Inside the Presidential Administration, a “control panel” that is actually a reserve in relation to the government has been created in the person of assistants to the President and the specialized departments controlled by them. The President implemented the American model in Russia, in which the President leads the entire vertical of executive power (a kind of "Big Government");
The contradictions of individual groups within the "Big Government" are resolved by an informal body, which the experts of the Holding call Putin's "Politburo 2.0", following the principle of Brezhnev's Politburo, but without officializing this body.
In the spheres of influence of large elite clans, with the support of the President, the autonomy of individual players is ensured with a simultaneous process of fragmentation of elite groups and the emergence of new players from them;
Putin is dismantling the "Medvedev coalition" of 2006-2007, demonstrating his disposition only towards its individual members.
The authors of the report included D. Medvedev, I. Sechin, S. Ivanov, S. Sobyanin, businessmen G. Timchenko and Yu. Kovalchuk close to V. Putin, and others who represent various elite groups among the members of the Politburo. Among the "candidates for membership in the Politburo" were A. Kudrin, N. Patrushev, V. Surkov. In the political bloc of the Politburo, the authors included "figures who influence the ideological design of the government's actions, offer their own options and development scenarios": including the ideologists of the liberal course (A. Kudrin, A. Chubais, A. Voloshin), the patriarch Kirill.
In a new report, "Politburo 2.0: On the Eve of Elite Group Reset," the authors note some reshuffling of power. Vladimir Putin still acts as an influential supreme arbiter, whose word remains decisive in conflict situations, while the composition of Politburo 2.0 has been replenished - according to experts, Sergei Shoigu, appointed by the Minister of Defense, has become its full member. Its members' influence ratings have changed; as the rating descends, the alignment of actors now looks like this: Sergei Shoigu, Igor Sechin, Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Vyacheslav Volodin, Yuri Kovalchuk, Gennady Timchenko, Sergei Sobyanin, Dmitry Medvedev.
In general, Sergei Shoigu is given a lot of space in the report, his figure is seen as very serious on the political map. Analysts also classify him as one of the "image locomotives" - new figures in power, whose high rating serves to lower the ratings of the President and the Prime Minister. Perhaps we can agree with this, due to the circumstances of Shoigu's biography itself: having worked for almost 20 years as the Minister of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, identified with the savior who finds himself at the site of earthquakes, floods and other disasters, he is associated in the public mind with real and useful deeds. Various kinds of theft, in which the press accused the Ministry of Emergency Situations, were almost not associated with him. Yes, and work as the governor of the Moscow region did not last long, and Shoigu was not smeared with anything.
According to the authors of the report, Sergei Chemezov and Sergei Ivanov, as well as Dmitry Rogozin and Igor Shuvalov, who joined them (who, according to the authors of the report, achieved the resignation of Serdyukov), formed an intra-elite coalition - "with the active participation of the chairman of the board of directors of OAO Gazprom" Viktor Zubkov, who thus returned to the number of candidates for membership in the Politburo 2.0.
All this changed alignment of forces has led, the authors believe, to an increase in the influence of the President, on the one hand, and to a slowdown and decrease in the quality of decisions made, on the other. The ruling coalition managed to "keep the political protest within manageable limits" and ensure acceptable results for United Russia in the regional elections. But it is interesting what the authors of the report mean when they say that the ruling coalition managed to keep the political process within the framework: did they prevent the revolution? And what does the movement and realignment of forces within the ruling coalition have to do with their achievements?
Experts predict a number of conflicts within the ruling coalition: for control over the fuel and energy complex, around the creation of a single Investigative Committee, the fight over the restart of the Siberia and Far East Development Corporation project. They also voice the possible appointment of Moscow Mayor S. Sobyanin as Prime Minister, although they call both A. Kudrin and M. Prokhorov a possible candidate for prime minister in case the current government fails. Such a failure, of course, is possible - although the appointment of liberals does not correspond in any way with the conclusions of the authors of the report themselves about strengthening the position of the security forces, who clearly do not like such an appointment. However, perhaps the appointment of A. Kudrin and M. Prokhorov just implies V. Putin's actions to balance the power elites?
The effectiveness of the current model of political governance will be exhausted by 2014-2015. This conclusion, however, is not new, it was predicted not only by the opposition, but also by some managers, in particular, A. Chubais.
As for V. Putin's strategy, the priority tasks are the desire to protect the elite from external influence, maintain a high level of personal popularity among the population and ensure a stable geopolitical weight of Russia, simultaneously strengthening its influence in the post-Soviet space. Added to this is the task of providing a solution to the problem of 2018 - to ensure one's own nomination or to prepare a successor for oneself. Although it is not clear why V. Putin should look for successors at all, if in 2018 he can simply run for another term?
According to experts, there is a struggle inside the Politburo between two groups - supporters of "tandemocracy", who are grouped around D. Medvedev, who becomes V. Putin's automatic successor in the event of an emergency, and those who are grouped around I. Sechin: they defend the maximum maintaining Putin's sole political dominance.
This arrangement seems to be rather strained. It is unlikely that experienced members of the Politburo can count on an "extraordinary situation" (what - Putin's illness, an unexpected relinquishment of power?), grouping around D. Medvedev, who occupies the last place in the rating. On the other hand, why is I. Sechin the leader of another group, from whom the security forces are distancing themselves, according to the authors of the report themselves?
