On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of fascist Germany, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and launched bombing airstrikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

The Great Patriotic War began. She was expected, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin's distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates were given for the start of the war, for example, May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to a later date. There is another factor that is rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. So, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the direction of the main attack in an area where it was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like disinformation, so it was on this day that the attacks were least expected.
And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic States this date is considered positive, giving "hope for liberation".

Russia

§4. Invasion of the USSR. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War
At dawn on June 22, 1941, Nazi troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, they relied on the blitzkrieg ("lightning war") tactics on the surprise attack factor. The defeat of the USSR was supposed within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
In the first days of the war, the German army inflicted serious damage on the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group "South" (commander von Rundstedt) captured the Right-Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But the Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July, 5 million people were drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps formed at the front.

V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. Grade 9 Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, publishing house "Ventana-Graf", 2013

Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
The perfidious attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
Fulfilling the grandiose tasks of the third Stalinist five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government, at the same time, did not for a moment forget about the possibility of a new "imperialist attack on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 In his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of a capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try, on occasion, to launch a military attack on the USSR.”
Comrade Stalin demanded the strengthening of the defense capability of our country. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen in every possible way our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, Osoaviakhim. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies could take us by surprise ... "
Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, made them more vigilantly follow the intrigues of the enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were striving to unleash a new bloody war, with the help of which they hoped to win world domination. Hitler declared the Germans a "superior race" and all other peoples inferior, inferior races. With particular hatred, the Nazis treated the Slavic peoples and, first of all, the great Russian people, who more than once in their history came out to fight against the German aggressors.
The Nazis based their plan on the plan of a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and the rapid advance deep into Russia, up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
The monstrous war machine of the Nazi imperialists began its movement in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.

Textbook "History of the USSR", 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Foght, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

Austria, Germany

Chapter "From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat"
After careful preparations that lasted for many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany launched a "war of total annihilation" against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the Germanic Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called "Barbarossa". It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of a trained German military machine, Soviet troops would not be able to provide decent resistance. In a few months, the Nazi command seriously hoped to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would finally demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, after a few weeks, the Nazis were thrown back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

Textbook "History" for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

Holt McDougal. The World History.
For Senior High School, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

Hitler began planning an attack on his ally, the USSR, as early as the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeast Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a foothold in Southeastern Europe to attack the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
In order to prepare for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threatening to use force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, fought back. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell after 11 days. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early on the morning of June 22, 1941, the roar of German tanks and the drone of aircraft marked the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not ready for this attack. Although he had the largest army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans penetrated 500 miles into the territory of the Soviet Union (804.67 kilometers. - Ed.). Retreating, the Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the way of the enemy. The Russians used such a scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

Section 7. World War II
The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. The German army, which numbered about three million soldiers, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - on Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - on Moscow and in the south - on the Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans laid siege to Leningrad and Sevastopol, came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main goal of the Nazis - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - never materialized. The vast expanses and early Russian winter, with the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops and ordinary inhabitants of the country, thwarted the German plan for a blitzkrieg. In early December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and drove the enemy troops back 200 kilometers from Moscow.

History textbook for the 8th grade of elementary school (Klett publishing house, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

Never before have our people treated the German invasion otherwise than with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov announced the German attack in a trembling voice, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
Russian soldiers aroused dislike in the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and fond of music, from the places where they gathered, laughter and playing musical instruments could be heard.

Lauri Vahtre. Textbook "Turning Moments in Estonian History".

Bulgaria

Chapter 2: The Globalization of Conflict (1941-1942)
Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Starting the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of "living space", proclaimed in the book "My Struggle" ("Mein Kampf"). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: the aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating the "Jewish Marxists".
However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shaken by the surprise attack, bled dry by Stalin's repressions and ill-prepared, the Soviet army was quickly driven back. In a few weeks, the German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But the fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht could not defeat the enemy on the move in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership was developing plans for an attack on the USSR and the development of the territory and the use of its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was to advance on Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

The plan of "blitzkrieg" against the USSR
The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against "Asian Russia" by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary entry into the Red Army acquired a mass character. Popular militia became widespread. Fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created in the front line to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and property began from the territories threatened by the occupation.
Military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The rate was headed by I. Stalin. Italy
June 22, 1941
Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for the 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for the 11th grade of high school "Our New History", Dar Aun Publishing House, 2008
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. The widest front was opened in the east of Europe. Great Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the termination of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 adopted an ambiguous position of condemnation of "opposing imperialisms", revised it in favor of allying with democracy and fighting fascism.
That the USSR was the main target of Hitler's expansionist intentions was no mystery to anyone, including the Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Britain. So when, on 22 June 1941, the German offensive (code-named "Barbarossa") began on a 1,600-kilometer front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, and this lack of readiness, exacerbated by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red the army of its best military leaders, made the task of the aggressor easier at first.
The offensive, which also included the Italian expeditionary force sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in a crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltics, in the south through Ukraine in order to reach the oil regions in the Caucasus .

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, I.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany - the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially fixed. And the name - "Great Patriotic" war appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
Until now, the question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at its beginning and the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad is being discussed. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not fulfill what he was obliged to do, because he took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of the war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation, the townsfolk were alarmed by rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world”, which was constantly repeated in the newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, moreover, on his own territory, encroaching on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev by the decisions of the XX Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who was “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “trusted” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on alert before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the soldiers of the Red Army met the war sleeping in their barracks »;
- “The main thing, of course, that dominated him, over all his activities, which also responded to us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces ”(From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military History Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the magazine Ogonyok No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities .....” (G.K. Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections”. M. Olma -Press.2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and significance of the General Staff .... he was little interested in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to fully report to I. Stalin on the state of the country's defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy ..». (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

Until now, in different interpretations, it sounds that the “main culprit”, of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot”, “everyone was afraid of him” and “nothing happened without his will”, “did not allow the troops to be brought into combat readiness in advance", and "forced" the generals to leave soldiers in the "sleeping" barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I am gone, more than one tub of dirt will be poured on my head, a pile of rubbish will be put on my grave. But I am sure that the wind of history will dispel all this!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, recorded in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this testimony, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall upon him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed in his time, is typical, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to digress from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is unacceptable to try to put all the blame for the surprise attack of fascist Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless lamentations of our military leaders about the "surprise" one can see an attempt to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the mistakes in the combat training of the troops, in their command and control in the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all units - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the non-fulfillment of it with references to I.V. Stalin is not to the face of the soldiers.
Stalin, by the way, just like them, gave a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, what the former People's Commissar of the USSR aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister should also be responsible for something ... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I will definitely bear responsibility for this. And then everything is on Stalin ... ".
The great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov were the same.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and appointed him to the 2nd Belorussian.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Pole to take Berlin, and G.K. became the Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov almost all of his officers of the Front Headquarters, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky have always been distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
Troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. Ye Golovanov was proud that he had the honor to serve the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but he did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military figures and historians speak about the same.

Here is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia”, Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s wording was invented at one time in order to shift the blame for the defeat at the beginning of the war onto Stalin and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period ... ".

According to the long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, “Neither strategically nor tactically, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was not sudden” (VIZH 1990 No. 5).

The Red Army in the prewar years was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of mobilization and training.
Hitler declared universal military service from March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only from September 1, 1939.
As you can see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to wear and how to equip the conscripts, and only then, if the calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as much as, according to the calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the "Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940", developed by the head since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army - only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and re-equip it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

I. V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that she would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than mid-1942-43. That is why he sought to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to play for time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and was afraid of Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, an entry appeared that recorded the following words of Stalin personally heard by her during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for a rebuff, for a war with Hitler.

As to whether Stalin "trusted" Hitler, his speech at a meeting of the Politburo on November 18, 1940, when summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, testifies very well:

“... As we know, immediately after the departure of our delegation from Berlin, Hitler loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we well know the price of these statements! For us, even before meeting with Hitler, it was clear that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the requirements of the security of our country ....
We considered the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to probe the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his stubborn refusal to reckon with the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to stop the de facto occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about not infringing on the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to buy time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ....
It was at this time that we managed to prevent the attack of fascist Germany. And in this case, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role ...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite, the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but not completely eliminated.

But having concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot regard the Soviet-German pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
State security issues are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been moved to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops put on alert in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear.
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops on the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink for the war, for the offensive in the war, for our victory in this war .... "

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshal S.K. Timoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting about.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the troops of the districts:

“The war creeps up imperceptibly and will begin with a surprise attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. Molotov in the mid-1970s recalled the beginning of the war:

“We knew that war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war .... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months .... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, by the hour of the attack, no one could be ready, even the Lord God!
We were waiting for the attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would say: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!
The TASS message of June 14, 1941 was sent to give the Germans no reason to justify their attack ... It was needed as a last resort .... It turned out that on June 22, Hitler became the aggressor in front of the whole world. And we have allies .... Already in 1939 he was determined to unleash a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or a few months. Of course, we knew that we had to be ready for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It is very difficult ... "(F. Chuev. "One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov."

