East Prussian operation 1914

East Prussian operation August 4 (17) - September 2 (15), 1914 - an offensive operation of Russian troops, which were tasked with defeating the 8th German Army and capturing East Prussia to develop an offensive directly into German territory.

"Do you have a plan, Mr. Fix?"

According to the opinion of the majority of domestic and foreign researchers of the history of the First World War, plans for a future war were actively developed by the general staffs of all participating countries long before the outbreak of hostilities. The German General Staff had been preparing for a new war almost since the 1870s-80s, at the same time France and Belgium became concerned with this issue, and later in the 1910s Russia. However, by the beginning of the First World War, neither the Entente powers nor Germany and its allies had any single, agreed upon plan for conducting combat operations. Everyone was preparing for a quick, lightning-fast offensive war, striving, first of all, to implement their own developments to seize the strategic initiative at the front.

The German war plan, developed by the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, called for the rapid defeat of France in six to eight weeks, and then transferring the blow to the east and an equally rapid defeat of Russia. This plan, after Schlieffen’s resignation, was modified by the new Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, but the essence of the German blitzkrieg remained the same: to defeat France and quickly transfer all forces to the Eastern Front to deal with Russia. During the initial deployment of troops, Germany concentrated 79% of its forces in the west, and 21% against Russia.

The Franco-Russian military convention and the protocol of the meeting of the chiefs of general staff, Generals Joffre and Zhilinsky in 1913, set the task of avoiding the defeat of France and forcing Germany to fight simultaneously in two theaters of military operations. To achieve this, Russia promised to launch an immediate offensive against Germany by the 15th day of mobilization. Russian mobilization schedules No. 19 and No. 20 ordered the North-Western and South-Western fronts to go on the offensive and transfer the war to the territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The direction of the main attack against Germany - from Narev to Allenstein - was determined back in 1912 at the negotiations between Zhilinsky and Joffre.

However, the works of the most prominent Russian historians of the First World War (N.N. Golovin, A.M. Zayonchkovsky and others) directly state that initially the plans of the Russian General Staff did not include the development of a large-scale offensive against German troops in a more than fortified area East Prussia. Russia planned to conduct offensive operations against the troops of Austria-Hungary on the Southwestern Front, where the main forces were concentrated. Only defensive actions were planned against Germany in the North-Western and Western fortified areas, for which a new line of fortifications was created along the line Novogeorgievsk - Ivangorod - Warsaw - Brest-Litovsk in 1910, which by 1914 was only at the stage of unfinished construction.

The French General Staff, in turn, understood perfectly well that while their powerful ally Russia would deal with the Austrians in the southwest, and then with the Ottoman Empire in the south, the Germans would find themselves in Paris in the best possible way. Therefore, the French commanders-in-chief Joffre and Dubail at all meetings of the coalition openly inspired the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky, the desired course of operations of the Russian troops for them, trying to keep secret their real plans for offensive operations in the West. They insisted that it was first necessary to carry out a large-scale offensive operation with the forces of the Russian North-Western Front in order to defeat Germany. Then Austria-Hungary will quickly capitulate, and the war in Europe will end before the first leaf falls.

At the operational-strategic game held by the Russian Ministry of War and the General Staff in April 1914, the invasion of East Prussia by the forces of two armies of the North-Western Front from the east and south was practiced. It was assumed that the closed “pincers” would lead to the defeat of the German army, eliminating the threat of a flank attack during the attack on the main direction through Poznan to Berlin from the Warsaw ledge.

Ya.G. Zhilinsky, cavalry general

In August 1914, the Northwestern Front (commander - General Ya.G. Zhilinsky) included the 1st Army (commander - General P.K. von Rennenkampf), deployed east of East Prussia (Neman), and 2nd I am the army (commander - General A.V. Samsonov). Samsonov's army was stationed south of East Prussia (Narev area) and included 12.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions with 720 guns. Rennenkampf's 1st Army included 6.5 infantry and 5.5 cavalry divisions with 492 guns. In total, the two armies had more than 250 thousand soldiers, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft.

The German 8th Army opposing them on this section of the front included three army and one reserve corps, two reserve divisions, one cavalry division, one landwehr division, three landwehr brigades, two fortress ersatz brigades, 9.5 ersatzlandwehr battalions, a total of 14.5 infantry (4.5 Landwehr) and one cavalry division or 173 thousand soldiers. According to various sources, the number of guns in the 8th Army is determined to be 774 (without serfs) - 1044 (with serfs).

Numerical superiority over the enemy, an excellent plan of operation, promises from the allies - all this promised victorious prospects and gave rise to a general mood of mischief in the leadership of the Russian army. Almost everyone - from the monarch himself to the last infantry officer - was confident of lightning success. Those who believed that the war would drag on until winter were called alarmists and defeatists in St. Petersburg.

In a directive dated August 13, 1914, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, set the Northwestern Front the task of immediately going on the offensive and defeating the enemy. General Zhilinsky sent a corresponding directive to the army commanders on the same day.

The 1st Army (Rennenkampf) was ordered to set out on August 14, cross the border on August 17, bypass the Masurian Lakes from the north and cut off the Germans from Königsberg. The 2nd Army (Samsonov) was supposed to set out on August 16, cross the border on August 19, bypass the Masurian Lakes from the west and prevent the withdrawal of German troops beyond the Vistula.

Today, almost everyone, both domestic and foreign historians, unanimously assure that with clear interaction between the two armies, the Russian side had every chance to implement this plan and inflict a crushing defeat on the Germans.

However, the East Prussian offensive operation of 1914 ended in a monumental failure, which marked the beginning of a whole chain of Russian military failures in the First World War. Why? Let's try to figure it out.

Stage I of the operation: Battle of Gumbinen-Goldap

The East Prussian operation of the Russian troops began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of the 1st Russian Army (commander Rennenkampf), during which on August 20, 1914, a crushing defeat was inflicted on the enemy at Gumbinnen.

The battle took place on a front of 50 km from the city of Gumbinnen to the city of Goldap. The balance of forces before the battle was not in favor of the Russian army, which had 6.5 infantry and 1.5 cavalry divisions. German troops had 8.5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions.

PC. Rennenkampf, cavalry general

The commander of the 1st Army, General Rennenkampf, was precisely prescribed the direction of his attack and indicated the lines that he was supposed to occupy. To fill a front of 50 km, he had insufficient forces, which led to the dispersion of forces on a wide front without reserves and deprived the commander of the opportunity to maneuver, i.e. personally influence events.

The first German attack fell on the 28th Infantry Division. The cavalry units entered the rear of the Russian troops, destroyed the convoys, but the Russians did not allow them to go deeper into their rear. The division, suffering heavy losses, retreated in an orderly manner under the protection of its artillery. By mid-day, the 29th arrived to the aid of the 28th division, the Russian divisions launched a counterattack, and parts of the German corps began to retreat. During the battle, the Russians completely defeated the 17th Corps of General Mackensen. The Germans retreated in disarray, Russian troops captured 12 abandoned guns. Near Goldap, on the southern flank, the German 1st Reserve Corps under General Belov also retreated, but the result of the battle still hung in the balance. The Germans could attack the next day.

The entourage of the commander of the 8th Army, General Prittwitz, advised him to resume the battle and finish off the Russians, while Rennenkampf's headquarters, taking into account the losses and general fatigue of the troops, convinced him of the need to interrupt the battle and retreat before reinforcements arrived.

In the end, the outcome of the battle was decided solely by the “combat” of the generals. The Russian irrevocably decided to hold out, and the German, dejected by the flight of his best 17th Corps and worried about the emergence of a new threat from General Samsonov, admitted himself defeated and ordered a retreat to the Vistula.

Rennenkampf gave the order to pursue the fleeing enemy, but due to lagging rear lines, stretched communications and general fatigue of the troops, this order was canceled.