In general, the report gives the impression of being too speculative and based on trivial conclusions. Again, the most influential political figures ("members of the Politburo") are already in plain sight, and no additional evidence is required. It would be more interesting if the specific role and influence of each of these figures were outlined ...
The Russian elite will face a reset, during which Dmitry Medvedev has a chance to lose both the post of prime minister and the opportunity to again become Vladimir Putin's successor, analysts at the Minchenko Consulting holding say. According to experts who are well known for their work on the survival rating of governors, Medvedev's resource may flow to Sergei Sobyanin, Sergei Shoigu or Alexei Kudrin, and for the first time in a long time, governors have a chance to participate in the race of "successors" that has already begun. However, the ruling coalition seems to be preparing to extend Putin's powers.
A significant renewal of the upper stratum of the Russian political elite is predicted in the study “Vladimir Putin’s Big Government and the Politburo 2.0” by the Minchenko Consulting holding, which was studied by Lenta.ru. According to analysts (who, by the way, are well-established in predicting the imminent resignations of the heads of regions), the ruling elite of Russia is now a kind of analogue of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, whose main goal is to maintain an inter-clan balance in power. Putin in this political system is assigned the role of an arbiter and moderator, resolving conflict issues.
For the first time, analysts called Putin's entourage an analogue of the Soviet Politburo back in August 2012. Then it included eight people. Igor Sechin, Sergei Chemezov, Gennady Timchenko, Yuri Kovalchuk, Sergei Sobyanin, Sergei Ivanov, Vyacheslav Volodin, and Dmitry Medvedev have steadily entered Putin's inner circle over the past year. In addition to the members of the Politburo themselves, analysts also single out candidates for inclusion in Putin's inner circle.
The researchers divided the candidates into five conditional groups: the power bloc, business, the political bloc, the secretariat of the "Central Committee" and the group of regional leaders. In the August report, experts estimated the number of such candidates at 45 people. This bloc, in particular, included security ministers, major Russian businessmen (Roman Abramovich, Alisher Usmanov and others), politicians without obvious powers (Alexander Voloshin, Anatoly Chubais, Alexei Kudrin and Patriarch Kirill), as well as the most famous apparatchiks ( like, for example, Alexey Gromov) and heavyweight governors. The latest measurements made it possible to expand the block of candidates for members of the Politburo to 51 people.
Minchenko Consulting's new report "Politburo 2.0 on the eve of elite groups reboot" (the first part was published in January 2013, the second was published on February 19) tells both about the current composition of the president's inner circle and about the upcoming changes in it. These changes are not included in the strategic plans of the authorities, but will be the result of a series of tactical moves in response to internal and external challenges, experts say.
In the first part of the report, the experts outlined the changes in the ruling coalition, which they call Politburo 2.0, that have taken place since August 2012. In connection with the resignation and the threat of prosecution, the experts withdrew former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov from among the candidates for membership in Putin's Politburo. At the same time, the former head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and now the former governor of the Moscow Region, Sergei Shoigu, who replaced Serdyukov as head of the Ministry of Defense, immediately ended up in the Politburo, becoming its ninth member.
Photo: Alexei Filippov / RIA Novosti
According to experts, the governor of St. Petersburg, Georgy Poltavchenko, has lost his place in the cohort of influential regional leaders. Things are obviously not going well for Poltavchenko, he is increasingly out of tune with the St. Petersburg style of management, it is possible that he will not finish his job as governor until the end of his term, Evgeny Minchenko, president of Minchenko Consulting, explained to Lente.ru.
The places of Poltavchenko and Shoigu were taken by the presidential envoys in the Central, Far Eastern and North Caucasian federal districts - Alexander Beglov, Viktor Ishaev and Alexander Khloponin. "Heavyweight" plenipotentiaries from among the former governors and officials of the federal level are playing the role of influential regional leaders, since Russia's heavyweight governors are almost gone, Minchenko explained.
Experts included the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Mikhail Fradkov, in the "legal-power bloc" of candidates for membership in the "Politburo". This is due to the obvious increase in the importance of the SVR in the context of the aggravation of the foreign policy situation, says Minchenko. The names of the heads of the Supreme Court Vyacheslav Lebedev and the Supreme Arbitration Court Anton Ivanov appeared for the first time in the same block. The influence of the heads of the highest Russian courts is increasing due to the obvious growth in the importance of the "siloviki", Minchenko explained. The judicial vertical is the only counterweight to law enforcement agencies: “Where do certain cases break down? They break down in courts,” the expert said in an interview with Lenta.ru. In addition, Lebedev, according to Minchenko, performs an important foreign policy function for President Putin. “For example, [the former head of Yukos Mikhail] Khodorkovsky was sentenced, and he [the Supreme Court] sent it for review. The court considered and dropped the year. And, accordingly, to all the talk that our justice is somehow wrong, you can answer: "Wait, here the Supreme Court did not agree with us, sent it for revision." And so it is in many cases. So in this sense, Lebedev is very strong,” Minchenko believes.
At the same time, the head of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, is not mentioned by experts either among the members of the Politburo or among those who have a chance to enter it in the near future. Formally, Zorkin should be at the top of the Politburo, since the Constitutional Court is the main court in the country, Minchenko confirmed. However, the expert considers the level of independence of this court to be minimal: “We see that it [the Constitutional Court] is practically not active. The only place where he at least somehow showed himself was under the law "On rallies." And so, the Constitutional Court, as a rule, churns out all the decisions of the authorities.”
