Where the war of 1812 ended.  Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Sparrow Hills. Historical significance of the war

The agreement between Russia and France, concluded in Tilsit in 1807, was temporary. The continental blockade of Great Britain, to which Russia was forced to join in accordance with the terms of the Peace of Tilsit, undermined the country's economy, which was focused on export trade. Export turnover decreased from 120 million to 83 million rubles, import supplies exceeded exports and created conditions for an outburst of inflationary processes. In addition, exporters suffered from high duties imposed by France, which made foreign trade unprofitable. The economic decline and the precariousness of the peace with Napoleon forced Alexander I to prepare for war. For Bonaparte, Russia was an obstacle that stood in his way to world domination.

Thus, the causes of the Patriotic War of 1812 were:

1. the desire of Napoleon Bonaparte and the French bourgeoisie supporting him to establish world hegemony, which was impossible without the defeat and subjugation of Russia and Great Britain;

2. aggravation of contradictions between Russia and France, intensified both as a result of Russia’s non-compliance with the conditions of the continental blockade, and Napoleon’s support of anti-Russian sentiments in Poland, supporting local magnates in their aspirations to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its former borders;

3. Russia’s loss of former influence in Central Europe as a result of France’s conquests, as well as Napoleon’s actions aimed at undermining its international authority;

4. the increase in personal hostility between Alexander I and Napoleon I, caused both by the refusal of the Russian side to marry the Grand Duchesses Catherine, then Anna, to the French Emperor, as well as Napoleon’s hints about Alexander’s involvement in the murder of his father, Emperor Paul I.

The course of military operations (the retreat of the Russian army).

Napoleon's army, which he himself called the "Great Army", numbered over 600,000 people and 1,420 guns. In addition to the French, it included the national corps of European countries conquered by Napoleon, as well as the Polish corps of Prince Jozef Anton Poniatowski.

Napoleon's main forces were deployed in two echelons. The first (444,000 people and 940 guns) consisted of three groups: the right wing, led by Jerome Bonaparte (78,000 people, 159 guns) was supposed to move to Grodno, diverting as many Russian forces as possible; the central group under the command of Eugene Beauharnais (82,000 people, 208 guns) was supposed to prevent the connection of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies; The left wing, led by Napoleon himself (218,000 people, 527 guns), moved to Vilna - it was assigned the main role in the entire campaign. In the rear, between the Vistula and Oder, there remained a second echelon - 170,000 people, 432 guns and a reserve (Marshal Augereau's corps and other troops).

The “Great Army” was opposed by 220 - 240 thousand Russian soldiers with 942 guns. In addition, as noted above, the Russian troops were divided: the 1st Western Army under the command of the Minister of War, Infantry General M.B. Barclay de Tolly (110 - 127 thousand people with 558 guns) stretched over 200 km from Lithuania to Grodno in Belarus; 2nd Western Army led by Infantry General P.I. Bagration (45 - 48 thousand people with 216 guns) occupied a line up to 100 km east of Bialystok; 3rd Western Army of Cavalry General A.P. Tormasova (46,000 people with 168 guns) stood in Volyn near Lutsk. On the right flank of the Russian troops (in Finland) was the corps of Lieutenant General F.F. Steingel (19 thousand people with 102 guns), on the left flank - the Danube Army of Admiral P.V. Chichagov (57 thousand people with 202 guns).

Given the enormous size and power of Russia, Napoleon planned to complete the campaign in three years: in 1812, to capture the western provinces from Riga to Lutsk, in 1813 - Moscow, in 1814 - St. Petersburg. Such gradualism would allow him to dismember Russia, providing rear support and communications for the army operating over vast areas. The conqueror of Europe did not count on a blitzkrieg, although he intended to one by one quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in the border areas.

On the evening of June 24 (11), 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment under the command of the cornet Alexander Nikolayevich Rubashkin noticed a suspicious movement on the Neman River. When it became completely dark, a company of French sappers crossed the river from the elevated and wooded Polish bank to the Russian bank on boats and ferries, with whom a shootout took place. This happened three miles up the river from Kovno (Kaunas, Lithuania).

At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 25 (12), the vanguard of the French troops had already entered Kovno. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. The river was crossed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry. Emperor Alexander I was at a ball hosted by Leonty Leontyevich Bennigsen in Vilna, where he was informed about Napoleon's invasion.

June 30 (17) - July 1 (June 18) near Prena south of Kovno, another group crossed the Neman (79 thousand soldiers: 6th and 4th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, Napoleon's stepson, Eugene Beauharnais. Almost simultaneously, on July 1 (June 18), even further south, near Grodno, the Neman crossed 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the overall command of the King of Westphalia, brother Napoleon, Jerome Bonaparte.

In the northern direction near Tilsit, the Niemen crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal Etienne Jacques Macdonald. In the southern direction, from Warsaw through Bugn, a separate Austrian corps of General Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

On June 29 (16), Vilna was occupied. Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city following his troops only on July 17 (4).

The French emperor targeted the 10th corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal E.Zh. MacDonald to St. Petersburg. First, the corps had to occupy Riga, and then, connecting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Charles Nicolas Oudinot (28 thousand people), move on. The basis of MacDonald's corps were 20 thousand Prussian soldiers under the command of General Yu.A. Graverta.

Marshal MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, lacking siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, General Ivan Nikolaevich Essen, burned the outskirts and prepared for defense. Trying to support Oudinot, Macdonald captured the abandoned city of Dinaburg (now Daugavpils in Latvia) on the Western Dvina River and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussian military from MacDonald's corps avoided active combat clashes in a war that was foreign to them, however, they offered active resistance and repeatedly repulsed the attacks of the defenders of Riga with heavy losses.

Marshal Oudinot, having occupied the city of Polotsk, decided to bypass from the north the separate corps of General Pyotr Christianovich Wittgenstein (17 thousand people with 84 guns), allocated by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly during the retreat through Polotsk to defend the St. Petersburg direction.

Fearing a connection between Oudinot and MacDonald, P.H. Wittgenstein, unexpectedly for the enemy, attacked Oudinot's corps near Klyastitsy.

On July 29 (16), near the town of Vilkomir, 3 French cavalry regiments (12 squadrons) were unexpectedly attacked by 4 squadrons of the Grodno Hussar Regiment under the command of Major General Yakov Petrovich Kulnev and the Don Cossacks of Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Platov 4th (nephew of M.I. Platov) , Major Ivan Andreevich Selivanov 2nd, Colonel Mark Ivanovich Rodionov 2nd. Despite their numerical superiority, the French were overthrown and their advance stopped for several hours. Then, while on reconnaissance, near the village of Chernevo, the hussars and Cossacks Ya.P. Kulneva attacked units of the cavalry division of General Sebastiani. The enemy suffered heavy losses.

At the same time, Marshal Oudinot occupied the village of Klyastitsy, having 28 thousand soldiers and 114 guns against the Russians 17 thousand. However, General P.Kh. Wittgenstein decided to attack, taking advantage of the stretched French forces. The vanguard of Ya.P. moved ahead. Kulneva (3,700 horsemen, 12 guns), followed by the main forces of P.Kh. Wittgenstein (13 thousand soldiers, 72 guns).

July 31 (18) at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the Russian vanguard under the command of Ya.P. Kulneva collided with the French vanguard near the village of Yakubovo. The encounter battle continued until the end of the day. Ya.P. Kulnev tried to oust the French from the village, but after a series of fierce battles the French held this settlement.

On August 1 (July 19), the main Russian forces entered the battle, and after several attacks and counterattacks, Yakubovo was captured. Oudinot was forced to retreat to Klyastitsy.

To continue the attack on Klyastitsy, it was necessary to cross the Nishcha River. Oudinot ordered the construction of a powerful battery and ordered the destruction of the only bridge. While the detachment of Ya.P. Kulneva was crossed by a ford to bypass the French positions, the 2nd battalion of the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment attacked directly across the burning bridge. The French were forced to retreat.

General Ya.P. Kulnev continued the pursuit with 2 cavalry regiments together with the Cossacks I.I. Platov 4th, I.A. Selivanov 2nd, M.I. Rodionov 2nd, infantry battalion and artillery battery. After crossing the Drissa River on August 2 (July 20), he was ambushed near the village of Boyarshchino. The French artillery shot at Y.P.’s detachment. Kulneva from the commanding heights. He himself was mortally wounded.

Pursuing the Russian vanguard, the division of French General Jean Antoine Verdier, in turn, came across the main forces of General P.Kh. Wittgenstein and was completely destroyed. P.H. Wittgenstein was slightly wounded.

