Special forces of the armies of the world. Special forces of the armies of the world Victory in unity

Many in our country received the news of the revolution in Afghanistan with a sense of satisfaction. In yet another neighboring state in the East, forces have awakened striving for the establishment of justice, the formation of a society where the Labor Man would dominate.

The situation that developed around Afghanistan, as it was seen then, and even more clearly now, decades later, was a kind of exacerbated continuation of the struggle between the two worlds - capitalist and socialist. After all, the events in Afghanistan were directly related not only to the USSR, Pakistan, Iran, HP and the USA, but also to a number of European, Asian powers, countries of the Arab world.

No matter how current politicians and publicists evaluate the participation of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs, it is difficult in common sense to get away from a simple and clear view of this participation. History decreed that our country and Afghanistan are neighbors. For a long time, under different regimes of government, the most friendly relations and close economic ties were maintained between them. Long before the April Revolution, the USSR provided practical assistance to Afghanistan in many areas. Our specialists were sent there, who, together with Afghan business circles, solved the problems of developing comprehensive cooperation. With the help of the Soviet Union, hundreds of major economic facilities were built. Among them: the Jalalabad irrigation complex, a number of large chemical enterprises, plants and factories for the processing of agricultural raw materials. Assistance was provided in the training of personnel, in military construction.

It was natural for us to support both the revolution itself and the new government. Since 1978, various ties have intensified. Along with other areas of cooperation, contacts were also expanding in the law enforcement field. Close cooperation was established between the Ministries of the Interior. A group of advisers to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs appeared in Kabul. Before the introduction of the limited contingent of our troops, the apparatus of advisers to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was quantitatively strengthened. It was headed by Alexander Mikhailovich Kosogovsky, an experienced general who knew military and police affairs well.

The features of cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, during the deployment of an armed confrontation in the country (and that was a very difficult time), are described in the memoirs of a number of advisers of that period, including Alexander Sergeevich Klyushnikov. He worked at first with the senior adviser of the Ministry of Internal Affairs N.S. Veselkov, then in the team of A.M. Kosogovsky, and with the organization of the Representative Office - already as a deputy head.

The entry of our troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was preceded by events that seriously affected the military-political situation in the country. First of all, they include the assassination of the President, the leader of the revolution, the founder of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammed Taraki. The power ended up in the hands of the organizer of the assassination, the closest "ally" of the head of state, Hafizullah Amin. The subsequent adventurous actions, terror and repression against many prominent representatives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as well as business and religious authorities, caused discord in the party itself, as well as a sharp increase in the offensive of the armed counter-revolutionary forces.

As is known, with the direct participation of the Soviet side, its special armed units, measures were taken to eliminate Amin. Babrak Karmal, the leader of one of the two wings of the PDPA, Parcham, stood at the head of the party and the state.

In a few words, it should be explained that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was formed from two wings - currents: the right - "Parcham" (banner) and the left - "Khalk" (people). The main provisions of both currents were practically the same. Although, it must be said, the left wing was more resolutely disposed towards the radical, socialist course of the revolution. The right - more moderate, preferred only national-democratic transformations. However, the differences between these currents in practice manifested themselves more along the line of estate, class affiliation of members, and not because of program contradictions.

The "Parcham" wing consisted mainly of representatives of the intelligentsia, the top of society. "Khalq" was formed from the lower and middle layers. Shortly before the revolution, these currents united, led the party, and after the revolution and the state - Taraki, a Khalqist, known to the people as a progressive politician and writer of a democratic orientation. His companion, Amin, was also a Khalqist. Babrak Karmal, as already noted, was the leader of the other wing of the party. He held the position of second person in the party.

By the end of 1980, it was already clear that the change of leader, and at the same time the reorientation in general towards the Parchamist, elite part of the party, as well as the introduction of our troops, could not turn the tide, provide an effective solution to the fundamental problem of the revolution - its defense. The strength of the party and its support among the bulk of the population, among the peasants, turned out to be too weak. In order to save the situation, reliably resist the armed actions of the counter-revolution and expand the influence of the new government, all-round mobilization was needed, primarily internal forces. Active and widespread organizational, propaganda and other vital measures were required on the part of the party, its activists in the midst of the people, in villages, districts, provincial centers ...

In this vein, the Soviet side gave the necessary recommendations and provided comprehensive assistance. Among measures of this order, a decision was made to create a branched Representation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. Its main task was to provide practical assistance in the formation of a kind of internal troops - the operational units of the tsarandoi.

It was assumed that such units, deployed in counties, volosts and provincial centers, would be able to take on the task of actively protecting the new government, as well as reliable protection of the most important communications and enterprises.

From the beginning of the revolution, these functions in the localities were carried out by armed detachments of party members. But the party was small. In the middle of 1980, it had only about 15 thousand people in its ranks. At the same time, a significant part of it was in the military units of the Ministry of Defense, the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Information Service (SGI).

I began to understand all this after, at the end of November 1980, in the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I was told that it was necessary to head the Representation being created and to organize our assistance in the urgent formation of operational units of the tsarandoi as best as possible. From the conversations in the Central Committee, I remember the main thing: the faster and better we complete the task, the less the burden in combat work will fall on the units of the Limited Contingent of our troops, the less losses there will be.

This was also connected with the fact that as they were recruited, equipped, and improved in combat skills, these tsarandoy units should be included, in the order of interaction, in military operations.

Why did the choice fall on me? I didn't think much about it. I was known in the Central Committee from my previous work in the Department of Administrative Bodies, before that I had to visit various positions in the Komsomol and Party committees of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In the Ministry of the Interior for ten years he was the head of the centralized police organization in transport.

All this, apparently, was taken into account by the leadership of the Department of the Central Committee and the Ministry.

I am talking about this only because both then and later, many people asked me the question: why exactly were you appointed head of the Representative Office?

My former curator Boris Alekseevich Viktorov, the smartest lawyer and a wonderful soul, was especially interested in this. By that time, he had already retired from the post of Deputy Minister. These questions had to be answered with jokes. I understood that everyone who asked them expected confirmation of his opinion, and these opinions, I think, were different. It seemed to some comrades that the new position was a demotion, because. The head office of the Ministry is much more solid than the Representation. However, such appointments, it seems to me, should be perceived differently: as trust and a responsible assignment, behind which stand not only your honor and conscience, but, to a certain extent, the authority and prestige of the people and departments that vouch for you. I took this appointment precisely as a great trust. Moreover, proposals about it came from the minister Nikolai Anisimovich Shchelokov, respected by me, and the leadership of the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee.

Interest in this Representation arose among many, apparently due to the fact that, perhaps for the first time in the history of our state, such a kind of "embassy" was established, which was entrusted with dealing with some purely internal problems of another country, and even during the civil war.

However, this was justified by the desire to help the revolutionary government of Afghanistan in a difficult period of its history.

One of the main tasks of the Representation was to assist the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA in bringing to the end of 1981

tsarandoy forces to 50 thousand armed fighters, and a year later, a maximum of two, to 80-90 thousand.

It must be borne in mind that by the beginning of 1981 there were less than 30,000 people in the tsarandoy of Afghanistan.

It was clear that the task was no easy one. Moreover, it must be solved in the context of a civil war. This means that it is necessary to create such a team of the Representation, which could really lend a shoulder to the Afghan ministry and its subdivisions in the provinces.

The Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR began an urgent selection of experienced, established specialists for key positions in the Representation. Without delay, Alexander Sergeevich Klyushnikov was appointed Deputy Head of the Representative Office. He went through a good police school in Moscow, worked as the head of a large regional department of internal affairs. He earned respect and authority in the central office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, heading a responsible area of work there. He managed to prove himself in Afghanistan, in the advisory apparatus.

The experience and good business qualities of Alexander Sergeevich were most useful during the formation and deployment of the work of the Representative Office in many areas. But it was especially valuable that he skillfully organized operational intelligence work.

Along with the creation of the Representation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, a special reconnaissance detachment "Cobalt" was also formed by that time. He played an important role in identifying gangs in the provinces, clarifying the data of other intelligence services, when using them in the development and implementation of military operations, incl. and general character.

The Representation and "Cobalt" had broad reconnaissance capabilities in Afghanistan, because they reasonably and purposefully relied on an extensive system of tsarandoi. And who, if not local residents, employees of the internal affairs bodies, could better know the situation in their area ...

Igor Evlampievich Lozhkin is a military man. In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, under him, as Deputy Chief of Staff, the role and importance of this link in organizing the work of the entire ministry was truly highlighted. The culture and content of the most important documents have risen to a new level.

The central and urgent task of the Representation, as I understood it, was to help not only in the formation of companies, regiments and battalions of the tsarandoi, but also to prepare them for combat functions. Military

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the knowledge and staff organizational skills of this exceptionally experienced and businesslike person would be very useful in Afghanistan.

I had to fight for Lozhkin. In a conversation on this topic, N. A. Shchelokov said that he lowered how suitable his experience and knowledge were for the Representation, but without him it would be bad for the headquarters of the ministry ... And this link, we all knew very well, was the favorite brainchild of our minister.

Nevertheless, General Lozhkin was approved as deputy leader in this combat direction.

It is known that in a revolutionary situation political, agitational and propagandistic work is of particular importance. The rna is extremely important in battle formations. To assist in this area of activity of the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Dolbilov G.S., who had rich experience in Komsomol and political educational work, was well suited. For a long time, Grigory Sergeevich headed the political department in the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, worked as deputy secretary of the party committee of the ministry. Exceptionally contact, accessible public worker.

There was no one better than Eduard Vasilyevich Kalachev for the role of secretary of the party organization of the representative team (and in the state it is almost one and a half thousand people). I knew him from my joint work in the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs in Transport. A very energetic, organized and active person, he does not stop at any difficulties. With his powerful onslaught, Kalachev overcomes any obstacles.

