USS BB-63 Missouri, September 1945, Tokyo Bay

Although the previous part on battleships was final, there is one more topic that I would like to discuss separately. Reservation. In this article we will try to determine the optimal reservation system for battleships of the Second World War and conditionally “create” an ideal reservation system for battleships of the WWII period.

The task, I must say, is completely non-trivial. It is almost impossible to select armor “for all occasions”; the fact is that the battleship, as the ultimate artillery system of war at sea, solved many problems and, accordingly, was exposed to the entire range of weapons of those times. The designers were faced with a completely thankless task - to ensure the combat stability of the battleships, despite numerous hits from bombs, torpedoes and heavy enemy shells.

To do this, the designers carried out numerous calculations and full-scale experiments in search of the optimal combination of types, thicknesses and locations of armor. And, of course, it immediately became clear that there simply were no solutions “for all occasions” - any solution that gave an advantage in one combat situation turned out to be a disadvantage in other circumstances. Below are the main challenges faced by the designers.

Armored belt - external or internal?

The advantages of placing an armored belt inside the body seem to be obvious. Firstly, this increases the level of vertical protection in general - the projectile, before hitting the armor, has to penetrate a certain number of steel hull structures. Which can knock down the “Makarov tip”, which will lead to a significant drop in the armor penetration of the projectile (up to a third). Secondly, if the upper edge of the armored belt is located inside the hull, even if not by much, the area of ​​the armored deck is reduced - and this is a very, very significant weight saving. And thirdly, there is a well-known simplification of the manufacture of armor plates (there is no need to strictly repeat the contours of the hull, as should be done when installing an external armor belt). From the point of view of an artillery duel, the LK with its own kind seems to be the optimal solution.

Reservation schemes for North Carolina and South Dakota types of armored vehicles, with external and internal armor belts, respectively

But exactly what “seems to be”. Let's start from the beginning - increased armor resistance. This myth has its origins in the work of Nathan Okun, an American who works as a control systems programmer for the US Navy. But before we move on to the analysis of his works, a small educational program.

What is a “Makarov” tip (more precisely, a “Makarov” cap)? It was invented by Admiral S.O. Makarov at the end of the 19th century. This is a tip made of soft, unalloyed steel, which was flattened upon impact, simultaneously forcing the hard upper layer armor crack. Following this, the hard main part of the armor-piercing projectile easily pierced the lower layers of armor - much less hard (why armor has non-uniform hardness - see below). Without this tip, the projectile may simply break apart in the process of “overcoming” the armor and will not penetrate the armor at all, or will penetrate the armor only in the form of fragments. But it is obvious that if the projectile encounters spaced armor, the tip will “waste itself” on the first obstacle and will reach the second with significantly reduced armor penetration. That’s why shipbuilders (and not only them) have a natural desire to destroy the armor. But it makes sense to do this only if the first layer of armor has a thickness that is guaranteed to remove the tip.

So, Okun, referring to post-war tests of English, French and American shells, claims that to remove the tip, an armor thickness equal to 0.08 (8%) of the caliber of an armor-piercing projectile is sufficient. That is, for example, in order to decapitate a 460 mm Japanese APC, only 36.8 mm of armor steel is enough - which is more than normal for hull structures (this figure for the Iowa LC reached 38 mm). Accordingly, according to Okun, placing the armor belt inside gave it resistance no less than 30% greater than that of the external armor belt. This myth has been widely circulated in the press and is repeated in the works of famous researchers.

And yet, this is just a myth. Yes, Okun’s calculations are indeed based on actual data from shell tests. But for tank shells! For them, 8% of caliber is really correct. But for large-caliber ARSs this figure is significantly higher. Tests of the 380 mm Bismarck projectile showed that destruction of the “Makarov” cap is possible, but not guaranteed, starting with an obstacle thickness of 12% of the caliber of the projectile. And this is already 45.6 mm. Those. the defense of the same “Iowa” had absolutely no chance of removing the tip of not only the Yamato shells, but even the Bismarck shells. Therefore, in his later works, Okun consistently increased this figure, first to 12%, then to 14-17% and, finally, to 25% - the thickness of armor steel (homogeneous armor) at which the “Makarov” cap is guaranteed to be removed.

In other words, to guarantee the removal of the tips of 356-460 mm WWII battleship shells, 89-115 mm of armor steel (homogeneous armor) is required, although some chance of removing this very tip arises already at thicknesses from 50 to 64.5 mm. The only WWII battleship that had truly spaced armor was the Italian Littorio, which had a first armor belt 70 mm thick, and even lined with 10 mm of especially strong steel. We will return to the effectiveness of such protection a little later. Accordingly, all other WWII battleships that had an internal armor belt did not have any significant advantages in protection relative to a ship with an external armor belt of the same thickness.

As for the simplification of the production of armor plates, it was not so significant, and it was more than compensated by the technical complexity of installing an armor belt inside the ship.

In addition, from the point of view of combat stability in general, the internal armored belt is completely unprofitable. Even minor damage (small-caliber shells, an aerial bomb exploding near the side) inevitably leads to damage to the hull, and, albeit minor, flooding of the PTZ - and therefore to inevitable repairs at the dock upon return to base. LKs with an external armored belt are spared from this. During WWII, there were cases when a torpedo fired along the LC, for some reason, fell right under the waterline. In this case, extensive PTZ damage to a battleship with an internal armored belt is guaranteed, while battleships with an external armored belt usually got off with a “mild fright.”

So it would not be a mistake to state that the internal armored belt has one and only advantage - if its upper edge does not “go out”, but is located inside the hull, then it allows you to reduce the area of ​​​​the main armored deck (which, as a rule, rested on its upper edge) . But such a solution reduces the width of the citadel - with obvious negative consequences for stability.

To summarize, we make a choice - on our “ideal” battleship, the armor belt should be external.

In the end, it was not for nothing that the American designers of those times, who in no case could be suspected of either sudden “softening of the brain” or other similar diseases, immediately after the lifting of restrictions on displacement when designing the Montana battleships, abandoned the internal armored belt in benefit of the external.

USS BB-56 Washington, 1945, the “step” of the outer armor belt is clearly visible

Armored belt - monolithic or spaced?

According to research from the 1930s, monolithic armor generally resists physical impact better than spaced armor of equal thickness. But the impact of the projectile on the layers of spaced protection is uneven - if the first layer of armor is removed by the “Makarov cap”. According to numerous sources, the armor penetration of an ARS with a knocked-down tip is reduced by a third; for further calculations we will take a reduction in armor penetration of 30%. Let's try to estimate the effectiveness of monolithic and spaced armor against the impact of a 406 mm projectile.

During WWII, it was widely believed that at normal combat distances, for high-quality protection from enemy shells, an armored belt was required, the thickness of which was equal to the caliber of the shell. In other words, a 406 mm armor belt was required against a 406 mm projectile. Monolithic, of course. What if we take spaced armor?

As already written above, to guarantee the removal of the “Makarov” cap, armor with a thickness of 0.25 caliber of the projectile was required. Those. The first layer of armor, which is guaranteed to remove the Makarov cap of a 406 mm projectile, must have a thickness of 101.5 mm. This will be enough even if the projectile hits normal - and any deviation from the normal will only increase the effective protection of the first layer of armor. Of course, the indicated 101.5 mm projectile will not stop, but will reduce its armor penetration by 30%. Obviously, now the thickness of the second layer of armor can be calculated using the formula: (406 mm - 101.5 mm) * 0.7 = 213.2 mm, where 0.7 is the coefficient of reduction in the armor penetration of the projectile. In total, two sheets with a total thickness of 314.7 mm are equivalent to 406 mm of monolithic armor.

This calculation is not entirely accurate - since researchers have established that monolithic armor withstands physical impact better than spaced armor of the same thickness, then, apparently, 314.7 mm will still not be equivalent to 406 mm monolith. But nowhere is it said how much spaced armor is inferior to a monolith - and we have a considerable margin of strength (still 314.7 mm is 1.29 times less than 406 mm) which is obviously higher than the notorious decrease in the durability of spaced armor.

In addition, there are other factors in favor of spaced armor. The Italians, when designing armor protection for their Littorio, carried out practical tests and found that when the projectile deviates from the normal, i.e. when hitting armor at an angle other than 90°, the projectile for some reason tends to turn perpendicular to the armor. Thus, to a certain extent, the effect of increasing armor protection due to a projectile hitting at an angle other than 90° is lost. So, if you spread the armor just a little, say, 25-30 centimeters, then the first sheet of armor blocks the rear part of the projectile and prevents it from turning around - i.e. the projectile can no longer turn 90° to the main armor plate. Which, naturally, again increases the armor resistance of the protection.

True, spaced armor has one drawback. If a torpedo hits the armored belt, it is quite possible that it will break through the first sheet of armor, while hitting the monolithic armor will only leave a couple of scratches. But, on the other hand, it may not break through, and on the other hand, there won’t be any serious flooding even in the PTZ.

The technical complexity of creating a spaced armor installation on a ship raises questions. It's probably more complicated than a monolith. But, on the other hand, it is much easier for metallurgists to roll out two sheets of much smaller thickness (even in total) than one monolithic one, and Italy is by no means the leader in world technical progress, but it has installed such protection on its Littorio.

So for our “ideal” battleship, the choice is obvious - spaced armor.

Armored belt – vertical or inclined?

It seems that the advantages of an inclined armor belt are obvious. The sharper the angle at which a heavy projectile hits the armor, the more armor the projectile will have to penetrate, meaning the greater the chance that the armor will survive. And the tilt of the armored belt obviously increases the sharpness of the angle of impact of projectiles. However, the greater the inclination of the armored belt - the greater the height of its plates - the greater the mass of the armored belt as a whole. Let's try to count.

The basics of geometry tell us that an inclined armored belt will always be longer than a vertical armored belt covering the same side height. After all, a vertical side with an inclined armored belt forms a right-angled triangle, where the vertical side is a leg right triangle, and the inclined armored belt is the hypotenuse. The angle between them is equal to the angle of inclination of the armored belt.

Let's try to calculate the armor protection characteristics of two hypothetical battleships (LK No. 1 and LK No. 2). LK No. 1 has a vertical armor belt, LK No. 2 – inclined, at an angle of 19°. Both armored belts cover the side at a height of 7 meters. Both are 300mm thick.

Obviously, the height of the vertical armor belt of LK No. 1 will be exactly 7 meters. The height of the armored belt LK No. 2 will be 7 meters / cos angle 19°, i.e. 7 meters / 0.945519 = approximately 7.4 meters. Accordingly, the inclined armored belt will be higher than the vertical one by 7.4m / 7m = 1.0576 times or approximately 5.76%.

It follows that the inclined armored belt will be 5.76% heavier than the vertical one. This means that by allocating an equal mass of armor for armor belts LK No. 1 and LK No. 2, we can increase the thickness of the armor of the vertical armor belt by the indicated 5.76%.

In other words, by spending the same mass of armor, we can either install an inclined armor belt at an angle of 19° with a thickness of 300 mm, or install a vertical armor belt with a thickness of 317.3 mm.

If an enemy shell flies parallel to the water, i.e. at an angle of 90° to the side and vertical armor belt, then it will be met by either 317.3 mm of vertical armor belt, or... exactly the same 317.3 mm of inclined armor belt. Because in the triangle formed by the line of flight of the projectile (hypotenuse) with the thickness of the armor of the inclined belt (adjacent leg), the angle between the hypotenuse and the leg will be exactly 19° of the inclination of the armor plates. Those. we don't win anything.

It’s a completely different matter when a projectile hits the side not at 90°, but, say, at 60° (deviation from the normal – 30°). Now, using the same formula, we get the result that when hitting vertical armor with a thickness of 317.3 mm, the projectile will have to penetrate 366.4 mm of armor, while when hitting a 300 mm inclined armor belt, the projectile will have to penetrate 457.3 mm of armor. Those. when a projectile falls at an angle of 30° to the sea surface, the effective thickness of the inclined belt will exceed the protection of the vertical armor belt by as much as 24.8%!

So the effectiveness of the inclined armored belt is obvious. An inclined armored belt of the same mass as a vertical one, although it will have a slightly smaller thickness, its durability is equal to the durability of a vertical armored belt when projectiles hit perpendicular to the side (flat shooting), and when this angle is reduced when firing from long distances, as happens in real life naval combat, the durability of the inclined armor belt increases. So, is the choice obvious?

Not really. Free cheese only comes in a mousetrap.

Let's take the idea of ​​an inclined armored belt to the point of absurdity. Here we have an armor plate 7 meters high and 300 mm thick. A projectile flies at it at an angle of 90°. He will be met with only 300 mm of armor - but these 300 mm will cover the side of 7 m in height. What if we tilt the slab? Then the projectile will have to overcome more than 300 mm of armor (depending on the angle of inclination of the plate - but the height of the protected side will also decrease, and the more we tilt the plate, the thicker our armor, but the less side it covers. Apotheosis - when we rotate the plate 90°, we get as much as seven meters thick armor - but these 7 meters of thickness will cover a narrow strip of 300 mm of the side.

