulaks;

6) address the Tsaritsyn proletariat with an indication of the danger that threatens it from the Don counter-revolution;

7) to welcome the revolutionary 10th Red Army."

On June 12, 1919, a state of siege was again declared in Tsaritsyn. The enemy approached Beketovka. Attaching great importance to Tsaritsyn, V. I. Lenin on June 14 telegraphed the following to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army: “It is necessary to keep Tsaritsyn, he withstood the siege more than once. Strain all your strength; let us know more, more often, we are taking all measures. Speed ​​up the removal of excess, valuable. Mobilize completely. Do not weaken political work. Make sure you keep in touch with us." At the same time, Vladimir Ilyich sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front: “Are you taking all measures to support Tsaritsyn? From there they ask for 15,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. It is necessary to keep Tsaritsyn. Report what has been done and is being done.

On the same day, the RVS of the 10th Army replied that the situation of Tsaritsyn was very serious. “It is proposed to issue an urgent order to all institutions, departments, etc. on the need to complete the loading of goods and institutions in the shortest possible time.” An evacuation commission was created. Sanitary institutions, women and children left the city, they took out valuable property.

On June 15, the Tsaritsyn Provincial Committee and the City Council appealed to the defenders of the city, again thousands of workers joined the ranks of the 10th Army. Only those that provided for the needs of the front remained in factories and factories. From June 15 to June 19, rivermen removed from the city about half a million pounds of valuable cargo, trenches and wire fences were equipped on the near approaches to the city.

The executive committee of the Tsaritsyno Council turned to V. I. Lenin with a request to instruct the Council of Defense and the RVS of the republic not to surrender the city in any case. V. I. Lenin urgently telegraphed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front: “Again and again I draw your attention to the purely important importance of Tsaritsyn. Has the directive been given not to surrender Tsaritsyn, do you adhere to it quite definitely, or is there a different opinion. Answer accurately and promptly.

In fierce battles that took place from June 15 to June 19, the Red Guards managed to drive Denikin out of the Voroponovo station. Armored trains and ships of the Volga military flotilla took part in the battles. On June 18, Vladimir Ilyich sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army and the Tsaritsyn Provincial Committee: “I was happy to observe the heroism of the Tenth Army and the Tsaritsyn proletariat in the defense of Tsaritsyn. I am sure that the Red Tsaritsyn, having withstood many months of siege, will withstand all the tests even now. Greetings to the defenders of the Red Tsaritsyn.

On June 20, Basargino and Karpovskaya were released. But only. On June 29, the enemy launched a new offensive and broke through the front of the 10th Army. The last reserves were thrown to eliminate the breakthrough - the school of red cadets. By the end of the day, the 37th Rifle Division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade were ordered to leave Tsaritsyn and retreat to a new line. Early in the morning of June 30, 1919, the White Guards entered the city, but they failed to capture large trophies. 1.5 million poods of oil and other valuable property were removed in a timely manner, the entire steam fleet and over 100 barges were withdrawn. The fall of Tsaritsyn was a huge loss for Soviet Russia. In its editorial on July 1, 1919, Pravda wrote: “Our heroic Red Tsaritsyn has fallen. The hordes surrounded him. English and French tanks took the working fortress... Tsaritsyn fell. Long live Tsaritsyn."

General Denikin solemnly entered the city, on July 3 he signed a directive on a campaign against Moscow. Tsaritsyn was flooded with landowners, the bourgeoisie, officials, merchants, foreign missions; arrests and executions began. In total, up to 3,500 people were killed, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR are taking urgent measures to strengthen the Southern Front; the troops of the 9th and 10th armies and the cavalry corps of Budyonny were brought together in a special group, commanded by V. I. Shorin.

