Places of battles of the First World War in Transcaucasia. Caucasian front of the First World War. Genocide of Western Armenians

Introduction

The Caucasian Front is a combined arms operational-strategic formation of Russian troops in the Caucasian theater of military operations (TVD) of the First World War (1914-1918). Officially ceased to exist in March 1918 due to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by Soviet Russia.

See also the article Caucasian Army.

1. The beginning of the war. Balance of power

On August 2, 1914, a German-Turkish alliance treaty was signed, according to which the Turkish army was actually placed under the leadership of the German military mission, and mobilization was announced in the country. However, at the same time, the Turkish government published a declaration of neutrality. On August 10, the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau entered the Dardanelles Strait, having escaped pursuit of the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. With the advent of these ships, not only the Turkish army, but also the fleet found themselves under the command of the Germans. On September 9, the Turkish government announced to all powers that it had decided to abolish the capitulation regime (the special legal status of foreign citizens).

However, most members of the Turkish government, including the Grand Vizier, still opposed the war. Then War Minister Enver Pasha, together with the German command, started the war without the consent of the rest of the government, presenting the country with a fait accompli. On October 29 and 30, 1914, the Turkish fleet shelled Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk (in Russia this event received the unofficial name “Sevastopol Reveille”). On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. England and France followed on November 5 and 6. Thus, the Caucasian Front emerged between Russia and Turkey in the Asian theater of operations.

The martial art of the generals of the Ottoman army and its organization were inferior in level to the Entente, but military operations on the Caucasian front were able to divert some of the Russian forces from the fronts in Poland and Galicia and ensure the victory of the German army, even at the cost of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. It was for this purpose that Germany provided the Turkish army with the military-technical resources necessary for waging war, and the Ottoman Empire provided its human resources by deploying the 3rd Army on the Russian front, which at the initial stage was headed by the Minister of War Enver Pasha himself (Chief of Staff - German General F. Bronzart von Schellendorff). The 3rd Army, numbering about 100 infantry battalions, 35 cavalry squadrons and up to 250 guns, occupied positions from the Black Sea coast to Mosul, with the bulk of the forces concentrated on the left flank against the Russian Caucasian Army.

For Russia, the Caucasus theater of war was secondary compared to the Western Front - however, Russia should have been wary of Turkish attempts to regain control of the Kars fortress and the port of Batumi, which Turkey had lost in the late 1870s. Military operations on the Caucasian front took place mainly on the territory of Western Armenia, as well as Persia.

The war in the Caucasus theater of operations was fought by both sides in extremely difficult conditions for supplying troops - the mountainous terrain and lack of communications, especially railways, increased the importance of control over the Black Sea ports in this area (primarily Batum and Trabzon.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Caucasian Army was dispersed into two groups in accordance with two main operational directions:

Kara direction (Kars - Erzurum) - approx. 6 divisions in the Olta - Sarykamysh area,

Erivan direction (Erivan - Alashkert) - approx. 2 divisions and cavalry in the Igdir area.

The flanks were covered by small independent detachments of border guards, Cossacks and militia: the right flank was directed along the Black Sea coast to Batum, and the left was against the Kurdish areas, where, with the announcement of mobilization, the Turks began to form Kurdish irregular cavalry.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the Armenian volunteer movement developed in Transcaucasia. The Armenians pinned certain hopes on this war, counting on the liberation of Western Armenia with the help of Russian weapons. Therefore, Armenian socio-political forces and national parties declared this war just and declared unconditional support for the Entente. The Turkish leadership, for its part, tried to attract Western Armenians to its side and invited them to create volunteer detachments as part of the Turkish army and persuade the Eastern Armenians to jointly act against Russia. These plans, however, were not destined to come true.

The creation of Armenian squads (volunteer detachments) was carried out by the Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis. The total number of Armenian volunteers amounted to 25 thousand people under the command of well-known leaders of the Armenian national movement in Western Armenia. The first four volunteer detachments joined the ranks of the active army in various sectors of the Caucasian Front already in November 1914. Armenian volunteers distinguished themselves in the battles for Van, Dilman, Bitlis, Mush, Erzerum and other cities of Western Armenia. At the end of 1915 - beginning of 1916. The Armenian volunteer detachments were disbanded, and on their basis, rifle battalions were created within the Russian units, which participated in hostilities until the end of the war.

In November 1914, the Russian army, having crossed the Turkish border, launched an offensive in a zone of up to 350 km, but, encountering enemy resistance, was forced to go on the defensive.

At the same time, Turkish troops invaded Russian territory. On November 5 (18), 1914, Russian troops left the city of Artvin and retreated towards Batum. With the assistance of the Adjarians who rebelled against the Russian authorities, the entire Batumi region came under the control of Turkish troops, with the exception of the Mikhailovsky Fortress (fortress area) and the Upper Adjarian section of the Batumi district, as well as the city of Ardagan in the Kars region and a significant part of the Ardagan district. In the occupied territories, the Turks, with the assistance of the Adjarians, carried out massacres of the Armenian and Greek populations.

In December 1914 - January 1915, during the Sarykamysh operation, the Russian Caucasian Army stopped the advance of the 3rd Turkish Army under the command of Enver Pasha on Kars, and then completely defeated them.

Since January, in connection with the removal of A. Z. Myshlaevsky, N. N. Yudenich has taken over command.

In February-April 1915, the Russian and Turkish armies put themselves in order. The battles were local in nature. By the end of March, the Russian army cleared southern Adjara and the entire Batumi region of the Turks.

The Russian army had the task of ousting the Turks from the Batum region and conducting an offensive in Persian Azerbaijan in order to maintain Russian influence in Persia. The Turkish army, fulfilling the plan of the German-Turkish command to launch “jihad” (the holy war of Muslims against infidels), sought to involve Persia and Afghanistan in an open attack against Russia and England and, by attacking in the Erivan direction, achieve the separation of the Baku oil-bearing region from Russia.

At the end of April, cavalry units of the Turkish army invaded Iran.

Already in the first period of hostilities, the Turkish authorities began to evict the Armenian population in the front line. Anti-Armenian propaganda unfolded in Turkey. Western Armenians were accused of mass desertion from the Turkish army, of organizing sabotage and uprisings in the rear of Turkish troops. About 60 thousand Armenians, drafted into the Turkish army at the beginning of the war, were subsequently disarmed, sent to work in the rear, and then destroyed. Since April 1915, under the guise of deporting Armenians from the front line, the Turkish authorities began the actual extermination of the Armenian population. In a number of places, the Armenian population offered organized armed resistance to the Turks. In particular, a Turkish division was sent to suppress the uprising in the city of Van, blockading the city.

To help the rebels, the 4th Caucasian Army Corps of the Russian Army went on the offensive. The Turks retreated, and important settlements were captured by the Russian army. Russian troops cleared a vast territory from the Turks, advancing 100 km. The fighting in this area went down in history under the name of the Battle of Van. The arrival of Russian troops saved thousands of Armenians from imminent death, who, after the temporary withdrawal of Russian troops, moved to Eastern Armenia.

In July, Russian troops repelled the offensive of Turkish troops in the area of Lake Van.

During the Alashkert operation (July-August 1915), Russian troops defeated the enemy, thwarted the offensive planned by the Turkish command in the Kars direction and facilitated the actions of British troops in Mesopotamia.

In the second half of the year, fighting spread to Persian territory.

The Turkish command did not have a clear war plan for 1916; Enver Pasha even suggested that the German command transfer Turkish troops liberated after the Dardanelles operation to the Isonzo or Galicia. The actions of the Russian army resulted in two main operations: Erzurum, Trebizond, and further advancement to the west, deep into the Ottoman Empire.

In December 1915 - February 1916. The Russian army carried out a successful Erzurum offensive operation, as a result of which on January 20 (February 2) Russian troops approached Erzurum. The assault on the fortress began on January 29 (February 11). On February 3 (16), Erzurum was taken, the Turkish army retreated, losing up to 50% of its personnel and almost all its artillery. The pursuit of the retreating Turkish troops continued until the front line stabilized 70-100 km west of Erzurum.

The actions of Russian troops in other directions were also successful: Russian troops approached Trabzon (Trebizond) and won the battle of Bitlis. The spring thaw did not allow the Russian troops to completely defeat the Turkish army retreating from Erzurum, but spring comes earlier on the Black Sea coast, and the Russian army began active operations there.

On April 5, after a series of successful battles, the most important port of Trebizond was taken. By the summer of 1916, Russian troops liberated most of Western Armenia.

The defeat of the Turkish army in the Erzurum operation and the successful Russian offensive in the Trebizond direction forced the Turkish command to take measures to strengthen the 3rd and 6th Turkish armies in order to launch a counteroffensive. On June 9, the Turkish army went on the offensive with the goal of cutting off Russian forces in Trebizond from the main troops. The attackers managed to break through the front, but on June 21, having suffered heavy losses, the Turks were forced to suspend the offensive.

Despite the new defeat, Turkish troops made another attempt to attack in the Ognotic direction. The Russian command deployed significant forces to the right flank, which restored the situation with offensive actions from August 4 to 11. Subsequently, the Russians and Turks alternately took offensive actions, and success leaned first in one direction or the other. In some areas the Russians managed to advance, but in others they had to abandon their positions. Without particularly major successes on both sides, the fighting continued until August 29, when snow fell in the mountains and frost struck, forcing the opponents to stop fighting.

The results of the 1916 campaign on the Caucasian Front exceeded the expectations of the Russian command. Russian troops advanced deeper into Turkey by more than 250 km, capturing the most important and largest cities - Erzurum, Trebizond, Van, Erzincan and Bitlis. The Caucasian Army fulfilled its main task - protecting Transcaucasia from the invasion of the Turks on a huge front, the length of which by the end of 1916 exceeded 1000 miles.

In the territories of Western Armenia occupied by Russian troops, an occupation regime was established, and military administrative districts subordinate to the military command were created. In June 1916, the Russian government approved the “Temporary Regulations on the Administration of Regions Conquered from Turkey by Law of War,” according to which the occupied territory was declared a temporary General Government of Turkish Armenia, directly subordinate to the main command of the Caucasian Army. If the war ended successfully for Russia, the Armenians who fled their homes during the genocide would return to their native land. Already in mid-1916, the economic development of Turkish territory began: several branches of railways were built.

In the winter of 1917, there was a positional calm on the Caucasian front. The harsh winter made fighting difficult. In all areas from the Black Sea to Lake Van, only minor skirmishes were noted. The supply of food and fodder was very difficult.

On the Persian sector of the front, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, organized an attack on Mesopotamia in January 1917, which forced the Ottoman Empire to transfer some troops to the Russian front, weakening the defense of Baghdad, which was soon occupied by the British.

After the February Revolution, General Yudenich, appointed commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, created on the basis of the Caucasian Army, continued offensive operations against the Turks, but difficulties with supplying troops, a decline in discipline under the influence of revolutionary agitation and an increase in the incidence of malaria forced him to stop the Mesopotamian operation and withdraw troops to mountainous areas . Having refused to carry out the order of the Provisional Government to resume the offensive, on May 31, 1917, General Yudenich N.N. was removed from command of the front “for resisting the instructions” of the Provisional Government, surrendered command to Infantry General M.A. Przhevalsky and was transferred to the disposal of the Minister of War.