Much is said and written about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the leaders of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials (why, it will be shown below-sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was instructed to bring it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia, emphasizing that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.

So, for example, I. Stalin ordered to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
In early April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attache in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate potential aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on Stalin's instructions, specifically provided the Harbin residency of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to "intercept and decipher" a certain "circular from Moscow," which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union was preparing to defend its interests." (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

The most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR was obtained by foreign intelligence through its agents ("the magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, MacLean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations that British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax conducted with Hitler in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed to Hitler's demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany's expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of the highest representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were obtained on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion ("Sect's testament") that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for a period of time. more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.
The conclusion, as we see, was fully justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction of intelligence, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact in 1939.
In 1935, information was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged characterization of Germany's intentions towards the USSR, the specific goals, the timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained not yet clarified.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We should also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not bypass intelligence either. Our residency in Germany and other countries was severely weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov declared that he "cleaned 14,000 Chekists"

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to start aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces to develop a plan for a war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to start hostilities no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - very happy for himself and then appointed June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed directive No. 21 - Plan "Barbarossa".

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa".

In January 1941, Sam Edison Woods, the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, obtained it through his connections in the German government and military circles.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington K. Umansky be acquainted with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Samner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, moreover, with an indication of the source.

The information of the Americans was very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information of the NKGB intelligence department and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it. (Sudoplatov P.A. "Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941". M., 2001).

But the date - June 22, is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh), General of the Army Ivashutin, said:
"The texts of almost all documents and radiograms relating to the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff."

Therefore, the statement of G.K. looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we were allegedly aware of the Barbarossa plan ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data ”(G.K. Zhukov“ Memories and Reflections ”M. APN 1975. p. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask, what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (since February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - "Variants of military operations of the German army against the USSR", compiled on the basis of all intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country's leadership.

This document outlined the options for the possible directions of attacks by the German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the "Barbarossa plan" and the direction of the main attacks of the German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question posed to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(Moreover, it is characteristic that in his most "truthful book about the war" G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov assured that he knew nothing on the eve of the war about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. Zhukov copies of these German documents, which were signed by Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the March 20, 1941 report and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing to attack the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 Head of the General Staff Directorate F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, the head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, received a report “On the plans for a German attack on the USSR”, which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and gave the number of concentrated German divisions;
- May 15, 1941, the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on the military preparations of Romania. Until June 22, a number of messages were submitted.

As mentioned above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the potential capabilities of the enemy.
What capabilities of a potential adversary could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity for a detailed report to I. Stalin - also a complete lie in "the most truthful book about the war."
For example, only in June 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office.
This is evidenced by entries in the journal of visits to I. Stalin's office.
(“At a reception at Stalin’s. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)” Moscow. New Chronograph, 2008. Records of the duty secretaries of the reception room I.V. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day, to the nearest minute, the time spent in Stalin's Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded).

In the same period, Stalin's office was repeatedly visited, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, General of the Army Meretskov, Lieutenant Generals of Aviation Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement the Barbarossa plan.

The directive determined "Day B" - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Halder “On setting the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"one. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22, 1941.
2. In case of postponement of this period, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main strike will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned, and that you can proceed to the open execution of the order.
b) Alton's signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, then the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.

Unfortunately, our external, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht's bet on blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.

Foreign intelligence reports about German military preparations came from various residencies: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. He began to cooperate with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 he was arrested and executed) transmitted information that "at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin residency that on December 18, Hitler, speaking about the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, spoke out sharply against “injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice".

“In those pre-war years, there was a procedure to report to the leadership of the country each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without its analytical evaluation. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose certain measures were being taken, whether a political decision had been made on the attack, etc.
Generalizing materials were not prepared, with a deep analysis of all the information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country's leadership.” ("Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table" ed. Mosgorarkhiv 1995).

In other words, J. Stalin before the war was simply “filled up” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory, and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, which were developed by the highest ranks of the Third Reich.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, signed by Keitel, document No. 44142/41 “Guiding instructions of the Supreme High Command for masking the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, which provided for hiding from the enemy preparations for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed at the first stage, “until April, to maintain the uncertainty of information about their intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 "Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union."
This document provided:

“... from May 22, with the introduction of the maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all the efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason it is necessary to continue with particular energy the preparations for an attack on England...
Among the formations stationed in the East, a rumor must circulate about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the East", and the troops stationed in the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ...
Spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England ... ".
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted over 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to Crete by air. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin residency was set up by the agent provocateur "Lyceum student" (O. Berlinks. 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940.).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, during interrogation in May 1947 testified that in August 1940 Amayak Kobulov (a resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was substituted by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceum student”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting of the Lyceum student with Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and agreed with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from the "Lyceum student" about the low probability of Germany's war with the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of Soviet troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of the “Lyceum student”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that a quick determination of the true face of the "Lyceum student" left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin, Kobulov, provided the “Lyceum student” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation actions, information began to appear that German preparations near our borders were aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept economic and territorial demands, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin supposedly intends to put forward.

Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, she would not be able to defeat England.
All this misinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin residency, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence service also received them through its agents in these countries.
Thus, it turned out to be a multiple overlap of the information obtained, which, as it were, confirmed their “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials.
On May 5, the same "Corsican" gives information that the concentration of German troops is a "war of nerves" in order for the USSR to accept Germany's conditions: the USSR must give guarantees for entering the war on the side of the "Axis" powers.
Similar information comes from the British residency.
On May 8, 1941, in a message from the "Sergeant" (Harro Schulze-Boysen), it was said that the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum, demanding to increase exports to Germany.

And all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting its generalized analysis and conclusions on the table to Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions ..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation with intelligence materials, but by no means with all materials.
Here is what V.M. Molotov:
“When I was the Presovnarkom, it took me half a day every day to read intelligence reports. What was not there, no matter what terms were called! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The task of the scout is not to be late, to have time to report ... ".

Many researchers, speaking of I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar for State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Foreman” (Schulze-Boysen) and "The Corsican" (Arvid Harnak):
"Tov. Merkulov. Can send your source from the headquarters of the German. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a source, but a misinformer. I.St.”

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin's distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only on the basis of I. Stalin's resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates for a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported only through military intelligence, Stalin apparently developed.

Hitler, for example, issued an offensive order during the war on the Western Front, and canceled it on the planned day of the offensive. On the offensive on the Western Front, Hitler issued an order 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the very message of the "Foreman", then the irritation and resolution of I. Stalin will become clear.
Here is the text of the Master's message:
"one. All military measures for the preparation of an armed uprising against the SSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any meaning.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops ... ".
(Following the text is the report of the "Corsican" on economic and industrial issues in Germany).
.
"Foreman" (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. He studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. He was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Imperial Ministry of Aviation, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack (The Corsican) before the start of World War II. Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed on August 31, 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks rather frivolous just because it confuses the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that the resolution of I. Stalin applies only to the "Foreman" - an agent working in the headquarters of the German aviation, but not to the "Corsican".
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why the intelligence service trusted Starshina, Stalin said: "Go check everything and report back to me."

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by the military attaché, Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1638 sheets of telegraph reports were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR.
The telegram of Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, Krasnaya Zvezda published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The same fake and "resolution" L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
"Many workers are sowing panic ... The secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Almaz, Verny should be wiped into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany."
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

Indeed, since February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence became completely subordinate to Merkulov.

And here are some actual reports by R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2:“ I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German uprising against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."
- June 1: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left - on May 6 to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.
- June 20 "The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable."

Only according to military intelligence reports on the date of the start of the war with Germany, since 1940, more than 10 have come.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin next spring;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will perform in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack is scheduled for 3 - 4 am on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source in the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Directorate - "HVTs" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who, early in the morning of June 21. "KhVTs" himself called for an urgent meeting of his curator Colonel of the Republic of Uzbekistan K.B.Leontva.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again met with an agent of the HVC.
Information "KhVTs" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive was the agent network of Soviet intelligence is also evidenced by the fact that the agents of our military intelligence were such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk.

The illegal intelligence officer, acting under the pseudonym "Merlin", she is Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, the volume, and especially the level and quality of the information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that communication between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow, three radio operators in Berlin and its environs supported at once.
Hitler conferred on Olga Chekhova the title of State Artist of the Third Reich, specially established for her, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he defiantly showed her signs of the highest attention, invariably seated her in rows with him. (A.B. Martirosyan “The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to the undercover group of the Soviet military intelligence, which bore the code name "Krona". Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Yan Chernyak.
The group was founded in the mid 1920s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but none of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important officers of the Wehrmacht, major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers by captured German
film "The Girl of My Dreams"

But G.K. Nevertheless, Zhukov did not miss the opportunity to cheat our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Directorate of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our undercover intelligence, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Nazi high command. Our undercover intelligence was unable to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union.

