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Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation

FROM it is read that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops stationed in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by the Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops could not immediately begin the pursuit of the enemy. Only on July 17, parts of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st Panzer Army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the front, consisting of five combined arms armies, managed to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better near the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by the German troops were expected. So, the 1st Panzer Army by the beginning of the counteroffensive had T-34 tanks - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

Artillerymen of the fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue the retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery preparation. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. The German artillery fire was erratic. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Army had crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5-6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya Volya area.

In a more difficult situation, parts of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarovsky and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarovsk resistance center was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards came to the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod was bypassed by mobile units of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarovsky center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the southern front was much higher than the floor of Orlom. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front, he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks were allocated to the front for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced by two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.

Grenadier after the battle. August 1943

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be brought forward to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket-propelled mortars suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and included in the firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German cars were left perfectly serviceable. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th infantry and part of the 19th tank division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov grouping of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9 also the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the Steppe Front's offensive was now bypassing the Kharkov grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highway roads leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Panzer Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive grouping of German troops.

StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka region.

Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near the RSO tractor, left after shelling near Bogodukhov.

Tanks T-34 with infantry landing in the attack on Kharkov.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction on parts of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of the SS Panzer Divisions Totenkopf, Das Reich and Viking. This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since the latter had to take part of the units to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans were constantly attacking with tank and motorized infantry units, but they could not achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkiv-Poltava railway. To reinforce the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoye direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German squadron managed to penetrate somewhat into the junction between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, the German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Panzer Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern face).

The crew is trying to level the overturned tank PzKpfw III Ausf M. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943

T-34 tanks knocked out in the Akhtyrka area.

Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.

The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive installations of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive bypass of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repulsing the German snowcock in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive contour and approached the suburbs.

Between August 13-17, Soviet troops started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. Army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the number of a tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.

German gunners fire from the IeFH 18 howitzer at the advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.

A Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment of the 5th Tank Army follows a wrecked eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank turret there is an inscription "For Radyanska Ukraine". Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The strike force involved the Grossdeutchland motorized division, deployed from near Bryansk. 10th Motorized Division, parts of the 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions and two independent heavy tank battalions. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The grouping was opposed by units of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery preparation and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repulsed the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was put out of action, and the front was broken through. By 1300, the Germans had broken through to the headquarters of the division, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a southeasterly direction. To localize the strike, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.

The long-range 152-mm Br-2 gun is preparing to open fire on the retreating German troops.

German gunners reflect the attack of the Soviet troops.

German troops retreat across the river. August 1943

Soviet counterattack.

Battle on the outskirts of Kharkov. August 1943

"Panthers" shot down on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At the same time, units of the right wing of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th and 47th armies) continued to develop the offensive and advanced 12-20 km, hanging over the Akhtyrskaya group from the north. On the morning of August 19, the 1st Panzer Army also launched an offensive against Akhtyrka. By noon, the advance of the Akhtyrskaya grouping in the direction of Bogodukhov was stopped, and by the end of the day its position became precarious due to the overhang from the rear of the units of the 40th and 47th armies. However, on August 20, the Germans tried to encircle two divisions of the 27th Army in the Kotelva area, but this plan failed. In repulsing the offensive, the artillerymen and units of the engineering assault brigades especially distinguished themselves. Here the Germans lost 93 tanks, 134 guns and one armored train.

Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyrskaya grouping was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov grouping of German troops. It was only on August 21-25 that the Akhtyrskaya corps was destroyed and the city was liberated.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", lined by the calculation of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At a time when the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, the troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest area on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine-gun emplacements and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having advanced all the artillery to open positions, did the Soviet troops succeed in knocking the defenders out of their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and began crossing in some places.

Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German grouping from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by the Soviet troops to break into the city ran into dense artillery and machine-gun fire from the units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent the German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front ordered a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 am on August 23 they began the assault.

"Tame" "Panther" on the street of the liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations

Note: The first digit - tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irretrievable losses amounted to T-34 tanks - up to 31%, for T-70 tanks - up to 43% of the total losses. The sign "~" marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.

The units of the 69th Army were the first to break into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army. The Germans retreated, hiding behind strong rearguards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 0430 hours, the 183rd division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was largely liberated. But only in the afternoon ended the fighting on its outskirts, where the streets were clogged with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. In the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but the fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, the inhabitants of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.

CONCLUSION

To The battle of Ur was the first battle of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part on both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further develop the offensive. The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterattacks designed to restore the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.

However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of the anti-tank defense of their opponents. For the German troops, the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line turned out to be unexpected. The Soviet command, on the other hand, did not expect the high maneuverability of the German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed ambush fire even in the conditions of their own offensive. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved the best results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at the positions of the Soviet troops from a long distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders, on the other hand, achieved better results, also using tanks "in a self-propelled way", firing from tanks dug into the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, anti-tank and self-propelled artillery still remained the main enemy of armored combat vehicles. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.

Nevertheless, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defense.

Your attention is invited to an illustrated edition dedicated to the fighting on the Kursk Bulge. When compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They used as primary sources mainly domestic documents of those years: combat logs, combat and loss reports provided by various military formations, and protocols of work commissions engaged in July-August 1943 in the study of new models of German military equipment. The publication deals mainly with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation

It is believed that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, the German troops, who were in the area of ​​​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by the Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops could not immediately begin the pursuit of the enemy. Only on July 17, parts of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5–6 km. On July 18–19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st Panzer Army. The tank units advanced 2–3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant.

An artillery pursuit brigade follows retreating enemy.

On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20 did the troops of the front, consisting of five combined arms armies, succeed in advancing 5–7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days.

In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better near the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by the German troops were expected. Thus, the 1st Tank Army had 412 T-34, 108 T-70, and 29 T-60 tanks by the beginning of the counteroffensive (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery preparation. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. The German artillery fire was erratic. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Army had crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5 ... 6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya Volya area.

In a more difficult situation, parts of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7 ... 8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarovsk and Belgorod centers of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarovsk resistance center was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30–50 km deep into the enemy defenses. creating a threat of encirclement to the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards came to the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Bel-yurod bypassed the mobile formations of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarovsky center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front was much higher than near Orel. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front, he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks were allocated to the front for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced with two engineering brigades and four self-propelled artillery regiments.

After the battle. August 1943.

The assault gun StuG 40 destroyed by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka region.

Soviet SU-122 SP guns in combat. Kharkov line of advance, August 1943.

RSO tractor and PaK 40 gun destroyed near Bogodukhov.

The T-34 with tank-borne infantry advance to Kharkov.

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be brought forward to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket-propelled mortars suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and included in the firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German cars were left perfectly serviceable. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th infantry and part of the 19th tank division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov grouping of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9 also the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the Steppe Front's offensive was now bypassing the Kharkov grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highway roads leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Panzer Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive grouping of German troops.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction on parts of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of the SS Panzer Divisions Totenkopf, Das Reich and Wiklng. This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since the latter had to take part of the units to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans were constantly attacking with tank and motorized infantry units, but they could not achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkiv-Poltava railway. To reinforce the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoye direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German grouping managed to penetrate somewhat into the junction between the 1st and Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. armies achieved significant success, advancing 4–7 km. But the next day, the German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Panzer Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed particularly well, and at the same time, the Ilyushin attack aircraft were not effective enough (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern face).

The PzKpfw III Ausf M of panzerdivision "Das Reich".

Retreating German troops. The Donets river. August 1943.

Soviet T-34 tanks destroyed in Akhtyrka region.

Soviet troops are moving to Kharkov.

German leFH 18 howitzer firing to advancing Soviet troops Kharkov direction. August 1943.

"Studebackers" towing ZIS-3 AT guns. Kharkov direction.

The heavy tank Mk IV "Churchill" of 49 Guards heavy tank regiment of 5th Guards tank army with slogan "For Soviet Ukraine" written on the turret passes a destroyed SdKfz 232 (8-Rad). Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

The SU-122 on a march. August 7, 1943.

The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive installations of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive bypass of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repulsing the German attack in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive contour and approached the suburbs.

Between August 13-17, Soviet troops started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. Army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the strength of the tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.

A scheme of Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The strike force involved the Grossdeutchland motorized division, deployed from near Bryansk, the Yuth motorized division, units of the 11th and 19th tank divisions, and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The grouping was opposed by units of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery preparation and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repulsed the attacks of German tanks, but after the second hour, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was put out of action, and the front was broken through. By 1300, the Germans had broken through to the headquarters of the division, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a southeasterly direction. To localize the strike, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov (Photo from the collection of the authors).

The "Panther" destroyed at the outskirts of Kharkov by a gun of Guards senior sgt Parfenov. August 1943.

The "Tiger" destroyed by troops of the 70th army. Orel-Kursk line of advance, July 1943.

The "tame" "Panther" on a street of liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943.

At the same time, units of the right wing of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th and 47th armies) continued to develop the offensive and advanced 12-20 km, hanging over the Akhtyrskaya group from the north. On the morning of August 19, the 1st Panzer Army also launched an offensive on Akhtyrka. By noon, the advance of the Akhtyrskaya grouping in the direction of Bogodukhov was stopped, and by the end of the day its position became precarious due to the overhang of units of the 40th and 47th armies from the rear. Nonetheless. On August 20, the Germans tried to encircle two divisions of the 27th Army in the Kotelva area, but this plan failed. In repulsing the offensive, the artillerymen and units of the engineering assault brigades especially distinguished themselves. Here the Germans lost 93 tanks, 134 guns and one armored train.

Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyrskaya grouping was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov grouping of German troops. Only on August 21-25, the Akhtyr group was destroyed, and the city was liberated.

Successful battles south of Kursk in the summer of 1943 were the focus of the attention of friends and foes of our Motherland, the subject of controversy in the pages of the world press, the cause of disappointment within the Nazi bloc and the greatest joyful event for the Soviet people.

From July 5 to July 12, our troops heroically defended themselves, then launched a powerful counterattack on the Nazi troops and drove them back to the positions they had occupied before the start of the offensive. From July 24 to August 2, the troops of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts intensively and thoroughly prepared to break through the enemy defenses and go over to a decisive counteroffensive. This was the third major counter-offensive during the Great Patriotic War.

The counteroffensive near Kursk consisted of two operations: the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov operations.

I, the commander of the Steppe Front, would like to tell you about the advance of the troops of the front in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. It should immediately be noted that the counteroffensive near Kursk cannot be mechanically compared with the famous counteroffensives near Moscow and Stalingrad, since the military-political and economic situation at that time could not be put into a logical comparison with the situation in the summer of 1943.