Finally, the experts added the head of VTB Bank Andrey Kostin to the business group of candidates for membership in the Politburo. On the one hand, Kostin's influence has increased, Minchenko noted, on the other hand, the head of VTB has one of the largest groups of influence in the State Duma. Experts made this discovery in the course of a closed study of the lobbying opportunities of federal influence groups. They do not plan to publish the results of this study, Minchenko said.
Illustration: Minchenko Consulting
The forthcoming changes in Putin's entourage will be caused by a decrease in controllability and speed of decision-making in the cumbersome system of the so-called Big Government, built by the president. The big government of Putin (in contrast to the body with the same name under Dmitry Medvedev), experts call the Russian government itself, the presidential administration and the Security Council of the Russian Federation. In addition, changes may occur due to the collapse of the “Medvedev coalition” of the 2010-2011 model. Its members are a liberal group of supporters of the incumbent prime minister and the so-called "family" group (we are talking about the family and entourage of Boris Yeltsin; according to experts, Alexander Voloshin, Anatoly Chubais, Roman Abramovich and Oleg Deripaska are related to this group), as well as part apparatus - are currently looking for ways to politically survive Medvedev as a presidential candidate in 2018, the authors of the report note. Alternative candidates for this post are also being considered - Sergei Shoigu, Alexei Kudrin or Mikhail Prokhorov.
Additional reasons for intra-elite changes will be the "erosion of the existing party-political system" and the struggle of elite groups for the post of prime minister of Russia. The prime minister is seen as an "automatic successor" in the event of a tragic accident with Putin, the authors of the study explain.
At present, the top of the Russian elite is ready to extend the presidential mandate of Vladimir Putin in 2018, the authors of the report say. However, all political players, including Putin himself, are also working on alternative political scenarios, experts say. Competing groups will fight not only for rental resources and administrative influence, the researchers predict, but will try to present their personnel potential and successful political projects to Putin. Contradictions at the federal level will inevitably be projected onto the regional level. Various nomenklatura groups will oppose each other in the elections of governors and regional legislative assemblies.
Not later than 2014-2015, the Kremlin will have to change its policy in relations with society as well. The line he chose in response to the protests of 2011-2012 will have exhausted itself by this time, analysts say. In particular, within the framework of the “conservative-value mobilization of the population”, which is currently being carried out by the Kremlin, it is impossible to constantly bring to the top of the information agenda topics that are actually on the periphery of the problem field of the population, experts say. In addition, among the dead-end tactical moves of the Kremlin, researchers name an attempt to form an “alternative middle class” from regional state employees (it will run into a budget deficit and damage the economy by reducing the motivation of workers in the real sector of the economy) and flirting with nationalist rhetoric in the absence of real steps (this the move will shake the nationalist agenda, and the nationalists will be disappointed in the authorities). Nor will “anti-Atlanticism” be effective. "Contradictions with the West have acquired a value character and are not overcome through economic bargaining," the authors of the report believe.
Among the external factors that may have an impact on the domestic situation in Russia, experts, in particular, note the likelihood of a decrease in energy prices due to the “shale revolution”, the possibility of a second wave of the economic crisis, instability in the Middle East and Central Asia, where power. In addition, the behavior of the Russian authorities will be affected by a series of elections abroad (in particular, the President of Georgia in 2013 and the President of the United States in 2016), as well as the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi and the 2018 World Cup, experts add.
Putin's strategy in the coming years is clear to experts: the president is focused on maintaining Russia's territorial integrity and maintaining his place in the club of leading world leaders. In addition, he seeks to secure a balance of power within his Politburo that will allow Putin to achieve any desired solution to the 2018 problem, including his own presidential nomination - or any successor. In addition, Putin is interested in maintaining a high level of personal popularity among the population and reducing the opportunities for external influence on the behavior of the Russian elite.
The political technologies that Putin will use to achieve these goals are also understandable. Contrary to the persistent notion of Putin's unpredictability, he regularly repeats the same "patterns", experts say. Among Putin’s usual technologies, experts single out, in particular, “early victory” (its application began even with the early resignation of Boris Yeltsin in 1999), “elite leveling” (that is, making sure that none of the groups acquires excessive influence) , "endless testing of successors" (a new race has already begun, experts say, even some governors may join it), "a forceful response to the threat from the South." At the same time, experts note that within the framework of the “pushing fellow travelers” technology, which is also traditionally used by Putin, currently at risk are “systemic liberals”, part of the “family” group that staked on Medvedev’s second term and was dissatisfied with the loss, and governors of the "Medvedev call".
Now two poles are being formed inside Putin's "Politburo": on one, supporters of tandemocracy (and not necessarily with the participation of Medvedev), on the other, adherents of Putin's rule as long as possible. The interests of the second group are expressed by Igor Sechin, experts say. Analysts advise Medvedev to stop playing "the role of an alternative political pole and a figure with a specific political identity different from Putin" - in their opinion, this reduces his chances of remaining as prime minister until 2018.