Hitler, on the other hand, continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay J. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft (the Junkers-52 aircraft was used by Hitler as a personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynka field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very "serious troubles."
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to J. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion forces far from the eyes and aviation of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about 88 divisions, accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to the rumors circulating now about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you on the honor of the head of state that this is not the case.
For my part, I am also sympathetic to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all rule out the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large dimensions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans.
It's only about one month. Around June 15 - 20, I plan to start a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I most convincingly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, needless to say, try not to give them any reason.
If a provocation by one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report the incident through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, we have clearly agreed with you. I thank you for meeting me halfway in a matter known to you, and I ask you to excuse me for the way I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941".

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself "calls" the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But I. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler's intentions and confidence in him.
The question of whether he believed or did not believe - simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler's "sincerity" and continued to take measures to "bring operational groupings of troops in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear," about which he spoke in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo, so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, directives of the General Staff No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) were sent on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline for submitting plans indicated in them by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, neither the General Staff nor the People's Commissar of Defense had time to approve these plans.
This is the direct fault of the commanders of the districts, as well as the General Staff, which did not demand the submission of plans by the specified date.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers answered with their lives with the beginning of the war;

- “... In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border was outlined, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the forms of their use .. ”(Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”. M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally call up about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the admission to the cadres of the reserve command staff, called up for mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who was detained in the army after the end of this war until a special order;

On May 24, 1941, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, I. Stalin openly warned all the top Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of "hidden mobilization" about a million "accomplices" from the inner districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions up to the regular strength of wartime (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and resupplying of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This covert mobilization could not be carried out without I. Stalin's instructions, but it was carried out covertly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859 / ss / s was sent to the ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the troops of the district, all deep rifle divisions ... withdraw to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual putting troops on high combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent on the immediate bringing into proper condition and full combat readiness of the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO, primarily strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report on the execution by June 15, 1941. But the report on the implementation of this directive has not been received.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg”. M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question was, where was the General Staff and its chief, who were supposed to demand its execution, or were I. Stalin to control these issues for them?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent to put into effect Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a directive of the General Staff was issued on the advancement of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”).
In three of the four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (commander of the district, General of the Army D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kiev OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sc (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sc (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sc (141.80.139 sd); 55 sc (169,130,189 sd); 49 sc (190.197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (sk), having 14 rifle divisions (sd), which is about 200 thousand people "
In total, 28 divisions were advanced closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko already in June 1941 recommended that the district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was put into practice by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
... The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kyiv OVO-Kirponos), without agreement with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if, without their knowledge, the commanders of the districts are taking such measures when a war with Germany is on the verge?
As a result, some corps and divisions of the covering forces during the attack of fascist Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order followed from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the strike force of the troops, was practically absent in combat formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover the units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command rendered this "invaluable service" to the invading German troops.
Here is what the German General Blumentritt, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd tank group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest region against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - the commander of the army, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all our artillery opened fire ... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer ... A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were being crossed, pontoon bridges were being built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy ... There was no doubt that they had caught the Russians by surprise ... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground ”(“ Fatal Decisions ” Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this it must be added that the bridges in the Brest region were not blown up, along which the German tanks moved. Even Guderian was surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in a 500-km strip from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has been done so far to mask airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft, in the “complete absence of their masking”, are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, commander's and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection, and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military installations...”.
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, especially the Western OVO, showed on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 were lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, which failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of its orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, having learned about these losses, on the same day, June 22, shot himself.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was ... He believed that at any moment, on a combat alert, they could give a reliable rebuff to the enemy ... Knowing exactly the number of aircraft deployed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.
Naturally, I. Stalin's idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly heard in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, Northwest, North.
By this time, the command posts of the fronts were already equipped, because. As early as June 13, a decision was made to separate the command and control structures in the military districts and to transform the departments of the military districts into front-line ones.
The command post of the Western Front (Front Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war).
In the city of Ternopil, there was a front-line command post of the South-Western Front (Front Commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos died on 09/20/1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, "the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it turned out to be in reality ...".
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the impending war from Merkulov’s foreign intelligence residencies from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the RU General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also reconnaissance of the border troops, subordinated to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by constant monitoring of the border guards, a large number of informers of the border regions who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these are residents of the border regions, train drivers , switchmen, greasers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot but be reliable. This information, summarized and put together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B dated April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko are given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, the reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868 / B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from the intelligence of the border troops were presented.

But this is what Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk in Minsk to be presented to the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I'll check again, but I think it's just a provocation ... "
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Not in the spirit of the Boss. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...”. Apparently, by this "bastard" he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to repeat that Stalin allegedly did not believe "Pavlov's warnings" about the concentration of German troops ....
The situation heated up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS report, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany."
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It became apparently clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany's military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no "withdrawal" and "transfer" of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter of May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, "toward England" did not happen.
On the contrary, an intensified accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR Naval Attaché, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that the German attack on the USSR would take place on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on June 21 in the evening he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with the "inspection" of German units near our border.
Here is what he writes in his book - “I am a fighter” - Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov. Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting against it ... and ready to overflow over it.
We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane at any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information -sad39 would soon land) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok
After landing, the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took me after the report to the commander of the district.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either ....

June 22, 1941. 1st day of the war

The day before, June 21, at 13:00. German troops received the prearranged signal "Dortmund". It meant that the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan should begin the next day at 3 hours 30 minutes.

On June 21, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held, after which an order (directive No. 1) of the NPO of the USSR was issued and transmitted to the western military districts on the night of June 22: “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts is possible LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO ... The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions ... At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.

On the night of June 21-22, German saboteurs began to operate on the territory of the USSR in the border zone, violating communication lines.

At 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. along the entire length of the Western border of the USSR, the Germans began artillery and aviation training, after which the German ground forces invaded the territory of the USSR. 15 minutes before, at 3 o'clock. 15 minutes, the Romanian Air Force launched air strikes on the border regions of the USSR.

At 4 o'clock. 10 min. The Western and Baltic Special Districts reported on the start of hostilities by German troops in the land areas of the districts.

At 5:30 a.m. German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg handed over to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov a declaration of war. The same statement was made in Berlin to the USSR Ambassador to Germany Dekanozov.

At 7 o'clock. 15 minutes. Directive No. 2 was issued signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov and Zhukov: “On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them.
At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border ... The troops should use all their forces and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

The western border military districts of the USSR were transformed into fronts: the Baltic Special - into the North-Western Front, the Western Special - into the Western, the Kyiv Special - into the South-Western.

The beginning of the defense of the Liepaja naval base.

In the evening, Directive No. 3 of the NPO of the USSR was issued signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov, ordering the fronts to destroy the enemy with powerful counterattacks, "regardless of the state border."

The offensive of the German troops took the enemy by surprise ... everywhere we easily managed to capture bridges over water barriers and break through the border fortifications to the full depth ... After the initial “tetanus” caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy proceeded to active operations ... Our advancing divisions everywhere where the enemy tried to resistance, threw it back and advanced with the battle an average of 10-12 km! Thus, the way to mobile connections is open.

June 23, 1941. 2nd day of the war

• 2nd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 2nd day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 2nd day of border battles.

June 24, 1941. 3rd day of the war

• 3rd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 3rd day of Liepaja naval base defense.
• 3rd day of border battles.
• 2nd day of counterattacks by the Red Army in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 2nd day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

The Leningrad Military District was reorganized into the Northern Front.

June 25, 1941. 4th day of the war

• 4th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 4th day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 4th day of border battles.
• 3rd, last, day of counterattacks by the Red Army in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 3rd day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

The air forces of the Northern Front and the aviation units of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets simultaneously attacked 19 airfields in Finland, on which formations of Nazi and Finnish aviation were concentrated for operations against our targets. Having made about 250 sorties, the Soviet pilots destroyed many aircraft and other enemy military equipment on the airfields that day.

The Odessa Military District was reorganized into the Southern Front.

On June 25, enemy mobile units developed an offensive in the Vilna and Baranovichi directions ...

Enemy attempts to break through on the Brodsky and Lvov directions are met with strong opposition ...

On the Bessarabian sector of the front, the troops of the Red Army firmly hold their positions ...

The assessment of the situation in the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians decided to wage decisive battles in the border zone and retreat only in certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.

June 26, 1941. 5th day of the war

• 5th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 5th day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 5th day of border battles.
• 4th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

During June 26, in the Minsk direction, our troops fought with infiltrated enemy tank units.

The fights continue.

In the Lutsk direction, large and fierce tank battles are going on throughout the day with a clear advantage on the side of our troops ...

Army Group South is slowly advancing, unfortunately suffering significant losses. The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has a firm and energetic leadership ...

