The war with Chechnya remains today the largest conflict in Russian history. This campaign brought many sad consequences for both sides: a huge number of killed and wounded, destroyed houses, crippled destinies.

This confrontation showed the inability of the Russian command to act effectively in local conflicts.

History of the Chechen War

In the early 90s, the USSR was slowly but surely moving towards its collapse. At this time, with the advent of glasnost, protest sentiments began to gain strength throughout the Soviet Union. In order to keep the country united, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev is trying to federalize the state.

at the end of this year the Chechen-Ingush Republic adopted its declaration of independence

A year later, when it was clear that it was impossible to save a single country, Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected president of Chechnya, who on November 1 declared the sovereignty of Ichkeria.

Planes with special forces were sent there to restore order. But the special forces were surrounded. As a result of negotiations, the special forces soldiers managed to leave the territory of the republic. From that moment on, relations between Grozny and Moscow began to deteriorate more and more.

The situation escalated in 1993, when bloody clashes broke out between Dudayev’s supporters and the head of the Provisional Council, Avturkhanov. As a result, Grozny was stormed by Avturkhanov's allies. The tanks easily reached the center of Grozny, but the assault failed. They were controlled by Russian tank crews.

by this year all federal troops had been withdrawn from Chechnya

To stop the bloodshed, Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: if the bloodshed in Chechnya does not stop, Russia will be forced to intervene militarily.

First Chechen war 1994 - 1996

On November 30, 1994, B. Yeltsin signed a decree designed to restore law and order in Chechnya and restore constitutional legality.

According to this document, the disarmament and destruction of Chechen military formations was envisaged. On December 11 of this year, Yeltsin spoke to Russians, claiming that the goal of Russian troops was to protect Chechens from extremism. On the same day the army entered Ichkeria. This is how the Chechen war began.

The beginning of the war in Chechnya

The army moved from three directions:

• northwestern group;
• Western group;
• eastern group.

At first, the advance of troops from the northwestern direction proceeded easily without resistance. The first clash since the beginning of the war happened only 10 km before Grozny on December 12.

Government troops were fired at from mortars by Vakha Arsanov’s detachment. Russian losses were: 18 people, 6 of them killed, 10 pieces of equipment were lost. The Chechen detachment was destroyed by return fire.

Russian troops took a position on the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, from here they exchanged fire throughout December.

As a result, many civilians died.

From the east, the military convoy was stopped at the border by local residents. Things immediately became difficult for the troops from the western direction. They were fired upon near the village of Varsuki. After this, unarmed people were fired on more than once so that the troops could advance.

A number of senior Russian army officers were suspended amid poor results. General Mityukhin was assigned to lead the operation. On December 17, Yeltsin demanded Dudayev’s surrender and disarmament of his troops, and ordered him to arrive in Mozdok to surrender.

And on the 18th, the bombing of Grozny began, which continued almost until the storming of the city.

Storm of Grozny

Four groups of troops took part in the hostilities:

• "West", Commander General Petruk;
• "Northeast", Commander General Rokhlin;
• "North", Commander Pulikovsky;
• "East", Commander General Staskov.

The plan to storm the capital of Chechnya was adopted on December 26. He envisioned an assault on the city from 4 directions. The ultimate goal of this operation was to capture the presidential palace by surrounding it with government troops from all sides. On the side of the government forces there were:

• 15 thousand people;
• 200 tanks;
• 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

According to various sources, the armed forces of the ChRI had at their disposal:

• 12-15 thousand people;
• 42 tanks;
• 64 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

The eastern group of troops, led by General Staskov, was supposed to enter the capital from the Khankala airport, and, having captured a large area of ​​the city, divert significant resistance forces to itself.

Having been ambushed on the approaches to the city, the Russian formations were forced to return, failing in their assigned task.

Just like in the eastern group, things were going badly in other directions. Only the troops under the command of General Rokhlin managed to resist with dignity. Having fought through to the city hospital and the canning army, they were surrounded, but did not retreat, but took up a competent defense, which saved many lives.

Things were especially tragic in the northern direction. In the battles for the railway station, the 131st brigade from Maykop and the 8th motorized rifle regiment were ambushed. The biggest losses that day occurred there.

The Western group was sent to storm the presidential palace. Initially, the advance went without resistance, but near the city market the troops were ambushed and forced to go on the defensive.

by March of this year we managed to take Grozny

As a result, the first assault on the formidable one failed, as did the second after it. After changing tactics from the assault to the “Stalingrad” method, Grozny was captured by March 1995, defeating the detachment of the militant Shamil Basayev.