In our example, an inclined armored belt, when a projectile fell at an angle of 30° to the water surface, turned out to be 24.8% more effective than a vertical armored belt. But, again remembering the basics of geometry, we will find that from such a projectile an inclined armored belt covers exactly 24.8% less area than a vertical one.

So, alas, the miracle did not happen. An inclined armor belt increases armor resistance in proportion to the reduction in protection area. The greater the deviation of the projectile trajectory from the normal, the more protection the inclined armor belt provides - but the smaller the area this armor belt covers.

But this is not the only drawback of the inclined armor belt. The fact is that already at a distance of 100 cables the deviation of the projectile from the normal, i.e. the angle of the projectile relative to the surface of the water, the main battery guns of WWII battleships ranges from 12 to 17.8° (V. Kofman, “Japanese battleships of World War II Yamato and Musashi,” p. 124). At a distance of 150 kbt these angles increase to 23.5-34.9°. Add to this another 19° inclination of the armor belt, for example, as on the South Dakota type LK, and we get 31-36.8° at 100 kbt and 42.5-53.9° at 150 cable.

It should be borne in mind that European shells ricocheted or split already at 30-35° deviation from the normal, Japanese shells at 20-25°, and only American ones could withstand a deviation of 35-45°. (V.N. Chausov, American battleships of the South Dakota type).

It turns out that the inclined armored belt, located at an angle of 19°, practically guaranteed that the European projectile would split or ricochet already at a distance of 100 kbt (18.5 km). If it breaks, great, but what if it ricochets? The fuse may well be cocked by a strong glancing blow. Then the projectile will “slide” along the armored belt and go straight down through the PTZ, where it will fully explode almost under the bottom of the ship... No, we don’t need such “protection”.

So what should we choose for our “ideal” battleship?

Our promising battleship must have vertically spaced armor. Spreading the armor will significantly increase protection with the same mass of armor, and its vertical position will provide maximum protection area during long-range combat.

HMS King George V, external armor belt also clearly visible

Casemate and armored ends – is it necessary or not?

As you know, there were 2 LC reservation systems. “All or nothing”, when the citadel was exclusively armored, but with the most powerful armor, or when the ends of the LK were also armored, and on top of the main armored belt there was also a second, though of lesser thickness. The Germans called this second belt a casemate, although, of course, the second armored belt was not a casemate in the original sense of the word.

The easiest way to decide on a casemate is because this thing on the LK is almost completely useless. The thickness of the casemate took a lot of weight away, but did not provide any protection from heavy enemy shells. It is worth considering only the very narrow range of trajectories in which the projectile first penetrated the casemate and then hit the armored deck. But this did not provide a significant increase in protection, and the casemate did not protect against bombs in any way. Of course, the casemate provided additional cover for the barbettes of the gun turrets. But it would be much easier to book the barbettes more thoroughly, which would also provide significant savings in weight. In addition, the barbette is usually round, which means there is a very high probability of a ricochet. So the LK casemate is completely unnecessary. Perhaps in the form of anti-fragmentation armor, but a slight thickening of the hull steel could probably cope with this.

Booking the ends is a completely different matter. If it is easy to say a decisive “no” to a casemate, then it is also easy to say a decisive “yes” to armoring the ends. Suffice it to remember what happened to the unarmored ends of even battleships as resistant to damage as the Yamato and Musashi were. Even relatively weak blows to them led to extensive flooding, which, although in no way threatened the existence of the ship, required lengthy repairs.

So we armor the ends of our “ideal” battleship, and let our enemies build a casemate for themselves.

Well, it seems that everything is with the armored belt. Let's move on to the deck.

Armored deck - one or many?

History has never given a definitive answer to this question. On the one hand, as already written above, it was believed that one monolithic deck would withstand a blow better than several decks of the same total thickness. On the other hand, let’s remember the idea of ​​spaced armor, because heavy aerial bombs could also be equipped with a “Makarov” cap.

In general, it turns out this way, from the point of view of bomb resistance it looks preferable American system deck reservations. The upper deck is for “cocking the fuse”, the second deck, which is also the main one, in order to withstand a bomb explosion, and the third, anti-fragmentation deck – in order to “intercept” the fragments if the main armored deck still fails.

But from the point of view of resistance to large-caliber projectiles, such a scheme is ineffective.

History knows such a case - the shelling of the unfinished Jean Bart by the Massachusetts. Modern researchers almost sing hosannas to the French battleships - the majority of voices believe that the Richelieu reservation system was the best in the world.

What happened in practice? This is how S. Suliga describes it in his book “French LC Richelieu and Jean Bart”.

"Massachusetts" opened fire on the battleship at 08 m (07.04) on the starboard side from a distance of 22,000 m, at 08.40 it began to turn 16 points towards the coast, temporarily stopping fire, at 08.47 it resumed firing on the port side and finished it at 09.33. During this time, he fired 9 full salvoes (9 shells each) and 38 salvoes of 3 or 6 shells at the Jean Bar and the El-Hank battery. The French battleship suffered five direct hits (according to French data - seven).

One shell from a salvo that fell at 08.25 hit the aft part on the starboard side above the admiral's salon, pierced the spardeck deck, the upper deck, the main armored deck (150 mm), the lower armored deck (40 mm) and the 7 mm deck of the first platform, exploding in The cellar of the onboard 152-mm turrets closest to the stern is fortunately empty.”

What do we see? The Frenchman's excellent defense (190 mm of armor and two more decks - no joke!) was easily broken through by an American shell.

By the way, it would be appropriate to say a few words here about the calculations of free maneuvering zones (FMZ, in English literature - immune zone). The meaning of this indicator is that the greater the distance to the ship, the greater the angle of impact of the projectiles. And the larger this angle, the less chance of breaking through the armored belt, but the greater the chance of breaking through the armored deck. Accordingly, the beginning of the free maneuvering zone is the distance from which the armored belt is no longer penetrated by a projectile and the armored deck is not yet penetrated. And the end of the free maneuvering zone is the distance from which the projectile begins to penetrate the armored deck. Obviously, the ship’s maneuvering zone is different for each specific projectile, since armor penetration directly depends on the speed and mass of the projectile.

The free maneuvering zone is one of the most favorite indicators of both ship designers and researchers of the history of shipbuilding. But a number of authors have no confidence in this indicator. The same S. Suliga writes: “The 170-mm armored deck above the Richelieu cellars is the next thickest after the only armored deck of the Japanese Yamato.” If we also take into account the lower deck and express the horizontal protection of these ships in the equivalent thickness of American “class B” deck armor, we get 193 mm versus 180 mm in favor of the French battleship. Thus, the Richelieu had the best deck armor of any ship in the world.

Amazing! Obviously, the Richelieu was better armored than the same South Dakota, which had armored decks with a total thickness of 179-195 mm, of which homogeneous “Class B” armor was 127-140 mm, and the rest was structural steel that was inferior in strength. However, the calculated indicator of the South Dakota’s free maneuvering zone under fire from the same 1220 kg of 406 mm shells ranged from 18.7 to 24.1 km. And the “Massachusetts” penetrated a better deck than the “South Dakota” from about 22 km!

Another example. After the war, the Americans shot off the front plates of the turrets planned for the Yamato class LK. They got one such slab, it was taken to the training ground and fired at with heavy American 1220 kg shells of the latest modification. Mark 8 mod. 6. They fired so that the projectile hit the slab at an angle of 90 degrees. We fired 2 shots, the first shell did not penetrate the slab. For the second shot, an enhanced charge was used, i.e. provided increased projectile speed. The armor shattered. The Japanese modestly commented on these tests - they reminded the Americans that the slab they tested was rejected by acceptance. But even the rejected slab split only after the second hit, moreover, by an artificially accelerated projectile.

The paradox of the situation is this. The thickness of the Japanese armor tested was 650 mm. Moreover, absolutely all sources claim that the quality of Japanese armor was worse than average world standards. The author, unfortunately, does not know the firing parameters (initial projectile speed, distance, etc.) But V. Kofman, in his book “Japanese Yamato and Musashi light guns,” claims that in those test conditions, the American 406 mm gun in theory should have penetrate 664 mm of world average armor! But in real life they were obviously unable to overcome 650 mm of armor worse quality. So then believe in the exact sciences!

But let's return to our sheep, i.e. to horizontal reservation. Taking into account all of the above, we can conclude that the spaced horizontal armor did not withstand artillery strikes well. On the other hand, the only, but thick, armored deck of the Yamato did not perform so badly against American bombs.

Therefore, it seems to us, the optimal horizontal armor looks like this - a thick armored deck, and below that - a thin anti-fragmentation one.

Armored deck - with or without bevels?

Bevels are one of the most controversial issues in horizontal armoring. Their merits are great. Let's look at the case when the main, thickest armored deck has bevels.

They participate in both the horizontal and vertical defense of the citadel. At the same time, the bevels greatly save the overall weight of the armor - this is, in fact, the same inclined armor belt, only in the horizontal plane. The thickness of the bevels may be less than that of deck armor - but due to the slope, they will provide the same horizontal protection as horizontal armor of the same weight. And with the same thickness of the bevels, the horizontal protection will increase significantly - albeit along with the mass. But horizontal armor protects exclusively the horizontal plane - and the bevels also participate in vertical protection, allowing the armor belt to be weakened. In addition, the bevels, unlike horizontal armor of the same weight, are located lower - which reduces the upper weight and has a positive effect on the stability of the ship.

The disadvantages of bevels are a continuation of their advantages. The fact is that there are two approaches to vertical protection - the first approach is to prevent the penetration of enemy shells at all. Those. The side armor should be the heaviest - this is how the Yamato's vertical protection was implemented. But with this approach, duplicating the armor belt with bevels is simply not necessary. There is another approach, an example of which is Bismarck. The Bismarck designers did not strive to make an impenetrable armored belt. They settled on a thickness that would prevent the projectile from penetrating the armored belt as a whole at reasonable combat distances. And in this case, large fragments of the projectile and the explosion of the half-scattered explosive were reliably blocked by the bevels.

Obviously, the first approach of “impenetrable” defense is relevant for “ultimate” battleships, which are created as super-fortresses without any artificial restrictions. Such battleships simply do not need bevels - why? Their armored belt is already strong enough. But for battleships whose displacement is limited for some reason, bevels become very relevant, because make it possible to achieve approximately the same armor resistance at much lower armor costs.

But still, the “bevels + relatively thin armored belt” scheme is flawed. The fact is that this scheme a priori assumes that the shells will explode inside the citadel - between the armored belt and the bevels. As a result, a battleship armored according to this scheme in conditions of intense battle would share the fate of the Bismarck - the battleship very quickly lost its combat effectiveness. Yes, the slopes perfectly protected the ship from flooding and the engine rooms from penetration of shells. But what good is this when the rest of the ship has long been a blazing wreck?

Comparison of armor schemes, armored and unprotected volumes of aircraft of the Bismarck/Tirpitz and King George V types

Another minus. The bevels also significantly reduce the reserved volume of the citadel. Notice where the Tirpitz's armored deck is compared to the King George V's. Due to the weakened armor belt, all rooms above the armored deck are essentially given over to be torn to pieces by enemy APCs.

Summarizing the above, the optimal reservation system for our “ideal” World War II battleship would be the following. Vertical armor belt - with spaced armor, the first sheet - at least 100 mm, the second - 300 mm, spaced no more than 250-300 mm from each other. Horizontal armor - upper deck - 200 mm, without bevels, rests on the upper edges of the armor belt. The lower deck is 20-30 mm with bevels to the lower edge of the armor belt. The extremities are lightly armored. The second armored belt (casemate) is missing.

Battleship Richelieu, post-war photo

P.P.S. The article was posted deliberately, given its great potential for “discussion”. ;-)

More precisely, two answers. The first is Strasbourg. She is, of course, not a battleship, but a “heavy artillery ship.” The main differences between it and the cruisers of that time are as follows: the ship cannot be sunk by dive bombers with 250 kg and even 500 kg bombs; the ship does not lose speed from one torpedo hit in the CMU zone; the ship is protected from high-explosive shells of the main linear calibers (this is much more than you might initially think).

The correct answer number two can be obtained if you remember: the best ships of World War II were designed in the USSR in the late 40s and early 50s. And battleships were no exception. Accordingly, the best WWII battleship is Project 24, this one:

The features of this project - theoretical, yes - are that it allows you to get a ship capable of maintaining combat effectiveness after torpedo hits; virtually invulnerable to bomber aircraft (protection from a 1000-kg armor-piercing bomb dropped from a height of 3,000 m), having a wide free maneuvering zone under fire from 16" guns (100-160 cable); advanced anti-aircraft and radar weapons, originally included in the project; and and for all that, running at 30 knots. Let's be proud of our domestic engineers and move on.