Here, even before the start of the enemy offensive, we had powerful strategic reserves concentrated in advance, while the enemy did not have them and was forced to begin a hasty transfer of his troops to the Kursk direction from other sectors of the front, thereby weakening these sectors. Many other facts, which are not difficult to see even for a non-specialist in military affairs, testify to the incomparability of these operations.

The transition of our troops to the counteroffensive was a complete surprise for Hitler, since the German command did not reveal our plan of deliberate defense. Moreover, the Germans, as already noted, had little success, only managing to wedge into our defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 kilometers. The offensive of the troops of the Western (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by General M.M. Popov) fronts, which began on July 12, violated the entire defense of the enemy on the Oryol bridgehead. By the end of July 13, the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I.Kh. Bagramyan) had penetrated 25 kilometers into the enemy’s defenses, and a week after the start of the offensive, it advanced to a depth of 70 kilometers, creating a threat to the main communications of the enemy’s Oryol grouping from the north -west. The troops of the Bryansk Front also achieved significant success.

On July 15, drastic changes took place in the course of the struggle at the Oryol bridgehead. In the morning, after artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. The main blow was dealt to Gremyachevo in the center of the enemy grouping, advancing earlier on Kursk. As a result of the fighting, the enemy was driven back to their original positions.

The scale of the struggle in the Oryol direction was expanding more and more. A question that was of great importance for the further development of the war was being decided: how realistic was the German plan to transfer the struggle on the Soviet-German front into stable positional forms.

At a meeting at headquarters on July 26, Hitler demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge, promptly retreat troops from the Oryol bridgehead, reduce the front line due to this and release a number of divisions for transfer to other sectors.

Events unfolded extremely unfavorably for the enemy on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. By July 23, formations of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping back to their original positions.

By the end of July, the main forces of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were concentrated north and northwest of Belgorod, which created the conditions for delivering a deep frontal strike at the junction of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. Based on this, it was decided to carry out a dissecting blow by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod in the general direction to Valki, Novaya Vodolaga with the aim of splitting the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and subsequent envelopment and defeat of enemy troops in the Kharkov region.

It is not without interest to cite the full plan of the operation, reported to the Headquarters, which was approved and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

“To Comrade Ivanov (conditional name of I.V. Stalin).

We report:

In connection with the successful breakthrough of the enemy front and the development of the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, we will continue to carry out the operation according to the following plan.

1. 53A with Solomatin's corps will advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Pergacha. The army must reach the line of Olshany, Dergachi, replacing Zhadov's units on this line.

69A advances to the left of 53A in the direction of Cheremoshnoye. Upon reaching Cheremoshnoye 69A, having transferred a couple of the best divisions to Managarov, she herself remains in the front reserve for resupplying in the B area of ​​Mikoyanovka, Cheremoshnoye, Gryaznoye.

69A it is necessary to submit replenishment of 20,000 people as soon as possible.

7th Guards A will now advance from the Pushkarnoe area to Brodok and further to Bochkovka, turning the enemy front from north to south.

From the line Cheremoshnoye, Ziborovka, 7th Guards A will strike at Tsirkuny and will reach the line Cherkasskoe, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin.

Part of the forces from the Ziborovka area will advance on Murom and further on Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army cross the river. Seversky Donets near Rubezhnoye, Star. Saltov.

2. 57A of the South-Western Front, it is desirable to transfer to the submission of the Steppe Front and now prepare a 57A strike from the Rubizhnoye, Star line. Saltov in the general direction to Nepokrovaya and further to the state farm. Frunze.

57 And it is necessary to bring the state farm Kutuzovka, the state farm to them. Frunze, Rogan (northern).

If 57A remains subordinate to the Southwestern Front, then it must be obliged to go on the offensive in the above direction with Shumilov's approach to the Murom region.

3. For the second stage, i.e. Kharkov operation, the 5th guards must be transferred to the Steppe Front. tank army, which will go to the area of ​​Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy.

The Kharkov operation is tentatively proposed to be built in the following plan:

a) 53A in cooperation with Rotmistrov's army will cover Kharkov from the west and south-west.

b) Shumilov's army will advance from north to south from the Tsirkuny-Dergachi line.

c) 57A will advance from the east from the line of the state farm. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south.

d) 69A (if it is replenished by this time) will deploy at the junction between Zhadov and Managarov in the Olshany area and will advance south to support the Kharkov operation from the south.

69 And will go to the line Snezhkov Kut, Minkovka, Prosyanoe, Novoselovka.

e) The left flank of the Voronezh Front must be brought to the line Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut.

This task must be carried out by Zhadov's army and the left flank of the 27th army.

It is desirable to have Katukov's army in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

The Southwestern Front needs to strike from the Zamostye region in the general direction of Merefa, advancing along both banks of the river. Mzha, part of the forces to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, part of the forces must clear the forest south of Zamostye from the enemy and reach the Novoselovka, Okhochae, Verkh line. Bishkin, Geevka.

4. To carry out the Kharkov operation, in addition to 20,000 reinforcements, it is necessary to give 15,000 to replenish the divisions of the 53rd and 7th guards. armies, to complete the tank units of the front, give 200 pieces of T-34 and 100 T-70, KB - 35 pieces. Transfer four regiments of self-propelled artillery and two engineering brigades. To resupply the Air Force of the front with attack aircraft, fighters and bombers in the amount of: fighters - 90, Pe-2 - 40, Il-2 - 60.

We ask for approval. No. 64, 6. 8. 43.

Zhukov, Konev, Zakharov" [TsAMO, f. 48-A, op. 1691, d. 233, l. 397-401].

As follows from this plan, the blows of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts broke up the enemy defenses into isolated parts, and created conditions for the destruction of the enemy grouping in parts.

What was the enemy group? For the defense of the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead, the Germans kept a large group of troops in the amount of 14 infantry and 4 tank divisions. In addition, during the battle, the enemy transferred another 5 tank, motorized and 4 infantry divisions to this direction.

It should be noted that in the course of the war, the Nazi troops learned how to create a solid, well-saturated and defense in depth.

The tactical defense zone of the enemy consisted of the main and second lanes with a total depth of up to 18 kilometers. At the same time, the enemy's main line of defense, 6-8 kilometers deep, consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with strongholds and resistance nodes, interconnected by full-profile trenches. The trenches were connected by communications. In the strongholds, the enemy had a significant number of bunkers. The second strip consisted of one position with a depth of 2-3 kilometers. There was an intermediate position between the main and second lanes.

The enemy prepared settlements for all-round defense. Around Kharkov, two ring bypasses were equipped. Belgorod was also well protected by fortifications, strongholds with many firing points, several rows of barbed wire with a huge number of minefields.

Stone buildings were turned into small "fortresses".

The chalk mountains of Belgorod were used to cover the enemy troops.

It is no coincidence that the Germans attached great strategic importance to the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead. It was the strongest bastion of the German defense in the east, the gate blocking the way for our troops to Ukraine. One of the most important economic and political centers of the Soviet Union, the second capital of Ukraine - Kharkov, as well as Belgorod, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Lebedin, Bogodukhov, Chuguev and other cities were located on the territory of this bridgehead.

Kharkov occupied a special position in the defense of the enemy, which was regarded by Hitler as the “eastern gate” of Ukraine. And this is understandable: Kharkov is the largest railway junction on the routes from Moscow to the Donbass, Crimea, the Caucasus, the most important junction of highways and airlines, a city of mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemical, light and food industries. Attaching great strategic importance to Kharkov, Hitler demanded that his generals keep the city at any cost.

The heavily rugged terrain, combined with the solid defense of the enemy, made our offensive operations difficult.

In the 17th century, the so-called Belgorod line passed here - a defensive line, which was a series of fortresses, earthen ramparts and fortifications that protected the Russian state from raids from the south. New fortifications appeared on the sites of the ancient notches, more serious than the previous ones.

We have thoroughly prepared for the successful fulfillment of the tasks set by the Headquarters. Suffice it to note that in the directions of the main attacks of the 5th Guards and 53rd Armies, operating in the main zone of the main attack, the density of artillery saturation reached 230 barrels per kilometer of the front. This created such a firepower that, according to the testimony of the prisoners, many of the surviving German soldiers lost their minds.

At dawn on August 3, a counteroffensive began in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction with powerful artillery and aviation preparation. The enemy's defenses were broken. In the first half of the day, formations of the combined arms armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the direction of the main attack wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. Soon, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were introduced into the gap with the task of forward brigades to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and build on success in the operational depth with the main forces.

With the breakthrough of the enemy defense, the troops of the Steppe Front were faced with the task of liberating Belgorod. Knowing that an attack on Belgorod from the north would require very great efforts, I did everything to ensure that the formations of the right wing of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarov and the 1st mechanized corps M.D. Solomatin to get on the way of the enemy's retreat to the west. The blow from the front was carried out by the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkona, and the 7th Guards Army under the command of General M.S. Shumilova (member of the Military Council Z.T. Serdyuk), having crossed the Seversky Donets, was supposed to attack the enemy garrison from the east.

So, before the offensive, the front line of the enemy's defense was carefully processed, the entire fire system was suppressed. And then, after the remaining unsuppressed firing points were identified, they were destroyed by a second artillery raid and aviation of the 5th Air Army under the command of Lieutenant General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov. Artillerymen of divisions and regiments and artillery divisions of the RGK played an important role in processing the front line of the enemy. We must pay tribute to the commander of the artillery of the front, Lieutenant General N.S. Fomin and the representative of the Headquarters, General M.N. Chistyakov, who skillfully and creatively organized such a powerful artillery attack. But, despite all this, on August 4, enemy resistance intensified.

The pace of advancement of our troops has slowed down. All our attempts to go in from the flank in order to inflict a roundabout blow on the enemy failed. The main enemy tank grouping, located in front of our front, offered fierce resistance, although our tank armies were already destroying enemy reserves.

On August 4, the troops of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, fighting fierce battles, broke through the second and third defensive lines of the enemy, covering Belgorod from the north.

7th Guards Army, consisting of eight rifle divisions (111th and 15th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 49th Guards Rifle Corps, 73rd, 78th, 81st Guards Rifle Divisions of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps, 72 -I, 36th Guards and 213th Rifle Divisions of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps) with many tank and artillery regiments and brigades, wedged into the enemy’s defenses, advanced on Belgorod from the east. She liquidated the Mikhailovsky bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets, and her formations started fighting already on the western bank.

The German command became worried. On August 4, the advance of the 3rd Panzer Corps and the SS Panzer Corps began from the Donbass to the Kharkov direction. The directorates (headquarters) of these corps were already in Kharkov.