Battles of the First Chechen War

After the capture of Grozny, government armed forces were sent to establish control over the entire territory of Chechnya. The entry involved not only weapons, but also negotiations with civilians. Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken almost without a fight.

Fierce fighting also continued, with resistance especially strong in the mountainous areas. It took Russian troops a week to capture the village of Chiri-Yurt in May 1995. By June 12, Nozhai-Yurt and Shatoy were taken.

As a result, they managed to “bargain” for a peace agreement from Russia, which was repeatedly violated by both sides. On December 10-12, the battle for Gudermes took place, which was then cleared of bandits for another two weeks.

On April 21, 1996, something that the Russian command had been striving for for a long time happened. Having caught a satellite signal from Dzhokhar Dudayev’s phone, an air strike was carried out, as a result of which the president of the unrecognized Ichkeria was killed.

Results of the First Chechen War

The results of the first Chechen war were:

• peace agreement between Russia and Ichkeria signed on August 31, 1996;
• Russia withdrew its troops from Chechnya;
• the status of the republic was to remain uncertain.

The losses of the Russian army were:

• more than 4 thousand killed;
• 1.2 thousand missing;
• about 20 thousand wounded.

Heroes of the First Chechen War

175 people who participated in this campaign received the title of Hero of Russia. Viktor Ponomarev was the first to receive this title for his exploits during the assault on Grozny. General Rokhlin, who was awarded this rank, refused to accept the award.

Second Chechen War 1999-2009

The Chechen campaign continued in 1999. The main prerequisites are:

• lack of fight against separatists who committed terrorist attacks, caused destruction and committed other crimes in neighboring regions of the Russian Federation;
• The Russian government tried to influence the leadership of Ichkeria, however, President Aslan Maskhadov only verbally condemned the chaos that was happening.

In this regard, the Russian government decided to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.

Start of hostilities

On August 7, 1999, the troops of Khattab and Shamil Basayev invaded the territory of the mountainous regions of Dagestan. The group consisted mainly of foreign mercenaries. They planned to win over the locals, but their plan failed.

For more than a month, federal forces fought with the terrorists before they left for the territory of Chechnya. For this reason, with Yeltsin’s decree, massive bombing of Grozny began on September 23.

During this campaign, the sharply increased skill of the military was clearly noticeable.

On December 26, the assault on Grozny began, which lasted until February 6, 2000. The liberation of the city from terrorists was announced by the acting. President V. Putin. From that moment on, the war turned into a struggle with partisans, which ended in 2009.

Results of the Second Chechen War

Based on the results of the second Chechen campaign:

• peace was established in the country;
• people of pro-Kremlin ideology came to power;
• the region began to recover;
• Chechnya has turned into one of the calmest regions of Russia.

Over the 10 years of war, the real losses of the Russian army amounted to 7.3 thousand people, the terrorists lost more than 16 thousand people.

Many veterans of this war remember it in a sharply negative context. After all, the organization, especially the first campaign of 1994-1996. I didn't leave the best memories. This is eloquently evidenced by various documentary videos filmed in those years. One of the best films about the first Chechen war:

The end of the civil war stabilized the situation in the country as a whole, bringing peace to families on both sides.

Ten years ago the “second Chechen war” began

On September 23, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.” Almost on the same day, massive bombing of the city of Grozny and other cities and towns in Chechnya began. On September 30, federal forces entered the republic.

Most residents of the republic have a vague idea about the events of ten years ago, which became a prologue to new bloodshed. People remember the invasion of militant groups by Basayev and Khattab into Dagestan to help “fighting Muslims,” the bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, and Putin’s promise to “kill terrorists in the toilet.”

However, even before the events in Dagestan and the explosions of residential buildings, which Moscow blamed on the Chechens, the Russian military actually seized part of the territory of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

“Today it is not customary to talk about this, but the actual invasion of the Russian army into the territory of Ichkeria, despite the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between Russia and Maskhadov signed in 1997 between Yeltsin and Maskhadov The CRI, according to which both sides refused “the use or even the threat of using military force in resolving any controversial issues,” occurred at the end of July 1999. Then parts of the federal forces entered the territory of Ichkeria from Dagestan, destroying the border and customs post , and went 10-12 kilometers deep into the territory of the republic,” says one of the former members of the Ichkerian parliament, who wished to remain anonymous.