Later, Anatoly Vasilievich Anikiev was recruited from the Department of External Relations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was appointed Deputy Head of the Representative Office for Human Resources.

Alexander Ivanovich Glukhikh proved himself well as a logistics adviser even before the establishment of the Representation. He was sent to Afghanistan from the Main Directorate of Logistics and Military Supply of the Ministry. The Negro, already as the head of the department, was entrusted with the logistics of the formed operational units of the tsarandoy through the supply of clothing and weapons from the Soviet Union.

By agreement with the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee, the leadership of our ministry selected promising personnel from the reserve for promotion to Afghanistan. It was firmly agreed that after the successful completion of a two-year mission, returnees were appointed to positions, as a rule, with a promotion. This made it easier to talk with local authorities in the selection and secondment of the right staff.

In the provinces, the heads of groups of advisers (they were held as senior operational officers) were, as a rule, deputy heads of departments of internal affairs of the territories and regions of the USSR.

This principle was adhered to almost all the time of our participation in the Afghan events, especially in the first years of the Mission's activity.

After the official appointment, I had the opportunity to get acquainted with the peculiarities of the situation in Afghanistan in the apparatus of the First Main Directorate (PTU) of the KGB of the USSR. Conversations with the deputy heads of the PGU Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, Yakov Prokofievich Medyannik, Ivan Alekseevich Markelov, and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, head of the Glavka himself, made it possible in a short time, albeit in general terms, to imagine the complexity of the situation in this country and to understand how difficult there will be an upcoming mission. We also managed to sort out a bit the confusion of our newspaper and other publications, in which it was possible to deduct at the same time that socialist construction was already in full swing in Afghanistan and that everything in this country rests, as before, on feudal orders, under which each tribe has its own armed formations, zones of settlement and influence, as well as its own hierarchy of power.

Deputy Minister Boris Kuzmich Elisov, a highly experienced leader, who, for his part, did a lot to ensure that our mission was successfully completed, became the curator and guardian of the Representative Office in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. He persistently and authoritatively supported us in difficult moments both in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the Central Committee of the CPSU, defended the Representation from various kinds of biased assessments, often coming from our Embassy in Afghanistan.

First impressions, first difficulties. Apparently, everyone who comes to a country for the first time, which in many ways differs markedly from the places of permanent residence, develops his own feelings and impressions. They are etched in my memory forever. So it was when, back in 1958, in January, after freezing Moscow, I found myself in Ashgabat. The Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League sent me to Turkmenistan for Komsomol work. That year, January was especially warm here. The temperature in the capital during the day sometimes exceeded twenty degrees. Not only the unusual temperature surprised me after the plane landed, but everything around me: the bare earth, its whitish-gray color, the mountain range in a blue haze, and some sort of silence that had been settled for centuries, filling the gaps between the emerging noises of civilization at the airport. All this sudden change was simply mesmerizing.

Peculiar impressions were also remembered upon arrival in Afghanistan. Completely different world! Everything is unusual! And the wilderness of the nature surrounding Kabul, and the multi-stage terraces of clay buildings on the slopes of steep hills and mountain spurs, and the colorful squares of solid rows of dukan shops, and the decorated trucks and cars scurrying in the city crowd and disorder.

Asia is also felt in everything, although - winter, snow, frost. Our group arrived in Kabul in January 1981.

At an altitude of almost 2000 meters, on which this city is located, it can be cold even in the thirtieth latitudes. But the lying snow, winter does not at all resemble Moscow, Russia. The unusual situation and impressions are disturbing and, as it were, urge you to quickly learn, at least in general terms, how your life and work will develop here. And in the first days doubts creep in: what can be done with our weak forces in this unfamiliar corner of the planet? What ways can we find so that the aspirations of the employees of our ministry both in Kabul and in the provinces will find a response among the Afghan comrades, in the unknown soul of the Pashtun, the Hazara, the Tajik, and other representatives of the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting this harsh land?...

They were settled in whoever where, as determined by the adviser for the rear of the Deaf. And basically - in the microdistrict, built in the order of cooperation with the help of the Soviet Union. By that time, it was already saturated with representatives of numerous Soviet organizations.

The next day - acquaintance with the Minister of Internal Affairs of the DRA Said Muhammad Gulyabzoy. Medium height, slender and handsome young man. I knew the main milestones of his party biography and underground revolutionary work in the ranks of the Afghan army. They commanded respect for this gifted organizer, an active and fearless party member - a combat aviation officer. In the April armed battle, Gulyabzoy was seriously wounded, but soon returned to the ranks of the responsible leaders of the revolution. He became the closest assistant to N. M. Taraki.

Joint work, many other meetings after his departure from the post of minister, when he headed the Embassy in the Soviet Union, as well as during the years of his exile position, not Yulko confirmed these first impressions, but also significantly strengthened them.

Unusually receptive to justice and truth, he always and in everything showed himself exclusively devoted to revolutionary convictions. Caring for his people, the fatherland is his main life calling. „ „

This young man was old enough to be my son, but I did not feel that he needed fatherly guidance. Frankly, I admired how, in the incredibly difficult conditions of the struggle on two fronts (within the party and with the armed opposition), he was able to cut off and neutralize intrigues and encroachments aimed at removing him from the revolutionary arena, up to physical liquidation.

Of course, in some cases youth made itself felt and, as they say, there were some deviations. But they further strengthened the impression of him as a brave, uncompromising fighter.

I remember such a case. The SGI, an agency headed by Dr. Najibullah, sharply increased the pressure on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its leader. Gulyabzoy was under constant surveillance. It was clear that the leadership of the DRA had set the task of calling him to compromising actions.

One day, while traveling to the rear base of the ministry, located on the outskirts of Kabul, he could not stand the annoying "guardianship", abruptly stopped his car, forcing those who openly "accompanied" him to do the same. Jumping out of his limousine, the Minister pulled the SGI operatives out of their Car, disarmed and brought them to his ministry.

The appointment of Gulyabzoy as Minister of Internal Affairs took place at one time under pressure from the Soviet side in order to create at least the appearance of a balance between "Parcham" and "Khalk" in power structures. KRNECHNO, and the SGI and the brocade wing of the party that stood behind it did not expect such an incident from the Minister of the Interior. They wanted sooner or later to bring the matter to a major clash between the two departments and, on this basis, decisively remove the leader they were uncomfortable with.

Gulyabzoy told me in detail about this incident, and I praised him for the fact that in this way it is necessary to repulse the insolent people.

However, what a fuss was raised about this! The case was presented as follows: the minister was utterly unrestrained. Being in a state of intoxication, he made a scandal, beat up innocent citizens ... One accusation of drunkenness is worth something in a Muslim society!

The incident was actively exaggerated in the Politburo, among the entire elite. Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, officially as an ambassador, apparently in connection with the complaint of Babrak Karmal, began to scold the advisers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about this. His opinion, of course inspired by the leadership of the SGI and other parchamists, that Gulyabzoy is an immature boy who has no place in the leadership of the ministry, in this case received, as it were, additional reinforcement. Our employees took a completely different position. The ambassador was repeatedly expressed categorical rejection of such assessments of the Minister of the Interior and his activities. And I had to remind more than once that in Moscow, in the central competent authorities, it was agreed in principle: the task of urgent formation of the operational units of the tsarandoi we will solve with Gulyabzoy. The ambassador was forced to retreat.

However, during the entire period of my business trip, until the very departure, the ambassador and I had a confrontation on this issue, sometimes reaching a critical point. Elsewhere in the story, I will dwell on this topic.

Acquaintances with the heads of other departments, as well as with the secretaries of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers were mostly formal. I got to know many of the then party and state leaders well later. There were many among them whose unfriendly attitude towards Gulyabzoy was reflected in the work of the Representation.

The meeting with the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, was remembered for the fact that, despite his cheerfulness and optimism, the conversation, although not particularly significant for the ambassador, did not show a firm and confident line that could be unconditionally accepted as a guide to action for our Representation. I already knew that with regard to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Gulyabzoy, Tabeev, one might say, completely took the side of those Parchamists who did not want to see this Khalqist, who was gaining experience and authority, at the head of such an important department.

In the Afghan conditions, we attached great importance to the issue of interaction with the Representation of the KGB of the USSR. It was clear that particular difficulties could arise here. Prior to the organization of the Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, our small advisory apparatus was under the wing of the Representation of the KGB, in fact, in its composition. The autonomy and independence of our new organization was not quite usual. Nevertheless, my acquaintance with General Spolnikov Viktor Nikolaevich, who then headed this Representation, was encouraging for me. I I felt that this solid, as if too straightforward Chekist could be a support in our work. We just need to be able to find ways to mutual understanding and successful cooperation. Behind departmental interests, both in the first conversation and in the course of further joint work, his broader views on the Afghan revolution, the situation in the country and the leadership of the party and state were visible.

In order not to unnecessarily inflate the volume of my narrative, I will not characterize in detail and in detail the organizational period, the features of the formation of our Representation. I think that all the participants in the memories will gradually touch upon these issues, and the picture as a whole will become clear.

Only as an excuse for our shortcomings and an explanation for the considerable difficulties that the arriving employees faced, it is necessary to dwell on some moments from the life of that period.

A small group flew to Kabul with me: Lozhkin, Dolbilov and a few others. And immediately, without delay, it was necessary to get acquainted with the work of the ministry, its leadership and services, I had to deal with the whole range of internal, organizational and everyday problems. Replenishment arrives in batches. He must be met, accommodated, briefed on security issues, prudent behavior, told about the current situation in the country, Kabul ...