I demanded that the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps defeat the enemy's 6th Panzer Division and develop an offensive against Mikoyanovka. The 1st mechanized corps managed to reach the Gryaznoye, Repnoe area from behind the right flank of the army and cut off the Belgorod German grouping of the escape route to the southwest and south.

The 69th Army, with the assistance of the 7th Guards Army, was to capture Belgorod, and the 7th Guards Army was to break through the enemy defenses and reach the Tavrovo-Brodon line in order to encircle the Belgorod German grouping in cooperation with the 69th and 53rd armies .

The fighting for the city took on a fierce character. Units of the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 89th Guards Rifle Division (division commander Colonel M.P. Seryugin), as well as units of the 305th and 375th Rifle Divisions under the command of Colonel respectively A.F. Vasiliev and Colonel P.D. Govorunenko. From the east, the city was attacked by the 93rd Guards and 111th Rifle Divisions of the 7th Guards Army.

On August 5, troops of the 69th and formations of the 7th Guards Army of the Steppe Front stormed Belgorod. On the same day, Orel was liberated after intense fighting. The capital of our Motherland, Moscow, for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, celebrated outstanding victories with artillery salutes. It was the first artillery salute in honor of the combat prowess of the Soviet troops. Since then, fireworks in Moscow to commemorate the victories of the Red Army have become a glorious tradition.

In the meantime, our tank armies, having high maneuverability, successfully operated in isolation from the main forces of the combined arms armies. For five days, the connection of the 1st tank army, commanded by General M.E. Katukov, advanced more than 100 kilometers into the depth of the enemy’s defenses and by the end of August 7 they captured Bogodukhov, the 5th Guards Tank Army captured Cossack Lopan and Zolochev. The Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of the enemy was cut into two parts.

The offensive of our troops continued to develop rapidly. By August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front, having significantly expanded the breakthrough in the western and southwestern directions, approached Boromla, Akhtyrka, Kotelva and cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway, and the troops of the Steppe Front, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy tank group, approached the outer contour of the Kharkov defensive lines.

The enemy thoroughly prepared for the fight for the city. It was not easy to take such a fortified area. All our attention was riveted here, to this fortress, for the construction of which the Nazis drove many thousands of people. Great was the desire of the enemy to keep the city.

The defense of the enemy, according to intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, was a system of bunkers with an overlap of two or three rolls and partially reinforced concrete structures. Flanking and oblique fire was widely used, all nodes of resistance had fire communication, firing points were connected by communication lines, the front edge was reinforced with engineering structures, wire and anti-tank barriers, and minefields.

All stone buildings on the outskirts of the city were turned into a kind of long-term firing points, the lower floors of the Houses were used as firing positions for artillery, the upper floors were occupied by submachine gunners, machine gunners and grenade launchers.

The entrances to the city and the streets on the outskirts were mined and blocked with barricades. The inner quarters of the city were also prepared for defense with an anti-tank fire system.

For the defense of Kharkov, the German command concentrated a strong grouping of eight infantry, two tank divisions, artillery units, many SS detachments, police and other units, concentrating them mainly on the northern and eastern faces of the outer defensive bypass with significant echeloning of troops in depth. Hitler ordered that Kharkov be held at all costs and demanded that the generals use extensive repression against soldiers and officers who showed signs of cowardice and unwillingness to fight. He pointed out to Manstein that the loss of Kharkov would threaten the loss of Donbass.

In order to prevent the possibility of a deep coverage of the Kharkov grouping of troops from the southwest, the Nazi command brought operational reserves into battle against the troops of the Voronezh Front - tank and motorized rifle divisions transferred from the Donbass and from the Oryol direction, which launched strong counterattacks on our troops on Bogodukhovsky, and then and in the Akhtyrka directions. At the same time, measures were taken to strengthen the troops fighting for Kharkov. SS Panzer divisions were transferred here: "Reich", "Dead Head", "Viking", the 3rd Panzer Division and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland".

If the enemy took all measures to keep Kharkov, then we had to take it at all costs. The task was not easy. During the war, Soviet troops launched offensive operations three times in order to liberate Kharkov. The first offensive was carried out by the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts in May 1942. At first, they broke through the enemy defenses and advanced to a shallow depth. However, insufficient training and a significant superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment affected. The offensive did not reach its goal.

In February 1943, the liberation of the Kharkov region began again. During this offensive, on February 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front liberated Kharkov. But at the end of February, the enemy regrouped forces, pulled up fresh reserves and launched a counteroffensive. On March 15, 1943, Kharkov was abandoned again, although the soldiers fought heroically for the city.

It is not my task to analyze the causes of failures. Participants in the battles and military historians have already said their word about this. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. Moskalenko writes about this in particular detail in his book “In the South-Western Direction”. However, at the time when we were to liberate Kharkov for the third time and for good, I remembered the bad lessons and decided to take into account the experience of previous operations in order to act for sure.

Of course, the strategic situation during the Battle of Kursk was more favorable for us, but this should not have reassured us. I had to think hard and hard, weigh all the factors, analyze data about the enemy, study the enemy's defenses, personally check everything. Great was the desire this time to liberate the city with a full guarantee that once again it would not be necessary to give it to the enemy. To do this, it was necessary to utterly smash the enemy, drive him out of Kharkov, causing the city as little destruction as possible. Under no circumstances should the city or individual districts be allowed to change hands. This just leads to the complete destruction of the settlement. We knew this well from the example of Voronezh.

We began to carefully prepare for the upcoming heavy battles for Kharkov. Together with the front artillery commander, tankers, aviators, army commanders, and in some cases division commanders, we studied the most advantageous approaches to the city. For this purpose, I went to NP P.A. Rotmistrov, I.M. Managarova, N.A. Gagena, M.S. Shumilov, where together we figured out where and with what forces it would be better to strike. Assessing the terrain, the nature of the enemy's fortifications, they planned a maneuver with their troops, a place where it would be expedient to concentrate the main strike force of artillery, where it would be more convenient to deliver a tank attack, where to aim aviation. It was a difficult process. It was necessary to take into account all the positive and negative, to find the right key to success.

Being with General N.A. Hagen, I became interested in the southeast direction from Volchansk, but here rivers with steep banks could hinder the development of the strike, the enemy would probably hold on to them.

Just before the NP General M.S. Shumilov opened the panorama of Kharkov. M.S. Shumilov managed to enter the outskirts of the Kharkov Tractor Plant. It is more convenient to take the city from here. But with this option, more artillery will be required, since it is necessary to break through the way for our troops through the reinforced concrete factory buildings. The largest enterprise in the city did not want to cause such great destruction. And there was no special expediency in delivering the main blow from here either. Here, the actions of the tank army of P.A. will be difficult. Rotmistrov, which will require a significant regrouping of forces. It is better if the army of General M.S. Shumilova will take by storm individual buildings of the plant and conduct street battles.

69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkona advanced on Kharkov from the north, along the Moscow highway, directly in the forehead and had very strong strongholds in front of her in the form of factory buildings adapted for defense. It would seem that the direction is the most direct and closest, but it is also the most difficult for the advancing infantry. Leaving the NP, I considered in my mind all the pros and cons, aiming at Kharkov from all sides, from different directions, and finally came to the final decision: the most advantageous direction for delivering the main attack is the north-western one, where the 53rd army of the general is located. THEM. Managarov. The members of the Military Council in the army were generals P.I. Gorokhov and A.V. Tsarev, chief of staff - General K.N. Derevianko. Here are the best approaches to the city, forest, commanding heights, from which the whole of Kharkov is clearly visible. Now it was necessary to resolve the issue of ensuring the strike of this army from the west from Lyubotin, from where the enemy tank divisions counterattacked intermittently. We decided to oppose the tanks to the tanks and attack the city of that direction with two armies: the 53rd Army and the tank army of P.A. Rotmistrov. True, this army, again returned to the front, was no longer the same as it left us. Fierce fighting weakened it, it had only 160 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, even these forces could make it much easier for the front to accomplish its main task.

Thus, in thought and doubt, the final plan for the capture of Kharkov was born, the idea of ​​​​the operation was developed.

My advanced command post was located in the sector of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarov, i.e. on the main line.

The day and hour of the decisive offensive was approaching.

Not knowing the position of the troops at the front, but wanting to see Kharkov free as soon as possible, some representatives of the Ukrainian SSR came to see me at the command post and expressed dissatisfaction with our slow advance. I confess that I could not pay due attention to them, explain everything properly, and I did not have the right to disclose the operational plan. Time is running out. I was absorbed in leading the troops.

All these days, the troops of the front were actively fighting. There was no respite. The enemy was constantly pushed back, knocked out of fortified knots, beaten with artillery and aircraft. Slowly but surely, the troops of the front moved forward in order to come close to the city. Of course, it would be good not only to drive the enemy out of the city, but also to surround him. However, it must be said that bypassing such a large center as Kharkov, its complete encirclement, given the existing disposition of our troops, would be associated with great destruction. This became clear when we were still on the way to the city. The enemy at that time still possessed large tank forces and constantly maneuvered them, so the encirclement of Kharkov was a difficult task for the front. The Voronezh Front could have helped us in this, but it got involved in tank battles near Bogodukhov. The southwestern front could have made a deep detour, but by this time, unfortunately, the offensive of this front had not developed.

On August 8, at my request, by decision of the Headquarters, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to our front.

On August 10, I issued a directive for the capture of Kharkov. Its main idea was to defeat the enemy grouping defending in the Kharkov area on the outskirts of Kharkov, in the field. We clearly imagined that the struggle in the city, which was so carefully prepared for defense, would require very great efforts from the troops, would be fraught with significant losses of personnel and could take on a protracted character. In addition, fighting in the city could lead to unnecessary civilian casualties, as well as to the destruction of residential buildings and surviving industrial plants. It was necessary to do everything in the field to split and break up the enemy grouping in parts, deprive it of interaction with the tank troops that launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhov area, and isolate the city from the influx of tank reserves from the west.

Compared with the original plan of the operation, the plan for taking the city was refined and consisted of the following: the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrova struck west of Kharkov - on Korotich and Lyubotin. The purpose of the strike is to cut off the enemy's retreat to Poltava and isolate Kharkov from the influx of enemy reserves from Bogodukhov. 53rd Army under the command of General I.M. Managarov and the 1st mechanized corps under the command of General M.D. Solomatin struck at the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkona advanced on Kharkov from the north along the Moscow highway. 7th Guards Army General M.S. Shumilova was advancing on the northeastern outskirts of the city, and the 57th Army was advancing on the left wing of the front, south of Kharkov.