Then this action was declared “border leveling.” “Maskhadov and his government repeatedly tried to contact Yeltsin and discuss the current situation, but everything was in vain,” says the interlocutor of the “Caucasian Knot” correspondent.

“The issue of a new war in Moscow was resolved long before 1999 - one might say, immediately after the end of the first military campaign. Despite the signed peace treaty and the pending issue of the status of Ichkeria, the Russian special services carried out active subversive activities in Chechnya. Everything was done to in order to discredit the leadership of Chechnya, primarily President Maskhadov, whom Moscow had previously recognized as a legitimate leader, to present the Chechens as bandits and terrorists, and so on,” noted the former Ichkerian deputy.

According to him, these goals were achieved largely due to the lack of mutual understanding between Maskhadov’s former associates.

“Fearing the possibility of a civil war breaking out in Chechnya (in the summer of 1998, clashes between Wahhabi detachments and government forces took place in Gudermes - note by the Caucasian Knot), Maskhadov lost sight of the fact that revanchist sentiments are strong in the military-political leadership of Russia. And when he tried to enter into a dialogue with the Kremlin, it was already too late. The machine was already running, and no one was going to stop it," the interlocutor says.

As a result, “we got what we got: a destroyed republic, tens of thousands killed on both sides and mutual distrust and hatred.”

“Those who say that the reason for the repeated invasion of Russian troops into the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria were the explosions of residential buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities or the Basayev-Khattab campaign in Dagestan are deeply mistaken,” the interlocutor asserts.

According to Grozny resident Rizvan Madayev, it was known in advance that a new war in Chechnya was inevitable. “Back in the summer of 1999, an article “The war in Chechnya will begin in October” was published in one of the Russian newspapers. I personally read it and remember very well that it even indicated the numbers and names of units and units of the Russian army that are planned to be involved in the new war "So today you can talk and argue as much as you like, but no Basayev or Maskhadov started this war. The Kremlin started it," Madayev noted.

Some associate the beginning of the second war in the republic with the name of the current Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. “It’s enough to remember 1999, when an unknown retired FSB lieutenant colonel, Putin, suddenly became first the director of this service, and then the Prime Minister of Russia. The military operation in the Chechen Republic was conceived specifically to bring him to power,” the employee believes one of the local public organizations Sultan.

According to him, Yeltsin initially bet on both Primakov and Stepashin, but ultimately chose Putin. “The first decree that Vladimir Putin, who became the acting president of Russia, signed was a decree providing guarantees of immunity to the former president of Russia and his family. In fact, Putin came to the Kremlin during the Chechen war,” says Sultan.

On September 23, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” according to which a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus (OGV (s) was created to conduct a “counter-terrorism operation" on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Almost on the same day, massive bombing of the city of Grozny and other cities and towns of Chechnya began. A week later, federal forces re-entered the republic.

On October 5, 1999, Maskhadov signed a decree “On the introduction of martial law on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.” Large-scale military operations on the territory of Chechnya continued until the middle of 2000, after which the war acquired a partisan character.

According to some Chechen political scientists, the “second Chechen war,” just like the “first one,” could have been avoided. “If Yeltsin had met with Dudayev at one time (Dzhokhar Dudayev - the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, approx. "Caucasian Knot"), then there would not have been the first military campaign in the Chechen Republic. If he or Vladimir Putin had met with Maskhadov, then there would not have been would have a second war," says a local political scientist who wished to remain anonymous. "If Basayev invaded Dagestan, then why did the federal troops let him out of there? It was possible, as a last resort, to simply block the militant detachments in the mountains of Dagestan and destroy them, and then "from the position of the victorious side, set conditions for Maskhadov. And I am sure that Moscow and Grozny would sooner or later come to a common opinion."

“Any war is started by the strongest. Well, how can you say that tiny Chechnya, whose territory is less than one Moscow region, attacked Russia, a nuclear power? Moscow really didn’t care about Dudayev, Maskhadov, Basayev or Khattab. "If they wanted, the special services could have eliminated them in exactly two hours, as Grachev once said. Instead, they staged a bloody massacre here, killed thousands of people, and for ten years now they have not been able to defeat some one and a half to a thousand militants. This is absurd," says teacher Umar Khankarov.