We distribute the arrivals (taking into account the experience of previous work) by positions and provinces. The Kabul, central part of the Representation is only being completed, and already in an unfamiliar environment it is necessary to ensure the dispatch of operational groups to provincial centers, to negotiate through the Afghan side on their deployment and arrangement. Everything is on the move, everything is new. Enough worries. However, the energetic actions of the experienced employees of the Representative Office (A.I. Glukhikh, V.V. Bezuglova), as well as the interested attitude of the newly arrived employees, little by little overcome the difficulties that arise.

Systematic, obligatory instructive meetings are being introduced for the entire composition of the employees who have arrived and have already decided in the central office of the Representative Office. At these meetings, as at planning meetings, they stand out from the "turnover" and discuss emerging problems. Reports on the execution of instructions and earlier decisions are also considered here.

How to complete the main task? It should be noted that the staff of the Representative Office took part in all areas of activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. He also dealt with the problems of combating crime, especially with the drug trafficking flows that began to emerge along the line of Afghanistan - the Central Asian republics of the Union. Practical assistance was provided in organizing the work of the fire service, the traffic police (traffic), in training personnel at the educational institution of the Ministry - the Tsarandoi Academy, etc.

At the same time, we understood that the Representation was created primarily for the comprehensive support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA in the formation, equipment and training of armed units, which were entrusted with the tasks of actively protecting the revolutionary authorities in the field. This direction of work for us was the main and defining.

Traditionally in Afghanistan, police organizations were recruited in the same way as the army - by recruiting young men for this type of public service. And in our time, one could often see how, according to tradition, young peasants, water carriers, dukans, carrying beds-trestle beds on their shoulders, go to the army.

Previously, before the revolution, a soldier in a military unit or an employee of a tsarandoy served his duty, being completely dependent on his immediate superior. The conscript often had to take care of his life himself. The officer received money for the maintenance of the soldiers, but often spent it at his own discretion and, it happened, not so much for these state needs, but for his own personal interests. It was believed that for some high-ranking officers, officer service provided a comfortable future life not only for him, an enterprising retiree, but also for his descendants. Of course, this rumor is an exaggeration. But there is no smoke without fire. We saw that in the first years of the revolution, both in the army and in the tsarandoi, these traditions were not completely outlived. A solution naturally suggested itself: in order to speed up the creation of operational units and make them combat-ready, it was necessary to ensure, not in words, but in deeds, a more attractive social and everyday status of a soldier. Such an approach would be consonant with revolutionary tasks, would attract young people to the side of serving the proclaimed ideas.

By the time the civil war engulfed the entire republic, it became clear that the fundamental problems of the new government, among other circumstances, lie and will continue to lie in who the youth, especially the peasants, will follow. Which side will she fight on?

But how to break traditions? How to solve in wartime conditions the capital task of arranging those created from scratch

In Kabul itself, by the end of 1981, there were several battalions and two regiments were being formed. The units were well armed and full-blooded. Companies numbering one hundred, and battalions - five hundred or more people.

Of course, the defense of cities and provinces was not only based on the forces of the tsarandoi. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA skillfully relied on the direct interest of the local authorities in recruiting its units. At the same time, the main advantage in attracting conscripts to serve in the tsarandoy was achieved, as I have already said, due to the comprehensive attention to the life of the soldiers and the benevolent attitude towards them on the part of the officers.

The great difference that existed in these matters in the divisions of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA and the Tsarandoy was known in all corners of Afghanistan. And if the forces of the Defense Ministry were often replenished by "catching" the draft contingent, sometimes even in specially planned operations, then many went to the tsaranda voluntarily.

I remember that in the fall of 1981, due to the widespread aggravation of the situation, all the attention of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Revolutionary Council of the Republic, the power ministries and, of course, the representative apparatuses was focused on conscription. Difficulties in recruiting military units were great. At one of the extended meetings of the Revolutionary Council, the Chief Military Adviser, General of the Army Alexander Mikhailovich Mayorov, spoke rudely and disrespectfully to Gulyabzoy about the fact that he allegedly interferes with the replenishment of parts of the Ministry of Defense. During the meeting of the Council, I managed with difficulty to keep Gulyabzoy from well-founded reciprocal insulting accusations.

According to the elementary concepts of ethics, not to mention diplomatic rules, harsh claims against the minister of the host country, especially those expressed in an official setting, are unacceptable. The consequences of such behavior should be either a sincere official apology or leaving the country. However, Maiorov at that time, unfortunately, did not own such concepts.

Somewhat deviating from the line of this story, I want to note that Mayorov's behavior, as it seemed to me then, showed signs of not only excessive self-confidence, but also a desire to "crush" under him that part of the leadership of the armed forces of Afghanistan, which fell under his influence as the Chief military adviser. This was perceived by the Afghan side, sometimes as an attempt to dictate, to create such a regime of relations that can be called an occupation.

It is good that such behavior on the part of our representatives was a rare exception. Nevertheless, in that situation, even isolated instances of disrespectful attitude, especially committed by persons who stood at the heights of interstate cooperation, undermined our credibility. They created among those who watched with interest and intently the work of Shuravi in Afghanistan, the wrong idea about our true intentions.

So, a large-scale call-up work began. It was necessary to complete the regiments and divisions of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, which in many cases were not combat-ready. By that time, according to available data, the total number in the Moscow Region did not exceed 120-130 thousand. At the same time, the armed forces were burdened with bulky rear and headquarters formations. Many soldiers, although unofficially, performed the functions of servants and batmen.

The task was to bring the number of troops of the Defense Ministry to about 150 thousand people. Members of the Revolutionary Council, party activists and command staff took up the organization of the draft.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not "yawn" either. He needed to form his units, to bring the number of tsarandoi according to the staffing table approved by the government to 75 thousand.

And soon, on one of the quiet autumn days, strings of young people reached the Kabul district departments of the tsarandoy, who voluntarily asked to enroll them in the Kabul garrison and other units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Gulyabzoy and the apparatus of the ministry demanded from the city government an organized reception and distribution of the incoming replenishment.

It was before the weekend. I left for the Embassy for talks with Moscow, and agreed with Gulyabzoy that he would inform me about the results of that day later. The minister calls before sunset. He says that more soldiers enrolled in Kabul during the day than the entire number of the capital's tsarandoi had been before. And by that time it numbered about 8 thousand people.

This result was unexpected. In a day! I thought there was something dangerous here. I ask Gulyabzoy to invite his deputies and other reliable comrades, with whom it will be possible to hold advice.

I'm going to the Ministry immediately. Eight people had already gathered in the minister's office, among them Vatanjar, a well-known hero of the revolution, who at that time was the minister of communications.

One of Gulyabzoy's deputies reports:

"Indeed, there is information about the impending attack of gangs on Kabul from several directions at the same time."

Those present express assumptions about the possibility of sending a tsarandoi to the district administrations under the guise of bandit conscripts, in order to disarm the tsaranda from the inside during an attack on Kabul and try to capture the city in one night.

This is quite likely. So, we must act immediately. The minister urgently sent his faithful comrades to all units with instructions: under the pretext of difficulties that had arisen in providing normal accommodation and food for the arrivals, everyone, without exception, should be released on parole to their homes, and from the next day, they say, the registration of conscripts into regiments and battalions.

Everything was done that way. In the subdivisions of the Tsarandoy of Kabul, combat readiness was increased everywhere. Officers and non-commissioned officers are left on night duty.

On the outskirts of Kabul, intense gunfire was heard throughout the night. However, the offensive of serious bandit forces, in all likelihood, was either not planned that night or was thwarted by the above-mentioned actions of the Ministry.

The expulsion of conscripts from the district administrations brought some losses, less took shape in the city's subdivisions than arrived that day. But taking risks in that situation was dangerous.

The rivalry between the Ministries of Defense and the Interior over conscription has escalated to the extreme. The chief military adviser put the question "point-blank" to Babrak Karmal - the entire draft contingent should go to replenish the military units of the Defense Ministry of the DRA. And only after they are completed, call for service in a tsaranda.

This was fundamentally at odds with traditions, and most importantly, it went against the guidelines of the Soviet authorities to ensure the accelerated formation of operational military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. So it is necessary to convince Mayorov that it is impossible to conduct business in this way. However, the conversations on this subject, which were conducted with him by F.A. Tabeev, the head of the group of party advisers S.V. Kozlov, did not give any results. Enlisting the support of the Central Committee

The PDPA, the Chief Military Adviser, instructed his representatives in the provinces not to allow the transfer of conscripts by tsaranda until the units of the Defense Ministry located in their zone of influence are fully staffed.

It was already over the top. It was decided by the entire "leading five" (that was the name of the permanent coordinating meeting at the ambassador's, which was attended by the leaders of the party advisory apparatus, as well as the Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to get together and convince A. M. Mayorov of the fallacy of the confrontation. Let me remind you that, despite the significant number (about 130 thousand), the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA were weak. Desertion was the real misfortune of the army units. The command of our 40th Army was often more willing to take tsarandoy battalions into combat operations than units of the Moscow Region. In addition, as I have already said, the forces of the tsarandoi were indispensable for the constant protection of local authorities and the consolidation of territories under revolutionary control. Under the pressure of these circumstances, it was clear to everyone that it would be right to simultaneously solve the tasks of strengthening the combat capability of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. You can't do one at the expense of the other.

It was not difficult to understand: Babrak Karmal did not want the Ministry of Internal Affairs to gain more and more serious power and become dangerous in matters of distribution of actual power in the country. I AM. Mayorov received, albeit unofficially, strong support from the Central Committee of the PDPA.

The whole "four" arrived at the residence of the Chief Military Adviser. The Ambassador asked for attention to the issue that Gypsy wants to highlight. I briefly reported the essence of the matter.

