Vitebsk offensive operation. Vitebsk-Orsha operation Development of the offensive in the Vitebsk direction

The Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts in order to defeat the troops of the left wing of Army Group Center and create favorable conditions for a further offensive.

On the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha directions, the troops of the German 3rd Tank Army and part of the forces of the 4th Army of the Army Group "Center" defended (up to 17 divisions with a total strength of up to 140 thousand people). Their actions were supported by the 6th Air Fleet.

The 1st Baltic Front included the 4th Shock Army, the 6th Guards Army, the 43rd Army, the 3rd Air Army, the 1st Tank Corps with a total strength of more than 220 thousand people.

The 3rd Belorussian Front included the 39th Army, the 5th Army, the 11th Guards Army, the 31st Army, the 5th Guards. Tank Army, KMG (3 Guards Mk and 3 Guards KK), 1st Air Army and 2 Guards. shopping mall with a total number of more than 210 thousand people.

The concept of the operation provided for a breakthrough by shock groups of fronts (6th Guards Army, 43rd Army, 1st Corps - 1st Baltic Front; 39th Army, 5th Army, KM G - 3rd Belorussian Front) enemy defenses northwest and south of Vitebsk, forcing the Western Dvina river and the encirclement, followed by the destruction of the Vitebsk grouping of the German 3rd Tank Army with the simultaneous development of the offensive on Lepel and Senno. In addition, the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front (11th Guards A, 31st A, 2nd Guards TC) were to defeat the formations of the German 4th Army in the Orsha region with a frontal attack and capture the city. Subsequently, introducing the 5th Guards into the breakthrough. Tank Army, to develop an offensive in the Borisov direction.

On June 23, after conducting preliminary aviation training, the troops went on the offensive. Connections 6 Guards. The armies and 43 armies advanced up to 16 km in depth during the day of the battle, expanding the breakthrough to 30 km. The 39th Army and the 5th Army successfully advanced in the Bogushev direction. Having cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, they advanced 10-13 km, expanding the gap to 50 km. In the Orsha direction 11 Guards. The Army and the 31st Army met stubborn resistance from the enemy and advanced to a shallow depth.

By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. The Western Dvina in the Beshenkovichi-Gnezdilovichi section, and the formations of the 6th Guards. The armies crossed it. The troops of the northern grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front overcame the resistance of the enemy and, having repulsed his counterattacks, advanced 10-16 km, captured the city of Bogushevsk. On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the river. The Western Dvina, by the end of the day, reached the Gnezdilovichi region and established direct contact with the troops of the 39th Army that had left here, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east.

Five divisions of the German 3rd Panzer Army were surrounded and simultaneously cut into pieces. On June 26, the city was completely liberated; on June 27, the entire enemy grouping ceased resistance.

To develop success in the Bogushevsky direction, on June 24, in the lane 5, the Army entered the battle of the KM G, which on June 25 liberated the city of Senno and cut the railway. On the same day, in the band 5, the Army was introduced into the breakthrough of the 5th Guards. Tank Army, which the next day cut the enemy's communications to the west of the city of Orsha.

On the morning of June 26, introduced into the breakthrough in the band of 11 Guards. And the 2nd Guards Corps began to bypass Orsha from the north-west. On June 27, Orsha was liberated by troops of the 11th Guards. Army and 31st Army.

On June 28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the line Zaozerye - Lepel, and the 3rd Belorussian Front - to the river. Berezina north of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated, the troops advanced 80-150 km. Conditions were created for the development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions.




	Vitebsk region, Byelorussian SSR
	Insignificant advance of the Soviet troops with heavy losses
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
V. D. Sokolovsky	Ernst Bush
I. Kh. Bagramyan
Side forces
436 180 people	unknown

27,639 non-refundable, 107,373 sanitary	unknown

Vitebsk offensive operation February 3 - March 13, 1944- front-line offensive operation of the Soviet Western Front and the 1st Baltic Front in the Great Patriotic War.

Background and plan of operation

In October - December 1943, the Soviet fronts in the western direction tried to fulfill the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to defeat the German Army Group Center and reach the Vilnius-Minsk line. In a number of areas, it was possible to inflict local defeats on the enemy (Gorodok operation, Nevelsk operation, Gomel-Rechitsa operation), in others the offensive ended in failure (Orsha operation), but in general these operations did not develop into a strategic offensive, the German defense in the central sector of the Soviet-German front withstood the onslaught of Soviet troops.

In the Vitebsk direction, after the defeat of the grouping of German troops north of Gorodok, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front cut the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway and took up an enveloping position from the north in relation to the Vitebsk enemy grouping. Then the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command attracted the Western Front to the operation, transferring the 39th Army from the 1st Baltic Front to it. Due to the failure of previous operations, somewhat reduced tasks were set in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command No. 220011 of January 18, 1944.

However, the troops did not have the opportunity to properly prepare for the operation. So, the Western Front, before the start of the operation, went on the offensive twice, trying to break through the German defenses: from December 23, 1943 to January 6, 1944 in the Vitebsk direction (the front advanced up to 12 kilometers, forcing the enemy to leave the first defensive line, losing 6692 people killed, wounded - 28,904 people, a total of 35,596 people), and in the Bogushevsky direction from January 8 to 24, advancing 2-4 kilometers (losses were killed - 5517 people, wounded - 19,672 people, total - 25,189 people). Thus, instead of accumulating forces for the operation, the troops squandered them.

Side forces

USSR

1st Baltic Front (commander General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan):

4th Shock Army (commanded by Lieutenant General P. F. Malyshev)
11th Guards Army (commanded by Lieutenant General K. N. Galitsky)
43rd Army (commanded by Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev)
5th Panzer Corps
3rd Air Army (USSR) (commander Lieutenant General N. F. Papivin)

Western Front (commanded by General of the Army V. D. Sokolovsky):

5th Army (Lieutenant General Krylov N.I.)
31st Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V. A. Gluzdovsky)
33rd Army (Colonel-General Gordov V.N.)
39th Army (during the operation transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, commander N. E. Berzarin)
49th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I. T. Grishin)
2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (commander Major General of Tank Forces A. S. Burdeyny)
1st Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation Gromov M. M.)

Germany

Troops of the Army Group "Center" (commanded by Field Marshal Ernst Busch):

3rd Panzer Army (Commander General of Panzer Troops Georg Hans Reinhardt
6th Air Fleet (Colonel-General Robert von Greim)

Operation progress

On February 3, 1944, Soviet troops launched an offensive in the Vitebsk direction. At the same time, the armies of the Western Front advanced south of Vitebsk, and the 1st Baltic Front advanced on the city from the east and covered it from the north. Attaching great importance to the retention of Vitebsk, Hitler declared it a "fortress" and ordered to hold it to the last man. This offensive led to only partial successes - the 1st Baltic Front forced the enemy to leave the advanced defensive line and slowly advanced to the west with heavy fighting, repelling the enemy's continuous counterattacks. On the Western Front, they managed to advance only 4 kilometers. On February 16, the offensive was temporarily suspended. The troops suffered heavy losses.