If Medvedev starts to lose, the resources he has lost within the Politburo could flow to the current mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, analysts say. Now groups of influence, not interested in such a rise of Sobyanin, are forced to rely on the leader of the Civic Platform party, Mikhail Prokhorov, whom experts call Sobyanin's "natural competitor" in Moscow. Prokhorov also fits the role of a short-term anti-crisis prime minister, called upon to carry out unpopular reforms, the speakers note.
Another pole of attraction for the "Medvedev" elites is ex-Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, experts say. Kudrin has image problems due to the manner of defiantly voicing unpopular theses (he lost his post in the government precisely because of this, having come into conflict with Medvedev), but he would be the best candidate for the role of anti-crisis prime minister in the event of the failure of the current cabinet experts believe.
The personnel rise of Sergei Shoigu in the fall of 2012 created the effect of inflated expectations in relation to him. However, experts note three important factors that work against him: he is an outsider in Putin's team, a Buddhist by roots (Orthodox and Muslims may oppose), and his image as an anti-crisis manager is vulnerable. On the other hand, Shoigu can become such a manager for power structures, whose growing independence can become dangerous for Putin. In this case, experts assign Shoigu the role of a specialized deputy prime minister. At the same time, it is noted that acting Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin will be his natural competitor in this niche.
The reset of the elites will be carried out through the reconfiguration of the government, experts believe. At the same time, Dmitry Medvedev can either keep the post of prime minister or lose it. One of the options for reforming the elites is if former ministers of the Putin government are returned to the Medvedev government with the rank of deputy prime ministers, who, after his election as head of state, changed their status to assistants to the president. However, this could create problems within Putin's Politburo: Putin's new proxies could take over some of the informal functions of current members of the ruling group.
Another option for reconfiguring the government does not involve keeping Medvedev as prime minister. In this case, Putin can choose one of six types of head of government: technocrat prime minister (candidates: Alexander Zhukov, Dmitry Kozak or Alexander Khloponin), conservative prime minister (Sergey Chemezov or Sergei Ivanov), social prime minister (Valentina Matvienko), liberal prime minister a reformer (Aleksey Kudrin or Mikhail Prokhorov), a prime minister-cleaner whose task will be to fight groups that Putin (Sergei Shoigu) will not be able to oust from the political field. Finally, Putin's chosen successor (Sergei Sobyanin or Sergei Shoigu) could be appointed as the new prime minister.
Elite renewal tools can also be direct elections of the Federation Council, constitutional reform (with a revision of the country's administrative-territorial division, government functions, strengthening the powers of parliament and the introduction of the post of vice president under Medvedev), the report says. Renewal of the elites will also be achieved through the creation of a political association within the framework of the Eurasian Union, the researchers note. However, experts consider this option the most problematic. And the most feasible is the renewal of the government and early elections to the State Duma.
Report
"Politburo 2.0" on the eve of the reboot of the elite groups
January 2013
Communication holding "Minchenko Consulting" presents a continuation of the study "The Big Government of Vladimir Putin and the Politburo 2.0". The report is of interest to regional elites, Russian business and foreign investors.
Part 1. The dynamics of elite groups within the Politburo 2.0
In the previous report, we proposed the concept of the ruling elite of Russia as a specific analogue of the Soviet collective power body - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which aims to maintain the existing inter-clan balance. In our analysis, we proceed from the fact that Russian power is a conglomeration of clans and groups that compete with each other for resources. And the role of Vladimir Putin in this system remains unchanged - this is the role of an arbiter and moderator, but an influential arbitrator, whose word in conflict situations, at least for now, remains decisive.
The formation around Vladimir Putin of the Big Government (which includes the government itself and the Presidential Administration), with duplicating functionality and a composition heterogeneous in professionalism and clan representation, led, on the one hand, to an increase in the influence of the president personally, but, on the other hand, to a slowdown in the adoption of strategic decisions and reduce their quality.
At the same time, the main object of criticism from business, political elites and from the president himself was, and the intensity of the change of ministers in the first few months of the cabinet was unprecedented.
At the same time, it should be noted that the stalling of the government's work was associated, among other things, with a number of objective reasons. Among them:
· The inconsistency of the president's election promises. In particular, it is difficult to combine the tasks of creating 25 million new high-performance jobs and a gradual increase in the wages of public sector workers up to 200% of the regional average. The delay in preparing the concept of the pension reform, criticized by the president, is connected, among other things, with the fact that there are difficulties in coordinating budget indications and the given parameters for increasing pensions;
· Working out "from the wheels" of the political strategy of the authorities in relation to the protest groups of the public. Only by the time the Address of the President to the Federal Assembly was announced, this strategy finally took shape (ignoring and marginalizing the liberal part of the protest, integrating part of the nationalist rhetoric into the official rhetoric of the authorities and increasing social benefits to attract socially motivated protesters to their side);
· Leveling the role of parliament and transferring it to the regime of the department for the approval of decisions of the executive branch.
Decisions that were made quickly and without public and expert discussion have already begun to fail at the implementation stage. For example, Minister of Justice Alexander Konovalov said he did not know how to administer the Law on Foreign Agents. The decision taken in conjunction with the budget to increase pension payments for workers in hazardous industries has sharply increased the fiscal burden on businesses and a number of budget organizations (while the explanatory note to the law noted that no additional federal budget expenditures would be required).