Then all those sitting at the table spoke and supported me in the main thing - not to oppose the Ministry of Internal Affairs in solving the important task of forming the operational units of the tsarandoy. At the same time, it was emphasized that by introducing these additional forces into combat operations, we reduce the losses of our, Soviet troops. And we are more fully using the Afghan resources themselves to protect the revolutionary government.

However, A. M. Mayorov defiantly did not accept our arguments and convictions and, in order to emphasize this, he got up from the table around which we were all seated, and, taking a chair, left and sat down in the farthest corner of his huge office.

What were we to do? Shrugging our shoulders and looking at each other in bewilderment, we left the inhospitable owner of the residence.

On the same day, a serious and substantiated telegram on this matter was sent to the Center from the Representation. It seems that she also had some influence on the fact that soon a new Chief Military Adviser, Army General Mikhail Ivanovich Sorokin, arrived in Kabul.

With the change of adviser, the conflict was also resolved. We continued to provide the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA with active assistance in building up and activating its armed forces. And in this we found both the necessary understanding and support from the new Chief Military Adviser.

Revolution or coup? Many writers on the Afghan events assess what happened there in April 1978 as an ordinary armed coup. There was no revolution there, they say. In my opinion, this is a simplified approach to assessment, an erroneous perception of a historical phenomenon. Of course, there was a revolution, although it was carried out thanks to the selfless actions of that part of the members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which was in the armed forces. However, at the origins of the event was a party that consisted of representatives of all the main strata of the population, a party that had a political program and a goal for radical changes in the structure and form of power. A revolution took place, in the development of which there was a sharp transition from authoritarian-bourgeois and formal parliamentary methods of government (where there was practically no place for representatives of the main, working strata of the population) to government by introducing people's democratic foundations for decisive political, social and economic transformations in the interests of majority, in the interests of the workers.

Another thing is that the party that took the liberty of taking this step, as time has shown, was insufficiently prepared and united. It had weak support, primarily among the peasantry, which in Afghanistan makes up over eighty-five percent of the total population and which has been and remains to this day the foundation of the life of the state. The country's economy is mainly based on agricultural production.

Both before and after the revolution, the party did not carry out enough work to attract the progressively minded intelligentsia, students, and also the petty-bourgeois stratum to the proclaimed truly democratic idea. The line of relations with religion was extremely erroneous. In a country where Sharia law reigned, in the broad plans for social transformation, the party had to single out a special direction - cooperation with religious authorities. but

The word revolution comes from the Latin Revolutio, which means upheaval.

instead of a thoughtful, loyal position, disdain for the Islamic elite and elders-aksakals prevailed.

The role of a special resonator in the bitterness of the opposition was played by Hafizullah Amin, who at first was the right hand of the head of the party and state, Nur Mohammed Taraki. His unjustified repressions against representatives of other political movements and his party comrades, as well as merchants, religious and other figures became a serious factor in the sharp increase in armed resistance to the revolutionary authorities, unleashing a large-scale civil war.

Regarding the assessments of the activities of the revolutionary forces of Afghanistan in the period of the 80s, one cannot but say that the People's Democratic Party took shape and entered the forefront of the political struggle of a heterogeneous, actually consisting of two factions-wings, which differ significantly both in their social composition , and on approaches to many problems of the structure of Afghan society.

The left, Khalqist wing, which consisted mainly of representatives of the working environment, was more consistent in its aspirations to bring the revolutionary changes to their logical conclusion, in the interests of the working people. Many of the Khalqists studied in the Soviet Union, in military schools and civilian universities. They were imbued with the spirit of true friendship for the Soviet people, they saw the prospects for the development of their state in a progressive direction. For them, power was a means to achieve these goals.

The Parchamist part of the party, especially its leaders, seemed to adhere to the same ideas and program guidelines, but was in no hurry with the transformations. Having come to power, this elite did not become an active and effective engine for the restructuring of society and the rallying of forces to defend and deepen the revolutionary gains. From the very beginning, it closed in on the internal party struggle, believing that the Soviet armed forces and representative offices should take the brunt of protecting the revolution and power. It seemed that their main goal was power. And everything else - revolutionary phrases, slogans and intentions - is just an appearance and obvious playing along with our Soviet political leaders, who provided the Parchamist leaders with all possible attention, material and military assistance. Hence the struggle that never ceases for a moment with the Khalqist wing, with its bright leaders, among whom is our friend, Minister of the Interior Said Muhammad Gulyabza.

After the death of Taraki and the dangerous period of Amin's power, the leaders of "Parcham" did not even allow the thought that the Khalqists would once again begin to rule the state on an equal basis with them, to hold any power levers in their hands. Babrak Karmal and others clearly learned that the Soviet Union, after the removal of Amin, took as a basis the line of transferring power to "moderate" figures from among the Parchamists in the hope that they would more skillfully consolidate Afghan society and put out the already blazing war with might and main.

It is surprising how our leaders could go to send troops, to sacrifice human lives (I'm not talking about the reaction of the world community to this, as well as huge moral and material losses), realizing that people who do not have pillars in the working environment, far from the true needs of their people and who, like an umbilical cord, are tied to the traditions and wealth of their ancestors.

Babrak Karmal. The son of the richest father - colonel general, former head of the financial department of the Ministry of Defense, governor general of Paktia province.

Standing next to him Najibullah, also comes from a wealthy family. His father for a long time served as Consul General in Pakistan, was a major owner of real estate.

A violent and treacherous fighter against the Khalqists, a permanent member of the Politburo, in fact - the second person in the party and the state, Noor Ahmad Noor - landowner. Despite the fact that the province of Kandahar in the early 80s was practically in the hands of the Mujahideen, according to the information of the tsarandoy, he continued to regularly receive income from his vast lands, on which the peasants of this province bent their backs in semi-slave labor.

And here are the representatives of the Khalq.

Said Muhammad Gulyabzoy - a representative of an ordinary Pashtun family. Father - in his younger years a warrior, then worked as a shepherd. In the family, all the brothers and sisters got out of need with their work. Said himself received officer training in the Soviet Union, where he got acquainted with the socialist system and involved many of his fighting friends in the ranks of the PDPA.

Saleh Mohammed Zirai - Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA (as a demonstration of the unity of the party, on a special instruction of the Central Committee, he and Nur were always supposed to appear in public together). Ros Zirai is in a family that lost his father early. To feed the children, the mother was forced to work as a laundress for a long time. Almost all her life she has bent her back on the rich.

Examples of this kind are typical of both wings of the party. I remember that by the middle of 1981, I managed to more or less sort out the relationship between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SGI, as well as their leaders - Gulyabzoy and Najibulla. These relations, without exaggeration, can be characterized as hostile. It was obvious that such a situation gives rise to confrontation, hinders the establishment of the necessary interaction between departments. Any provocations and even bloodshed can be expected at any moment.

Fortunately, by that time, good relations and mutual understanding had already been established with the head of the KGB Representation of the USSR, Viktor Nikolayevich Spolnikov, and his deputies Vladimir Aleksandrovich Chuchukin and Stepan Pavlovich Dzyuba. Together we understood that detente was needed, the elimination of tension between these ministries. We agreed that we will make every effort on both sides, as well as exchange information in order to influence the situation in a timely and proactive manner. Don't let events take us by surprise.

In the meantime ... We decided to use elementary approaches - to bring these figures together in a bathhouse. Soon the "event" took place. I remember joking that in the bath everyone is equal, because it is difficult to figure out what rank and origin he is in a naked man. There was a good, friendly atmosphere. There was also a serious conversation about the revolutionary cause, the fight against the Mujahideen, that this requires the friendly and well-coordinated work of such departments as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SGI. There were also ardent assurances that this is how relations will be built, because it is clear that without good cooperation and trust, the desired results cannot be achieved. As if the result was a semi-serious definition: as soon as a representative of the richest family and the son of a shepherd are sitting next to each other on the bath bench, then the revolution has already brought serious changes in relations between people. And to whom, if not members of one party, to demonstrate, despite social differences in their origin, well-coordinated combat work. It seemed that an agreement had been reached... Further events testified to the contrary.

Attempts to eliminate FROM. M. Gulyabzoya. Along with the development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, a significant increase in its combat power, the experience of the young minister quickly increased, the ability to see the main thing in his work was honed. In the provinces and the capital of the state, not only those who adjoined the Khalqist wing of the party began to reckon with his opinion, as well as decisions relating to the activities of the internal affairs bodies and other problems. The authority of Gulyabzoy in the Pashtun provinces among the tribal elite rose noticeably.

To a certain extent, all this was facilitated by the qualified work of advisers to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the provinces. Along with the commanders of the tsarandoi, they carried a significant part of the load in the formation, training and combat training of the companies and battalions of the tsarandoi. Experienced senior operational officers, as plenipotentiaries sent by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, actively and competently helped the party organizations of the provinces to organize work to consolidate revolutionary power. To analyze and competently use intelligence information received through the Afghan line and through our Cobalt detachments about bandit formations and their plans. Thanks to this, along with the units of the Soviet Army and the Ministry of Defense, the internal affairs bodies became a serious support for the governors of the provinces and administrations in the regions and cities of the republic. In many cases, the tsarandoy independently held the defense against attacks by opposition detachments, and during military operations, his companies and battalions took part in hostilities together with units of the 40th Army and units of the DRA Defense Ministry.

In many provinces, and especially such as Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh, Juzjan, Faryab, Helmand, Kunduz Laghman, as well as in Kabul itself and the Kabul province, there were strong teams of employees of the Representation, who skillfully managed the business and in a short time helped to raise the prestige tsarandoy, to ensure the organization of effective combat operations through a significant increase in the power of operational units.