A hasty and unprepared attempt to capture the Vitebsk groupings deep from the south, from the Orsha direction, did not give a result - from February 22 to 25, German troops repelled a new offensive attempt.

On February 29, 1944, Soviet troops resumed their offensive in the Vitebsk direction. New heavy fighting also did not bring a turning point. However, the continuous onslaught of the Soviet troops forced the German command of Army Group Center to use up almost all of its reserves. A critical situation arose, to get out of which Bush hardly got Hitler's permission to withdraw troops to the outer defensive bypass of Vitebsk. Pursuing the enemy, the 1st Baltic Front bypassed Vitebsk deeply from the north, occupying an overhanging position over the German grouping in the city area. On the western front south of Vitebsk, the offensive was again limited to penetrating the German defenses from 2 to 6 kilometers. An attempt to strike a second time in the Orsha region from March 5 to March 9 ended without result. The troops were forced to go on the defensive.

Operation results

During the operation, its main tasks were not completed. Soviet troops were unable not only to break through to Minsk, but also to capture Vitebsk. Nevertheless, the 3rd German Panzer Army, which was defending in the area of the city, suffered heavy losses and was forced to commit all its reserves into battle. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front deeply engulfed the Vitebsk enemy grouping, creating the conditions for its subsequent defeat in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation in June 1944. The actions of the Western Front were considered unsuccessful. The losses of the Soviet troops in this operation were very high: 27,639 irretrievable people and 107,373 sanitary people, the total losses amounted to 135,012 people.

German General Kurt von Tippelskirch assesses the situation near Vitebsk in early 1944 as follows:

“This time, the German troops had to strain all their forces to the limit in order to hold the defense northwest and southeast of the city, where it was repeatedly on the verge of a breakthrough. Although the Germans suffered heavy losses at the same time, they managed to prevent decisive breakthroughs by the enemy, who threw fifty-three rifle divisions, ten tank brigades and three artillery divisions into the offensive. But the forces of the few German divisions that held the defense along a wide 70-kilometer arc around Vitebsk were exhausted.

Consequences of the operation

The unsuccessful actions of the command of the Western Front in this and the previous Orsha operations led to the arrival of the commission of the State Defense Committee headed by G. M. Malenkov (members - Colonel General A. S. Shcherbakov, Colonel General S. M. Shtemenko, General Lieutenant A. A. Kuznetsov, Lieutenant General A. I. Shimonaev). Based on the results of the work, the commission presented to I. V. Stalin a report dated 04/11/1944, where the actions of the command were subjected to devastating criticism. V. D. Sokolovsky was blamed for planning operations without taking into account the experience of the war (breakthrough of the German defense by the forces of each army independently in narrow areas, bringing tank forces into battle directly in the defense zone, insufficient preparation of operations), inability to attack with a significant superiority in forces over by the defending enemy, illiterate use of artillery, poor reconnaissance preparation of the offensive, improper interaction of the combat arms in battle, repeated unprepared and hasty attacks on the same lines with huge losses. A number of other military leaders were criticized, primarily the commander of the 33rd Army Gordov V.N.

As a result of the consideration of the case, the Western Front was reorganized. For omissions, the front commander V.D. Sokolovsky, the front artillery chief I.P. Kamera, the head of the front intelligence department, and a number of other commanders were removed from their positions and received penalties and punishments.

At the same time, one cannot fail to note the guilt of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself and the General Staff of the Red Army in the failure of the offensive. Planning deep breakthroughs of the German defenses with far-reaching goals, they did not provide the troops with the proper means of reinforcement. The rifle and tank units themselves, after heavy losses in previous battles, were hardly replenished and were exhausted. Sufficient time was not allocated for the preparation of troops.

The operations of the four fronts were not coordinated among themselves and were not coordinated during the fighting, although in essence they had a single goal. The enemy used the uncoordinated actions of the Soviet fronts, skillfully maneuvering with the limited forces available to him.

The conclusions from the unsuccessful operations of the Soviet troops in the central direction in the winter of 1943-1944 were drawn and taken into account in the preparation of the Belarusian strategic operation in the summer of 1944, which ended in the defeat of Army Group Center.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation(belor. Viciebsk-Arsha Apery(June 23 - June 28)) - a strategic military operation of the armed forces of the USSR against German troops during the Great Patriotic War, carried out in Eastern Belarus, with the aim of collapsing the defense of the right flank of Army Group Center. It is an integral part of the Belarusian operation (operation "Bagration").

balance of power

USSR

By the beginning of June, 4 Soviet armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front were located in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions: 5th, 31st, 39th and 11th Guards, which were reinforced by offensive development units: 5th Guards Tank Army, 2 -m Guards Tatsinsky tank corps, as well as Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group. To the north were the 6th Guards and 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, reinforced by the 1st Tank Corps.

1st Baltic Front (commander General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, chief of staff Colonel General V. V. Kurasov D. S. Leonov)
3rd Belorussian Front (Commander General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov)
- 5th Army N. I. Krylov)
- 11th Guards Army (commanded by Lieutenant General K. N. Galitsky)
- 31st Army (commander Lieutenant General V. V. Glagolev, chief of staff Major General M. I. Shchedrin)
- 39th Army (commander Lieutenant General I. I. Lyudnikov)
- 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov)
- 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Guard Commander Major General of the Armored Forces A. S. Burdeyny)
- Horse-mechanized group (guard commander Major General N. S. Oslikovsky)
  - 3rd Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps (Commander Lieutenant General V. T. Obukhov)
  - 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (guard commander Major General N. S. Oslikovsky, chief of staff Colonel S. T. Shmuylo)
- The 1st Air Army (commanded by Lieutenant General of Aviation M. M. Gromov) on June 23 had 1,901 serviceable combat aircraft (fighters - 840, attack aircraft - 528, bombers - 459, reconnaissance aircraft - 54).
long-range aviation formations

coordinated the actions of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, the representative of the Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky

Germany

On the Vitebsk direction at the turn east of Polotsk, Bogushevsk (Bogushevskoye), on the front of 150 km, the 3rd German tank army opposed the Soviet troops, and on the Orsha and Mogilev direction in the Bogushevsk (claim.), Bykhov on the front of 225 km - units of the 4th German army.

parts of the army group "Center" (commander Field Marshal Ernst von Busch)
parts of the army group "North" (commander Colonel-General Georg Lindemann)
- 16th Army (commanded by General of Artillery Christian Hansen)
  - 1st Army Corps (Commander General of the Infantry Karl Hilpert)
- parts of the 1st Air Fleet (commander General Kurt Pflugbeil)

Side Plans

USSR

As part of the Belarusian offensive operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front were aimed through Polotsk, Glubokoe, Shvenchenis (Sventsyany) - to Siauliai, cutting off the German army group "North" from the army group "Center" and entering the Baltic in the Klaipeda region; troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, after defeating the enemy in the area of Vitebsk and Orsha and attacking Borisov, were sent through Minsk, Molodechno, Vilnius, Kaunas, Lida and Grodno to the borders of East Prussia

At the first stage of the Belorussian operation, the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were tasked with "the defeat of the Vitebsk grouping, the introduction of tank and mechanized troops into the breakthrough and the development of the main attack to the west, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of German troops with its left-flank grouping" .