The February Revolution of 1917 caused chaos and unrest among the troops of the Caucasian Front. During 1917, the Russian army gradually disintegrated, soldiers deserted, going home, and by the end of the year the Caucasian front was completely collapsed.

On December 5 (18), 1917, the so-called Erzincan Truce was concluded between Russian and Turkish troops. This led to a massive withdrawal of Russian troops from Western (Turkish) Armenia to Russian territory.

By the beginning of 1918, Turkish forces in Transcaucasia were actually opposed by only a few thousand Caucasian (mostly Armenian) volunteers under the command of two hundred officers.

Even under the Provisional Government, by mid-July 1917, 6 Armenian regiments were created on the Caucasian Front at the proposal of Armenian public organizations in St. Petersburg and Tiflis. By October 1917, 2 Armenian divisions were already operating here. On December 13, 1917, the new commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, Major General Lebedinsky, formed the Armenian volunteer corps, whose commander was Lieutenant General F.I. Nazarbekov (later the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia), and General Vyshinsky as chief of staff. At the request of the Armenian National Council, “General Dro” was appointed as a special commissioner under Commander-in-Chief Nazarbekov. Later, the Western Armenian division under the command of Andranik also entered the Armenian corps.

In the first half of February (new style), Turkish troops, taking advantage of the collapse of the Caucasian Front and violating the terms of the December truce, launched a large-scale offensive in the Erzurum, Van and Primorsky directions, under the pretext of the need to protect the Muslim population of Eastern Turkey, almost immediately occupying Erzincan. The Turks in Western Armenia were actually opposed only by the Armenian volunteer corps, consisting of three incomplete divisions, which did not offer serious resistance to the superior forces of the Turkish army.

Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the Armenian troops retreated, covering the crowds of Western Armenian refugees who were leaving with them. After occupying Alexandropol, the Turkish command sent part of its troops to Karaklis (modern Vanadzor); On May 21, another group of Turkish troops under the command of Yakub Shevki Pasha launched an offensive in the direction of Sardarapat (modern Armavir), with the goal of breaking through to Erivan and the Ararat Plain. On February 11 (24), Turkish troops occupied Trebizond.

On February 10 (23), 1918 in Tiflis, the Transcaucasian Commissariat convened the Transcaucasian Seimas, which included deputies elected from Transcaucasia to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and representatives of local political parties. After a lengthy discussion, the Sejm decided to begin separate peace negotiations with Turkey, based on the principle of restoring the Russian-Turkish borders of 1914 at the start of the war.

Meanwhile, on February 21 (March 6), the Turks, having broken the three-day resistance of a few Armenian volunteers, captured Ardahan with the help of the local Muslim population. On February 27 (March 12), the retreat of Armenian troops and refugees from Erzurum began. On March 2 (15), a retreating crowd of thousands reached Sarykamysh. With the fall of Erzurum, the Turks effectively regained control of all of Eastern Anatolia. On March 2 (15), the commander of the Armenian corps, General Nazarbekov, was appointed commander of the front from Olti to Maku; the Olti-Batum line was to be defended by Georgian troops. Nazarbekov commanded 15,000 people on a 250 km front.

The peace negotiations, which took place from March 1 (14) to April 1 (14) in Trebizond, ended in failure. A few days earlier, Türkiye signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Soviet Russia. According to Art. The IV Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Russian-Turkish additional treaty transferred to Turkey not only the territories of Western Armenia, but also the regions of Batum, Kars and Ardahan populated by Georgians and Armenians, annexed by Russia as a result of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The RSFSR pledged not to interfere “in the new organization of state-legal and international legal relations of these districts”, to restore the border “in the form in which it existed before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78” and to dissolve on its territory and in the “occupied Turkish provinces" (that is, in Western Armenia) all Armenian volunteer squads.

Turkey, which had just signed a peace treaty with Russia on the most favorable terms and had already effectively returned to the borders of 1914, demanded that the Transcaucasian delegation recognize the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The Diet interrupted negotiations and recalled the delegation from Trebizond, officially entering the war with Turkey. At the same time, representatives of the Azerbaijani faction in the Seimas openly stated that they would not participate in the creation of a common union of Transcaucasian peoples against Turkey, given their “special religious ties with Turkey.”

For Russia, the war with Turkey was completed with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops still remaining in Turkey and Persia. However, the actual offensive of the Ottoman Empire was stopped only at the end of May, as a result of the Battle of Sardarapat.

The events that followed are described in more detail in the articles:

Republic of Armenia

Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

Battle for Baku

Bibliography:

David Martirosyan: The tragedy of the Batumi Armenians: just a “massacre” or a harbinger of the Armenian genocide?

Ivan Ratziger: To the lawyers of cannibalism: Facts about the massacre of Armenians and Aisors in Turkey and Iran

Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian Army. Fight in the Caucasus.

Korsun N. G. The First World War on the Caucasian Front. - 1946. - P. 76.

Andranik Zoravar

The uniqueness of the operational-strategic position of the Russian Caucasian Army during the First World War was that, with a lack of its own forces and means, almost always victorious, this army not only fulfilled and exceeded the most important strategic task, but also fed the German-Austrian front with reserves. Army operations are the standard of excellence in a world war, the embodiment of Suvorov’s principles of combat operations.

During the Sarykamysh operation on December 9, 1914 – January 4, 1915, units of the Caucasian Army eliminated the attempt to carry out the Turkish “blitzkrieg”, which led to a turning point and the seizure of strategic initiative in the Caucasian theater of military operations (TVD) from the beginning of 1915. And Russia maintained this initiative throughout the war.

Brilliant operations of 1915-1916. (Euphrates, Ognot, Erzurum, Trebizond, Erzincan) led to the fact that the valiant troops of the Caucasian Army captured the first-class fortress of Erzurum and a number of other cities and strongholds, advancing almost 250 km deep into Turkey. The 3rd and 2nd Turkish armies were defeated in the Erzurum, Erzincan and Ognot operations, while the expeditionary corps of cavalry general N.N. Baratova went to the Turkish-Iranian border.

As a result, the Caucasian army exceeded its objectives, and the war was transferred to enemy territory.

Throughout the war, combat operations on the Caucasian Front were mainly of maneuver nature, and cavalry was widely used. The centurion of the 1st Caucasian Viceroy of Yekaterinoslav General Field Marshal Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky Regiment Fyodor Eliseev described the cavalry attack near Memakhatun during the Erzincan operation as follows: “Two regiments of Cossack cavalry of 1500 sabers unexpectedly and without a single shot, almost in the blink of an eye, appeared in front of the Turkish positions and rushed to attack them. This did not take the Turks by surprise. They immediately opened hurricane rifle, machine gun and artillery fire from all places and nests of their positions. We did not expect artillery fire from the Turks, because we thought that if our artillery could not advance through the mountains, then the Turks would send their artillery deep to the rear. In addition, their artillery opened fire on us on the flank, from the south, from the peaks that separated it from us by a deep gorge. From this mixed fire of the Turks, everything instantly began to bubble, like lard thrown onto a hot frying pan.”

The specifics of mountain warfare played a key role in the fighting in the Caucasian theater of operations.

The command studied the Caucasian-Turkish theater of military operations in advance and, taking into account the combat experience of the Russo-Japanese War, carried out special training for the troops of the Caucasian Army for combat operations in mountainous conditions.

War in the mountains is characterized by: difficult roads and trails that require great effort and have poor carrying capacity, inaccessible terrain, and the lack of areas of sufficient size and configuration for the deployment of military masses. The abundance of hidden approaches and dead spaces in mountain warfare reduces losses and increases the combat resilience of small units, giving the latter greater tactical independence than on the plains.

Thus, in 1916, the 19th Kuban Plastun battalion with a mountain artillery division successfully defended the rocky Shaitan-Dag ridge on a 10-verst (!) front against superior Turkish forces.

During combat operations in mountainous areas, tactical detours and envelopments were of particular importance. A particularly strong impression is made by the unexpected appearance of even small military units at hard-to-reach heights and directions that were considered impregnable by the enemy.

In August 1916, the Turkish 4th Infantry Division ousted the detachment of General Rybalchenko from the Ravenduz area. To rescue the detachment, a small combined group of 500 Cossacks with two horse-mounted guns was advanced from the city of Urmia. She, quite unexpectedly for herself, reached the communications of the 4th Turkish division. The group commander hurried and turned the Cossacks around, immediately opening artillery fire on the rear of the Turks. One of the first shots killed the division chief. The Turks began to panic from the unexpected appearance of the enemy in the rear. The Cossacks boldly and decisively launched an offensive, enveloping the enemy from the flanks. Rybalchenko’s detachment also went on the attack, as a result of which it was not the Russian detachment surrounded by the Turks that was captured, but the Turkish division.

Given the nature of the terrain, troops operating in mountainous conditions are required to carry out thorough reconnaissance, surveillance, and secure flanks. Since control and communication are difficult, such qualities of command personnel as initiative and perseverance are of increased value in the mountains. Optical signaling is the most common means of communication.

The method of reconnaissance in the mountains is covert observation of the enemy from commanding heights, followed by withdrawal as the enemy advances, but without losing observation of him.

Of great importance was the retention of commanding heights (who owns them wins the battle in the mountains) and observation points. Reserves had to be kept close to the battle line. In order to take the enemy into the fire bag, it was necessary:

- capture the nearest advantageous line, lying across the enemy’s path of movement and commanding the section of the road ahead;

– simultaneously occupy the heights on both sides of the path, advanced towards the enemy;

- with your fire, stop the enemy on the narrowest and lowest section of the road, so that he cannot deploy his advanced units, and his units have the best visibility and fire.

The success of an attack on a mountain position depended primarily on its careful reconnaissance.

Units of the Caucasian Army, after a thorough reconnaissance of the detour route, left a small part of their forces at the front, while the main mass of troops was sent to detour - and removed from their position at night and made a detour movement at night.

When attacking heights and strong points, the Field Service Charter of 1912 ordered “to pay primary attention to covering them and paralyzing fire from neighboring enemy strong points. Flanking fire from even a small number of shooters can be of great benefit. The captured heights must immediately be secured with machine guns and artillery.”

An offensive battle in the mountains began in a situation where: a) the enemy stopped or was defending at the base of the ridge, covering the roads and trails leading to the passes; b) the enemy has occupied and is holding passes across the ridge. In the first case, the task of the attacker is to deliver the main blow at key points, knock the enemy off the occupied line and, in pursuit, break into the passes on his shoulders.

The mountain attack technique is accumulation in shooting positions located at various distances from the enemy position and in most cases not parallel to it. The advantage of a mountain attack is the ability to fire artillery over friendly troops at the closest distances - up to 30 steps. You can also support an attack from your shooting position with rifle and machine gun fire until the very last moment, because the attacker is climbing from the bottom up.

Once the enemy is driven out of position, his pursuit does not promise much success - he will always find convenient positions for the rearguard. Parallel pursuit is much more important: it promises greater success and can put the entire enemy detachment in a critical position. Parallel pursuit of a defeated enemy deprives him of the opportunity to cling to the terrain, while at the same time providing an opportunity to encircle the retreating enemy - the fewer enemy fighters reach the top of the ridge, the easier the fight on the passes.