However The ruling coalition succeeded on the whole in solving the tactical tasks that it set for itself:
1. Keep political protest within manageable limits;
2. Ensure acceptable performance of the "party of power" in the October 2012 regional elections;
3. Reduce the potential for external influence on the Russian elite (apparently, the anti-tobacco law was put forward in the same logic, since it was the lobby of tobacco TNCs that until recently was the most influential foreign lobby in Russian authorities).
The use of the rhetoric of an external threat, law enforcement agencies and the anti-corruption campaign to solve domestic political problems has led to serious progress within the Politburo 2.0. The security forces corporation has significantly strengthened its position within the Politburo 2.0. The head of the Foreign Service returned to the list of candidates for membership in the Politburo. The new head acquired the status of a full member of the Politburo 2.0. The heads of power ministries and departments, which previously belonged to the orbits of influence of the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, continue to distance themselves from their former patrons.
The role of the judiciary has grown as one of the tools for building an intra-elite balance, which was expressed in the entry into the number of candidates for membership in the Politburo 2.0. heads of the Supreme and Supreme Arbitration.
In the same time decline in the ratings of the president and prime minister ( true, ostavnovsheysya in recent times) forms a request for the emergence of new figures in power - "image locomotives". This is also why the intra-elite shares of Sergei Shoigu, who is practically the only federal politician who has recently shown an increase in the trust rating among the population, soared sharply. Also, with varying degrees of success, the Mayor, the Speaker of the Council, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin are trying to claim the role of charismatics.
The relative success of United Russia in the regional and municipal elections in autumn 2012 was achieved in the conditions of active use of administrative resources and a relatively low turnout. Therefore, the influence of figures with their own political projects and additional instruments of political influence is growing (head of Rostekhnologii Sergey Chemezov, first deputy head of the Administration, head, presidential plenipotentiary in the Central Federal District Alexander Beglov).
The formation of an intra-elite coalition (Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Dmitry Rogozin, Igor Shuvalov), which achieved the resignation of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (naturally, who left the Politburo 2.0 as a result), took place with the active participation of Chairman of the Board of Directors Viktor Zubkov, who thus returned to the number of candidate members of the Politburo 2.0.
It is worth noting low influence of the governor's corps on the political agenda. In the regional bloc, only two of the current heads of regions, the head of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov and. The position of the Governor of St., who is turning into a "lame duck" in front of his eyes, has worsened. In the same time Today, three plenipotentiaries of the President can claim the role of regional heavyweights in the federal districts - Alexander Khloponin, Viktor Ishaev and Alexander Beglov. Two of them are former governors, who also have the status of members of the Government (as vice-premiers and ministers, respectively). As for Beglov, he skillfully uses the apparatus influence that has been preserved from the time of his work as the chief personnel officer of the Kremlin.
Yury Trutnev became a new candidate for Politburo 2.0 membership in the technical bloc, who very quickly found himself a new niche in the State Council as a moderator of regional disagreements.
The legislative fever of the fall session of 2012 forced us to reconsider the functional roles of some of the candidates in Politburo 2.0. Thus, the leaders of both chambers of parliament were moved to the "new Secretariat of the Central Committee", while the deputy heads of the Administration and Dmitry Peskov showed themselves not as performers, but rather as ideologists, therefore they were moved to the Political bloc of candidates for members of the Politburo 2.0. The most important function of the representatives of this bloc is to work out alternative ways of governing, including ideological ones, without changing the foundations of the existing political system.
There was one change in the number of candidates for Politburo 2.0 from business. Andrey Kostin was included in the list to ensure the presence of representatives of all four systemically important banks: Sberbank, VEB, VTB and Rosselkhozbank. It is worth noting that VEB Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev is not included in the list of candidates, since the activities of this bank are supervised personally by Vladimir Putin through First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. Rosselkhozbank is headed by Dmitry Patrushev - the son of a candidate member of the Politburo 2.0 from the legal-power bloc N. Patrushev.
Otherwise, the business block of the Politburo 2.0 demonstrates stability. Significant redistribution of property is not planned, the place of criminal showdowns was taken by high London courts dealing with offshore assets. Moreover, the settlement of the conflict around Norilsk Nickel showed that it is possible to reach a compromise not only in the course of a foreign lawsuit. After the departure of Vladimir Strzhalkovsky as head of the company, a strategic bloc of three big businessmen from the 1990s emerges: Vladimir Potanin, Oleg Deripaska and Roman Abramovich. It is also important that a large-scale privatization program has fallen out of the top priority, and the political rhetoric of returning assets withdrawn from Russia remains rhetoric. The state is only increasing its assets, as happened in the deal to buy TNK-BP. As a result of the deal with Rosneft, Alfa Group and Viktor Vekselberg received impressive free funds, which creates additional room for them to maneuver.