German plan

The defeat at Gumbinnen created a real threat of defeat of the 8th German Army. General Prittwitz decided to retreat beyond the Vistula, but Headquarters, contrary to the Schlieffen plan, which assumed that in case of unfavorable developments on the Eastern Front, retreat deep into Germany, but under no circumstances withdraw troops from the Western Front, decided not to surrender East Prussia. Troops from the Western Front (2 corps and a cavalry division) were transferred to help the 8th Army. The German command made a decision, leaving 2.5 divisions against the 1st Russian army of Rennenkampf, quickly, along the rock railway through Königsberg, to transfer the main forces of the 8th army against the 2nd Russian army of Samsonov and try to defeat it before it will connect with units of the 1st Army.

The implementation of the German plan depended entirely on the actions of Rennenkampf's army, whose rapid advance to the west would have made maneuver unthinkable.

Meanwhile, the command of the Northwestern Front, after the success at Gumbinen, considered the East Prussian operation already completed. Comfront Zhilinsky changed the strategic mission of the 1st Army, ordering Rennenkampf to move not to join Samsonov’s army, but to go to Königsberg, where, according to his assumptions, the main part of the enemy’s 8th Army had taken refuge.

The commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, Samsonov, in turn, decided to intercept the Germans “retreating to the Vistula” and himself insisted to the front command on transferring the main attack of his army from the northern to the northwestern direction. This led to the fact that the Russian armies began to attack in diverging directions. A huge gap of 125 km opened between them, which the enemy was quick to take advantage of.

The new command of the 8th Army (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) decided to launch advanced flank attacks on the 2nd Army, encircle it and destroy it.

The Russian Headquarters, in turn, also considered the operation in East Prussia basically completed and worked on a plan for an offensive deep into Germany, towards Poznan, in connection with which com. Front Zhilinsky was denied reinforcement of Samsonov's 2nd Army with the Guards Corps.

Stage II: Battle of Tannenberg

The death of the army of General Samsonov

A.V. Samsonov, cavalry general

As planned, units of the 8th German Army, feigning an organized retreat, left Rennenkampf’s army and on August 26 launched an attack on the right flank of Samsonov’s army. The 6th Corps of General Blagoveshchensky was thrown back to Ortelsburg, two divisions of the corps lost more than 7.5 thousand people killed, and retreated in complete disorder. General Blagoveshchensky himself fled to the rear, and Army Commander Samsonov did not receive any information about this incident. Therefore, on August 27, he ordered his army to carry out the previously assigned task: to go forward, pursuing the Germans, who had supposedly retreated to the Vistula.

On August 27, the enemy launched a successful attack on the left flank of Samsonov’s army. The blow was delivered to the 1st Corps of General Artamonov and threw it south of Soldau. General Kondratovich's 23rd Corps suffered losses and retreated to Neidenburg.

Samsonov received incorrect information about the situation from Artamonov, and decided that nothing terrible had happened. On August 28, the army commander planned an attack by the forces of the 13th Corps of General Klyuev and the 15th Corps of General Martos on the flank of the West German group. To lead the battle, Samsonov and the operational part of the army headquarters arrived at the headquarters of the 15th Corps on the morning of August 28.

The command of the Northwestern Front at that moment had absolutely no idea where exactly the 2nd Army and General Samsonov himself were located. The order from the front headquarters to withdraw the corps of the 2nd Army to the Ortelsburg-Mlava line never reached the troops. Communication with the front headquarters and the flanking corps of Samsonov's army was lost, and army control was disorganized. Knowing nothing about the defeat of their flanks, the central units of the 2nd Army continued to advance, thereby falling into a pocket perfectly organized by the Germans.

Realizing that things were bad, the front headquarters ordered the 1st Army to move forward the left flank corps and cavalry to assist the 2nd Army, but on the evening of August 29, the offensive was stopped.

According to the official version, front commander Zhilinsky, citing a lack of communication, decided that Samsonov’s 2nd Army, according to his order of August 28, had already retreated to the border and did not need the help of the 1st Army. Rennenkampf's troops at that time were 50-60 km from the retreating divisions of Samsonov's army, which came under the main German attack.

On August 29, the retreat of five Russian divisions of the 13th and 15th corps, occupying the center of the front, took place under growing flank pressure from Francois's 1st corps and Belov's 1st reserve corps. On the flanks of the 2nd Army, German attacks were repulsed, but in the center the Russian retreat became disorderly. Five divisions of the 13th and 15th corps (about 30 thousand people with 200 guns) were surrounded in the Komusinsky forest area. On the night of August 30, General Samsonov, who was among the surrounded units, shot himself. General Martos was captured, General Klyuev tried to withdraw troops from encirclement in three columns, but two columns were defeated, and Klyuev gave the order to surrender.

The total losses of the 2nd Army in killed, wounded and prisoners amounted to 56 thousand people. 10 generals were killed, 13 were captured, and 230 guns were captured. German losses (killed and wounded) amounted to 30 thousand people.

The 2nd Army (1st, 6th, 23rd corps and the remnants of the encircled 13th and 15th corps) retreated across the Narew River. The units that were surrounded continued to resist until August 31. In Western historiography, this battle is known as the Battle of Tannenberg.

The main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Army were the completely unsatisfactory command on the part of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, which failed to correctly assess the operational situation in the period August 20-26, as well as the mistakes of the army commander, General Samsonov, who unjustifiably expanded the army’s offensive zone and failed to ensure operational control of army formations during an oncoming battle. Separately, it should be noted the disgusting work of Russian army intelligence, which failed to reveal the concentration of the main forces of the 8th German Army against Samsonov’s flanks, and the complete disregard at the headquarters of the 2nd Russian Army for the rules of front-line radio communications. The day before going on the offensive, German signalmen intercepted a message from the headquarters of the 2nd Army transmitted in clear text (clear text) to one of the corps with a detailed disposition of the army's forces and an indication of its immediate tasks, which immediately affected the statement of the commander of the 8th German Army, Hindenburg tasks for the advancing troops.

End of operation

Having finished with Samsonov's army, the 8th Army attacked the troops of General Rennenkampf from the south, from the Masurian lakes. Since the main forces of the 1st Army were concentrated in the north, near Königsberg, the German command planned to break through the defenses in the south, and in the meantime encircle the army, pressing it to the Neman swamps, where it would be completely destroyed. The 1st Army had every chance of repeating the fate of Samsonov’s 2nd Army, finding itself in another trap set by the Germans. But General Rennenkampf figured out the enemy’s outflanking maneuver in time. He quickly transferred troops, ensuring the strengthening of the southern flank. During the desperate battles of the flank units, the main forces of the 1st Army were able to retreat to the east in time, connect with the corps of the 2nd Army remaining after the defeat and avoid encirclement.

East Prussian operation, 1914

In the final battles with the Germans, both Russian armies (1st and 2nd) suffered huge losses - about 100 thousand people and more than 50 guns. By September 15, our troops were literally squeezed out of East Prussia.

Causes of defeat and significance of the East Prussian operation

In the historiography of the First World War, there is an opinion that the defeat in East Prussia in the summer of 1914 was dictated by a number of both completely objective and purely subjective reasons.

One of the first reasons is usually cited as Russia's unpreparedness for war. But is Russia ever ready for anything?.. In this case, we can only talk about Russia’s unpreparedness for offensive actions in the sector of the North-Western Front, since all the main forces were concentrated in the South-West. But if we take it more broadly, Russia, as it turned out, in 1914 was not at all ready to fight a European war. Let us recall that the Russian army has not fought in the territories of Western Europe since 1813-1814. Since that time, a network of railways has already been built in European countries, the mobility of troops has increased, the speed of supply of ammunition has increased significantly, means of communication have been improved, coordination of command and control, etc.

The Russian command still believed that “victory is at the feet” of the Russian soldier, and his courage and stamina in battle are a complete replacement for modern methods of warfare.

By August 1914, Russia’s opponents Germany and Austria-Hungary had already completely completed mobilization. The Germans managed to gain some time to quickly transfer some of the best troops from the Western Front to East Prussia. Whereas the news of general mobilization and the outbreak of war reached some territories of the vast Russian Empire only in September-October.