Another blow- by the forces of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies (3rd Belorussian Front), should be inflicted on the enemy's Orsha grouping and further along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov. Part of the forces of this grouping was supposed to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

The mobile troops of the front (cavalry and tanks) were proposed to be used to develop success in the general direction of Borisov “with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina near Borisov .

Germany

The German command did not expect a serious offensive by the Soviet troops in the summer of 1944 on the positions of the Center GA. Therefore, the plans for the Vitebsk-Orsha operation came as a surprise to the command of the army group. Field Marshal Bush, when visiting the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army on April 21, 1944, said: “In any case, based on the events of this winter, the Russian command will set very large-scale goals in the sectors of other army groups”. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, General Reinhard, agreed with him: “The fact that the Russians have an intention to capture Vitebsk with an attack in the 3 TA lane seems doubtful to the commander”.

As part of the GA "Center" as a whole and the 3rd Panzer Army, there were practically no mobile formations. The German command planned to repel all possible attacks by the Soviet troops, relying on developed defensive structures. So, in the zone of the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Army, which covered the Orsha direction, the German defense extended to a depth of 20-25 km, with 11-14 trench lines at several defense lines, with dugouts and shelters equipped with artillery positions for direct firing aiming, 6-7 rows of barbed wire and continuous minefields.

According to Hitler's order of March 8, 1944, large cities in the army group zone were declared "fortresses", including Vitebsk (commandant - commander of the 53rd Army Corps, Infantry General Friedrich Hollwitzer (German) Russian, covering forces - 1 battalion, filling - 3 divisions), Orsha (commandant - Colonel Ratoliff, covering forces - 1 company, filling - 2 divisions). The commanders of the army groups were skeptical about the effectiveness of the "fortresses" to repel the enemy's offensive. So, Reinhard proposed in the event of a Soviet offensive to leave Vitebsk, thus forcing the enemy to strike his first blow at an empty place, and to retreat and hold the defense at the Tiger line. But the Fuhrer's order remained in force.

The general course of the operation

The operation was carried out between 23 - 28 June 1944. It was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began on 22 June.

22nd of June

In zone 1 of the Baltic Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out by the forces of 10 rifle companies, reinforced with tanks, after a little artillery preparation.

During the day, units of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (6th Guards Army) broke through the main German defense line (for which the main forces of the first echelon were brought into battle) and advanced on the front 15 km by 5-7 km, pushing back the units of 252- th infantry division of the enemy by the morning of June 23 to the Savchenko-Morgi-Pligovka line.

Significantly less success was achieved by units of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (6th Guards Army), which managed to occupy only the first trench, and later had to repulse enemy counterattacks.

The 1st Rifle Corps (43rd Army), which launched the attack at 4 p.m., managed to penetrate the German defenses by 0.5-1.5 km. On the night of June 23, the main forces of the regiments of the first echelon, units of the 5th assault and 28th engineer-sapper brigades were additionally introduced into the corps sector. As a result, the village of Zamoshye was captured, by the morning the corps units reached the village of Gorovatka. Promotion in some areas amounted to 3.5 km.

The 60th and 92nd Rifle Corps (43rd Army) had no success during June 22 and, under pressure from the enemy, were forced to return to their original positions by the end of the day.

In the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, when conducting reconnaissance in force, the advanced battalions of the 65th and 72nd rifle corps (5th Army) achieved the greatest success, which captured the first 2 trenches during the day and fought in the direction of Mashkov. In order to increase the success of rifle units, the command brought into battle the 153rd tank brigade and the 954th regiment of self-propelled guns. As a result, units of the 5th Army managed to capture bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Sukhodrevka River and transport infantry, tanks and artillery to them during the night. The enemy was forced to transfer his reserves to the place of the breakthrough.

The units of the 11th and 31st armies were not successful: having stumbled upon strong enemy resistance, they suffered significant losses and were withdrawn to their original positions by the end of the day.

On June 22, reconnaissance in force was not carried out in the zone of the 39th Army at the request of Lieutenant General I. I. Lyudnikov, in order not to reveal plans for the offensive (the position of the enemy troops was known).

Troops of the 1st and 60th Rifle Corps of the 43rd Army, after artillery preparation, broke through the enemy defenses in the Novaya Igumenshchina-Uzhmekino sector (16 km along the front), captured the nodes of resistance Shumilino and the Sirotino station during the day, and reached the Dobeya line by 21-00 - Plyushchevka - Pushchevye - Kuzmino - Uzhmekino (advance up to 16 km).

The blow of the 1st Baltic Front fell on the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" and was unexpected for the enemy: " The offensive northwest of Vitebsk was especially unpleasant, since, unlike the attacks on the rest of the front, it was a complete surprise.» .

A deep breakthrough of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front forced the enemy to begin a quick withdrawal of units of the 9th Army Corps to the line of the Western Dvina, and units of the 53rd Army Corps to the southern and western outskirts of Vitebsk.

Despite the rapid advance of rifle subunits, the introduction of the 1st Tank Corps into the breakthrough did not take place due to its slow advance (including due to the poor condition of the roads after the past rains); the command of the 1st Baltic Front decided to bring in the corps after seizing the bridgehead on the Western Dvina.

The aviation of the front made 764 sorties. Enemy aircraft made 14 sorties.

The 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive in the Perevoz - Romanovo sector: three rifle divisions of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, after artillery preparation and air strikes at 6:00, broke through the enemy defenses in the Perevoz - Kuzmentsy sector (6 km), they crossed the Luchesa River, taking 3 crossings on the move (by 12-00), and by 13-00 they cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway at the Zamostye station. Parts of the 84th Rifle Corps of the 39th Army during the day wedged into the enemy's main line of defense, the greatest success was achieved by units of the 158th Rifle Division, which captured the Babinovichi settlement. By the end of the day, the army reached the Tishkovo-Lyadenki line, and advanced units to the Shelki area (advance up to 13 km in a day).