On August 18, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, they were assisted by the ships of the military flotilla and the landing detachment of sailors I.K. Kozhanov. On August 22, Kamyshin was cleared of whites, on September 1 - Dubovka, on September 3 - Kachalino, on September 4 - Market-Orlovka. On September 5, the Red Army began the assault on Tsaritsyn. However, it was not possible to take the city immediately. Only the landing force of Kozhanov, supported by sailors, was successful. The 28th and 38th rifle divisions could not break through and come to the aid of the paratroopers. Kozhanovites retreated to their original lines. The fighting continued from 6 to 8 September.

From September 21 to 26, 1919, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was held, which took additional measures to strengthen the Southern Front, which was already divided into the Southern and South-Eastern Fronts on the 27th. At the end of November 1919, the troops of the South-Eastern Front went on the offensive. Serious success was brought by the raid of the combined cavalry group B. M. Dumenko in the rear of the enemy; The six thousandth corps of General Toporkov was defeated. The 10th Army was able to improve its positions and prepare for a new attack on Tsaritsyn, the battles for which had begun. On December 28, the 50th Taman division of E.I. Kovtyukh, which was part of the 11th army, advanced from behind the Volga. The 37th division of P.E. Dybenko from the 10th Army advanced along the right bank to Tsaritsyn. On the night of January 3, 1920, the troops of the Red Army entered Tsaritsyn. “On December 28, the 10th Army went on the offensive ... At about 7 p.m., two workers ran across to us from Tsaritsyn and said that the enemy was evacuating the city,” recalls Dybenko. - Without waiting for the rest of the division to approach, the 1st brigade at 20 o'clock moved to the wire fence ... At about 20 o'clock, fires and explosions broke out in the city and at the French factory. By this time, the 450th regiment of the 50th division, commanded by Kovtyukh, crossed from the left bank of the Volga ... By this time, the cavalry brigade of the 37th division broke into the city from the western side. At two o'clock in the morning on January 3, 1920, the victorious red banners of the great proletarian revolution forever hoisted over the Red Verdun.

The release of Tsaritsyn was welcomed by the working people of the whole country. On January 4, rallies were held in Moscow, Petrograd, Saratov and other cities. The Moscow proletariat awarded the 50th Division with the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner.

The White Guards, however, managed to inflict enormous damage on the economy of Tsaritsyn. Thus, in 1920, the city's largest enterprise, the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical plant (as the former French plant has now become known), produced 70 times less products compared to the pre-war level. On January 6, the Borba newspaper published an appeal by the provincial committee “To the Proletarians of the City of Tsaritsyn”, in which the task was set: to begin the restoration of the destroyed economy.

In January 1920, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin visited Tsaritsyn. He met with the proletarians of the Krasny Oktyabr plant, visited the railway workers, spoke at a rally of fighters of the 11th Army, at a joint meeting of trade unions. Addressing the workers, M. I. Kalinin said: “We must show to the whole world that we are able to build. I'm sure we'll show it in action." At the request of Kalinin, the Soviet government allocated 25 million rubles to Tsaritsyn for the restoration of the economy.

On January 24, a citywide meeting of communists was held. The resolution adopted by the meeting noted: “In the field of tasks facing the Tsaritsyn organization of the RCP (B) in the city of Tsaritsyn and its districts, the general meeting of members of the RCP (b) set the immediate goal of restoring the destroyed city and the physical improvement of the proletarian masses, specifically defining this task in in the form of the exertion of all forces to combat transport and fuel devastation and epidemic diseases. A new composition of the city committee of the RCP (b) was elected, which included Pavin, Pestryakov, Sorokopudov, Miroshnikov, Ignatov, Rakhlin, Kozharsky. Structurally, the city committee was divided into five district committees: there were 35 party cells; 2237 members and 104 candidate members of the party were registered.

On March 19, the gubernatorial committee of the RCP(b) sent a letter to the city and district party committees to combat the devastation in transport: “Proper, systematic work of the railways is necessary in order to supply the front with the necessary supplies in a timely manner ... means to hasten the final victory over Denikin, to destroy the main cause of the country's food, industrial and all other economic difficulties.

