BELARUSIAN FRONT 3rd(ZBF), operational strategist. association of owls troops in the Great Fatherland, the war in the west. direction in 1944-1945. Created on April 24. 1944 as a result of the division of Zap. front on the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. Initially, the ZBF included the 5th, 31st, 39th combined arms and 1st air. army.
Lastly, the front included: 2nd and 11th guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th combined arms, 5th guards. tank, and 3rd air. army. In May 1944, the troops of the front were engaged in combat operations of local significance in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions.
June - Aug. participated in the Belorussian operation, during which, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Balt, front, from June 23 to 28, they carried out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation of 1944. As a result of this operation, the troops of the rights, the wing of the front, together with the 1st Baltic, concentric front. punches broke through prepared. defense avenue southeast. Vitebsk, crossed the river. Luchesa, surrounded up to 5 infantry. divisions and liquidated them within 5 days.
The rest of the neighborhood the groups capitulated on June 27, 1944. At the same time, the troops of the left wing of the front broke through the defenses of the avenue in the Orsha direction. The advancing formations of the front advanced 140 km in 6 days, reached the river. Berezina, freeing Mr.
Vitebsk, Orsha, Bogugaevsk, Tolochin, and other settlements, points in the north-east. Belarus.
From June 29 to July 4, ZBF troops took part in the Minsk operation of 1944. Together with the 1st and 2nd BFs, they completed the encirclement of more than 100,000 soldiers. armies pr-ka east. Minsk, liberated
Minsk, Borisov, Molodechno, advancing 150-170 km in 6 days of the offensive. On July 5-20, the troops of the front carried out the Vilnius operation of 1944, advancing up to 210 km, liberated the cities. Vilnius and Lida, went to the river. Neman and crossed it on the front of 70 km, capturing bridgeheads in the west. shore.
From 28 July to 20 Aug. ZBF carried out the Kaunas operation of 1944, fought 50-135 km and liberated the city of Kaunas.
Later, the ZBF, with the help of one army and aviation, participated in the Memel operation of 1944 of the 1st Baltic Front, and then independently carried out the Gumbinnen offensive. operation (16-27. 10. 1944). As a result, the troops of the front went to the state. border of the USSR, occupied part of the East. Prussia and sowing. -east.
Poland, incl. Stallupenen (Nesterov), Goldap, Su-rolls.
In Jan. - Apr. ZBF troops participated in the East Prussian operation of 1945, during which from 13 to 27 January. carried out the Insterburg-Königsberg operation of 1945, where, in close cooperation with the 2nd Belorus Front, they broke through a deep echelon. defense, advanced 70 - 130 km and blocked the east. -Prus, a grouping, having reached the approaches to Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad). From March 13 to March 29, 1945, the troops of the front liquidated the east. -Prus, grouping pr-ka southwest. Koenigsberg and went to the hall.
Frisch-Gaff on the entire front of the offensive. In the Königsberg operation of 1945, the troops of the front on April 6-9. captured the fortress and the city of Koenigsberg, capturing the enemy garrison number. 91 800 people 25 air. front troops completed the liquidation of the entire Zemland German grouping. -fash. troops, cleared the Zemland Peninsula from the pr-ka and captured the port and the city of Pillau (Baltiysk) (see the Zemlapd operation of 1945). Aug 15 1945 ZBF was disbanded, part of the troops was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and the rest was used to form the Special and Baranovichi military. districts. The leadership of the ZBF: teams. - gen. Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944 - February 1945), Marshal of Sov. Union A. M. Vasilevsky (February - April 1945), gene. Army I. X.
Bagramyan (April - Aug. 1945); member Military Council - Gen. -l. V. E. Makarov (April 1944 - Aug. 1945); Chief of Staff - Gen. -nolk. A. P. Pokrovsky (April 1944-Aug. 1945).
Literature:
Pokrovsky A.P. On the 3rd Belorussian Front. - “Military. -ist. magazine ", 1964, No. 6.
See also lit. at Art. Belorussian Front 2nd.
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3rd Belorussian Front
To accomplish the assigned task, the 3rd Belorussian Front received a large number of combined arms, tank, artillery formations and other special units.
In addition to the two armies already mentioned (11th Guards, 5th Tank) and three corps (3rd Guards Stalingrad Mechanized, 3rd Guards Cavalry, 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank), the front received more than fifteen artillery pieces along the line of artillery reinforcement alone. brigades and several separate artillery battalions of special and high power.