“The culprits of the last two wars in Chechnya are Yeltsin and Putin. This is unambiguous. Because they were presidents of Russia. Neither one nor the other did anything to avoid bloodshed, to stop the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people. I really hope that sooner or later everyone those involved in starting the war in Chechnya will appear before an international tribunal, just like the leadership of the former Yugoslavia in recent times,” said Grozny resident Milana Akhmadova, who lost several close relatives during two military campaigns.

Progress of the Second Chechen War Russia § 1999 15 military operations § 2000 four major military operations § 2001 2 major military operations § 2002 1 military operation § 2003 there were no major military operations § 2004 2 military operations § 2005 4 military operations § 2006 7 military operations § 2007 3 military operations § 2008 2 military operations Chechnya § § § § § 1999 7 terrorist attacks 2000 4 terrorist attacks 2001 1 terrorist attack 2002 6 terrorist attacks 2003 terrorist attacks 2004 9 terrorist attacks 2005 1 terrorist attack in 2006 2 terrorist attacks in 2007 1 terrorist attack in 2008 2 terrorist attacks

The Second Chechen War was officially called a counter-terrorist operation (CTO) - a common name for military operations on the territory of Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date of the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it developed into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 0 o'clock on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was cancelled.

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya (1999) June 18 - Chechnya attacked two outposts on the Dagestan-Chechen border, and attacked a Cossack company in the Stavropol Territory. The Russian leadership is closing most of the checkpoints on the border with Chechnya. June 22 - for the first time in the history of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, an attempt was made to commit a terrorist attack in the main building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The bomb was defused in time. According to one version, the terrorist attack was a response of Chechen militants to threats from the head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Rushailo, who intended to carry out acts of retaliation in Chechnya. June 23 - shelling from the side of Chechnya at the outpost near the village of Pervomaiskoye, Khasavyurt district of Dagestan. July 3 - V. Rushailo stated that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation “is beginning to strictly regulate the situation in the North Caucasus, where Chechnya acts as a criminal “think tank” controlled by foreign intelligence services, extremist organizations and the criminal community.” Deputy Prime Minister of the ChRI government Kazbek Makhashev stated in response: “We cannot be intimidated by threats, and Rushailo knows this well.” July 5 - Rushailo stated that “early in the morning of July 5, a preemptive strike was launched against concentrations of 150-200 armed militants in Chechnya.”

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya On July 7, a group of militants from Chechnya attacked an outpost near the Grebensky Bridge in the Babayurt region of Dagestan. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the FSB of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that “Russia will henceforth take not preventive, but only adequate actions in response to attacks in the areas bordering Chechnya.” He emphasized that “the Chechen authorities do not fully control the situation in the republic.” July 16 - Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation V. Ovchinnikov stated that “the issue of creating a buffer zone around Chechnya is being studied.” July 23 - Chechen militants attacked the outpost protecting the Kopaevsky hydroelectric complex on the territory of Dagestan. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Dagestan stated that “this time the Chechens carried out reconnaissance in force, and large-scale actions by gangs will soon begin along the entire perimeter of the Dagestan-Chechen border.”

Attack on Dagestan August 7 - September 14 - from the territory of the ChRI, detachments of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of Dagestan. Fierce fighting continued for more than a month. The official government of the ChRI, unable to control the actions of various armed groups on the territory of Chechnya, dissociated itself from the actions of Shamil Basayev, but did not take practical action against him. August 12 - Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Zubov reported that a letter was sent to the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov with a proposal to conduct a joint operation with federal troops against Islamists in Dagestan. August 13 - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “strikes will be carried out on bases and concentrations of militants, regardless of their location, including on the territory of Chechnya.” August 16 - President of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov introduced martial law in Chechnya for a period of 30 days, announced the partial mobilization of reservists and participants in the First Chechen War.

Aerial bombing of Chechnya August 25 - Russian aircraft strike militant bases in the Vedeno Gorge of Chechnya. In response to the official protest from the ChRI, the command of the federal forces declares that they “reserve the right to strike militant bases in the territory of any North Caucasus region, including Chechnya.” September 6 - 18 - Russian aviation carries out numerous missile and bomb attacks on military camps and militant fortifications in Chechnya. September 11 - Maskhadov announced general mobilization in Chechnya. September 14 - V. Putin said that “the Khasavyurt agreements should be subjected to an impartial analysis,” as well as “a strict quarantine should be temporarily introduced” along the entire perimeter of Chechnya. September 18 - Russian troops block the border of Chechnya from Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

September 23 - Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. As a result, several electrical substations, a number of oil and gas complex factories, the Grozny mobile communications center, a television and radio broadcasting center, and an An-2 aircraft were destroyed. The press service of the Russian Air Force stated that “aircraft will continue to strike targets that gangs can use in their interests.” September 27 - Chairman of the Russian Government V. Putin categorically rejected the possibility of a meeting between the President of Russia and the head of the ChRI.