To ensure the breakthrough of the outer defensive bypass, the troops of the Steppe Front were reinforced with 4234 guns and mortars at a ratio of 6.5:1 in our favor.

On August 11, fierce battles were already underway with the enemy, who stubbornly defended strongholds and centers of resistance located to the north of the defensive bypass and covered the approaches to it. Only by nightfall did the 53rd, 69th and 7th Guards armies on the entire front come close to the outer Kharkov defensive bypass.

The 57th Army, having overcome the second defensive line of the enemy, captured large centers of resistance and approached its right flank to an intermediate line that covered Kharkov from the southeast. Fierce battles broke out in the trenches in some areas.

The 69th Army, having eliminated large enemy centers of resistance in the areas of Cherkasskoe-Lozovoye, Bolshaya Danilovka and destroyed up to a thousand Nazis, came close to the city bypass on the northern outskirts of Kharkov. With its center, the army wedged itself into the depths of the city bypass, capturing Sokolniki - one of the strongholds that were part of the system - the defense of the city.

The 7th Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the outer contour, bypassed Kharkov from the northeast; The 57th Army crossed the Roganka River, broke through the intermediate defensive line and the outer contour with its right flank.

As a result of very tense fighting on August 12 and 13, the troops of our front in a number of sectors came close to the city bypass and started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.

The German command threw for defense everything that could be opposed to our troops, and for four days we had to fight stubbornly on the lines reached, repelling fierce counterattacks by the Nazis, who tried to delay our offensive at any cost. But all their counterattacks were repulsed, and the troops of the 53rd, 5th Guards Tank and 57th armies were preparing to launch new attacks with the aim of deep enveloping Kharkov from the west, east and south.

Especially fierce battles unfolded from August 18 to 22, when the Germans tried to defeat the main forces of the strike force of the Voronezh Front in the Bogodukhov area in order to achieve a decisive change in the situation in their favor on the entire Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead.

However, these enemy attempts could not change the course of the battle for Kharkov.

On the morning of August 18, the 53rd and 57th armies continued their offensive, trying to more tightly capture Kharkov from the west and southwest. The troops of the 53rd Army had to fight hard battles northwest of Kharkov for the cleansing of the forest. The offensive of the 299th and 84th rifle divisions of this army on the northern edge of the forest was not crowned with success. Then, together with General I.M. Managarov, we made a decision: to break through the enemy defenses and take control of the forest with a night attack. All divisional artillery, part of the army artillery and tanks were moved to firing positions for direct fire. After a powerful fire raid by a unit of the 299th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.Ya. Klimenko and the 84th Infantry Division under the command of General P.I. Bunyashin broke the resistance of the enemy and captured the forest. The 252nd Infantry Division under the command of General G.I. was introduced from the reserve. Anisimov. I observed the actions of the division. Its units quickly and skillfully advanced through the forest and, in cooperation with the 299th and 84th rifle divisions, by the morning of August 19, having cleared the forest, launched battles for the village of Peresechnaya and crossings across the Uda River.

In these battles, the soldiers of the 1st battalion of the 41st rifle regiment of the 81st rifle division under the command of senior lieutenant Eremenko especially distinguished themselves. The fighters of the mouths of this battalion showed themselves as heroes in a night hand-to-hand fight. The forest area liberated from the enemy played the role of a good approach and a convenient springboard in the further struggle for Kharkov.

So, units of the 53rd Army captured advantageous positions to strike at the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. From a height of 208.6 and from the edge of the forest, a view of the city opened up. My observation post was equipped at a height of 197.3 and combined with the observation post of General I.M. Managarov. From here I led the fighting to liberate Kharkov.

In order to speed up the capture of Kharkov, I gave the order to concentrate the 5th Guards Tank Army in the forest area south of the village of Polevoe. With a blow to Korotich, she was supposed to cut off the enemy's retreat from Kharkov to the west and southwest.

Using the crossings and passages built at night through the railway embankment and concentrating their tanks on the southern bank of the Uda, the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive and covered the enemy grouping in the Kharkov region from the west and southwest, and the 57th Army from the southwest. east.

For the enemy grouping in the Kharkov region, a threat of complete encirclement was created. Only one railway and one highway remained at his disposal, and even those were under constant attack from the 5th Air Army.

At the same time, the neighbor on the right - the 5th Guards Army under the command of General A.S. Zhadov, closely interacting with the 53rd Army, advanced west of Kharkov.

During a tense struggle for Kharkov, the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, having successfully completed the Oryol offensive operation, reached the approaches to Bryansk; troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts launched battles for the liberation of Donbass; On the Voronezh Front, enemy counterattacks in the area of ​​Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka did not bring him success, although the troops of this front suffered significant losses in fierce battles on August 17-20. However, according to General S.M. Shtemenko, who tells in his book “The General Staff during the War Years” about that period, the intervention of I.V. Stalin, who pointed out to the commander of the Voronezh Front the inadmissibility of dispersing forces and means, soon rectified the situation. [See: Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. M., 1975, book 1, pp. 245-246].

In the afternoon of August 22, the Nazi troops began to withdraw from the Kharkov area. In order to prevent the enemy from getting away from the blows, on the evening of August 22, I gave the order for a night assault on Kharkov.

Throughout the night of August 23, street battles were going on in the city, fires were blazing, strong explosions were heard. The soldiers of the 53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army, showing courage and courage, skillfully bypassed the enemy strongholds, infiltrating his defenses, attacked his garrisons from the rear. Step by step, Soviet soldiers cleared Kharkov from the Nazi invaders.

Parts of the 183rd Infantry Division, which broke into the city at dawn on August 23, successfully advanced along Sumskaya Street and were the first to reach Dzerzhinsky Square. Warriors of the 89th Guards Rifle Division along Klochkovskaya Street went to the Gosprom building and hoisted the Red Banner over it.

By 11 o'clock on August 23, the troops of the Steppe Front completely liberated Kharkov. Most of the group that defended the city was destroyed. The rest of her retreated.

During the five months of the secondary occupation, the Nazis destroyed Kharkov even more. They burned and blew up hundreds of the best buildings, completely robbed the city, took away even tram rails, furniture, shop equipment, and firewood. On the territory of the Clinical Town, where the hospital was located, the Nazis destroyed about 450 wounded soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. Ruins were everywhere. In the city, where more than a million inhabitants now live, there were then only 190 thousand people. According to far from complete data, the Nazis destroyed over 60 thousand Kharkovites in concentration camps, more than 150 thousand were taken to Germany. August 23 was the day of the liberation of Kharkov.

Before reporting to I.V. Stalin about the state of affairs at the front and about the liberation of Kharkov, as usual, I called Poskrebyshev. He replied:

Comrade Stalin is resting. I won't bother him. Then I decided to call myself. The first calls were not answered. I demanded from the telephone operator:

- Call again. I am responsible for the consequences.

- I'm listening...

- I report, Comrade Stalin, the troops of the Steppe Front today liberated the city of Kharkov.

Stalin did not hesitate to answer:

- Congratulations. We will salute in the first category.

It is worth noting that when working at night, Stalin usually rested at this time. I knew about this, but nevertheless the capture of Kharkov was such an important event that I could not but report to him personally about the completion of the Kharkov operation.

In the evening, Moscow again saluted the soldiers of the Steppe Front, this time for the liberation of Kharkov, with 20 salvos from 224 guns.

On August 23, 1943, an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was announced in all units and formations, which stated that in the battles for Kharkov, all soldiers, officers and generals showed their courage, heroism, courage and ability to beat the hated enemy. Gratitude was declared to all personnel of the front. 10 divisions of the Steppe Front - 89th Guards Belgorod Rifle, 252nd, 84th, 299th, 116th, 375th, 183rd Rifle, 15th, 28th, 93rd Guards Rifle - were awarded the high honor of being called "Kharkiv". A number of units, as well as a large number of generals, officers, sergeants and Red Army soldiers received government awards.

The rally of soldiers and workers held on August 30 at the monument to T.G. Shevchenko. As we expected, the enemy aircraft went on a rampage that day.

Going, apparently, to take revenge on us for the fact that we defeated him during the capture of Kharkov, the enemy decided to destroy Kharkov from the air. But not a single enemy aircraft managed to break through the fire of our anti-aircraft gunners and bypass the dense cover of the city from the air by the forces of the 5th Air Army. While giving the order to cover the city with aviation during the demonstration, I told the commander of the 5th Air Army that a reliable "protective umbrella" should be created.

All the surviving residents of the city took to the streets. Kharkov rejoiced. Kharkovites rejoiced at the complete and final liberation from the Nazi invaders. Stormy applause and joyful exclamations greeted the square with the appearance on the podium of representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the government, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, the command of the front and delegations of the party and Soviet organizations of Kharkov, the intelligentsia, workers and peasants. The rally was opened by the secretary of the Kharkov city committee of the Communist Party (b) U Churaev. The first word was given to me. In my speech, I noted that in fierce battles, the soldiers of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the armies of the Voronezh Front, defeated the best German tank divisions and liberated Belgorod, and then the second capital of Ukraine, Kharkov.

The Battle of Kursk was the "swan song" of the German tank forces, since the huge losses they suffered in this battle in tanks and personnel excluded the possibility of restoring their former combat power. Further, I conveyed battle greetings from the fighters, officers and generals of the front to all the participants in the rally and congratulated the Kharkovites on their liberation from fascist captivity.

Then the commander of the 89th Guards Belgorod-Kharkov Rifle Division, General M.P. Seryugin, Professor A.V. Tereshchenko, engineer of the "Sickle and Hammer" plant Borziy and others. In conclusion, a greeting was read on behalf of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The square was packed with people. White handkerchiefs kept flashing in the crowd - people were crying for joy.

Remembering these events, I feel a great sense of pride for our Soviet soldiers, for the entire Soviet people, who showed patriotism, courage and heroism unprecedented in history in the fight against the Nazi invaders.

What conclusions can be drawn from what has been said in this chapter? First of all, it should be noted that here, and in subsequent chapters, I will not be able to talk about the great events in detail, I am not able to mention all, even the most distinguished commanders of formations and units, it is not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of the actions of infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen, pilots , signalers, engineers, etc., although they all deserve it. Therefore, it is difficult to elaborate on all issues in the conclusions.

As follows from what has been said, the victory in the battle for Kharkov was not easy for us. The troops of the front were advancing against a powerful enemy tank grouping that had not yet dispersed, which was striking on the southern face of the Kursk salient. I would like to at least briefly talk about the combat prowess of all branches of the armed forces who have shown genuine heroism in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy. Our infantry, the queen of the fields, having undergone organizational qualitative changes even before the war (it had many of its own automatic weapons, its own artillery and mortars), assumed the brunt of military labor.