The 5th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Zarechye-Shelmino sector. Units of the 72nd Rifle Corps crossed the Luchesa River and captured bridgeheads in the area of the villages of Kovali, Zarechye and Savchenki (where units of the 299th Infantry Division were defeated and the railway bridge was captured and thereby the Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut). Units of the 65th Rifle Corps, after heavy fighting in the second half of June 23, captured bridgeheads on the Luchesa River in the Rudakov, Kalinovichi area. The command of the German 3rd Panzer Army tried to throw off the Soviet troops from the bridgeheads on the Luchesa Riverby introducing units of the 14th Infantry Division, supported by assault guns, into battle, but all attacks were repulsed. As a result, units of the 5th Army moved forward 10 km and by the end of the day reached the line of Savchenko - Vladykovshchina - Gryada - Nikolaevo - Pushcheyevo - Ponizovye - Rudaki - Bolshie Kalinovichi - Novy Stan - Boston, expanding the breakthrough front to 26 km. The defending units of the 6th German Army Corps began to retreat, trying to gain a foothold on the next line of defense. Under these conditions, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to continue the offensive at night in order to frustrate the enemy’s plans, and to develop success, to introduce a cavalry-mechanized group of General Oslikovsky (due to the poor condition of the roads, KMG units arrived in the concentration area only by 07:00 June) .

The 11th Guards Army broke through the enemy's defenses in the section Lake Zelenskoye - Kireevo. Units of the 36th Guards Rifle and 8th Rifle Corps, after artillery preparation and air strikes, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, went on the offensive and captured the enemy’s first trench, the village of Kireevo was also captured, but due to the increased resistance of the 78th Infantry Division, further the advance of Soviet troops in this area was suspended. But on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army, units of the 16th Guards Corps and the 155th fortified area attached to it successfully broke through the defenses in a wooded and swampy area and captured Yuryev Island by 10-00. Despite numerous enemy counterattacks, the offensive on the right flank of the army developed successfully (to build on success during the day, the 1st Guards Moscow Rifle Division was brought into battle in this sector, parts of which by the end of the day captured a bridgehead on the Vydreyka River, the 5th Guards The Gorodok Rifle Division, which fought for the Vydritsa settlement, as well as the 11th Guards Gorodok Rifle Division, which received the task of defeating the enemy south of Babinovichi). By the end of the day, the 11th Guards Army was fighting at the line of Zelenukha - Boltuny - Settlement No. 10-les southeast of the settlement of Polypki - the eastern outskirts of the settlement of Bryukhovskie - Shibany - east of the settlement of Zavolny - Kireevo (advance per day was from 2 to 8 km) .

The 31st Army wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 km by the end of the day fought at the forest line 2 km southwest of Kireevo settlement - east of Buroe Selo-east of Zagvazdino.

The aviation of the front made 877 sorties (105 of them at night). Enemy aircraft made 36 sorties.

Operation results

As a result of the operation, the district centers of the Vitebsk region Shumilino (June 23), Beshenkovichi, Bogushevsk, Senno (June 25), Tolochin (June 26), Orsha, Chashniki (June 27), Lepel (June 28) were liberated.

Individual episodes

The commander of the sapper platoon, senior sergeant Fyodor Blokhin, was given the task of saving the only surviving bridge in the city from destruction, so that the main forces of the 39th army, which liberated Vitebsk, could then cross over it. The success of this task was largely predetermined by the fact that on the eve of Blokhin received news of the death of his beloved son in battle. Blokhin, at first extremely upset by the death of his son, then carried out this task with tripled energy.

The operation to save the bridge was preceded by street fighting in the center of Vitebsk on the night of June 26 by the forces of the 875th regiment of the 158th rifle division. A platoon of 12 men, led by senior sergeant Blokhin, in the predawn darkness leaked through the enemy formations and went to the Western Dvina. The bridge was mined and could be blown up at any moment. The key to success was the surprise of the attack and the speed of the operation. On a signal from the commander, the soldiers threw grenades at the enemy's trenches and broke into the bridge. A fight ensued that turned into hand-to-hand combat. Senior Sergeant Blokhin stabbed the Nazi who blocked his path with a knife and rushed to the water, where the wires leading to the land mines were stretched, after which he cut them and, together with Corporal Mikhail Kuznetsov, removed the electric detonator. The sappers removed 300 boxes of explosives from the bridge supports. At that moment, Soviet tanks were already approaching the bridge.

Attack of the 215th Infantry Regiment under the command of N. B. Borisov

In the area of the village of Zaborye, the commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment of the 179th Infantry Division of the 43rd Army Borisov N. B. was tasked to seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Dvina and firmly gain a foothold on it. After assessing the situation, Borisov came to the conclusion that after capturing the bridgehead, it was necessary not to defend, but to attack, and that the capture of the village of Zaborye would be the best way to successfully cross the Western Dvina with the main forces of the regiment. In a swift attack, Borisov's battalion captured the village of Zaborye and in 3 days of fighting destroyed 400 German soldiers and officers (including a colonel), captured 65 prisoners, up to 80 vehicles, 20 motorcycles, 1 rifle battery, 13 machine guns, 7 warehouses (including 5 with food). The battalion lost 3 men. The operation was carried out so successfully that in the future, using the example of Borisov, officers were taught how to crush the enemy with “little blood, a mighty blow”.

Bespyatov crossing in the Shumilino area

In the area of the settlement center of Shumilino, the 935th rifle regiment of the 306th rifle division of the 43rd army under the command of Bespyatov A.I. broke through the German defenses by forcing the Western Dvina under heavy enemy fire. Bespyatov's regiment was the first to seize a foothold on the left bank of the Western Dvina, expand it, and this section then became an army crossing. After forcing the Western Dvina, part of the troops of the 43rd Army went to connect with the 39th Army, while the other continued to advance westward in the direction of the city of Lepel. Not far from this city, Bespyatov's regiment surrounded the SS battalion and completely destroyed it.

The feat of mortar Borodulin

During the Vitebsk operation, the Katyusha gunner, a fighter of the 3rd separate guards mortar regiment Borodulin SD, distinguished himself, for whom the battle near Vitebsk was the last. His "Katyusha" at the crossing over the small river Obolyanka was attacked by an enemy from a nearby forest. Although the Katyusha mortar was not intended for direct fire, the mortars decided to take the fight and unleashed heavy fire on the Germans. The Nazis set in motion artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns. From the explosion of the Katyusha shell, Borodulin caught fire, the combat crew, which consisted of several fighters, was burned and suffocated from smoke. According to the surviving eyewitnesses, Borodulin with the words “We will die, but we will not let the goats!” managed to make one more, last, volley at the Nazis. Borodulin Sergey Dmitrievich, the driver-senior driver of the combat installation of the guard, senior sergeant Nazarenko Pavel Ivanovich and the commander of the M-8 gun of the guard Sergeant Svetlichny Timofei Ivanovich burned down along with the installation.