Assessing the resource potential of full members of the Politburo 2.0 (see Table 4), it is important to note the following:
Prime Minister and nominal leader of United Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, retaining the first place in terms of resources, after the departure of Anatoly Serdyukov lost some influence on the security forces, and as a result of a vague image positioning, he worsened his rating indicators;
On the rise is the tandem of the head of the Administration and the head of Russian Technologies, Sergei Chemezov, who has increased his influence on the administrative apparatus and law enforcement agencies;
Engaged in political management, as a result of success in the October elections and the gradual fading of protest activity, he also strengthened his position;
A newcomer to the Politburo 2.0, Sergei Shoigu, is showing an impressive rise in ratings both among the population and among elite groups, especially regional ones. However, with the current image, the growth of his rating has a ceiling ( see details in part 2 of the report). According to some military experts, he has already made a number of mistakes as head of the Ministry of Defense ("stepping on the same rake as Serdyukov"). In addition, the administrative influence of Shoigu in his previous fiefdoms (the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Moscow Region) is limited by the rather high independence of successors. In particular, personnel policy and. O. Andrey Vorobyov, Governor of the Moscow Region, says that today he is in the orbit of influence of Gennady Timchenko;
The tandem of businessmen Gennady Timchenko and Yuri Kovalchuk maintains a stable position in Vladimir Putin's entourage. However, the situational reconciliation between Timchenko and Igor Sechin is unlikely to last long, given the systemic nature of the companies they lead;
The mayor, despite a number of unpopular decisions made by him, continues to be among the candidates for successors and prime ministers. However, the growth of his influence is limited by the unsuccessful start of his team members Viktor Basargin and Yevgeny Kuyvashev as governors in Perm Krai and Sverdlovsk Oblast;
The situational decrease in the influence of the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, is associated with a change in his status, which entails a decrease in administrative and power resources, as well as with a large number of conflicts within the industry in which he is involved.
Over the coming year the conflicts already mentioned in the previous report will remain on the agenda of intra-elite struggle:
Apparatus competition for control over the fuel and energy complex between the secretary of the relevant presidential commission I. Sechin and the relevant deputy prime minister A. Dvorkovich (and the coalition of nomenklatura and business groups that joined him);
Competition around the "big privatization" program;
The tension between the leadership of Moscow and the Moscow Region and the correction of the contours of the “Greater Moscow” project, which will be aggravated by the elections of the Governor of the Moscow Region in the fall of 2013 and the Moscow City Duma in the fall of 2014. Deterioration of his relations with Dmitry Medvedev, caused by rumors about a possible transition of the mayor of Moscow to chair of the Prime Minister;
The struggle of the security forces around the creation of a single Investigative Committee. Since the result for competing groups is not obvious, and the influence of almost all law enforcement agencies has recently grown, there are fewer enthusiasts for this idea. In a number of recent high-profile cases, the FSB used its own investigation, without resorting to the support of the TFR;
The struggle around the restart of the project "Corporation for the Development of Siberia and the Far East."
high the likelihood of a new attack on the management of Gazprom in order to reorganize the company. have recently weakened due to the shale revolution threatening the positions of the “national treasure” and the partial loss of markets for Russian gas. Therefore, the idea of restructuring Gazprom, which is now being actively promoted by the head of Sberbank German Gref, can be revived (for example, in the format of separating the transport component and creating 5-6 mining companies that can be distributed among the main elite groups).
The actualization of objective contradictions between the Ministry of Defense and manufacturers of military products is also inevitable. Their sharpness will largely depend on political alignments and coalitions.
In addition, the new hardware voltage points should be noted:
Between ministers and ex-ministers who have moved to the posts of assistants to the president (most noticeable in the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education and Science);
Between the Government apparatus and presidential aide Elvira Nabiullina.
An attempt to remove these conflicts within the framework of the Big Government is the practice of regular reports of ministers to the president on the progress in the implementation of his decrees. During the year, a reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers is not ruled out, during which a number of former Putin ministers may return to the government as deputy prime ministers.
Evgeny Minchenko , President of the communication holding "Minchenko consulting",
starring Kirill Petrov, head of the analytical department of Minchenko consulting .
http://*****/analitika/analitika_27.html
More details in part 2 of the report.
Minchenko Consulting report: "Politburo 2.0" on the eve of the reboot of elite groups. Part 2
Communication holding "Minchenko Consulting" presents a continuation of the study "Vladimir Putin's Big Government and Politburo 2.0"
Responding to the internal and external challenges facing the regime, Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in Politburo 2.0 will reset the elite, changing both its personal composition and the mechanisms for recruiting new members. Moreover, one of the intra-elite risks that will push for this is the struggle for the place of the prime minister as an “automatic successor” in the event of any tragic accident with Putin. This is how the leaders of the Minchenko Consulting expert holding, President Yevgeny Minchenko and head of the analytical department Kirill Petrov, think about the progress in Putin's inner circle.
Other options for Putin's departure are not considered in principle, experts emphasize: the top of the elite is determined that his powers will be extended after 2018. However, all political players, including the president, are creating additional footholds for themselves, the document says.
Among the alternative figures of Medvedev's successor, the authors name former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin (he has the best chances if the current government fails), Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and leader of the Civic Platform party Mikhail Prokhorov. At the same time, the so-called "Medvedev coalition" of the 2010-2011 model, including the "liberals", is in the process of disintegration and is looking for ways to politically survive Prime Minister Medvedev as a presidential candidate in 2018, analysts believe.
The current model of governance, including the line chosen by the Kremlin as a tactical response to the protests of 2011-2012, will inevitably run into obstacles. Its effectiveness will be exhausted no later than 2014-2015, which will require a transition to a new policy, the speakers predict.
Enumerating many macroeconomic and foreign policy factors and risks, Minchenko and Petrov single out the main "trends" on which they believe Putin's political strategy will be based. First of all, this is the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia, which the president perceives as nothing less than his personal mission, experts say.