The total number of tanks and self-propelled guns in tank and mechanized formations that had newly arrived at the front was about 1,500.
Concentration of troops and operational camouflage
In the period from June 3 to June 21, the front was supposed to receive (except for the 11th Guards Army, which followed the campaign) from 350 to 380 operational echelons arriving in the Smolensk, Krasnoe unloading area.
At the unloading station, officers of the operational department of the front headquarters with vehicles were allocated. In addition, special groups were created to regulate traffic on the roads from unloading stations to concentration areas. The unloaded troops were immediately sent to the areas of concentration designated for them, on the instructions of the representative of the front headquarters. The concentration areas were chosen in the forests, at such a distance from the front line that the newly arrived units could not be detected by enemy ground reconnaissance.
The 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, which began arriving on May 25, completed its concentration on June 2 in the area of the Gusino and Katyn stations.
The 5th Guards Tank Army, the first echelons of which began to arrive in mid-June, concentrated by June 23:
29th Panzer Corps and an area 25 km southeast of Rudnya; 3rd Panzer Corps - in the area 25 km northeast of Krasnoe.
The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters until June 11, was concentrated in the Arkhipovka, Krasnaya Gorka, Bliznaki area. The total distance of the areas of concentration of mobile units from the forward edge reached 50–60 km.
The corps of the 11th Guards Army, having made a 250-kilometer march from the Nevel region, by June 10 concentrated in the forests southwest of Lyubavichi: the 16th Guards Rifle Corps (1st, 11th and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions) in Gorbovo, Ozery, Dubrovka (12–20 km south of Dobromysl), 8th Guards Rifle Corps (5th, 18th and 26th Guards Rifle Divisions) - in the area of Kota, Skumaty, south of Kryuki (6–12 km south and southwest of Lyubavichi), the 36th Guards Rifle Corps (16th, 83rd and 84th Guards Rifle Divisions) - in the Marchenka, Nov. Zemlya, Markovo (10–12 km south of Lyubavichi). The total distance of the formations of the 11th Guards Army from the front line was 10–20 km.
Particular attention was paid to the disguise of the unloading of troops and their concentration. Road traffic was allowed only at night. The camouflage of the troop concentration areas was checked by headquarters officers from the air by overflights at least three times a day.
It was also forbidden to conduct any kind of correspondence related to the impending offensive and the concentration of new troops. Newly arriving units were forbidden to conduct ground reconnaissance until a special order from the front headquarters. Reconnaissance was allowed in small groups, no more than three people. New aviation units could carry out training flights at a distance of no closer than 25 km from the front line.
Simultaneously with measures to conceal and camouflage the impending offensive, measures were widely carried out aimed at disorienting the enemy, creating in him the idea of the transition of our troops to a long-term defense (trenches were torn off, minefields were simulated, false troop movements were made, etc.).
Strict control was established over the implementation of all camouflage measures, for which special officers were assigned to the headquarters.
The measures taken have proved to be quite effective. From the testimonies of prisoners captured before the start of our offensive, and during the operation, it was established that although the German command expected active actions from our troops, they did not know the time of the start of the offensive, the concentration and grouping of our troops. The enemy, in general correctly assessing the Orsha direction as the main one, did not, however, assume that a rather powerful grouping was also concentrated on the Bogushev direction from our side. The German units defending in this direction did not have significant means of reinforcement and reserves, and the defensive lines turned out to be the least developed here.
Combat training of troops
A large role in the preparation of the operation was assigned to the combat training of the troops. For this purpose, the divisions intended to break through the enemy defenses were withdrawn in advance to the second echelon. Here, on specially equipped camps and training grounds that reproduced the defense of the Germans, they were trained with the involvement of those reinforcements that they actually had to use in the offensive.
Particular attention was paid to the development of infantry offensive techniques in terms of overcoming enemy trench defenses and to the clarity of interaction between infantry and tanks and artillery. The main requirement for the infantry was the rapid, non-stop forward movement during the attack. The infantry had to master the technique of moving through the enemy trenches so that, without stopping in them, on the very first day of the offensive, they would penetrate to a depth of 12–14 km, i.e., completely overcome the tactical zone of the enemy defense.