On the front of Army Group Center, operations are developing successfully. In the Slonim area, enemy resistance is broken ...

Army Group North, surrounding individual enemy groups, continues to systematically move east.

June 27, 1941. 6th day of the war

• 6th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 6th, last, day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 6th day of frontier battles.
• 5th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• Day 2 of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

During the day, our troops in the Shaulyai, Vilensky and Baranovichi directions continued to retreat to positions prepared for defense, lingering for battle at intermediate lines ...
On the entire sector of the front from Przemysl to the Black Sea, our troops firmly hold the state border.

June 28, 1941. 7th day of the war

• 7th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 7th day of border battles.
• 6th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• 3rd day of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

... In the Lutsk direction, a large tank battle unfolded during the day, in which up to 4,000 tanks participate from both sides. The tank battle continues.
In the region of Lviv, stubborn intense battles with the enemy are going on, during which our troops inflict a significant defeat on him ...

June 29, 1941. 8th day of the war

• 8th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 8th, last, day of the Border Battles.
• 7th, last, day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• 4th day of defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

German and Finnish troops went on the offensive in the Murmansk direction.

A strategic defensive operation began in the Arctic and Karelia.

On June 29, Finnish-German troops went on the offensive along the entire front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland ...

In the Vilna-Dvina direction, attempts by the enemy’s mobile units to influence the flanks and rear of our troops, retreating as a result of the fighting in the Siauliai, Keidany, Panevezh, Kaunas regions to new positions, were not successful ...
In the Lutsk direction, the battle of large tank masses continues ...

The Germans pursued the goal of disrupting the deployment of our troops in a few days and capturing Kyiv and Smolensk with a lightning strike within a week. However ... our troops still managed to turn around, and the so-called lightning strike on Kyiv, Smolensk turned out to be thwarted ...

Heavy fighting is still going on at the front of Army Group South. On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Group, the 8th Russian Panzer Corps penetrated deep into our position ... This wedging of the enemy, obviously, caused a lot of confusion in our rear in the area between Brody and Dubno ... Separate groups are also operating in the rear of the 1st Panzer Group the enemy with tanks, which are even advancing for considerable distances... The situation in the Dubno region is very tense...

In the center of Army Group Center's zone, our completely mixed divisions are making every effort not to let the enemy out of the inner ring of encirclement, who is desperately making his way in all directions ...

On the front of the Army Group "North", our troops systematically continue the offensive in the planned directions to the Western Dvina. All available crossings were captured by our troops... Only part of the enemy troops managed to get out of the threat of encirclement in the east across the lake region between Dvinsk and Minsk to Polotsk.

June 30, 1941. 9th day of the war

• 9th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 5th day of defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.
• 2nd day of the strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia.

The formation of the people's militia in Leningrad began.

All power in the USSR passes to the newly formed State Defense Committee (GKO) consisting of: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy chairman), Beria, Voroshilov, Malenkov.

In the Vilna-Dvina direction, our troops are fighting fierce battles with enemy motorized mechanized units ...
In the Minsk and Baranovichi directions, our troops are engaged in stubborn battles with the superior forces of the enemy’s mobile troops, delaying their advance at intermediate lines ...

In general, operations continue to develop successfully on the fronts of all army groups. Only on the front of the Army Group "Center" part of the encircled enemy grouping broke through between Minsk and Slonim through the front of the Guderian tank group ... On the front of the Army Group "North" the enemy launched a counterattack in the Riga region and wedged into our location ... An increase in enemy aviation activity in front of the front was noted army group "South" and in front of the Romanian front ... On the side of the enemy, already completely outdated types of four-engine aircraft are operating.

Sources

• 1941 - M.: MF "Democracy", 1998
• History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Volume 2. - M.: Military Publishing, 1961
• Franz Halder. War diary. 1941-1942. - M.: AST, 2003
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 1985. In 3 volumes.
• Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M.: AST; Transitbook, 2004

In the memory of our people, this day will remain not as an ordinary day of summer, but as the day of the beginning of the most terrible and bloody war in the history of the country and in world history.
Real photos of June 1941.

Hero of the defense of the Brest Fortress, commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment of the 42nd Infantry Division, Major Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov (1900 - 1979).

P.M. Gavrilov from June 22 to July 23, 1941 led the defense of the Eastern Fort of the Brest Fortress. He managed to rally around him all the surviving soldiers and commanders of various units and subunits, to close the most vulnerable places for the enemy to break through. Until June 30, the fort's garrison offered organized resistance, steadfastly repelling countless enemy attacks and preventing it from breaking into the fort. After the enemy used high-powered air bombs and destroyed part of the fort's buildings, the Germans managed to break into the fort and capture most of its defenders.

From the beginning of July, Major Gavrilov, with the surviving soldiers, switched to the tactics of sudden sorties and attacks on the enemy. On July 23, 1941, he was seriously wounded by a shell explosion in the casemate and was captured in an unconscious state. He spent the war years in the Nazi concentration camps of Hammelburg and Revensburg, having experienced all the horrors of captivity. Released by Soviet troops in May 1945 in the Mauthausen concentration camp. Passed a special check and was reinstated in military rank. But at the same time, he was expelled from the party due to the loss of his party card and being in captivity, which played a negative role in his future fate. Since the autumn of 1945, he was the head of the Soviet camp for Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia on the construction of the Abakan-Taishet railway. In June 1946 he was transferred to the reserve.

In 1955, he finally found a wife and son, with whom he parted under the bombs in the first hour of the war. In 1956, a book by S.S. Smirnov "Brest Fortress", based on factual material. This event had a favorable effect on the fate of Gavrilov. He was reinstated in the party and he was presented to the country's highest award.

On January 30, 1957, for the exemplary performance of military duty during the defense of the Brest Fortress in 1941 and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Gavrilov Pyotr Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The city of Molotovsk at the hour of the declaration of war. Location: Molotovsk. Shooting time: 06/22/1941. Author: B. Koshkin

View of the Belomorsky Prospekt of Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Region) at the time of the declaration of war. In the distance, a crowd of people can be seen in front of the city's House of Soviets, where the first volunteers were enrolled. The photo was taken from house number 17 of Belomorsky Prospekt.

On Sunday morning, June 22, 1941, a Komsomol-youth cross was held in Molotovsk. At noon, V. Molotov made a speech in which he officially announced the treacherous German attack. The performance was repeated several times. Some time later, the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were issued, declaring the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 in the Arkhangelsk military district and introducing martial law in the Arkhangelsk region. By evening, a mobilization point was deployed in Molotovsk. During the first three days of its work, in addition to those liable for military service, 318 volunteers arrived.

The city was founded just five years before the start of the war, but its contribution to the overall Victory was significant. Over 14 thousand Molotovites went to the front, over 3.5 thousand died on the battlefields. The 296th reserve ski regiment, the 13th separate ski brigade, and the 169th cadet rifle brigade were formed in the city. In Molotovsk, there was a strategic port for receiving Lend-Lease convoys. In the city, 741 thousand rubles were collected for the Arkhangelsk Collective Farmer tank column, 150 thousand rubles for the Molotov Rabochiy air squadron, 3350 thousand rubles for two cash and clothing lotteries, a loan was implemented for 17 thousand rubles, by February 1942 1740 thousand rubles were collected in cash and 2,600,000 bonds to the defense fund. By October 1, 1941, 9920 things were received from Molotovites to be sent to the front, sending gifts to the soldiers of the Red Army was massive. The city has three evacuation hospitals of the Karelian Front (No. 2522, 4870 and 4871). In the winter of 1942, a part of the staff of the Leningrad Leninsky Komsomol Theater arrived in the city along the “road of life”, in total over 300 evacuees were received. Throughout the war, Molotov Plant No. 402 built large project 122A submarine hunters, completed the construction of M and C type submarines, repaired Soviet and foreign ships, fired 122,262 armor-piercing shells, 44,375 high-explosive bombs, 2,027 sets of sea trawls .

Source: Severodvinsk City Museum of Local Lore.

Praskovya Leontievna Tkacheva, senior nurse of the surgical department of the Brest Fortress hospital, with the wives and children of the Red Army commanders, surrounded by German soldiers. Shooting time: 06/25-26/1941.

Soviet amphibious tanks T-38, broken in the Brest Fortress. Location: Brest, Belarus, USSR. Shooting time: June-July 1941

On the front is a captive vehicle manufactured in 1937 with an armored hull and a turret manufactured by the Ordzhonikidze Podolsk plant. In the background is another T-38 tank. Tanks are located on the territory of the citadel next to the White Palace. The military equipment of the 75th separate reconnaissance battalion of the 6th rifle division of the 28th rifle corps of the 4th army of the Western Front was also located there, the armored vehicle fleet of which was located on the shore at the fork of the Mukhavets River.