The feat of Yuri Smirnov

The squad leader of the 77th Guards Rifle Regiment (26th Guards Rifle Division, 11th Guards Army, 3rd Belorussian Front), Junior Sergeant Yuri Smirnov, on the night of June 25, 1944, was part of a tank landing during a breakthrough of enemy defenses on Orsha direction. In the battle for the village of Shalashino, Orsha district of the Vitebsk region of Belarus, he was seriously wounded and captured by the enemy. The Nazis subjected the Soviet soldier to brutal torture, but the courageous fighter did not betray military secrets to the enemy. The Nazis crucified Yuri Smirnov on the wall of the dugout, and pierced his body with bayonets.

Guards Junior Sergeant Yu. V. Smirnov died a hero's death, remaining faithful to his soldier's duty and military oath until the last minute of his life. His feat serves as an example of soldier's prowess, selfless loyalty to the Motherland.

Assault height "Cemetery"

In June 1944, Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike took command of the machine gun company of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 19th Guards Division of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on the 20th of June, after a 3-hour artillery raid, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps occupied 3 lines of fortifications of the Nazi invaders, but further enemy counterattacks did not allow them to advance further. In front of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment, on a hill, there was a cemetery, which was the dominant height on the battlefield. All attacks on this height were repelled by the enemy. There were heavy losses of tanks and self-propelled guns when trying to take this height.

The regiment commander set a combat mission for the guard lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike: “To gather combat guards officers and soldiers. Create an assault company and take the cemetery. Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike understood that the order was difficult to fulfill, but when applying tactics and battle experience, as well as knowledge of the psychology of the enemy, a bold decision was made: to install machine guns in such a way as to provide strong and aimed fire to accompany the assault company during the enemy’s departure for lunch .

The enemy machine gunners left on duty could not stop the attacks of the Soviet guards, at the head of the company shouting "Hurrah!" Guard lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike walked with his close friend of the guard senior lieutenant Innokenty Pavlov. Height "Cemetery" was taken almost without loss. The fighting continued until evening. The enemy, leaving cover groups, began to retreat. The Soviet guards continued to fight and pursue the enemy in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold at the next line.

Introduction
Conclusion
Application

Introduction

Ten Stalinist strikes in 1944 led to the expulsion of the German invaders from our country and allowed the Supreme Commander to set the final task: "To finish off the fascist beast in its own lair and hoist the banner of Victory over Berlin."

In April 1944, the Soviet-German front line looked like this. In the south, the formations of the Red Army reached the border with Romania and were already aiming their strikes at Bucharest. Their neighbors on the right pushed the Nazis back from the Dnieper and approached the foothills of the Carpathians, cutting the German Eastern Front into two parts. In the north, having completely liberated Leningrad from the blockade, our troops reached Lake Peipus, Pskov and Novorzhev. Thus, between these flanks, which had advanced far to the west, there remained a huge ledge towards Moscow. It was called "Belarusian Balcony". The front part of this arc passed along the line of the cities of Vitebsk - Rogachev - Zhlobin and was not too far from Moscow. Hitler's units in this ledge (this was the Army Group Center, which included more than sixty divisions) blocked the path of the Soviet troops to the west. In addition, the fascist command, having a well-developed network of railways and highways there, could quickly maneuver and hit the flanks of our troops advancing south and north of this ledge. From it, enemy aircraft carried out bombing attacks on Soviet groups in the north and south. The possibility of raids on Moscow was not ruled out. At the same time, the German troops in this salient themselves, thanks to this position, were under the threat of our flank attacks from the south and north and, consequently, under the threat of encirclement. But in order to carry out an encirclement of this magnitude, huge forces were needed. For this, the Soviet troops had to defeat the North Army Group in the Baltic States, and the Northern Ukraine Army Group in Ukraine, and only after that it was possible to cover the Center Army Group from both sides. As early as the end of April 1944, Stalin, in the presence of General Antonov, consulted with Zhukov about the plan for the summer campaign.

A difficult regrouping was ahead: to carry out Operation Bagration, it was necessary to transfer the troops of five combined arms, two tank and one air armies to new areas. In addition, the Stavka transferred to the fronts an additional 4 combined arms, 2 tank armies, 52 rifle and cavalry divisions, 6 separate tank and mechanized corps, 33 aviation divisions, 2849 guns and mortars and 210 thousand marching reinforcements.

Initially, the Soviet command imagined the Bagration operation as a repetition of the Battle of Kursk, something like the new Kutuzov or Rumyantsev, with a huge consumption of ammunition with a subsequent relatively modest advance of 150–200 km. Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with long, stubborn battles in the tactical defense zone for attrition - required a large amount of ammunition and a relatively small amount of fuel for mechanized units and modest capacities for the restoration of railways, the actual development of the operation turned out to be for the Soviet command of the unexpected.

Alexei Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Leading Developer of the Operation Plan

The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed by the General Staff in April 1944. The general plan was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of Minsk, and completely liberate Belarus [ 10 ] . It was an extremely ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire army group was planned very rarely during the course of the war.

Significant personnel changes were made. General V. D. Sokolovsky failed to prove himself in the battles of the winter of 1943-1944 (the Orsha offensive operation, the Vitebsk offensive operation) and was removed from command of the Western Front. The front itself was divided in two: the 2nd Belorussian Front (to the south) was headed by G.F. Zakharov, who showed himself well in battles in the Crimea, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, who had previously commanded the army in Ukraine, was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (to the north).

The direct preparation of the operation was carried out from the end of May. Specific plans were received by the fronts on May 31 in private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

According to one version, according to the original plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow from the south, in the Bobruisk direction, but K.K. and two main blows. He motivated his statement by the fact that in the heavily swamped Polesie, with one breakthrough, the armies would bump into each other's heads, clog the roads in the near rear, and as a result, the troops of the front could only be used in parts. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, it was necessary to deliver one blow from Rogachev to Osipovichi, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk, while surrounding Bobruisk, which remained between these two groups. The proposal of K.K. Rokossovsky caused a heated debate in the Stavka, the members of the Stavka insisted on delivering one blow from the Rogachev area, in order to avoid dispersal of forces. The dispute was interrupted by I. V. Stalin, who declared that the persistence of the front commander spoke of the thoughtfulness of the operation. Thus, K.K. Rokossovsky was allowed to act in accordance with his own idea.

However, G.K. Zhukov argued that this version is not true:

The version existing in some military circles about “two main blows” in the Belarusian direction by the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, which K.K. Rokossovsky allegedly insisted on before the Supreme, is without foundation. Both of these strikes, designed by the front, were previously approved by I.V. Stalin as early as May 20 according to the project of the General Staff, that is, before the arrival of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front at Headquarters.

A thorough reconnaissance of enemy forces and positions was organized. The extraction of information was carried out in many directions. In particular, the reconnaissance teams of the 1st Belorussian Front captured about 80 "languages". Aerial reconnaissance of the 1st Baltic Front detected 1,100 different firing points, 300 artillery batteries, 6,000 dugouts, etc. Active acoustic, undercover reconnaissance was also carried out, the study of enemy positions by artillery observers, etc. Due to the combination of various reconnaissance methods and its intensity, the enemy grouping was revealed quite fully.