Marshal Oudinot retreated beyond the Dvina, leaving behind fortified Polotsk. Thus, the French offensive on St. Petersburg failed. Moreover, fearing the actions of General P.Kh. Wittgenstein on the supply routes of the Great Army, the French emperor was forced to weaken the main group of troops by sending the corps of General Gouvillon Saint-Cyr to help Oudinot.

In the main direction, the Moscow direction, the Russian troops, retreating, fought rearguard battles, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. The main task was to unite the forces of the 1st and 2nd Western armies. The position of Bagration's 2nd Army, which was threatened by encirclement, was especially difficult. It was not possible to get through to Minsk and connect with Barclay de Tolly’s army there, because. the path was cut off. Bagration changed the direction of movement, but the troops of Jerome Bonaparte overtook him. On July 9 (June 27), near the town of Mir, a rearguard battle of Russian troops took place, the basis of which was the Cossack cavalry of Ataman M.I. Platov with the best part of Napoleonic cavalry - the Polish cavalry regiments. The Polish lancers, who fell into the Cossack front, were defeated and hastily retreated. The next day a new battle took place, and again the Don people won.

July 14 (2) - July 15 (3) near the town of Romanovo, Cossacks M.I. Platov held back the French for 2 days to allow army convoys to cross Pripyat. Platov's successful rearguard battles allowed the 2nd Army to freely reach Bobruisk and concentrate its forces. All attempts to surround Bagration failed. Napoleon was furious that the Cossacks M.I. Platov destroyed the 1st Cavalry Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Pshependovsky and the squadron of the 12th Uhlan Regiment, and also thoroughly “battered” other units of General Latour-Maubourg’s corps. And his officers and soldiers were surprised and delighted that their wounded comrades who were captured (there were 360 ​​prisoners in total, including 17 officers) received medical care and care and were left in Romanov.

Bagration decided to advance to Mogilev. And in order to occupy the city before the French approached, he sent there the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General N.N. Raevsky and the brigade of Colonel V.A. Sysoev, which consisted of 5 Don Cossack regiments. But Marshal Davout's corps entered Mogilev much earlier. As a result, on July 23 (11), the corps N.N. Raevsky had to repel the advance of superior enemy forces between the villages of Saltanovka and Dashkovka. N.N. Raevsky personally led soldiers into battle. Both sides suffered heavy casualties; The enemy was driven back in fierce bayonet attacks, but the plan to break through Mogilev had to be abandoned. There was only one way left - to Smolensk. The fierce resistance of the Russians misled Davout. He decided that he was fighting the main forces of Bagration. The Napoleonic commander began to strengthen himself near the village of Saltanovka, expecting a second Russian offensive. Thanks to this, Bagration gained time, managed to cross the Dnieper and break away from the French on the way to Smolensk.

At this time, the 3rd Western Army of Alexander Petrovich Tormasov operated very successfully. Already on July 25 (13), the Russians liberated the city of Brest-Litovsk, captured by French units. On July 28 (16), the Tormasov captured Kobrin, capturing a 5,000-strong detachment of the Saxon Major General Klengel, led by himself.

On August 11 (July 30) in the battle of Gorodechno, Lieutenant General E.I. Markov repelled an attack by superior French forces. After these successes, the Southwestern Front stabilized. And here significant enemy forces were pinned down for a long time.

Meanwhile, important changes took place in the leadership of the Russian troops. On July 19 (7), Emperor Alexander I, who was in the 1st Western Army with his entire retinue, which greatly hampered the normal staff and operational work of the army, left for St. Petersburg. Barclay de Tolly got the opportunity to fully implement his plan for waging war against Napoleon, developed by him in 1810 - 1812. In general terms, it boiled down to the following: firstly, to avoid a general battle and retreat deeper into the country so as not to expose the army to the danger of defeat; secondly, to weaken the superior enemy forces and gain time to prepare fresh troops and militia.

Barclay de Tolly led the 1st Army to Vitebsk, where he hoped to wait for Bagration. Vanguard of the army under the command of A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy was sent to the village of Ostrovno to delay the French advance.

On July 24 (12), the battle with the advancing enemy began. The cavalry corps of Lieutenant General F.P. was sent to help Osterman-Tolstoy. Uvarov and the 3rd Infantry Division of Lieutenant General P.P. Konovnitsyn, which replaced the Osterman-Tolstoy building. After 3 days of stubborn fighting with the superior forces of Marshal Murat, Konovnitsyn began to slowly, with fighting, retreat to the Luchesa River, where all of Barclay’s forces had already concentrated.

The fierce resistance of the Russians prompted Napoleon to think that they were ready to give the general battle that he so wanted. The French emperor brought his entire 150,000-strong group here (against 75,000 Russians). But Barclay de Tolly, having deployed the corps of Major General P.P. as cover. Palena broke away from the French and moved towards Smolensk. The troops of Marshals Ney and Murat were thrown onto the flank and rear of the Russian army. In their vanguard was the division of General Horace Francois Sebastiniani, consisting of 9 cavalry and 1 infantry regiments. On July 27 (15), near the village of Molevo Boloto, they clashed in a fierce battle with 7 Cossack regiments and 12 guns of the Don horse artillery under the overall command of Ataman M.I. Platova. The French were defeated and fled, pursued by the Don, and the hussars of P.P., who joined them at the end of the battle. Palena. About 300 privates and 12 officers were captured. In addition, the Cossacks seized O.F.’s personal documents. Sebastiniani, the content of which indicated that the French command knew the plans of the leadership of the Russian army, i.e. Napoleonic spy settled in the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly.

On August 2 (July 21) near the city of Krasny, the troops of Marshals Ney and Murat fought with the 27th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General D.P. Neverovsky, consisting of 7 thousand unfired recruits.

All day long, forming in a square and slowly moving towards Smolensk, this small detachment fought heroically, repelling 45 attacks by Murat’s cavalry and numerous attacks by Ney’s infantry.

The delay of the enemy near Krasnoye allowed Barclay de Tolly to bring the 1st Army to Smolensk. And on August 3 (July 22), Bagration’s 2nd Army approached Smolensk. As a result of all these efforts, Napoleon's plan to defeat the two Russian armies one by one collapsed.

For two days, August 4 and 5 (July 23–24), stubborn battles took place under the walls of Smolensk. On August 6 and 7 (July 25–26), the battle continued for the city itself.

But there was no general battle here either. Inspired by the heroism of Russian soldiers and officers and private successes, many military leaders insisted on going on the offensive. However, Barclay de Tolly, having weighed everything, decided to continue the retreat. On August 7 (July 26) Russian troops left Smolensk.

Napoleon sent his best forces after them - two infantry and two cavalry corps - about 35 thousand people. They were opposed by the rearguard of General Pavel Alekseevich Tuchkov, numbering 3 thousand people, half of which were Don Cossacks under the command of Major General A.A. Karpov and a company (12 guns) of the Don horse artillery.

Already on the morning of August 7 (July 26), Marshal Ney attacked P.A. Tuchkov’s corps at Valutina Gora (Battle of Lubinsk), but was repulsed. However, the enemy pressure increased. Our rearguard retreated a little and gained a foothold on the line of the Stragan River. Chief of Staff of the 1st Army A.P. Ermolov strengthened P.A. Tuchkov's first cavalry corps, which included a Life Guards Cossack regiment and 4 hussar regiments. Now the forces of the Russian corps have grown to 10 thousand people. As enemy attacks intensified, Barclay de Tolly strengthened Tuchkov's corps with new units. The 3rd Infantry Corps of General P.P. approached the village of Dubino. Konovnitsyna. After this, 15 thousand Russians confronted the corps of Ney, Murat and Junot, who joined them. Cossacks and hussars under the command of Count V.V. Orlov-Denisov, using the “venter”, was lured into an ambush near the village of Zabolotye and inflicted great damage on Murat’s cavalry.

In total, the enemy lost about 9 thousand people that day, and the Russians lost more than 5 thousand people. During the night attack, General P.A. was seriously wounded and captured. Tuchkov.

But his troops held out and gave the 1st and 2nd armies the opportunity to break away from the pursuit of the French troops.

Russian units retreated in three columns. They were covered by rearguard detachments: Southern - under the command of General K.K. Siversa, Central - under the command of General M.I. Platov, Northern - under the command of General K.A. Kreutz. But the brunt of the fighting fell on the M.I. unit. Platova. It consisted of 8 incomplete Don Cossack regiments: Atamansky, Balabin S.F., Vlasov M.G., Grekov T.D., Denisov V.T., Zhirov I.I., Ilovaisky N.V., Kharitonova K.I. and one Simferopol equestrian Tatar.