The regrouping of troops and the occupation of the starting position
The entry of formations of the 11th Guards Army into the first operational echelon of the front began four days before the start of the offensive. Within two days, the 11th Guards Army changed the left-flank units of the 152nd fortified area and two right-flank divisions (192nd and 88th rifle divisions) of the 31st Army in the Protasovo, Central Settlement, Putai, Kiriev sector and, together with the transferred her 152nd fortified area occupied the strip between Vinokorno 1st and Kiriev, 35 km long. The change was carried out by small units (numbering from a company to two battalions) from each division, intended for operations in the first echelon of the army. In the last two nights before the offensive (on the night of June 22 and 23), the army formations were withdrawn to their original position, occupying the sectors previously taken by the detached subunits.
The commander of the 11th Guards Army concentrated the main grouping for the attack along the Moscow-Minsk highway on the left flank of the army in the zone between Zapolye and Kiriyeva at a front of 8 km. It included the 8th and 30th Guards Rifle Corps, consisting of five divisions with the 120th Tank Brigade and most of all reinforcements. The 16th Guards Rifle Corps with the 152nd fortified area occupied a 27 km strip from Vinokorno 1st to the Central Village.
The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, intended to enter the gap in the zone of the 11th Guards Army, by night transitions brigade by morning of June 22, concentrated on waiting positions behind the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps at a distance from the front edge of the 12th 18 km.
As a result of the entry of the 11th Guards Army into the first line and the establishment of its southern demarcation line almost along the Krasnoe - Orsha railway, the front of the 31st Army was halved (from 65 to 30 km).
This allowed the commander of the 31st Army to create on the right flank of the army (in the strip between Kiriev and Bobrov) in a 7 km section, a strike force consisting of five rifle divisions (71st and 36th rifle corps) and the 213th tank brigade. According to the decision of the army commander, the task of this grouping was to strike in the general direction of Dubrovno.
On the Vitebsk direction, on the front of the 39th Army, forces were regrouped to the left flank. Here, on the Makarovo-Yazykovo sector, five divisions were concentrated on a 6 km front with the 28th Tank Brigade and other reinforcements. The overhanging position of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps over the right flank of the German Vitebsk grouping created favorable conditions for enveloping and encircling the enemy in cooperation with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front with a strike in a northwestern direction.
As a result of the establishment of a new dividing line between the 39th and 5th armies, the front of the latter was reduced from 35 to 22 km.
In addition, in order to compact the battle formations of the first echelon and increase their strike force, the commander of the 5th Army introduced the 65th Rifle Corps, which was in the second echelon of the army, between the 72nd and 45th rifle corps, which occupied a strip of 5 km. As a result of the regrouping, the army commander created on the right flank of the army (in the zone between Yazykovo and Yulkovo) on a front of 12 km a strike force consisting of six rifle divisions (72nd and 65th rifle corps) with two tank brigades (153rd and 2nd Guards) and most of the means of reinforcement.
The task of this grouping was to strike in the general direction of Bogushevsk and ensure the entry of a cavalry-mechanized group into the gap from the line of the Luchesa River, which by June 22 was concentrated in the Liozno area (15–20 km from the front line).
As a result of the large reinforcement received by combined arms formations and equipment, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a general superiority over the enemy: in manpower - two and a half times, in military equipment - three to six times. The general balance of forces in the 130-km front's zone of action is shown in Table 5.
Table 5
| Enemy | Forces and means | Our troops | Ratio | ||
| Total | 1 km front | 1 km front | Total | ||
| 13 | One division per 10 km | divisions | One division per 4 km | 33 | 2,5:1 |
| 157 300 | 1200 | Combat people | 3085 | 401 089 | 2,5:1 |
| 8793 | 67,6 | machine guns | 103,3 | 13 430 | 1,5:1 |
| 997 | 7,6 | mortars | 28,8 | 3746 | 3,8:1 |
| 764 | 5,8 | PTO and PA guns | 13,6 | 1770 | 2,3:1 |
| 675 | 5,2 | Field guns 76 mm and above | 20,5 | 2670 | 4:1 |
| 116 | 0,8 | RS and rocket launchers | 5,3 | 689 | 6:1 |
| 472 | 3,6 | Tanks and self-propelled guns | 14 | 1867 | 4:1 |
| 328 | 2,5 | Aircraft | 15,3 | 1991 | 6:1 |
As a result of the regroupings carried out in the directions of the main attacks (in the breakthrough zones), a decisive superiority in forces and means over the enemy was achieved. The balance of forces of the parties in the Bogushev and Orsha directions is shown in Table 6.