German firing points in the Brest Fortress. Shooting time: 06/22/1941

After the failure of the sudden capture of the Brest Fortress, the Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.

Registration of volunteers in the Red Army in the Oktyabrsky district military registration and enlistment office in Moscow. Duty officer of the Oktyabrsky district military registration and enlistment office P.N. Gromov reads the statement of the volunteer M.M. Grigoriev.

Location of shooting: Moscow. Shooting time: 06/23/1941.

Soviet light tank BT-7, destroyed on June 23, 1941 during the battle in the Alytus area. Location: Lithuania, USSR. Shooting time: June-July 1941.

Vehicle from the 5th Panzer Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front. In the background is a destroyed German tank Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. E from the 7th Panzer Division of the 39th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group of General Hoth.

The flight commander of the 145th Fighter Aviation Regiment Senior Lieutenant Viktor Petrovich Mironov (1918-1943) at the I-16 fighter.

V.P. Mironov in the Red Army since 1937. After graduating from the Borisoglebsky VAUL in 1939, he was sent to the 145th IAP. Member of the Soviet-Finnish war.

Member of the Great Patriotic War from the first days.
By September 1941, the flight commander of the 145th IAP, senior lieutenant Mironov, made 127 sorties, personally shot down 5 enemy aircraft in 25 air battles. Bombing and assault strikes caused great damage to enemy manpower and equipment.
On June 6, 1942 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Since November 1942 - as part of the 609th IAP, commander of the 2nd AE. Until February 1943, he made 356 sorties, shot down 10 enemy aircraft personally and 15 in a group.

Soldiers and commanders of the Red Army inspect the captured German tank Flammpanzer II. Shooting time: July-August 1941. Author: Georgy Petrusov

Soldiers and commanders of the Red Army inspect the captured Flammpanzer II flamethrower tank in the Western direction. On the fender is the installation of smoke grenade launchers. By June 22, 1941, the 100th and 101st flamethrower tank battalions of the Wehrmacht were equipped with Flammpanzer II flamethrower tanks.

Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Galkin (02/12/1917 - 07/21/1942).

Born at the mine Kochkar of the Chelyabinsk region, in a working class family. He graduated from the workers' faculty, worked as a locksmith. Since 1936 in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1937 he graduated from the Voroshilovgrad Military Aviation Pilot School. Member of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940. Made 82 sorties. In May 1940 he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Since 1941, Lieutenant M.P. Galkin has been in the army. He fought on the Southern, Southwestern and Volkhov fronts. Until August 1941, he served in the 4th IAP, flying I-153 and I-16. In early August 1941, on the Crimean Isthmus, he was seriously wounded in one of the air battles. By August 1941, the commander of the 4th Fighter Aviation Regiment (20th Mixed Aviation Division, 9th Army, Southern Front), Lieutenant M.P. Galkin, made 58 sorties, conducted 18 air battles, shot down 5 enemy aircraft.

From February to July 1942 he fought in the 283rd IAP, where he flew the Yak-7. In January 1942 he was sent to Novosibirsk for instructor work. On March 27, 1942, for courage and military prowess shown in battles with enemies, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. From June 1942 he fought on the Volkhov Front in the 283rd IAP, where he flew the Yak-7. Won a few more victories.

On July 21, 1942, he died in an air battle in the Kirishi area. He was buried in a mass grave in the urban-type settlement of Budogoshch, Kirishsky District, Leningrad Region.
Awarded with orders: Lenin, Red Banner, Red Star. A street and a secondary school in the city of Plast, Chelyabinsk Region, are named after him. In the city of Plast, on the Alley of Heroes and the urban-type settlement of Budogoshch, a bust was erected.

Soviet heavy tank KV-2 from the 6th tank regiment of the 3rd tank division of the 1st mechanized corps of the North-Western Front, shot down on July 5, 1941 in the battle for the city of Ostrov. Location: Pskov region. Shooting time: June-August 1941.

Vehicle produced in June 1941, serial number B-4754. The surviving write-off certificates for the KV-2 tank No. 4754 stated the following: “The tank was hit - the caterpillar was killed, which fell off. The projectile pierced the side armor of the transmission and damaged the control rods and side clutches, the movement of the tank was impossible. Since the wrecked and burning tanks clogged the roadway of the bridge, the withdrawal was impossible due to the wrecked control of the tank and the caterpillars that fell down, and the tank was not able to turn around. The battalion commander gave the order to get out of the tank, while he himself remained in the vehicle to disable the tank. The further fate of Captain Rusanov is still not known, the rest of the crew returned to the unit. The battlefield was immediately occupied by the enemy and the evacuation of the remaining vehicle from the battlefield became impossible.

Tank crew: vehicle commander Captain Rusanov, driver Zhivoglyadov, gun commander Osipov, radio operator Volchkov, loader Khantsevich.

The commander of the 1st squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force Mikhail Vasilyevich Avdeev (09/15/1913 - 06/22/1979) next to his Yak-1 fighter. Shooting time: 1942. Author: Nikolai Asnin

From June 1941 he took part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. He fought throughout the war in the 8th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which in April 1942 was renamed the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment. At first he was deputy squadron commander, from January 1942 he became squadron commander, and from April 1943 to November 1944 he commanded a regiment. By June 1942, Mikhail Avdeev made more than three hundred sorties, shot down 9 enemy aircraft in 63 air battles, and also caused significant damage to enemy troops with assault strikes.

By Decree No. 858 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 14, 1942, for the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism of the guards shown at the same time, Captain Avdeev Mikhail Vasilievich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the medal " Golden Star".

An abandoned Soviet tracked tractor STZ-5-NATI blown up in the forest. Behind the tractor is an abandoned heavy tank KV-2, issued in May - June 1941 from one of the tank divisions of the 7th mechanized corps of the Western Front.

Location: Belarus, USSR
Shooting time: summer 1941.

Squadron commander of the 788th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment Captain Nikolai Alexandrovich Kozlov (1917 - 2005).

In June-September 1941 N.A. Kozlov is the deputy commander of an air squadron of the 162nd Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought on the Western (June 1941) and Bryansk (August-September 1941) fronts. Participated in defensive battles in Belarus and in the Bryansk direction. On September 24, 1941, a German Yu-88 bomber was shot down by a ramming attack from his MiG-3 fighter. During the ramming, he was seriously wounded in the left leg, landed by parachute. Until December 1941, he was treated in a hospital in the city of Ulyanovsk.

In February-July 1942 - deputy commander of an air squadron of the 439th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, in July-September 1942 - commander of an air squadron of the 788th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. Fought as part of the Stalingrad Air Defense Region (April-September 1942). He provided air cover for military facilities in the cities of Stalingrad (now Volgograd), participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. On May 25, 1942, near the city of Morozovsk (Rostov Region), he made a second ramming, shooting down a German Yu-88 bomber. He made an emergency landing on his MiG-3 fighter and was slightly injured. He spent several days in a hospital in Stalingrad.

In October 1942 - September 1943 - commander of an air squadron of the 910th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought as part of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk (October 1942 - June 1943) and Voronezh (June-July 1943) air defense regions, the Western Front of Air Defense (July-September 1943). Provided air cover for railway junctions in the Voronezh region, participated in the Battle of Kursk.

For courage and heroism shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 14, 1943, Captain Nikolai Alexandrovich Kozlov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

From August 1943 - commander of the 907th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought in the Western (August 1943 - April 1944) and Northern (April-October 1944) air defense fronts. He carried out air cover for front-line communications during the battle for the Dnieper, the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Korsun-Shevchenko, Belorussian and Berlin operations.

In total, during the war he made 520 sorties on I-16, MiG-3, Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5 fighters, in 127 air battles he shot down 19 personally and as part of a group of 3 enemy aircraft.

Soviet tanks KV-2 and T-34, stuck while crossing the Maidansky stream. Location: Lviv region, Ukraine. Shooting time: 06/25/1941. Author: Alois Beck

A heavy tank KV-2 and a medium tank T-34 of the 1940 model with an L-11 cannon from, presumably, the 16th tank regiment of the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps of the Red Army, stuck and then knocked out on June 23, 1941 during time to overcome the creek Maidan. Tanks were fighting near the village of Stary Maidan, Radekhovsky district, Lviv region of Ukraine.

German soldiers examine a Soviet KV-2 tank stuck in the Maidansky stream. Location: Lviv region, Ukraine. Shooting time: 23-29.06.1941

Heavy tank KV-2 from, presumably, the 16th Tank Regiment of the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army, stuck and then shot down on June 23, 1941 while crossing the Maidansky stream. Tanks were fighting near the village of Stary Maidan, Radekhovsky district, Lviv region of Ukraine. It can be seen that the car was under fire from anti-tank artillery.

Flight commander of the 2nd Guards Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Pavlovich Pokrovsky (1918 - 1998).