From February 15, 1920, Sundays began to be held in the city to clean the railway tracks, clean the hospital yards, prepare boards for the repair of cars, clean the tram tracks, buried the dead and those who died from wounds of the city's defenders. March 7 began the week of assistance to the front and transport. The depot at the stations Tsaritsyn-I, Tsaritsyn-II, Volzhskaya, Sarepta lay in ruins; only 4 steam locomotives remained, and even then they were out of order. A significant part of the wagons also needed repairs. The steam locomotives were restored, and 120 wagons were equipped for sanletuchki. There were not enough railroad workers - the most skilled workers (up to 1000 people) were taken away by the White Guards. Through “I can’t”, depots and workshops were put in order, the Tikhoretsky railway bridge across the Tsaritsa was restored. City enterprises produced spare parts for locomotives, wagons and technical trains, trusses for railway bridges were built at the metallurgical plant.

On April 24, 1920, the provincial committee of the party called on "the working people of Krasny Tsaritsyn and the Tsaritsyn province" to take part in the May Day All-Russian communist subbotnik. On May 1, thousands of workers worked for free on the restoration of the railway, factories, plants, on the wharfs, in hospitals. In total, from May to October 1920, 26 subbotniks were held, in which 28,172 communists and 23,854 non-party people participated, that is, a total of 52,026 people.

From March 15 to March 27, elections of deputies to the Tsaritsyno Soviet took place; On April 7, its executive committee was elected. He was primarily tasked with restoration tasks. It was decided to urgently restore the power plant of the former Maksimov sawmills, since the city power plant required extensive restoration work. In June, the water supply started working, the tram started running, the streets began to be illuminated. By the end of the year, it was possible to restore about 100 residential buildings, organize the work of theaters, libraries, cinemas; the radio station started up. On May 21, 1920, the first oil caravans passed along the Volga; Tsaritsyno oil storage facilities began to fill up with oil. Timber rafting for sawmills began. In Tsaritsyn itself, there were 16 sawmills for 31 sawmills; in Elshanka - 4 sawmills for 16 sawmills; there were 11 sawmills in Beketovka; in Sarepta - 2. With a full load of all factories, 4500 people were provided with work, the daily productivity was 1600 logs. Consequently, there were 33 sawmills in the Tsaritsyno industrial region (there were 45 before the revolution), of which only 8 were operational. Light industry enterprises also began to operate. Thus, in 1920, 20 small leather factories produced 2,500 pairs of shoes. By the end of the year, traffic on the Tikhoretsky railway bridge was adjusted, while on Astrakhan it began earlier. Firewood was harvested on Sarpinsky Island, in Srednyaya Akhtuba - on Osnovsky Island, and also in Chapurnikovskaya Dacha. A total of 370 people participated in the preparation.

Work continued to help the front. In May 1920 alone, 261 communists were sent to the Western Front. And in total, 7.6 times more party members went to the front than was established for the Tsaritsyn organization of the RCP (b). On June 19, the Borba newspaper published a tab entitled Proletarian Youth, which tells about the week of Red Army volunteers held in Tsaritsyn, which “...should serve as a guarantee of the defeat of the Polish lords and the triumph of the Russian and Polish working class. In the forefront of the volunteers, we are sure, will go the proletarian youth.”

From Tsaritsyn, from Tsaritsyn, Lenin, Chernoyarsk, Kamyshinsky districts, the 2nd Don and Khoper districts, detachments of Komsomol volunteers left for the civil war. At the same time, communists and Komsomol members were mobilized in the special purpose unit for combating banditry (CHON), in food detachments.

The first results of the restoration of the city's economy were summed up at the II Provincial Conference of the RCP(b) held on May 10, 1920. By this time, the city committee and the provincial committee of the party merged into a single organization, there were 4783 communists in it, of which 3356 were workers (60%), 1614 were peasants (33%), 873 were employees (12%), 40 were students (1, 2%). The provincial conference, in connection with the 50th anniversary of V. I. Lenin, with a letter of greeting, elected a new provincial committee of the RCP (b) from 11 members and 5 candidate members.