Table 6
| Enemy | Forces and means | Our troops | Ratio | ||
| Total | 1 km front | 1 km front | Total | ||
| On the Bogushevsky direction in the offensive zone of the 5th Army (breakthrough section 12 km) | |||||
| One division and three separate battalions | One division per 16 km | divisions | One division per 2 km | 6 | - |
| 13 583 | 1132 | Combat people | 3491 | 41 895 | 3:1 |
| 707 | 59 | machine guns | 139 | 1667 | 2,3:1 |
| 98 | 8,2 | mortars | 42,6 | 511 | 5,2:1 |
| 84 | 7 | PTO and PA guns | 17 | 207 | 2,5:1 |
| 90 | 7,5 | Field guns 76 mm and more | 55 | 662 | 7,4:1 |
| 36 | 3 | RS and rocket launchers | 16 | 194 | 5,4:1 |
| 45 | 3,7 | Tanks and self-propelled guns | 21 | 251* | 5,6:1 |
| On the Orsha direction in the offensive zone of the 11th Guards 1st Army (breakthrough section 15 km) | |||||
| Two divisions, a regiment and two independent battalions | One division per 10 km | divisions | One division per 1.4 km | 11 | - |
| 28 320 | 1888 | Combat people | 7915 | 118 729 | 4,2:1 |
| 1800 | 120 | machine guns | 274 | 4107 | 2,3:1 |
| 218 | 14,5 | mortars | 77,4 | 1161 | 5,3:1 |
| 131 | 12 | PTO and PA guns | 32 | 482 | 2,7:1 |
| 220 | 14,6 | Field guns 76 mm and more | 80 | 1193 | 5,4:1 |
| 54 | 3,6 | RS and rocket launchers | 24 | 360 | 6,6:1 |
| 70 | 4,7 | Tanks and self-propelled guns | 24,7 | 371* | 5,3:1 |
* Tanks and self-propelled guns of the breakthrough development echelon are not taken into account.
Operational formation of troops
All combined-arms armies advanced in the first operational echelon of the front. The second echelon consisted of mobile formations intended for the development of a breakthrough achieved by combined arms formations.
The rifle corps in the armies were built in one line. At the same time, the first echelons of the corps attacked: in the 39th Army - five divisions, in the 5th Army - also five divisions, in the 11th Guards Army - four divisions and a fortified area, in the 31st Army - six divisions. In the second echelons, there were respectively: two, three, four and one division, and only ten divisions. In addition, the commander of the 5th Army had two divisions in his reserve, the commanders of the 11th Guards and 31st armies had one division each.
The battle order of most rifle divisions was built in one echelon - all regiments in a line. The breakthrough areas allocated for each division in the strike direction did not exceed 1.5–2 km.
Such a formation made it possible to deliver a powerful and simultaneous blow to the enemy defenses by the forces of the first echelon, and the presence of strong second echelons and reserves made it possible to quickly develop a breakthrough.
Preparing controls
Anticipating that a large number of mobile formations assigned to the front would make high demands on command and control during the operation, the front command took measures in advance to ensure stable communication with the troops.
15 officers from the reserve were seconded to the operational department of the front headquarters as communications officers. A sufficient number of Po-2 aircraft and vehicles were allocated for the work of this group.
Responsible representatives with a group of officers were sent to all mobile formations (two or three officers from the operational department, an intelligence officer, a tank officer and a cipher officer). Each group was given a radio station that maintained direct communication with the front headquarters. As experience has shown, these radio stations were the main channel through which communication was maintained between the front headquarters and mobile formations during the operation.
The headquarters of the front and the headquarters of the armies prepared for rapid redeployment and deployment, for which mobile communication centers were equipped, consisting of several vehicles, on which central telephone exchanges, hardware ST-35, Bodo, etc. were mounted. For flexibility in command and control of troops and approximation leadership to the armies under the commander of the front, an operational group was created (the first echelon of the field control of the front).