The headquarters tried to achieve maximum surprise. All orders to the commanders of the units were given personally by the commanders of the armies; telephone conversations relating to preparations for the offensive, even in coded form, were forbidden. The fronts preparing for the operation went into radio silence. At the forefront, active earthworks were carried out to simulate preparations for defense. Minefields were not removed completely, so as not to alarm the enemy, sappers limited themselves to screwing fuses from mines. The concentration of troops and regroupings were carried out mainly at night. Specially assigned officers of the General Staff on planes patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures.

The troops conducted intensive training to work out the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks, assault operations, forcing water barriers, etc. Units were withdrawn one by one from the front line to the rear for these exercises. Tactical techniques were tested in conditions as close as possible to combat and with live fire.

Before the operation, commanders of all levels up to companies carried out reconnaissance, setting tasks for subordinates on the spot. Artillery spotters and air force officers were introduced into the composition of the tank units for better interaction.

Thus, the preparation of the operation "Bagration" was carried out extremely carefully, while the enemy was left in the dark about the upcoming offensive.

The purpose of our study is a detailed examination of the features of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation of 1944.

study the prerequisites for the operation;

to study the features of the military operations of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation of 1944;

analyze the result of the operation.

When writing this work, scientific methods were used: description, comparative analysis, induction and deduction.

1. The beginning of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation of 1944

Immediately after the withdrawal of the 1st Tank Corps to the reserve of the 1st Baltic Front, its intensive preparation for the summer campaign of 1944 began.

The corps stationed on the border of the Vitebsk and Pskov regions in the area of the Ezerishche station began to receive reinforcements.

On April 1, 1944, tank brigades received a third tank battalion each. Now each tank brigade had sixty-five tanks instead of the previous forty-four. In addition, the T-34 tanks, which arrived to replenish the hull, were armed with 85 mm ZIS-S-53 cannons, capable of penetrating the armor of heavy Tiger tanks at a point-blank range with their armor-piercing projectile. These two important circumstances significantly increased the combat potential of the corps.

By this time, the configuration of the central section of the Soviet-German front had taken on new outlines.

As a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army in the winter and spring of 1944, our troops moved far ahead in two directions.

In the southwestern direction, after the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, our troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania.

In the northwestern direction, after the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, our troops pushed the enemy back from Leningrad by 200–220 km, reached the enemy’s Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area, and began the liberation of the Baltic republics.

And only in the center of the Soviet-German front, a ledge occupied by the enemy, which the Nazi command dubbed the "Belarusian balcony", was wedged into the depths of the disposition of our troops.

The presence of this "balcony" gave the Nazi command certain strategic advantages. Firstly, it served as a powerful barrier covering the direction to Warsaw and Berlin. Secondly, it made it possible to inflict flank attacks on our troops in the event of their offensive in the northwestern direction - to the borders of East Prussia or in the southwestern direction - to Lvov and Hungary. From the same "balcony" planes could take off to bombard Moscow.

Preparing for the summer campaign of 1944, the enemy concentrated on this "balcony" large forces of Army Group Center, led by Field Marshal E. von Busch (3rd Panzer, 4th and 9th Armies) and a number of formations of neighboring army groups - a total of 63 divisions and 3 brigades.

The Soviet high command was also busy preparing for the summer campaign. The tasks of the Red Army for the summer and autumn were formulated in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of May 1, 1944. They included the completion of the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet territory, the restoration of the state border of the USSR along its entire length, the withdrawal of the European allies from the war on the side of Germany and the liberation of the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other peoples of Europe from fascist captivity.

The plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", was simple in concept, but impressive in scope.

The plan provided:

simultaneous powerful blows from four fronts - the 1st Baltic (General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan), the 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 26.06 General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky), the 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 28.07 Army General G.F. Zakharov) and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian (Army General, and from 29.06 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) - to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Vitebsk, Bogushevsky, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions;

crush the enemy's strategic defense front, encircle and destroy his grouping in the area of Vitebsk and Bobruisk;

rapidly develop the offensive in depth, encircle and liquidate the troops of the 4th Army east of Minsk.

These actions were supposed to create favorable conditions for a further offensive to the west in general directions towards Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Brest [website, 25].

As follows from the foregoing, in the implementation of this plan, the stake was placed on the swiftness of the offensive. Therefore, the decisive role was assigned to the tank troops.

Taking into account the scope of hostilities, the location and structure of the main nodes of enemy defense, the Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration" was carried out in the form of ten relatively independent, but interconnected operations: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk, Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest and Kaunas. The share of the 1st Baltic Front, which included the 1st Tank Corps, had to participate in three of these operations: Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk and Siauliai. Therefore, further narration will be mainly devoted to these operations.

2. Development of the offensive in the Vitebsk direction

If the “Belarusian Balcony” as a whole protruded to the east, then the area of the city of Vitebsk was a “ledge on a ledge”, protruding even further from the northern part of the “balcony”. The city was declared a "fortress", a similar status had Orsha located south. The 3rd Panzer Army under the command of General G. H. Reinhardt was defending in this sector (the name should not be deceived, there were no tank units in the 3rd Panzer Army). The Vitebsk region was defended directly by its 53rd Army Corps under the command of General F. Golwitzer. Orsha was defended by the 17th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army.

The operation was carried out on two fronts. The 1st Baltic Front, under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, operated on the northern flank of the future operation. His task was to surround Vitebsk from the west and develop the offensive further southwest towards Lepel. The 3rd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel-General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, operated further south. The task of this front was, firstly, to create a southern “pincer” of the encirclement around Vitebsk, and secondly, to independently cover and take Orsha. As a result, the front was supposed to reach the area of the city of Borisov (south of Lepel, southwest of Vitebsk). For operations in depth, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a cavalry-mechanized group (mechanized corps, cavalry corps) of General N. S. Oslikovsky and the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov.

To coordinate the efforts of the two fronts, a special task force of the General Staff was created, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.

Retreat from Orsha.

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. In the course of this reconnaissance, it was possible in many places to break into the German defenses and capture the first trenches. The next day was the main blow. The main role was played by the 43rd Army, covering Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I.I. Lyudnikov, surrounding the city from the south. The 39th Army had practically no overall superiority in people in its zone, but the concentration of troops on the breakthrough section allowed to create a significant local advantage. The front was quickly broken both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, which was defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, "corps group D" was surrounded. A cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky was introduced into the gap south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly move to the south-west.

Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undeniable, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.Kh. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeitzler flew to Minsk. He got acquainted with the situation, but did not give permission to withdraw, having no authority to do so. A. Hitler initially forbade the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved the breakthrough, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city [ 13 ]. Even before that, F. Gollwitzer had withdrawn the 4th airfield division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough. This measure, however, came too late.