In the second case, it is necessary to use all roads, paths and spaces between them to approach the enemy. The exit of one of the columns to the top of the ridge makes it easier for others to advance.

At the same time, there are no absolutely inaccessible places in the mountains, you just need to be able to walk through them. The situation in a mountain war is such that the strike group in its composition is not the strongest, but the weakest, because it is sent to a weakly or completely unoccupied point in the enemy’s position - and such a point is determined by the inaccessibility of the terrain and at the same time is its “weak point.” Accordingly, the strike group in the combat formation of the advancing unit is those units that move through the most rugged terrain to the least accessible point of the enemy’s position, with the loss of which further resistance at this line is impossible.

Fire support for those units moving through the least rugged terrain is especially important.

Night attacks were important in mountain warfare - they were prepared by the Russian command very carefully and gave positive results.

Defending in the mountains is easier than attacking: relatively weak forces leading the defense can resist significant enemy forces for a long time. Thus, in the Sarykamysh operation, a small Olta detachment of Russian troops consisting of eight battalions successfully defended against the entire Turkish 10th Army Corps on heights covered on the flanks by gorges. And an insignificant detachment consisting of a battalion of the 5th Caucasian border regiment (in companies of 60-70 bayonets, four heavy machine guns), fifty Cossacks (40 sabers) and two mountain guns held on the line of the Mosul road from spring to late autumn 1916 .

At the same time, the 1912 charter specifically stipulated that “during the defense, in view of the vast dead spaces, the approaches along the entire front must be under flanking or oblique fire from machine guns and artillery, which for this purpose will often have to be deployed in small units.”

It is more difficult to localize a breakthrough in the mountains: the reserve has to attack from the bottom up. Moreover, an attack in the mountains cannot be met with a counterattack - so as not to lose the advantage of your position.

Defense in a mountain war can be either positional or active.

Transporting the wounded in the mountains.

During positional defense, passes, gorges and exits from mountains to valleys are blocked. During active defense, retreat is carried out by rolling rocks, which makes it possible to keep the enemy under fire all the time. An example is the actions of a small Turkish detachment consisting of two companies of infantry operating in southern Kurdistan in the summer of 1917. The companies secured the Rouen Pass on the great Mosul road and monitored the Russian detachment advanced along the Mosul road from the area of Urmia to the area of Neri . The Turks echeloned their detachment to a depth of 17 km and positioned it as follows: the ridge with a pass closest to the Russian positions was occupied by guards, consisting of half a company at a front of up to 4 km; behind the guard guard, 12 km away on the second ridge, there was support for the guard guard with a force of half a company, and the Rouen Pass itself was defended by one company. The flanks of the Turkish positions were secured by Kurdish detachments.

The Turks attacked a Russian detachment consisting of three companies of infantry and fifty Cossacks, which had four heavy machine guns and two mountain guns.

On the first day of the offensive, at dawn, a Turkish outpost was shot down and retreated to an intermediate position.

Around noon, the Russian detachment finally gained a foothold on the first ridge and only in the evening again came into contact with the Turks, dug in on the intermediate ridge. The attack on this ridge was launched at dawn the next day, and the Turks offered stubborn resistance. It was necessary to bring in artillery, and only in the evening they managed to establish themselves on the heights of the intermediate ridge, and the entire Turkish detachment concentrated on the Rouen Pass. A further attack on the Rouen Pass was postponed.

Thus, the Turkish command gained time: the Russian detachment covered a space of 16 km within two days, and an attack on the main Rouen Pass would have delayed it for another day, while without fighting it would have been possible to cover this distance in one day’s march.

In mountain warfare, special attention was required to be paid to camouflage, the organization of false trenches on heights and slopes, to securely occupy heights and secure flanks. Finally, it was in mountain warfare that grenades were recognized as one of the most effective combat weapons.

The flanking maneuver acquired great importance on the Caucasian front. Both the Russian and Turkish commands sought to implement it. For example, during the Sarykamysh operation in December 1914 - January 1915, the enemy command undertook a roundabout maneuver with the forces of two army corps (9th through the village of Bardus and 10th through the village of Olty) to encircle the main forces of the Caucasian army.

The Russian command undertook a counter-maneuver. Taking advantage of the fact that the Turkish 9th and 10th Army Corps were advancing scatteredly and slowly, and the 11th Army Corps operating from the front did not show much activity, the Russian command skillfully organized the regrouping of its troops and allocated forces in order to launch a counterattack to the Turkish corps performing a flanking maneuver. This was a new method of combating the environment in a mountain theater of operations.

At the head of the Russian detachments performing a flanking maneuver were bold and enterprising commanders who were well aware of the peculiarities of mountain combat. Thus, one of the companies of the 154th Derbent Infantry Regiment, having broken through into the depths of the Turkish defense, captured (and at command posts) the commander of the 9th Army Corps and all three division commanders (17th, 28th and 29th infantry) with their headquarters. The outflanking maneuver of the 18th Turkestan Rifle Regiment was also successfully completed - to attack the Turkish 11th Army Corps from the rear. Having set out from the area west of Yayla-Bardus, the regiment made a 15-km march in the mountains, digging trenches more than 1.5 m deep in the snow, carrying disassembled mountain guns and ammunition on their hands, moving forward unnoticed by the enemy. And straight from the gorge he went to the rear of the Turkish corps, which retreated, abandoning strong positions. The regiment's outflanking maneuver, which lasted five days in off-road conditions and severe frosts, led to a major tactical success.

The main burden of the battle in the mountains falls on the infantry.

To operate successfully in mountain conditions, she must have the appropriate equipment. Thus, before the Erzurum operation of 1916, each Russian soldier received warm uniforms: felt boots, a short sheepskin coat, cotton trousers, a hat with a turning back, and mittens. White calico camouflage coats and cap covers were prepared; To protect their eyes, the troops received safety goggles. The advancing units had boards and poles with them (for crossing streams), the infantrymen of the shock units were supplied with hand grenades.

Sappers were even more necessary in the mountains than on the plains.

A significant advantage of mountain positions over flat ones is the impossibility of a gas attack. But, on the other hand, gases can be used as an artificial obstacle, directing them downwards - towards the attacking enemy.

In artillery, not only mountain cannons, but also howitzers proved effective.

A positive effect was provided by the deployment of individual guns for direct fire dagger fire on the enemy accumulated in dead spaces. Often it was necessary to prepare several positions for individual guns - in close proximity (30-50 m) to the main one. Rolling the guns on them made it possible to sharply increase the field of fire and shorten the smallest sight. The principle of massing artillery capacity turned out to be inapplicable. When placing each gun, artillerymen have to solve the problems of determining the steepness of the trajectory, the concealment of the gun's location, etc.

The most important factor in the victories of the Caucasian Army was the inclusion of light field 122-mm howitzers in the infantry strike detachments. During the August battles of the Ognot operation of 1916, they played a key role - despite the more than triple superiority of the Turks, the 5th Caucasian Rifle Division was able to hold out until reinforcements arrived solely thanks to its howitzers. For a whole week, the Russian division fought with four Turkish divisions until units of the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division began to arrive to help.

Radiotelegraph was of particular importance in the mountain war - other means of communication were unreliable. Wire communication lines often had to be laid through deep gorges, which required a lot of time and reduced their unreliability, and restoration in case of damage also took a long time. Therefore, the main means of communication were radio and optical communications, and wire was used only in a backup role. Flags when using binoculars allow you to receive commands in the mountains at a distance of 800-1000 m.

Before the Erzurum operation, the radio communication service was structured as a separate radio group subordinate to front headquarters. The actions of Russian troops in the Caucasus Mountains showed that in mountainous conditions special attention should be paid to communication along the front between separately operating units.

Russian units at the Keprikey bridge.

The victories of the Russian troops in the Battle of Kepri-Key and during the assault on Erzurum were won primarily thanks to the skillful use of the factor of tactical surprise.

Thus, in the Battle of Kepri-Key, the Russian command, to deliver the main blow, chose those sectors of the front that the German instructors of the Turkish army and the Turks considered the most inaccessible. By organizing the operation, the Russian command carefully prepared the troops for the offensive, both tactically and logistically.

The 14th, 15th and 16th Caucasian rifle regiments secretly concentrated in the village area. Sonamer and Geryak, having made a quick maneuver through inaccessible mountainous terrain, unexpectedly reached the flank and rear of the Turkish troops operating in the Passinskaya Valley and to the south, and thereby ensured the success of the Russian troops.

The Erzurum fortified area consisted of 11 long-term forts located in two lines at the heights of the Deveboynu ridge (height - 2.2-2.4 thousand m, length - 16 km). The ridge separated the Passinsky valley from the Erzurum valley, the approaches to the fortress from the north through the Gurjibogaz pass were secured by the forts of Kara-Gyubek and Tafta. The approaches to the Turkish positions on the Deveboynu ridge along the roads going to the south were also covered by two forts. The total length of this mountain defensive line along the front was 40 km. Only the Karga-bazaar ridge, which dominates the area, remained unfortified (the Turkish command considered it difficult to access). The ridge had an important tactical significance - it made it possible to reach the gap between the forts of Taft and Choban-dede directly into the Erzurum Valley, to the rear of the Gurjibogaz Pass and to the communications of the Turks.

Along this ridge, the Russian command carried out a flanking maneuver - the Don Foot Brigade (four battalions with two guns) and the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division (with 36 guns) unexpectedly for the Turkish command entered the Erzurum Valley and struck the flank of the Turkish troops.

This Russian breakthrough into the Erzurum Valley was decisive in the fight for the fortress.

Aviation was actively used.

By 1914, there was only one air squadron in the Caucasus. The meager technical supply, the routine skepticism regarding the use of aviation that reigned among many commanders, the almost complete lack of combat experience did not seem to bode well for the “Caucasian aviation.”

At the beginning of the campaign, the question even arose: is aviation applicable in the conditions of the Caucasian theater of military operations?

But the first 5-6 brave aerial reconnaissance dispelled doubts.

Conditions for flights in the Caucasus theater of operations are extremely harsh. Mountain ranges in dense chains, in different directions, crossed air routes, rising to heights exceeding 3 thousand m (and these were very high heights for airplanes of those years). The chaotic mountain surface looked like a picture of a frozen ocean at the moment of the “ninth wave.” Rapid air currents, unexpected atmospheric turbulences, air funnels of extraordinary strength and depth, strong sudden winds, fog covering the valleys with a thick veil and constantly moving - made the pilots’ activities extremely difficult. To this must be added the extremely small number of sites suitable for aircraft take-off and landing.

There were only five airfields in the entire theater of operations, of which only one - Trebizond - was located in conditions close to flat terrain, and the rest were located in the mountains.

Under these conditions, the most important task was to provide the troops with airplanes that had the ability to rise quickly and have the greatest stability. And this despite the fact that the Caucasian Front was a kind of Kamchatka, where aging or obsolete types of aircraft were sent, distributed among pilots and detachments not according to objective criteria dictated by the benefits of the service, but according to subjective criteria. There were also difficulties in acquiring combat experience - it was difficult to gain it within a few flight days - only 5-8 per month.