On August 9 (July 28), Platov’s fighters held back the onslaught of the French at the Solovyova crossing of the Dnieper. On August 10 (July 29) they detained the enemy at Pnevaya Sloboda, and in the meantime, 7 infantry battalions, 18 squadrons of hussars and lancers and 22 guns, including Don horse artillery, arrived to reinforce them, under the command of Major General G.V. Rosen, took a convenient position near the village of Mikhailovka. Where they repulsed enemy attacks on August 11 and 12 (July 30 and 31). On August 13 (1), Napoleonic troops were detained for a whole day near the city of Dorogobuzh at the turn of the Osma River. On August 14 (2), the Cossacks and Tatars of Platov fettered the advance of the French vanguard, remaining in their positions, giving the opportunity to the detachment of G.V. Rosen, retreat and gain a foothold near the village of Belomirskoye. On August 15 (3), the battle here lasted from 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. On this day, the Cossacks rushed to attack the enemy 6 times and lost more killed and wounded than in the entire time since the beginning of the war.

On the evening of August 16 (4), M.I. Platov handed over command of the rearguard to General P.P. Konovnitsin and went to Moscow to resolve the accumulated issues: about the formation and dispatch of the Don militia to the theater of operations - 26 regiments, supplies for the regiments already fighting against the French army, and many others. The rearguard continued to carry out its assigned tasks. Thanks to this, the main forces of the Russian army retreated without major losses.

Patriotic War of 1812

Russian empire

Almost complete destruction of Napoleon's army

Opponents

Allies:

Allies:

England and Sweden did not participate in the war on Russian territory

Commanders

Napoleon I

Alexander I

E. MacDonald

M. I. Kutuzov

Jerome Bonaparte

M. B. Barclay de Tolly

K.-F. Schwarzenberg, E. Beauharnais

P. I. Bagration †

N.-Sh. Oudinot

A. P. Tormasov

K.-V. Perrin

P. V. Chichagov

L.-N. Davout,

P. H. Wittgenstein

Strengths of the parties

610 thousand soldiers, 1370 guns

650 thousand soldiers, 1600 guns, 400 thousand militias

Military losses

About 550 thousand, 1200 guns

210 thousand soldiers

Patriotic War of 1812- military actions in 1812 between Russia and the army of Napoleon Bonaparte that invaded its territory. In Napoleonic studies the term " Russian campaign of 1812"(fr. campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812).

It ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleonic army and the transfer of military operations to the territory of Poland and Germany in 1813.

Napoleon originally called for this war second Polish, because one of his declared goals of the campaign was the revival of the Polish independent state in opposition to the Russian Empire, including the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. In pre-revolutionary literature there is such an epithet of war as “the invasion of twelve languages.”

Background

Political situation on the eve of the war

After the defeat of Russian troops in the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he undertook to join the continental blockade of England. By agreement with Napoleon, Russia took Finland from Sweden in 1808 and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; Napoleon had a free hand to conquer all of Europe with the exception of England and Spain. After an unsuccessful attempt to marry the Russian Grand Duchess, in 1810 Napoleon married Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of the Austrian Emperor Franz, thus strengthening his rear and creating a foothold in Europe.

French troops, after a series of annexations, moved close to the borders of the Russian Empire.

On February 24, 1812, Napoleon concluded an alliance treaty with Prussia, which was supposed to field 20 thousand soldiers against Russia, as well as provide logistics for the French army. Napoleon also concluded a military alliance with Austria on March 14 of the same year, according to which the Austrians pledged to field 30 thousand soldiers against Russia.

Russia also diplomatically prepared the rear. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border and would not be zealous at all for the benefit of Napoleon. In April of the same year, on the Swedish side, former Napoleonic Marshal Bernadotte (future King Charles XIV of Sweden), elected crown prince in 1810 and de facto head of the Swedish aristocracy, gave assurances of his friendly position towards Russia and concluded an alliance treaty. On May 22, 1812, the Russian ambassador Kutuzov (the future field marshal and Napoleon's conqueror) managed to conclude a profitable peace with Turkey, ending the five-year war for Moldavia. In the south of Russia, Chichagov’s Danube Army was released as a barrier against Austria, which was forced to be in an alliance with Napoleon.

On May 19, 1812, Napoleon left for Dresden, where he reviewed the vassal monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the “Great Army” on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon wrote an appeal to the troops, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit Agreement and called the invasion the second Polish war. The liberation of Poland became one of the slogans that made it possible to attract many Poles into the French army. Even the French marshals did not understand the meaning and goals of the invasion of Russia, but they habitually obeyed.

At 2 a.m. on June 24, 1812, Napoleon ordered the start of the crossing to the Russian bank of the Neman through 4 bridges above Kovno.

Causes of the war

The French infringed on the interests of Russians in Europe and threatened the restoration of independent Poland. Napoleon demanded that Tsar Alexander I tighten the blockade of England. The Russian Empire did not respect the continental blockade and imposed duties on French goods. Russia demanded the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia, stationed there in violation of the Treaty of Tilsit.

Armed forces of opponents

Napoleon was able to concentrate about 450 thousand soldiers against Russia, of which the French themselves made up half. Italians, Poles, Germans, Dutch, and even Spaniards mobilized by force also took part in the campaign. Austria and Prussia allocated corps (30 and 20 thousand, respectively) against Russia under alliance agreements with Napoleon.

Spain, having tied up about 200 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, provided great assistance to Russia. England provided material and financial support to Russia, but its army was involved in battles in Spain, and the strong British fleet could not influence land operations in Europe, although it was one of the factors that tilted Sweden's position in favor of Russia.

Napoleon had the following reserves: about 90 thousand French soldiers in the garrisons of central Europe (of which 60 thousand in the 11th reserve corps in Prussia) and 100 thousand in the French National Guard, which by law could not fight outside France.

Russia had a large army, but could not quickly mobilize troops due to poor roads and vast territory. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: Barclay's 1st Army and Bagration's 2nd Army, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, Chichagov’s Danube Army (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.

According to the lists, the irregular Cossack troops numbered up to 110 thousand light cavalry, but in reality up to 20 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

Infantry,
thousand

Cavalry,
thousand

Artillery

Cossacks,
thousand

Garrisons,
thousand

Note

35-40 thousand soldiers,
1600 guns

110-132 thousand in Barclay’s 1st Army in Lithuania,
39-48 thousand in Bagration’s 2nd Army in Belarus,
40-48 thousand in the 3rd Army of Tormasov in Ukraine,
52-57 thousand on the Danube, 19 thousand in Finland,
the rest of the troops in the Caucasus and throughout the country

1370 guns

190
Outside Russia

450 thousand invaded Russia. After the start of the war, another 140 thousand arrived in Russia in the form of reinforcements. In the garrisons of Europe up to 90 thousand + National Guard in France (100 thousand)
Also not listed here are 200 thousand in Spain and 30 thousand allied corps from Austria.
The values ​​given include all troops under Napoleon, including soldiers from the German states of the Rhineland, Prussia, the Italian kingdoms, Poland.

Strategic plans of the parties

From the very beginning, the Russian side planned a long, organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of a decisive battle and the possible loss of the army. Emperor Alexander I told the French ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt, in a private conversation in May 1811:

« If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even probable that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not yet give him peace. The Spaniards were beaten repeatedly, but they were neither defeated nor subjugated. And yet they are not as far from Paris as we are: they have neither our climate nor our resources. We won't take any risks. We have vast space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. […] If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.»

However, the original campaign plan developed by the military theorist Pfuel proposed defense at the Driss fortified camp. During the war, Pfuel's plan was rejected by the generals as impossible to implement in the conditions of modern maneuver warfare. Artillery warehouses for supplying the Russian army were located in three lines:

  • Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonnoye - Kyiv
  • Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk
  • Moscow - Novgorod - Kaluga

Napoleon wished to conduct a limited campaign for 1812. He told Metternich: “ Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there.“The French emperor hoped that the defeat of the Russian army in the general battle would force Alexander to accept his conditions. Caulaincourt in his memoirs recalls Napoleon’s phrase: “ He started talking about Russian nobles who, in the event of war, would fear for their palaces and, after a major battle, would force Emperor Alexander to sign peace.»

Napoleon's offensive (June–September 1812)

At 6 a.m. on June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Russian Kovno (modern Kaunas in Lithuania), crossing the Neman. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the French army (1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry) near Kovno took 4 days.