V.P. Pokrovsky participated in the Great Patriotic War from June 1941, first as part of the 72nd mixed, from October 1941 - as part of the 78th fighter regiment of the Northern Fleet, and then again the 72nd mixed (then 2nd guards mixed) air regiment. On December 26, 1942, while protecting an allied convoy, he shot down a German fighter, but he himself was shot down. He jumped out by parachute and was rescued from the waters of the Kola Bay by Allied sailors. By May 1943 V.P. Pokrovsky made 350 sorties, conducted 60 air battles, personally shot down 13 aircraft and 6 enemy aircraft in the group.

For the exemplary performance of command assignments on the front of the struggle against the German invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 24, 1943, Captain Pokrovsky Vladimir Pavlovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Since the summer of 1943 - the commander of a training squadron at the courses for commanders of the Air Force of the Navy.

A German soldier poses on a T-34 tank knocked out on a road near Dubno

Tank T-34 tank with a cannon L-11 issued in October 1940. Serial number 682-35. The tank belonged to the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. Shot down in the Dubno area, possibly the southeastern entrance to Dubno. According to the inscription on the starboard side, the tank was hit by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Regiment. Presumably, the tank was hit on June 29, 1941.

Soviet medium tank T-34 with an L-11 cannon, produced in October 1940, shot down near the road near the southeastern entrance to Dubno. The serial number of the tank is 682-35. The vehicle belonged to the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. According to the autograph on the starboard side, the tank was shot down by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Regiment. The tank may have been hit on 29 June 1941. In the background, on the right in the picture, a wrecked T-26 tank is visible. From this angle, another wrecked T-26 tank is visible. The same car from a different angle with the dead tanker.

A Soviet T-34 tank knocked out on the road and a dead Soviet tanker next to it. Tank T-34 tank with a cannon L-11 issued in October 1940. Serial number 682-35. The tank belonged to the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. Shot down in the Dubno area, possibly the southeastern entrance to Dubno. According to the autograph on the starboard side, shot down by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Regiment. The tank may have been hit on 29 June 1941. In the middle of the road lies the driver's hatch.

Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot of the 3rd Squadron of the 158th Air Defense Fighter Regiment, Junior Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Zhukov (1917-1943) poses for a photograph at his I-16 fighter.

M.P. Zhukov has been with the regiment since October 1940. He made his first sortie on June 22, 1941. On June 29, 1941, in his third sortie, he destroyed a Junkers Yu-88 bomber with a ramming attack.

He fought in the skies of Leningrad, escorted transport aircraft, covered the ports on Lake Ladoga, the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Was injured. At the end of 1941 he mastered the P-40E fighter.

January 12, 1943 M.P. Zhukov (by that time a senior lieutenant, flight commander of the 158th IAP) died in an air battle near the village of Moscow Dubrovka. In total, he made 286 sorties, conducted 66 air battles, shot down 9 enemy aircraft personally and 5 in a group.

Leningraders on 25th October Avenue (now Nevsky Prospekt) at the boarded-up showcase of the Eliseevsky Store (the official name is Grocery Store No. 1 Central). Author: Anatoly Garanin.

On the boards are placed "Windows TASS", which first appeared in Leningrad in the windows of the grocery store on June 24, 1941.

Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Alexei Nikolaevich Katrich (1917 - 2004).

A.N. Katrich graduated from the Chuguev Military Aviation Pilot School in 1938. He served in the Air Force as a pilot of a fighter aviation regiment (in the Moscow Military District). Member of the Great Patriotic War: in June 1941 - June 1942 - pilot, deputy commander and commander of an air squadron of the 27th Fighter Aviation Regiment (Moscow Air Defense Zone). Participated in the defense of Moscow, the defense of the city and rear communications of the Western Front from enemy bomber raids. On August 11, 1941, in an air battle, a Dornier Do-215 reconnaissance aircraft of the enemy was shot down by a ram at an altitude of 9,000 meters, after which it landed safely at its airfield.

For courage and heroism shown in battles, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 28, 1941, Lieutenant Aleksey Nikolaevich Katrich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

In June 1942 - October 1943 Katrich was the commander of an air squadron of the 12th Guards Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. Fought as part of the Moscow and Western air defense fronts. Participated in the defense of Moscow and the rear communications of the Western Front from enemy bomber raids. In total, during the war he made 258 sorties on MiG-3, Yak-1 and Yak-9 fighters, in 27 air battles he personally shot down 5 and as part of a group of 9 enemy aircraft (M.Yu. Bykov in his research indicates 5 personal and 7 group victories). In November 1943 - January 1946 - navigator of the 12th Guards Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, until 1944 he was on combat duty in the air defense system of the city of Moscow.
Captain-Lieutenant Gurin commanded the destroyer "Gremyashchiy" on sea voyages to escort and guard convoys, raid operations on ports and enemy communications. Under his command, the destroyer completed 21 combat missions in 1941 and more than 30 in 1942. The crew of the destroyer carried out 6 artillery firing at enemy troops on the coast, 4 laying minefields, participated in escorting 26 convoys, sank the German submarine "U-585" (March 30, 1942, the area of ​​​​Kildin Island), together with a group of Soviet and British ships repulsed the attack of a group of German destroyers on the convoy guarded by them (one enemy destroyer was sunk in this battle), shot down 6 German aircraft.

In October 1942 A.I. Gurin was appointed commander of the 2nd division of the destroyer brigade of the Northern Fleet. From September 1944 to October 1945 he commanded the 1st division of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet squadron. During the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, he personally led the division in carrying out combat missions for artillery support of two amphibious assault forces and during the offensive of the forces of the Karelian Front along the coast of the Barents Sea. Captain 1st rank (09/01/1944).

Destroyer division under the command of Captain 1st Rank Gurin A.I. escorted allied convoys, performed tasks to support the positions of our troops, fired at bases and searched for enemy ships and convoys. By May 1945 A.I. Gurin made over 100 different combat exits to the sea, passed 79,370 nautical miles.

The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to Captain 1st Rank Gurin Anton Iosifovich was awarded by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 8, 1945.

A group of Red Army soldiers who died on June 29-30, 1941 during a battle with units of the German 29th Infantry Division near the village of Ozernitsa, north of the Zelva-Slonim highway. Location: Slonimsky district, Belarus, USSR. Shooting time: 29-30.06.1941.

A destroyed T-34 tank from the 6th mechanized corps is visible in the background. In this battle, the headquarters of the 6th mechanized corps was ambushed.

Sergeant Gavriil Ivanovich Zalozny (born in 1901, right) at the Maxim machine gun. Shooting time: 1941.

Gavriil Ivanovich Zalozny was drafted into the Red Army on June 26, 1941. Fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. September 23, 1941 was shell-shocked and taken prisoner. Released in February 1944 and enrolled in the 230th reserve regiment, since July 1944 - commander of the Maxim machine gun crew of the 12th shock assault rifle battalion of the 1st shock assault rifle regiment of the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front . Then he served in the 310th Guards Rifle Regiment.

Sanitary instructor of the 369th separate battalion of the marine corps chief foreman E.I. Mikhailov near Kerch

Sanitary instructor of the 369th separate battalion of the marines of the Danube military flotilla chief foreman Ekaterina Illarionovna Mikhailova (Dyomina) (b. 1925).

In the Red Army since June 1941 (added two years to her 15 years). In the battles near Gzhatsk, she was seriously wounded in the leg. She was treated in hospitals in the Urals and in Baku. After recovering from January 1942, she served on the military hospital ship Krasnaya Moskva, which ferried the wounded from Stalingrad to Krasnovodsk. There she was awarded the rank of chief foreman, for exemplary service she was awarded the badge "Excellent Worker of the Navy". Among the volunteers, she was enrolled as a sanitary instructor in the 369th separate battalion of the Marine Corps. The battalion was part of the Azov and then the Danube military flotillas. With this battalion, which later received the honorary name "Kerch Red Banner", Mikhailova fought through the waters and shores of the Caucasus and Crimea, the Azov and Black Seas, the Dniester and the Danube, with a liberation mission - through the land of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. Together with the soldiers of the battalion, she entered the battle, repulsed enemy counterattacks, carried the wounded from the battlefield, and provided them with first aid. She was wounded three times.

On August 22, 1944, when crossing the Dniester estuary as part of the landing force, Chief Petty Officer E.I. Mikhailova was one of the first to reach the shore, rendered first aid to seventeen seriously wounded sailors, suppressed the fire of a heavy machine gun, threw grenades at the bunker and destroyed more than ten Nazis. December 4, 1944 E.I. Mikhailova, in a landing operation to capture the port of Prahovo and the fortress of Ilok (Yugoslavia), being wounded, continued to provide medical assistance to the soldiers and, saving their lives, exterminated 5 enemy soldiers from a machine gun. After recovery, she returned to duty. As part of the 369th Marine Battalion, she fought for the Imperial Bridge in the Austrian capital of Vienna. Here she celebrated the Victory on May 9, 1945.