Soviet projects of the 40s are the only projects of classic ships in which the experience of war was more or less fully taken into account. Actually, that's why they were the best. This is actually important. The complex phenomenon of the “aircraft artillery fleet” did not last long. It’s ridiculously short - compared not only to the classic sail-and-artillery, but even compared to the “steam ironclad”. Real experience - technical and especially combat - was very limited, which does not allow us to consider it at least somewhat comprehensive, providing answers to many burning questions. That is why Soviet projects are especially interesting.

Further, for some reason it is not customary in society to discuss big battleships. Suspicious Japanophiles see here a conspiracy of the Anglo-Saxons who do not want to recognize the primacy of Yamato. There is a certain consensus like “with monsters of 70 thousand tons, everyone would go down the drain.” This is a wrong, bad consensus. There was Japan. A country with the economy and industry of Italy, a country that has been waging a large-scale war since 1937 - and, nevertheless, has built 2.7 battleships weighing 70 thousand tons. This alone should make one think about the validity of the “pipe theory”. It is hardly worth assuming that the much stronger UK economy would collapse if, say, 5 “monsters” were built.

On the other hand, the same Great Britain successfully survived a twofold increase in the price of a battleship in 1900-1910. At the same time, thanks to the “Fisher Revolution”, in 1910 the cost of the fleet was 36 million pounds - against 31 million pounds in 1901. Was there room for such maneuvers between the First and Second World Wars? Yes it was. The mass construction of "Washington" cruisers was not a cheap pleasure. The cost of maintaining such ships was approximately 0.6 of the cost of maintaining the Washington battleship. In the USA in the 1930s, the cost of maintaining the personnel of heavy and light cruisers was 1.5 times higher than the cost of maintaining the personnel of battleships. The total costs of maintaining 2...3 cruisers of 10,000 tons over 10 years were comparable to the costs of building a battleship of 35,000 tons. In other words, timely replacement(with a slight decrease in the number) of new battleships and the abandonment of cruising “hypercompensation” provided the possibility of creating a full-fledged battleship fleet of large battleships.

This is roughly how it goes. The fight against battleships within the framework of the "Washington system" was not directly associated with the high cost of the battleships themselves. This struggle was based on the simple and understandable desires of Great Britain - to avoid a direct and obviously losing competition with the United States, to maintain a “two-power” standard in relation to Japan and Italy - which coincided with the simple and understandable desire of the United States to get for so a fleet equal to the British.

There is a myth according to which America began building the fleet that helped the United States win the war on the morning of December 8, 1941, when it recovered a little from the defeat of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese the day before. Myth. In fact, the American militarists began building all ten fast battleships that brought victory to Washington on their decks at least ten months before the samurai attack on Pearl Harbor. The North Carolina-class battleships were laid down at two-week intervals in June 1940 and entered service in April and May 1941. In fact, three of the four South Dakota-class battleships were launched before December 7, 1941. Yes, the fleet that crushed Japan had not yet been built, but it certainly could not have been built if one rolled up one’s sleeves only on the morning of December 8th. Thus. the Japanese air strike on the main base of the US Pacific Fleet played absolutely no role in the fate of the high-speed battleships of the US Navy.

Fast battleships in World War II and after it

The Washington Treaty of 1922 stopped the production of heavy ships for the US Navy. Due to the machinations of politicians, the construction of seven battleships and six battlecruisers had to be stopped or not started at all. It got to the point that on February 8, 1922, a decision was made to dismantle the battleship Washington (BB47), which was at 75% completion stage - a blatant act of vandalism! The Washington Treaty limited the number of battleships of the US and British Navy to 18 and 20, respectively. Japan was allowed to have ten such ships, France and Italy - just a few. In the ten years that have passed since the conclusion of the treaty, only two battleships have entered service in the world - the British Nelson and Rodney. The construction of these ships began in 1922 and was specially stipulated in the Washington Treaty, because the frankly weak Grand Fleet at that time had only extremely outdated battleships. The world “vacation” in battleship building ended in 1932 with the laying of the Dunkirk ship with a displacement of 26,500 tons in France.

The US Navy reacted to the conclusion of the Washington Treaty with mixed feelings. The admirals mourned the loss of battleships and cruisers, but those of them. who were considered realists, understood the complexity of the political and economic situation in the country and the world that developed after the end of the First World War. Although for the USA this situation was rather favorable. First world war The United States entered as the third power in the naval rankings of the world. And after the war, the US Navy became one of the two great navies in the world, and most experts agreed that in a short time the US Navy would become the number 1 fleet in the world. The previously unattainable greatness of the Grand Fleet was fading into history. The war clearly demonstrated the strategic role of the fleet. Only the navy was able to provide convoys across the Atlantic. After the war, the US Navy was left with de facto the only serious adversary - the Japanese navy. Everything was merry and rosy for the American admirals, but then suddenly the Great Depression happened.

World economic crisis contributed to the rise to power of authoritarian regimes in a number of countries that did not firmly defend the ideals of freedom and democracy. Duce Mussolini came to power in Italy, and Fuhrer Hitler came to power in Germany. Well, in the USA - Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt was at one time involved in the affairs of the US Navy and served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In 1932, the ex-assistant became US President from the Democratic Party. Roosevelt considered the adoption and implementation of an ambitious shipbuilding program to be one of the ways to bring the country out of the Great Depression. However, the first “naval” budget, adopted during the time of Roosevelt, provided for appropriations for the construction of aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers; it did not say anything about the construction of battleships. Japan's sudden announcement of refusal to comply with the terms of the Washington Treaty, made in 1934, changed the situation in a most dramatic way by 1936. For the first time in ten years, American designers rolled up their sleeves, washed their hands, took a drawing board, whatman paper and drawing board, and then began to draw the outline of the battleship of the future. The process has begun. All that remains is to deepen it.

The design of a battleship after 1922 was determined largely not by technology, but by politics. The British constantly insisted on limiting the size, displacement and armament of battleships due to the simple fact that they themselves had decrepit, small and poorly armed battleships. They wished the same for everyone. The British demanded that new battleships not be armed with artillery of a caliber higher than 14 inches, although the Washington Treaty established a limit for the main caliber of battleships at 16 inches. Surprisingly. but it was the Americans who benefited primarily from the British demands in terms of displacement and size. The size and displacement of all American ships were limited throughput Panama Canal - the requirement for ships to pass through the canal from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic and back was mandatory when designing any American ship or vessel. At the same time, American admirals began to swear in American style when they heard about the limitation of the main caliber of a battleship to 14 inches. The restrictions imposed by the Panama Canal, combined with restrictions on the main gun, promised the US Navy a battleship weaker than the British Nelson or the Japanese Nagato. Japan withdrew from the treaty and installed 16-inch guns on the battleship. The British demanded 14 inches from everyone except themselves, also arming the Nelson with 16-inch main-caliber artillery. In October 1935, US representatives began negotiations with British representatives regarding the limitations of the Washington Treaty in light of the perfidy shown by the Japanese military. The parties came to an agreement on April 1, 1937... after which the permitted main caliber of battleships automatically increased to 16 inches.

On September 14, North Carolina was hit by a torpedo fired by Japanese submarine 1-19. The submarine then fired six torpedoes in one gulp, three of them hit the aircraft carrier Wasp, one hit the destroyer O'Brien and one hit the battleship. North Carolina was hit by a torpedo on the left side of the bow of the hull in the turret area. No. 1 main caliber. The explosion destroyed the armored belt of the battleship. The battleship tilted by five degrees, but retained the ability to maneuver at high speed. On October 11, 1942, the battleship was put into dry dock at Pearl Harbor for repairs.

The decision to increase the caliber gave rise to new problems. The design of battleships for the US Navy in 1937 was already in full swing, and now with more powerful guns it was necessary to develop new larger and heavier turrets, then “fit” the new turrets into the design of the already designed ship. Admiral Standley took a thoughtful position in his time, ordering the design of universal three-gun turrets of the main caliber, intended for mounting both 14-inch guns and 16-inch guns. The size and caliber of battleship guns even became a topic of discussion during the 1936 presidential election campaign. Republicans criticized Democrat Roosevelt for publicly speaking in favor of increasing the main caliber of battleship artillery, pointing out that such statements contribute to the growth of the arms race and are a tangible blow to détente international tension. Ordinary Americans did not heed the arguments of the Republicans, electing Roosevelt as president for a second term and, thereby, confirming the obvious fact that America has always remained the preserve of rabid imperialism. Japan, on the other hand, did not initially react to the statements of the American Democrats. believing that the unclear international situation will delay the design of new battleships for the US Navy. Only March 27, 1937 Japanese government publicly spoke out against the new terms of the Washington Treaty. It was then that a decision was made in Japan to build Yamato-class battleships with a displacement of 64,000 tons and armed with 18-inch caliber artillery.

During a break between main gun fire, sailors walk along the quarterdeck of the battleship Massachusetts. Two huge American flags are raised on the mast - a faint hope that the French will not shoot at their sincere American friends, with whom they fought shoulder to shoulder with the Boches during the First World War.

Even the Japanese refusal to comply with the 14-inch limit on the caliber of artillery on battleships did not cause harsh statements in the USA and Great Britain. Roosevelt became the first politician to advocate arming his own ships with cannons larger than 14 inches. The British began in 1937 the construction of a new series of battleships of the King George V type with 14-inch caliber guns, although the former Minister of the Navy, a certain Winston Churchill, sharply objected to this.

Roosevelt, however, reconsidered his decision regarding the main caliber of battleships - in favor of 14 inches. Specialists from the Naval Design Bureau felt insulted and in some cases even became indignant. Meanwhile, it’s in vain: they should read the Pravda newspaper more often. After all, the whole world has long known the corruption of bourgeois politicians who spin any fairy tales in order to attract votes, and immediately after the elections they forget about both the fairy tales and the voters. In fact, the choice in favor of a larger caliber of battleship artillery is not so clear-cut. as it may seem to amateurs. A 14-inch caliber projectile weighs 680 kg. 16-inch caliber projectile - 450 kg. Due to a more powerful powder charge, a 14-inch projectile flies further than a 16-inch projectile, due to its greater mass it has greater destructive power, and causes less wear on the expensive gun barrel. However, as representatives of the design bureau noted in their excited message dated May 17, 1937 to the President of the United States: the real difference lies in the “dead” zone of the guns. In this case, the dead zone is not considered to be a zone that cannot be shot through due to the insufficiently small angle of descent of the guns, but a zone in which a projectile is even theoretically unable to penetrate armor of a certain thickness. That is, the “dead” zone is not adjacent to the ship, but is far away from it. Experts made calculations based on the average thickness of the armor of battleships - 12 inches for the main armor belt and 5-6 inches for the armored deck. It turned out that at short firing distances the armor penetration of 14- and 16-inch shells is approximately the same. At long firing distances, at which a naval battle actually takes place, a 14-inch projectile is significantly inferior to a 16-inch one, approximately ten times!

Iowa

Roosevelt, in response to the message, promised to think or come up with something. The President kept his word. In early June 1937, he suggested that Ambassador Grew once again appeal to the Japanese side with a proposal to agree to limit the main caliber of battleships to 14 inches. While the court - yes the case - Roosevelt puts forward a proposal, the Japanese discuss it, then prepare an answer - the design of battleships could not stand still. This time I didn't have to wait long for an answer. The Japanese agreed to the US President's proposal, with a small amendment: subject to limiting the total number of battleships in the US and British Navy - ten American and ten British. Such an amendment was completely unacceptable to Roosevelt, so on July 10, 1937, the president gave the command to design battleships with 16-inch artillery.

Debates over the main caliber of battleships delayed the design of battleships for several months. But once the decision was made, the design moved forward by leaps and bounds. The budget for the 1938 fiscal year allocated financial flows for the construction of two battleships, North Carolina and Washington, with laying down on October 27, 1937 and June 14, 1938, respectively. According to the budget for the 1939 fiscal year, July 5, 1939 was laid down "South Dakota", 15 days later - "Massachusetts". November 20, 1939 Indiana and February 1, 1940 Alabama. The fiscal year 1941 budget called for the Missouri to be laid down on January 6, 1941, and the Wisconsin to be laid down on January 25, 1941.

The Two-Ocean Navy Act passed by Congress in 1940 provided for the construction of seven more battleships - two more Iowas (Illinois and Kentucky) and five Montana-class monsters armed with four turrets with three 16-inch guns in each and on each. Due to its width, the Montana would no longer be able to pass through the Panama Canal. The last two Iowas were laid down, the first two Montanas were ordered, but their construction was abandoned in 1943. The Kentucky was no longer considered a modern ship, which is why there were discussions for a very long time about what to do with the hull of the unfinished battleship. The hull occupied the slipway for five long years. Ultimately, the unfinished ship was launched in 1950. but they did not finish building it, and in 1958 they sold it for scrap metal.