On May 16, the First Provincial Congress of Soviets took place. It noted that the activities of the Gubernia Economic Council since the restoration of Soviet power in Tsaritsyn were mainly of an organizational nature, that it proceeded in conditions of severe devastation and famine. The establishment and restoration of industry is greatly hampered by the transport and food devastation, the general plight of the province. There is a shortage of skilled workers. The provincial congress proposed the GSNKh "... to intensify all its efforts towards the speedy restoration of the industrial life of the province, pursuing strict principles of centralization as a way of making the best use of manpower and the greatest savings in material, take measures to ensure the timely and sufficient supply of the industry of the Tsaritsyno province with raw materials, fuel, and production equipment . As far as possible, restore and strengthen the main industries ... of the province, especially those that serve the agricultural needs of the Republic. The electrification of the industry of Tsaritsyn, carried out by the GSNKh, was also welcomed.

At the end of June 1920, out of several dozen enterprises, 2-3 were working in the city, there was not enough raw materials; about 300 workers worked in the workshop for the repair and manufacture of agricultural tools and machines, raw materials were available for 2-3 months. The powerful power station equipped in Elshanka at the Maksimovsky plant gave current. Of the 300 registered cab drivers, 100 left, and out of the available 30 motor tram cars and 25 trailer cars, only 10 motor and 5 trailer cars were fit. The tram lines were in need of repair.

On October 2-4, the III Provincial Conference of the RCP(b) took place, which summed up some of the results of the restoration of the national economy. Despite the difficulties, the working people of the city, the party organization selflessly, sparing no effort, healed the wounds of the civil war, learned to manage in a new way. One of the indicators of the consciousness of the masses was the mass subbotniks, in which party members and non-party members took part; for the period from May 1 to November 1, 1920, 26 such subbotniks were held. At the conference, it was noted that “the idea of ​​communist labor from party spheres is beginning to penetrate deeply into the mass of working people ... grandiose work has been done for the benefit of railway and water transport - work in the warehouses of Tsaritsyn for transshipment of grain, loading firewood and pumping out oil, unloading and loading wagons , work in infirmaries, hospitals, orphanages, etc. The material value of these works is estimated at tens of millions of rubles.

By the end of the year, all the shops of the metallurgical plant were working, production was being established at the gun shop.

Thus, in 1920, in the most difficult conditions of the ongoing civil war in the country, devastation and the beginning of famine, the Tsaritsyn provincial party organization, the working people did a lot to revive the economic life of the region. But even more had to be done, because compared with the pre-war period, the level of industrial production was insignificant, and the area under crops amounted to a little more than one third, half of the crops died due to drought.

Civil War. Battles for Tsaritsyn

Where and how did Stalin's military abilities develop, when and how did he accumulate combat experience?

The first event of a strategic scale, in which Stalin not only took part, but also played a leading role, took place in 1918 near Tsaritsyn. Moreover, his participation in that big battle began not in the position of a military leader, but only as a food commissar.

Let me remind you that, then surrounded on all sides by fronts, Petrograd turned out to be cut off from the provinces, which supplied the capital with bread and other products. Hunger began to suffocate not only the inhabitants of the huge city, but also the revolution itself. It was necessary to take urgent measures to improve the supply of food. One of these actions was the decision of the Central Committee to send Stalin as a food commissar to Tsaritsyn, through which it was possible to carry grain from the Volga and the North Caucasus, bypassing Denikin's army, which occupied Ukraine and the Don grain expanses.

Understanding and emphasizing the significance of this event, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin) signed a special mandate:

“Member of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin is appointed by the Council of People's Commissars as the general head of the food business in the South of Russia, vested with emergency rights. Local and regional Councils of People's Commissars, Soviets of Deputies, Revolutionary Committees, headquarters and chiefs of detachments, railway organizations and station chiefs, organizations of the merchant fleet, river and sea, postal, telegraph and food organizations and emissaries undertake to carry out the order of Comrade Stalin.