September 30 - Vladimir Putin, in an interview with journalists, promised that there would be no new Chechen war. He also stated that “combat operations are already underway, our troops have entered the territory of Chechnya several times, already two weeks ago they occupied commanding heights, liberated them, and so on.” As Putin said, “we need to be patient and do this work - completely clear the territory of terrorists. If this work is not done today, they will return, and all the sacrifices made will be in vain." On the same day, tank units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of Chechnya. October 4 - at a meeting of the military council of the ChRI, it was decided to form three directions to repel attacks by federal forces. The western direction was headed by Ruslan Gelayev, the eastern direction by Shamil Basaev, and the central direction by Magomed Khambiev. October 6 - in accordance with Maskhadov's decree, martial law began to apply in Chechnya. Maskhadov suggested that all religious figures in Chechnya declare a holy war on Russia - gazavat. October 15 - troops of the Western group of General Vladimir Shamanov entered Chechnya from Ingushetia.

October 15 - troops of the Western group of General Vladimir Shamanov entered Chechnya from Ingushetia. October 16 - Federal forces occupied a third of the territory of Chechnya north of the Terek River and began the second stage of the anti-terrorist operation, the main goal of which is the destruction of gangs in the remaining territory of Chechnya. October 18 - Russian troops crossed the Terek. October 29 - November 10 - Battles for Gudermes: field commanders the Yamadayev brothers and the Mufti of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov surrendered Gudermes to federal forces. November 16 - federal forces took control of the settlement of Novy Shatoy. November 17 - near Vedeno, militants destroyed the reconnaissance group of the 31st separate airborne brigade (12 dead, 2 prisoners).

November 18 - according to the NTV television company, federal forces took control of the regional center of Achkhoy-Martan “without firing a single shot.” November 25 - CRI President Maskhadov addressed the Russian soldiers fighting in the North Caucasus with an offer to surrender and go over to the side of the militants. December 4 - 7 - federal forces occupied Argun. By December 1999, federal forces controlled the entire flat part of Chechnya. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and in Grozny. December 8 - federal forces occupied Urus-Martan December 14 - federal forces occupied Khankala December 17 - a large landing of federal forces blocked the road connecting Chechnya with the village of Shatili (Georgia). December 26, 1999 - February 6, 2000 - siege of Grozny

Losses from 1999 to 2002 Russia: 4572 killed 15549 wounded Chechnya: 3600 killed 1500 wounded

On September 30, 1999, the first units of the Russian army entered the territory of Chechnya. The Second Chechen War or - officially - the counter-terrorism operation - lasted almost ten years, from 1999 to 2009. Its beginning was preceded by the attack of militants Shamil Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan and a series of terrorist attacks in Buinaksk, Volgodonsk and Moscow, which occurred from September 4 to 16, 1999.

Open full size

Russia was shocked by a series of monstrous terrorist attacks in 1999. On the night of September 4, a house in the military town of Buynaksk (Dagestan) was blown up. 64 people were killed and 146 were injured. This terrible crime in itself could not shake up the country; similar precedents in the North Caucasus have become a common occurrence in recent years. But subsequent events showed that now residents of not a single Russian city, including the capital, can feel completely safe. The next explosions occurred in Moscow. On the night of September 9-10 and September 13 (at 5 a.m.), two apartment buildings located on the street were blown up along with the sleeping residents. Guryanov (109 people were killed, more than 200 were injured) and on Kashirskoye Highway (more than 124 people were killed). Another explosion occurred in the center of Volgodonsk (Rostov region), where 17 people were killed and 310 were injured. According to the official version, the terrorist attacks were carried out by terrorists who were trained in Khattab's sabotage camps on the territory of Chechnya.