This leads to the second, in our opinion, the most compelling reason for the failure of the East Prussian campaign. The armies of Rennenkampf and Samsonov, sent on a campaign two weeks after the start of mobilization, were not fully equipped with rank and file and officers; The supply of ammunition and food was not adjusted. In the very first days after crossing the border, supply interruptions, hunger and desperate looting began in both armies, especially in Cossack units.

The divisions of Rennenkampf's 1st Army also did not have horse reconnaissance or any other means of quickly detecting enemy deployments (airships, balloons, airplanes, etc.). Corps and division headquarters, in most cases, acted blindly or based on unverified, now irrelevant data: infantry reconnaissance could not keep up with the enemy moving by trains, cars and bicycles.

A small supply of shells, ammunition, food, the lack of transport communications in the form of a railway network, well-functioning communication between the armies and the command, unclear actions (and often inaction) of front-line reconnaissance turned the Russian troops into a hungry, clumsy bear. He laid his bones in the path of the advancing Germans, blocking their path to a quick victory, but he was never able to fulfill his strategic task (to develop his own offensive, encircle and destroy the mobile, well-armed 8th Army).

The East Prussian operation had dire consequences for the Russians in tactical and especially moral terms. Many contemporaries called the defeat at Tannenberg the reason for anti-militarist and anti-monarchist protests, a harbinger of all revolutionary events in Russia in the 20th century. This was the first such major defeat in history for the Russian army in battles with the Germans.

However, won by the Germans tactically, this operation strategically meant for them the failure of the plan for a lightning war. To save East Prussia, they had to transfer considerable forces from the Western Theater of Operations. This saved France from defeat and forced Germany to be drawn into a disastrous struggle on two fronts, abandon the blitzkrieg developed by Schlieffen, and move on to a protracted trench war.

From the subjective reasons for the defeat of the Russian troops in East Prussia, both domestic and foreign historians often put forward versions of the fatal mistakes of the command of the Northwestern Front in the person of General Ya.G. Zhilinsky.

Wilhelm Groener, one of the best German generals of World War I, assessed the reasons for the failure of the Russian offensive:

“The campaign in East Prussia could have ended very badly for the Germans if the commander of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky, had risen to the task of exercising unity of leadership over the armies entrusted to him in operations against East Prussia with a firm hand. Although he was already the chief of staff of the Russian army in peacetime, during the war he still did not display the abilities necessary to lead armies. Just like the younger Moltke, he relied on the discretion and independence of army commanders and therefore did not show his own initiative.”

The modern British historian N. Stone also gives a very interesting description of the main cause of the disaster:

“The main difficulty was not that the armies were “not ready”; but the fact that they were ready as Zhilinsky understood it - that is, they were absolutely not prepared for what was about to happen.”

Rennenkampf and Samsonov: debunking the myth

In Soviet historiography of the First World War, the version of the personal conflict between generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf, which allegedly became one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian armies in East Prussia in the summer of 1914, was especially actively used.

Some Soviet historians placed the main emphasis on the general mediocrity of the Russian generals, Headquarters and the command of the North-Western Front, while others placed all the blame solely on General Rennenkampf, who treacherously left Samsonov’s army to die in the Komusinsky forest.

The beginning of the legendary conflict between the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies is usually associated with a semi-mythical quarrel between generals at the Mukden station in 1904. According to a very common version in the literature, the troops of General Rennenkampf during the battle of Liaoyang did not support the offensive of Samsonov’s Cossacks on the Yentai coal mines, which led to numerous casualties and Samsonov abandoning his occupied positions. After the battle, Samsonov allegedly caught up with Rennenkampf at the Mukden station and gave him a heavy slap in the face (in some versions, he beat him with a whip right on the platform).

All authors who mention this episode associate the origin of the legend with the figure of German General Staff officer Max Hoffmann, who witnessed a quarrel and an ugly fight between Rennenkampf and Samsonov. For more than a hundred years, the story of the “Mukden slap in the face” has acquired a mass of fantastic details, being reflected both in literary works and in the works of some highly respected historians of the First World War.

In fact, during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Max Hoffmann was assigned as a foreign observer not to the Russian, but to the Japanese General Staff. He could not become a direct eyewitness to the conflict between Russian generals in Mukden, which, in fact, is confirmed by his memoirs:

“I heard from witnesses (!) about a sharp clash between both commanders after the Liaoyang battle at the Mukden station. I remember that even during the battle of Tannenberg we spoke with General Ludendorff about the conflict between both enemy generals.”

It turns out that a foreign observer simply heard something from someone somewhere, and then, with German pedantry, reported to his superiors (what if the information would be useful in a future war?). And these rumors formed the basis of a whole mass of speculation and hoaxes by both Soviet and foreign authors, and after a vivid artistic embodiment by V. Pikul in one of his historical miniatures, they acquired the status of an immutable truth in the public consciousness.

In modern studies specifically devoted to the study of the biography of General P.K. Rennenkampf, it was thoroughly proven that there was and could not be any obvious, let alone public, conflict between the generals in Mukden. At the Battle of Liaoyang (August 1904), during the battle near the village of Fanjiapuzi, General Rennenkampf was seriously wounded in the leg. Until October 1904, he was undergoing treatment in a hospital in the city of Harbin, of which there is indisputable documentary evidence. The general was physically unable to cross paths with Samsonov at the Mukden station, much less fall under his hot hand. In addition, after Liaoyang, Samsonov had no reason to rush at Rennenkampf with a whip, making such serious claims against him.

Theoretically, a quarrel between the two generals could have occurred after the failure on the Shahe River in October 1904. Then, indeed, the successful offensive floundered solely due to the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian troops, and both military leaders had every reason for mutual accusations. But the direct participants in those events (including Baron P.N. Wrangel) claim in their memoirs that nothing like this happened. After the battle, generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf peacefully conferred and dispersed to their troops.

The version of the Rennenkampf-Samsonov conflict, of course, was born much later, and not in the military, but in liberal-democratic public circles. The revolutionary-minded public could not forgive General Rennenkampf for his tough and decisive actions during the revolution of 1905-1907, his faithful service to the Tsar and the Fatherland, and his right-wing monarchist views.

In 1914, the Russian German Rennenkampf was not forgiven either for his German surname or (most importantly) for the defeat at Tannenberg, in which his troops, by the way, did not even participate.

Among Rennenkampf’s long-time ill-wishers and envious people, who wanted to find the culprit at all costs, the idea of ​​the general’s “inaction” at the decisive moment of the battle was instantly born. The “inaction” and “lack of initiative” of the commander of the 1st Army were explained by the most fantastic reasons: from settling personal scores to outright betrayal and collusion with the enemy.

This is what Admiral Bubnov, who was at Headquarters at that time, wrote:

“Public opinion called the inaction of General Rennenkampf criminal and even saw in him signs of treason, because, mainly thanks to this inaction, the Germans managed to inflict such a heavy defeat on Samsonov’s army. The share of blame fell on the gene. However, Zhilinsky was not released by the gene. Rennenkampf from responsibility for failure to show initiative, passivity, inability to assess the situation and insufficient desire to establish operational communication with Samsonov.”

What was this “inaction”?

Some “writers” claim that Rennenkampf remained on the battlefield, completely inactive for three days (from August 20 to 23), and there are Western historians who assure us that he no longer moved at all, awaiting the death of Samsonov, his supposedly personal enemy.

In fact, the stop of the 1st Russian Army after the battle of Gumbinnen lasted, according to some sources, 48 ​​hours, and according to others, only 36 hours.

Rennenkampf's immediate superior, front commander Zhilinsky, clearly outlined the direction of the 1st Army's advance towards Königsberg, and not towards a junction with Samsonov. Rennenkampf knew nothing at all about Samsonov. because there was no direct connection between the 1st and 2nd armies: they could only communicate through the front headquarters. In Zhilinsky's telegrams for August 20-28, sent to Rennenkampf, there is not a word about Samsonov and his army. Rennenkampf, like any military man, was obliged to carry out the orders of his superiors, that is, to pursue the retreating enemy.