Putin also seeks to ensure in his “politburo” such a balance of power, in which any solution to the 2018 problem that is beneficial to him, including both his own nomination and the nomination of a successor, would not meet with objections and counterbalance. Added to this is the desire to protect the elite from external influence, maintain a high level of personal popularity among the population, and ensure Russia's stable geopolitical weight, simultaneously strengthening its influence in the post-Soviet space.
Minchenko Consulting is convinced that no fundamentally new technologies and methods should be expected from Putin: despite the stable reputation of an unpredictable politician, he will solve the tasks set in “proven” ways, which he has repeatedly resorted to throughout his time in power. One of these technologies is “early victory”, which is based on the principle of no alternative. It has consistently brought Putin the desired result since 1999, when his subsequent election as president became practically unopposed after his appointment as prime minister under Yeltsin and the latter's voluntary resignation.
Another proven way to achieve your goals is to “align the elites.” Putin is careful to ensure that no group gains undue influence and, if necessary, weakens those that threaten to “pull ahead.” Moreover, he does it in such a way that the leaders of such groups do not lose loyalty and remain among the trusted persons. So at one time the group of Igor Sechin was weakened, although Sechin himself retained his positions. And now there is a process of weakening the Medvedev group, which began with the resignation of his "creature" Anatoly Serdyukov. Putin will stop this process when he considers that the elites are "balanced", share their analytics.
Speakers highlight such an important technique as “endless testing of successors”. Experts lead to the idea that Putin gave Medvedev, roughly speaking, "to play the president." But by the end of Medvedev's only term in office, it became clear that he had not become a real successor. In their opinion, a new race of successors has actually begun, in which all new participants will enter in the coming years. According to Minchenko and Petrov, in particular, governors who have successfully passed through the elections can compete for this role.
However, for now, Medvedev remains the second person in the state and Putin's automatic successor in an emergency situation, around whom players are grouped who seek to preserve elements of tandemocracy. They are opposed by a coalition advocating the final dismantling of the tandem and the maximum preservation of Putin's sole political dominance. Experts call Sechin the “leader” of this second group. In their opinion, it is between these two poles that the main confrontation takes place within Politburo 2.0.
It is noteworthy that in Medvedev's desire to show himself as an independent political figure, an alternative to Putin, experts see the weakness of his position. They give this advice: “The sooner Medvedev realizes that the optimal political strategy for him is the role of a “technical prime minister”, demonstrating maximum loyalty to his patron and lack of ambition, the higher his chances are to remain in his current post until 2018.”
Experts have shown when and what political steps Putin can take before 2018. Thus, the reorganization of the government (with or without Medvedev's resignation) can take place, in their opinion, from 2013 to 2015, although the likelihood of the prime minister's resignation will remain from 2014 to 2018. The fate of the next presidential election, in accordance with the aforementioned "early victory" methodology, will be decided in advance - in 2016-2017, analysts say.
The combination of internal and external factors will force Vladimir to change the personal composition of the political elite and the mechanisms for recruiting new members of the ruling coalition, this conclusion follows from the second part of the report “Politburo 2.0. On the Eve of the Elite Groups Reboot,” published on February 19.
The authors of the report, experts from the communications holding Minchenko Consulting, view the ruling Russian elite as an analogue of the Politburo, whose goal is to maintain the existing inter-clan balance.
In the first part of the report, which describes the political situation in Russia in the period from August 2012 to January 2013, the authors stated the stability of the top layer of the Russian elite. , by the beginning of 2013, the coalition of security forces had strengthened its position within the Russian political elite thanks to the appearance in the "Putin Politburo" .
Politburo 2.0 also includes Chairman of the Board of Directors Igor Sechin, CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (until December 2012 -), head of the presidential administration Sergey Ivanov, first deputy head of the presidential administration, close to Vladimir Putin - chairman of the board of directors and entrepreneur , as well as Moscow Mayor and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.
However, the period of stability in the elites will be replaced by a new stage in the near future.
Intra-elite risks
As stated in the second part of the report, changes in the Russian political system will be caused by the risks that have developed within the elite: a decrease in manageability within the cumbersome Big Government system (the government, the presidential administration and the Security Council);
the collapse of the "Medvedev coalition" of the 2010-2011 model; erosion of the existing party-political system; the struggle of elite groups for the place of the prime minister as an automatic successor in the event of any tragic accident with Vladimir Putin.
Federal intra-elite showdowns will lead to confrontation between regional elites. The competition between them will be exacerbated by the dissatisfaction of most of the regional elites with the budgetary policy of the center, the low level of electoral support for a significant part of the governors, and the lack of clear rules of the game on the part of the center regarding political reform and gubernatorial elections.
Putin will solve the tasks before him by the usual methods, experts say. They suggest that the fate of the presidential elections in 2018 will be decided in advance - in 2016-2017, following the example of the September castling with Medvedev in 2011 (when Medvedev proposed Putin's candidacy for the presidency of Russia).
When choosing a successor, the president will be guided by the example of the 2006-2007 succession race (between the then first deputy prime ministers and), encouraging competition between them.
Experts believe that Dmitry Medvedev and his deputy have entered the succession race so far.
In addition, governors may join the fight - for example, the one who will replace the governor of St. Petersburg. “If the processes of unification of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region are launched, as well as the merger of oil and gas matryoshkas and the south of the Tyumen region into a single entity, the heads of these regions, due to their economic importance and constant communication with key elite players, will also automatically be shortlisted” , the report says.