To ensure control at a fast pace of advance in corps and divisions, attention was paid to the preparation of radio and mobile communications. The commanders of corps and divisions had radio stations with them and could personally set tasks for units by microphone.
A few days before the start of the operation, the front commander, having personally left for the troops, checked the progress of preparations for the offensive and gave instructions on the spot to correct the shortcomings he noted. In particular, the commander of the 11th Guards Army was ordered to transfer all the commanders of corps, divisions and artillerymen from June 14 to their observation posts, from where they were to lead all the preparations, ready to receive the approaching troops. Artillery was ordered to be deployed to carefully camouflaged firing positions no further than 5 km from the front line (including the heaviest systems), and all headquarters were ordered to be pulled up to a distance not exceeding the length of the front of their formation or unit.
All preparations were to be completed by 8 o'clock on June 21. On this day and June 22, the commanders of the armies were to carry out a thorough check.
Ensuring the operation
The troops of the front received from the reserve of the High Command three breakthrough artillery divisions, one cannon division, one division of guards mortars and five separate divisions of special and high power. The total number of front artillery (together with 82- and 120-mm mortars) reached 5752 barrels. In addition, there were up to 680 installations in the guards mortar units. The supply of ammunition in the troops ranged from 2.5 to 4 ammunition.
Of the tank troops in the front, there were: in the breakthrough echelon - five separate tank brigades, six separate tank regiments, nineteen regiments and nine divisions of self-propelled artillery, which amounted to 392 tanks and 486 self-propelled guns.
In the development echelon of the breakthrough were two separate corps (tank and mechanized) and a tank army consisting of two tank corps with a total of 766 tanks and 223 self-propelled guns.
The total number of tanks and self-propelled guns in the front was 1867. The fuel supply was from 2 to 3 refueling.
The offensive of the front was supported by the 1st Air Army, which had 1991 aircraft: 894 of them were fighters, 547 attack aircraft, 473 bombers, the rest were scouts and spotters.
In terms of engineering, the troops of the front were reinforced by three assault engineering brigades, four engineer-sapper brigades and a pontoon-bridge brigade.
Such a large number of reinforcements made it possible to concentrate the overwhelming amount of equipment on the strike directions, but at the same time made great demands on the organization of command and control and on the rear service.
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The 3rd Belorussian Front was created on April 24, 1944 according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 19, 1944 on the basis of the Western Front and the formations of its right wing and center. It included the 5th, 31st, 39th combined arms armies, 1st air army. Subsequently, it included the 2nd, 11th guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th, 50th combined arms armies, 5th guards tank army , 3rd Air Army.
Spring - summer 1944 formations of the front participated in offensive operations in Belarus, entered the territory of East Prussia. Vitebsk, Orsha, Borisov, Minsk, Molodechno, Vilnius, Kaunas were liberated.
By early June 1944 troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front took up defensive positions in the strip from the Western Dvina River to Baevo (45 km east of Orsha) with a total length of 130 km. The 39th Army was located in the Vitebsk direction, south of the Western Dvina River; the troops of the 5th Army were grouped in the center, and the 31st Army was located in the Orsha direction. In connection with the preparation of an offensive operation during the first ten days of June, the 11th Guards Army arrived from the 1st Baltic Front, whose formations were concentrated in the forests south of Liozno.
Before the 3rd Belorussian Front units of the 53rd and 6th army corps of the 3rd tank army and the 27th army corps of the 4th German army operated. They were supported by the 6th Air Fleet, consisting of about 330 aircraft. In the first line, the Germans had five infantry, one airfield, one motorized division and several separate security and special units, as well as a brigade of assault guns. The operational reserves, consisting of two infantry and two security divisions, were located in the Lepel, Orsha and Minsk directions. The operational density of the German defense averaged about 14 km per division.
Besides, in the operational depth of the enemy, a large number of separate regiments and battalions operated, scattered by separate garrisons and having the task of protecting communications and fighting partisans.
Undertaking in May 1944 concentric offensive against the main partisan forces from the areas of Budslav, Lepel, Senno, Orsha, Bobr, Ostroshitsky Gorodok, the Germans sought to press them against the impenetrable swamps adjacent to Lake Palik.