From August 21 to 23, Rennenkampf’s army essentially did not stand still, as his accusers are trying to imagine. All the time it was in close contact with German troops, who covered the withdrawal of the main part of the 8th Army with strong barriers.

In the absence of army cavalry reconnaissance, Rennenkampf could not even imagine that the Germans were leading him by the nose, pretending to retreat in this area, while they themselves were preparing to attack the flanks of Samsonov’s army in the north-west.

Zhilinsky, the commander of the front, should have known about this, but he also knew nothing and scheduled the start of the 1st Army’s offensive on Königsberg on August 23.

The actual state of affairs was revealed only after the work of a special Government Commission appointed by the Sovereign, which conducted an investigation into the causes of the death of the 2nd Army of General Samsonov. In her conclusions there is not a single word of reproach against General Rennenkampf.

A well-known military historian, Professor General N.N., who carefully studied this operation in exile. Golovin wrote:

“It is impossible to find in the actions of the 1st Army the reasons for the failure that befell our 1st operation in East Prussia. Both the troops and the army commander himself, with full effort, carried out everything that the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front required of them.”

Meanwhile, the findings of the Government Commission did not convince either public opinion or the military leadership of the innocence of General Rennenkampf.

The military leaders Zhilinsky and Samsonov, who were much more guilty of the strategic mistake that led to the death of the 2nd Army, were never subjected to such sharp attacks from public opinion as P.K. Rennenkampf.

Ya.G. Zhilinsky was removed from the post of front commander and the post of Warsaw governor-general. In 1915-1916 he represented the Russian command in the Allied Council in France. In 1917 he was dismissed with a uniform and a pension. After the October coup, he tried to go abroad, but was captured by security officers and shot.

Monument at the site of the death of A.V. Samsonov, established in 1918 by his opponent General Paul Hindenburg (district of Wielbark, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland).

Inscription on the board: " To General Samsonov, Hindenburg's opponent at the Battle of Tannenberg, August 30, 1914".

General Samsonov voluntarily passed away. By the act of suicide, he seemed to atone for his guilt, and subsequently acquired the tragic aura of a martyr and victim of betrayal.

General Rennenkampf, who prevented the encirclement and possible death of his 1st Army near Königsberg and successfully completed the operation to withdraw Russian troops from East Prussia, got the role of a traitor and an outcast.

After the Lodz operation (November 1914), Rennenkampf was dismissed from the army without any explanation. The general himself explained his dismissal solely by the intrigues of War Minister Sukhomlinov and his entourage.

The memoirs of one of Rennenkampf’s former subordinates, V.N. Von Dreyer, who met his retired boss in Petrograd in 1915, have been preserved:

“We sat in the director’s box, ate, drank, looked at the stage, listened to the choirs. Rennenkampf sat sad, he apparently had no time for fun. And even the fighting number of the café-chantant Rode could not bring Rennenkampf out of the state of depression that was noticed by everyone. He drank a lot and, unable to bear it, suddenly began talking about how unfairly they had treated him.

I was removed from command of the army for absolutely no reason; and all this according to the machinations of Sukhomlinov. I asked to be given any assignment, I was ready to accept even a squadron, just not to stay here, without any benefit, without any business; They didn't even answer me.

And suddenly, to our horror and embarrassment, this strong, courageous and brave general burst into burning tears...”

Death of General Rennenkampf

It is not surprising that in the very first days of the February Revolution, General P.K. Rennenkampf was among the “enemies of the people” arrested by the new government. He was reminded of the year 1905, and the retired military leader spent several months in the Peter and Paul Fortress. However, no evidence was collected in favor of his accusation, and after October 1917, Rennenkampf was released.

He went to his wife’s relatives in Taganrog, where he lived under the name of the tradesman Smokovnikov. When the city was captured by the Bolsheviks, he hid under the name of the Greek subject Mandousakis. In the spring of 1918, Rennenkampf was tracked down by security officers and arrested.

According to the act of the Special Commission to Investigate the Atrocities of the Bolsheviks, which consisted of the Commander-in-Chief of the AFSR A.I. Denikine, cavalry general Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf from March 3 to April 1, 1918 was arrested at the headquarters of the Taganrog military commissar Rodionov.

According to the Special Commission, the general was offered to serve in the Red Army three times, but Rennenkampf sharply rejected all offers.

At the end of March, the commander of the Southern Front, Antonov-Ovseenko, arrived in Taganrog. Upon learning that General Rennenkampf was still alive, he ordered his immediate execution.

On the night of April 1, 1918, General Rennenkampf was taken by car outside the city and there shot at the Baltic railway line, two miles from the Baltic plant.

He was subsequently reburied by his family in the old Taganrog cemetery.

Russian bayonet attack in East Prussia.
Propaganda leaflet

This is the name given to the offensive operation of the troops of the Russian North-Western Front in the First World War, carried out on August 4 (17) - September 2 (15).

It was undertaken at the request of the French government before the completion of the full mobilization and concentration of the Russian army in order to disrupt the offensive of the main German forces against France.

In accordance with the Headquarters plan, troops of the North-Western Front (cavalry general Ya.G. Zhilinsky) were deployed on the border with East Prussia as part of the 1st and 2nd armies. The 1st Army (cavalry general P.K. von Rennenkampf) was concentrated in the area of ​​Pilvishki-Kowna - Simno - Olita - Suwalki.

By the beginning of the operation, the 1st Army consisted of 6.5 infantry and 5.5 cavalry divisions, 492 guns. The 2nd Army (cavalry general A.V. Samsonov) was concentrated in the area of ​​Augustow - Ostroleka - Novogeorgievsk. In total, the 2nd Army consisted of 11.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 720 guns. The entire front - more than 250,000 fighters. The Russian troops were opposed by the 8th German Army (Colonel General Maximilian von Prittwitz).

The main forces of the army, numbering 14.5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, about 173 thousand people in total, about 1000 guns were deployed in the Insterburg - Gumbinnen - Angerburg - Deutsch-Eylau - Allenstein - Passenheim area. The plan of the Russian Headquarters provided for the invasion of the 1st Army into East Prussia and, enveloping the enemy’s left flank, bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the north, attacking the Insterburg (Chernyakhovsk) - Angerburg front. The 2nd Army was supposed to cross the border with East Prussia 2 days later and, bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the west, act in the direction of Rastenburg - Zeerburg. In the future, both armies were supposed to cover the enemy’s flanks in order to cut it off from Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and the Vistula River.

Maximilian von Prittwitz

The operation began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of three army corps of the 1st Russian Army. Having crossed the state border, they entered the territory of East Prussia. The first military clash with the enemy took place on August 6 (19) near Stallupenen (Nesterov), during which the 1st German Army Corps of General G. Francois was defeated and retreated.

"To Prussia!" A painting dedicated to the campaign in East Prussia. Edition “The Great War in Images and Pictures.” Issue I, 1914.

The German command decided, taking cover from the 2nd Russian Army, to move the main forces against the troops of General P.K. Rennenkampf, inflict two blows on them: from the north with the 1st Corps of General G. Francois and from the south with the 17th Corps of General A. Mackensen. In the direction of Goldap, an auxiliary blow was to be delivered by the 1st Reserve Corps of General G. Belov.

On August 7 (20), in the area of ​​​​Gumbinen, Goldap, a fierce oncoming battle unfolded between the main forces of the 1st Russian Army and the 8th German Army. The German troops, which were initially successful, were eventually defeated and began to retreat westward. Favorable conditions were created for the complete defeat of the 8th German Army. However, they were not used, since generals Ya. G. Zhilinsky and P.K. Rennenkampf did not organize the pursuit of the enemy, giving the troops of the 1st Army a two-day rest to put themselves in order. Only on August 10 (23) did the Russian corps begin to slowly move west, towards Koenigsberg, almost without encountering resistance and without reliable information about the enemy.