There is a myth according to which America began building the fleet that helped the United States win the war on the morning of December 8, 1941, when it recovered a little from the defeat of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese the day before. Myth. in fact, the American militarists began building all ten fast battleships that brought victory to Washington on their decks at least ten months before the samurai attack on Pearl Harbor. The North Carolina-class battleships were laid down at two-week intervals in June 1940 and entered service in April and May 1941. In fact, three of the four South Dakota-class battleships were launched before December 7, 1941. Yes, the fleet that crushed Japan had not yet been built, but it certainly could not have been built if one rolled up one’s sleeves only on the morning of December 8th. Thus. the Japanese air strike on the main base of the US Pacific Fleet played absolutely no role in the fate of the high-speed battleships of the US Navy.

The U-bots of the Kriegsmarine began to pose a mortal threat to England. It was the presence of such a threat that forced the command to shift priorities in the development plans of the US Navy. In 1941, the American fleet was increasingly involved in escorting Atlantic convoys. First of all, it was not the Pacific, but the Atlantic Fleet that was strengthened. In the US Navy. just like in the White House, the yellow danger was clearly underestimated. The calculation was based on that. that the power of the Pacific Fleet will be enough to defend the Philippines from a possible Japanese attack while Europe deals with Hitler. The North Carolina and the Hornet aircraft carrier, intended for operations off the East Coast of the United States, were sent to the Atlantic. But after Pearl Harbor, both battleships were transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

While not yet fully commissioned, Washington became the first high-speed American battleship to take part in hostilities. The battleship was transferred from the base in Casco Bay to the British fleet base of Scapa Flow, from where she, together with Her Majesty's ship Wasp, set off on a campaign in March 1942. the purpose of which was to support the landing of New Zealand troops in Madagascar. In early May, Washington took part in escorting convoys PQ-15 and QP-11 to and from Murmansk. Together with the British battleship King George V, the American ship patrolled the waters between Norway and Iceland in case of Kriegsmarine ships. There was no naval battle then, but adventures did happen. A British battleship collided with a British destroyer. "Washington" left for a military campaign from Scapa Flow once again. On June 28, 1942, he, along with the battleship Duke of York, went out to guard the ill-fated convoy PQ-17. To defeat the convoy, the Germans initiated Operation Rosselsprung. Four large Kriegsmarine surface ships appeared in Altafjord. including Tirpitz. Well, the Tirpitz, alone, was capable of smashing to smithereens the entire united Anglo-American fleet. And here are as many as four large ships of the German fleet. The order of the British Admiralty to abandon convoy warships to their fate seems quite understandable in such conditions. In fact, the German ships never left Norwegian waters, which did not save the convoy. Participation, or rather non-participation, in guarding convoy PQ-17 was the last combat (such as combat) operation of the battleship Washington in the Atlantic. After a short stop on the West Coast, the battleship was transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

The beginning of the campaign in the Pacific resulted in heavy losses in aircraft carriers for the Americans. By mid-May 1942, the Lexington was sunk, the Saratoga was torpedoed, and the Yorktown was heavily damaged. The fleet urgently needed replenishment. The aircraft carrier Wasp rushed to the rescue, accompanied by the battleship North Carolina. By the time the ships passed the Panama Capal, the peak of the crisis in the campaign in the Pacific had safely passed for the Americans, but the Yorktown was lost in the Battle of Midway and a new aircraft carrier for the Pacific Fleet became even more urgently needed. Wasp, North Carolina and four cruisers formed TF-18. The formation arrived in San Diego on June 15, 1942, and then headed to the South Pacific. Along the way, North Carolina was separated from TF-18 and became part of the TG-61 group. 2, guarding the aircraft carrier Enterprise. Enterprise aircraft were involved in Operation Watchtower, the landing on Guadalcanal that began on August 7, 1942, as part of TG-61. 2 North Carolina took part in the two-day battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands. August 23–24, 1942. At one point in the battle, the battleship’s anti-aircraft fire became so dense that the North Carolina disappeared in a puff of smoke. A request came from the Enterprise - what’s wrong with the ship, do you need help? In eight minutes, the battleship's anti-aircraft gunners shot down 18 Japanese aircraft and damaged seven (or seventy - it was not possible to determine exactly). Thanks to the skill of the North Carolina anti-aircraft gunners, the American fleet did not suffer any losses.

Despite the obvious success in the first battle, North Carolina was unable to protect the aircraft carrier Wasp in the next one. Perhaps that battle was the most successful example of the use of torpedo weapons in history. On September 14, 1942, the Japanese submarine 1-19 fired a salvo of six torpedoes at an aircraft carrier from a distance of approximately 1,400 m. One traveled a distance of ten miles, passing the keels of two destroyers along the way. after which she stuck into left side the nose of the North Carolina below the armor belt. As a result of the torpedo explosion, a hole with an area of ​​32 square meters was formed in the side. feet, through which the ship received 1000 tons of water. Two torpedoes passed in front of the aircraft carrier's bow, one of them hit the destroyer O'Brien (also in the left bow of the hull, the torpedo traveled 11 miles). The other three torpedoes hit the starboard side of the aircraft carrier. The consequences of the torpedo explosions became catastrophic for the aircraft carrier. The ship did not sank, but there was no point in repairing it. "O" Brien lost its bow and sank three days later. North Carolina acquired negative angle pitch of 5 degrees, the bow magazine of the battleship's ammunition was flooded. Attempts to tow the battleship were unsuccessful. However, the battleship continued to guard the aircraft carrier Enterprise under its own vehicles. sometimes developing a speed of 25 knots. There was no danger of flooding, but the damage to the battleship was great. The ship was sent to Pearl Harbor for repairs, and the Enterprise went there along with the battleship. The battleship was under repair until January 1943.

The American fleet in the South Pacific was left without high-speed battleships for only three weeks - the Washington arrived from the Atlantic to Noumea on October 9, 1942. A week later, the South Dakota and the Enterprise (reorganized) left Pearl Harbor for the South Pacific. connection TF-6I). "Washington" became part of the TF-64 formation. along with three cruisers and six destroyers. This unit was intended to escort convoys between Noumea and Gaudalcanal. The force was commanded by Rear Admiral Wills A. "Ching" Lee. previously serving as chief of staff to Vice Admiral William F. "Bill" Halsey, commander of the Pacific Fleet. Lee would spend most of the war as commander of TF-64. The admiral found himself in right time and in the right place. Subsequent events became the culmination of the confrontation between American and Japanese battleships in the Pacific Ocean. The month of the battleship war has arrived.

The month began with an attempt by Japanese aircraft carriers to make another raid in the Solomon Islands area. Again, aircraft carriers of the United States fleet rushed to intercept them, and again high-speed battleships provided escort for carrier-based aircraft carriers. South Dakota continued to guard the Enterprise, preserving the aircraft carrier in the brutal affair at Santa Cruz, which took place on October 26, 1942. Then the battleship's anti-aircraft gunners shot down at least 26 Japanese airplanes. The next day, the battleship Washington was nearly hit by a torpedo fired by the submarine I-15. On the same day, the South Dakota was attacked by a Japanese submarine. While dodging a torpedo, the South Dakota collided with the destroyer Mahan. Fortunately, none of the ships received serious damage.

Admiral Lee's battleships returned to action two weeks later. On November 11, 1942, TF-64 was reorganized to include the battleships South Dakota and Washington and the destroyers Winham and Welk. The formation was intended to provide additional protection to the TF-16 group, the core of which was the aircraft carrier Enterprise. Two days later, after the dramatic first naval battle at Guadalcanal, TF-64 was reinforced with the destroyers Priston and Gwin. The formation received orders to go to Guadalcanal in case of a possible second coming of the Japanese Admiral Kondo. On November 14, Lee approached the strait, and from the other end Kondo sailed here with his battleship Kirishima, heavy cruisers Rakao and Atagi, light cruisers Nagara and Sendai, and eight destroyers.

The forces of the opponents, who inexorably walked towards each other, were theoretically approximately equal. The Japanese had more ships, and Lee had larger artillery. In addition, Admiral Lee had the opportunity to use radar, which the Japanese were completely deprived of. But the Japanese had excellent training for conducting naval battles in the dark and were far superior to the Americans in the art of using torpedo weapons. Kondo led his forces in four separate columns. Lee lined up his squadron with the destroyers at the head, followed by the Washington and South Dakota.

The Japanese discovered the American fleet at 10:15 p.m. on November 14, 1942, identifying the enemy force as four destroyers and two heavy cruisers. At 10:45 p.m. Lee changed course to a southerly direction. At 23.00, the radar of the battleship Washington detected Japanese ships. Minutes later, visual contact was made. At 23.17, the battleship Washington opened fire with its main guns on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers withdrew without receiving damage. Return fire from the Japanese heavy ships and the main group of destroyers led to dire consequences for the American destroyers. Two lines of enemy ships diverged on opposite courses. The Japanese brought all their artillery and all their torpedo tubes into action. The destroyer Priston came under concentrated fire from the cruiser Nagara and destroyers. The destroyer exploded at 23.27 and disappeared from the surface nine minutes later. The destroyer Welk was next in the sights of the Nagara gunners. It was hit by a torpedo at 23.32. The ship sank after 11 minutes.

However, the battle was not at all of the nature of a one-goal game. As soon as the American battleships got involved, events quickly took a completely different turn. The lead Japanese destroyer Ayanami received three main caliber gifts from the South Dakota at 23.32, after which she was engulfed in flames.

Eight minutes later the fire reached the ammunition magazines, and seven minutes later the Annami went down in history. The battle, however, was far from over. The next American destroyer in the line, the Gwin, received a portion of one-inch shells from the Nagara at 23:37, after which it was forced to withdraw from the battle. Benham, the last American destroyer, was hit by a torpedo on the bow a minute later. Its speed immediately dropped to 5 knots, but the ship still remained afloat, although it was no longer possible to continue the battle.

Suddenly, silence fell over the gray waves of the greatest of planet Earth's oceans. Relative silence: the noise of ship's engines after the roar of artillery reminded the sailors of the chirping of grasshoppers among the fields of Arizona and the fields of Fuji. The guns fell silent because at 23.43 the column of the Japanese samurai Nagara went beyond the firing range of the American ships. Two US Navy battleships still remained to the west. The lull was just an episode on the way to the climax. The main forces of the Japanese appeared on the scene - the Kondo column consisting of the battleship Kirishima, two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. And here is Lee. at the most critical moment, an unfortunate incident occurred: the radar of the main fire control system on the battleship South Dakota failed.” Another problem faced by the American naval commander. there was a violation of the battle order by the battleships. The ships were in each other's wake for a very short time. To avoid a collision with the sinking and damaged destroyers, the South Dakota steered north, as a result of which it found itself a good few hundred meters closer to the Japanese than the Washington. Suddenly, at 23.50, the South Dakota was illuminated by the searchlight of the Japanese battleship Kirishima. At the same time, all five Japanese ships fired at the US Navy battleship. In a short period of time, the South Dakota was hit by 27 shells with a caliber of 5 inches or more. "South Dakota" was unable to return fire to fire. The third main caliber turret was temporarily out of action, a fire spread through the superstructure, and 58 people among the crew were killed and 60 wounded. "South Dakota" turned south.

However, the situation with South Dakota also had some positive side. Behind the burning Dakota, the Japanese did not see the Washington, whose radar was working properly in normal mode. At approximately midnight, the Washington opened fire with its main caliber from a distance of 8,000 m. The battleship, in the shortest possible time, fired nine 16-inch shells and more than 40 5-inch shells into the Kirishima. On the Kirishima, the poorly armored steering device failed, after which the Japanese battleship began to describe a wide circulation. Kondo had only one thing left to do - give the order to retreat so as not to lose ends. Washington tried to pursue the enemy for several miles, but then the Yankees decided: “Game over.” The Kirishima, unable to stay on course, was scuttled by the Japanese themselves at 3.20 on November 15, 1942.

First and last time Throughout the war, American high-speed battleships met face to face in open battle with their Japanese opponent, the battle was won by the ships of the United States Navy. It is worth noting that the battle conditions are not entirely equal. "Kirishima" at a venerable age, which was approaching 30 years, was two generations older than the American battleships, that is, it was old enough to be their grandfather. Kirishima began its life as a battlecruiser designed by the British during the First World War, and then through successive steps it was turned into a high-speed battleship. The Kirishima's booking was half that of the Washington or South Dakota. Was it armor? The Kirishima's sister ship, the battleship Hiei, two days earlier, also in a night battle, was taken out of the battle by the Americans with one hit from an 8-inch shell to the steering gear. The Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal resulted in victory for the American fleet, but the cost, as in many other cases that took place in the waters of the Solomon Islands, was high. Three American destroyers sank (Benham sank by the end of the day), another destroyer and the battleship South Dakota were heavily damaged. It took seven months to repair the battleship.