Until the end of 1916, Caucasian aviation used aircraft that were already outdated at that time, such as the Moran-Parassol, Ron, and Voisin. It was only at the beginning of 1917 that single- and twin-engine Caudrons and two Nieuport-21 fighters appeared in the air squadrons.

The general advantage of the Russian army over the Turkish and the weakness of the enemy’s air defense helped.

How the air squads were provided with aircraft is evidenced by the report of the aviation inspector of the Caucasian Army dated October 11, 1917: the 1st detachment, with eight pilots, had two aircraft suitable for combat service (twin-engine Caudron and Nieuport-21). ; The 2nd detachment, with six pilots, had six aircraft (the most combat-ready of them were a twin-engine Caudron, two single-engine Caudrons and a Nieuport-21); The 4th detachment, with seven pilots, had two devices (one- and two-engine Caudrons).

Speaking about a weaker opponent, it is necessary to note the following. At the beginning of the campaign, Turkish aviation was completely absent on the Caucasian front. They first appeared in noticeable quantities after the Russians captured Erzurum - i.e. winter-spring 1916. But although Turkish aviation was weak in numbers, it had the latest German aircraft. Considering the significant length of the front and the episodic nature of the actions of Turkish aviation, meetings between Russian pilots and the enemy were extremely rare. During the entire war, no more than five air battles took place. The main thing that Russian pilots had to contend with was the difficulties of theater operations.

In terms of quality, the personnel of the Caucasian aviation were at their best. In total, 3-4 air detachments operated on the Caucasian front during the war, whose activities were expressed mainly in aerial reconnaissance and bombing. Aerial photography, artillery fire adjustment and aviation communications began to be used in the Caucasus much later than on the Austro-German front.

The Caucasian Front did not know trench warfare. Long distances, poor condition of roads, and the almost complete absence of forests made it difficult to camouflage movements, so visual aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography almost always gave good results.

Bombing brought a very significant moral and sometimes material effect. Enemy troops were often bivouacked in tents in open areas, and their bombardment invariably led to panic. But in order to carry out successful bombing, the pilots had to descend, which was associated with significant risk, but did not stop the pilots of the Caucasian Army.

In general, in the conditions of a mountain war, more than on a plain, the troops and their commanders are required to have sharpness, courage, and energy. Mountain Warfare School is the best military school.

Mountain warfare is characterized by increased complexity. Rain, hail, snow, wind, echo, optical (light) deception so strongly influence the actions of troops that they must be taken into account not only at the tactical, but also at the operational and even strategic levels.

In spring and summer in the mountains, during thunderstorms and floods, streams and mountain rivers instantly overflowing their banks cause losses to troops and lead to material damage. Hail (when the size of hailstones resembles a chicken egg) is comparable to enemy aerial bombardment.

Snow is of particular importance. Winter 1916-1917 The Caucasian front was literally covered with snow. Contact with the enemy was lost and communications were disrupted. The front did not receive food for more than a month: severe famine set in, horses and donkeys were eaten. In this case, snow became the enemy. And during the already mentioned successful maneuver of the 18th Turkestan Rifle Regiment during the Sarykamysh operation, snow became an ally for the Russians.

In December 1914, when the main forces of the Russian Caucasian Army, after successful border battles for it, approached Hasan-Kale, two marches from Erzerum, leaving their Sarykamysh base defenseless, the Turkish command, covering the Deva-Boyna position with a barrier, abandoned two of its best corps to Sarykamysh. Severe frosts significantly reduced the pace of the Turks' outflanking maneuver and led to thousands of non-combat losses.

Wind in the mountains is also a significant obstacle to the actions of troops, especially in winter, because... significantly increases the cold. During the Erzurum operation of 1916, the Caucasian army had 40% frostbite, while the Arab enemy troops at the beginning of the war had 90%. This is due almost exclusively to the action of the icy wind.

But even ordinary wind is a significant obstacle to the actions of troops. Ten kilometers south of Erzurum there is the Shaitanadag ridge - this name was given to it due to incredibly strong winds. The wind speed on this ridge is such that it was absolutely impossible to sit astride a horse, a car is blown off the road, and a person on foot can only move against the wind with his back at a speed of less than 1 km per hour.

The general conclusion made by the command in relation to the results of the Sarykamysh and Erzurum operations was as follows: the Russians, northerners, are accustomed to severe frosts, and therefore have advantages in winter campaigns over their southern Turkish neighbors, who cannot stand the long absence of shelter in the winter cold. The superiority of the Turks when moving in the mountains in the summer was undeniable.

Echo, i.e. reflection of sound, also one of the phenomena inherent in mountainous areas, sometimes adversely affects troops. There are places in which the sound is repeated 5-6 times, and the repeated sound differs little in strength from the primary one. Thus, each shot is repeated many times in different directions, and the enemy's shooting appears to be much stronger than it really is. Moreover, it seems that the enemy has circled around from all sides and is firing from the flanks and rear. Troops operating in such conditions must have good endurance. Near Erzurum, in one of the columns of the 2nd Turkestan Army Corps, while moving through a narrow mountain pass, shooting suddenly began - from all sides. The confused soldiers responded without aiming; there were killed and wounded. The column stopped and began to reform into battle formation. The shooting continued for more than an hour. When the troops calmed down and the absence of the enemy became clear, the cause of the panic was discovered: an accidental shot from one of the lagging soldiers.

In artillery, there is a way to determine the location of an enemy firing battery by sound - it is marked simultaneously from three points. This method allows you to identify an enemy battery in a few minutes on the plain, but in the mountains this is impossible.

There is another phenomenon that makes firefighting in the mountains difficult: optical illusion. In clean, transparent air, the mountains seem much closer than in fog and darkness: a slope illuminated by the sun is also much closer in the observer’s mind compared to a slope in the shadow. A specialist observer who determines distances in the lowlands at medium distances with an accuracy of up to 10% and at long distances with an accuracy of up to 20%, in the mountains is mistaken by 100-200% or more.

Supplying troops in the mountains also poses significant difficulties. This is explained by a number of circumstances. The main thing is off-road. When advancing deeper into Turkey, Russian troops moved more than 150 versts from their final railway station, Sarykamysh. Molokan four-wheeler vans with a carrying capacity of up to 100 pounds could not cope with transportation. Camel and other pack transports did not have sufficient carrying capacity. It was necessary to stop the offensive until the completion of the construction of the narrow-gauge railway, which was brought first to Erzurum and then to Erzincan. Of course, it also did not completely satisfy the needs of the army, but it allowed at least to resume the offensive. The rolling stock and rail links for it were delivered across all of Russia - from the northernmost station of Arkhangelsk to the southernmost station of Sarykamysh. Practice has shown that an army in the mountains cannot move further than five crossings from the railway (the example of Erzurum is an exception). In addition, railways in the mountains, having a lot of artificial structures, were extremely fragile.

The highway network was also underdeveloped - and the formation of pack transport was inevitable. But the camel is suffocating on high passes, the horse is too gentle, and the donkey is weak. The most useful animal in this regard is the mule. The most important cargo is artillery supplies. The quartermaster's (clothing) load was also significant - in the mountains, sometimes even in the summer you have to dress warmly: the average temperature depends not on the latitude of the area, but on its altitude above sea level. The daily temperature range is also extremely high: in the summer of 1916 on the Erzurum Plain it was up to 40 degrees. Shoes in the mountains wear out much faster than on the plain. Rocky soil requires tamping the soles with iron spikes.

Food supply in the mountains is also more difficult than in the plains. Firstly, there are fewer local resources there and it is more difficult to use them; secondly, the human and animal body requires more calories in the mountains (40% for people). This results in the need to consume more fat and sugar. True, there is always fatty lamb in the mountains, but you need to use it wisely. Thus, the Erivan detachment, having crossed the border Agrydag ridge at the end of October 1914, descended into the rich Euphrates Valley. The Russian units received huge herds of sheep. But what did the commissariat do? Nothing. The troops themselves disposed of the spoils - as a result, each fighter got 2-3 rams at once. The soldiers were literally gorging themselves. At the bivouacs the following pictures were observed: a soldier is cooking himself a huge piece of lamb, the soup is almost ready, but a greedy eye has seen his neighbor’s best piece, and the pot is tipped over in order to cook a fattier piece. And two days later, everyone started vomiting due to inflammation of the gastrointestinal tract - from excessive consumption of fats. The regiment is moving, and each soldier has huge pieces of lamb on his bayonets. Or, for example, the Akhulginsky regiment inherited a huge herd of cattle. There was no fodder, there was too much salt. The regiment slaughtered the entire herd, put it in a cellar and salted it, and the next day set out on a campaign and never saw its cellar again. Two months later, famine set in, the regiment killed horses and ate turtles.

There was a huge amount of fish in the mountain rivers of Armenia. But the commissariat again failed to organize fishing, and the soldiers did it in a makeshift way - shooting into the water and drowning the fish. The sappers and artillerymen who had pyroxylin especially distinguished themselves. And soon a shortage of ammunition was discovered.

Protecting hiking traffic in the mountains is very difficult, because... It is not easy to find parallel roads and even more difficult to establish a connection between them. By sending observing units to commanding heights, it is not always possible to achieve the goal, especially in wooded mountains. The only way to protect is good reconnaissance.

Rest and its protection in the mountains are also more difficult to organize than on the plain. There is no need to even think about observing the statutory forms of bivouac location: for any significant detachment there is unlikely to be a suitable horizontal platform - you have to be located on a slope or split the detachment into parts. Villages in the mountains are rare and small. Near the enemy, as combat experience has shown, you should avoid resting in a village or even near it: there will always be a hostile or corrupt element who will tell the enemy information about the detachment. In addition, the villages are located below, near the water, they are surrounded by heights - woe to anyone who is tempted to stop for the night, surrounded by dangerous heights: he can easily fall into a trap. In the mountains there is no battle in a populated area - battles are fought only on the heights surrounding the village, and the one who first occupies the commanding height will win.

So, on February 1, 1916, during the capture of Erzurum, the 18th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, having captured the village. Taft, was not tempted to rest in this village, despite the fact that he had no roof over his head for more than a month, but immediately occupied the commanding heights. As a result of this, without any losses, he received the entire 54th Turkish Infantry Regiment (led by the regiment commander, three battalion commanders, 50 officers, over 1.5 thousand askers and with full weapons), which settled down to rest at the base of this height.

The ability to apply it to the terrain is important for mountain warfare. In this regard, mountain dwellers are great masters: they have a superbly developed eye. The Turks camouflaged their trenches in the folds of the mountainous terrain in such a way that even with binoculars at close range it was difficult to distinguish them. They adhered to the system of individual trenches (and quite correctly), because It was impractical to dig extra cubic meters into the rock.

The difficulties of mountain warfare were overcome by careful preparation, energy, determination and mobility of troops - which was demonstrated by the troops of the Caucasian Army during the First World War. And although the fighting was carried out in extremely difficult conditions, nevertheless, throughout the war, luck inspired Russian weapons, and the troops of the Caucasian Army wrote glorious pages in the annals of Russian military history.