Taking advantage of the gap between the Russian armies and knowing from intercepted radiograms about their plan of action, the German command suspended the retreat. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who took command of the 8th Army, decided, pinning down the central corps of the 2nd Russian Army (15th and 13th) from the front, to deliver two coordinated attacks on it with the main forces: the main one - 1- m corps and one brigade on Uzdau against the left-flank Russian corps (1st), then develop an offensive to the rear of the central corps and a second blow - with the 17th and 1st reserve corps against the 6th Russian corps, which was covering along with the 4th a cavalry division on the left flank of the 2nd Army in the Bischofsburg area, with the same goal - to then develop an offensive on the flank and rear of its same central corps.

Paul von Hindenburg

Thus, the German command planned to encircle the 13th and 15th Russian corps. A small barrier of 1.5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions was left against Rennenkampf's units. The Russian command missed the enemy and assumed that the Germans were withdrawing their forces to Koenigsberg. As a result of this false assumption, the 1st Army received the task of besieging Königsberg, effectively leaving the 2nd Army alone with all German forces in East Prussia. By August 13 (26), the 8th German Army, having completed its regrouping, began to implement the planned plan. During two days of fighting, its striking forces forced the flanking Russian corps to retreat. As a result, the eastern and western flanks of the central corps of the 2nd Army, which by this time had reached Allenstein, were open.

During August 15 (28) and 16 (29), fierce fighting continued in the zone of action of Samsonov’s army, deprived of any help and assistance from the 1st Army. The 13th and 15th corps, on the evening of August 15 (28), when the situation became clearer, having received an order from the army commander to withdraw, were unable to do so and ended up surrounded. General N.A. Klyuev, who took command of the army after the death of Samsonov, did not use all the opportunities to save the encircled corps and gave the order to surrender.

Commander of the German 1st Army Corps General of Infantry
G. von Francois meets the captured Russian lieutenant general
ON THE. Klyueva August 18 (31), 1914

In total, the enemy captured about 30 thousand people and captured up to 200 guns. The remaining forces of the 2nd Army on August 17 (30) began to fight to retreat to the river. Narev.

In this situation, the German command decided, leaving cover against the 2nd Army, to concentrate its main efforts on the defeat of the 1st Army P.K. Rennenkampf. The main blow was to be delivered through the Masurian Lakes region.

On August 24 (September 6), the 8th German Army went on the offensive, and by the end of August 27 (September 9), it had broken through the weak Russian defenses and threatened the left flank of the 1st Army. P.K. Rennenkampf gave the order to withdraw under the cover of the rearguards. The command of the 8th Army, fearing a counterattack, acted sluggishly and indecisively. The pursuit was slow. On August 31 (September 13), a directive from the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Northwestern Front, Ya. G. Zhilinsky, followed, ordering the 1st Army to withdraw beyond the Middle Neman, and the 2nd to the river. Narev. The East Prussian operation was over. Russian troops failed.

The East Prussian operation had a great influence on the course of the armed struggle on the Eastern Front of the 1st World War. Thanks to the active actions of the armies of the Northwestern Front, the enemy was unable to provide assistance to the Austro-Hungarian troops who were defeated in the Battle of Galicia. At the same time, the failure in East Prussia forced the Russian command to use all reserves on the German border, which is why it was not possible to fully develop the success in Galicia. During the operation, Russian troops suffered huge losses, which negatively affected the combat effectiveness of all ground armed forces. According to the calculations of the modern Russian historian S. G. Nelipovich, the Russian army lost about 20 thousand people killed, 155 thousand missing and captured, 48 thousand wounded, in total over 223 thousand people, over 300 machine guns, about 500 guns. German troops lost only 4 thousand people killed, 3 thousand prisoners, 7 thousand missing, 22 thousand wounded - a total of 36 thousand people, 17 guns and 17 machine guns.

The results of the operation revealed major shortcomings in the organization, management and training of the Russian army. The main reasons for the failure in East Prussia include disagreements between the front headquarters and the command of the 2nd Army on the choice of the main operational direction, unsatisfactory coordination of the actions of the 1st and 2nd armies, careless use of radiotelegraph, poor intelligence work and poor supply of troops.

Despite this, the operation had important strategic results: the German command was forced to transfer 2 corps and 1 cavalry division from the French front to East Prussia. In addition, one corps located in the Metz area was also prepared for transfer, which weakened the strike group of German troops in the west and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the German army in the Battle of the Marne in 1914. The actions of Russian troops in the initial period of the war thwarted the plan of the German command defeat your allies one by one.

We will analyze the total combat losses of the parties (in this article - the Russian armies), involving authoritative sources and the opinions of major experts, as well as participants in this one of the most important battles of the First World War, which contributed to the collapse of German pre-war strategic planning and was a prerequisite for the victorious end of the war for the Entente.

The cavalry of the 1st and 2nd armies (and the 5th Infantry Brigade, which interacted with the 1st Cavalry Division) from July 20 to August 1 (Belzonen, Soldau-Neidenburg, Stallupenen, Markgrabov) lost about 500 people [Collection of documents. P. 117; 122-123; Rogvold V. Enhanced reconnaissance of Markgrabov on August 14/1, 1914. M., 1926. P. 29; Evseev N. Battle of August. P. 69].

In the battle of Stallupenen, the 1st Army lost 7,467 people (619 killed, 2,382 wounded, 4,466 missing, mostly captured). The Reichsarchive noted over 1000 prisoners from the 27th Infantry Division of the 3rd AK. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. Vd. 2. S. 75. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the 25th, 27th infantry divisions of the 3rd Corps and the 29th Infantry Division of the 20th AK at 6,600 people. S. 76). Kaushen cost the Russian cavalry 396 people (and from August 3 to 6, the cavalry group lost 45 officers and 429 privates killed and wounded) [Rogvold V. Cavalry of the 1st Army in East Prussia (August-September 1914). M., 1926. P. 63].

Head of the 27th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A.-K.-M. M. Adaridi

The Gumbinnen affair, fatal for Germany, led to the loss of 16,500 people by the Russians (mainly due to the 3rd and 20th Army Corps). Thus, the losses of the 28th Infantry Division were 104 officers, 6945 privates, 23 machine guns, 8 guns [ Vatsetis I.I. Fighting in East Prussia. P. 41]. An eyewitness recalled that he saw entire chains of dead infantry on the Gumbinnen field - companies and battalions lay with their officers, including battalion commanders, and the soldiers froze in the poses in which death overtook them [Radus-Zenkovich L. Decree. op. P. 53]. The 3rd Army Corps, which played the main role in the battle (25th and 27th Infantry Divisions), lost 87 officers and 6117 lower ranks [Vatsetis I.I. Operations on the eastern border of Germany. P. 130]. The 40th Infantry Division of the IV Army Corps suffered 2,050 casualties.

Field hospital in Suwalki

The cavalry group trying to establish contact with the army of A.V. Samsonov on August 18-19 lost about 70 people [Rogvold V. Decree. op. P. 101].

The First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, which was unsuccessful for the 1st Army, resulted in the loss (with some units of the 10th Army) of 19,000 killed and wounded and 43,000 missing (mostly prisoners), 150 guns. General E. Ludendorff wrote about 45,000 Russian prisoners . British military agent A. Knox confirmed these figures, citing German estimates of the total Russian losses in the Battle of Masuria - up to 60,000 people and 150 guns . General G. von Francois wrote after the war: “The spoils of war in this battle, according to Hindenburg’s report, amounted to 30,000 prisoners and 150 guns” [ Khramov F. Decree. op. P. 94].

Head of the 30th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General E. A. Kolyankovsky

N.N. Golovin, comparing the number of fighters in the army of K.-G. Rennenkampf at the beginning of the invasion of East Prussia and those who remained in these formations after the withdrawal from it by September 1 (the army did not receive staffing during this period, only secondary formations and units were introduced), assessed (including by studying objective German data) the general losses of the 1st Army during the East Prussian campaign and the battle of the Masurian Lakes - up to 100 thousand people, of which 30 thousand prisoners, noting a high percentage of wounded and non-combatant among the prisoners [ Golovin N.N. From the 1914 campaign on the Russian Front - the beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. Prague, 1926. P. 408].