On June 25, in the Gnezdilovichi area (southwest of Vitebsk), the 43rd and 39th armies linked up. In the Vitebsk region (the western part of the city and the southwestern environs), the 53rd Army Corps of F. Gollwitzer and some other units were surrounded. The 197th, 206th and 246th infantry, as well as the 6th airfield division and part of the 4th airfield division, got into the "cauldron". Another part of the 4th aviation field was surrounded to the west, near Ostrovno].

3 Development offensive on the Orsha direction

In the Orsha direction, the offensive developed rather slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th Assault, was located near Orsha. She was much better equipped than the others and, in addition, had the support of almost fifty self-propelled guns. Also in this area were parts of the 14th motorized division. However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west at Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the "boiler". As a result, Orsha was liberated by the morning of June 27. The 5th Guards Tank Army was advancing southwest, towards Borisov.

The forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts began to develop success in the southwestern and western direction. By the end of June 28, they liberated Lepel and reached the Borisov area. The retreating German units were subjected to continuous and most severe air strikes. There was little opposition from the Luftwaffe. The Vitebsk-Lepel highway, according to I. Kh. Bagramyan, was literally littered with dead and broken equipment.

4. Course of hostilities and results

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. In the course of this reconnaissance, it was possible in many places to break into the German defenses and capture the first trenches. The next day was the main blow. The main role was played by the 43rd Army, which covered Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I. I. Lyudnikov, which surrounded the city from the south. The 39th Army had practically no overall superiority in men in its zone, but the concentration of troops in the breakthrough sector made it possible to create a significant local superiority. The front was quickly broken both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, which was defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, "corps group D" was surrounded. A cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky was introduced into the gap south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly move to the south-west.

Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undeniable, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.Kh. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeitzler flew to Minsk. He got acquainted with the situation, but did not give permission to withdraw, having no authority to do so. A. Hitler initially forbade the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved the breakthrough, however, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city. Even before that, F. Gollwitzer had withdrawn the 4th airfield division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 53rd Army Corps was almost completely destroyed. According to V. Haupt, two hundred people broke through from the corps to the German units, almost all of them were wounded. Parts of the 6th Army Corps and Corps Group D were also defeated. Vitebsk and Orsha were liberated. The losses of the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet applications, exceeded 40 thousand dead and 17 thousand prisoners (the 39th Army, which destroyed the main "cauldron", showed the best results). The northern flank of Army Group Center was swept away, and thus the first step was taken towards the complete encirclement of the entire group.

Conclusion

Thanks to successful actions in the Vitebsk-Orsha direction, it happened. In 6-day battles, Soviet troops destroyed a large enemy grouping, a large amount of equipment, captured many trophies and prisoners. Soviet troops showed high skill in conducting operations in a wooded and swampy area. As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, conditions were created for the development of success in Minsk and in the direction of the South Baltic. The units and formations that distinguished themselves in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation were given the honorary titles "Vitebsk" and "Orsha" by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin.

However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west at Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the "boiler". As a result, Orsha was liberated by the morning of June 27. The 5th Guards Tank Army was advancing southwest, towards Borisov.

On the morning of June 27, Vitebsk was completely cleared of the encircled German group, which had been continuously subjected to air and artillery strikes the day before. The Germans made active efforts to break out of the encirclement. During the day of June 26, 22 attempts were recorded to break through the ring from the inside [24]. One of these attempts was successful, but the narrow corridor was sealed after a few hours. A group of about 5,000 people that broke through was again surrounded around Moshno Lake.

At the same time, small boilers near Ostrovno and Beshenkovichi were destroyed. The last large group of encirclement was led by the commander of the 4th airfield division, General R. Pistorius ( English. ). This group, trying to leave through the forests to the west or southwest, on June 27 stumbled upon the 33rd anti-aircraft division marching in columns and was scattered [11]. Pistorius died in battle.

After the crushing of the front of the 3rd Panzer Army near Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front began to develop success in two directions: to the northwest, against the German grouping near Polotsk, and to the west, in the direction of Glubokoe.

Polotsk caused concern among the Soviet command, since this next "fortress" now hung over the flank of the 1st Baltic Front. I. Kh. Bagramyan immediately set about eliminating this problem: there was no pause between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. Unlike most of the battles of Operation Bagration, near Polotsk, the main enemy of the Red Army was, in addition to the remnants of the 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group North represented by the 16th Field Army under the command of General H. Hansen. From the side of the enemy only two infantry divisions were used as reserves [ 11 ] .

After the crushing of two corps of the 9th Army, K.K. Rokossovsky received new tasks. The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two directions, to the southwest, towards Minsk, and west, to Vileyka. At this stage, German mobile reserves began to arrive at the front, withdrawn mainly from the troops operating in the Ukraine. On June 26-28, the 5th Panzer Division under the command of General K. Dekker arrived northeast of Minsk, in the Borisov area. It posed a serious threat, given that over the previous few months it had hardly taken part in hostilities and was staffed almost to its full strength (including in the spring the anti-tank battalion was re-equipped with 21 Jagdpanzer IV / 48 tank destroyers, and in June a fully staffed battalion of 76 "panthers"), and upon arrival in the Borisov region was reinforced by the 505th heavy battalion (45 "tiger" tanks). The weak point of the Germans in this area was the infantry: these were either security or infantry divisions that suffered significant losses.

Vitebsk Orsha operation troops

List of used literature

1. Alekseev M. A. Encyclopedia of military intelligence. 1918−1945 M., 2012.

2. Great Soviet encyclopedia. Ch. ed.1−7 vols. — S. I. Vavilov, 8−51 vols. - B. A. Vvedensky. 2nd ed. T.8. Vibraphone - Volovo. 1951.648 pp., illustrations; 50 l. ill. and maps.

3. Beshanov VV Ten Stalin's blows. Moscow: Harvest, 2004, ISBN 985-13-1738-1, pp. 414-423

4. Vasilevsky A. The work of a lifetime. — M.: Politizdat, 1983.

5. Gareev M. A. About the unsuccessful offensive operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. // New and recent history. 1994. No. 1. (The report of the GKO commission dated 04/11/1944 and the GKO resolution dated 04/12/1944 are also published here).

6. Zhukov G. Memories and reflections. In 3 volumes. T.3. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1986.

7. Kiryukhin S. P., 43rd Army in the Vitebsk operation, M., 1961; Lyudnikov I. I., Pod Vitebsk, M., 1962.

9. Memory: Gist. - documentary chronicle of Vitsebsk: In 2 books. Book 1 / Red. cal.: Pashkov G. P. (gal. ed.) and insh. - Minsk: BelEn, 2002. - 648 p. - 5000 copies. - ISBN 985-11-0246-6 (Belarusian)

10. Protsky A. E. Heroic Belarus: Commemorative medals and badges tell. - Minsk: Polymya, 1985. - 128 p.

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During the first day of the offensive, the 6th Guards and 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front broke into the German defense north of Vitebsk and advanced 15-20 kilometers inland along the front.