The very name "infantry" changed, it was renamed "rifle troops", whose role in the battle as the most massive branch of the military was enormous. Rifle battalions and regiments, under the thunder of artillery, together with tanks, with the support of aviation, set the tone for the attack. Advancing, they completed the battle and, together with tanks, artillery and sappers, consolidated the conquered positions.

The Soviet people always lovingly pay tribute to the courage and heroism of the soldiers of the rifle troops. Who now does not know the names of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - Alexander Matrosov, Yuri Smirnov, Meliton Kantaria, Mikhail Yegorov and many, many other soldiers of the rifle troops who glorified our Motherland with their exploits!

Our gunners, representatives of the fire and strike force, steadfastly held back the onslaught of the enemy on the defensive and provided excellent offensive operations.

The Soviet tankers also convincingly proved their moral and combat superiority over the enemy. The technical superiority of our T-34 tank was clearly manifested on the battlefield. The tactical training of tank crews turned out to be much higher as well. Soviet tank troops under the command of generals P.S. Rybalko, P.A. Rotmistrova, S.I. Bogdanova, M.E. Katukov and V.M. Badanov fought skillfully and bravely at all stages of the struggle, and were a powerful shock and maneuver force of the ground forces.

Experience has confirmed that the created tank armies of the new organization have fully justified themselves as operational formations capable of conducting combat operations in operational depth and in isolation from rifle formations.

Our pilots, commanded by Generals S.A., played an important role in this operation. Krasovsky, S.I. Rudenko, V.A. Sudets, S.K. Goryunov, M.M. Gromov, T.T. Khryukin and N.F. Naumenko.

The command and staffs played a significant role in the successful conduct of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. A great merit belongs to the entire staff of the front headquarters, which was skillfully led by General M.V. Zakharov.

The military councils of the armies, commanders, army headquarters were at the height of the situation. In the battle for Kharkov, especially responsible tasks fell to the lot of the 53rd Army. Its commander is a strong-willed, experienced and brave General I.M. Managarov during combat operations, in order to always see the battlefield, was no further than 2-3 kilometers from the line of battle formations. Moreover, the general often risked his life (for which he often received remarks from senior commanders), was wounded several times, but continued to lead the troops by the same methods.

The Military Council of the 53rd Army stood out for its efficiency and organization, where General P.I. Gorokhov (I knew him when I was a regiment commander), as well as the army headquarters, headed by General K.N. Derevianko.

The troops of the 7th and 5th Guards Armies were skillfully led by generals heroes of Stalingrad M.S. Shumilov and A.S. Zhadov. Perseverance and perseverance in achieving the goal was repeatedly shown by the commander of the 57th Army, General N.A. Hagen and commander of the 69th Army V.D. Kryuchenko.

Now it is difficult to name all the commanders and political workers of formations and units of the front who made a worthy contribution to our victory, but their military deeds did not go unnoticed. The motherland has repeatedly noted the merits of generals, officers, sergeants and ordinary soldiers of the Steppe Front with government awards.

With the defeat of the enemy grouping in the area of ​​Belgorod and Kharkov and the liquidation of his Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead, the counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk ended victoriously.

During the offensive battles, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the assistance of the troops of the Southwestern Front, inflicted a crushing defeat on the strike group advancing on Kursk from the south, and defeated 15 enemy divisions. Already in the second half of July, the counter-offensive of our troops developed into a general offensive of the Red Army and led to the collapse of the Nazi front from Velikie Luki to the Sea of ​​Azov.

The Battle of Kursk and subsequent offensives were among the most important and decisive events of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. In this battle, the Hitlerite offensive strategy suffered a complete collapse and the inability of the German defense to resist our offensive, which was successfully carried out on a large scale for the first time in summer conditions, was revealed. After the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Armed Forces firmly retained the strategic initiative until the end of the war.

The battle was a major contribution to the development of Soviet military art and military science. In this regard, I would like to once again clarify some of the considerations expressed above regarding the concept of the operation and the use of strategic reserves.

As already mentioned, in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to switch to deliberate defense. A correct assessment of the situation and foresight of events made it possible to draw the correct conclusion that the main events would unfold in the Kursk region. That is why the Headquarters planned to bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then choose the moment and go on a counteroffensive with the aim of finally defeating the strike groups of the Nazi troops.

The course of events confirmed the correctness of this decision. As a result of the defensive battle, the enemy was exhausted, drained of blood, and committed all his reserves to the battle. At this critical moment for the enemy, our troops launched a counteroffensive and finally defeated him in two strategic operations - Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov. The decisive defeat of the enemy was achieved not in a defensive battle, but in offensive operations. Here we had an outstanding example of the creative approach of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, and the command of the fronts in determining strategic tasks for the summer of 1943.

The experience of the Battle of Kursk, as well as a number of other operations, teaches that in order to achieve a major strategic success, it is necessary to have large reserves, which were in this case the troops of the Steppe Front.

The course of the Battle of Kursk showed that thanks to the introduction of strategic reserves, it was possible to create the necessary superiority in forces over the enemy, favorable conditions for maneuver, to disrupt the enemy’s offensive in a short time, and then go on to a decisive counteroffensive.

Of course, it would be ideal to preserve the Steppe Front and, if necessary, strike with all its forces. But the situation developed in such a way that the Headquarters demanded that the enemy's blows in the Prokhorovka direction be parried immediately with the nearest reserves. And the Steppe Front was next to the fighting Voronezh Front. That is why, at first, at the direction of the Stavka, two tank corps were taken from the Steppe Front, then two armies, and after some time, two more armies. In general, the experience of using strategic reserves in the Battle of Kursk is very instructive and has not lost its significance in modern conditions.

True, the nature and quality of strategic reserves have now somewhat changed, but the question of creating them and the timeliness of their deployment in the direction of the main attack remains one of the main issues in the art of war.

In the organization and conduct of the defense near Kursk, the main essence of defense in the understanding of Soviet military art, which considers it as a type of military operations used to bleed the enemy and create favorable conditions for a counteroffensive, was exceptionally clearly manifested.

It must be recalled once again that the defense near Kursk was deliberate, and this left its mark on its entire character. It is known, for example, that our troops near Kursk were very saturated with artillery, the positions were well equipped, and battle formations were in deep echelon. The defense near Kursk was not only more stable, but also more active than near Moscow and Stalingrad. This was expressed primarily in the conduct of powerful artillery and aviation counter-preparation, in the timely occupation of the lanes prepared for defense, in a wide maneuver of forces and means, and in the conduct of counterattacks against enemy troops. The deep, multi-lane defense near Kursk was built primarily as an anti-tank one. It was distinguished by great stability, which was achieved by the correct location of anti-tank strongholds and areas, close fire interaction between them, the widespread use of engineering barriers, minefields linked to the anti-tank fire system, and maneuvering of anti-tank artillery reserves. But the victory in this battle was won by the offensive.

In the Battle of Kursk, the very important problem of organizing a breakthrough of the enemy's well-prepared and deeply echeloned defenses in the Bryansk and Kharkov directions was successfully solved.

The breakthrough of the enemy's defense was carried out on relatively narrow sectors of the front, on which forces and means were boldly massed, which ensured numerical and material superiority over the enemy troops. It is enough, for example, to note that the commander of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, General I.Kh. Bagramyan concentrated 92% of the rifle divisions and all reinforcements in the breakthrough sector, which accounted for about 40 percent of the army's total offensive front. The main forces in the direction of the main attack were also concentrated in the troops of the 5th Guards and 53rd armies. Here, the operational density was 1.5 kilometers per division, up to 230 guns and mortars and up to 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front.

Such a massing of forces and means, combined with good preparation for the offensive, ensured the successful breaking of the enemy's long-term defenses.

Breakthrough is an art, not just the result of arithmetic calculations. From the experience of the war, we know many examples of how difficult it was sometimes to achieve a breakthrough. As a rule, the main content of an operational breakthrough was the defeat of the main enemy forces in the tactical zone and the creation of conditions for the introduction of mobile forces into the breakthrough - tank armies or second echelons of the front (army).

To develop success in the operational depth in the Battle of Kursk, for the first time, tank armies were introduced into the breakthrough, which made up the mobile front group. Of particular interest is the use of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Operating side by side, after breaking through the tactical defense zone, they launched a swift offensive and advanced up to 120-150 kilometers. The 1st Panzer Army, advancing in the Bogodukhov direction, traveled 20-30 kilometers a day in isolation from the combined arms armies, struck at the operational reserves, on the flanks and rear of the Nazi troops, forcing them to leave their defensive positions and retreat.

It should be noted that there were 1380 armored units in the Steppe Front. And in total, the three fronts in the Battle of Kursk included 4980 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, which accounted for approximately 50 percent of the armored units of the entire active army. This indicates that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command provided for the massive use of armored and mechanized troops in the main strategic direction. The result of this far-sighted planning is well known.

Near Kursk, an unprecedented oncoming tank battle unfolded, the largest in the history of the Second World War. In the area of ​​​​Prokhorovka, and then in the areas of Akhtyrka and Bogodukhov, there was a truly tank battle. The experience of these battles is very valuable. He showed that the success of the battle of tank armies depends on their interaction with the combined arms armies, on the correct organization of artillery and air support, on the rapid concentration of forces in the main direction, on the swiftness of the attack and the continuity of control.

A lot of value for the development of the theory of military art was given by the experience of using the air force in the Battle of Kursk. Our aviation has won complete air supremacy. In the counteroffensive, an air offensive was carried out in full and to great depths. The fight against the enemy's reserves was carried out effectively. Aviation, both in defense and counteroffensive, was used massively, in close cooperation of several air armies with the country's air defense aviation.

Huge work during the Battle of Kursk was carried out by the rear of the Red Army, which provided the troops with all types of weapons and military equipment, ammunition and fuel, food and equipment.

A kind word must be said about our glorious doctors, who gave all their strength to timely evacuate the soldiers and commanders wounded on the battlefield to the rear, save the lives of Soviet soldiers and return them to service.

Speaking about the development of tactics in the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize that the organization and conduct of combined arms combat is a very complex form of military art. The commanders and staffs organizing combined-arms combat require careful preparation of the offensive, organization of interaction and control, for success can be achieved only through the combined efforts of all branches of the armed forces.

The actions of soldiers, subunits, units, formations and associations near Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, Belgorod were carefully studied, comprehensively reflected in military literature, not only in the interests of history, but also because the experience of the Battle of Kursk has not lost its significance in our days. .