Russian prisoners of war in East Prussia

Thus, the total losses of the 1st Army for July-August amounted to at least 90,000 people. The largest losses occurred (in increasing order) in the battles of Stallupenen, Gumbinnen and the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. Moreover, the losses in the latter amounted to two-thirds of the army’s losses and were more than 2 times higher than the remaining losses of the operational formation combined - and fell mainly on insufficiently combat-ready secondary divisions that found themselves in battle for the first time, and army rear structures (which fell during the retreat from East Prussia under attack from the advancing Germans).

On the front of the 2nd Army, during the victorious battle at Orlau-Frankenau, the 15th Army Corps lost up to 3,000 people. This is the average figure from sources and studies. The materials of General Panteleev’s commission indicate the figure of 2,500 lower ranks and 50 officers [Cm. Collection of documents. P. 581]. N. Evseev also gives the same figure [Evseev N. Decree. op. pp. 103 - 104]. The memoirs of General N. N. Martos, quoted by N. N. Golovin, spoke of the loss of many officers and 3,000 privates. In the notes to the work of A. A. Kersnovsky, the figure for the losses of the 15th AK was given - 4067 wounded and killed, but the source was not named [Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian Army. T. 3. M., 1994. P. 340]. These are probably materials from the Reichsarchive (in which the total Russian losses were estimated at 4,000 people, of which 2,900 people were in the 2nd Brigade of the 6th Infantry Division at Frankenau. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. Vd. 2. S. 129). Considering that the Russians won in these battles (accordingly, the battlefield remained with them), we will take as a basis the weighted average figure for the losses of the 15th Corps, indicated by domestic experts and indicated above.

The losses of the regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division of the 23rd Corps that participated in the battle at Mühlen are unclear. It is known that the 2nd battalion of the 5th Kaluga Infantry Regiment, which was part of the 2nd division, lost 6 officers and 300 lower ranks [Cm. Bogdanovich P. N. Invasion of East Prussia in August 1914. Memoirs of an officer of the general staff of the army, General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964. P. 172; Buchinsky Yu. F. Tannenberg disaster. Sofia, 1939. P. 33]. An eyewitness to the “Samsonov disaster”, Lieutenant Colonel - commander of the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment, Yu. F. Buchinsky, estimated the losses of his regiment for the day of August 14 at approximately 25%, which is about 1000 people [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. op. P. 25]. The regiment's losses in the battle on August 15, in his opinion, were 40%. Units of the 15th AK also suffered losses. Thus, 215 recorded graves belonged to soldiers of the 29th and 30th Infantry Regiments of the 8th Infantry Division [ Bogdanovich P.N. Decree. op. P. 163. The total losses of the 30th Infantry Regiment amounted to 34 officers and more than 1,500 lower ranks. Collection of documents. P. 584].

The total losses of the 2nd Infantry Division and units of the 15th AK in the victorious battles of August 15 at Waplitz - Mühlen amounted to at least 2,000 people.

In unsuccessful battles of the flank corps (Uzdau-Soldau, Gross Bessau, Bischofsburg), which ended with the withdrawal of these formations, which allowed the Germans to begin encircling the central core of the 2nd Army, the Russians lost at least 13,000 people.

Thus, the 6th Army Corps in the battle on August 13 near Bischofsburg lost 73 officers and 5283 lower ranks in the 4th Infantry Division [Up to 1.7 thousand prisoners are trophies of the 1st Reserve Corps.Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. Vd. 2. S. 174], 18 machine guns and 16 guns [Collection of documents. P. 290]. The total loss in the 16th Infantry Division in the period August 13-18 is 523 people (including on August 16 and 18 the division lost 381 people wounded, killed and missing [Ibid. P. 570]. According to German sources, the 1st Reserve Corps buried 310 German and 220 Russian soldiers on the battlefield, and the 17th Army Corps buried another 116 Russian soldiers.

Field military ambulance train for first aid

According to the report of General P.I. Postovsky to the front headquarters on September 3, the losses of the 1st Army Corps are as follows: 24th Infantry Division - 4374 people; 22nd Infantry Division - 1852 people; 1st Infantry Brigade - 1970 people; mortar and heavy artillery divisions and sapper battalions - 212 people [Collection of documents. P. 320. But the losses of the regiments of the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, which also participated in the battles, are not mentioned]. Thus, the total losses of this corps amounted to 8,408 people.

During the breakthrough and encirclement, the Russian troops of the central corps of the 2nd Army suffered heavy losses. Information about losses in surroundings is always contradictory. Thus, the Russian military agent in France, Count A. A. Ignatiev, mentioned a German radiogram intercepted by the French, which spoke of the defeat of the 2nd Army and the capture of 60,000 Russian soldiers [Ignatiev A.A. Decree. op. P. 48]. The Austrian W. Rauscher wrote about 60,000 prisoners and 30,000 dead and missing soldiers of the 2nd Army [Rauscher W. Hindenburg. Field Marshal and Reich President. M., 2003. S. 48, 49]. Etc.

Html) we touched upon the situation with losses in the “Tannenberg” cauldron, which included 5 divisions, and of incomplete strength (13th and 15th corps, 2nd division of the 23rd corps). The Reichsarchiv map shows 44,000 fighters who fought in the Tannenberg pocket and were mostly captured . As noted by general historian N. Golovin [Decree. op. P. 337], among the prisoners, a large percentage were convoys and non-combatants - after all, the convoys of 3 corps at once fell into the hands of the Germans, and the most determined fighters, who wanted to get out of the encirclement, broke through to their own.

In the period from August 16 to 18 (the “Samson disaster” in the Grünflis forest - battles, breakthrough attempts and the death of the central group of the 2nd Army), the Germans counted up to 7,000 killed Russian soldiers. That is, the total losses of the core of the 2nd Army when surrounded reached 50,000 people.

The bodies of Russian soldiers who fell in a rearguard action during the withdrawal from East Prussia

The document recorded that 171 officers and 10,300 privates from the 13th and 15th corps returned to their homes (not counting the soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division - there is no information on it) [Tsikhovich, Y. K. Operation of the 2nd Army in East Prussia in August 1914 // Military historical collection. Vol. 3. M., 1919. P. 159]. But the battalion commander of the 5th regiment of the 2nd division, Yu. Buchinsky, noted that only from the soldiers of his brigade who emerged from the encirclement were they able to form an entire battalion (2 companies each of the 5th and 6th regiments) - i.e. 1/8 brigade. The lieutenant colonel recalled that the soldiers continued to emerge from the encirclement later. He also noted that the personnel of his brigade, after leaving East Prussia, was replenished to such an extent with people (both those who had escaped encirclement and those who had been on various business trips before the operation - the shortage due to the diversion of people to extraneous tasks was very large) that the regiments already had a full-time command staff and began exercises [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. op. P. 50]. In total, up to 3,000 soldiers and officers emerged from the encirclement from the 23rd Corps (which is basically the 2nd Division) [Vatsetis I.I. Decree. op. P. 213]. To this must be added up to 20,000 wounded soldiers who were evacuated after previous battles.

As F. Khramov noted, the Germans managed to capture about 30,000 people on August 16-18, while they themselves put the figure at 90,000 prisoners. The latter, as the colonel noted, is absolutely untrue - after all, in the 13th, 15th corps and 2nd division there were a total of up to 80,000 people - and of these, up to 20,000 broke out of the encirclement, up to 6,000 died and up to 20,000 wounded were left behind. battlefields. If, as F. Khramov noted, the encircled troops were led by a more courageous general than Klyuev, then they would have been able to break through the ring and retreat to the south - evidence of which is a number of remarkable tactical victories that Russian troops won in the East Prussian operation [Khramov F. Decree. op. P. 69].

Thus, the total losses of the 2nd Army in the operation (offensive - defensive battles and losses in encirclement) are up to 70,000 people(3000 and 2000 - Orlau-Frankenau and Waplitz, respectively, 13000 - losses of flank corps and 50000 - “Samson disaster”) - and more than two thirds of this figure are due to battles in the encirclement, i.e. the “Samson disaster” of the core 2- th army.