E.I. Mikhailova is the only woman who served in the intelligence of the Marine Corps. She was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, medals, including the Medal for Courage and the Florence Nightingale Medal.

To the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, chief foreman E.I. Mikhailova was presented in August and December 1944, but the award did not take place.
By decree of the President of the USSR of May 5, 1990, Ekaterina Illarionovna Demina (Mikhailova) was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 11608).

The first and most difficult day of the Great Patriotic War

The implementation of Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" began at dawn on June 22, 1941. It was at this time that the Wehrmacht troops concentrated on the border of the USSR received the order to start the invasion.

That first day of the war began unusually early, not only for the troops of the western border military districts, but also for the Soviet people living in the border regions of the USSR. At dawn, hundreds of German bombers invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. They bombarded airfields, areas where troops were stationed in the western border districts, railway junctions, communication lines and other important objects, as well as large cities in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.

At the same time, Wehrmacht troops concentrated along the entire length of the State Border of the USSR opened heavy artillery fire on border outposts, fortified areas, as well as formations and units of the Red Army stationed in its immediate vicinity. After artillery and aviation preparation, they crossed the State Border of the USSR along a huge stretch - from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The Great Patriotic War began - the most difficult of all wars ever experienced by Russia and its people.

Germany and its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary)

for the war against the Soviet Union deployed a powerful grouping,

numbering 190 divisions, 5.5 million people, over 47 thousand guns and mortars,

about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 4200 aircraft.

They were united in three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South",

which were intended to strike in the directions of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.

The immediate strategic goal of the German military leadership was to defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The main blows of the Wehrmacht were directed at Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The efforts of one of the army groups were concentrated in each direction.

The troops of Army Group North deployed in East Prussia advanced on Leningrad. They were supposed to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, seize ports on the Baltic Sea and the North-Western regions of the USSR. In cooperation with this group of armies, a little later, the German army "Norway" and the Karelian army of the Finns, who had the task of capturing Murmansk, were to act. The enemy grouping directly operating in the Baltic direction was opposed by the troops of the Baltic Special Military District under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsov, and in the Murmansk sector the troops of the Leningrad Military District, which was headed by General M.M. Popov.

The troops of the Army Group Center were operating in the main Moscow direction, which were supposed to defeat the Soviet troops in Belarus and develop an offensive to the East. In this direction, the USSR State Border was covered by the troops of the Western Special Military District under the command of General D.G. Pavlova.

Army Group South, deployed from Vlodava to the mouth of the Danube, struck in the general direction of Kyiv. This grouping of enemy troops was opposed by the forces of the Kiev Special Military District, commanded by General M.P. Kirponos and the Odessa Military District under the command of General Ya.T. Cherevichenko.

In Moscow, the first reports of the invasion came from the border guards. "Advance on all fronts. Parts of the border guards are fighting ... - the command of the Bialystok border section reported to the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, - The Germans are advancing Kretinga ... Bialystok. At the same time, the General Staff received similar information from the western border districts. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, his boss, General G.K. Zhukov reported to I.V. Stalin about what happened.

Only an hour and a half after the invasion of the Wehrmacht troops into Soviet territory, the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg arrived at the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, and gave him an official note from his government, which stated: “In view of the further intolerable threat, due to the massive concentration ... of the armed forces of the Red Army. The German government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures. However, even after receiving an official document from the German embassy, ​​I.V. Stalin could not fully believe that this was a war. He demanded that Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General G.K. Zhukov, so that they would immediately figure out if this was a provocation of the German generals, and ordered the troops to order the border not to cross until special instructions.

The whole country learned about the German attack only at 12 noon, when the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The appeal ended with the words that became the slogan of the Soviet people in the fight against the invaders: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

Already after the speech of V.M. Molotov, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a number of decrees aimed at mobilizing all the forces of the state to repel the attack, as well as to ensure public order and state security within the country:

• "On the announcement of mobilization on the territory of 14 military districts from June 23";
• "On the introduction of martial law in certain areas of the USSR."

Crowding around loudspeakers installed on the streets and industrial enterprises, people listened to Molotov's speech, afraid to miss a word. At first, almost none of them doubted that the Red Army would need only a few weeks to defeat the enemy "with little blood, with a mighty blow." The tragedy of the situation was not fully realized by the military-political leadership of the country due to the lack of objective information from the front.

Only by the end of that day, it became clear to the head of the Soviet government that military operations on the western borders of the USSR were by no means a large-scale military provocation by Germany, but the beginning of a war - the most terrible and cruel. “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea,” the population of the country was informed in the first report of the High Command of the Red Army, “and during the first half of the day they were held back. In the afternoon ... after fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes ... ".

Already in this report from the front, to some extent, the whole drama of the first border battles and battles, the most severe in their intensity and consequences, was visible. But then, on the first day of the war, no one could even imagine what inhuman tests would fall on the shoulders of every Soviet person, not only at the front, but also in the rear.

The population of Germany learned about the beginning of a new war from Hitler's appeal to the people, which at 5:30 a.m. was read out on the Berlin radio by the Minister of Propaganda I. Goebbels. Judging by this appeal, the political leadership of Germany sought not only to justify the aggression in the eyes of the world community, but also to attract Western powers to participate in the anti-Soviet war and thereby deprive the USSR of possible allies. However, both the leaders of the leading powers and the majority of sober-minded European politicians clearly understood that the Nazi statements were just a propaganda trick with which they hoped to justify another act of their aggressive aspirations.

The British were the first to react. Already in the evening of the same day, British Prime Minister W. Churchill made a statement about the support of the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany. He clearly articulated the purpose of British policy in the war and guaranteed a tough and consistent position for his country:

“We have only one single unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime..."

He ended his speech with promises "to provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can."

The speech of the British Prime Minister had a huge resonance all over the world. All points were placed: England clearly defined its attitude towards the Soviet Union, which was subjected to aggression. To clarify the positions of many other states of the world, primarily the countries of the British Commonwealth, which are accustomed to traditionally orient themselves on the opinion of London, Churchill's speech was of fundamental importance. In a certain sense, it also influenced the position of the United States of America. True, the events that took place in Europe did not affect the Americans much. After all, they were away from the world war. Nevertheless, on the morning of June 23, Acting Secretary of State S. Welles, at the direction of President F. Roosevelt, made an official statement about rendering assistance to the USSR. The next day, Roosevelt himself at a press conference at the White House said that the United States would provide all possible assistance to the USSR in its struggle against Germany, but noted that it was not yet known what form it would take.

And yet, at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Western powers spoke more about supporting the USSR than actually helping it. The reasons for this slowness are obvious. The temptation was already very great to strengthen their own positions - to take advantage of the mutual weakening and exhaustion of the two irreconcilable enemies of Germany and the Soviet Union. And there was not so much confidence that the Red Army would withstand the battle with the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht. Indeed, already on June 22, the strike groups of the German troops achieved tangible success in all directions, due to the decisive concentration by his command in the first strategic echelon of more than 80% of all forces intended for the eastern campaign - 130 divisions, 8 brigades, 3350 tanks, about 38 thousand people. guns and mortars and about 5 thousand aircraft.

A strike of such force for all the troops of the western border districts was a complete surprise. They were not ready for such a development of events. The Soviet border guards, who were the first to stand in the way of the German troops, did not expect this blow either. The enemy hoped to crush the border outposts in a short time, but he did not succeed. The border guards fought to the death.

In extremely unfavorable conditions, the formations and cover units of the western border districts had to start hostilities. Not put on alert in advance, they were unable to provide a proper rebuff to the enemy. As early as half past two in the night of June 22, the headquarters of the border military districts received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1 that an attack on the country by the German armed forces was possible on June 22 or 23. But, this document did not give permission to put into effect a plan to cover the state border in full, since it only prescribed "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications ...".

The insufficiently specific content of the given order caused many questions from commanders of all levels, and most importantly, it fettered their initiative. So, in the directive of the Baltic Special Military District, it was indicated to the 8th and 11th armies:

“During the night of June 22, covertly occupy the defense of the main zone ... Do not issue live ammunition and shells ... Do not open fire in case of provocative actions by the Germans.”

At 02:25, similar instructions were given to the armies by the military council and the Western Special Military District.

The army headquarters, having received district directives a few minutes before the start of the war, brought this order to subordinate formations and units until 5-6 in the morning. Therefore, only a few of them were put on alert in a timely manner. Most of them were alerted by the first explosions of enemy artillery shells and aerial bombs. The commanders of the 3rd and 4th armies of the Western Special Military District managed to give the formation commanders only some preliminary orders. At the headquarters of the 10th Army, the directive was received after the outbreak of hostilities. There were several reasons. On the night of June 22, in the entire border zone, as a result of the actions of enemy sabotage groups, wire communications in the army-corps-division link were largely disrupted. The lack of pre-worked out documents on covert command and control of troops, the low provision of headquarters with radio equipment, as well as radio fear led to the fact that they practically did not use this type of communication.