Describing the affairs of historical figures, they usually omit details from their personal lives. And in vain: sometimes everyday, purely personal moments have a certain influence on the behavior of historical figures and, consequently, on the course of events.

Here, it seems to me, it would be appropriate to talk about a little-known fact from the life of Joseph Vissarionovich. This incident undoubtedly had a certain psychological impact on Stalin's behavior in Tsaritsyn. The fact is that Stalin, returning from exile in 1917, settled in the family of his old acquaintances, the Alliluyevs. They once provided shelter to Stalin - after escaping from exile in 1915. After the February Revolution, he again lived with the Alliluyevs as in a safe house, and then, in the heat of the October Revolution, he remained in this family - there was no time for apartment worries at that time.

But there is reason, and quite convincing, to believe that Dzhugashvili stayed with the Alliluyevs not only because of the lack of his own apartment. The fact is that the daughter Nadenka grew up with the Alliluyevs, she was in her seventeenth year at that time. Being brought up in the family of a revolutionary, she, a pure and ardent nature, considered her party comrades who came to her father's house as romantic heroes, she really liked them, and she dreamed of being like them. And suddenly one of these legendary heroes settles in the apartment. He escaped from exile many times and once already hid in this family.

She remembered all this, so she looked at the mysterious black-haired Dzhugashvili with admiring eyes, with a booming heart.

All this could not help but notice the 38-year-old "uncle-revolutionary." Things went so far that despite the difference in age and regardless of how the party comrades would regard all this, Stalin took Nadya with him to Tsaritsyn. Probably, Stalin wanted to show off his significance in front of his young beloved: he drove her in a personal saloon car and looked forward to how Nadia would see him in the big things that he was going to do with the mandate of Lenin himself.

Stalin arrived in Tsaritsyn on June 6, 1918. He remained to live in the saloon car, which was guarded by the St. Petersburg Red Guards who came with him. As an extraordinary commissar, Stalin began to call for a report not only the leaders of local party and Soviet authorities, but also the military. The latter, not understanding at first what the civilian food commissar had to do with them, did not obey him very much and continued to go about their business.

The commander of the North Caucasian District, the former lieutenant general of the tsarist army, Snesarev skillfully led the actions of his subordinate troops and created a reliable defense for Tsaritsyn. Andrei Evgenievich was an experienced front-line general, he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff before the war. According to his progressive convictions, which probably developed during the years when he was a student at Moscow University, Snesarev decided to serve the revolution and voluntarily joined the Red Army. He was very necessary and useful to the revolution. Lenin highly valued such people, he recommended using former military experts who know their business on all fronts, ”and in order to prevent the possible betrayal of some of them, appoint commissars to the military experts.

Stalin's attitude towards former officers was clearly suspicious. He considered them conspirators. And in this respect, he disagreed with Lenin's opinion on the question of the use of military specialists. Having met the cool attitude of the military in Tsaritsyn, Stalin sent a telegram to the Central Committee to Lenin, demanding for himself the authority to intervene in military affairs, because he discovered great unrest here.

At first, the Central Committee did not give Stalin such powers, believing that he should deal with the main thing for which he was sent - food.

Stalin managed to send several echelons of bread to starving Petersburg, thereby rendering a great service to the revolution.

But at the end of July, the enemy went on the offensive. General Krasnov intended to seize Tsaritsyn with the forces of the White Cossack army and unite with the rebellious Czechoslovak corps, the Ural and Orenburg White Cossacks. The unification of the counter-revolutionary forces would cut off the northern part of Russia from the southern part, from where food was supplied to Petrograd and Moscow. The loss of Tsaritsyn would have been a catastrophe that was difficult to repair.