On June 29-30, near Prena (modern Prienai in Lithuania) a little south of Kovno, another group (79 thousand soldiers: 6th and 4th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of Prince Beauharnais crossed the Neman.

At the same time, on June 30, even further south near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the overall command of Jerome Bonaparte.

North of Kovno near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of the French Marshal MacDonald. In the south of the central direction from Warsaw, the Bug River was crossed by a separate Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers).

Emperor Alexander I learned of the start of the invasion late in the evening of June 24 in Vilna (modern Vilnius in Lithuania). And already on June 28, the French entered Vilna. Only on July 16, Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city following his troops.

From Neman to Smolensk (July - August 1812)

Northern direction

Napoleon sent Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps, consisting of 32 thousand Prussians and Germans, to the north of the Russian Empire. His goal was to capture Riga, and then, uniting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), attack St. Petersburg. The core of MacDonald's corps was a 20,000-strong Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York). MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, lacking siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, Essen, burned the outskirts and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison. Trying to support Oudinot, Macdonald captured the abandoned Dinaburg on the Western Dvina and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of Macdonald's corps tried to avoid active military clashes in this foreign war, however, if the situation threatened the “honor of the Prussian arms,” the Prussians offered active resistance, and repeatedly repulsed Russian forays from Riga with heavy losses.

Oudinot, having occupied Polotsk, decided to bypass Wittgenstein’s separate corps (25 thousand), allocated by Barclay’s 1st Army during the retreat through Polotsk, from the north, and cut it off from the rear. Fearing Oudinot's connection with MacDonald, on July 30 Wittgenstein attacked Oudinot's 2/3 corps, which was not expecting an attack and was weakened by a march on the 2/3 corps, in the battle of Klyastitsy and threw it back to Polotsk. The victory allowed Wittgenstein to attack Polotsk on August 17-18, but Saint-Cyr's corps, timely sent by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repulse the attack and restore balance.

Oudinot and MacDonald were stuck in low-intensity fighting, remaining in place.

Moscow direction

Units of Barclay's 1st Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, with headquarters located in Vilna. In view of Napoleon's rapid advance, the divided Russian corps faced the threat of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational environment, but was able to escape and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. At the same time, Dorokhov’s cavalry detachment found itself cut off from the corps and united with Bagration’s army. After the 1st Army united, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.

On June 26, Barclay's army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissa fortified camp on the Western Dvina (in northern Belarus), where Emperor Alexander I planned to fight off Napoleonic troops. The generals managed to convince the emperor of the absurdity of this idea put forward by the military theorist Pfuel (or Ful). On July 16, the Russian army continued its retreat through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving Lieutenant General Wittgenstein’s 1st Corps to defend St. Petersburg. In Polotsk, Alexander I left the army, convinced to leave by persistent requests from dignitaries and family. An executive general and cautious strategist, Barclay retreated under the pressure of superior forces from almost all of Europe, and this greatly irritated Napoleon, who was interested in a speedy general battle.

The 2nd Russian Army (up to 45 thousand) under the command of Bagration at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno in western Belarus, approximately 150 kilometers from Barclay’s 1st Army. At first Bagration moved to join the main 1st Army, but when he reached Lida (100 km from Vilno), it was too late. He had to escape from the French to the south. To cut Bagration off from the main forces and destroy him, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout with a force of up to 50 thousand soldiers to cross Bagration. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. On the other hand, from the west, Jerome Bonaparte attacked Bagration with 4 corps, which crossed the Neman near Grodno. Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of the Russian armies in order to defeat them piece by piece. Bagration, with swift marches and successful rearguard battles, broke away from Jerome's troops, and now Marshal Davout became his main opponent.

On July 19, Bagration was in Bobruisk on the Berezina, while Davout on July 21 occupied Mogilev on the Dnieper with advanced units, that is, the French were ahead of Bagration, being in the northeast of the Russian 2nd Army. Bagration, having approached the Dnieper 60 km below Mogilev, sent General Raevsky’s corps against Davout on July 23 with the goal of pushing the French back from Mogilev and taking a direct road to Vitebsk, where according to plans the Russian armies were to unite. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout's advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was blocked. Bagration was able to cross the Dnieper in the town of Novoye Bykhovo without interference on July 25 and headed towards Smolensk. Davout no longer had the strength to pursue the Russian 2nd Army, and the troops of Jerome Bonaparte, hopelessly behind, were still crossing the wooded and swampy territory of Belarus.

On July 23, Barclay's army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay wanted to wait for Bagration. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy to meet the enemy vanguard. On July 25, 26 versts from Vitebsk, the battle of Ostrovno took place, which continued on July 26.

On July 27, Barclay retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility of Bagration breaking through to Vitebsk. On August 3, the Russian 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk, thus achieving their first strategic success. There was a short respite in the war; both sides were putting their troops in order, tired of continuous marches.

Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon stopped to rest his troops, frustrated after a 400 km offensive in the absence of supply bases. Only on August 12, after much hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.

South direction

The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the left flank of Napoleon’s main forces from the 3rd Russian Army under the command of Tormasov (25 thousand under arms). Rainier took a cordon position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spreading out an already small body over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov was surrounded by Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.

Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to hold Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to attract Schwarzenberg’s Austrian corps (30 thousand) to the main direction and left it in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, gathering his troops and linking up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on 12 August at Gorodechny, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk (northwest Ukraine). The main battles take place between the Saxons and the Russians, the Austrians try to limit themselves to artillery shelling and maneuvers.

Until the end of September, low-intensity fighting took place in the southern direction in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.

In addition to Tormasov, in the southern direction there was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of Lieutenant General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blocked garrison of Bobruisk. To blockade Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left Dombrowski's Polish division (10 thousand) from the 5th Polish Corps.

From Smolensk to Borodin (August-September 1812)

After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from Barclay a general battle. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay decided to defeat them one by one and marched on August 8 to Rudnya, where Murat’s cavalry was quartered.

However, Napoleon, taking advantage of the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to go to Barclay’s rear, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he crossed the Dnieper west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoye. Neverovsky's stubborn resistance gave time to transfer General Raevsky's corps to Smolensk.

By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), into whose 7th corps the remnants of Neverovsky’s division joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay was against a battle that was unnecessary in his opinion, but at that time there was actual dual command in the Russian army. At 6 a.m. on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city with a march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a major battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army) covered the retreat route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed at Smolensk).

Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rearguard detained the marshal, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind the Russian rear in a roundabout way, but he was unable to complete the task, running into an impassable swamp, and the Russian army left in good order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a large city, marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon’s marshals. Settlements along the route of the French army were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised peace proposal to Tsar Alexander I, so far from a position of strength, but did not receive an answer.

Relations between Bagration and Barclay after leaving Smolensk became more and more tense with each day of retreat, and in this dispute the mood of the nobility was not on the side of the cautious Barclay. On August 17, the emperor assembled a council, which recommended that he appoint infantry general Prince Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army. On August 29, Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day the French entered Vyazma.

Continuing the general strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. Russian society demanded a battle, even though it was unnecessary from a military point of view. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino; further retreat implied the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle, since the balance of power had shifted in the Russian direction. If at the beginning of the invasion Napoleon had a threefold superiority in the number of soldiers over the opposing Russian army, now the numbers of the armies were comparable - 135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The problem of the Russian army was the lack of weapons. While the militia provided up to 80-100 thousand warriors from the Russian central provinces, there were no guns to arm the militia. The warriors were given pikes, but Kutuzov did not use people as “cannon fodder”.

On September 7 (August 26, Old Style) near the village of Borodino (124 km west of Moscow), the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place between the Russian and French armies.

After almost two days of battle, which consisted of an assault by French troops on the fortified Russian line, the French, at the cost of 30-34 thousand of their soldiers, pushed the Russian left flank out of position. The Russian army suffered heavy losses, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk on September 8 with the firm intention of preserving the army.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon on September 13, in the village of Fili, Kutuzov ordered the generals to gather for a meeting on the further plan of action. Most of the generals spoke in favor of a new general battle with Napoleon. Then Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and announced that he was ordering a retreat.

On September 14, the Russian army passed through Moscow and reached the Ryazan road (southeast of Moscow). Towards evening, Napoleon entered empty Moscow.

Capture of Moscow (September 1812)

On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight, and already on the night of the same day the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15 intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow.

Up to 400 lower-class townspeople were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.