Meanwhile, other ships of the South Dakota class completed combat training and were ready to take part in hostilities. "Massachusetts" received a baptism of fire on November 8, 1942. Off the coast of North Africa, where the battleship escorted transports with landing forces that took part in Operation Torch. The American battleship also took part in the “neutralization” of the French battleship Jean Bart. The Massachusetts hit the Jean Bart with five 16-inch shells and disabled the French ship's only operational main-caliber turret. By the evening of November 8, the invasion fleet began to be threatened by several destroyers of the Vichy government fleet. One 16-inch shell from the Massachusetts and several 8-inch shells fired through the Tuscaloosa's gun barrels caused the sinking of the destroyer Fogue. In this battle, the Massachusetts was almost hit by a torpedo fired by a French submarine. The torpedo missed the battleship's hull by only 15 feet. Just before nightfall, a 16-inch shell from an American battleship's gun pierced the bow of the French destroyer Milan, after which the latter withdrew from the battle. At approximately 11 p.m., Massachusetts was hit by a 5-inch cannon shell from the French destroyer Boulogne, which soon disappeared in a barrage of concentrated artillery fire from the battleship Massachusetts and the light cruiser Brooklyn. The battle ended with a direct hit by a 16-inch shell from the battleship Massachusetts on the French flagship, the light cruiser Primacu. The French fought bravely, but their light forces stood no chance against the US Navy's newest fast battleship. The commander of the French squadron gave the order to return to port.

"Indiana" at the end of November 1942 found itself in the waters of the island. Tonga, where she, along with the Washington and the repaired North Carolina, provided cover for the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Saratoga during operations off Guadalcanal. There was not much work for the battleships here, since both the Japanese and the Americans had not yet recovered from the fierce naval battles off the Solomon Islands. In the first almost six months of 1943, large naval battles almost nothing happened in the South Pacific. The crews of fast American battleships spent most of this period on Noumea. where they periodically hunted wild animals of New Caledonia, ate them, washed down the meat with excellent Australian champagne. Time was on America's side. When the US Navy resumed in mid-1943 offensive operations in the Pacific Ocean, the command already had a much stronger fleet at its disposal.

American naval activity in 1943 resumed in June in both the Pacific and Atlantic. The repaired South Dakota joined the Alabama at Scapa Flow. allowing the British to send the battleships of the Home Fleet, Howe and King George V, to Sicily to participate in Operation Husky. Along with the remaining British battleships of the "Home" fleet, Anson. The Duke of York and Malaya, the cruisers Augusta and Tuscaloosa, two American battleships took part in a demonstration off the coast of Norway in order to divert the attention of the Kriegsmarine command from the Mediterranean Sea. Unfortunately for the Allies, German intelligence did not detect the movements of the Anglo-American fleet. Soon after the demonstration, the South Dakota left the hospitable waters of Great Britain, going to the Pacific Ocean, where the battleships Washington, North Carolina and Indiana formed TF3. 3, designed to support Operation Cartwheel, the invasion of New Georgia scheduled for June 30. This was the first of the typical amphibious operations in which the fast battleships of the US Navy were involved - three battleships were escorted by aircraft carriers (in this case the American Saratoga and the British Victoria), while the "old" battleships provided fire support for the invasion forces . Indiana would later be involved in escorting the first carrier raid, during which carrier-based aircraft attacked Makin on August 31. The aircraft carriers Yorktown, Essex and Independence took part in that raid.

Indiana returned to the Gilbert Islands on November 19, 1943 as part of TF50. 2 along with the battleship North Carolina. The battleships were escorted by the aircraft carriers Enterprise, Belly Wood and Monterey, which were involved in Operation Galvanic, the invasion of Makin. Washington, South Dakota and Massachusetts made up the TF50. 1, which also included the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Lexington and Cowpens, which covered the landing on Mili. At the end of August, carrier-based aircraft softened the Japanese defenses in the Gilbert Islands, so the samurai resisted the invasion for no more than a week. The Japanese were able to hold out only on Makina and, to a greater extent, on Tarawa. The same five high-speed battleships were brought together again by December 8 to cover the movement of aircraft carriers in the direction of Kwajalein. All five battleships were part of one formation, TF50. 8, which Rear Admiral Lee took command of. The battleships advanced to Nauru under the cover of aircraft from the aircraft carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey, where they fired 810 16-inch shells and 3,400 5-inch shells at the island’s small Japanese garrison. With return fire, the Japanese sank one escort destroyer of the American squadron.

Fast battleships again found themselves in the fire of battle on January 29, 1944 - Operation Flintlock, the invasion of the Marshall Islands. Now there were already eight battleships, the Alabama (came from the Atlantic) and the first two Iowas (Iowa and New Jersey) were added. Again the battleships were divided between aircraft carrier groups. "Washington", "Indiana" and "Massachusetts" were assigned to connection TG58. 1 ("Enterprise", "Yorktown" and "Belly Wood"), operating in the waters of the islands of Roy and Namur (Kwajalein). North Carolina, South Dakota and Alabama escorted the aircraft carriers Essex, Intrepid and Cabot of TG58. 2 in the waters of Maloelap. The newest "Iowa" and "New Jersey" worked in the interests of TG58. 3 (Bunker Hill, Monterey and Cowpens) in the Eniwetok area. In the first hours of February 1, a collision between the battleships Indiana and Washington occurred in the waters of Kwajalein. The ships were not seriously damaged, but their combat activity was interrupted for several months.

The six surviving high-speed battleships took part in the raid, codenamed Hailstone, launched against the island of Truk on February 17–18, 1944. Iowa and New Jersey were assigned to formation TG50. 9. Then Admiral Spruance chose the battleship New Jersey as his flagship. The other four battleships, along with the escort carriers, formed TG58. 3, it played an auxiliary role in the operation. A month later, on 18 March, Iowa and New Jersey, again under the command of Rear Admiral Lee, escorted the aircraft carrier Lexington and seven destroyers in TG50. 10 during the bombardment of Milli Atoll, south of Majuro. During the operation, Iowa received several direct hits from 6-inch shells fired by Japanese coastal batteries, which, however, did not cause serious damage to the ship. The battleship remained in the battle line. A similar group was formed on May 1, it was again commanded by our good friend Lee (already vice admiral!). for a raid to Ponape Island from the Caroline Archipelago. Seven fast battleships (Indiana was removed) and ten destroyers, supported by aircraft from aircraft carriers of formation TF58. 1 shot around the island without interference.

For the next raid operation, seven battleships were again brought together, although now the place of the Massachusetts was taken by the Washington (with a new bow); "Massachusetts" went for repairs. Battleships formed the core of the TG58 group. 7. intended for shelling the enemy as part of Operation Forager - the invasion of the Mariana Islands. Spruance expected opposition from the Japanese fleet. The expectations of the American naval commander were justified - on June 18, 1944, an epic naval battle unfolded in the Philippine Sea, well known as the Great Marianas Defeat. Lee's battleships then formed the core of the 5th Fleet. Throughout the day, the American battleships were subject to sporadic attacks by Japanese aircraft, whose main targets were actually US Navy aircraft carriers. The South Dakota then received one direct hit from an air bomb, and another bomb exploded under the Indiana's side.

Spruance's strategy in that three-day battle was considered by modern critics to be at times lacking in aggressiveness. The most questionable thing is the admiral's decision to turn away from Ozawa's fleet on the evening of the 18th, giving the initiative into the hands of the Japanese naval commander. Spruance's decision was then greatly influenced by Lee, who did not want to risk his still intact battleships in a night battle with the Japanese, known for their art of fighting in the dark. Lee reasonably doubted the ability of his ships, which had never operated in a single battle formation, to inflict more damage on the enemy than the enemy would inflict on them.

The damage inflicted on the South Dakota did not cause the battleship to be sent to Pearl Harbor for repairs. At the same time, the North Carolina went to the West Coast of the United States for repairs, which this ship needed more than the South Dakota. Thus, six high-speed battleships remained available, capable of taking part in Admiral Halsey's TF38 raid into the Philippine Sea in September - October 1944.

And again the group of high-speed battleships was dismembered. "Iowa" and "New Jersey" (Admiral Halsey's flagship) gave the formation TG38. 3. Four other battleships (Washington, Indiana, Massachusetts and Alabama) entered TG38. 3. Washington - Admiral Lee's flagship. These forces supported raids on Palac (6–8 September), Mindanao (10 September), Visayas (12–14 September), and Luzon (21–22 September). During the short pause that followed the strike on Luzon. "South Dakota" was replaced by "Indiana"; "South Dakota" went for repairs. The attacks resumed with a raid against Okinawa (October 10), then again against Luzon (October 11), then Formosa (October 12–14), Luzon again (October 15). In anticipation of the invasion of Leyte Gulf, which began on 17 October, Washington and Alabama were transferred from TG38. 3 in TG38. 4.

The Imperial Japanese Navy responded to the American invasion of the Philippines by gathering its main forces for the last time. For the last time, Lee’s battleships had an excellent chance, with a high probability of a successful outcome, to meet their opponents in person without intermediaries in the form of aircraft carriers. Lee didn’t get this chance.

The fast battleships were distributed in pairs among Admiral Halsey's carrier force, which was in the San Bernardino Strait for most of the day on October 24. According to the main forces of the Japanese fleet, the squadron of Admiral Kurito. carrier-based aircraft of the American fleet operated. The planes sank the super battleship Musashi, and Kurita's force was partly sunk and partly scattered. By the evening of October 24, the aircraft carriers of Admiral Ozawa's Northern Fleet, which was operating independently, were spotted by the Americans north of Luzon. Halsey gave the order at 15.12 to Lee's high-speed battleships to head north, isolating them into a separate formation TF34.

Lee protested against the removal of his battleships from the general fleet and the immediate departure of the ships from the San Bernardino Strait. He protested twice, both protests had no effect on Halsey. There were not even radar patrol destroyers left in the San Bernardino Strait.

In a slow and dangerous night maneuver, Lee regrouped his forces, concentrating the battleships in a screen ahead of the carriers. Maneuvering took most of the night. At dawn on October 25, TF34 was formed and, at the head of Halsey's fleet, began to pursue Ozawa's aircraft carriers at high speed, the American fleet filling the entire horizon. Three hours after Halsey left the strait, the ships of Admiral Kurita's Central Squadron arrived here. Right at the moment Halsey launched the first strike on Ozawa’s ships, Admiral Kincaid, who was in Leyte Gulf, 300 miles to the south, radioed for help. Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor heard Kincaid's calls and did not understand how the Japanese reached the Taffy-3 connection undetected and why the Japanese were not intercepted by Lee's battleships. At 1000 Nimitz radioed Halsey:

- FROM WITH IN RAC ACYION COM TFIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF77 X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TF34 RR THE WORLD WONDERS

The last three words were added to the radiogram to confuse Japanese cryptographers, but Halsey took them personally. Halsey was furious, feeling that he was being made out to be an "M" weirdo in front of Admiral King (COMINCH) and Admiral Kincaid (CTF77). The admiral had a stroke, almost an hour passed before he gave the order at 10.55 to Admiral Lee to go to the rescue at full speed. TF34 returned to the strait at 1.00 on October 26, Kurita had left three hours earlier. The irony of fate is that at the time of receiving the order to return to San Bernardino, Lee's battleships were only 42 miles from Ozawa's aircraft carriers. There was a chance of a successful battle both at the starting and ending points of the route. As a result, it didn’t work out either way. not here. Four battleships scurried across the sea-ocean in a completely obscene manner.

The chance for the last general battle of the battle fleets turned out to be missed, to the great indignation of naval historians of all countries and generations - how many lost fees! It's one thing to criticize Halsey and Lee, it's another to describe the battle. The number of printed characters, directly proportional to the amount of the fee, in the latter case increases many times. Well - this is how the cards of historical solitaire lay down.

Having missed the chance to put an end to the twilight of their historical career, American battleships accompanied aircraft carriers for the rest of the war, occasionally being involved in shelling Japanese coastal positions. Of the significant events, it is worth noting only the trip of the New Jersey and the newest Wisconsin to Cam Ranh Bay in January 1945, guarding a cruiser and a destroyer in order to shoot at the surviving Kurita ships, which allegedly found their refuge in Cam Ranh. The campaign was interrupted, since on January 12, aviation reconnaissance was convinced of Kurita’s absence in Cam Ranh.

With the exception of the campaign to Cam Ranh, high-speed battleships were exclusively engaged in escorting aircraft carriers until the end of the war. Battleships, along with aircraft carriers, passed from November 1944 to March 1945 Luzon, Okinawa, Indochina, mainland China, Formosa and waters Japanese Islands. On January 25, the Indiana bombarded Iwo Jima once, firing 203 16-inch shells. In April 1945, the main efforts of the American fleet were directed to Okinawa, then high-speed battleships fired at Japanese positions on the island several times. When the carriers returned to Japanese waters in July, the fast battleships came with them. "South Dakota", "Indiana" and "Massachusetts" fired on the island of Kamaishi on July 14. 29–30 July Hamamatsu aircraft plant and again 9 August 1945 Kamaishi Island.