Many general principles in the activities of the command, staffs and troops are of considerable interest even now, especially in the theoretical development of a nuclear-free period of war.

The historic victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Battle of Kursk was of great international significance.

The freedom-loving peoples of the whole world saw for themselves that, despite the absence of a second front in Europe, the military plans of fascist Germany were failing.

The strategic importance of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was also exceptionally great. “If the battle of Stalingrad,” said I. V. Stalin, “foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk put it in front of a catastrophe.”

In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces won not only a military, but also a major moral and political victory.

In all its grandeur, this battle showed the high morale and fighting qualities of the Soviet people, their selfless patriotism.

Selfless service to the Motherland, the ability to overcome difficult trials, readiness for heroic deeds have become the norm of behavior, the character trait of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

The population and local party organizations actively participated in the fight against the hated enemy. In the midst of the battle, the partisans launched a "rail war". By mid-August, the partisans of Belarus, Ukraine, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk and Smolensk regions intensified their operations, which was of great help to the advancing fronts.

Over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers - participants in the Battle of Kursk, Kharkov and Belgorod battles were awarded orders and medals, many of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The authority of the Soviet Union as the decisive force in the struggle against fascist Germany increased even more. The victory near Kursk strengthened the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for an early liberation, and intensified the struggle of the anti-fascist resistance forces.

The Battle of Kursk marked a major stage in the development of Soviet military art. It will remain for centuries not only as a symbol of the invincible power of the socialist state, born of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and its Armed Forces, but also as an outstanding example of the achievements of advanced Soviet military science.

By July 23, 1943, the Soviet troops had basically restored the position that they had occupied before the start of the Kursk defensive operation, and began preparing an offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. They were opposed by the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf task force (since 16.0S.1943 - the 8th field army). They were supported by the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). German troops numbered up to 300 thousand people, over 3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 600 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1 thousand aircraft. The enemy occupied a defense well prepared in terms of engineering, which included seven defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km. The desire of the enemy command to keep the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was explained by the fact that it covered the Donbass grouping from the north and was considered by the Nazi strategists as a gate blocking the exit to Ukraine.

Despite the fact that the plan for an offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction was developed even before the start of the Battle of Kursk, with the completion of the defensive battle, the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were unable to proceed to its implementation without an operational pause. They suffered heavy losses, spent and a significant part of the reserves and materiel. In this regard, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the front commanders time to prepare the troops for the offensive.

The idea of ​​the operation was to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Belgorod and , developing success with mobile formations on Bogodukhov, Vatki, Novaya Vodolaga, cut the enemy grouping into parts, followed by envelopment and defeat of all the main forces in the Kharkov region. An auxiliary strike around Kharkov from the south was delivered by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front. To ensure the actions of the main grouping from the west, the Voronezh Front advanced on Akhtyrka with part of its forces.

The preparation of the offensive took place in an extremely limited time frame (10 days), which required great skill and strenuous efforts from the command and troops. It was completed in early August. By this time, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts included over 1.1 million people, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars, 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.3 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops had superiority over the enemy in people by 3.3 times, artillery and tanks - by 4 times and aviation (taking into account 200 long-range aviation aircraft, part of the forces of the 17th Air Army of the South-Western Front and air defense aviation) - in 1 .5 times. On the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, thanks to the skillful massing of forces and means, this superiority was even higher. For the development of tactical success into an operational one, two tank armies were used at once as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front for the first time in the war. On the night of August 3, secretly from the enemy, Soviet troops took up their starting position for the offensive. The coordination of the actions of both fronts was carried out by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. The Soviet command manages to misinform the enemy, divert his attention to the Sumy direction and thereby ensure the surprise of the strike on the main (Belgorod) direction. The success of the operation was largely facilitated by the "Rail War" being carried out by the partisans at that time. The successful offensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions, according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was to develop into a general offensive of the Red Army on the entire Soviet-German front.

The offensive on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction began early in the morning on August 3 after powerful artillery and aviation preparation. In the direction of the main attack, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army (Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov), seven rifle divisions, an artillery breakthrough division, a guards mortar division (“Katyusha”), 14 artillery and mortar regiments, a tank brigade, five tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The average density of tanks was 87 units per 1 km of the front, and in a breakthrough section 6 km wide, there were an average of 230 guns and mortars, 178 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer. Even higher densities of forces and means were created in the offensive zone of the 57th Army (Lieutenant General NA. Hagen) - over 300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. By 13:00, formations of the 5th Guards Army broke through the first enemy position, advancing to a depth of 4-5 km. The second echelons of the regiments entered into battle began to break through the second position of the main strip. By 2 p.m., in order to increase the rate of penetration of the defense, the commander of the Voronezh Front brought forward brigades of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies into battle. Together with the rifle divisions, they completed the breakthrough of the first line of defense, which created the conditions for bringing the main forces of the tank armies into battle. By the end of the day, in cooperation with rifle formations, they broke the fierce resistance of the enemy, completed the breakthrough of his tactical defense zone and advanced to a depth of 30 km. On August 4, fierce fighting continued throughout the entire offensive zone of the Soviet troops. Operating in the same operational direction, two tank armies were, as it were, a kind of armored sword, cutting through the enemy's defenses to its entire depth. The massive use of tanks on a narrow sector of the front had a decisive influence on increasing the pace of the operation. Having broken through the tactical defenses and defeated the nearest operational reserves of the enemy, the strike groupings of the fronts proceeded to pursue him. The pace of their offensive gradually increased. The aviation of the 2nd (lieutenant general of aviation S.A. Krasovsky) and the 5th (lieutenant general of aviation S.K. Goryunov) air armies provided great assistance to the ground forces.

By the morning of August 5, the troops of the Steppe Front reached Belgorod and started fighting for the city. Formations of the 69th Army (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchyonkin) advanced on the city from the north, and the 7th Guards Army (Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov) attacked the city from the east. The 1st Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General M.D. Solomatin) bypassed Belgorod from the west. But, despite the threat of encirclement, the enemy will continue to hold the city. Fierce street fighting ended in the evening with the defeat of the German garrison and the liberation of Belgorod. In the battles for this ancient Russian city, the 89th Guards (Colonel M.P. Seryugin) and the 305th (Colonel A.F. Vasiliev) rifle divisions and the 23rd Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment (Major G.A. Shamraev) especially distinguished themselves. awarded the honorary title of Belgorod. In honor of the liberation of Belgorod and Orel, which the troops of the Bryansk Front captured on the same day, on the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, which then became a traditional commemoration of the major victories of the Red Army.

On August 5, the 27th (Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko) and 40th (Lieutenant General K.S. Moskalenko) armies of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive. The fascist German command, having discovered their miscalculation, began to hastily transfer formations from the Donbass and from the Oryol direction to the Kharkov region in order to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. In turn, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command attracted aircraft from the Voronezh, Steppe, South-Western, Southern fronts and long-range aviation formations to strike at suitable enemy reserves. At the same time, she reassigned the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Voronezh Front to the Steppe Front.

Soviet troops continued to develop the offensive. By the middle of the day on August 6, the 1st Tank Army (Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov) advanced to a depth of 50-55 km. and the 5th Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov) eliminated a strong enemy resistance center in the Tomarovka area and rushed to Zolochev. It was already well past midnight when the combat vehicles of the 181st tank brigade of the 18th tank corps (Colonel A.V. Egorov) reached the outskirts of the city with their headlights off. Brigade commander lieutenant colonel V.A. Bubble will decide to attack the city on the move, using the element of surprise.

The engines roared - and Soviet tanks broke into Zolochev. Awakened by the shooting, the roar of engines and the rattle of caterpillars, the half-dressed Nazis jumped out of their houses in a panic and fell directly under the fire of tank guns and machine guns. Moving along the streets), the tanks shot and crushed the equipment standing on the side of the road; trucks and staff vehicles, tractors, artillery pieces, field kitchens, etc. Captain Ya.P. Vergun and senior lieutenant E.V. especially distinguished themselves in this night battle. Shkurdalov. Both of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But with the dawn, the resistance of the enemy increased sharply. Having understood the situation, the enemy moved on to active operations. The position of the brigade became much more difficult. But at this critical moment, the main forces of the corps came to the rescue. By evening, Zolochev was completely liberated from the enemy, and the remnants of his garrison were thrown back to the southwest.

The 29th Tank Corps (Major General I.F. Kirichenko) of the 5th Guards Tank Army at that time was developing an offensive in the direction of the settlement of Kazachya Lopan. Enemy resistance here was also quickly broken.

On August 7, Soviet tankmen liberated the city of Bogodukhov, breaking through the enemy defenses to its entire operational depth. The breakthrough front reached 120 km, and the depth -80-100 km. The Belgorod-Kharkov group of Nazi troops was, in essence, divided into two parts. Soviet aviation in a tense struggle won air supremacy. Only in the period from 3 to 8 August, she destroyed about 400 German aircraft. By August 2, the Voronezh Front left the right wing to Akhtyrka, and cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway with the left. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov.

The Soviet command intended to capture Kharkov by delivering a concentric attack simultaneously from several directions. Four combined-arms and one tank armies advanced on the city. The Voronezh Front, with the forces of three armies, advanced on Akhtyrka, and part of the forces on Merefa, bypassing Kharkov from the west. To fulfill the tasks of the second stage of the operation "Commander Rumyantsev", he was reinforced by the reserves of the Headquarters - the 4th Guards and 47th combined arms armies. The Southwestern Front (General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky) dealt the main blow to Stalin (Donetsk), and part of the forces - to Merefa, towards the troops of the Voronezh Front. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command also included the Southern Front (Colonel-General F.I. Tolbukhin), advancing from the area south of Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) in the general direction to Stalino, towards the troops of the Southwestern Front, to the operation. After the liberation of Kharkov, all fronts of the southwestern direction were to launch an offensive in the Left-Bank Ukraine - to the Dnieper.

In order to prevent the encirclement of the Kharkov grouping, the command of Army Group South, a few days before, began urgently concentrating south of Bogodukhov a strong counter-strike group, the basis of which was the 3rd Panzer Corps (up to 400 tanks and assault guns). Although our aircraft inflicted significant damage on the advancing enemy reserves, slowing down their concentration, they were unable to disrupt the regrouping.

On August 11, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps counterattacked the 1st Panzer Army and the left flat of the 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov).

In the area south of Bogodukhov, a counter battle unfolded, which was of an exceptionally tense and stubborn character. The enemy sought to cut off the 1st Panzer Army, which had pulled ahead, from the main forces of the front and defeat it. Using an almost triple superiority in tanks and strong air support, the Germans managed to push our tank formations 20 km to the north and recapture the section of the Kharkov-Poltava railway that they had cut. But to break through to the God-spirit; and even more so, the enemy failed to surround and defeat the tank army.