Alexey OLEINIKOV

Fighting in 1914-1915
The Russian-Turkish (Caucasian) front was 720 kilometers long, stretching from the Black Sea to Lake Urmia. But we must keep in mind the most important feature of the Caucasian theater of military operations - unlike the European fronts, there was no continuous line of trenches, ditches, barriers; combat operations were concentrated along narrow roads, passes, and often goat trails. Most of the armed forces of the parties were concentrated here.
From the first days of the war, Russia and Turkey sought to seize the strategic initiative, which could subsequently determine the course of the war in the Caucasus. The Turkish plan of operations on the Caucasian front, developed under the leadership of Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha and approved by German military experts, provided for the invasion of Turkish troops into the Transcaucasus from the flanks through the Batum region and Iranian Azerbaijan, followed by the encirclement and destruction of Russian troops. The Turks hoped to capture all of Transcaucasia by the beginning of 1915 and push back Russian troops beyond the Caucasus mountain range.

Russian troops had the task of holding the Baku-Vladikavkaz and Baku-Tiflis roads, defending the most important industrial center - Baku, and preventing the appearance of Turkish forces in the Caucasus. Since the main front for the Russian army was the Russian-German one, the Caucasian army had to actively defend itself on the occupied border mountain lines. Subsequently, the Russian command planned to capture Erzurum, the most important fortress, the capture of which would make it possible to threaten Anatolia, but this required significant reserves. It was necessary to defeat the 3rd Turkish Army, and then take a powerful fortress and hold it when Turkish reserve units arrived. But they just weren’t there. The Caucasian Front, at Supreme Headquarters, was considered secondary and the main forces were concentrated against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Although, according to common sense, it would be possible to defeat the German Empire by delivering crushing blows to the “weak links” of the Quadruple Alliance (German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman Empires, Bulgaria) - Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Germany itself, although it was a powerful fighting mechanism, had practically no resources to wage a long war. This is what A. A. Brusilov proved by practically crushing the Austro-Hungarian Empire in May-June 1916. If Russia had limited itself to active defense on the border with Germany, and delivered the main blows to Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, which would not have been able to resist the numerous, brave, fairly well-prepared (at the beginning of the war, when the army was personnel and with a whole guard) Russians armies. These actions victoriously ended the war back in 1915; Germany could not have stood alone against the three great powers. And Russia, having received from the war territories important for its development (the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits), a patriotic public, could have industrialized without the Revolution, becoming the leader of the planet.

1914

The fighting on the Caucasian front began in early November with oncoming battles in the Kepri-Key area. Russian troops under the command of General Berkhman quite easily crossed the border and began to advance in the direction of Erzurum. But the Turks soon counterattacked with forces of the 9th and 10th corps, while simultaneously pulling up the 11th corps. The Keprikey operation ended with the withdrawal of Russian units to the border, the 3rd Turkish Army was inspired and the Turkish command began to harbor hopes that they could defeat the Russian army.

At the same time, Turkish troops invaded Russian territory. On November 18, 1914, Russian troops left Artvin and retreated towards Batum. With the assistance of the Adjarians (part of the Georgian people, largely professing Islam), who rebelled against the Russian authorities, the entire Batumi region came under the control of Turkish troops, with the exception of the Mikhailovsky fortress and the Upper Adjarian section of the Batumi district, as well as the city of Ardagan in the Kars region and a significant part Ardagan district. In the occupied territories, the Turks, with the assistance of the Adjarians, carried out massacres of the Armenian and Greek populations.

Having abandoned the battle to help Bergman's troops, all the reserves of the Turkestan Corps stopped the Turks' offensive. The situation was stabilized, the Turks lost up to 15 thousand people (total losses), Russian troops - 6 thousand.

In connection with the planned offensive, changes occurred in the Turkish command; Hasan Izzet Pasha, who doubted the success of Hasan Izzet Pasha, was replaced by the Minister of War Enver Pasha himself, his chief of staff was Lieutenant General von Schellendorff, and the head of the operational department was Major Feldman. The plan of Enver Pasha's headquarters was that by December the Caucasian Army occupied a front from the Black Sea to Lake Van, stretching over 350 km in a straight line, mainly on Turkish territory. At the same time, almost two-thirds of the Russian forces were moved forward, located between Sarykamysh and Kepri-Key. The Turkish army had the opportunity to try to bypass the main Russian forces from their right flank and strike in the rear, cutting the Sarykamysh-Kars railway. In general, Enver Pasha wanted to repeat the experience of the German army in defeating the 2nd Russian army in East Prussia.

From the front, the actions of the Sarykamysh detachment were supposed to pin down the 11th Turkish corps, the 2nd cavalry division and the Kurdish cavalry corps, while the 9th and 10th Turkish corps began a roundabout maneuver through Olty (Olta) on December 9 (22) and Bardus (Bardiz), intending to go to the rear of the Sarykamysh detachment.
But the plan had many weaknesses: Enver Pasha overestimated the combat readiness of his forces, underestimated the complexity of the mountainous terrain in winter conditions, the time factor (any delay nullified the plan), there were almost completely no people familiar with the terrain, the impossibility of creating a well-organized rear. Therefore, terrible mistakes occurred: on December 10, two Turkish divisions (31 and 32) of the 9th Corps advancing along the Oltinsky direction staged a battle among themselves(!). As stated in the memoirs of the commander of the 9th Turkish Corps, “When the mistake was realized, people began to cry. It was a heartbreaking picture. We fought with the 32nd Division for four hours.” 24 companies fought on both sides, the losses in killed and wounded amounted to about 2 thousand people.

With a swift blow, the Turks knocked out the Olta detachment, which was significantly inferior in number to them in number (headed by General N.M. Istomin), from Olta, but it was not destroyed. On December 10 (23), the Sarykamysh detachment relatively easily repelled the frontal attack of the 11th Turkish corps. On December 11 (24), the actual commander of the Caucasian Army, General A. Z. Myshlaevsky and his chief of staff, General N. N. Yudenich, arrived at the headquarters of the Sarykamysh detachment from Tiflis. General Myshlaevsky organized the defense of Sarykamysh, but at the most crucial moment, having incorrectly assessed the situation, he gave the order to retreat, left the army and went to Tiflis. In Tiflis, Myshlaevsky presented a report on the threat of a Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, which caused disorganization of the rear of the army (in January 1915 he was removed from command, in March of the same year he was dismissed and replaced by General N.N. Yudenich). General Yudenich took command of the 2nd Turkestan Corps, and the actions of the entire Sarykamysh detachment were still led by General G. E. Berkhman, commander of the 1st Caucasian Corps.

On December 12 (25), Turkish troops, performing a detour maneuver, occupied Bardus and turned to Sarykamysh. Frosty weather, however, slowed down the pace of the offensive and led to significant (many thousands) non-combat losses of Turkish forces (non-combat losses reached 80% of personnel). The 11th Turkish Corps continued to put pressure on the main Russian forces, but did not do it energetically enough, which allowed the Russians to withdraw the strongest units from the front one after another and transfer them back to Sarykamysh.

On December 16 (29), with the approach of reserves, Russian troops pushed back the enemy and launched a counteroffensive. On December 31, the Turks received orders to withdraw. On December 20 (January 2), Bardus was recaptured, and on December 22 (January 4), the entire 9th Turkish Corps was surrounded and captured. The remnants of the 10th Corps were forced to retreat, and by January 4-6 (17-19) the situation at the front was restored. The general pursuit, despite the severe fatigue of the troops, continued until January 5 inclusive. Russian troops, due to losses and fatigue, stopped the pursuit.

As a result, the Turks lost 90,000 people killed, wounded and prisoners (including 30,000 frozen people), 60 guns. The Russian army also suffered significant losses - 20,000 killed and wounded and more than 6,000 frostbitten. According to General Yudenich, the operation ended in the complete defeat of the Turkish 3rd Army, it practically ceased to exist, Russian troops took an advantageous starting position for new operations; the territory of Transcaucasia was cleared of the Turks, except for a small part of the Batumi region. As a result of this battle, the Russian Caucasian Army transferred military operations to Turkish territory and opened its way deep into Anatolia.

This victory also had an impact on Russia’s allies in the Entente; the Turkish command was forced to withdraw forces from the Mesopotamian front, which eased the position of the British. In addition, England, alarmed by the successes of the Russian army, English strategists were already imagining Russian Cossacks on the streets of Constantinople, decided to launch the Dardanelles operation (an operation to capture the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits with the help of an Anglo-French attack fleet and landing) on February 19, 1915.

The Sarykamysh operation is an example of a rather rare example of a struggle against encirclement - a struggle that began in the context of Russian defense and ended in the conditions of a counter-collision, with the encirclement ring loosened from the inside and the pursuit of the remnants of the outflanking wing of the Turks.

This battle once again emphasizes the enormous role in war of a brave, proactive commander who is not afraid to make independent decisions. In this regard, the high command of the Turks and ours in the persons of Enver Pasha and Myshlaevsky, who abandoned the main forces of their armies, which they considered already lost, to the mercy of fate, provide a sharply negative example. The Caucasian army was saved by the persistence of private commanders in carrying out decisions, while the senior commanders were confused and were ready to retreat beyond the Kars fortress. They glorified their names in this battle: the commander of the Oltinsky detachment Istomin N.M., the chief of staff of the Caucasian Army Yudenich N.N., the commander of the 1st Caucasian Corps Berkhman G.E., the commander of the 1st Kuban Plastun brigade Przhevalsky M.A. (cousin of the famous traveler), commander of the 3rd Caucasian Rifle Brigade V.D. Gabaev.

1915

The beginning of 1915 was characterized by active actions in the Erivan direction, as well as in Persia-Iran, where the Russian command tried to cooperate with the British, who were based in southern Persia. The 4th Caucasian Corps operated in this direction under the command of P.I. Oganovsky.
By the beginning of the 1915 campaign, the Russian Caucasian Army had 111 battalions, 212 hundreds, 2 aviation detachments, St. 50 militia and volunteer squads, 364 guns. The 3rd Turkish Army, having restored its combat effectiveness after the defeat at Sarykamysh, had 167 battalions, as well as other formations. The Turkish 3rd Army was restored at the expense of parts of the 1st and 2nd Constantinople armies and the 4th Syrian. It was headed by Mahmud Kamil Pasha, the headquarters was controlled by the German Major Guze.

Having learned the experience of the Sarykamysh operation, fortified areas were created in the Russian rear - Sarykamysh, Ardagan, Akhalkhatsikh, Akhalkalakh, Alexandropol, Baku and Tiflis. They were armed with old guns from army supplies. This measure ensured freedom of maneuver for units of the Caucasian Army. In addition, an army reserve was created in the area of Sarykamysh and Kars (maximum 20-30 battalions). He made it possible to timely parry the Turkish attack in the Alashkert direction and allocate Baratov’s expeditionary force for action in Persia.

The focus of the warring parties was the struggle for the flanks. The Russian army had the task of ousting the Turks from the Batum area. The Turkish army, fulfilling the plan of the German-Turkish command to launch “jihad” (the holy war of Muslims against infidels), sought to involve Persia and Afghanistan in an open attack against Russia and England and, by attacking in the Erivan direction, achieve the separation of the Baku oil-bearing region from Russia.

In February-April 1915, the fighting was local in nature. By the end of March, the Russian army cleared southern Adjara and the entire Batumi region of the Turks. The Russian Caucasian army was strictly limited (“shell famine”, supplies prepared for war were used up, and while industry was moving to “war footing”, there were not enough shells) in shells. The army's troops were weakened by the transfer of part of its forces to the European theater. On the European front, the German-Austrian armies waged a broad offensive, the Russian armies retreated fiercely, the situation was very difficult.