By cutting off Tsaritsyn from the northern Caucasus, the Whites deprived Stalin of the opportunity to fulfill his main task, for which he was sent here, that is, to mobilize food resources and send them to Moscow and Petrograd. Bread remained in the south, and Tsaritsyn, isolated from it, did not have its own bread. Stalin is making every effort to fulfill the instructions of the Central Committee and Lenin:

“I drive and scold everyone who needs it, I hope we will restore it soon. You can be sure that we will not spare anyone - neither ourselves nor others, but we will still give bread. If our military "specialists" (shoemakers!) had not slept and were not idle, the line would not have been interrupted; and if the line is restored, then not thanks to the military, but in spite of them ...

As for the hysterical ones, be sure that our hand will not waver, we will act in a hostile way with the enemies.

“The matter is complicated by the fact that the headquarters of the North Caucasian District turned out to be completely unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle against the counter-revolution. The point is not only that our “specialists” are psychologically incapable of a decisive war against the counter-revolution, but also that they, as “staff” workers, who can only “draw blueprints” and give plans for reorganization, are absolutely indifferent to operational actions .. and generally feel like strangers, guests. The military commissars were unable to fill the gap ...

I don't think I have the right to look at it with indifference. I will correct these and many other shortcomings on the ground, I will take a number of measures and will take them up to the removal of officials and commanders ruining the cause, despite formal difficulties, which I will break if necessary. At the same time, it is clear that I take full responsibility before all higher institutions.”

The supply of the center of the country with bread was interrupted. Lenin conveyed to Stalin: “... about food, I must say that today they do not give out at all either in St. Petersburg or in Moscow. The situation is quite bad. Let me know if you can take emergency measures, because there is nowhere else to get it from you ... ”

Stalin replied that “before the restoration of the route, the delivery of bread is unthinkable ... in the coming days it will not be possible to help with bread. In ten days we hope to restore the line ... ”But not days, but months passed, and the situation worsened.

The situation was extremely tense not only at the front, but also in the rear: in Petrograd there was an uprising of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, an attempt on Lenin's life. A lot of elements hostile to the new government have accumulated in Tsaritsyn: Socialist-Revolutionaries, terrorists, anarchists, monarchists, former officers. There was an organized counter-revolutionary underground.

It seems to me that the role of Stalin in the fight against internal counter-revolution will be more clearly presented in the mouth of a participant in the events of those days, the former head of the operational department of the army, Colonel Nosovich, who defected to the Whites and on February 3, 1919 published the following in the White Guard magazine Donskaya Volna:

“Stalin’s main importance was the supply of food to the northern provinces, and to carry out this task he had unlimited powers ...

The Mud-Tsaritsyn line was finally cut. There was only one way to get supplies and keep in touch in the north: the Volga. In the south, after the “volunteers” occupied Tikhoretskaya, the situation also became very precarious. And for Stalin, who draws his (grain) supplies exclusively from the Stavropol province, this situation bordered on the unsuccessful end of his mission in the south. It is not in the rules, obviously, for such a person as Stalin to deviate from the work he once started. We must do justice to him, that his energy can be envied by any of the old administrators, and his ability to apply himself to business and circumstances should be learned by many.

Gradually, as he remained idle, or rather, along with the reduction of his direct task, Stalin began to enter into all departments of city administration, and, mainly, into the broad tasks of defending Tsaritsyn in particular and the entire Caucasian front in general.

By this time, the atmosphere in Tsaritsyn had thickened. The Tsaritsyn Cheka worked at full speed. Not a day passed without various conspiracies being discovered in the most seemingly reliable places. All the prisons in the city were overflowing...

The struggle at the front reached extreme tension... From July 20, Stalin turned out to be the main engine and the main arbiter. A simple conversation over a direct wire with the center about the inconvenience and inconsistency for the cause of the real organization of the administration of the region led to the fact that Moscow gave an order by which Stalin was placed at the head of all military and civil administration ... ”

“By this time, the local counter-revolutionary organization, standing on the platform of the Constituent Assembly, had grown significantly stronger and, having received money from Moscow, was preparing for active action to help the Don Cossacks in the liberation of Tsaritsyn.