In engineering terms, defense The Germans represented a system of developed field fortifications using natural boundaries and advantageous terrain features. The depth and equipment of the defensive zones were different, depending on the importance of the covered areas and the nature of the terrain. The Germans most firmly covered Vitebsk and Orsha. So, in the Orsha direction, the enemy had three equipped lines, echeloned to a depth of 15–20 km. The most important areas were reinforced with armored caps or prefabricated reinforced concrete gun emplacements. Mining was widely used. Less developed was the defense in the Bogushev direction, where the enemy counted on the wooded and marshy nature of the terrain, as well as on lakes and river barriers that hampered the actions of large military formations and equipment.
In the operational depth of the Germans had a number of intermediate lines of the field type of varying degrees of readiness. In the planned large-scale operation of the four fronts to defeat the Germans in Belarus, the 3rd Belorussian Front was assigned a very important role. It was determined by the general concept of the operation outlined above and the place of the 3rd Belorussian Front in it, as well as by the position that the troops of the front occupied in the theater of military operations. Located at the "Smolensk Gate" in the area between the rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper, the troops were in the most important operational direction, leading to the central regions of Belarus and to its capital.
Headquarters Directive of May 31, 1944 The 3rd Belorussian Front was instructed: “To prepare and conduct an operation, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina River, for which they break through the enemy defenses, inflicting two strike: a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno and the general direction of Bogushevsk, Senno; with part of the forces of this grouping, advance in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the southwest, with the aim of defeating the enemy’s Vitebsk grouping and capturing the city of Vitebsk in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front; b) another strike by the forces of the 11th Guards and 31st armies along the Minsk highway in the general direction of Borisov: part of the forces of this grouping would take the city of Orsha with a strike from the north.
The immediate task of the troops of the front, seize the frontier of Senno, Orsha. In the future, to develop the offensive on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the Borisov grouping of the enemy and reach the western bank of the Berezina River in the Borisov region. Mobile troops (cavalry and tanks) should be used to develop success in the general direction of Borisov.
By order of the Headquarters, the 3rd Belorussian Front was transferred: from the 1st Baltic Front, the 11th Guards Army (as part of the 8th, 16th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps), and from the Stavka reserve, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and powerful reinforcements.
Based on the task, the front commander decided to create two strike groups: the first, in the area west of Liozno on the adjacent flanks of the 39th and 5th armies (consisting of thirteen rifle divisions, three tank brigades and reinforcements); the second, east of the city of Orsha, in the strip of the Minsk highway on the adjacent flanks of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies (consisting of fourteen rifle divisions, one tank corps, two separate tank brigades and most of the reinforcements).
The task of the first group was to strike most of the forces that were part of the 5th Army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Senno and (using the success of mobile units) access to the Berezina River on the 10th day of the operation in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Palik and to the north; at the same time, part of the forces that were part of the 39th Army, striking in a north-western direction with the aim of encircling and defeating the Vitebsk group of Germans in cooperation with the 1st Baltic Front.
Second strike force was supposed to strike in the Minsk highway in the general direction to Orsha and to the north, defeat the enemy’s Orsha grouping, and on the tenth day of the operation, with the main forces, reach the Berezina River near the city of Borisov and to the north of it.
After breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy in the zone of the 5th Army, a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of the 3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was to enter the breakthrough with the task of developing success in the direction of Bogushevsk, Chereya and capturing the crossings on the Berezina River on the fifth day of the operation.
In the band of the 11th Guards Army the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (operating under the operational subordination of the commander of the 11th Guards Army) was introduced into the breakthrough, which was supposed to strike from the area northwest of Orsha, bypassing Orsha from the north, cut the communications of the Orsha group of Germans and by the end of the fourth day of the operation capture the Staroselye area (23 km southwest of Orsha); in the future, providing the left flank of the front, the corps was to advance in the direction of Ukhvala, Chernyavka, and on the sixth day of the operation, capture the crossings across the Berezina River in the Chernyavka area with advanced detachments.
5th Guards Tank Army it was supposed to be used, depending on the situation, on the third day of the operation according to two options. It was supposed to enter the gap either in the Orsha direction in the zone of the 11th Guards Army with the task of developing success along the Minsk highway in the direction of Borisov, or north of Orsha in the zone of the 5th army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Smolyany with access to the Minsk highway in the Tolochin area, followed by an offensive along it also towards Borisov.
For aviation front the task was to assist combined-arms formations on the battlefield in breaking through enemy defenses, isolating and cutting off enemy reserves, and also ensuring the actions of mobile groups in operational depth. The operation was planned in two stages.