At the end of April, cavalry units of the Turkish army invaded Iran.

To help the rebels, the 4th Caucasian Army Corps of the Russian Army went on the offensive. The Turks retreated, and important settlements were captured by the Russian army. Russian troops cleared a vast territory from the Turks, advancing 100 km. The fighting in this area came under the name of the Battle of Van. The arrival of Russian troops saved thousands of Armenians from imminent death, who, after the temporary withdrawal of Russian troops, moved to Eastern Armenia.

Battle of Van (April-June 1915)

With the outbreak of the First World War, a mass massacre of the Armenian population was organized in the Van vilayet (an administrative-territorial unit in the Ottoman Empire). Defeated on the Caucasian front and retreating Turkish troops, joined by armed Kurdish bands and deserters, marauders, under the pretext of “infidelity” of the Armenians and their sympathy for the Russians, mercilessly massacred the Armenians, robbed their property, and ravaged Armenian settlements. In a number of districts of the Van vilayet, the Armenians resorted to self-defense and fought stubborn battles against the pogromists. The most significant was the Van self-defense, which lasted about a month.
The Armenian population took measures to repel the impending attack. To manage self-defense, a single military body was formed - the “Military Body of the Armenian Self-Defense of Van.” Services for the provision and distribution of food, medical care, a weapons workshop were created (the production of gunpowder was established in it, two guns were cast), as well as a “Women's Union”, which was mainly engaged in the production of clothing for fighters. In the face of impending danger, representatives of Armenian political parties rallied together. Against superior enemy forces (12 thousand regular army soldiers, a large number of gangs), the defenders of Van had no more than 1,500 fighters.

Self-defense began on April 7, when Turkish soldiers fired at Armenian women moving along the road from the village. Shushants to Aygestan; The Armenians returned fire, after which a general Turkish attack began on Aygestan (the Armenian-speaking district of Van). The first ten days of Van self-defense were marked by success for the defenders. Despite the fact that Aygestan was subjected to fierce shelling, the enemy was unable to break through the Armenian defense line. Even the night assault, organized by a German officer who arrived from Erzurum, did not produce results: the Turks, having suffered losses, were driven back. The defenders acted bravely, inspired by the just goals of their struggle. Quite a few women and girls fought in the ranks of the defenders. In the second half of April, heavy fighting continued. The enemy, continuously replenishing his troops, made attempts to break through the Van defense line. The artillery shelling of the city continued. During the Van self-defense, the Turks raged in the Van district, slaughtering the peaceful Armenian population and setting Armenian villages on fire; About 24 thousand Armenians died at the hands of the pogromists, over 100 villages were looted and burned. On April 28, the Turks launched a new assault, but the defenders of Van repulsed it. After this, the Turks abandoned active actions, continuing to shell the Armenian quarters of Van. At the beginning of May, the advanced units of the Russian army and detachments of Armenian volunteers approached Van.

The Turks were forced to lift the siege and retreat. On May 6, Russian troops and Armenian volunteers entered Van, enthusiastically received by the defenders and the population. The military self-defense body issued an appeal “To the Armenian people,” in which it welcomed the victory of a just cause over violence and tyranny. Van self-defense is a heroic page in the history of the Armenian national liberation movement
In July, Russian troops repelled the offensive of Turkish troops in the area of Lake Van.

After the completion of the Sarykamysh operation of 1914-1915, units of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (Infantry General P.I. Oganovsky) went to the Kop-Bitlis area in order to prepare for the transition to a general offensive on Erzurum. The Turkish command, trying to disrupt the plan of the command of the Caucasian Army, secretly concentrated a strong strike force west of Lake Van led by Abdul Kerim Pasha (89 battalions, 48 squadrons and hundreds). It had the task of pinning down the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (31 battalions, 70 squadrons and hundreds) in a difficult and deserted area north of Lake Van, destroying it, and then launching an offensive on Kars to cut off the communications of the Russian troops and force them to retreat. Parts of the corps, under pressure from superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat from line to line. By July 8 (21), Turkish troops reached the line of Helian, Jura, Diyadin, creating the threat of a breakthrough to Kars. To disrupt the enemy’s plan, the Russian command created a strike detachment in the Dayar area under Lieutenant General N.N. Baratov (24 battalions, 31 hundred), which on July 9 (22) launched a counterattack on the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. A day later, the main forces of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps went on the offensive. The Turkish troops, fearing an encirclement, began to retreat and, taking advantage of the insufficiently energetic actions of the corps units, managed to go on the defensive on July 21 (August 3) at the Buluk-Bashi, Ercis line. As a result of the operation, the enemy’s plan to destroy the 4th Caucasian Army Corps and break through to Kars failed. Russian troops retained most of the territory they occupied and provided conditions for the Erzurum operation of 1915-1916, facilitating the actions of British troops in Mesopotamia.

In the second half of the year, fighting spread to Persian territory.

In October-December 1915, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, carried out the successful Hamadan operation, which prevented Persia from entering the war on the side of Germany. On October 30, Russian troops landed in the port of Anzeli (Persia), by the end of December they defeated pro-Turkish armed detachments and took control of the territory of Northern Persia, securing the left flank of the Caucasian army.
After the Alashkert operation, Russian troops tried to launch a number of offensives, but due to a lack of ammunition, all attacks ended in vain. By the end of 1915, Russian troops, with a few exceptions, retained those areas that they had conquered in the spring and summer of that year, however, due to the difficult situation on the Eastern Front and the lack of ammunition, the Russian command had to abandon active operations in the Caucasus in 1915. The front of the Caucasian Army was reduced by 300 km. The Turkish command did not achieve its goals in the Caucasus in 1915.

Genocide of Western Armenians

When talking about Turkey's military operations in this period, one cannot help but draw attention to such a monstrous event as the genocide of Western Armenians. Nowadays, the Armenian genocide is also widely discussed in the press and the world community, and the Armenian people preserve the memory of the innocent victims of the genocide.

During the First World War, the Armenian people experienced a terrible tragedy; the Young Turk government carried out the mass extermination of Armenians on an unprecedented scale and with unheard-of cruelty. The extermination took place not only in western Armenia, but throughout Turkey. The Young Turks, who, as already mentioned, pursued aggressive goals, sought to create a “great empire.” But the Armenians, who were under Ottoman rule, like a number of other peoples who were subjected to severe oppression and persecution, sought to get rid of the cruel Turkish rule. To prevent such attempts by the Armenians and put an end to the Armenian Question forever, the Young Turks planned to physically exterminate the Armenian people. The rulers of Turkey decided to take advantage of the outbreak of the world war and carry out their monstrous program - the program of the Armenian genocide.

The first exterminations of Armenians took place at the end of 1914 and at the beginning of 1915. At first they were organized covertly, secretly. Under the pretext of mobilizing into the army and collecting workers for road construction work, the authorities drafted adult Armenian men into the army, who were then disarmed and secretly, in separate groups, killed. During this period, hundreds of Armenian villages located in the regions bordering Russia were simultaneously devastated.

After insidiously destroying most of the Armenian population capable of resistance, the Young Turks, in the spring of 1915, began an open and general massacre of peaceful, defenseless residents, carrying out this criminal action under the guise of deportation. In the spring of 1915, an order was given to evict the Western Armenian population to the deserts of Syria and Mesopotamia. This order from the ruling Turkish clique marked the beginning of a general massacre. The mass extermination of women, children and the elderly began. Some were cut out on the spot, in their native villages and towns, the other, which was forcibly deported, was on the way.

The massacre of the Western Armenian population was carried out with monstrous ruthlessness. The Turkish government has instructed its local authorities to be decisive and not spare anyone. Thus, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Turkey, Talaat Bey, in September 1915 telegraphed the governor of Aleppo that the entire Armenian population must be liquidated, not even sparing infants. The pogromists acted in the most barbaric manner. Having lost their human appearance, the executioners threw children into rivers, burned women and old people in churches and living quarters, and sold girls. Eyewitnesses describe the atrocities of the killers with horror and disgust. Many representatives of the Western Armenian intelligentsia also died tragically. On April 24, 1915, outstanding writers, poets, publicists and many other cultural and scientific figures were arrested and then brutally murdered in Constantinople. The great Armenian composer Komitas, only accidentally escaped death, could not stand the horrors he witnessed and lost his mind.

News of the extermination of the Armenians leaked to the press of European states, and the terrible details of the genocide became known. The world community expressed an angry protest against the misanthropic actions of the Turkish rulers, who set themselves the goal of destroying one of the most ancient civilized peoples in the world. Maxim Gorky, Valery Bryusov and Yuri Veselovsky in Russia, Anatole France and R. Rolland in France, Fridtjof Nansen in Norway, Karl Liebknecht and Joseph Marquart in Germany, James Bryce in England and many others protested against the genocide of the Armenian people. But nothing influenced the Turkish pogromists; they continued their atrocities. The massacre of Armenians continued in 1916. It took place in all parts of Western Armenia and in all areas of Turkey inhabited by Armenians. Western Armenia lost its indigenous population.
The main organizers of the genocide of Western Armenians were the Minister of War of the Turkish government Enver Pasha, the Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha, one of the major military figures in Turkey, General Jemal Pasha and other Young Turk leaders. Some of them were subsequently killed by Armenian patriots. So, for example, in 1922 Talaat was killed in Berlin, and Dzhemal in Tiflis.

During the years of the extermination of the Armenians, the Kaiser's Germany, an ally of Turkey, patronized the Turkish government in every possible way. She sought to capture the entire Middle East, and the liberation aspirations of Western Armenians prevented the implementation of these plans. In addition, the German imperialists hoped, through the deportation of Armenians, to obtain cheap labor for the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. They in every possible way incited the Turkish government to organize the forced eviction of Western Armenians. Moreover, German officers and other officials who were in Turkey took part in organizing the massacre and deportation of the Armenian population. The Entente powers, which considered the Armenian people their ally, did not actually take any practical steps to save the victims of the Turkish vandals. They limited themselves to publishing a statement on May 24, 1915, which held the Young Turk government responsible for the massacre of Armenians. And the United States of America, which had not yet taken part in the war, did not even make such a statement. While the Turkish executioners were exterminating the Armenians, the US ruling circles were strengthening their trade and economic ties with the Turkish government. When the massacre began, part of the Western Armenian population resorted to self-defense and tried - where possible - to defend their lives and honor. The population of Van, Shapin-Garahisar, Sasun, Urfa, Svetia and a number of other areas took up arms.

In 1915-1916 The Turkish government forcibly deported several hundred thousand Armenians to Mesopotamia and Syria. Many fell victim to famine and epidemics. The survivors settled in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and moved to the countries of Europe and America. The Armenians living abroad were in very difficult conditions. During the First World War, many Western Armenians managed, with the help of Russian troops, to escape the massacre and move to the Caucasus. This happened mainly in December 1914 and the summer of 1915. During 1914 - 1916. About 350 thousand people moved to the Caucasus. They settled mainly in Eastern Armenia, Georgia and the North Caucasus. Refugees, not receiving tangible material assistance, experienced great hardship. In total, according to various estimates, from 1 to 1.5 million people were killed.