Unfortunately, the head of this organization, engineer Alekseev, who arrived from Moscow, and his two sons were little familiar with the current situation, and due to an incorrectly drawn up plan based on recruiting the active Serbian battalion, which was under the state emergency, into the ranks of the actively participating, the organization was discovered .. .

Stalin's resolution was short: "shoot". Engineer Alekseev, his two sons, and with them a significant number of officers, who were partly in the organization, and partly on suspicion of complicity in it, were captured by the Cheka and immediately shot without any trial.

About the cleansing of the Whites, Nosovich writes:

“A characteristic feature of this dispersal was Stalin's attitude to leading telegrams from the center. When Trotsky, worried about the destruction of the administration of the districts, established with such difficulty, sent a telegram about the need to leave the headquarters and the commissariat on the same conditions and give them the opportunity to work, Stalin made a categorical and meaningful inscription on the telegram: “Do not take into account!”

So this telegram was not taken into account, and all the artillery and part of the headquarters continue to sit on the barge in Tsaritsyn.

Stalin telegraphed to Moscow:

“... For the good of the cause, I need military powers. I already wrote about this, but did not receive a response. Very good. In this case, I myself, without formalities, will overthrow all the commanders and commissars who ruin the cause. This is what the interests of the cause suggest to me, and, of course, the absence of a piece of paper from Trotsky will not stop me.

Under the "absence of a piece of paper" Stalin meant that Trotsky, as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, did not give Stalin the authority to interfere in the affairs of the military command.

Indeed, he was “not stopped” by the lack of “legitimate” powers; on Stalin’s orders, Snesarev and almost all former officers from the headquarters were arrested. Several hundred arrested officers were placed on a barge and kept there under guard.

The fate of these officers, or rather, the use of such drastic measures by Stalin in Moscow, was written more than once: several groups of officers were taken out and shot from the barge, and in general they intended to flood this barge. A special commission headed by A. I. Okulov was even sent to Tsaritsyn to investigate this fact.

The commission dealt with the accusation of the arrested, most of them were released, including General Snesarev. In order to separate Snesarev from Stalin, the general was appointed commander of the Western Front.

But while the commission was traveling, Stalin, Voroshilov and other associates managed to hide the ends in the water, in the truest sense of the word.

For a long time there were rumors that not everything became known to the commission at that time. For example, I heard about the sinking of another barge from elderly commanders in 1939, when I became a cadet at a military school.

In the autumn of 1918, the White troops reached the approaches to Tsaritsyn and in some places broke through to the Volga. The most critical situation arose in January 1919, when General Krasnov brought in fresh forces and, having broken through the Reds' defenses, moved towards Tsaritsyn. The commander of the Southern Front, created by that time, Sytin, and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, Stalin, had no reserves to counter the breakthrough.

In this most difficult situation, Stalin did not lose his head, showed firmness and found a way out. Here, for the first time, his ability to think on an operational-strategic scale is manifested.

Those who were in those days next to Stalin in the salon-car recall that Stalin was much more excited than usual, almost did not stop smoking his pipe, but spoke in his even, firm voice, and this calmed those around him.

Stalin understood: as soon as he concentrated all the leadership in his hands, then the responsibility for the defeat would fall on him. But what to do? There are no reserves. The enemy will take Tsaritsyn almost unhindered.

Stalin suggested that General Krasnov's units were probably already ready to celebrate the victory. It always lulls vigilance. There are many examples in history when a premature triumph led to the loss of success gained in battle.

- What is happening now at the location of General Krasnov? Stalin asked, addressing no one in particular. Those present fell silent. A representative from the headquarters of the front reported:

- They are preparing to enter Tsaritsyn, the main forces are being built in columns in the Dubovka area. A small vanguard will go ahead to shoot down the remnants of our troops.