However, there is no good without bad. We all worked with enthusiasm and did not pay much attention to the fact that these good changes and achievements, it turns out, are not to the liking of either the Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal, or the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Keshtmand, or many other high-ranking representatives of power. As before, they showed not only hostility towards the Minister of the Interior and those who help him from the Soviet side, but also direct attacks and threats against Gulyabzoy. It came to the point that on the basis of fake data allegedly received by the SGI, under the guise of suppressing an attempted coup, groups of capture of the state information service were sent to the territory where the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was located in order to stop the actions of the minister “in time”.

Here's another example. In the autumn of 1981, after a reception at the Soviet embassy of a narrow circle of leaders from the Afghan and Soviet sides, when everyone went out into the fresh air, the heavily drunk Secretary of the Central Committee Nur Ahmad Nur became so embittered for no apparent reason against Gulyabzoy that he drew a pistol and, twitching the bolt, wanted to shoot him. And only thanks to the decisive intervention of those around it was possible to prevent a serious incident. Subsequently, an action was planned to compromise the Minister of the Interior at the PDPA conference. It was planned to discuss the issue of deepening revolutionary transformations and strengthening the protection of people's power. As it became known to us, approximately the following scenario was planned: to ensure that the delegates of the conference were elected mainly Parchamists; to criticize the inaction of the Ministry and its local bodies in a report and prepared speeches by representatives of "Parcham" in advance and, on this basis, adopt a resolution on the dismissal of Gulyabzoy from his post.

However, the plan failed. Due to the fact that the bulk of party members both in the parts of the Ministry of Defense and in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs belonged to the Khalq wing, almost only Khalqists were elected delegates here. Taking into account the specific weight of the party members of these departments in the total number of members of the PDPA throughout the country, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of the conference delegates represented the hapkiist wing. In addition, a meaningful speech about the work done by Gulyabzoy himself knocked out the weapon previously prepared against him from the hands of the Parchamists. An attempt to rectify the situation by means of a sharp speech against Gulyabzoi by the head of the SGI, Najibulla, was no longer successful. The sympathies of the conference turned out to be clearly on the side of the Minister of the Interior.

We have noticed that Najibullah is becoming an increasingly influential leader of the Parchamist wing of the party. The leadership of the Central Committee of the PDPA, receiving from him information about the situation in the country and the peculiarities of the political situation, more and more fell under the influence of this very capable, but secretive and insidious figure. Failures in attempts to punish and eliminate the authoritative and growing leader of the Khalqist wing inflamed the desire of Najibullah, and through him the leadership of the PDPA, to overcome any obstacles, to deal with this jadran. It was evident that even some kind of excitement appeared in this case.

I would not like to pay too much attention to these issues. There are topics closer to our intention - to publish a book of memoirs about interesting events and people we met in

’ Jadran is a Pashtun warlike tribe. Gulyabzoy comes from this tribe.

Afghanistan. But I think that I have no right to ignore the phenomena that, together with many other mistakes and shortcomings in the activities of the revolutionary leadership, ultimately brought to nothing both the efforts of the PDPA and our all-round assistance and support for the April Revolution. It seemed that all our Soviet representations, and the Central Committee of the PDPA, and the Council of Ministers of the Republic should rejoice at the successes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in every possible way support Gulyabzoy, who was one of the organizers of the party and revolutionary actions. But it was not there. Everything was done just the opposite.

Why Babrak Karmal and those who are at one with him do not want the strengthening of Gulyabzoy is clear. He can be a power rival! But why is he, Gulyabza, undesirable to the ambassador of the Soviet Union? The ambassador of a country that helps this minister to organize military work, to form an armed force to protect the people's power? The position of the ambassador is not easy to understand and justify.

A few months after the PDPA conference, the bureau of the Central Committee once again met to discuss, along with others, the same question - about strengthening the defense of the revolution. Our Representation has learned that at its meeting it is again planned to come to a decision on the release of Gulyabzoy from the post of minister. As usual, the Bureau is attended by the Ambassador of the USSR, the Chief Military Adviser, the leaders of a group of party advisers and representatives of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. From the nervousness of Babrak Karmal and Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, one feels that our information is being confirmed. And indeed! For the umpteenth time, groundless claims are made against the Ministry of the Interior and accusations of the minister of all grave sins.

Gulyabzoy, with our help, prepared well for this meeting. In his speech, he consistently breaks down the arguments and heaps of accusations made against the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the Bureau... confusion. At this time, the ambassador is invited to the apparatus of our government communications (HF).

Soon, clearly embarrassed, he returns to the meeting room of the Bureau. After a short conversation with the ambassador, Karmal says: "We will consider it expedient to confine ourselves to discussing the issue of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs." Move on to other routine issues.

And the fact was that shortly before the meeting of the Bureau, we, knowing about the next intention to crack down on Gulyabzoy, sent a desperate and harsh telegram to the authorities of the USSR about the position of our Embassy in support of the persecution of the Minister of Internal Affairs, about the position,

which contributes to the disorganization of the armed forces of Afghanistan. It was pointed out that this could lead to extremely undesirable consequences.

According to a number of comrades who knew the essence of these vicissitudes, the ambassador was warned in time about the inexpediency of supporting the actions of the Afghan side to discredit Gulyabzoy.

In 1982, it was already clear that the situation in Afghanistan "with our Soviet help" was reaching a dead end. And taking this into account, it was clear why the leadership of the DRA and our ambassador were so persistently trying to eliminate Gulyabzoy. It was necessary to find some kind of "scapegoat" and blame on him at least part of the failures in the development of the revolutionary process, the failures in the fight against the Mujahideen. All the same, fear was added to this: what if, given the growing authority of this young Pashtun, the mood towards the current ruling persons would change.

And what does the change of persons in power mean? This is an acknowledgment of the mistakes of those who, on our part, supported these persons in every possible way.

Soviet "contribution" to the tragedy of Afghanistan. Over time, from today's standpoint, one can more or less correctly assess the "contribution" to the Afghan events of our, Soviet, side.

Some authoritative figures are trying to convince the inexperienced reader that neither the State Security Committee, nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor the Central Committee of the CPSU knew and did not know that a revolution was brewing in Afghanistan, and everything happened in April 1978 suddenly, by chance, unexpectedly and unexpectedly. Moreover, a very narrow circle of people, only a few people, took part in deciding on the introduction of our troops, and under the active pressure of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, that the KGB had nothing to do with this important step.

It is quite obvious that those who try to present the case in this way are seriously sinning against the truth or want to escape the court of conscience in this way. Those who think so and describe events are either naive or defend not the truth, but someone's interests.

The true truth, I think, is that such issues could not be considered in the power structures of our country without the participation and recommendations, first of all, of the State Security Committee. Representatives of this department had the most complete information about events abroad. First of all, on the basis of this information, the views of our political leadership on the events in Afghanistan were formed and "reasoned" decisions were prepared to respond to them.

The truth about who played first fiddle on our side in Afghan issues is too expensive. Not to mention the tragedy that the people of Afghanistan are still experiencing, our intervention in the affairs of this country was paid for with life and blood, the heavy suffering of thousands and thousands of our sons, and the unhealed spiritual wound of the entire people. It, this true truth, cannot be hushed up or obscured, because it is immoral.

According to my convictions, the convictions of many comrades, together with whom I had to help the Afghans in their difficult struggle, it is impossible to condemn only the PDPA, its active elite, for the fact that, without objectively assessing the prospects for their revolutionary actions, they decided to take power and lead the country, their people along the path of progress. Perhaps, those on our part who could give a scientifically substantiated and objective answer in advance to the questions: is the situation ripe, are the Party forces sufficient for such a responsible historical step? Those who could and should have given answers to these questions did not, but in every possible way encouraged the revolutionary aspirations of the PDPA and hoped its activists that they would receive proper support and comprehensive assistance.

It seems that there are many grounds for such an assessment of our complicity in the Afghan revolutionary upheavals.

Indeed, help and support were provided. Our state had to not only send its armed forces there, but also supply weapons, military equipment, clothing allowances, bread, sugar, other food resources, as well as fuel for military and civilian needs to revolutionary Afghanistan almost free of charge. Every day of our presence there cost the Soviet treasury a substantial expense.

However, neither this help, nor active armed support for the fight against the Mujahideen ensured victory, failed to consolidate the revolutionary gains.

In addition to the weakness of the PDPA, among many other reasons that to a greater or lesser extent influenced the final outcome of events, the most important, in my deep conviction, was the erroneous orientation of the Soviet political leadership towards representatives of the small wing of Parcham. Orientation, recklessly established in the second stage of the revolution, after the removal of Amin. There were serious discrepancies between the goals of the revolution, the efforts of all Soviet departments that assisted in the establishment of power, and the actual actions of the Parchamist elite, for which the main thing was not the benefit of the working people of this long-suffering country, but to stay in power. Using our help and armed support, to be able to fight within the party for the neutralization and elimination of the Khalqists.

The struggle of the Parchamist wing for power for the sake of power was clearly visible to the Afghan people, who received practically nothing from the revolutionary transformations, except for declarations, slogans and promises.

Initially, the victory of the revolution caused an explosion of enthusiasm. There were noisy jubilations of the people, rallies and processions, bright hopes. However, after a while - after a year, two, three - it became clear to many that nothing, in essence, was changing, with the exception of ever-increasing repressions, an ongoing fight between the two wings of the party and the spread of civil war.

The proclaimed land reform, as the most important factor in revolutionary, social transformations, ultimately turned into a farce.

The transfer of land into the hands of the peasants in a country dominated by private, feudal property is an exceptionally difficult matter. Such an action requires breaking the age-old traditions and overcoming the most cruel, bloody resistance of those who are deprived of their land. Enormous efforts on the part of the revolutionary authorities are needed to carry out such reforms. Declarations on fundamental changes in land use should be backed up not only by broad explanatory measures and other various forms of influencing people's consciousness, but also by reliable armed protection of a new order of ownership of natural lands - the main source of human life.