First stage. Breakthrough of the enemy defenses, defeat of his Vitebsk and Bogushevo-Orsha groupings and the exit of the main forces of the front to the Berezina River with the capture of the city of Borisov. Second phase. Forcing the Berezina River and further development of the offensive with the aim of capturing the city of Minsk in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.
Front headquarters planned in more detail only the first stage lasting 10 days and with a depth of advance of 160 km. The plan determined and indicated the lines that the armies and mobile formations were to reach by the end of each day of the operation. The average rate of advance for combined arms formations was planned to be 12-16 km, for mobile units - 30-35 km per day.
June 20 front commander gave the commanders of the armies private directives. The 39th Army was ordered with the forces of five rifle divisions to strike from the front of Makarovo, Yazykovo (18 and 23 km south of Vitebsk) in the direction of Zamostochye, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi, in cooperation with the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, to defeat the Vitebsk enemy grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk. The immediate task of the army was to break through the enemy defenses in the Karpovichi, Kuzmentsy sector (the width of the sector was 6 km) and, by the end of the first day of the operation, reach the line of Perevoz, Borisovka, Zamostochye, Ovchinniki; by the end of the second day - to the line of Rogi, Butezhi, Church, Moshkany; by the end of the third day - to the border of Ostrovno, Lake Sarro, Lake Lipno. In the Ostrovno area, the advancing units of the army were to link up with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and completely surround the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, while part of the forces continued the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi.
The further task of the army, destruction of the encircled enemy and the capture of the city of Vitebsk. To interact with the 5th Army, which was advancing south, the 39th Army, with one division, was to advance in the direction of Simaki, svh. Walkers. The 5th Army was ordered with the forces of eight rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement to strike from the front of Efredyunka, Yulkovo in the direction of Bogushevsk. The immediate task of the army is to break through the German defenses in the Podnivye, Vysochany sector (the width of the sector is 12 km) and, in cooperation with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the enemy's Bogushevo-Orsha grouping. By the end of the second day of the operation, the army was to capture Bogushevsky and go to the front of Moshkany, Chudnya, Lake Devinsky; by the end of the third day - to the line (claim.) Lake Lino, Nov. Obol, Janovo. The next task is to develop a rapid offensive in the direction of Senno, Lukoml, Moiseevshchina and, by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River near Lake Palik and to the north with the main forces.
With access to the line of the Luchesa River the army was supposed to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the cavalry-mechanized group (3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps). To curtail the enemy front to the south of the breakthrough, the army commander was ordered, with the start of the offensive, part of the forces to vigorously advance from the front of Yulkovo, Shelmin to the south in the direction of Cape Bobinovichi.
The 11th Guards Army was ordered with the forces of nine rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement, strike in the strip of the Moscow-Minsk highway in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov with the immediate task of breaking through the enemy defenses in the Ostrov, Yuryev, Kirieva sector (section width 8 km) and in cooperation with the troops of the 5th and 31 th armies to defeat the Bogushev-Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the third day of the operation, the army was to reach the line of Janovo, Molotany, Lamachin; further develop a vigorous offensive along the Minsk highway and by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River in the area of the city of Borisov and to the north. Upon reaching the Zabazhnitsa, Shalashino, Bokhatovo line, the army commander was to bring the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps into the gap, and also ensure the readiness of the 5th Guards Tank Army to enter it into the gap from the morning of the third day of the operation.
To assist the 31st Army in capturing the city of Orsha, the commander of the 11th Guards Army was asked to advance around Orsha from the northwest with the forces of one rifle division. The 31st Army was tasked with striking with the forces of five rifle divisions on both banks of the Dnieper in the direction of Dubrovno, Orsha, breaking through the enemy defenses in the Kiriev, Zagvazdino sector (the width of the sector is 7 km) and, together with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the first day of the operation, the army was supposed to capture Dubrovno, by the end of the third day, capture Orsha and reach the Lamachin, Chorven, Chernoe line. The next task is to advance on Vorontsevichi, Vydritsa (south of the Orsha-Borisov railway). Part of the forces (the 113th rifle corps, consisting of two rifle divisions) of the army were to advance in the direction of Kr. Sloboda, Negotina, Borodino with the task of rolling up the enemy front to the south.