Stalin angrily banged his pipe on the table.

- Excellent! Vanguard skip and crack down on it in our depths.

– But this means opening the way for the main enemy forces...

“An absolutely fair remark,” said Stalin. He felt confident because he had found a way out of the impasse. Stalin even smiled: - The main forces of the enemy will go not to the city, but to their death.

- But who...

- Chief of artillery, Comrade Kulik, how many guns do you have in the Dubovka area?

- I have nothing here ... - Kulik began to justify himself.

How many on the whole front? Stalin interrupted impatiently.

- There will be a hundred guns ...

- All these guns immediately, without wasting a minute, begin to concentrate on Dubovka. Send reliable people to the batteries. Drive everyone in the tail and mane! To focus on Dubovka during the night. Bring all the shells here. Did you understand me? Enemy in euphoria. The victory turned their heads. So we will hit with all the artillery on these stupid heads! And the consolidated cavalry division of Dumenko should be concentrated here, to Dubovka. Her task is to beat and chase the enemy after he is knocked over by artillery!

During the night, all artillery was drawn up and took up firing positions near Dubovka. Division Dumenko went to the designated area. Stalin's psychological analysis of the enemy was fully confirmed. The troops of General Krasnov marched in columns along the roads behind the vanguard. The cavalry, also in formation, moved along the roads. A heavy, huge mass of troops flowed in a thick stream towards Tsaritsyn.

The impact of artillery, in such a concentrated, unprecedented quantity, and even with the utmost rate of fire, was not only unexpected, but also destructive. Shells burst in the thick of people, in a few minutes a huge space was covered with corpses, soldiers ran in different directions. Dumenko's division under the command of Budyonny (Dumenko fell ill) famously pursued the retreating. Other parts of the front also went on the offensive. Krasnov's troops were repulsed from Tsaritsyn.

This brilliant victory strengthened Stalin's authority. The city was defended, the whites were driven back. And who was in charge of all this? - Stalin! And another person helped a lot - Kulik. And this is natural: the decisive role in this battle was played by artillery, used by its original, previously unused concentration on the main direction and massive fire. And who is the commander of the artillery? - Kulik! Thank Kulik after that, too, was stable for many years.

Well, relations at the level of front leadership developed as usual, Stalin continued to show his character. Rather, he remained himself and could not behave differently.

As mentioned above, in September 1918, Pavel Pavlovich Sytin, also a former tsarist general, general staff officer, who also voluntarily joined the Red Army in January 1918, was appointed the new commander of the created Southern Front.

From the very first days, Stalin began to clash with the new commander Sytin. And even independently removed him from command of the front. Thus, Stalin refused to obey the order of the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of Trotsky on non-interference in the operational orders of the front commander. Trotsky appealed to the Central Committee. The chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ya. M. Sverdlov, telegraphed Stalin and Voroshilov to Tsaritsyn: “All decisions of the Revolutionary Military Council (republic) are binding on the military councils of the fronts. Without subjugation, there is no united army... There should be no conflicts.” But Stalin did not take into account the instructions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and continued to act at his own discretion.

In order to correct this situation, the Central Committee was forced to recall Stalin to Moscow. Sytin was left in command of the troops of the front.

Summing up the results of Stalin's first independent contact with military strategy, we note his wisdom, energy, determination, firmness, especially in difficult situations. These are all good qualities of a military leader. Stalin gained experience in organizing and conducting major army operations. I got acquainted with the activities of the headquarters, the role of which, however, I clearly did not understand. Along with this, it became obvious that Stalin did not always use wide powers and power sparingly. This already gave the Central Committee and party comrades a reason to be wary. But in the tense days of the civil war, it was not up to that. And some people considered all this in that situation not as vices, but as virtues, especially since this was confirmed by the real result - Stalin defended Tsaritsyn. The winners are not judged, and the victory at Tsaritsyn really had a strategic scale.

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