By the time the reform was announced, revolutionary power was far from dominating the whole country. After all, the party was small, and the state structures that were being formed on the go could not yet ensure the implementation of such major decisions. They had nothing to rely on.

At the first stage of the revolution, under Taraki, armed committees and detachments for the defense of the revolution were created from landless poor peasants and party activists in many districts and settlements. They were then the main power force, with the help of which the Land Reform was also carried out. However, with the coming to power of the Parchamists, the committees and detachments, under all sorts of pretexts and due to the fact that they allegedly formed under Amin, began to disarm and liquidate. At the same time, under the protection of the Parcham wing, landowners began to adapt, who sought to preserve their possessions at all costs.

Many figures of the second stage of the revolution were big feudal lords. Among them, in addition to the already mentioned Nur Ahmad Nura, Minister of Nationalities (Tribals) Suleiman Laek, Minister of Culture Majid Sarboland, Chief Prosecutor Zirmal, Commander of the Second Army Corps Ulumi and others.

The peasants, the bulk of the country's population, from the very beginning of the proclamation of the reforms did not feel and did not see decisive actions on the part of the authorities in order to transfer the land for their use. In many places, they were forced to take a wait-and-see position, especially since bloody repressions soon began on the part of the dushmans against those who received land, who hurried to take advantage of the fruits of the revolution. The leadership of the Ministry of the Interior had information that large landowners, who held various government posts and controlled local power, were taking all sorts of measures to prevent the implementation of land reform, up to armed opposition. There was information that the same member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA Nur Ahmad Nur, through appropriate connections, gave instructions to the armed opposition for punitive measures against the peasants who encroached on his land holdings in the provinces of Kandahar and Logar. And these installations were carried out in due measure.

My meetings with Cobalt. April 1982 Afghanistan, Samangan province, Tashkurgan city. Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB of the USSR.

The first very large operation, Tashkurgan. Great forces are involved. Two of our mangruppa, three or four border air assault groups and a considerable number of units of the 201st division of the 40th army. At the same time, we surround the city from all sides. In the hills, where vehicles cannot pass, DSh (airborne assault groups) land. According to intelligence data, a large number of Basmachi accumulated in the city (as we then called dushmans). The encirclement closes in time, they could not leave. About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the LH from the side, listen to the radio, we are on the same wavelength and can listen to their negotiations. A tough, fleeting firefight and the Basmachi surrendered, a rather large group. A mortar battery is actively working in our area around the city. And from the other end, the artillery of the 201st division hits the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city, start combing, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves cruelly. A BRDM with a loudspeaker comes up, a propaganda machine. A Tajik interpreter begins to broadcast to the city, urging civilians to go to its outskirts. Whoever does not come out will be considered Basmachi. The city has a population of 30,000. They fell together, in large crowds. Mostly women with children and the elderly, few men.

A filter station is urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Our department, together with an armored personnel carrier, is sent to guard the filter station. We take a position on the slope of the hill, below the Afghans. Interpreters and the Afghan State Security Service (HAD) begin to work with them.

Some of our group appears in a uniform without shoulder straps and without insignia, by the look of all the officers, they call themselves the “Cobalt” group (later we will be told that this is a special unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but I still don’t know if it’s true or not). They are interrogating prisoners. We set up a separate tent for them. They bring suspicious Afghan detainees into it for interrogation, interrogate them harshly. For us, this is a surprise, not the Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. "Kobaltovites" quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine the right shoulder, whether there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple. Three young Afghans were identified by local residents, they were trained in Pakistan, active militants. In the evening we were ordered to put these three people on the ground away from the bulk of the detainees. Give them the opportunity to run, and when they run, shoot to kill. They are irreconcilable militants and there is no reason to transfer them to the Afghans, they will soon find themselves in a gang again. We waited all night like in a shooting range. They did not run, or they did not have the strength, or they guessed our intentions. In the morning, a wounded Afghan was brought in, lying on a wooden stretcher covered with a velvet blanket. He was wounded in the right thigh by a fragment of a NURS (unguided rocket), his leg was swollen and blackened, it looks like he has gangrene. A man of about forty, endures pain with firmness, only grinds his teeth and sometimes groans. He is the commander of a group of militants, they themselves carried him wounded at night to our cordon and left him in the hope of our humanity. And another prisoner, an old man at all, during a search in the house, they found a bloody Soviet uniform. Neighbors said that a wounded Soviet soldier was kept in his house, then brutally killed. During interrogation, he admitted this, and also said with pride that his son was the leader of one of the gangs.

One day a helicopter flew in and landed near our filter station. In addition to the pilots, there was some Soviet in civilian clothes in it. Who he was, we did not know, but he spoke sternly, the officers of the "Cobalt" stood in front of him at the stand "at attention". He took many prisoners with him and flew away. In addition to a high-ranking Soviet representative, some journalist flew in with a large camera. I talked with the Cobalt, photographed the captured Afghans, to complete the picture, he called us into the frame. I still regret that I did not ask him where, in which publication these photos would be placed.

"Cobalt" was aimed at operational-search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, the personnel were stationed in teams in key provinces (the territory of the DRA is divided into 26 provinces), from where, as part of operational combat groups, they went to the districts.

In total, from August 1980 to April 1983, three compositions of Cobalt were replaced in Afghanistan. The commander of the first two was the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Major General of Militia Beksultan Beslanovich Dziov.

Under his leadership were constantly 23 operational-combat groups and one reserve unit in Kabul. The staff of each group included seven people who, in addition to small arms, were armed with armored personnel carriers, a Niva car and a field radio station.

They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th Combined Arms Army of the TurkVO, participated in the intelligence support of its military operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.
The war in Afghanistan gave the first significant experience in the use of operational-search measures in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. The fact that partisan or so-called "small" warfare has become today the main type of armed conflicts on the planet gives special weight to the operational developments of those years.

Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, it is obvious that the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars needs to be generalized for the purpose of effective practical use in the future.
At present, it is generally recognized that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.

The international purpose of our specialists, including the special detachment "Cobalt", was to assist in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy.

The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to solve combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, was prone to panic and defection to the side of the enemy.

The beginning of the direct participation of the special detachment "Cobalt" in the unfolding events took place in March 1980 and lasted until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale, together with Afghan formations and units, work on reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" performed the most important tasks of identifying the places of deployment of bandit formations using the undercover method, obtaining and clarifying intelligence, as well as their implementation. Therefore, the composition of "Cobalt" included mainly employees of the criminal investigation apparatus, other operational services, and for their security cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.

A feature of the operational-search activity of the first detachment "Cobalt" was the recruitment of an agent network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, worked with the agents already transferred to the connection. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in rooms specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.

The detachment "Cobalt" was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the structure of the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.
However, the operational staff of "Cobalt", unlike colleagues from the "Cascade", already had experience in operational-search work on gangs.

They generously shared this experience with the state security fighters, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience of participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to connect the criminal police to intelligence? Because no other department had such experience in operational-search work, which was necessary for Tsarandoy, whose units needed to be trained in operational-search activities in order to quickly ensure combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians.

In addition, the "Cascade" had to be unloaded in order to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps, equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage operations themselves.

In addition, the subordination of "Cobalt" to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relations with the military administration and commandant's officers who carried out the appropriate regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.

In order to assess the experience of the operational-search work of the special detachment "Cobalt" in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its opponent and the features of operational-search work with him.

The Mujahideen militia included dozens of various associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic supporters of the revolution in Iran. Most of the opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran.

The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished at the expense of new armed detachments trained in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and at the expense of the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of the land and water reform.

Soviet troops fought active battles along with government Afghan formations and units. The armed formations of the opposition, having suffered a number of defeats, switched to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Their main groupings moved to mountainous areas where military equipment could not approach.
Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual way of life of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, comprehensively provided for and, importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational-search work and the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was of a focal nature, and in this war there was no division into front and rear.

The enemy could appear anywhere and from any side, using kyarizes (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried riverbeds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impenetrable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance, had an extensive network of informers and observers.

At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to communications, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.

The tactics of the rebels, the difficult terrain predetermined the high importance of reconnaissance activities under these conditions, including the operational-search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, predicting enemy actions and ending with identifying the strength of enemy bandit groups, their places location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased by 4 times.

The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center.

The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and undercover work. However, as combat practice has shown, even these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information.

According to the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of the forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (the KGB of the USSR - "Kaskad", "Omega", the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - "Cobalt"), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures for the comprehensive development of their interaction. All military and undercover intelligence data, including the operational information of the Cobalt special detachment, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the 40th Army headquarters.

“For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence in the Combat Control Center on a daily basis,” recalls Colonel-General B.V. Gromov, “even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, morning meetings were regularly held. The meeting began at seven hours from the report of the intelligence chief. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all the intelligence agencies of our missions in Afghanistan gathered.

They came: from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - these are mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, US plans, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the "Alliance of Seven" (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of the opposition Afghan parties located on the territory Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan military district, which had intelligence centers, conducted radio interception, etc .; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representations of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from "Cobalt") in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, separate regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data appeared during the day, new goals, including especially important ones, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite efficiently. There were, as they say, overlaps when decisions were made by the relevant military commanders insufficiently quickly, which led to a disruption in the implementation of the information received, including bombing and assault strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from where the dushmans had already left, and even on their own units that had already advanced to the search location.

Belated management decisions sometimes entailed irretrievable losses. So, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of the OKSV units with the participation of the Cobalt and Cascade detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, they were ambushed and killed the officers of Cascade-1 Alexander Puntus (previously fought in part of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.