There are several versions of the fire - organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of F.V. Rostopchin), arson by Russian spies (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges), uncontrolled actions of the occupiers, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by general chaos in an abandoned city. The fire had several sources, so it is possible that all versions are true to one degree or another.

Kutuzov, retreating from Moscow south to the Ryazan road, performed the famous Tarutino maneuver. Having knocked off the trail of Murat's pursuing cavalrymen, Kutuzov turned west from the Ryazan road through Podolsk onto the old Kaluga road, where he reached on September 20 in the Krasnaya Pakhra area (near the modern city of Troitsk).

Then, convinced that his position was unprofitable, by October 2, Kutuzov transferred the army south to the village of Tarutino, which lies along the old Kaluga road in the Kaluga region not far from the border with Moscow. With this maneuver, Kutuzov blocked Napoleon’s main roads to the southern provinces, and also created a constant threat to the rear communications of the French.

Napoleon called Moscow not a military, but a political position. Hence, he makes repeated attempts to reconcile with Alexander I. In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap: it was not possible to spend the winter in a city devastated by a fire, foraging outside the city was not going well, the French communications stretched over thousands of kilometers were very vulnerable, the army, after suffering hardships, began to disintegrate. On October 5, Napoleon sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov for passage to Alexander I with the order: “ I need peace, I need it absolutely at all costs, save only honor" Kutuzov, after a short conversation, sent Lauriston back to Moscow. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat not yet from Russia, but to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.

Napoleon's retreat (October-December 1812)

Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, Wittgenstein's army, held by the French corps of Saint-Cyr and Oudinot, hung over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region. Napoleon's right flank trampled near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. Tormasov's army connected with its presence the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of Rainier. French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded the communication line and Napoleon's rear.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets (October 1812)

On October 18, Kutuzov launched an attack on the French barrier under the command of Murat, who was monitoring the Russian army near Tarutino. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated to Moscow. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive.

On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the old Kaluga road. Napoleon, in anticipation of the coming winter, planned to get to the nearest large base, Smolensk, where, according to his calculations, supplies were stocked for the French army, which was experiencing hardships. In the Russian off-road conditions, it was possible to get to Smolensk by a direct route, the Smolensk road, along which the French came to Moscow. Another route led south through Kaluga. The second route was preferable, since it passed through unravaged areas, and the loss of horses from the lack of forage in the French army reached alarming proportions. Due to the lack of horses, the artillery fleet was reduced, and large French cavalry formations practically disappeared.

The road to Kaluga was blocked by Napoleon's army, positioned near Tarutino on the old Kaluga road. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of ​​the village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the new Kaluga road (modern Kyiv highway) to bypass Tarutino.

However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the new Kaluga road.

On October 24, the battle of Maloyaroslavets took place. The French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.

On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. The battles for Maloyaroslavets were in vain for the French and only delayed their retreat. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow.

From Maloyaroslavets to Berezina (October-November 1812)

From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasny (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of Miloradovich. Platov's Cossacks and partisans attacked the retreating French from all sides, not giving the enemy any opportunity for supplies. Kutuzov's main army slowly moved south parallel to Napoleon, performing the so-called flank march.

On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma, on November 8 he entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days waiting for the stragglers. On November 3, the Russian vanguard severely battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma. Napoleon had at his disposal in Smolensk up to 50 thousand soldiers under arms (of which only 5 thousand were cavalry), and about the same number of unfit soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons.

Units of the French army, greatly thinned out on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of food in the city, and what was there was plundered by crowds of uncontrollable soldiers of the Great Army. Napoleon ordered the shooting of the French intendant Sioff, who, faced with resistance from the peasants, failed to organize the collection of food.

Napoleon's strategic position had deteriorated greatly, Chichagov's Danube Army was approaching from the south, Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of the food reserves accumulated there.

On November 14, Napoleon and the guard moved from Smolensk following the vanguard corps. Ney's corps, which was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17. The column of French troops was greatly extended, since the difficulties of the road precluded a compact march of large masses of people. Kutuzov took advantage of this circumstance, cutting off the French’s route of retreat in the Krasnoye area. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near Krasny, Napoleon managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.

The Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) captured Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of its largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard captured Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, but the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.

On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the pursuing armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov.

From Berezina to Neman (November-December 1812)

On November 25, through a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert Chichagov’s attention to Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a shortcut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. Meanwhile, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina, throwing off the weak Russian guards.

Realizing the mistake, Chichagov attacked Napoleon with his main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rearguard defending the crossing was attacked by Wittgenstein's approaching corps. Kutuzov's main army fell behind. Without waiting for the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, consisting of the wounded, frostbitten, those who had lost their weapons and civilians, to cross, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

Having lost up to 30 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved towards Vilna, joining along the way French divisions operating in other directions. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of unfit people, mainly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons. The course of the war at the final stage, a 2-week pursuit by the Russian army of the remnants of Napoleonic troops to the border of the Russian Empire, is outlined in the article “From the Berezina to the Neman.” Severe frosts that struck during the crossing finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The pursuit of Russian troops did not give Napoleon the opportunity to gather at least some strength in Vilna; the flight of the French continued to the Neman, which separated Russia from Prussia and the buffer state of the Duchy of Warsaw.

On December 6, Napoleon left the army, going to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia. Of the 47 thousand elite guards who entered Russia with the emperor, six months later only a few hundred soldiers remained.

On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the “Great Army” in the amount of 1,600 people crossed the Neman into Poland, and then into Prussia. Later they were joined by remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete destruction of the invading “Grand Army”.

The last stage of the war was commented on by the impartial observer Clausewitz:

Northern direction (October-December 1812)

After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, bringing Wittgenstein’s advancing army dangerously closer to Napoleon’s rear line. During these days, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Victor's 9th Corps, which arrived in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe, was immediately sent to help from Smolensk. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which approximately corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein. An oncoming battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French were defeated and rolled back even further to the south.

Vitebsk remained uncovered; a detachment from Wittgenstein’s army stormed the city on November 7, capturing 300 garrison soldiers and food supplies for Napoleon’s retreating army. On November 14, Marshal Victor, near the village of Smolyan, tried to push Wittgenstein back across the Dvina, but was unsuccessful, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina. Then Victor, joining the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.

In the Baltic states near Riga, a positional war was fought with rare Russian forays against MacDonald's corps. General Steingel's Finnish corps (12 thousand) came to the aid of the Riga garrison on September 20, but after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main military operations. On November 15, Macdonald, in turn, successfully attacked Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.

Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps began to retreat from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the pitiful remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with Wittgenstein's vanguard. On December 30, Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, Macdonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.

Southern direction (October-December 1812)

On September 18, Admiral Chichagov with an army (38 thousand) approached from the Danube to the slow-moving southern front in the Lutsk region. The combined forces of Chichagov and Tormasov (65 thousand) attacked Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing the latter to leave for Poland in mid-October. Chichagov, who took over the main command after the recall of Tormasov, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24 thousand soldiers, leaving General Sacken with a 27 thousand-strong corps against the Austrians Schwarzenberg.

Schwarzenberg pursued Chichagov, bypassing Sacken's positions and covering himself from his troops with Rainier's Saxon corps. Rainier was unable to hold off Sacken's superior forces, and Schwarzenberg was forced to turn toward the Russians from Slonim. With joint forces, Rainier and Schwarzenberg drove Sacken south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov’s army broke through to Napoleon’s rear and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.

On November 27, Schwarzenberg, by order of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to Poland.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon, a recognized genius of military art, invaded Russia with forces three times greater than the Western Russian armies under the command of generals not marked by brilliant victories, and after just six months of the campaign, his army, the strongest in history, was completely destroyed.

The destruction of almost 550 thousand soldiers is beyond the imagination of even modern Western historians. A large number of articles are devoted to searching for the reasons for the defeat of the greatest commander and analyzing the factors of the war. The most frequently cited reasons are bad roads in Russia and frost; there are attempts to explain the defeat by the poor harvest of 1812, which is why it was not possible to ensure normal supplies.

The Russian campaign (in Western names) received the name Patriotic in Russia, which explains the defeat of Napoleon. A combination of factors led to his defeat: popular participation in the war, mass heroism of soldiers and officers, the leadership talent of Kutuzov and other generals, and the skillful use of natural factors. The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only a rise in national spirit, but also a desire to modernize the country, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825.