Victory over Japan Day found the high-speed battleships of the American Navy in Tokyo Bay distributed among four aircraft carrier groups. The fact that the South Dakota was the flagship of Admiral Nimitz, and the signing of the Japanese Surrender Act took place on board the Missouri, completely obscured the very modest contribution that high-speed battleships actually made to the outcome of the campaign in the Pacific. In fact, except for the first battles, these ships acted only as fast armored floating batteries.

With the end of World War II, heated discussions arose in the United States about reducing military spending, as well as about ways to further build the armed forces in general and the Navy in particular. The fate of ten new battleships was also discussed. These ships became the crown of development, but the crown of development, according to most experts, no longer had a future. Battleships couldn't fly. Airplanes finally became the main caliber of the navy.

In 1946, the battleship Missouri took part in the highly successful Operation Goodwill, a campaign in the Mediterranean undertaken to limit the activity of the communist movement in Greece and Turkey. The operation of large ships with numerous crews required significant costs, while the role of such ships remained not entirely clear. In this light, the decision to withdraw battleships from the fleet’s operational composition appears logical. On September 11, 1946, exactly one year after Victory over Japan Day, the USS Indiana was withdrawn from the Navy. North Carolina and three other South Dakotas followed the path paved by Indiana in 1947. New Jersey and Wisconsin were removed from the fleet lists in 1948, Iowa in 1949.

At the start of the Korean War in 1950, the only battleship left in service with the US Navy was the Missouri. He arrived on the shores of Korea in mid-September 1950 and immediately began using his big guns to very remarkable effect. The assessment of the combat work was so high that in 1951 they decided to put three Iowa-class battleships back into service.

The second “tour” of the Iowa combat service turned out to be longer than the first. The parties concerned signed an armistice in 1952, but before the armistice the main body of four American battleships actively fought the threat of communism, bombarding Korea left and right, that is, from the East and from the West. For two years after the armistice, four battleships remained in service with the Navy, while their further fate Again, legislators who decided to cut defense spending did not intervene. The first to be removed from the Navy's combat lists was the Missouri, on February 26, 1955. The following year, the “sisters” of “Missouri” were retired. The Mississippi was withdrawn from Navy service on March 8, 1958 - for the first time since 1895, there was not a single battleship left in the US Navy.

S.K.

SK-2

One by one, the battleships were sent to be dismantled, although there were also supporters of continuing the active service of battleships. In the early 50s, the possibility of increasing the full speed of six old “fast” battleships to 31 knots was studied, so that their use for escorting aircraft carriers would again become possible. The price of such an improvement turned out to be prohibitively high, which is why the idea had to be abandoned. "North Carolina" and "Washington" were scrapped on June 1, 1960 ("North Carolina", however, was preserved as a monument ship). Two years later, the time came for the four South Dakotas. Two of them, Massachusetts and Alabama, were permanently moored. If the Vietnam War had not happened, a similar fate would most likely have awaited Iowa. The Vietnam War made us remember battleships - a decision was made to modernize and commission the New Jersey. The battleship once again entered service with the US Navy on April 8, 1968. The battleship’s participation in Vietnam events turned out to be very short-term, despite the extremely positive effect provided by its main caliber. Alarmed diplomats raised a fuss about “... the destabilizing influence...” in fear of a possible super-response from the enemy. On December 17, 1969, New Jersey was again put into reserve.

The Iowa's radio equipment differed from that of the New Jersey only in the installation of an FC antenna on the tower-like superstructure. The coloring is extremely unusual, camouflage: Dull Black/Ocean Gray. Please note: one side of the black stripes is clear, the other is “softened” with gray paint. This paint scheme was developed for use in the Atlantic on escort carriers. Presumably, "Iowa" is the only ship in the Pacific Ocean painted in this scheme.

A ray of light in the dark life of old battleships sparkled again in the 70s. Many narrow-minded people from among the inhabitants of the Pentagon have repeatedly criticized their superiors for their desire to store expensive relics of the Second World War. However, at the end of the decade, prominent analysts, mainly outside the Pentagon, began to develop new scenarios for naval policy in which there was a place for battleships. Since the mid-60s in American Navy There was a fairly slow process of replacing surface ships built during the Second World War with new ships, focused on use in the World Ocean in conditions of dominance of aircraft carriers and submarines, as the main means of warfare at sea. At that time, the majority of the world's navies (but not the Navy) entered service with relatively small and relatively weak ships, which were intended to combat aircraft and submarines. In most cases, they had no hull armor protection at all, and their superstructures were generally made of aluminum. Artillery was represented at best by a caliber of 5 inches. The ships were intended to protect aircraft carriers or to hunt enemy submarines. The main work was assigned to carrier-based aircraft.

Fire control radars

F.C.

FH

At the end of the 70s, this approach to the construction of the Navy was criticized by prominent representatives of the expert community. The Vietnam War showed that the development of air defense systems is progressing as rapidly as the development of aviation. This conclusion was confirmed during the Middle East war of 1973. Then the Israeli Air Force fulfilled the tasks assigned to it only at the cost of very heavy losses in people and equipment. Even if the level of losses in tactical aircraft taking part in a raid is 1% (a very optimistic estimate), their cost becomes fabulous - the price of one aircraft even then exceeded a million dollars. In addition, again with a loss level of 1%, two aircraft carriers (the standard composition of the US Navy aircraft carrier group) are not capable of providing direct air support to ground forces in the required volume for more or less a long time. None of the above problems could have been solved by the guns of ships of that time. 5-inch caliber shells did not have sufficient destructive effect to destroy coastal fortifications. The big question is whether ships not protected by armor will be able to withstand the fire of land artillery and tanks. Aluminum burns, and the superstructures of many American ships were made of aluminum to save weight. What a fire on an “aluminum” ship can lead to was clearly demonstrated by the collision of the cruiser Belknap with the aircraft carrier Kennedy in 1975. The British lost four ships of the destroyer-frigate class in the Falklands campaign, and several more ships were disabled due to damage, which would hardly have been fatal for ships of a similar class during the Second World War.

Analysts saw an alternative to the use of aviation, which was insufficient and sometimes inadequate, in high-speed battleships of the Second World War. At the end of the 70s, the issue of introducing Iowa-class ships into service with the US Navy again came up on the agenda. The logic is simple: aircraft from two aircraft carriers will deliver 420 tons of explosives ashore in about 12 hours of operations. while a battleship armed with nine 6-inch guns is capable of bringing down a similar “payload” on coastal structures in just 18 minutes. On the other hand, the range of carrier-based aircraft is several hundred miles, while the firing range of the main gun of a battleship is only 20 miles. However, the experience of the Vietnam War showed that 80% of carrier-based aircraft operated on targets that could have been fired from the guns of a battleship. In terms of accuracy of ammunition delivery and reaction time to a threat, a battleship is preferable to an aircraft. If we take naval artillery, then the 5-inch/45-caliber guns that were widespread at that time on US Navy ships simply cannot be compared with the 16-inch monsters of the Iowa-class battleships. Let's compare anyway. A five-inch projectile weighs about 70 kg, the firing range is about 13 nautical miles; the projectile is capable of penetrating a concrete floor 90 cm thick. The mass of a 15-inch caliber projectile is from 860 to 1220 kg, the firing range is more than 20 nautical miles, the projectile penetrates a concrete floor up to 9 m thick. New technologies have made it possible to increase the firing range of 16-inch caliber guns to 50 nautical miles. With 12 inches of armor and an all-steel construction, the Iowa-class battleships posed virtually no threat to anti-ship missiles like the French Exocet or the 500-pound bombs that had caused such heavy losses to the British fleet at the Falklands.

Despite the weight of the arguments of supporters of the next coming of battleships, military budget cuts during the presidency of Jimmy Carter made the return of the Iowas to the combat service of the US Navy impossible. Only the coming to power of Ronald Reagan in 1980 sparked hope in the hearts of battleship supporters. Reagan immediately after his housewarming party announced the start of a program to build a 600-ship navy. Appropriations allocated for the 1981 fiscal year included the commissioning of the battleship New Jersey, and allocations for the 1982 fiscal year included the commissioning of the Iowa. In the future, it was planned to modernize and commission the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin. Budget cuts and revisions of plans are typical of US politicians at the end of the 20th century, which is why plans in full were not implemented, and the program for commissioning battleships itself slowed down. The commissioning ceremony of the battleship New Jersey was furnished in Hollywood style, it took place on December 28, 1982 at the shipyard in Long Beach. “Iowa” underwent a deeper modernization, according to the full program, and not in a truncated form like “New Jersey”. Iowa entered service on April 28, 1984. The allocation of funds for the modernization and commissioning of the other two battleships was blocked by Congress. "New Jersey" showed excellent performance already in the first year of service after commissioning in Nicaragua and Lebanon.

According to the plan, New Jersey was to become the core of an autonomous formation of surface ships designed to strike the coast and enemy ships.

From the moment guns are installed on ships, the eternal rivalry between projectile and armor begins. After realizing the vulnerability of the majestic sailing fleet to gunfire, engineers and shipbuilders begin to install armor on warships. In the 19th century, the first battleships appeared, completing their development by the beginning of the 20th century and becoming the main striking and most powerful force of the fleet. They are being replaced by dreadnought battleships, even larger, more powerful and heavily armored. The development of battleships peaked during World War II, when the competition between shell and armor reached its climax, giving rise to the most powerful and magnificent ships ever created by man. They will be discussed in our article.

6. Battleships of the King George V class

Before World War II, the navies of the leading maritime powers were intensively armed with modern battleships. Great Britain was considered a trendsetter in the field of military shipbuilding and the most powerful naval power for several centuries, but after the First World War its leadership began to gradually fade away. As a result, the Lady of the Seas approached the war with the least powerful “main” battleship.

The British began designing battleships of the King George V type in the late 1920s to replace super-dreadnoughts. Over the course of several years, the original project underwent significant changes, and by 1935 the final version, about 230 meters long and with a displacement of about 35 thousand tons, was approved. The main caliber of the new battleship was to be ten 356-mm guns. The placement of the main caliber artillery was original. Instead of the classic four 2-gun turrets or three 3-gun turrets, they chose an option with two turrets of four guns each at the bow and stern and one turret with two guns at the bow. At the beginning of World War II, the caliber of 356 mm was considered insufficient and was the smallest among the other battleships of the leading powers. The King George armor-piercing projectile weighed a modest 721 kg. The initial speed was low - 757 m/s. The English guns did not shine with their rate of fire. The only advantages can be attributed to the traditionally high-quality gun barrels and armor-piercing shells, coupled with the reliability of the system as a whole.

The average caliber of the battleship was represented by sixteen 133-mm guns in two-gun turrets. These guns were supposed to become universal, conducting both anti-aircraft fire and performing the function of fighting enemy destroyers. While such guns coped well with the second task, they turned out to be ineffective against aviation due to their low rate of fire and imperfect guidance systems. Also battleships The King Georges were equipped with two reconnaissance seaplanes with one catapult.

The armor of British ships was based on the classic “all or nothing” principle, when the main and most important components of the ship were covered with the thickest armor, and the ends of the hull and deck remained practically unarmored. The thickness of the main armor belt reached an impressive 381 mm. Overall, the booking was quite good and balanced. The quality of the English armor itself remained excellent. The only criticism was the frankly weak mine and torpedo protection.

The main power plant developed 110 thousand horsepower and allowed the battleship to accelerate to 28 knots. The estimated cruising range at an economical 10-knot speed reached 14 thousand miles, but in reality everything turned out to be much more modest.

In total, the British managed to build five ships of this type. The battleships were created to confront the German fleet in the Atlantic, but they had to serve in many parts of the world. The most belligerent of the British battleships were the King George V, which had long been the flagship of the English Royal Navy, and the Prince of Wales, which took the battle along with the ill-fated Hood against the legendary Bismarck. At the end of 1941, the Prince of Wales was sunk by Japanese aircraft, but the rest of her brothers survived the war and were safely scrapped in 1957.

Battleship Vanguard

In addition to ships of the King George V type, during the war the British managed to lay down the new Vanguard - a larger and more powerful battleship, devoid of many of the shortcomings of previous battleships. In terms of displacement and armament (50 thousand tons and eight 381-mm guns), it resembled the German Bismarck. But the British were able to complete the construction of this ship only in 1946.

5. Battleships of the Littorio / Vittorio Veneto type

After the First World War, Italy did not experience the most better times. There was not enough money to build new battleships. Therefore, the release of new ships was postponed in every possible way for financial reasons. Italy began to develop a modern battleship only after the laying of powerful and fast battlecruisers of the Dunkirk class in France, its main rival in the Mediterranean, which completely devalued the old Italian battleships.