Putin will continue to monitor the balance of power of groups within the elite and gradually change fellow travelers to those who owe him their rise. According to the authors of the report, a new personnel source is people from the regions who owe their rise to Putin personally (in particular, Moscow mayor and ex-head Sergei Sobyanin and presidential aide, ex-Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology).
Reboot Options
Inside Politburo 2.0, two poles are now being formed: some want to preserve elements of tandemocracy, others, led by Vladimir Putin, for the longest possible time maintaining sole political dominance and dismantling the consequences of the existence of a tandem.
“The sooner Medvedev understands that the optimal political strategy for him is the role of a technical prime minister who demonstrates maximum loyalty to his patron and lack of ambition, the higher his chances of remaining in his current post until 2018,” the report says.
In the event that Medvedev leaves the political arena, the centers of elite attraction will be the mayor of the capital, who has stable positions in the regional elites, and ex-Finance Minister Alexei. As the authors of the report recall, Kudrin "still has a trump card in the form of the 'cotton in the kitchen' factor." Experts hint at Putin's political debt to Kudrin, who, in 1996, being deputy head of the administration of President Yeltsin, invited Putin to Moscow after the defeat of the team in the gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg.
According to experts, Kudrin is the best candidate for prime minister in a situation where it will be necessary to implement an anti-crisis policy in the event of the failure of the current government.%
The intra-elite breakthrough of Sergei Shoigu in the fall of 2012, when he headed, gave rise to rumors about his possible succession. However, the authors believe that Shoigu, historically connected with the family, never became one of Putin's inner circle. In addition, it is noted that he is a Buddhist by roots, therefore, as a presidential candidate, he can cause opposition from the Orthodox and Muslim lobbies.
In the first case, we are talking about the transition of former ministers, and now assistants to the president, back to the government, but already in the rank of deputy prime ministers. This may be preceded by the strengthening of the Security Council, an alternative center of power to the government. In the second scenario, the existing parliamentary parties may not get into the next Duma or enter it with a worse result, which will be the rationale for Medvedev's resignation from the post of prime minister as the leader who did not hold the majority. The speakers do not rule out that Putin can even afford to lose the parliamentary elections in order to relieve tension in society.
Experts also do not rule out a constitutional reform, within the framework of which the administrative-territorial division of the country can be revised, the posts of the prime minister and the president are combined, the powers of the parliament are strengthened, and the post of vice president is introduced specifically for Medvedev. The driver of these transformations, which are possible in 2015-2016, could be the Chairman of the State Duma, the authors believe.
Another option for rebooting the elites, according to the report, is to hold direct elections as a tool for recruiting new figures from the regions into the elite.
The most problematic, but still possible move is “the creation of a political association within the framework of elections to the parliamentary assembly and the head of the association. In this case, managers from Belarus and Kazakhstan will become a personnel reservoir for the new elites.”
According to political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin from Kudrin's Civil Initiatives Committee, Rogozin has more chances to become Putin's successor than Medvedev.
“Medvedev can no longer become a successor, because Putin has ceased to be the representative of the strategy of containment between the conditional security forces and conditional liberals. Since the beginning of his third term, he has clearly been a security official. Medvedev is no longer a player. Now Medvedev is acting as a punching bag, problems in the economy are falling on him, - Oreshkin told Gazeta.Ru. “If the Western liberals are not slowed down now, as the economy further deteriorates, their influence in public opinion will increase, so the security forces are on the attack, it is necessary to destroy the appearance of competition.”
In his opinion, Rogozin is suitable for the role of a successor in all respects - "he is a patriot, a Chekist." However, Oreshkin reminds, according to the usual rule of Putin's personnel policy, those who are talked about a lot do not become real players. The question of Putin's successor will be relevant only if people from his entourage see that he is ill, primarily mentally, the political scientist believes.
Assessing the possibility of appointing Kudrin as prime minister, Oreshkin admits that the ex-minister of finance is an ideal candidate: "he knows Putin, inspires confidence in him, is loyal, a professional."
“But for those who are now exerting maximum pressure on Putin, Kudrin is even worse than Medvedev, Kudrin is a player, it is dangerous to let him out on the political field as a strong competitor,” the expert believes.
The political scientist proposes not to hurry with the conclusion of the authors of the report about the beginning of the race for successors. “This is not about a race, but about careful eyeing, anyone who makes a false start will lose,” he explained to Gazeta.Ru. “The question of whether Putin will run for a fourth term or not is unlikely to be decided before the parliamentary elections, everyone will be careful, because the option of a fourth term is quite likely,” the expert continues.
According to Makarkin, Putin will not go to early elections to the State Duma, since the current one generally suits him.
Pavel Baev, a research professor at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, told Gazeta.Ru that the split and vacillations in the Russian political elite are due to the fact that almost all elite groups are dissatisfied with Putin. In his opinion, the fragmentation in the elite is much higher than between the two camps - the security forces and the liberals. So, the expert believes, it is wrong to attribute Sechin to the security forces: “He does not get into power politics, since he has gone headlong into the oil industry, energy, there he has conflicts, on the one hand, with (chairman of the board. - "Gazeta.Ru"), and on the other hand, with the assistant to the president, they have their own split lines.