Clausewitz, analyzing Napoleon’s campaign in Russia from a military point of view, comes to the conclusion:

According to Clausewitz's calculations, the invasion army in Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, numbered 610 thousand soldiers, including 50 thousand soldier of Austria and Prussia. While the Austrians and Prussians, operating in secondary directions, mostly survived, only Napoleon's main army had assembled across the Vistula by January 1813. 23 thousand soldier. Napoleon lost over 550 thousand trained soldiers, the entire elite guard, over 1200 guns.

According to the calculations of the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “in a pitiable condition and mostly unarmed.” Many of them, according to Count Segur, died of disease upon reaching safe territory. To this number must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (who returned to the French army) from the Rainier and Macdonald corps, operating in other directions. Apparently, from all these returning soldiers, 23 thousand (mentioned by Clausewitz) later gathered under the command of the French. The relatively large number of surviving officers allowed Napoleon to organize a new army, calling up the recruits of 1813.

In a report to Emperor Alexander I, Field Marshal Kutuzov estimated the total number of French prisoners at 150 thousand man (December, 1812).

Although Napoleon managed to gather fresh forces, their fighting qualities could not replace the dead veterans. The Patriotic War in January 1813 turned into the “Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army”: the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig and in April 1814 abdicated the throne of France (see article War of the Sixth Coalition).

The historian of the mid-19th century M.I. Bogdanovich traced the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the statements of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. He counted the reinforcements of the Main Army at 134 thousand people. By the time of the occupation of Vilna in December, the main army numbered 70 thousand soldiers in its ranks, and the composition of the 1st and 2nd Western armies at the beginning of the war was up to 150 thousand soldiers. Thus, the total loss by December is 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich’s assumption, up to 40 thousand wounded and sick returned to duty. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions and the losses of the militias could amount to approximately the same 40 thousand people. Based on these calculations, Bogdanovich estimates the losses of the Russian army in the Patriotic War at 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

Memory of the War of 1812

On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued a Manifesto: “ December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, will henceforth be a day of thanksgiving celebration under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Empire from the invasion of the Gauls and with them the twenty tongues».

The highest manifesto on bringing thanksgiving to God for the liberation of Russia 12/25/1812

God and the whole world are witnesses to this with what desires and strength the enemy entered our beloved Fatherland. Nothing could avert his evil and stubborn intentions. Firmly relying on his own and the terrible forces he had collected against Us from almost all European Powers, and driven by the greed of conquest and the thirst for blood, he hastened to burst into the very breast of Our Great Empire in order to pour out on it all the horrors and disasters that were not generated by chance, but from ancient times the all-devastating war prepared for them. Knowing from experience the boundless lust for power and the impudence of his enterprises, the bitter cup of evils prepared for Us from him, and seeing him already entering Our borders with indomitable rage, We were forced with a painful and contrite heart, calling on God for help, to draw our sword, and promise to Our Kingdom that We will not put it into the vagina, until at least one of the enemies remains armed in Our land. We placed this promise firmly in Our hearts, hoping for the strong valor of the people entrusted to Us by God, in which we were not deceived. What an example of courage, courage, piety, patience and firmness Russia has shown! The enemy who had broken into her chest with all the unheard of means of cruelty and frenzy could not achieve the point that she would sigh even once about the deep wounds inflicted on her by him. It seemed that with the shedding of her blood, the spirit of courage increased in her, with the fires of her cities, love for the Fatherland was inflamed, with the destruction and desecration of the temples of God, faith was confirmed in her and irreconcilable vengeance arose. The army, the nobles, the nobility, the clergy, the merchants, the people, in a word, all government ranks and fortunes, sparing neither their property nor their lives, formed a single soul, a soul together courageous and pious, as much flaming with love for the Fatherland as with love for God . From this universal consent and zeal, consequences soon arose that were hardly incredible, hardly ever heard of. Let those gathered from 20 Kingdoms and nations, united under one banner, imagine the terrible forces with which the power-hungry, arrogant, and fierce enemy entered Our land! Half a million foot and horse soldiers and about one and a half thousand cannons followed him. With such a huge militia, he penetrates into the very middle of Russia, spreads, and begins to spread fire and devastation everywhere. But six months have barely passed since he entered Our borders, and where is he? Here it is appropriate to say the words of the sacred Songsinger: “I have seen the wicked exalted and towering like the cedars of Lebanon. And I passed by, and behold, I sought him, and his place was not found.” Truly this lofty saying was fulfilled in all the power of its meaning over Our proud and wicked enemy. Where are his troops, like a cloud of black clouds driven by the winds? Scattered like rain. A great part of them, having watered the earth with blood, lies covering the space of Moscow, Kaluga, Smolensk, Belarusian and Lithuanian fields. Another great part in various and frequent battles was taken prisoner with many military leaders and generals, and in such a way that after repeated and severe defeats, finally their entire regiments, resorting to the generosity of the victors, bowed their weapons before them. The rest, an equally great part, driven in their swift flight by Our victorious troops and greeted by scum and famine, covered the path from Moscow itself to the borders of Russia with corpses, cannons, carts, shells, so that the smallest, insignificant part of the exhausted ones remaining from all their numerous forces and unarmed warriors, hardly half-dead, can come to their country, in order to inform them, to the eternal horror and trembling of their fellow countrymen, since a terrible execution befalls those who dare with abusive intentions to enter the bowels of powerful Russia. Now, with heartfelt joy and ardent gratitude to God, We announce to Our dear loyal subjects that the event has surpassed even Our very hope, and that what We announced at the opening of this war has been fulfilled beyond measure: there is no longer a single enemy on the face of Our land; or better yet, they all stayed here, but how? dead, wounded and prisoners. The proud ruler and leader himself could barely ride away with his most important officials, having lost all his army and all the cannons he brought with him, which, more than a thousand, not counting those buried and sunk by him, were recaptured from him and are in Our hands. The spectacle of the death of his troops is incredible! You can hardly believe your own eyes! Who could do this? Without taking away worthy glory either from the famous Commander-in-Chief of our troops, who brought immortal merit to the Fatherland, or from other skillful and courageous leaders and military leaders who distinguished themselves with zeal and zeal; nor in general for all of Our brave army, we can say that what they did is beyond human strength. And so, let us recognize God’s providence in this great matter. Let us prostrate ourselves before His Holy Throne, and seeing clearly His hand, punishing pride and wickedness, instead of vanity and arrogance about Our victories, let us learn from this great and terrible example to be meek and humble doers of His laws and will, not like these defilers who have fallen away from the faith temples of God, Our enemies, whose bodies in countless numbers are strewn as food for dogs and corvids! Great is the Lord Our God in His mercy and in His wrath! Let us go by the goodness of our deeds and the purity of our feelings and thoughts, the only path leading to Him, to the temple of His holiness, and there, crowned by His hand with glory, let us give thanks for the generosity poured out on us, and let us fall to Him with warm prayers, that He may extend His mercy over By Us, and ceasing wars and battles, He will send victory to Us; desired peace and silence.

The Christmas holiday was also celebrated as the modern Victory Day until 1917.

To commemorate the victory in the war, many monuments and memorials were erected, of which the most famous are the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column. A grandiose project has been implemented in painting, the Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. One of the most famous works of Russian literature was the epic novel “War and Peace,” where L. N. Tolstoy tried to comprehend global human issues against the backdrop of war. The Soviet film War and Peace, based on the novel, won an Academy Award in 1968; its large-scale battle scenes are still considered unsurpassed.

Already in Moscow, this war would not turn into a brilliant victory for him, but a shameful flight from Russia the distraught soldiers of his once great army, which conquered all of Europe? In 1807, after the defeat of the Russian army in the battle with the French near Friedland, Emperor Alexander I was forced to sign the unfavorable and humiliating Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon. At that moment, no one thought that in a few years Russian troops would drive Napoleon’s army to Paris, and Russia would take a leading position in European politics.

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Causes and course of the Patriotic War of 1812

Main reasons

  1. Violation by both Russia and France of the terms of the Tilsit Treaty. Russia sabotaged the continental blockade of England, which was disadvantageous for itself. France, in violation of the treaty, stationed troops in Prussia, annexing the Duchy of Oldenburg.
  2. The policy towards European states pursued by Napoleon without taking into account the interests of Russia.
  3. An indirect reason can also be considered that Bonaparte twice made attempts to marry the sisters of Alexander the First, but both times he was refused.

Since 1810, both sides have been actively pursuing preparation to war, accumulating military forces.

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

Who, if not Bonaparte, who conquered Europe, could be confident in his blitzkrieg? Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army in border battles. Early in the morning of June 24, 1812, the Grand Army of the French crossed the Russian border in four places.