The main theater of military operations for the Italians was the Mediterranean Sea, which was historically considered “theirs.” This left its mark on the appearance of the new battleship. If for the British, autonomy and long cruising range were a key factor when developing their own battleships, then the Italian designers could sacrifice it for the sake of increased firepower and armor. The lead "Littorio" and "Vittorio Veneto" were larger than the "King George" - their total displacement was about 45 thousand tons with a length of about 240 meters. The battleships entered service in the spring of 1940.

The main battery consisted of nine powerful 15-inch (381 mm) guns in three 3-gun turrets. The Italians took the path of maximally boosting old guns of a similar caliber, increasing the barrel length from 40 to 50 calibers. As a result, Italian guns turned out to be record holders among 15-inch guns in Europe in terms of muzzle energy and projectile power, second in armor penetration only to the larger-caliber guns of the American Iowa and Japanese Yamato.

The weight of the armor-piercing projectile reached 885 kg with a high initial speed of 870 m/s. For this we had to pay for the extremely low accuracy and accuracy of fire, which is considered the main disadvantage of this type of battleship. Unlike the British, the Italians divided their medium artillery into mine and anti-aircraft artillery. Twelve 6-inch (152 mm) guns in four 3-gun turrets were used to combat the attacking destroyers. For firing at aircraft there were twelve 90-mm guns, which were supplemented by 37-mm machine guns. The experience of the war showed the complete inadequacy of the anti-aircraft artillery of Italian battleships, as well as most similar ships of other countries.

The air group of the Littorio-class battleships consisted of three seaplanes and one catapult for launching them. The main armor belt was spaced apart and, although not very impressive in thickness, provided protection against 380 mm shells.

Battleship Vittorio Veneto

The main power plant produced 130 thousand horsepower and accelerated the Italian battleship to 30 knots. Such a high speed was a great advantage and made it possible to choose the optimal combat distance or even evade the fire of a stronger enemy. The cruising range was quite modest (4.5-5 thousand miles), but quite sufficient for the Mediterranean.

Battleship Roma

In total, the Italians managed to launch three battleships of this type; the fourth ship remained unfinished. Throughout the Second World War, the courts were fighting and were periodically damaged by British and American aircraft, after which they were repaired and put back into service. As a result, "Vittorio Veneto" and "Littorio" were transferred after the war to the UK and the USA, respectively, where they were cut up in the mid-1950s. The third battleship, Roma, suffered a sadder fate. After the surrender of Italy, the Germans sank it with Fritz-X guided bombs so that the ship would not fall to the Allies. Thus, the beautiful and graceful Italian battleships were never able to gain military glory.

4. Battleships of the Richelieu class

After the First World War, France found itself in a situation similar to Italy regarding the state and further development navy.

After laying down the “pocket battleships” of the Scharnhorst class in Germany, the French were forced to urgently design ships to combat them. The resulting Dunkirk turned out to be so successful that it served as the basis for the creation of full-fledged battleships of the Richelieu class.

The full displacement of the Richelieu was almost 45 thousand tons, and the maximum length was about 250 meters. In order to fit the maximum possible weapons and heavy armor into a limited displacement, the French again used the original layout of the main caliber weapons, tested on the Dunkirk.

"Richelieu" carried eight 380-mm guns with a length of 45 calibers in two 4-gun turrets. The weight of the armor-piercing projectile was 890 kg with an initial speed of 830 m/s. This placement made it possible to save the total weight of each gun compared to 3- and especially 2-gun turrets. In addition, only two main caliber turrets instead of three or four required a shorter length of the main armor belt to protect the guns and artillery magazines, and simplified the system for storing and supplying ammunition and fire control.

But such a bold scheme also had its drawbacks. Damage to any of the towers resulted in the failure of half of the ship's artillery, so the French separated each of the towers with an armored partition. Each pair of guns had independent guidance and ammunition supply. In practice, the 2-tower scheme turned out to be unreliable. French sailors used to say that the turret rotation system could fail at any minute. In addition, the aft sector of the ship was not protected by the main caliber guns, which was partly compensated by the large rotation angles of the front turrets.

Battleship Jean Bart

The pride of French shipbuilders was armor and protection in general. In terms of survivability, the Richelieu was superior to its competitors from England and Italy, was approximately equal to the larger Bismarck and Iowa, and was second only to the much heavier Yamato. The main armor belt had a thickness of 330 mm and an 18 mm lining. The belt, tilted at 18 degrees, resulted in almost half a meter of armor. The unfinished Jean Bart received about five heavy 406-mm American main-caliber shells. The ship survived this.

The Richelieu power plant produced 150 thousand horsepower, and the speed of more than 31 knots was one of the best in the class, formally second only to the Iowa. The maximum cruising range was about 10 thousand miles at an economical speed.

In total, the French planned to build three battleships of this type. Only two were put into operation - "Richelieu" and "Jean Bar", which survived the war not without incident. These ships have become one of the most balanced and successful ships of this class. Many experts give them the palm in battleship construction. They combined enough powerful weapons, excellent armor and high speed. At the same time, they had average dimensions and displacement. However, many positive sides were only good on paper. Like the Italian battleships, the French Richelieu and Jean Bart did not cover their history with immortal exploits. They managed to survive the war and even serve after it, having undergone modernization. As for the aesthetic side, the author of the article puts them in first place. The French battleships turned out to be truly beautiful and graceful.

3. Bismarck-class battleships

After World War I, Germany was one of the first to begin designing new modern battleships. As a country that lost the war, it was prohibited from building large warships. Therefore, the launch Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could only be called battleships with a stretch. Nevertheless, German engineers gained serious experience. And after the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935, which effectively abolished the Versailles restrictions, Germany began the development and construction of the largest and most powerful ships ever in service with the German fleet.

Bismarck-class battleships had a total displacement of about 50 thousand tons, a length of 250 meters and a width of 36 meters, surpassing their European counterparts in size. The main artillery, as on the Richelieu and Vittorio Veneto, was represented by 380-mm guns. The Bismarck carried eight guns in four 2-gun turrets, two each at the bow and stern. This was a step back from the 3- and 4-gun turrets of competitors.

Main caliber artillery was more durable, but required more space, armor and, accordingly, weight to accommodate it. The Bismarck guns did not stand out as anything special other than traditional German quality compared to the fifteen-inch guns of the French and Italians. Unless, unlike the latter, the pragmatic Germans relied on shooting accuracy at the expense of the power and weight of the projectile (800 kg). As time has shown, it was not in vain.

The Bismarck's armor can be called moderate and not entirely ordinary. Using a scheme with four main caliber turrets, the Germans had to armor up to 70% of the hull length. The thickness of the main armor belt reached 320 mm in its lower part and up to 170 mm in the upper part. Unlike many battleships of the period, the armor of the German battleships was not sharply differentiated, with outstanding maximum thicknesses, but the overall armor area was higher than that of any of the competitors. Perhaps it was precisely this armoring scheme that allowed the Bismarck to withstand numerous salvos from the British for a long time, remaining afloat.

The main power plant was the weak point of the project. It developed about 150 thousand “horses”, accelerating the “Tirpitz” and “Bismarck” to 30 knots, which was a very good result. At the same time, it was not reliable and especially economical. The actual cruising range was almost 20% lower than the stated 8.5-8.8 thousand miles.

German shipbuilders were unable to create a ship that was qualitatively superior to its competitors. The combat characteristics of the Bismarck were at the level of the Richelieu and Littorio, but the combat fate of the German battleships made them the most recognizable and famous ships Second World War.

In total, the Germans managed to commission two ships of this type. In 1941, the Bismarck had to take part in a battle that became the most famous naval battle World War II. A German detachment from the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen collided with the British ships. And although the British had the advantage of the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Hood, the salvoes of the Bismarck sent the beauty and pride of the Royal Navy to the bottom in a matter of minutes - the flagship cruiser Hood, along with its entire crew. As a result of the duel, German ships were also damaged. The shocked and enraged British sent an entire squadron to capture the Bismarck. The German battleship almost managed to escape pursuit, but the British planes damaged the ship's steering, and then for a long time they shot at the immobilized ship with all their guns. As a result, the Bismarck crew opened the seams and sank their ship.

Model of the battleship Tirpitz

After the loss of one of the two battleships, the Germans hid the remaining Tirpitz in the Norwegian fjords. Even inactive and hidden, this ship remained a constant headache for the British throughout the war, drawing enormous forces onto itself. In the end, the Tirpitz could only be sunk from the air with specially designed huge 5-ton bombs.

2. Iowa-class battleships

The United States approached World War II as a leader in economic and production potential. The owner of the most powerful navy was no longer Great Britain, but its partner overseas. By the end of the 1930s, the Americans managed to develop a battleship project within the framework of the Washington Agreement. At first these were ships of the South Dakota class, which were generally comparable to their European competitors. Then the time came for even larger and more powerful battleships of the Iowa type, called by many experts the best ships of this class.

The length of such battleships reached a record 270 meters, and the total displacement exceeded 55 thousand tons. "Iowa" was supposed to resist Japanese battleships of the "Yamato" class. Nevertheless, American shipbuilders retained the 16-inch (406 mm) main artillery caliber used on the South Dakota. But the main caliber guns were lengthened from 45 to 50 calibers, increasing the power of the gun and the weight of the armor-piercing projectile from 1016 to 1225 kg. In addition to the guns themselves, when assessing the firepower of the Iowa-class ships, one should note the most advanced artillery fire control system among battleships of that period. In addition to ballistic computers and optical rangefinders, it used radar, which significantly increased shooting accuracy, especially in poor weather conditions.

In addition, given the perfection of guidance systems and the quality of ammunition, American battleships were the absolute leaders in anti-aircraft weapons.

But booking was not Iowa’s strong point. The citadel in the central part of the ship was covered by a modest 307 mm main armor belt. In general, the battleship was armored at the level of the South Dakota and European battleships with a smaller displacement, and it was even inferior to the Richelieu. Not relying too much on their armor protection, the Americans took a different path.

Iowa-class battleships received the most powerful power plant among similar ships, producing 212 thousand horsepower. For comparison, on the predecessor the turbine power reached only 130 thousand “horses”. Iowa could theoretically accelerate to a record 33 knots, surpassing absolutely all World War II battleships in speed. Thus, American battleships had an advantage in maneuver, being able to choose the optimal distance and conditions for artillery combat, partially compensating for not the strongest armor.

In total, the Americans planned to build six ships of this type. But taking into account the already built four battleships of the South Dakota type and the increasingly increasing role of aircraft carriers, the United States limited itself to a series of four ships - Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin. All battleships took an active part in the war in the Pacific. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Surrender Act was signed on board the Missouri.

The post-war fate of the Iowa-class battleships, unlike most ships of this class, was not entirely usual. The ships were not scrapped, but continued their service. The Americans actively used their battleships during the war in Korea and Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, the ships, which were already old by that time, underwent modernization, receiving modern electronic filling and guided cruise missiles. The last conflict in which battleships took part was the Gulf War.

The main caliber artillery was represented by nine 18-inch guns in three 3-gun turrets, classically arranged as on the Vittorio Veneto and Iowa. No battleship in the world had such artillery. The armor-piercing projectile weighed nearly one and a half tons. And in terms of the total weight of the Yamato salvo, it was almost twice as large as European battleships with 15-inch guns. The artillery fire control system was perfect for its time. And if the Yamato did not have such innovations as radars (they were installed on the Iowa), then optical rangefinders and ballistic computers were not inferior to their world counterparts. Simply put, it would have been better for any battleship of that time not to appear within the firing range of the Japanese monster’s guns of more than 40 kilometers.

Japanese anti-aircraft guns, while not inferior in quality to European ones, lagged behind American ones in terms of shooting accuracy and pointing speed. Small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft guns, the number of which during the war increased from eight built-in machine guns to fifty, were still qualitatively inferior to the Bofors and Oerlikons of the Americans.

The armor of the Yamato-class battleships, like the main artillery, was “top of the line.” Moreover, in an effort to install armor of maximum thickness on their ships, the Japanese tried to reduce the length of the citadel. As a result, the main armor belt covered only about half of the ship in the central part. But its thickness was impressive - 410 mm. It should be noted that Japanese armor was inferior in quality to the best at that time English and German due to the closure of access to Japan to the most modern technologies production of armor steel and lack of supplies of a number of rare alloying elements. But still, Yamato remained the most heavily armored ship in the world.

Battleship Musashi

The main power plant of the Japanese super-battleship was quite modest and produced about 150 thousand horsepower, accelerating huge ship up to 27.5 knots. Yamato was the slowest of the World War II battleships. But the ship carried the largest air group of reconnaissance aircraft - as many as seven on two catapults.

The Japanese planned to commission three battleships of this type, but were able to complete only two - Yamato and Musashi. The third, Shinano, was converted into an aircraft carrier. The fate of the ships was sad. Japanese sailors joked that Yamato-class battleships were larger and more useless than even such huge and useless things as the Wall of China and the Egyptian pyramids.