These events dramatically changed the mood in society. The average person, faced with an unprecedented threat, was ready to support any forceful action against the breakaway republic. Unfortunately, few people paid attention to the fact that the terrorist attacks themselves became an indicator of the biggest failure of the Russian special services, who were unable to prevent them. In addition, it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that the FSB was involved in the bombings, especially after the mysterious events in Ryazan. Here on the evening of September 22, 1999, bags with hexogen and a detonator were found in the basement of one of the houses. On September 24, local security officers detained two suspects, and it turned out that they were active FSB officers from Moscow. Lubyanka urgently announced “conducted anti-terrorist exercises,” and subsequent attempts to independently investigate these events were suppressed by the authorities.

Regardless of who was behind the mass murder of Russian citizens, the Kremlin took full advantage of the events that took place. Now it was no longer about protecting Russian territory proper in the North Caucasus, or even about the blockade of Chechnya, reinforced by the bombing that had already begun. The Russian leadership, with some delay, began to implement the plan prepared back in March 1999 for the next invasion of the “rebel republic.”

On October 1, 1999, federal forces entered the territory of the republic. The northern regions (Naursky, Shelkovsky and Nadterechny) were occupied almost without a fight. The Russian leadership decided not to stop at the Terek (as originally planned), but to continue the offensive across the flat part of Chechnya. At this stage, in order to avoid major losses (which could have brought down the ratings of Yeltsin’s “successor”), the main emphasis was placed on the use of heavy weapons, which allowed the federal forces to avoid contact battles. In addition to this, the Russian command used negotiation tactics with local elders and field commanders. The former were forced to force the Chechen detachments to leave populated areas, threatening, otherwise, with massive air and artillery strikes. The latter were offered to go over to the side of Russia and jointly fight the Wahhabis. In some places this tactic was successful. On November 12, the commander of the Vostok group, General G. Troshev, occupied Gudermes, the second largest city of the republic, without a fight; local field commanders, the Yamadayev brothers (two of the three) went over to the side of the federal forces. And the commander of the “West” group, V. Shamanov, preferred forceful methods of resolving problems that arose. Thus, the village of Bamut was completely destroyed as a result of the November assault, but Russian units occupied the regional center of Achkhoy-Martan without a fight.

The “carrot and stick” method used by the federal group worked flawlessly for another reason. In the flat part of the republic, the defense capabilities of the Chechen army were extremely limited. Sh. Basayev was well aware of the advantage of the Russian side in firepower. In this regard, he defended the option of the Chechen army withdrawing to the southern mountainous regions of the republic. Here, federal forces, deprived of the support of armored vehicles and limited in the use of aviation, would inevitably face the prospect of contact battles, which the Russian command stubbornly tried to avoid. The opponent of this plan was Chechen President A. Maskhadov. While continuing to call on the Kremlin for peaceful negotiations, he did not want to surrender the capital of the republic without a fight. Being an idealist, A. Maskhadov believed that large one-time losses during the assault on Grozny would force the Russian leadership to begin peace negotiations.

In the first half of December, federal forces occupied almost the entire flat part of the republic. Chechen troops concentrated in the mountainous regions, but a fairly large garrison continued to hold Grozny, which was captured by Russian troops in early 2000 during stubborn and bloody battles. This ended the active phase of the war. In subsequent years, Russian special forces, together with local loyal forces, were engaged in clearing the territories of Chechnya and Dagestan from the remaining gangs of formations.

The problem of the status of the Chechen Republic by 2003–2004. leaves the current political agenda: the republic returns to the political and legal space of Russia, takes its position as a subject of the Russian Federation, with elected authorities and a procedurally approved republican Constitution. Doubts about the legal validity of these procedures are unlikely to seriously change their results, which depend decisively on the ability of the federal and republican authorities to ensure the irreversibility of Chechnya's transition to the problems and concerns of peaceful life. Two serious threats remain within the framework of such a transition: (a) indiscriminate violence on the part of federal forces, again tying the sympathies of the Chechen population to the cells/practices of terrorist resistance and thereby increasing the dangerous “occupation effect” - the effect of alienation between [Russia] and [ Chechens] as “parties to the conflict”; and (b) the establishment in the republic of a closed authoritarian regime, legitimized and protected by federal authorities and alienated from broad layers/territorial or teip groups of the Chechen population. These two threats are capable of cultivating the soil in Chechnya for the return of mass illusions and actions related to the separation of the republic from Russia.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. The federal center has sent and continues to send large amounts of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. Units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are permanently stationed in Chechnya to maintain order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather restless region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

©site
created based on open data on the Internet

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. Following the results of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but no one still recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means has begun to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal Forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky’s unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.