On August 13, the main forces of the left wing of the Voronezh Front entered the battle - the 5th and 6th Guards Armies, as well as the 5th Guards Tank Army turned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Kharkov direction. The main forces of front-line aviation were redirected to support them. After fierce fighting, the enemy's counterattack in the Bogodukhov area was repelled by the end of August 17. Having suffered heavy losses, the select units of the Wehrmacht are the motorized divisions of the SS "Reich". "Viking" and "Dead Head" - were forced to stop attacks and go on the defensive.

But the German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, the 48th Tank Corps (four tank, two motorized divisions and two separate battalions of heavy Tiger tanks) launched a counterattack in the Akhtyrka area. The enemy managed to break through the front of the 27th Army and advance in the direction of Bogodukhov to a depth of about 25 km. To repel this counterattack, the Soviet command advanced the 4th Guards Army (Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik), the 3rd, 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the main forces of the 1st Tank Army transferred from under Bogodukhov . By August 20, the enemy offensive was stopped by a powerful counterattack by the Soviet troops. As a result of the oncoming battle that unfolded east of the city of Akhtyrka, the enemy strike force suffered heavy losses and was forced to go on the defensive. Meanwhile, the armies of the right wing of the Voronezh Front - the 38th (Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov), the 47th (Lieutenant General P.P. Korzun) and the 40th, which continued to successfully develop the offensive in the western direction, deeply covered from the north, the Akhtyrskaya enemy grouping and created a threat to its rear. In the stubborn battles that unfolded on August 22-25, the strike force of the Nazi troops in the Akhtyrka region was defeated, the formations of the Voronezh Front again captured this city. Thus, the attempts of the command of the Army Group "South" to stabilize the front line, by delivering strong counterattacks to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops and remove the threat to the Kharkov industrial region, failed.

While the armies of the Voronezh Front were repulsing the onslaught of German tank divisions near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, the troops of the Steppe Front were fighting a stubborn battle for Kharkov. The enemy resisted fiercely. fulfilling Hitler's order not to surrender the city in any case. The intensity of the struggle grew with each passing day.

On August 13, the troops of the Steppe Front broke through the outer, located 8-14 km from Kharkov, and four days later the inner defensive contours. Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, repelling his continuous counterattacks, the Soviet soldiers stubbornly made their way to the city center. Troops of the 53rd (Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov). 7th Guards. The 69th and 57th armies captured Kharkov from three sides and squeezed the ring more and more. Finally, the enemy became convinced of the hopelessness of the situation and the withdrawal of the garrison troops began. In the afternoon of August 22, our ground and air reconnaissance discovered the beginning of the withdrawal of enemy troops from Kharkov. In order to prevent them from getting away from the blow, the front commander I.S. Konev in the evening of the same day gave the troops an order for a night assault on the city. Fierce street fighting went on all night in the city, ending by noon on August 23 with the liberation of Kharkov. In the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of the largest political and economic center in the south of our country with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns. The ten most distinguished formations in the battles for Kharkov were given the honorary name of Kharkov, several units and formations were awarded orders.

During the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group South and pushed it back in a south-westerly direction for 140 km. At the final stage of the operation, the width of the offensive front of the Soviet troops reached 300 km. Conditions were created for the liberation of the entire Left-bank Ukraine and access to the Dnieper.

The Belgorod-Kharkov operation is characterized by the preparation of troops for an offensive during a defensive battle in the shortest possible time with the successful implementation of operational camouflage measures. The experience of organizing operational interaction between the fronts, partisans and aviation was further developed. The operation is instructive by the massive use of aviation, which managed to gain air supremacy in the southern strategic direction. On the Voronezh Front, for the first time during the war, a second echelon consisting of two armies was created, as well as a mobile group consisting of two tank armies. Panzer armies of a uniform composition (including only tank and mechanized formations) were successfully used both in the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and in operations in operational depth. Further development was the massive use of artillery.

But the fight against an experienced and strong enemy, who was fluent in the most advanced methods of warfare, was far from an easy task. The victory over him required enormous efforts and considerable sacrifices, for the enemy also fought to the last opportunity, even when his position was hopeless. It was this that explained the exceptional tension and bitterness of the struggle that unfolded at the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. Soviet troops in Belgorod with the co-Kharkov operation lost about 256 thousand people (including over 71 thousand people - irretrievably), more than 400 guns and mortars, about 1.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 150 aircraft.

The losses of the enemy were also great. In the battles near Belgorod, Bogodukhov, Akhtyrka and Kharkov, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 divisions, including four tank divisions. As a result of the defeat in the Battle of Kursk, the German troops were forced to switch to strategic and defensive positions along the entire Eastern Front.

The victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk marked a turning point in the course of the war. Germany was dealt a blow of such force from which she could no longer recover.

The German Wehrmacht not only lost the strategic initiative, but also lost the opportunity to conduct active offensive operations on the Soviet-German front. From that moment on, all the efforts of the German command were concentrated on the defense.

This victory contributed to the rise of the international prestige of the Soviet Union in the West and the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition.

From now on, no one had any doubts about the outcome of the war.

On August 3, 1943, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation began (Operation Rumyantsev). The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the aim of defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the German army, liberating the Kharkov industrial region, creating prerequisites for the final liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine from the invaders. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, as well as the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, took part in the operation: more than 980 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand. aircraft. In total, by the beginning of the offensive on August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments.

From the side of the Wehrmacht, the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf Army Group and the 4th Air Fleet participated in the battle: about 300 thousand people, more than 3 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and over 1 thousand aircraft (according to Soviet data); 200 thousand people and 210 tanks (according to German data). The Wehrmacht had 15 infantry divisions in this direction and 4 tank divisions in the operational reserve (6th, 7th, 11th and 19th). Already during the battle, the German command transferred from the Donbass and the Oryol direction, the SS Panzer Division "Viking" and the 17th Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Totenkopf" and the 3rd Panzer Division. The Kharkov group was also reinforced with three infantry divisions.

It is officially believed that the beginning of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, the German command, fearing that the troops in the Prokhorovka area would fall victim to the flank attacks of the Red Army, ordered to begin retreating to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. The offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts, which began on July 12, and on July 15 of the Central Front on the Oryol Bulge, also played its role. The troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on July 16. On July 17, units of the 5th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were able to push the German rearguards and advance 5-6 kilometers. On July 18–19, the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army joined the offensive. Tank formations advanced 2–3 km.

On July 18, the Steppe Front under the command of Ivan Konev was also supposed to enter the battle, but until the end of July 19 he was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the Steppe Front managed to advance 5–7 km. On July 22, units of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having knocked down German barriers, they generally reached the positions occupied by Soviet troops before the start of Operation Citadel on July 5. However, the further advance of the Soviet troops was stopped by the German forces, which relied on the former defensive lines and received reinforcements. The headquarters offered to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it was necessary to regroup the forces and replenish the units with personnel and equipment. Having listened to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command postponed the further offensive until early August.

Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) are pursuing a retreating enemy (Photo by RGAKFD).

Plans of the Soviet command, preparation of the operation

The plan of the offensive operation was prepared by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front on the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The operation was named "Commander Rumyantsev", in honor of the great Russian commander of the 18th century, the winner of the Prussian troops Frederick the Great and the Turkish troops at Larga, Cahul. The first version of the operation provided for the encirclement of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping. The commander of the Voronezh Front, Nikolai Vatutin, wanted to conduct a classic version of the encirclement and destruction of enemy troops with converging strikes (“cannes”). They planned to inflict one strike in the Krasnopolye area, the other in the Chuguev area. One strike force was supposed to bypass Kharkov from the south, advancing to the west. The second grouping was to advance from north to south, bypassing Kharkov from the west. If the operation had been successful, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, that is, almost the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht, would fall into the "boiler". The second scenario was less ambitious and ambitious. It was proposed to deliver the main strikes from the Proletarsky - Krasnaya Yaruga and Chuguev area. If the operation was successful, the entire Kempf group and most of the 4th Panzer Army were to be surrounded.

However, in order to implement both variants of the offensive operation, it was necessary to concentrate large strike groups on the flanks, which would break the enemy’s defensive formations and break through to a depth of 250 km. To create them, it was necessary to carry out a series of regroupings of forces, which took a lot of time. In addition, the possibility of detecting these regroupings by German intelligence increased. Such a development of events did not suit the bet. Stalin gave about 8 days for the replenishment of units, the supply of ammunition and rest. The current situation required a strike as soon as possible. Soviet intelligence reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the Belgorod-Kharkov group at that time was seriously weakened. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was transferred to the Donbass, and the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" - to the Oryol direction. This was caused by the offensive of the Southern and South-Western Fronts in the Donbass and the Western and Bryansk Fronts in the Oryol Bulge. However, both offensives of the Soviet troops were already running out of steam, and it was necessary to hurry, while the German selected divisions were tied up in battles in the Donbass and in the Orel region. In addition, after Operation Citadel, a significant number of German tanks and assault guns were under repair. There was a replenishment of equipment of armored units. So in the Army Group South on July 31, 1942, there were 625 combat-ready tanks, 633 were under repair, 190 were on the way, 251 combat-ready assault guns, 84 were under repair, 11 were on the road. Most of the equipment needed short-term repairs lasting 6 to 21 days. If the preparation of Operation Rumyantsev had dragged on for a longer period, the Army Group South would have seriously strengthened its anti-tank potential.

The blow had to be delivered as quickly as possible, until the German troops recovered from Operation Citadel. Based on the instructions of the Headquarters, an offensive plan was developed. The main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, bypassing Kharkov from the west. This plan gave a significant gain in time, since it was not necessary to regroup forces. On the left flank of the Voronezh Front and the right flank of the Steppe Fronts, during the previous battles, there were already established strike groups. In addition, they planned to attack along the rivers, which weakened their defensive potential. After the shock groups of the two fronts entered the area west of Kharkov, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was supposed to launch an offensive towards them. As a result, the idea of ​​encircling German troops was retained. But the encircled territory was smaller, and the strike force of the Voronezh Front was stronger than that of the Steppe Front. The offensive plan included very high rates of movement of strike groups. In 3-4 days they had to advance 100-120 km. Such a swift throw was supposed to lead to the defeat of the Belgorod-Kharkov group before the arrival of German reserves. From the air, the Voronezh Front was supported by the 2nd Air Army (753 aircraft), the Steppe Front - by the 5th Air Army (769 aircraft).