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front successfully operated south of Vitebsk. By the end of the day, the 30th and 5th armies of the front managed to break through the enemy defenses by 10-15 kilometers along a 50-kilometer front.

It should be noted that the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Lyudnikov, advancing south of Vitebsk, which had practically no numerical superiority in people over the enemy, had to regroup forces in order to achieve success, concentrating the maximum possible on the direction of the main blow. Standing in the way of the advance of the army The 6th German army corps was dismembered and lost harmony in management. During the first days of the offensive, the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remnants of the corps began to retreat in small groups through forests and swamps. Successfully placed smoke screens in some sectors of the front reduced the losses of the attackers, forcing the Germans to fire at random. With an unrelenting pace, the advance of the fronts continued the next day. On this day, the garrison in Shumilino, surrounded by units of the 43rd Army, was completely destroyed. With the introduction of the main forces of the 60th Rifle Corps into battle, the pace of its offensive increased.

Ahead of schedule by a day, by the end of the day on June 24, the advanced units of the 1st Baltic Front reached the banks of the Western Dvina and began crossing it on the move, capturing five bridgeheads on the southern coast.

It was important to immediately overcome the river in order to prevent the retreating enemy from gaining a foothold. Due to severe mudslides, the rear, along with the crossing facilities, fell far behind, and the crossing had to be carried out using improvised means. The soldiers were announced that those who were the first to cross the river would be presented with the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union".

Mass heroism was shown by soldiers and officers in the performance of this task. In the area of the village of Bui, the advanced units of the 212th Rifle Corps came out to the Western Dvina. Platoon commander Vladimir Dolgov was one of the first to cross the river. On a makeshift raft in front of him, he was pushing a light machine gun. The crossing was carried out under continuous enemy fire. While still in the water, the lieutenant was wounded in the arm, but swam. With machine gun fire, driving the Germans away from the coast, he was able to ensure the crossing of his soldiers, whom he led to the attack. The enemy was pushed back. Already twice wounded, the fearless lieutenant, reflecting another counterattack, was killed. But the entire regiment was already landing on the bridgehead captured by its fighters.

Vladimir Konstantinovich Dolgov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union..

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke into the enemy defenses, and the command brought armored troops into the resulting breakthrough. The 4th Guards Tank Brigade of Guards Colonel Oleg Aleksandrovich Losik received the task of breaking through to the railway and the Moscow-Minsk highway and blocking the escape route for the Nazis from Orsha.

At dawn on June 26, the platoon of the party organizer of the guard company, Lieutenant Sergei Mitt, reached the line of the Adrov River.

The river is not wide, but deep. The success of the operation depended on how quickly the tanks had time to cross the water barrier.. The village of Rukli had a crossing, reliably guarded by artillery and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to capture and hold the bridge until the approach of the main forces of the brigade and prevent the Germans from blowing it up. The commander's tank rushed to the crossing at top speed. Behind him were the rest of the platoon's vehicles. With fire and caterpillars, Mitta's tank destroyed two anti-tank guns. ahead two kilometers from the river, tanks overtook an enemy convoy with ammunition and other military supplies. Without slowing down the movement, the tankers machine-gunned the German soldiers accompanying the cargo, defeated the convoy and made a swift rush to the main goal - the crossing. At the bridge, the tankers destroyed eight self-propelled guns of the enemy and a long-term firing point. Seeing our thirty-fours, the German miners rushed to the bridge to blow it up, but were destroyed by machine-gun fire. There were no more than two hundred meters left before the bridge, when a shell hit the commander's tank and the car caught fire. The path to the bridge was clear, but a burning car could explode on the bridge and destroy it. This could not be allowed. Not being able to bring down the flames, making way for the tanks coming from behind, Sergei Mitt abruptly turned off the road. The tank overturned into a ditch, there was a powerful explosion.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Guards, Lieutenant Sergei Mikhailovich Mitt was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The crew of Sergei Mitta was buried in the village of Smolyany, Orsha district, Vitebsk region. A memorial plaque was installed on the school building in the village of Rossky Selets, Orsha district.

The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. Meanwhile, units of the 92nd Rifle Corps broke into the northwestern outskirts of Vitebsk. The fighting on the streets of Vitebsk continued for two more days. For every street and every house had to fight, especially fiercely, the enemies defended key positions.

One of the units was ordered to prevent the explosion of the bridge across the Western Dvina. The bridge was well shot through and guarded by the enemy. The command instructed six fighters to neutralize the explosive device. At the entrance to the bridge had to grab hand-to-hand. German sappers have already managed to set fire to the fuse fuse. Senior Sergeant Blokhin broke through to the bridge and, under fire, managed to pull out the fuses and neutralized the heavy charge in time.

But that wasn't enough. It was necessary to remove the electric machine for undermining and eliminate the mechanical devices for the explosion. Performing these tasks, the senior sergeant still had time to shoot back from the enemies and destroyed seven enemy soldiers and an officer. For heroism and courage shown in the battles for the liberation of Vitebsk, the commander of a sapper platoon, senior sergeant Fyodor Timofeevich Blokhin, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the successful actions of the army of General Beloborodov, only a 10-kilometer gap remained between the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front. With a swift throw, our troops created a "bag", in which the Vitebsk group of German troops fell. The enemies tried to hold the remaining corridor, but their counterattacks were repulsed. On June 25, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts met in the Gnezdilovichi area. These were the 179th Rifle Division of the 43rd Army and the 19th Guards Rifle Division of the 39th Army. Thus, the encirclement of the Vitebsk enemy grouping, which received the name "Vitebsk boiler".

Thus, five infantry divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht were surrounded. An ultimatum was presented to the German troops surrounded in Vitebsk and given time to resolve the issue of surrender. However, no response was received. And only when the Soviet troops stormed the city, the enemy began to surrender. Among the prisoners were four Nazi generals, who were kept separately from each other. A.M. Vasilevsky recalled that the captured commander of the 53rd Army Corps, Golwitzer, for some reason was sure that his troops were still fighting, and asked to be informed about the course of the battle. What was his surprise when in response he was presented with his own former subordinates and offered to inquire himself.

It should be noted that the threat of encirclement of the Vitebsk garrison was obvious already on the first day of the offensive operation by the Soviet troops. The commander of the 3rd German Panzer Army turned to the high command with a request to begin the withdrawal of the corps from Vitebsk. However he received a positive answer only on June 25, when it was already too late, and the encirclement ring around the city has already closed. The Nazis made repeated attempts to break out of the encirclement. In desperate attempts to break out of the Vitebsk cauldron, part of the encircled group tried to break through, hiding behind civilians. Having missed the women and children, the Red Army soldiers in a fierce hand-to-hand fight stopped the breakthrough.