The northern flank under the command of Marshal MacDonald set out in the direction of Riga - St. Petersburg. Main a group of troops under the command of Napoleon himself advanced towards Smolensk. To the south of the main forces, the offensive was developed by the corps of Napoleon's stepson, Eugene Beauharnais. The corps of the Austrian general Karl Schwarzenberg was advancing in the Kiev direction.

After crossing the border, Napoleon failed to maintain the high tempo of the offensive. It was not only the vast Russian distances and the famous Russian roads that were to blame. The local population gave the French army a slightly different reception than in Europe. Sabotage food supplies from the occupied territories became the most massive form of resistance to the invaders, but, of course, only a regular army could provide serious resistance to them.

Before joining Moscow The French army had to participate in nine major battles. In a large number of battles and armed skirmishes. Even before the occupation of Smolensk, the Great Army lost 100 thousand soldiers, but, in general, the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812 was extremely unsuccessful for the Russian army.

On the eve of the invasion of Napoleonic army, Russian troops were dispersed in three places. Barclay de Tolly's first army was near Vilna, Bagration's second army was near Volokovysk, and Tormasov's third army was in Volyn. Strategy Napoleon's goal was to break up the Russian armies separately. Russian troops begin to retreat.

Through the efforts of the so-called Russian party, instead of Barclay de Tolly, M.I. Kutuzov was appointed to the post of commander-in-chief, with whom many generals with Russian surnames sympathized. The retreat strategy was not popular in Russian society.

However, Kutuzov continued to adhere to tactics retreat chosen by Barclay de Tolly. Napoleon sought to impose a main, general battle on the Russian army as soon as possible.

The main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812

Bloody battle for Smolensk became a rehearsal for a general battle. Bonaparte, hoping that the Russians will concentrate all their forces here, is preparing the main blow, and pulls up an army of 185 thousand to the city. Despite Bagration's objections, Baclay de Tolly decides to leave Smolensk. The French, having lost more than 20 thousand people in battle, entered the burning and destroyed city. The Russian army, despite the surrender of Smolensk, retained its combat effectiveness.

The news about surrender of Smolensk overtook Kutuzov near Vyazma. Meanwhile, Napoleon advanced his army towards Moscow. Kutuzov found himself in a very serious situation. He continued his retreat, but before leaving Moscow, Kutuzov had to fight a general battle. The protracted retreat left a depressing impression on the Russian soldiers. Everyone was full of desire to give a decisive battle. When a little more than a hundred miles remained to Moscow, on a field near the village of Borodino the Great Army collided, as Bonaparte himself later admitted, with the Invincible Army.

Before the start of the battle, the Russian troops numbered 120 thousand, the French numbered 135 thousand. On the left flank of the formation of Russian troops were Semyonov’s flashes and units of the second army Bagration. On the right are the battle formations of the first army of Barclay de Tolly, and the old Smolensk road was covered by the third infantry corps of General Tuchkov.

At dawn, September 7, Napoleon inspected the positions. At seven o'clock in the morning the French batteries gave the signal to begin the battle.

The grenadiers of Major General took the brunt of the first blow Vorontsova and 27th Infantry Division Nemerovsky near the village of Semenovskaya. The French broke into Semyonov's flushes several times, but abandoned them under the pressure of Russian counterattacks. During the main counterattack here, Bagration was mortally wounded. As a result, the French managed to capture the flushes, but they did not gain any advantages. They failed to break through the left flank, and the Russians retreated in an organized manner to the Semyonov ravines, taking up a position there.

A difficult situation developed in the center, where Bonaparte’s main attack was directed, where the battery fought desperately Raevsky. To break the resistance of the battery defenders, Napoleon was already ready to bring his main reserve into battle. But this was prevented by Platov’s Cossacks and Uvarov’s cavalrymen, who, on Kutuzov’s orders, carried out a swift raid into the rear of the French left flank. This stopped the French advance on Raevsky's battery for about two hours, which allowed the Russians to bring up some reserves.

After bloody battles, the Russians retreated from Raevsky’s battery in an organized manner and again took up defensive positions. The battle, which had already lasted twelve hours, gradually subsided.

During Battle of Borodino The Russians lost almost half of their personnel, but continued to hold their positions. The Russian army lost twenty-seven of its best generals, four of them were killed, and twenty-three were wounded. The French lost about thirty thousand soldiers. Of the thirty French generals who were incapacitated, eight died.

Brief results of the Battle of Borodino:

  1. Napoleon was unable to defeat the Russian army and achieve the complete surrender of Russia.
  2. Kutuzov, although he greatly weakened Bonaparte’s army, was unable to defend Moscow.

Despite the fact that the Russians were formally unable to win, the Borodino field forever remained in Russian history as a field of Russian glory.

Having received information about losses near Borodino, Kutuzov I realized that the second battle would be disastrous for the Russian army, and Moscow would have to be abandoned. At the military council in Fili, Kutuzov insisted on the surrender of Moscow without a fight, although many generals were against it.

September 14 Russian army left Moscow. The Emperor of Europe, observing the majestic panorama of Moscow from Poklonnaya Hill, was waiting for the city delegation with the keys to the city. After the hardships and hardships of war, Bonaparte’s soldiers found long-awaited warm apartments, food and valuables in the abandoned city, which the Muscovites, who had mostly left the city with the army, did not have time to take out.

After widespread looting and looting Fires started in Moscow. Due to the dry and windy weather, the entire city was on fire. For safety reasons, Napoleon was forced to move from the Kremlin to the suburban Petrovsky Palace; on the way, he got lost and almost burned himself to death.

Bonaparte allowed the soldiers of his army to plunder what was not yet burned. The French army was distinguished by its defiant disdain for the local population. Marshal Davout built his bedroom in the altar of the Archangel Church. Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin The French used it as a stable, and in Arkhangelskoye they organized an army kitchen. The oldest monastery in Moscow, St. Daniel's Monastery, was equipped for cattle slaughter.

This behavior of the French outraged the entire Russian people to the core. Everyone burned with vengeance for the desecrated shrines and the desecration of the Russian land. Now the war has finally acquired the character and content domestic.

The expulsion of the French from Russia and the end of the war

Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, committed maneuver, thanks to which the French army had already lost the initiative before the end of the war. The Russians, retreating along the Ryazan road, were able to march onto the old Kaluga road, and entrenched themselves near the village of Tarutino, from where they were able to control all directions leading from Moscow to the south, through Kaluga.

Kutuzov foresaw that precisely Kaluga land unaffected by the war, Bonaparte will begin to retreat. The entire time Napoleon was in Moscow, the Russian army was replenished with fresh reserves. On October 18, near the village of Tarutino, Kutuzov attacked the French units of Marshal Murat. As a result of the battle, the French lost more than four thousand people and retreated. Russian losses amounted to about one and a half thousand.

Bonaparte realized the futility of his expectations of a peace treaty, and the very next day after the Tarutino battle he hastily left Moscow. The Grand Army now resembled a barbarian horde with plundered property. Having completed complex maneuvers on the march to Kaluga, the French entered Maloyaroslavets. On October 24, Russian troops decided to drive the French out of the city. Maloyaroslavets as a result of a stubborn battle, it changed hands eight times.

This battle became a turning point in the history of the Patriotic War of 1812. The French had to retreat along the old Smolensk road they had destroyed. Now the once Great Army considered its successful retreats as victories. Russian troops used parallel pursuit tactics. After the battle of Vyazma, and especially after the battle near the village of Krasnoye, where the losses of Bonaparte’s army were comparable to its losses at Borodino, the effectiveness of such tactics became obvious.

In the territories occupied by the French they were active partisans. Bearded peasants, armed with pitchforks and axes, suddenly appeared from the forest, which numbed the French. The element of people's war captured not only the peasants, but also all classes of Russian society. Kutuzov himself sent his son-in-law, Prince Kudashev, to the partisans, who led one of the detachments.

The last and decisive blow was dealt to Napoleon's army at the crossing Berezina River. Many Western historians consider the Berezina operation almost a triumph of Napoleon, who managed to preserve the Great Army, or rather its remnants. About 9 thousand French soldiers were able to cross the Berezina.

Napoleon, who did not lose, in fact, a single battle in Russia, lost campaign. The Great Army ceased to exist.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

  1. In the vastness of Russia, the French army was almost completely destroyed, which affected the balance of power in Europe.
  2. The self-awareness of all layers of Russian society has increased unusually.
  3. Russia, having emerged victorious from the war, strengthened its position in the geopolitical arena.
  4. The national liberation movement intensified in European countries conquered by Napoleon.