Former Chief of Staff of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front, General I.T. Schlemin noted:

“On June 22, in the afternoon, wire and radio communications with the district were interrupted. It was impossible to find the district ... The district headquarters, receiving cipher telegrams from the army by radio, believed that the ciphers were coming from the enemy, and, afraid to give out their plan and their location, decided not to respond to the army's requests.

As a result of the first massive enemy air strikes on the places of deployment of troops, a large number of communications and transport facilities were destroyed. Already in the first hours of the war, the commander of the 3rd Army, General V.I. Kuznetsov reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Wire communication with the units is broken, radio communication is not established until 8 o'clock."

A similar situation was observed at the headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps. Later, its commander, General S.I. Oborin also reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

“The communications battalion was killed by 70% on June 22, 1941 in the morning, during the bombardment of the city of Kobrin. The headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps remained in the composition of 20% of the regular number.

Lacking accurate information from the troops about the development of events, the commanders and staffs were unable to assess the seriousness of the situation. The installation of the People's Commissar of Defense, in his directive No. 1 "not to succumb to any provocations," still continued to operate, which limited the decisive actions of the commanders of formations and units of the covering armies. Thus, the commander of the 3rd Army reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Enemy aviation is bombing Grodno, waiting for orders from General Pavlov ... artillery and machine-gun fire from the Germans ... waiting for instructions."

Practically the same was noted by the commander of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, General M.S. Shumilov: “The war began at 0400... I immediately reported to the commander of the 8th Army... I received an order: “Do not open fire, do not succumb to provocation.” But the troops, without orders, returned fire.

The commanders of most formations and units acted similarly in other sectors of the state border cover of the western border districts. Orders "from above" came much later. So, the Military Council of the Western Front sent a directive to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies only at 5 hours and 25 minutes: “In view of the mass hostilities that have emerged from the Germans, I order: to raise troops and act in a combat manner.”

Hard-to-replace losses from enemy air strikes were suffered by army aviation, destroyed for the most part at airfields. 66 airfields, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments of the western border districts were stationed, were subjected to massive raids. Thus, in the 10th mixed aviation division of the 4th Army of the Western Front, more than 70% of the aircraft of the attack and fighter aviation regiments were destroyed at airfields in the Vysokoye and Pruzhany regions. In the 7th mixed aviation division of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front by 15 o'clock there were only five or six aircraft left, the rest were destroyed. As a result, Soviet aviation lost over 1,200 aircraft that day.

Already from the very first hours of the war, the enemy, taking advantage of the almost complete absence of anti-aircraft weapons in the military air defense units, ensured complete air supremacy. Commander of the 3rd mechanized corps, General A.V. Kurkin, in one of his reports to the commander of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, noted:

“... there is no our aviation. The enemy is bombing all the time."

The troops of the western border military districts, alerted, sought to reach their cover areas, but, having no information about the situation, not knowing what was happening on the border, they were still attacked by German aviation and its ground forces while still in march formations. Even before they came into contact with the enemy, they suffered huge losses. On this occasion, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth, in the reporting document indicated:

“There were no signs of purposeful and planned command and control of enemy forces in general. The direct command and control of the troops was distinguished by inactivity, sketchiness ... Not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy crossings and bridges.

In such a situation, at 7:15 a.m., the headquarters of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts received Directive No. 2 of the People's Commissar of Defense, in which the commander of the troops of the fronts was given the task: "to attack enemy forces with all their forces and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

However, under the circumstances, this order of the People's Commissar was not feasible. Already at 8 o'clock in the morning, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. Bock, reported to the command of the Wehrmacht:

“The offensive continues successfully. On the entire front of the offensive, the enemy still offers little resistance ... the enemy in all sectors was taken by surprise.

A few documents testify to the complexity of the first day of the war. So, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko:

“Large forces of tanks and motorized units break through to Druskeniki. The 128th Rifle Division is mostly surrounded, there is no exact information about its condition ... I can’t create a grouping to eliminate the breakthrough. Please help."

Head of the Operational Directorate of the Western Front, General I.I. Semenov reported to the General Staff: “Rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire along the entire border ... We don’t have wired communications with the armies.”

Some formations and units of the front were already fighting in the encirclement during these first hours, it was not possible to establish contact with them. From the commander of the 3rd armies, General V.I. Kuznetsov, the headquarters of the Western Front from the beginning of the war until 10 a.m. received only three combat reports. From the commander of the 10th Army, General K.D. Golubev received only one message during the same time, and the commander of the 4th Army, General A.A. Korobkov was able to send the first combat report only at 06:40.

Nevertheless, commanders of all levels and in these difficult conditions withdrew their subordinate formations and units to their cover areas. So, in the zone of the Western Front, out of ten formations of the first echelon of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, three rifle divisions still managed to reach their operational areas. In the zone of the Southwestern Front, the advanced units of the 62nd and 87th rifle divisions of the 26th Army were the first to reach the state border.

In total, 14 divisions from 57 planned formations of the first echelon were withdrawn to cover the border on June 22, mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. They entered the battle on the move, defended in wide lanes, in one-echelon combat formations, sometimes on terrain not equipped in engineering terms, moreover, without significant artillery support, without proper air cover and anti-aircraft weapons, having a limited amount of ammunition. In this regard, they were forced to retreat with heavy losses.

By the middle of the day, the Wehrmacht strike groups managed to create a large gap on the adjacent flanks of the Northwestern and Western fronts, into which the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth rushed. Not knowing the true state of affairs, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to the People's Commissar of Defense that the formations of the 11th Army continued to hold back the enemy, although in reality they retreated hastily and disorganized with heavy losses.

Toward evening, the most threatened situation developed in the zone of the Western Front. His command, which had not yet realized the threat of deep bilateral coverage of the front troops by enemy tank formations, was more concerned about the situation on the northern face of the Bialystok ledge, where the enemy was rushing towards Grodno. The situation in the Brest direction was assessed by him as more or less stable. However, by the end of the day, formations and units of the 4th Army were thrown back from the border by 25-30 km, and the advanced tank units of the enemy managed to advance even deeper - by 60 km, and occupy Kobrin.

Without understanding the situation, the commander of the front, General D.G. Pavlov at 5 pm sent a report to the General Staff, which essentially disorientated the political and military leadership of the country:

“Parts of the Western Front during the day of 22.6.41 fought holding battles ... providing stubborn resistance to superior enemy forces ... Parts of the 4th Army fought defensive battles, presumably at the line ... Brest, Vlodava.”

In fact, the troops of the Western Front continued to hastily retreat to the east in scattered groups.

Based on reports from the headquarters of the North-Western and Western fronts, not fully imagining the real situation, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concluded that most of the fighting was taking place near the border. At that time, they were most worried about the situation in the Grodno direction, where a deep coverage of the Bialystok ledge from the north was already observed. Because of the misleading reports of the headquarters of the Western Front, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff clearly underestimated the powerful enemy grouping that was striking from the Brest region.

Trying to turn the tide of events and believing that there were quite enough forces for a retaliatory strike, the High Command at 21:15 sent directive No. enemy. However, aiming them at defeating the enemy groupings, which posed the greatest danger in the zone of each front, the General Staff did not take into account the difficulties that the front command would have in organizing and preparing strikes against the enemy during one night.

The real situation that had developed by the end of the first day of the war on the entire Soviet-German front turned out to be much more complicated than the military-political leadership of the country knew. Therefore, the requirements of the High Command were no longer realistic, since they did not meet the rapidly changing situation.

Meanwhile, the position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical: “The enemy, having bypassed the right flank of the army, strikes in the Lida direction ... - the commander of the 3rd Army, General Kuznetsov, reported to the front headquarters, - we have no reserves, and to fend off the blow nothing." By the end of the first day of the war, the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, under the unrelenting onslaught of the enemy, were forced to retreat, conducting rearguard battles.

The events of June 22 took place differently on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, where the enemy did not show activity or acted with limited forces. This allowed the Soviet troops, operating in a relatively calm situation, to advance to the border and take up defense lines in accordance with the cover plans.

In general, by the end of the first day of hostilities in the western direction, an extremely difficult situation developed for the Red Army. The enemy forestalled formations and covering units in occupying defensive zones and lines. By the end of the day, the forward detachments of the German 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups penetrated the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 60 km. Thus, they began to cover the main forces of the Western Front from the north and south and created favorable conditions for their troops operating in other directions.

Thus ended the first day of the war. Under the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy, the Soviet troops with heavy battles retreated into the interior of the country. They still had a whole war ahead of them, which lasted 1418 days and nights. During the Great Patriotic War, there were undoubtedly more fateful days for our country, but that first day will forever remain in the memory of the peoples of Russia.