We see that the East Prussian operation (including the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes) inflicted total losses on the North-Western Front of approximately 160,000 people (the bulk were wounded and captured, and some of them later returned to duty). Or 64% of the initial number of front troops.

The heaviest losses were suffered during the fighting in retreat and fighting in encirclement (the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes and the “Samson disaster”). The main losses in the first case fell on the secondary units and rear units of the 1st Army, in the second case - on the personnel regiments of the 15th, 13th Army Corps and the 2nd Infantry Division. That is, in the latter case, first-class troops, the strike group of the 2nd Army, suffered, and therefore the resonance from the “Samson disaster” exceeded the defeat of the 1st Army, although the loss figures are comparable.

The 2nd Army, which lost up to 70,000 people, immediately lost half of its original strength (half of the army - 2.5 corps - was not encircled). The 1st Army suffered the heaviest losses (60,000 people, two-thirds of all losses of the operational formation) in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, fighting with superior enemy forces, and then rapidly retreating from East Prussia - the bulk of them, as noted, fell on the Secondary divisions are not sufficiently combat-ready.

The damage of the 2nd Army in the “Samson disaster” or “Tannenberg” is comparable only to the damage of the 1st Army in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes.

Counter and offensive battles cost the front much less. The losses of the opponents in these battles are comparable - for example, the British agent in the Russian army A. Knox estimated the Russian losses at 4,000 people in the battle of Orlau-Frankenau, and the German ones at 6,000, etc. - which speaks, among other things, about the equal fighting qualities of the enemy troops.

Combat schedule of the sides

Russian army

• 1st Army - Commander Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich, Chief of Staff Mileant, Gavriil Georgievich, Quartermaster General Bayov, Konstantin Konstantinovich
  • II AK - Chief Sheideman, Sergei Mikhailovich
    • 26th Infantry Division - Chief Poretsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
    • 43rd Infantry Division - Chief Slyusarenko, Vladimir Alekseevich
    • 76th Infantry Division - Chief Iosefovich, Felix Dominikovich
    • 72nd Infantry Division (from August 27) - chief Orlov, Dmitry Dmitrievich
    • Don 31st Cossack Regiment (6 hundreds)
  • III AK - chief Epanchin, Nikolai Alekseevich, chief of staff Chagin, Vladimir Alexandrovich
    • 25th Infantry Division - Chief Bulgakov, Pavel Ilyich
    • 27th Infantry Division - Chief Adaridi, August-Karl-Mikhail Mikhailovich
    • Don 34th Cossack Regiment
    • Don 19th Separate Cossack Hundred
  • IV AK - chief Aliyev, Eris Khan Sultan Giray, chief of staff Desino, Konstantin Nikolaevich
    • 30th Infantry Division - Chief Kolyankovsky, Eduard Arkadevich
    • 40th Infantry Division - Chief Korotkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich
    • 57th Infantry Division - Chief Bezradetsky, Dmitry Nikolaevich
    • Don 44th Cossack Regiment
    • Don 26th Separate Cossack Hundred
  • XX AK - chief Smirnov, Vladimir Vasilyevich (general), chief of staff Shemyakin, Konstantin Yakovlevich
    • 28th Infantry Division - Chief Lashkevich, Nikolai Alekseevich
    • 29th Infantry Division - Chief Rosenschild von Paulin, Anatoly Nikolaevich
    • 54th Infantry Division (from September 9) - chief Erogin, Mikhail Grigorievich
    • Don 46th Cossack Regiment
    • Don 25th Separate Cossack Hundred
    • 73rd Artillery Brigade of the 73rd Infantry Division
  • XXVI AK (from September) - chief Gerngross, Alexander Alekseevich
    • 53rd Infantry Division - Chief Fedorov, Semyon Ivanovich
    • 56th Infantry Division - Chief Boldyrev, Nikolai Ksenofontovich
  • Army cavalry
    • 1st Guards Cavalry Division - Chief Kaznakov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
    • 2nd Guards Cavalry Division - Chief Rauch, Georgy Ottonovich
    • 1st Cavalry Division - Chief Gurko, Vasily Iosifovich
    • 2nd Cavalry Division - Chief of Nakhichevan, Khan Hussein
    • 3rd Cavalry Division - Chief Bellegarde, Vladimir Karlovich
  • 5th Infantry Brigade - commander Schrader, Pyotr Dmitrievich
  • 1st separate cavalry brigade - commander Oranovsky, Nikolai Aloizievich

• 2nd Army - commander Samsonov, Alexander Vasilyevich, beginning. headquarters Postovsky, Pyotr Ivanovich (from August 19), Quartermaster General Filimonov, Nikolai Grigorievich)
  • I AK - chief Artamonov, Leonid Konstantinovich (replaced on August 27 by A.V. Dushkevich), chief of staff Lovtsov, Sergei Petrovich
    • 22nd Infantry Division - Chief Dushkevich, Alexander Alexandrovich.
      • Vyborg 85th Infantry Regiment - commander Freiman, Karl Vladimirovich
    • 24th Infantry Division - Chief Reshchikov, Nikolai Petrovich
      • Irkutsk 93rd Infantry Regiment - commander Kopytinsky, Yulian Yulianovich
      • Krasnoyarsk 95th Infantry Regiment - commander Lokhvitsky, Nikolai Alexandrovich
    • Don 35th Cossack Regiment
  • VI AK - chief Blagoveshchensky, Alexander Alexandrovich), chief of staff Nekrashevich, Georgy Mikhailovich
    • 4th Infantry Division - Chief Komarov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
      • Belozersky 13th Infantry Regiment - commander Dzheneev, Dmitry Dmitrievich
      • Olonetsky 14th Infantry Regiment - commander Shevelev, Vladimir Georgievich
      • Shlisselburg 15th Infantry Regiment - Commander Arapov, Nikolai Ivanovich
      • Ladoga Regiment - commander Mikulin, Alexander Vladimirovich
    • 16th Infantry Division - Chief Richter, Guido Kazimirovich
      • Suzdal 62nd Infantry Regiment - commander Golitsynsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
      • Kazan 64th Infantry Regiment - commander Ivanov, Alexander Mikhailovich
    • Don 22nd Cossack Regiment
  • XIII AK - chief Klyuev, Nikolai Alekseevich), chief of staff Pestich, Evgeniy Filimonovich
    • 1st Infantry Division - Chief Ugryumov, Andrey Alexandrovich
      • Nevsky 1st Infantry Regiment - commander Pervushin, Mikhail Grigorievich
      • Sofia 2nd Infantry Regiment - commander Grigorov, Alexander Mikhailovich
      • Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment - commander Zagneev, Nikolai Grigorievich
    • 36th Infantry Division - Chief Prezhentsov, Alexander Bogdanovich
      • Zvenigorod 142nd Infantry Regiment - commander Venetsky, Georgy Nikolaevich
      • Dorogobuzh 143rd Infantry Regiment - commander Kabanov, Vladimir Vasilievich
      • Kashirsky 144th Infantry Regiment - commander Kakhovsky, Boris Vsevolodovich
    • Border Guard Detachment (4 hundreds)
    • Don 40th Cossack Regiment (from August 29)
  • XV AK - chief Martos, Nikolai Nikolaevich, chief of staff Machugovsky, Nikolai Ivanovich
    • 6th Infantry Division - Chief Torklus, Fedor-Emilius-Karl Ivanovich
      • Nizhny Novgorod 22nd Infantry Regiment - commander Meipariani, Zakhary Alexandrovich
      • Nizovsky 23rd Infantry Regiment - commander Danilov, Dmitry Evgrafovich
      • Simbirsk 24th Infantry Regiment - Sokolovsky, Andrey Frantsevich
    • 8th Infantry Division - Chief Fitingof, Evgeniy Emilievich
      • Chernigov 29th Infantry Regiment - commander Alekseev, Alexander Pavlovich
      • Poltava 30th Infantry Regiment - commander Gavrilitsa, Mikhail Ivanovich
      • Aleksopolsky 31st Infantry Regiment - commander Lebedev, Alexander Ivanovich
      • Kremenchug 32nd Infantry Regiment - commander Ratko, Vasily Alexandrovich
    • Orenburg 2nd Cossack Regiment (4 hundreds)
  • XXIII AK - chief Kondratovich, Kiprian Antonovich, chief of staff Nordheim, Wilhelm-Karl Kasperovich
    • 3rd Guards Infantry Division - Chief Sirelius, Leonid Otto Ottovich
      • Lithuanian Life Guards Regiment - commander Schildbach, Konstantin Konstantinovich
      • Kexholm Life Guards Regiment - commander Malinovsky, Alexander Mikhailovich
      • Volyn Life Guards Regiment - commander Gerua, Alexander Vladimirovich
    • 2nd Infantry Division - Chief Mingin, Joseph Feliksovich
      • Kaluga 5th Infantry Regiment - commander Zinoviev, Nikolai Petrovich
      • Libavsky 6th Infantry Regiment - commander Globachev, Nikolai Ivanovich
      • Revel 7th Infantry Regiment - commander Manulevich-Meydano-Uglu, Mikhail Alexandrovich
      • Estonian 8th Infantry Regiment - commander Raupach, German Maximilianovich
  • 1st Rifle Brigade - commander Vasiliev, Vladimir Mikhailovich
  • 2nd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade
  • Army cavalry
    • 4th Cavalry Division - Chief Tolpygo, Anton Aleksandrovich
    • 6th Cavalry Division - Chief of Roop, Vladimir Khristoforovich
      • Glukhovsky 6th Dragoon Regiment
    • 15th Cavalry Division - Chief Lyubomirov, Pavel Petrovich