Results of the 1914-1915 campaign.

Campaign 1914-1915 was controversial for Russia. In 1914, Turkish troops were unable to dislodge the Russian Caucasian Army from Transcaucasia and transfer hostilities to the North Caucasus. Raise the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, Persia and Afghanistan against Russia. They suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Sarykamysh. But the Russian army was unable to consolidate its success and launch a major offensive. The reasons for this were mainly the lack of reserves (secondary front) and mistakes of the high command.

In 1915, Turkish troops were unable to take advantage of the weakening of Russian troops (due to the difficult situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front) and did not achieve their goals - the capture of the Baku oil-bearing region. In Persia, Turkish units were also defeated and were unable to complete their task of dragging Persia into the war on their side. The Russian army inflicted several strong blows on the Turks: defeating them near Van, the Battle of Alashkert, and in Persia (Hamadan operation). But they also failed to carry out the plan to capture Erzurum and completely defeat the Turkish army. In general, the Russian Caucasian Army acted quite successfully. It strengthened its position along the entire front, gained the ability to widely maneuver in mountain winter conditions, improved the network of front-line communication routes, prepared supplies for the offensive and gained a foothold 70 km away. from Erzurum. All this made it possible to carry out the victorious Erzurum offensive operation in 1916.

The Caucasian Front, in short, was one of the theaters of the First World War. The main confrontation in this direction was between the Russian and Turkish armies. The main military operations in this direction took place in the territories of Western Armenia and Persia. For the Russian Empire, this was a secondary front, however, it could not be ignored, since the Ottoman Empire was eager to recoup all its defeats in the Russian-Turkish wars and laid claim to a number of Russian territories in this region.

Features of the Caucasian Front

The front line of this front stretched for more than 700 kilometers. The fighting took place in the territories located between Lake Urmia and the Black Sea. At the same time, unlike the European fronts, there was no single continuous defensive line with trenches. Therefore, most of the fighting had to be carried out along narrow mountain paths and passes.
At the very beginning, Russian troops on this front were dispersed into two groups. One of them was supposed to hold the Kara direction, the other - the Erivan direction. At the same time, the Russian flanks were covered by small detachments from among the border guards.
In addition, Russian assistance was provided here by members of the Armenian volunteer movement, who thus wanted to get rid of Turkish rule.

Progress of the war

The first clashes of opponents on the Caucasian front of the First World War occurred, briefly speaking, in the last autumn month of 1914, the year the Russian army, having begun to advance through enemy territories, stumbled upon enemy forces.
At the same time, the Ottoman Empire began to invade Russian territories. Having resorted to the help of the Algerians, who rebelled against the Russian authorities, the Turks managed to capture a number of territories where the real destruction of the Armenians and Greeks began.
However, the triumph of the Turkish army and government was short-lived. Already at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 15, having successfully carried out the Sarakamysh operation, the Russian Caucasian army not only stopped the offensive, but defeated the army of Enver Pasha.

1915

At the beginning of this year, due to the reorganization of both armies, there were, in short, no large-scale military operations on the Caucasian front of the First World War.
But this period was marked by the beginning of the mass genocide of the Armenians. Accusing the residents of western Armenia of desertion, the Turkish military carried out a systematic extermination of the civilian population. However, in a number of places the Armenians managed to organize self-defense. And quite successful.
So, in the city of Van they defended for almost a month before the approach of the Russian armed forces. As a result of the operation to protect the civilian Armenian population, the Russian army managed to simultaneously capture several more important settlements and force the Turks to retreat.
In the second half of the year, the Russian army inflicted another significant defeat on the Turkish troops, thwarting their plan of attack in the Kara direction. Thus, Russia facilitated the actions of its ally Great Britain, which was operating at that time in Mesopotamia.
In addition, in the same year (from October to December) the Hamadan operation of the Russian army was carried out, which prevented Persia, which was already preparing to take the side of the Central Powers, from entering the war.

1916

The next year was no less successful for the Russian side on the Caucasian front. In the course of several operations they managed to take one of the Turkish fortresses of Erzurum. At the same time, the Turkish garrison, forced to retreat, lost almost ¾ of its personnel and almost all its artillery.
Russian soldiers also captured Trebizond, an important Turkish port. At the same time, almost immediately Russia began the economic development of new territories.

1917

At the beginning of the year, due to the harsh winter, there were no active operations on the Caucasian front. Only a small attack on Mesopotamia by Russian troops was organized, which again distracted the Ottoman Empire from Great Britain.
After the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia, the same thing happened on this front. As on the Eastern Front of Europe, discipline in the army fell and supplies deteriorated. In addition, many soldiers came down with malaria. Therefore, it was decided to terminate the Mesopotamian operation, despite persistent demands for its continuation by the Provisional Government.
As a result, by the end of this year the Caucasian Front practically ceased to exist. And the Erzincan Truce was signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

Annotation:
The article presents an analysis of the course of military operations on the Caucasian front during the First World War. All the most significant military operations carried out by the Caucasian Army under the leadership of General N.N. are analyzed. Yudenich, conditions and factors that predetermined their success. The reasons that caused the collapse of the Caucasian Front and Russia's withdrawal from the First World War, including in the Caucasian direction, are identified.

The European theater of military operations, although it was the main one during the First World War due to the fact that it was here that the armed confrontation acquired the most violent character, was nevertheless far from the only one. The fighting went far beyond the European continent, thereby defining other theaters of war. One of these theaters of war was the Middle East, within which Russia had the Caucasus Front, where it was opposed by the Ottoman Empire.

Its involvement in the war was of fundamental importance for Germany. Turkey, according to the plan of German strategists, having an army of millions, was supposed to draw upon itself the reserves and resources of Russia to the Caucasus, and Great Britain to the Sinai Peninsula and Mesopotamia (the territory of modern Iraq).

For Turkey itself, which experienced a number of military defeats at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, participation in a new war, especially against Russia, was far from a rosy prospect. Therefore, despite allied obligations, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire hesitated for a long time before starting a war with Russia. Both the head of state, Sultan Mehmed V, and most of the members of his government opposed this. Only Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha, who was under the influence of the head of the German mission in Turkey, General L. von Sanders, was a supporter of the war.

Because of this, the Turkish leadership in September 1914, through the Russian ambassador in Istanbul N. Girs, conveyed its position on its readiness not only to be neutral in the war that had already begun, but also to act as an ally of Russia against Germany.

Paradoxically, this is exactly what the tsarist leadership did not like. Nicholas II was haunted by the laurels of his great ancestors: Peter I and Catherine II, and he really wanted to realize the idea of gaining Constantinople and the Black Sea straits for Russia and thereby going down in history. The best way to achieve this was only a victorious war with Turkey. Based on this, Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East was built. Therefore, the question of allied relations with Turkey was not even raised.

Thus, arrogance in foreign policy activities, isolation from political realities, and overestimation of one’s strengths and capabilities led to the fact that the Russian leadership placed the country in a war on two fronts. The Russian soldier once again had to pay for the voluntarism of the country's political leadership.

Combat operations in the Caucasian direction began literally immediately after the bombing by Turkish ships on October 29-30, 1914 of the Russian Black Sea ports of Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. In Russia, this event received the unofficial name “Sevastopol Reveille”. On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey, followed by England and France on November 5 and 6.

At the same time, Turkish troops crossed the Russian border and occupied part of Adjara. Subsequently, it was planned to reach the Kars-Batum-Tiflis-Baku line, raise the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, Adjara, Azerbaijan and Persia to jihad against Russia and thus cut off the Caucasian army from the center of the country and defeat it.

These plans were, of course, grandiose, but their main vulnerability lay in underestimating the potential of the Caucasian army and its command.

Despite the fact that most of the troops of the Caucasian Military District were sent to the Austro-German front, the group of Russian troops was still combat-ready, and the quality of officers and enlisted personnel was higher than in the center of the country.

It is noteworthy that the planning of operations and their direct management during combat was carried out by one of the best Russian military leaders of that time - the commander of the Suvorov school - General N.N. Yudenich, who became widely known after Lenin’s appeal “Everyone to fight Yudenich,” and then, through the efforts of ideologized censorship, was consigned to oblivion.

But it was the leadership talent of General N.N. Yudenich largely determined the success of the actions of the Caucasian Army. And almost all of the operations she carried out until April 1917 were successful, among which the following were of particular importance: Sarykamysh (December 1914 - January 1915), Alashkert (July - August 1915), Hamadan (October - December 1915), Erzurum (December 1915 - February 1916), Trebizond (January-April 1916) and others.

The course of hostilities on the Caucasian front at the initial stage of the war was determined by the Sarykamysh operation, the conduct of which by Russian troops should rightfully be included in the history textbooks of military art. Since its uniqueness is actually comparable to the Swiss campaign of A.V. Suvorov. Not only did the offensive of the Russian troops take place in conditions of 20-30 degree frosts, it was also carried out in mountainous areas and against an enemy superior in strength.

The number of Russian troops near Sarykamysh was about 63 thousand people under the overall command of the assistant commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky. The 90,000-strong 3rd Turkish field army opposed the Russian troops.

Having advanced more than 100 kilometers deep into Turkish territory, the formations of the Caucasian Army largely lost contact with weapons and food supply bases. In addition, communications between the center and the flanks were disrupted. In general, the position of the Russian troops was so unfavorable that General A.Z. Myshlaevsky, not believing in the success of the upcoming operation, gave the order to retreat, left the troops and left for Tiflis, which further complicated the situation.

The Turks, on the contrary, were so confident of their victory that the offensive operation against the Russian troops was personally led by Minister of War Enver Pasha. The chief of staff of the army was a representative of the German command, Lieutenant General F. Bronsart von Schellendorff. It was he who planned the course of the upcoming operation, which, according to the plan of the Turkish-German command, was to become a kind of Schlieffen “Cannes” for the Russian troops, by analogy with the defeat of France in the same period by German troops.

The Turks did not succeed in “Kannov”, and even more so the polished ones, since the chief of staff of the Caucasian Army, General N.N., confused their cards. Yudenich, who was convinced that “the decision to retreat presupposes inevitable collapse. And if there is fierce resistance, it is quite possible to snatch victory.” Based on this, he insisted on canceling the order to retreat and took measures to strengthen the Sarykamysh garrison, which at that time consisted of only two militia squads and two reserve battalions. In fact, these “paramilitary” formations had to withstand the first onslaught of the 10th Turkish Army Corps. And they withstood it and repelled it. The Turkish offensive on Sarykamysh began on December 13. Despite their multiple superiority, the Turks never managed to capture the city. And by December 15, the Sarykamysh garrison was strengthened and already numbered more than 22 battalions, 8 hundreds, 78 machine guns and 34 guns.

The situation for the Turkish troops was also complicated by weather conditions. Having failed to take Sarykamysh and provide its troops with winter quarters, the Turkish corps in the snowy mountains lost only about 10 thousand people to frostbite.