At the same time, a directive horse-mechanized group. Its commander (commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General Oslikovsky) was ordered on the night of the second day of the operation, after the 5th Army had captured the border of the Luchesa River, to be ready to lead the cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough and rapidly develop the offensive in in the direction of Bogushevsk, Senno, Holopenichi, Pleschenitsy. The readiness of the troops of the front for the offensive - by the morning of June 22.
In October 1944 Right-flank formations of the front took part in offensive operations in East Prussia, as a result of which the enemy grouping in Courland was blocked. Stallupenen, Goldap, Suwalki were released. During the winter offensive of 1945, the troops of the front participated in the encirclement and blocking of the enemy grouping in East Prussia, and in March of the same year in its liquidation. On February 24, 1945, the Zemland Group of Forces, formed on the basis of the 1st Baltic Front, entered the front. Later, the formations of the front stormed Koenigsberg, and at the end of April they completed the liquidation of the enemy grouping on the Samland Peninsula and liberated Pillau.
Disbanded 15 August 1945 according to the order of the NPO of the USSR of July 9, 1945. The field administration is aimed at forming the administration of the Baranovichi military district.
Front troops participated in the following operations:
Strategic operations: Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944; East Prussian strategic offensive operation of 1945; Baltic strategic offensive operation in 1944.
Front and army operations: Brownsburg Offensive of 1945; Vilnius offensive operation in 1944; Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation of 1944; Gumbinnen offensive operation in 1944; Zemland offensive operation in 1945; Insterburg-Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945; Kaunas offensive operation in 1944; Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945; Memel offensive operation in 1944; Minsk offensive operation of 1944; Rastenburg-Heilsberg offensive operation in 1945.
3rd Belorussian Front formed in the western direction on April 24, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 19, 1944 as a result of the division of the Western Front into the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. Initially, it included the 5th, 31st, 39th armies and the 1st air army. Subsequently, it included the 2nd and 11th guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th, 50th armies, the 5th guards tank and 3rd air armies.
In May and the first half of June 1944, the troops of the front conducted combat operations of local importance on the territory of Belarus. Participating in the Belorussian strategic operation (June 23-August 29, 1944), the front carried out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23-28 (together with the 1st Baltic Front), June 29-July 4-Minsk operation (together with the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts), July 5-20 - Vilnius operation and July 28 - August 28 - Kaunas operation. As a result of operations, his troops advanced to a depth of 500 km. They liberated Vitebsk (June 26), Orsha (June 27), Borisov (July 1), Minsk (July 3), Molodechno (July 5), Vilnius (July 13), Kaunas (August 1), other cities and went to the state USSR border with East Prussia.
In October 1944, the front, with the help of the 39th Army and the 1st Air Army, participated in the Memel operation (October 5-22) of the 1st Baltic Front, as a result of which the Kurland enemy grouping was isolated and pressed to the Baltic Sea. The troops of the front advanced to a depth of 30 to 60 km into East Prussia and Northeast Poland, captured the cities of Shtallupenen (Nesterov) (October 25), Goldap, Suwalki.
In January-April 1945, the troops participated in the East Prussian strategic operation, during which they carried out the Insterburg-Königsberg operation on January 13-27. In cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, they broke through the defense in depth, advanced to a depth of 70-130 km, reached the approaches to Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) and blocked the East Prussian grouping of the enemy, and then (March 13-29) eliminated it and went to Frisches Huff Bay.
From April 6 to April 9, 1945, the troops of the front carried out the Königsberg operation, as a result of which on April 9 they captured the fortress and the city of Königsberg.
On April 25, having completed the liquidation of the Zemland grouping of the enemy, the troops of the front captured the port and town of Pillau (Baltiysk).
The front was disbanded on August 15, 1945 on the basis of the order of the NPO of the USSR dated July 9, 1945. Its field administration was turned to the formation of the administration of the Baranovichi military district.
Front commanders: Colonel General, from June 1944 - General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944 - February 1945); Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky A. M. (February-April 1945); Army General Bagramyan I. Kh. (April 1945 - until the end of the war).
Member of the Military Council of the Front - Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov (April 1944 - until the end of the war).
Chief of Staff of the Front - Lieutenant General, from August 1944 - Colonel General Pokrovsky A.P. (April 1944 - until the end of the war).