Defeat in the First World War seemed to have finally eliminated Germany from the list of contenders for naval dominance. According to the Treaty of Versailles, the Germans were allowed to operate ships with a displacement of up to 10 thousand tons with guns with a caliber of no more than 11 inches. Therefore, they had to say goodbye to the hope of preserving even their very first dreadnoughts and be content only with hopelessly outdated battleships such as Deutschland and Braunschweig. When the opportunity arose to replace the latter with ships of new projects (and this was allowed to be done no earlier than after 20 years of their being in service), it was these “Versailles” restrictions that led to the appearance of “capital” ships of the “Deutschland” type, unusual in all respects.

When creating it, the Germans proceeded from the fact that the new ship would primarily be used on enemy communications as a raider. The successful actions of the Emden and Königsberg against British shipping in 1914 clearly showed that the weak armament of light cruisers leaves them no chance when a more serious enemy appears. Therefore, the Deutschland must be stronger than any enemy heavy cruiser and at the same time faster than any battleship. This idea, frankly speaking, is not new, but attempts to implement it previously rarely led to the desired result. And only the Germans managed to finally realize it in metal as closely as possible to the plan. The Deutschlands, with a very limited displacement, received powerful weapons, decent (by cruising standards) protection and an enormous cruising range. In the German Navy, the new ships were officially classified as armadillos (panzerschiffe), essentially heavy cruisers, but due to the overly powerful main-caliber artillery they remained in the history of world shipbuilding as “pocket battleships.”

Indeed, the Deutschland's armament - two three-gun 11-inch turrets and another 8 six-inch guns as a medium caliber - looked quite "battleship-like". The new 283 mm gun (the Germans officially called it “28 cm”, and therefore in the literature it is often listed as 280 mm) - with a barrel length of 52 calibers and an elevation angle of 40, could fire 300 kg shells at a range of 42.5 km. “Squeezing” such artillery into cruising dimensions was made possible, firstly, by the comprehensive lightweighting of the hull due to the widespread introduction of electric welding and, secondly, by the use of fundamentally new engines - four twin diesel units with hydraulic transmission. As a result, the project left room for both an armor belt 60-80 mm thick and anti-torpedo protection about 4.5 m wide (including bulges), ending with a 40 mm longitudinal bulkhead.

The entry into service of the lead “pocket battleship” coincided with Hitler’s rise to power and resulted in a noisy propaganda campaign designed to convince the average person that the revival of the German fleet began with the creation of the “best in the world” ships. In reality, these statements were far from the truth. For all their originality, the Deutschland and the Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee that followed it were far from superior to all Washington cruisers in terms of armor protection, and in speed they were inferior to all of them by an average of 4-5 knots. The seaworthiness of the “pocket battleships” initially turned out to be unimportant, which is why they had to urgently redo the bow of the hull. To top it all off, it should be noted that their actual standard displacement exceeded the declared one (10 thousand tons) by 17-25%, and the total displacement on the Admiral Graf Spee generally reached 16,020 tons!

The obvious limited capabilities of “pocket battleships” in the light of the new naval doctrine declared by Hitler forced the abandonment of the construction of three more ships of the same type in favor of full-fledged battleships. In June 1935, an agreement was concluded in London allowing Germany to have a fleet that was 35% of the British one. Having won a diplomatic victory, the Germans could now build battleships quite legally.

The creation of the ships was under the personal control of the Fuhrer. It is he who is considered to be the author of the new role assigned to the armored giants of the Kriegsmarine in the brewing war. The fact is that, being unable to compete with the British fleet in a general battle, the Nazis intended to use their battleships as ocean raiders. It was in the actions of powerful ships against transport shipping that Hitler saw the opportunity to bring the “mistress of the seas” to her knees.

Based on the totality of their parameters, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are often (and quite rightly) called battlecruisers. However, their continuity with their outstanding ancestors - "Derflinger" and "Makensen" - is very conditional. The Scharnhorst project largely traces its origins to “pocket battleships.” The only thing that the designers borrowed from the Kaiser's battlecruisers was the armor scheme. Otherwise, the Scharnhorst is simply a Deutschland that has grown to normal size with a third 283 mm turret and a steam turbine unit.

The Scharnhorst's armor protection design was old-fashioned, but at the same time very powerful. A vertical belt of 350 mm cemented armor was attached externally and could withstand 1016 kg 406 mm projectiles at ranges of more than 11 km. Above there was an additional 45 mm belt. There were two armored decks: 50 mm upper and 80 mm (95 mm above the cellars) lower with 105 mm bevels. The total weight of the armor reached a record value - 44% of the normal displacement! The anti-torpedo protection had an average width of 5.4 m on each side and was separated from the hull by an inclined 45 mm bulkhead.

The 283-mm guns of the SKC-34 model were slightly improved compared to the previous SKC-28 model: the barrel length increased to 54.5 calibers, which allowed the heavier 330-kg projectile to provide the same firing range - 42.5 km. True, Hitler was dissatisfied: he considered the German ships of the First World War to be clearly under-armed and demanded that 380-mm guns be installed on the Scharnhorst. Only his reluctance to delay the entry of battleships into service for a long time (and new weapons would delay their readiness for at least a year) forced him to compromise, postponing the rearmament of the ships until their future modernizations.

The mixed placement of medium artillery in two-gun turrets and deck-mounted shield installations looks very strange. But this fact can be explained very easily: the latter had already been ordered for the failed 4th and 5th “pocket battleships”, and the Scharnhorst designers simply “disposed of” them.

Already during the construction of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, it became clear that the international community's attempts to limit the naval arms race had failed. The leading naval powers immediately began designing super-battleships, and the Germans, naturally, did not stand aside.

In June 1936, the Bismarck and Tirpitz, the largest, were laid down at the shipyards of Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven warships ever built in Germany. Although it was officially stated that the displacement of the new battleships was 35 thousand tons, in reality this value was almost one and a half times higher!

Structurally, the Bismarck was largely the same as the Scharnhorst, but was fundamentally different primarily in its main caliber artillery. A 380-mm cannon with a barrel length of 52 calibers could fire 800-kg projectiles with an initial speed of 820 m/s. True, by reducing the maximum elevation angle to 30, the firing range compared to the 11-inch gun decreased to 35.5 km. However, this value was considered excessive, since fighting at such distances then seemed impossible.

The armor differed from the Scharnhorst mainly in the increase in the height of the main belt and the thickening of the upper belt to 145 mm. The deck armor, as well as the width of the torpedo protection, remained the same. Approximately the same can be said about the power plant (12 Wagner boilers and 3 four-case turbo-gear units). The relative weight of the armor has decreased slightly (up to 40% of the displacement), but this cannot be called a disadvantage, since the ratio between protection and weapons has become more balanced.

But even such giants as Bismarck and Tirpitz could not satisfy the growing ambitions of the Fuhrer. At the beginning of 1939, he approved the design of an "N" type battleship with a total displacement of over 62 thousand tons, armed with eight 406 mm guns. In total it was supposed to have 6 such ships; two of them were laid in July-August. However, the outbreak of war thwarted the Nazi plans. Programs for the construction of surface ships had to be curtailed, and in September 1939, Hitler could oppose 22 British and French battleships and battlecruisers with only the “11-inch” Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (“pocket battleships” do not count). The Germans had to rely only on new raider tactics.

The first joint corsair operation, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, was carried out in November 1939. The result was the sinking of the English auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi, a former passenger liner armed with old guns. The success was, to put it mildly, modest, although Goebbels’s propaganda inflated this unequal duel to the scale of a major naval victory, and in the “Library of German Youth” series they even published a separate book called “The End of Rawalpindi.”

In April 1940, both sisterships provided cover for the German invasion of Norway and for the first time entered into battle with a worthy opponent - the battlecruiser Rinaun. The duel took place in poor visibility conditions and lasted intermittently for more than two hours. The Gneisenau scored two hits on the British, but also received two 381-mm shells, one of which silenced the rear turret. The Scharnhorst was not hit, but its bow turret was also disabled due to damage caused by the storm.

Soon another battle took place in Norwegian waters, which received a huge resonance in navies all over the world. On June 8, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau stumbled upon the British aircraft carrier Glories, escorted by the destroyers Ardent and Ekasta. Using radar, the Germans opened fire from a range of 25 km and quickly scored hits that damaged the flight deck and prevented the planes from taking off. The Glories caught fire, capsized and sank. Trying to save the aircraft carrier, the destroyers bravely rushed into a suicidal attack. Both were shot, but still one torpedo from the Ekasta hit the Scharnhorst. The battleship took on more than 2500 tons of water and received a list of 5 to starboard; two artillery turrets - a rear 283 mm and one 150 mm - were out of action; the speed decreased sharply. All this somewhat blurred the undoubted success of the operation.

The results of the first battle between battleships and an aircraft carrier inspired admirals with conservative views on naval warfare, but, alas, not for long. Very soon it became clear that the shooting of "Glories" was just a tragic coincidence, an exception to the rule...

The finest hour of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" was their joint "ocean voyage" in January - March 1941. During two months of piracy in the Atlantic, they captured and sank 22 allied ships with a total tonnage of over 115 thousand tons and returned to Brest with impunity.

But then fortune turned away from the Germans. While in French ports, the battleships began to come under massive air attacks. It was barely possible to complete the repair of some damage before the British bombs caused new ones. I had to carry my feet away. The breakthrough across the English Channel into Germany in February 1942 was the last joint operation of Hitler's super-raiders.

On the night of February 27, the Gneisenau, which had just arrived in Kiel, was hit by a British 454-kg armor-piercing bomb in the area of ​​the first tower. The explosion caused enormous destruction and fire (230 main-caliber powder charges ignited at once). 112 sailors were killed and 21 wounded. The battleship was towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia) for repairs. During the latter, by the way, it was planned to replace the main artillery with six 380-mm guns. Alas, these plans remained on paper. In January 1943, all work was stopped, and on March 27, 1945, the skeleton of the Gneisenau was flooded in order to block the entrance fairway.

"Scharnhorst" after lengthy repairs (it was blown up by two mines during the English Channel breakthrough) moved to Norway, where it then mainly defended itself in the fjords. On December 26, 1943, under the flag of Admiral Erich Bey, while attempting to attack the allied convoy JW-55B, it was intercepted by British cruisers. The very first hit from the cruiser Norfolk disabled the German radar, which led to fatal consequences in the conditions of the polar night. Soon the battleship Duke of York joined the cruisers, and the Scharnhorst's position became hopeless. After stubborn resistance, the raider, crippled by heavy shells, was finished off by torpedoes from British destroyers. The British picked up 36 people from the water - the remaining 1,932 crew members of the fascist battleship died.

"Bismarck" and "Tirpitz" entered service with the Kriegsmarine during the war. The first combat campaign for the lead ship turned out to be the last. The beginning of the operation, it would seem, was going well: the unexpected death of the Hood in the eighth minute of the battle on May 24, 1941 plunged the British admirals into shock. However, the Bismarck also received a fatal hit from a 356-mm shell that dove under the armor belt. The ship took on about 2 thousand tons of water, two steam boilers failed, and the speed decreased by 3 knots. What happens next is well known. Three days later, the fascist battleship sank. Of the 2092 people on board, 115 were saved. Among the dead was Admiral Lutyens, the former hero of the Atlantic raid of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

After the death of the sistership, the Germans used the Tirpitz extremely carefully. As a matter of fact, he also had only one military operation to his name - an almost fruitless campaign to Spitsbergen in September 1942. The rest of the time, the super-battleship hid in the Norwegian fjords and was methodically “beaten up” by British aircraft. In addition, on September 11, 1943, it received a severe blow from under the water: the British midget submarines X-6 and X-7 detonated 4 two-ton mines under its bottom. The last Nazi battleship never had the chance to go to sea under its own power:

It should be noted that in maritime historical literature, Bismarck and Tirpitz are often called almost the most powerful battleships in the world. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, this is what Nazi propaganda said. Secondly, the British played along with it in order to justify the not always successful actions of their many times superior fleet. Thirdly, the rating of Bismarck was greatly increased by the generally accidental death of Hood. But in reality, compared to their counterparts, the German super-battleships did not stand out in better side. In terms of armor, armament and torpedo protection, they were inferior to the Richelieu, Littorio, and South Dakota, not to mention the Yamato. The weak points of the “Germans” were capricious energy, the “non-versatility” of 150-mm artillery, and imperfect radar equipment.

As for Scharnhorst, it is usually criticized, which again is not entirely fair. Although it had the same shortcomings as the Bismarck (to which was initially added poor seaworthiness, which forced it to rebuild the bow of the hull), due to its smaller size, in accordance with the cost-effectiveness criterion, it deserves a good rating. In addition, we must take into account that this was the second project in the world (after Dunkirk) to implement a high-speed battleship project, ahead of its more powerful “class brothers” in time. And if the Scharnhorst could be rearmed with six 380-mm guns, then it could generally be considered a very successful battlecruiser, superior to the British Repulse in almost all respects.