For such an offensive, fresh forces were needed. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts withstood the German offensive, but suffered serious losses. However, the Headquarters had reserves. Even during the preparation of the defensive operation on the Kursk Salient, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed very powerful reserves in case of a negative development of the situation. Even if the German armies had been able to cut off the Kursk salient, surrounding the significant forces of the Voronezh and Central fronts, the disaster would not have happened. The Soviet command had a whole new front that could close the gap. Partial reserve armies had to be used during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle.

But most of the reserves were kept. They were used during Operation Rumyantsev. The steppe front was reinforced by the 53rd army under the command of Ivan Managarov. The Voronezh Front received the 27th Army under the command of Sergei Trofimenko and the 47th Army of Pyotr Kozlov (from August 3, the army was headed by Pavel Korzun). The 4th Guards Army of Grigory Kulik remained in reserve, they planned to use it to develop success or parry enemy attacks. In addition, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, which suffered significant losses in defensive battles, received reinforcements.

Konev put Managarov's 53rd army at the forefront of the front, it was supposed to deliver the main blow. Vatutin did not transfer fresh armies to the strike force, there were already serious forces there - the 5th and 6th guards armies, the 1st tank army and the 5th guards tank army. Therefore, the 27th Army was to advance together with the 40th Army, to the west of the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. Their strike was aimed at the southeast, in the Grayvorona area. The 47th reinforced the 38th Army on the western flank of the front.

In addition, the auxiliary strike force from the 40th and 27th armies solved the problem of possible German counterattacks against the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. If German troops tried to strike at the base of the Soviet strike force, then the 40th and 27th armies would have to take the hit. If the German reserves attacked the Soviet tank armies advancing in the vicinity of Kharkov, they would, in turn, be under attack by the 40th and 27th armies leading the offensive. To parry possible German attacks, these two armies received three tank corps (more than 400 tanks). Thus, the armored potential of the 40th and 27th armies was comparable to an entire tank army (the 1st tank army had 450 tanks). In addition, the 4th Guards Army was located in their rear.

Before the offensive, the Voronezh Front carried out an operation to mislead the enemy in relation to the area where the Soviet troops would strike the main blow. To the west of the assembled strike force, in the area of ​​Sudzha, they simulated the concentration of large armored and rifle formations. For camouflage, 8 radio stations, 450 tank models and 500 gun models were used. Radio stations imitated the work of radio tank formations. The infantry moved towards the front. These activities have been successful. The German command concentrated the 7th Panzer Division to protect this direction. The activity of German aviation in the Sudzha region also intensified, which began to bombard the "clusters" of Soviet troops.

German defense

The Belgorod-Kharkov group consisted of 15 infantry and 4 tank divisions. The German infantry divisions suffered serious losses in Operation Citadel and had not yet had time to fully restore their combat potential. The German panzer divisions received reinforcements and, having repaired the damaged tanks, were in good condition.

After the withdrawal of troops to their original positions, the Germans went on the defensive in well-fortified positions. The main line of defense was 6-8 km wide and consisted of two positions, which had strong points connected by trenches and communications. The second defensive line was located 2-3 km from the front line, having various engineering, defensive structures and long-term firing points. The total tactical defense zone of the German troops was 15-18 km. All settlements in the defensive zone were prepared for all-round defense. The powerful strongholds - Tomarovka and Borisovka - were of particular importance. Belgorod was a powerful center of defense. At 50-60 km from the front line of defense, through Bogodukhov, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan, Zhuravlevka and Vesyoloye, an operational rear defensive line passed. Near Kharkov, the Wehrmacht created two ring defensive lines.

Belgorod was turned into a powerful defense center. Many strongholds were built on its territory. Around the city, defending the near approaches to it, an external defensive bypass was created. On the outskirts of the city, a significant number of long-term firing points were built, stone buildings were turned into strongholds. The city was prepared for street fighting. Crossroads were blocked by barricades, they were shot through by machine guns. Many buildings and streets were mined. The northern and eastern parts of the city were covered with strong minefields.

Operation start. Liberation of Belgorod

On August 2, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts took up their starting positions for the offensive. For the headquarters of Army Group South, the Soviet offensive on this sector of the Eastern Front came as a surprise. The German command believed that the strike capabilities of the Soviet troops in this direction were depleted by Operation Citadel. The Germans did not expect the Soviet troops to go on the offensive so soon.

On August 3, from 05:00 to 05:05, a short artillery raid of all fire weapons of the fronts continued along the front line of the German defense. A pause was taken until 5.35, and then a full-fledged artillery preparation began, which lasted three hours. From 0755 to 0815 all barrels again fired powerfully at the German front line, at the same time the Soviet infantry, behind the fire shaft, began advancing towards the first German trench. By 8.15 the fire began to move deep into the German positions. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, Soviet aviation in groups of 20-30 aircraft bombed and fired at German positions with machine guns and cannons. Aviation also ironed the locations of German artillery and reserve forces.

At 0815, the Soviet infantry, supported by tanks, broke into the enemy's advanced trenches. At 13.00, when the rifle units of the 5th Guards Army wedged into the main enemy defensive zone for about 2 km, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle. Tank formations were supposed to complete the breakthrough of the German defense and enter the operational space. Tanks were introduced into the gap in a narrow 5-kilometer section, it was a grandiose accumulation of armored vehicles.

The troops of the Voronezh Front on the very first day broke through the German defenses to the entire tactical depth. The arrows of the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced 8-12 km. The 1st Panzer Army, which was forced to participate in the breakthrough of the second line of defense of the Wehrmacht, advanced 12 km and reached Tomarovka. The tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army achieved the greatest success, advancing to a depth of 20-25 km. The operation went well, but not as planned. Tankers advanced 20 km, and not 40 km as originally planned.

The offensive of the troops of the Steppe Front also developed quite successfully. The artillery of the front dealt a powerful blow to the German defensive positions. Initially, however, the German troops withstood the blow. Then significant masses of aviation were thrown into battle. Stormtroopers and bombers dealt heavy blows to the German centers of resistance. For the final breakthrough of the German positions at 15.00, the 1st mechanized corps was brought into battle. During the first day of fighting, units of the 53rd Army and the right flank of the 69th Army advanced 7-8 km.

Forcing the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943

On the second day of the operation, the first hitches began. The commander of the 6th Panzer Corps, Hetman, did not comply with Katukov's order - not getting involved in the battle for the well-fortified Tomarovka, bypass it and move on, inserting a barrier. In the morning, the hetman began the battle for the German stronghold, the corps lost 21 vehicles. Only the personal intervention of Katukov forced Hetman to continue the offensive in the afternoon, bypassing Tomarovka from the east. A motorized rifle brigade was left as a barrier. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, which was operationally subordinate to Katukov, also took part in the frontal attacks on Tomarovka. The corps lost 23 vehicles without success. As a result, two tank corps lost time, only Krivoshein's 3rd mechanized corps developed the offensive. The 31st Panzer Corps was in reserve.

On the same day, the situation in the air changed. Luftwaffe activity in the Belgorod region increased dramatically. German attack and bomber aircraft began to inflict heavy blows on Soviet mechanized columns. Mobile formations began to suffer heavy losses in people and equipment from the effects of enemy aircraft.

However, despite these interferences, Katukov's 1st Panzer Army was able to pass about 20 km that day. German reserves did not get in the way of Katukov's army. The 19th Panzer Division was transferred to Tomarovka, and the 6th Panzer Division to the Belgorod area. The 3rd mechanized corps was able to wedge between two German mobile formations without getting involved in battle with them. Soviet tanks continued to move south and southwest.

Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was less fortunate on the second day of fighting. The guards entered the battle with the 6th Panzer Division of the enemy, which took up defensive positions prepared in advance in the area of ​​​​Orlovka and Bessonovka. The terrain was difficult to access for tanks, with a large number of ravines, beams, rivers. German troops occupied the heights, preparing positions for tanks and anti-tank artillery. The approaches to them were mined. The German defense was also strengthened by the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks (6 "Tigers"). Egorov's 18th Panzer Corps ran into the German defenses and, having no opportunities for flank maneuver, stopped.

The 18th and 29th tank corps of Rotmistrov's army, after a tense first day of the offensive, had limited supplies of fuel and ammunition. We decided to bring into battle, which was in the second echelon, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps. However, an order was received from Vatutin to send part of the army's forces to storm Belgorod, to help the troops of the Steppe Front. The mechanized corps had to be sent to the east. As a result, on August 4, Rotmistrov's army passed 10 km. Komfronta was angry. Vatutin threatened Rotmistrov with a lawsuit for exposing the flank of Katukov's army.

On August 5, the battles for Belgorod began. Konev sent the strong 53rd Army around the city from the west, while the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Parts of the 7th Guards Army crossed the Seversky Donets and reached the eastern outskirts. From the west, the offensive was supported by units of the 1st Mechanized Corps (as part of the 53rd Army). The city was in a semi-encirclement and was attacked from three directions. The Wehrmacht offered stubborn resistance, clinging to every block and stronghold. The German command wanted to keep this powerful knot of resistance in their hands. However, the German troops could not withstand such a massive blow. As a result, by 18 o'clock Belgorod was completely cleared of the Germans. The Steppe Front solved the problem of liberating Belgorod. The turn of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps from Rotmistrov's army did not have a decisive impact on the collapse of the defense of the Belgorod resistance center. The steppe front coped quite well on its own.

On August 5, the offensive of the 27th and 40th armies began. As early as August 4, their forward formations conducted reconnaissance in force, probing the enemy's defenses. On the morning of August 5, a powerful artillery strike was inflicted on enemy positions, after which the armies went on the offensive. The defense of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy was broken through on a 26-kilometer section. Soviet troops advanced 8-20 km in a day. From the complete collapse of the German defensive orders in this direction saved the entry into the battle of the 7th Panzer Division.

After the introduction of the 27th and 40th armies into battle, the Tomarov grouping of the enemy was under the threat of complete encirclement. In Tomarovka, the formations of the 255th, 332nd infantry and 19th tank divisions held the defense. The German troops held back the onslaught of the 6th Guards Army and the 6th Tank Corps, but now they were surrounded on both flanks. There was only one way to retreat - to Borisovka. On the night of August 6, the Wehrmacht left the fortified point. By the morning of August 6, Tomarovka was liberated from the enemy.

The 1st Tank Army of Katukov, due to the delay of the 5th Guards Tank Army, was forced to leave two brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps to cover its left flank. Which reduced the strike capabilities of the tip of the advancing forces. On this day, the tank army experienced the greatest resistance from the German aviation, and not from the enemy ground forces. In general, Katukov's army showed good results that day and covered about 30 km.