Together with them, two officers of the Cobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, who was wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade, and police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded.

From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, the officers of the Cobalt faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of the tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing to help and assisting the bandits.

In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered, there were few employees in Cobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up already in the course of operational combat work, to comprehend in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.

The hardships of the highlands were supplemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than during the fighting.

Against the opposition armed formations operating by guerrilla methods, it was required to use equally unpredictable and unconventional tactics. And already the first clashes showed that creative improvisation in local conflicts is the most necessary condition for achieving victory in battle.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value in planning operations.

This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, gereushniki, state security, police - all worked to get it. Soon, the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not outlive itself in this war either.

Each cobaltist was supposed to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of BSHU on the accumulation of the Mujahideen, including on settlements. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of the Soviet and government troops coordinated in terms of tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the Cobalt special detachment.

Employees of the internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops, who were part of "Cobalt-1", in August 1980 underwent additional training on the basis of the Tashkent Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. There they taught them the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, machine gun, machine gun, i.e. given the necessary initial combat training. Teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not own the situation in this country.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies in the entire long-term Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the marble slabs "Heroes of the Fatherland", located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of the internal affairs bodies and servicemen of the internal troops participated in the separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Afghan war. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the Kaskad group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational and combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the Cobalt special squad was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.

The increase in the combat effectiveness of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy with the participation of "Cobalt" made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to inflict serious blows on the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.

Today we have to state that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in special literature, is not studied and is not taught in educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Many wonderful masters of detective work have passed through "Cobalt". This is his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of the Interior of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Viktor Yerin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of the Interior, also went through the Cobalt school.
From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:

- I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of employees of the internal affairs bodies in the reconnaissance detachment "Cobalt". Priority was given to operatives who had completed the school of criminal investigation, snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We got to know each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities.

The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He was to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, they got to work. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search. However, there were many additional difficulties here: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there's the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from the desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of the fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB PV of the USSR, April 1982:

The first very large operation, Tashkurgan. Great forces are involved. Two mangruppa border troops, three or four border air assault groups and a considerable number of units of the 201st division of the 40th army. At the same time, we surround the city from all sides. In the hills, where vehicles cannot pass, DSh (airborne assault groups) land. According to intelligence data, a large number of Basmachi accumulated in the city (as we then called dushmans). The encirclement closes in time, they could not leave.

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the LH from the side, listen to the radio, we are on the same wavelength, and we can listen to their negotiations. A tough, fleeting firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, a rather large group. A mortar battery is actively working in our area around the city. And from the other end, the artillery of the 201st division hits the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city, start combing, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves cruelly.

A BRDM with a loudspeaker comes up, a propaganda machine. A Tajik interpreter begins to broadcast to the city, urging civilians to go to its outskirts. Whoever does not come out will be considered Basmachi. The city has a population of 30,000. They fell together, in large crowds. Mostly women with children and the elderly, few men.

A filter station is urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Interpreters and the Afghan State Security Service (HAD) begin to work with them.

Some of our group appears in a uniform without shoulder straps and without insignia, by the look of all the officers, they call themselves “Cobalt” (later we will be told that this is a special unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but I still don’t know if it’s true or not). They are interrogating prisoners. We set up a separate tent for them. They bring suspicious Afghan detainees into it for interrogation, interrogate them harshly.

For us, this is a surprise, a non-Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. "Kobaltovites" quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine the right shoulder, whether there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple.

Three young Afghans were identified by local residents, they were trained in Pakistan, active militants. In the evening we were ordered to put these three people on the ground away from the bulk of the detainees. Give them the opportunity to run, and when they run, shoot to kill. They are irreconcilable militants, and there is no reason to transfer them to the Afghans, they will soon find themselves in a gang again. We waited all night like in a shooting range. They did not run: either they did not have the strength, or they guessed our intentions.

Another prisoner, an old man at all, during a search in the house, they found a bloody Soviet uniform. Neighbors said that a wounded Soviet soldier was kept in his house, then brutally killed. During interrogation, he admitted this, and also said with pride that his son was the leader of one of the gangs.

Reference:
Special Forces Detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" was created in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Afghan war and operated approximately in the same period as the Cascade. Just like the (KGB), it was not a regular unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but was created for a specific war. The detachment consisted of 600 people. At the initiative of the Deputy Minister of the Interior the detachment was transferred to operational subordination to the commander of the "Cascade" Alexander Ivanovich Lazarenko .

Since one of the tasks assigned by the leadership of the KGB to Lazarenko was the creation of Tsarandoy (the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA), this task fell entirely on Cobalt. The fighters of "Cobalt" were engaged in the creation of regiments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan, while they carried out advisory and instructor activities.

Employees of "Cobalt" created checkpoints on highways and ring roads - a kind of filter for the migration of the civilian population. At the same time, intelligence and operational work was launched to collect information from the population. It brought certain results.

For most of the “Cobaltists”, gang work was familiar. In the Union, they had to deal with armed banditry and they imagined how to deal with them. They shared this experience and considerations with the stuntmen. In general, these two special forces were very similar to each other. In addition, they were deployed together, fought together, had the same armament and equipment. The organizational detachments that plied Afghanistan included both "Cascade" and "Cobalt" employees. Veterans of "Kaskad" speak highly of the level of training of employees of "Cobalt" and their fighting spirit, many of them were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, and some of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

On August 23, 2001, a meeting of former Cobalt employees with the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was held. Opening it, the head of the department, Boris Gryzlov, noted that the era of the so-called "Afghan war" was a special stage in the development of internal affairs bodies, then for the first time the Ministry of Internal Affairs got the opportunity to have its own representation and work on the territory of a foreign state. In the eighties, only a narrow circle of leaders knew about the Cobalt special forces detachment, Colonel-General Ivan Golubev, one of the former commanders of this unit, told Strana.ru.

According to the first commander of the detachment, Major General of Militia Beksultan Dzioev, "Cobalt" consisted of 23 reconnaissance groups deployed in the Afghan provinces, and one reserve unit in Kabul. The veterans of the police unit were greeted at the current meeting by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Valentin Korabelnikov, Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia, Major General Alexander Zhdankov, and former Interior Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Said Gulyabzoy.

Now the former fighters of "Cobalt" are the elite sector of the 25,000-strong Association of Combat Veterans of the Internal Affairs Bodies and Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its president, retired police lieutenant general Vitaly Turbin, noted that cobalt as a chemical element is used to produce super-strong alloys, and people with the character of "cobalt" are reliable in any business.

In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, at the end of 1979, a Soviet military group was introduced into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in order to stabilize the situation in the neighboring country, which at that time was already tired of the struggle of the ruling elites for power. The Soviet troops brought into the country were involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the government.

In addition to the units and institutions of the Soviet Army, there were separate units of the border troops and bodies of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Afghanistan. An important role in those conditions was called upon to play - and played - a special-purpose detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt", the first detachment of which, in the summer of 1980, began operational combat work in Afghanistan. "Cobalt" was aimed at operational-search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, the personnel were stationed in teams in key provinces (the territory of the DRA is divided into 26 provinces), from where, as part of operational combat groups, they went to the districts.

In total, from August 1980 to April 1983, three compositions of Cobalt changed in Afghanistan. The commander of the first two was the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Major General of Militia Beksultan Beslanovich Dziov. Under his leadership were constantly 23 operational-combat groups and one reserve unit in Kabul.

The staff of each group included seven people, who, in addition to small arms, were armed with armored personnel carriers, a Niva car and a field radio station. They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th Combined Arms Army of the TurkVO, participated in the intelligence support of its military operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.

The war in Afghanistan gave the first significant experience in the use of operational-search measures in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. The operational developments of those years are given special weight by the fact that partisan, or so-called "small" warfare has become today the main type of armed conflict on the planet. Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, it is obvious that the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars needs to be generalized for the purpose of effective practical use in the future.

At present, it is generally recognized that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.

The international mission of our specialists, including the special detachment "Cobalt", was to assist in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy. The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to solve combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, was prone to panic and defection to the side of the enemy.

The beginning of the direct participation of the special detachment "Cobalt" in the unfolding events fell on March 1980 and lasted until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale, together with Afghan formations and units, work on reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" performed the most important tasks of identifying the places of deployment of bandit formations using the undercover method, obtaining and clarifying intelligence, as well as their implementation. Therefore, the composition of "Cobalt" included mainly employees of the criminal investigation apparatus, other operational services, and for their power cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.

In the eight security zones created on the territory of Afghanistan, Tsarandoy battalions were formed with the participation of Cobalt. Already from the second half of 1981, with the support of Cobalt, they actively opposed local gangs in the provinces and effectively interacted with units of the government army and units of the 40th Army when conducting large-scale or local operations. A feature of the operational-search activity of the first detachment "Cobalt" was the recruitment of an agent network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, worked with the agents already transferred to the connection. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in rooms specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.

The "Cobalt" detachment was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the structure of the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.

However, the operational staff of "Cobalt", unlike colleagues from the "Cascade", already had experience in operational-search work on gangs. They generously shared this experience with the state security fighters, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience of participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to connect the criminal police to intelligence? Because no other department had such experience in operational-search work, which was necessary for Tsarandoy, whose units needed to be trained in operational-search activities in order to quickly ensure combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians. In addition, the "Cascade" had to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps, equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage operations themselves.

In addition, the subordination of "Cobalt" to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relations with the military administration and commandant's officers who carried out the appropriate regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.

To assess the experience of the operational-search work of the special detachment "Cobalt" in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize his opponent and the features of the operational-search work with him. The Mujahideen militia included dozens of various associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic supporters of the revolution in Iran. Most of the opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran. The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished at the expense of new armed detachments trained in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and at the expense of the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of the land and water reform.

Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual way of life of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, comprehensively provided for and, importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational-search work and the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was of a focal nature, and in this war there was no division into front and rear. The enemy could appear anywhere and from any side, using kyarizes (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried riverbeds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impenetrable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance, had an extensive network of informers and observers. At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to communications, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.

The tactics of the rebels' actions, the difficult terrain predetermined the high importance of intelligence activities under these conditions, including the operational-search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, predicting enemy actions and ending with identifying the strength of enemy bandit groups, their places location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased by 4 times. The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and undercover work. However, as combat practice has shown, even these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information. According to the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of the forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (the KGB of the USSR - "Cascade", "Omega", the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - "Cobalt"), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures for the comprehensive development of their interaction. All military and undercover intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special detachment, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the 40th Army headquarters. “For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence in the Combat Control Center on a daily basis,” recalls Colonel-General B.V. Gromov, - even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was customary to hold regular morning meetings. The meeting began at seven o'clock with a report from the chief of intelligence. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all the intelligence agencies of our missions in Afghanistan gathered. They came: from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - these are mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, US plans, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the "Alliance of Seven" (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of the opposition Afghan parties located on the territory Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan military district, which had intelligence centers, conducted radio interception, etc .; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representations of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from "Cobalt") in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, separate regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data appeared during the day, new goals, including especially important ones, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite efficiently. There were, as they say, overlaps when decisions were made by the relevant military commanders insufficiently quickly, which led to a disruption in the implementation of the information received, including bombing and assault strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from where the dushmans had already left, and even on their own units that had already advanced to the search location. Belated management decisions sometimes entailed irretrievable losses. So, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of the OKSV units with the participation of the Cobalt and Cascade detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, they were ambushed and killed the officers of Cascade-1 Alexander Puntus (previously fought in part of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.

Together with them, two officers of the Cobalt special forces were killed in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, who was wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade, and police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded. From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, the officers of the Cobalt faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of the tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing to help and assisting the bandits.

The hardships of the highlands were supplemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than during the fighting.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value in planning operations. This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, gereushniki, state security, police - all worked to get it. Soon, the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not outlive itself in this war either. Each cobaltist was supposed to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of BSHU on the accumulation of the Mujahideen, including on settlements. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of the Soviet and government troops coordinated in terms of tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the Cobalt special detachment.

Employees of the internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops, who were part of the "Cobalt-1", in August 1980 underwent additional training on the basis of the Tashkent Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. There they taught them the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, machine gun, machine gun, i.e. given the necessary initial combat training. Teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not own the situation in this country.

The first group of "Cobalt" stayed on a business trip in Afghanistan for about seven months, gained some experience, on which others later learned. Many employees were deservedly awarded orders and medals, promoted ahead of schedule to regular special and military ranks. And the police captain M.I. Isakov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Political School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol, who previously served in the Airborne Forces and the criminal investigation department in the transport police, a participant in the aforementioned battle near the village of Shivaki, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies for the entire long-term Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the marble slabs "Heroes of the Fatherland", located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of the internal affairs bodies and servicemen of the internal troops participated in the separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Afghan war. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the Kaskad group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational and combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the Cobalt special squad was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.

In total, in Afghanistan, the Cobalt special detachment carried out operational support for more than a thousand planned and private operations, during which a large number of armed opposition formations were neutralized, and the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured. The increase in the combat effectiveness of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy with the participation of the Cobalt made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to inflict serious blows on the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.

From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:

I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of employees of the internal affairs bodies in the reconnaissance detachment "Cobalt". Priority was given to operatives who had completed the school of criminal investigation, snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We got to know each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities. The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He was to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, they got to work. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search. However, there were many additional difficulties here: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there's the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from the desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of the fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB PV of the USSR, April 1982:

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the LH from the side, listen to the radio, we are on the same wavelength, and we can listen to their negotiations. A tough, fleeting firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, a rather large group. A mortar battery is actively working in our area around the city. And from the other end, the artillery of the 201st division hits the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city, start combing, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves cruelly.

A filter station is urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Interpreters and the Afghan State Security Service (HAD) begin to work with them.

The detachment became one of the most secret police units; an extremely limited circle of people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB knew about its existence. According to the official version, Cobalt was tasked with training employees of the Afghan security forces - tsarandoi (literally "protector", "protector"). In fact, the main function of the detachment was reconnaissance: collecting and analyzing information about armed formations and their leaders, establishing caravan routes for the delivery of weapons, their quantity and storage locations.

To adapt to operational work in a foreign state, each of the groups of "Cobaltists" began in its own way. Some of the policemen, such as those stationed in the city of Mazar-i-Sha-reef (the capital of the Balkh province), began to get acquainted with the population from the local prison.

Both captured dushmans and criminals sat in it. But there were also many who were treated harshly and unfairly by the authorities. Someone ended up behind bars on slander, someone fell under the hot hand of the security forces. It was with them that the operatives agreed on cooperation. The Afghans reinforced their verbal obligation to supply the Shuravi (Soviet) with information with a subscription.

A few days later, the “Kobaltites”, through a party adviser, approached the governor of the province with a proposal to hold an amnesty for prisoners, on whom, in their opinion, criminal cases were fabricated. The initiative was approved, and soon a certain number of prisoners were released from the city prison. Similar actions later took place in all provinces of the country. Most of the informants turned out to be useless or completely disappeared from sight. But there were also those who obtained valuable information. So, in a conversation with operatives, one of the Afghans let slip that his relative was a member of a large gang. Its backbone was approximately 350-400 people. But if necessary, the ranks of the Mujahideen could be replenished up to two thousand "bayonets". The armament of this group consisted of mortars, heavy machine guns and various small arms delivered from Pakistan. The guy was persuaded to cooperate, after which a legend was invented, with which he infiltrated the gang. The young Afghan told the Mujahideen that he wanted to take revenge on those who abused him in prison. They believed him, and soon the agent entered the circle of close associates of the field commander. After that, the operatives knew everything about the weapons of the gang, its composition, the planned attacks, and even the location of the training camp. According to the results of intelligence, a military operation was carried out, during which the rebel base was defeated. Dozens fell into the hands of the military

Prisoners, a large number of weapons and ammunition. In working with informers, Cobalt employees were guided by an unspoken rule: the informant is responsible for his messages with his head. And so the operatives always took the agent with them to the ongoing operations. In this way, they tried to stop a possible betrayal. The Afghan knew that if he led the group into an ambush, death awaited him too. It was extremely difficult to use women as sources of information in an orthodox Islamic country. And yet, Cobalt operatives managed to recruit Afghan women. And sometimes their connections brought police intelligence to the very top of the Dushman hierarchy. The brother of one of the women cooperating with the officers was a nafar (servant) at the head of a large rebel unit, Ahmad Shah, who received the nickname Masud (happy). His group occupied the strategically important Panjshir Gorge, which cut Afghanistan into two parts and stretched from the western borders of the country almost to China. The female agent managed to convince her brother to tell her everything that was going on in Massoud's headquarters, and every week she went many kilometers to visit a relative. From him she brought news from the headquarters of the Panjshir lion (as Ahmad Shah was also called). This information was very useful when, in 1980, the command of the 40th Soviet Army negotiated a truce with Ahmad Shah.

From the agent, the operatives learned about what Masood's further diplomatic bargaining would be like. Information was immediately transferred to the army headquarters. This made it possible to correct the negotiating line of military advisers from the GRU, as a result of which it was possible to conclude an unspoken agreement with Ahmad Shah. He took upon himself the obligation not to carry out hostile actions against Soviet and government troops. In response, he was promised not to launch air strikes on the Panjshir and to let his caravans in and out of the valley. The term of the agreement is until May 1982. And before the designated date, the fighting in the province really stopped. It has also become calmer on the Salang-Kabul highway. But trouble was not to be expected from the Mujahideen in Afghanistan alone. The enemy sometimes lurked nearby: among "comrades and associates." It happened that military operations failed miserably, as information about them was transmitted ahead of time to dushmans. Afghan officers were suspected of leaking data. But how do you calculate them? Somehow, one of the employees of "Cobalt" managed to get information that the head of finance of the Panjshir front had arrived in his native village on a visit. To detain him, an assault force was landed on the approaches to the settlement, but it was not possible to capture the rebel. But in the house destroyed after the battle, valuable documents were found: account books with the names of government officials and senior army officers and tsarandoi, who received remuneration for their services from the Mujahideen. After this operation, several high-ranking officers of the General Staff of the Afghan army were arrested in Kabul. Thus, for some time, it was possible to return the secrecy stamp to military affairs.

Military operations in Afghanistan with the participation of Soviet troops continued for almost ten years. In February 1989, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the army units left a foreign country in an organized manner, thus completing their international peacekeeping mission. By that time, the special forces of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs no longer existed. "Cobalt" and "Cascade" were withdrawn from Afghanistan and disbanded in the spring of 1983. The history of the units ended, but the history of their fighters continued. Many of the officers of the former freelance detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs soon returned to the mountainous republic, but already as advisers. Some of them continued to work there even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, until 1992.

The Afghan war became a special stage in the development of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was during that period that the internal affairs bodies got the opportunity to carry out covert operational activities on the territory of a foreign state. And the experience gained abroad was subsequently useful at home. More than 3,900 police officers have been on business trips abroad. Many of them were awarded orders and medals for military merits. Militia Captain Michael

Isakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1980, when near the village of Shivaki (east of Kabul) a group of ten Cobalt employees was ambushed and almost completely killed (seven killed, two wounded), the captain fought alone all night, preventing the dushmans from finishing off the wounded and outrage over the bodies of the dead.