It should also be noted that due to very contradictory orders from headquarters and the North-Western Front, the structure of the 2nd Army was constantly changing, moreover, there was uncertainty in the subordination of individual formations. So, for example, from August 21, Artamonov’s I AK was subordinated to the 2nd Army by order of Headquarters, but this order was not transmitted by the headquarters of the North-Western Front.

German army

8th Army (commander Colonel General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, since August 23, 1914 command replaced by: Commander Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of Staff Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General Hoffmann)

• 1st AK (commander Hermann von Francois)
  • 1st Infantry Division
  • 2nd Infantry Division.
• 1st Reserve AK (commander von Belov)
  • 1st Reserve Infantry Division
  • 36th Reserve Infantry Division
• 17th AK (commander August von Mackensen)
  • 35th Infantry Division
  • 36th Infantry Division
• 20 AK (commander General Scholz)
  • 37th Infantry Division
  • 41st Infantry Division

• 3rd reserve division
• 1 Ladder Division
• 6th Ladver Brigade
• 70th Ladver Brigade
• 1st Cavalry Division

Planning and preparation of the operation

The remnants of the 2nd Army retreated across the Narew River.

Retreat of the 1st Russian Army from East Prussia

At that time, the Battle of Galicia continued on the southern front of the Warsaw salient, and Austria-Hungary demanded that Germany move the 8th Army south and, through Poland, hit the rear of the Russian armies advancing in Galicia.

However, the German General Staff considered such an operation too risky and chose to liberate East Prussia, and on August 31 ordered the 8th Army to attack against the 1st Russian Army, which had reached Königsberg.

Having received 2.5 corps from the Western Front on September 4, Ludendorff regrouped the 8th Army: covering himself from the south against Scheidemann’s 2nd Russian Army with one and a half divisions (20,000 bayonets), he deployed seven corps and two cavalry divisions, 230,000 bayonets and sabers with 1080 guns. They were opposed by five corps and five cavalry divisions of the 1st Russian Army of Rennenkampf, 110,000 bayonets and sabers with 900 guns.

The main forces of Rennenkampf, aimed at com. Front Zhilinsky for the siege of Königsberg, concentrated on the northern flank, and the Germans decided to attack the southern flank, where there was only one 2nd corps and cavalry. The plan was to break through the front here, go to the rear of the 1st Army, push it back to the sea and the swamps of the Lower Neman and destroy it there. Ludendorff sent three corps and two cavalry divisions through the lake defile to Letzen, bypassing the Russian southern flank, and four corps - north of the lakes.

On the Narew, the Russian Headquarters replenished the 2nd Army with two fresh corps. Southeast of the Masurian Lakes, in the zone between the 2nd and 1st armies, the 10th Army was formed.

On September 7-9, the German outflanking column unhindered passed through the lake defile and threw back parts of the 2nd Corps, going to the rear of the 1st Russian Army. Rennenkampf urgently transferred two infantry and three cavalry divisions and the 20th Corps from the north to the southern flank from the center, and stopping the German advance, began to withdraw the entire army to the east. When the encircling column of the German 8th Army resumed its attack north on September 10, the threat of encirclement by Russian troops had already passed.

On September 9, the 2nd Russian Army struck from the south of East Prussia, allegedly destroyed a week ago, according to all Ludendorff’s reports, and forced the Germans to turn part of their forces against it.

The retreat of the 1st Army was covered mainly by the 2nd and 20th Corps, which held back the superior German forces in rearguard battles. By September 14, the 1st Army retreated to the Middle Neman, losing about 15 thousand people (killed, wounded and captured) and 180 guns (more than 30 thousand people during the entire operation). German troops lost about 10 thousand people (25 thousand people during the entire operation). Although the 1st Army withdrew, the German plan to encircle and destroy it failed, thanks to Rennenkampf's timely decision to retreat and the tenacity of the rearguard corps. The army was simply squeezed out of East Prussia.

Results of the operation

According to the directive of the North-Western Front of September 16, the 1st Army took up defense on the Neman, and the 2nd on the Narew, that is, in the same place where they were located before the start of the operation. The total losses of the front (killed, wounded and prisoners) amounted to more than 80 thousand people and about 500 guns. On September 16, General Zhilinsky was dismissed from the post of commander of the North-Western Front, and General N.V. Ruzsky was appointed in his place.

German losses amounted to 3,847 killed, 6,965 missing, 20,376 wounded, 23,168 sick.

The German 8th Army repulsed the advance of superior forces of two Russian armies into East Prussia, defeated the 2nd Army and drove the 1st Army out of East Prussia, which became a notable operational success for Germany in a secondary theater of operations. The significance of the German victory in the East Prussian operation lies in the temporary refusal of the Russian Headquarters to advance from the Warsaw salient through Poznan to Berlin.

At the same time, the fighting in East Prussia distracted the German 8th Army from attacking the northern front of the Warsaw salient while the Battle of Galicia was taking place on its southern front, allowing the Russian army to defeat the Austro-Hungarian forces.

The transfer of two corps and a cavalry division (120 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western Front to East Prussia seriously weakened the German army before the Battle of the Marne, which resulted in its defeat. Marshall Foch concluded:

If France was not wiped off the face of Europe, then we owe this primarily to Russia, since the Russian army, with its active intervention, diverted part of the forces to itself and thereby allowed us to win a victory on the Marne.

Germany's tactical success in East Prussia, due to the transfer of troops from the Western Front, turned into a strategic defeat due to the failure of the operation against France. Germany was forced to fight a protracted war on two fronts, which it had no chance of winning.

Notes

Literature

Specially dedicated to the East Prussian operation

• Colonel Buchinsky Yu. F. Tannenberg disaster. Diary of a participant in the battles in East Prussia in August 1914, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 5th infantry. Kaluga Emperor Wilhelm I regiment. - 1st. - Sofia, Bulgaria, 1939. - P. 52.
• Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The beginning of the war and the operation in the East. Prussia. Prague, 1926
• Vatsetis I. I. Combat operations in East Prussia in July, August and early September 1914 - M., 1923.
• Evseev N. August battle of the 2nd Russian army in East Prussia (Tannenberg) in 1914 M. 1936
• East Prussian operation. Collection of documents of the world imperialist war on the Russian front (1914-1917) M., 1939.
• Bogdanovich P. N. Invasion of East Prussia in August 1914; Memoirs of an officer of the General Staff of the Army, General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964.