On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the Patriotic War began - the liberation war of Russia against Napoleonic aggression.

The invasion of the troops of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte into the Russian Empire was caused by the aggravation of Russian-French economic and political contradictions, the actual refusal of Russia to participate in the continental blockade (a system of economic and political measures applied by Napoleon I in the war with England), etc.

Napoleon strove for world domination, Russia interfered with the implementation of his plans. He hoped, having delivered the main blow to the right flank of the Russian army in the general direction of Vilno (Vilnius), to defeat it in one or two general battles, capture Moscow, force Russia to capitulate and dictate a peace treaty to it on terms favorable to himself.

On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, Napoleon’s “Great Army”, without declaring war, crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire. It numbered over 440 thousand people and had a second echelon, which included 170 thousand people. The “Grand Army” included troops from all Western European countries conquered by Napoleon (French troops made up only half of its strength). It was opposed by three Russian armies, far apart from each other, with a total number of 220-240 thousand people. Initially, only two of them acted against Napoleon - the first, under the command of infantry general Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, covering the St. Petersburg direction, and the second, under the command of infantry general Peter Bagration, concentrated in the Moscow direction. The Third Army of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov covered the southwestern borders of Russia and began military operations at the end of the war. At the beginning of hostilities, the general leadership of the Russian forces was carried out by Emperor Alexander I; in July 1812, he transferred the main command to Barclay de Tolly.

Four days after the invasion of Russia, French troops occupied Vilna. On July 8 (June 26, old style) they entered Minsk.

Having unraveled Napoleon's plan to separate the Russian first and second armies and defeat them one by one, the Russian command began a systematic withdrawal of them to unite. Instead of gradually dismembering the enemy, French troops were forced to move behind the escaping Russian armies, stretching communications and losing superiority in forces. While retreating, the Russian troops fought rearguard battles (a battle undertaken with the aim of delaying the advancing enemy and thereby ensuring the retreat of the main forces), inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

To help the active army to repel the invasion of the Napoleonic army on Russia, on the basis of the manifesto of Alexander I of July 18 (July 6, old style) 1812 and his appeal to the residents of the “Mother See of our Moscow” with a call to act as initiators, temporary armed formations began to form - popular militia. This allowed the Russian government to mobilize large human and material resources for the war in a short time.

Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of Russian armies. On July 20 (July 8, old style), the French occupied Mogilev and did not allow the Russian armies to unite in the Orsha region. Only thanks to stubborn rearguard battles and the high art of maneuver of the Russian armies, which managed to frustrate the enemy’s plans, did they unite near Smolensk on August 3 (July 22, old style), keeping their main forces combat-ready. The first big battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place here. The battle of Smolensk lasted three days: from August 16 to 18 (from August 4 to 6, old style). The Russian regiments repelled all French attacks and retreated only on orders, leaving the enemy a burning city. Almost all the inhabitants left it with the troops. After the battles for Smolensk, the united Russian armies continued to retreat towards Moscow.

The retreat strategy of Barclay de Tolly, unpopular neither in the army nor in Russian society, leaving significant territory to the enemy forced Emperor Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all Russian armies and on August 20 (August 8, old style) to appoint infantry general Mikhail Golenishchev to it. Kutuzov, who had extensive combat experience and was popular both among the Russian army and among the nobility. The emperor not only placed him at the head of the active army, but also subordinated to him the militias, reserves and civil authorities in the war-affected provinces.

Based on the demands of Emperor Alexander I, the mood of the army, which was eager to give battle to the enemy, Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov decided, based on a pre-selected position, 124 kilometers from Moscow, near the village of Borodino near Mozhaisk, to give the French army a general battle in order to inflict as much damage as possible on it and stop the attack on Moscow.

By the beginning of the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army had 132 (according to other sources 120) thousand people, the French - approximately 130-135 thousand people.

It was preceded by the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt, which began on September 5 (August 24, old style), in which Napoleon’s troops, despite more than three times superiority in strength, managed to capture the redoubt only by the end of the day with great difficulty. This battle allowed Kutuzov to unravel the plan of Napoleon I and timely strengthen his left wing.

The Battle of Borodino began at five o'clock in the morning on September 7 (August 26, old style) and lasted until 20 o'clock in the evening. During the entire day, Napoleon failed to either break through the Russian position in the center or bypass it from the flanks. The partial tactical successes of the French army - the Russians retreated from their original position by about one kilometer - did not become victorious for it. Late in the evening, the frustrated and bloodless French troops were withdrawn to their original positions. The Russian field fortifications they took were so destroyed that there was no longer any point in holding them. Napoleon never managed to defeat the Russian army. In the Battle of Borodino, the French lost up to 50 thousand people, the Russians - over 44 thousand people.

Since the losses in the battle were enormous and their reserves exhausted, the Russian army withdrew from the Borodino field, retreating to Moscow, while fighting a rearguard action. On September 13 (September 1, old style) at the military council in Fili, a majority of votes supported the decision of the commander-in-chief “for the sake of preserving the army and Russia” to leave Moscow to the enemy without a fight. The next day, Russian troops left the capital. Most of the population left the city with them. On the very first day of the entry of French troops into Moscow, fires began that devastated the city. For 36 days, Napoleon languished in the burnt-out city, waiting in vain for an answer to his proposal to Alexander I for peace, on terms favorable to him.

The main Russian army, leaving Moscow, made a march maneuver and settled in the Tarutino camp, reliably covering the south of the country. From here, Kutuzov launched a small war using army partisan detachments. During this time, the peasantry of the war-torn Great Russian provinces rose up in a large-scale people's war.

Napoleon's attempts to enter into negotiations were rejected.

On October 18 (October 6, old style) after the battle on the Chernishna River (near the village of Tarutino), in which the vanguard of the “Great Army” under the command of Marshal Murat was defeated, Napoleon left Moscow and sent his troops towards Kaluga to break into the southern Russian provinces rich in food resources. Four days after the French left, advanced detachments of the Russian army entered the capital.

After the battle of Maloyaroslavets on October 24 (October 12, old style), when the Russian army blocked the enemy’s path, Napoleon’s troops were forced to begin a retreat along the devastated old Smolensk road. Kutuzov organized the pursuit of the French along the roads south of the Smolensk highway, acting with strong vanguards. Napoleon's troops lost people not only in clashes with their pursuers, but also from partisan attacks, from hunger and cold.

Kutuzov brought troops from the south and north-west of the country to the flanks of the retreating French army, which began to actively act and inflict defeat on the enemy. Napoleon's troops actually found themselves surrounded on the Berezina River near the city of Borisov (Belarus), where on November 26-29 (November 14-17, old style) they fought with Russian troops who were trying to cut off their escape routes. The French emperor, having misled the Russian command by constructing a false crossing, was able to transfer the remaining troops across two hastily built bridges across the river. On November 28 (November 16, old style), Russian troops attacked the enemy on both banks of the Berezina, but, despite superior forces, were unsuccessful due to indecision and incoherence of actions. On the morning of November 29 (November 17, old style), by order of Napoleon, the bridges were burned. On the left bank there were convoys and crowds of stragglers of French soldiers (about 40 thousand people), most of whom drowned during the crossing or were captured, and the total losses of the French army in the battle of the Berezina amounted to 50 thousand people. But Napoleon managed to avoid complete defeat in this battle and retreat to Vilna.

The liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire from the enemy ended on December 26 (December 14, old style), when Russian troops occupied the border cities of Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk. The enemy lost up to 570 thousand people on the battlefields. The losses of Russian troops amounted to about 300 thousand people.

The official end of the Patriotic War of 1812 is considered to be the manifesto signed by Emperor Alexander I on January 6, 1813 (December 25, 1812, old style), in which he announced that he had kept his word not to stop the war until the enemy was completely expelled from Russian territory. empires.

The defeat and death of the "Great Army" in Russia created the conditions for the liberation of the peoples of Western Europe from Napoleonic tyranny and predetermined the collapse of Napoleon's empire. The Patriotic War of 1812 showed the complete superiority of Russian military art over the military art of Napoleon and caused a nationwide patriotic upsurge in Russia.

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Causes and nature of the war. The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.

Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.

Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.

However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .

Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.

Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

Stages of war. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.

The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.

The Russian troops faced two main tasks - to eliminate disunity (not to allow themselves to be defeated individually) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.

The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.

Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. The order of M.I. Kutuzov on the army of December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western regions were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

46. ​​Internal policy of Russia 1812 – 1825. Decembrist movement



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