On December 17, Russian troops launched a counteroffensive and pushed Turkish troops back from Sarykamysh. On December 22, the 9th Turkish Corps was completely surrounded, and on December 25, the new commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich gave the order to launch a counteroffensive. Having thrown back the remnants of the 3rd Army by 30-40 km by January 5, 1915, the Russian troops stopped the pursuit, which was carried out in 20-30 degree frost. Enver Pasha's troops lost about 78 thousand people killed, frozen, wounded and prisoners. (over 80% of the composition). The losses of Russian troops amounted to 26 thousand people. (killed, wounded, frostbitten).

The significance of this operation was that it actually stopped Turkish aggression in Transcaucasia and strengthened the position of the Caucasian Army in Eastern Anatolia of Turkey.

Another significant event of 1915 was the Alashkert defensive operation (July-August) of the Caucasian Army.

In an effort to take revenge for the defeat at Sarykamysh, the Turkish command concentrated a strong strike force in this direction as part of the newly formed 3rd Field Army under the command of General Kiamil Pasha. Its task was to encircle units of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (Infantry General P.I. Oganovsky) in a difficult and deserted area north of Lake Van, destroy it, and then launch an offensive on Kars to cut off the communications of the Russian troops and force them to retreat. The superiority of the Turkish troops in manpower was almost twofold. It was also important that the Turkish offensive operation took place simultaneously with the offensive of the Austro-German troops on the Eastern (Russian) Front, which excluded the possibility of providing any assistance to the Caucasian army.

However, the calculations of Turkish strategists did not come true. In an effort to destroy units of the 4th Caucasian Corps as quickly as possible, the Turkish command exposed its flanks, which N.N. took advantage of. Yudenich, planning a counteroffensive in these areas.

It began with a counterattack on July 9, 1915 by a detachment of Lieutenant General N.N. Baratov to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. A day later, the main forces of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps went on the offensive. Turkish troops, fearing an encirclement, began to retreat, gaining a foothold on the Buluk-Bashi, Ercis line, 70 kilometers east of the strategically important city of Erzurum.

Thus, as a result of the operation, the enemy’s plan to destroy the 4th Caucasian Army Corps and break through to Kars failed. Russian troops retained most of the territory they occupied. At the same time, the most important significance of the results of the Alashkert operation was that after it the Turks finally lost the strategic initiative in the Caucasian direction and went on the defensive.

During the same period (second half of 1915), hostilities spread to the territory of Persia, which, although it declared its neutrality, at the same time did not have the ability to ensure it. Therefore, the neutrality of Persia, despite the fact that it was recognized by all the warring parties, was widely ignored by them. The most active in terms of involving Persia in the war was the Turkish leadership, which sought to use the commonality of ethno-confessional factors to launch a “jihad” against Russia on Persian territory in order to create a direct threat to the Baku oil-bearing region, which is strategically important for Russia.

In order to prevent Persia from joining Turkey in October-December 1915, the command of the Caucasian Army planned and successfully carried out the Hamadan Operation, during which the pro-Turkish Persian armed forces were defeated and the territory of Northern Persia was taken under control. Thus, the security of both the left flank of the Caucasian Army and the Baku region was ensured.

At the end of 1915, the situation on the Caucasian front became significantly more complicated, and, paradoxically, through the fault of Russia's allies - Great Britain and France. Concerned about its successes in Eastern Anatolia, which threatened all the vital regions of Turkey right up to Istanbul, Russia’s allies decided to conduct an amphibious operation to take control of both the capital of Turkey and its Black Sea straits. The operation was called the Dardanelles (Gallipolis) operation. It is noteworthy that the initiator of its implementation was none other than W. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty of Britain).

To implement it, the Allies concentrated 60 ships and more than 100 thousand personnel. At the same time, British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and French troops took part in the land operation to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The operation began on February 19 and ended in August 1915 with the defeat of the Entente forces. British losses amounted to about 119.7 thousand people, France - 26.5 thousand people. Although the losses of the Turkish troops were more significant - 186 thousand people, they compensated for the victory they won. The result of the Dardanelles operation was the strengthening of the positions of Germany and Turkey in the Balkans, the entry of Bulgaria into the war on their side, as well as the government crisis in Britain, as a result of which W. Churchill, as its initiator, was forced to resign.

After the victory in the Dardanelles operation, the Turkish command planned to transfer the most combat-ready units from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front. But N.N. Yudenich got ahead of this maneuver by conducting the Erzurum and Trebizond operations. In them, Russian troops achieved their greatest success on the Caucasian front.

The goal of these operations was to capture the Erzurum fortress and the port of Trebizond, the main bases of Turkish troops in the Caucasus direction. Here, the 3rd Turkish Army of Kiamil Pasha (about 100 thousand people) acted against the Caucasian Army (103 thousand people).

On December 28, 1915, the 2nd Turkestan (General M.A. Przhevalsky) and 1st Caucasian (General P.P. Kalitin) army corps launched an attack on Erzurum. The offensive took place in snow-capped mountains with strong winds and frost. Nevertheless, despite the difficult natural and climatic conditions, Russian troops broke through the Turkish front and on January 8 reached the approaches to Erzurum. The assault on this heavily fortified Turkish fortress in conditions of severe cold and snow drifts, in the absence of siege artillery, was fraught with great risk. Even the Tsar’s governor in the Caucasus, Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., was opposed to its implementation. However, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich nevertheless decided to continue the operation, taking full responsibility for its implementation. On the evening of January 29, the assault on the Erzurum positions began. After five days of fierce fighting, Russian troops broke into Erzurum, and then began pursuing Turkish troops, which lasted until February 18. At a distance of about 70-100 km west of Erzurum, Russian troops stopped, having advanced in total into Turkish territory by more than 150 km from the state border.

The success of this operation was also greatly facilitated by large-scale disinformation of the enemy. At the direction of N.N. Yudenich, a rumor was spread among the troops about preparations for an attack on Erzurum only in the spring of 1916. At the same time, officers began to be given leave, and officers' wives were allowed to arrive at army locations. The 4th Division was removed from the front and sent to Persia in order to convince the enemy that the next offensive was being prepared in the Baghdad direction. All this was so convincing that the commander of the 3rd Turkish Army left the troops and went to Istanbul. Measures were also taken to secretly concentrate troops.

The very offensive of the Russian troops began on the eve of the New Year and Christmas holidays (December 28), which the Turks did not expect, and therefore were unable to provide adequate resistance.

In other words, the success of the operation was largely due to the highest level of military-strategic art of General N.N. Yudenich, as well as the courage, stamina and desire for victory of the soldiers of his Caucasian army. All this in combination predetermined the successful outcome of the Erzurum operation, which even the Tsar’s viceroy in the Caucasus did not believe in.

The capture of Erzurum and, in general, the entire offensive operation of the Caucasian Army in the winter campaign of 1916 were of extremely important military-strategic significance. The road deep into Asia Minor was actually open to Russian troops, since Erzurum was the last Turkish fortress on the way to Istanbul. This, in turn, forced the Turkish command to hastily transfer reinforcements from other directions to the Caucasian front. And it was precisely thanks to the successes of the Russian troops that, for example, the Turkish operation in the Suez Canal area was abandoned, and the British expeditionary army in Mesopotamia received greater freedom of action.

In addition, the victory at Erzurum was of extremely important military and political significance for Russia. Extremely interested in active hostilities on the Russian front, Russia’s allies literally “meeted” her wishes on all issues related to the post-war world order. This is evidenced, at least, by the provisions of the Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement concluded on March 4, 1916 on the “goals of Russia’s war in Asia Minor,” which provided for the transfer to the jurisdiction of Russia of the region of Constantinople and the straits, as well as the northern part of Turkish Armenia. In turn, Russia recognized the right of England to occupy the neutral zone of Persia. In addition, the Entente powers took away the “Holy Places” (Palestine) from Turkey.

The logical continuation of the Erzurum operation was the Trebizond operation (January 23 - April 5, 1916). The importance of Trebizond was determined by the fact that it was through it that the 3rd Turkish field army was supplied, so taking it under control greatly complicated the actions of Turkish troops throughout the region. Awareness of the significance of the upcoming operation took place even at the level of the highest military-political leadership of Russia: both the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Nicholas II, and his Headquarters. This obviously explains the unprecedented case of the First World War, when troops were not taken from the Caucasus to the Austro-German front, but, on the contrary, they were sent here. We are talking in particular about two Kuban Plastun brigades sent from Novorossiysk to the area of the upcoming operation in early April 1916. And although the operation itself began at the end of January with the bombing of Turkish positions by the Black Sea Fleet, it was with their arrival that its active phase actually began, ending with the capture of Trebizond on April 5.

As a result of the success of the Trebizond operation, the shortest connection between the Turkish 3rd Army and Istanbul was interrupted. The Black Sea Fleet light forces base and supply base organized by the Russian command in Trebizond significantly strengthened the position of the Caucasian Army. At the same time, Russian military art was enriched by the experience of organizing joint actions of the army and navy in the coastal direction.

At the same time, it should be noted that not all military operations of the Caucasian Army were as successful as those described above. We are talking in particular about the Kerind-Kasreshira operation, within the framework of which the 1st Caucasian Separate Corps of General N.N. Baratov (about 20 thousand people) carried out a campaign from Iran to Mesopotamia with the aim of rescuing the English detachment of General Townsend (more than 10 thousand people), besieged by the Turks in Kut el-Amar (southeast of Baghdad).

The campaign took place from April 5 to May 9, 1916. Building N.N. Baratov occupied a number of Persian cities and entered Mesopotamia. However, this difficult and dangerous campaign through the desert lost its meaning, since already on April 13, the English garrison in Kut el-Amar capitulated, after which the command of the 6th Turkish Army sent its main forces against the 1st Caucasian Separate Corps itself. time already greatly thinned out (mainly from diseases). Near the city of Haneken (150 km northeast of Baghdad), an unsuccessful battle took place for the Russian troops, after which the corps of N.N. Baratova left the occupied cities and retreated to Hamadan. East of this Iranian city, the Turkish offensive was stopped.

Directly in the Turkish direction of the Caucasian Front, the actions of Russian troops were more successful. Thus, in June-August 1916, the Erzrincan operation was carried out. It is noteworthy that, just like at Sarykamysh and Alashkert, active hostilities were started by the Turkish side, which sought to take revenge for the defeat at Erzurum and Trebizond. By this time, the Turkish command had transferred up to 10 divisions from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front, bringing the number of its troops on the Caucasian front again to more than 250 thousand people in two armies: the 3rd and 2nd. It is noteworthy that the troops of the 2nd Army are the winners of the Anglo-French in the Dardanelles.

The operation itself began on May 18 with the launch of the 3rd Turkish Field Army, reinforced by Dardanelles units, on the offensive in the Erzurum direction.

In oncoming battles, the Caucasian riflemen managed to wear down the enemy, preventing the enemy from approaching Erzurum. The scale of the fighting expanded, and both sides introduced more and more new forces into the unfolding battle. After an appropriate regrouping, on June 13, the entire Turkish 3rd Army went on the offensive on Trebizond and Erzurum.

During the battles, Turkish troops managed to wedge themselves into the junction between the 5th Caucasian (Lieutenant General V.A. Yablochkin) and 2nd Turkestan (Lieutenant General M.A. Przhevalsky) corps, but they were unable to develop this breakthrough, because the 19th Turkestan Regiment under the command of Colonel B.N. stood in their way as an “iron wall”. Litvinova. For two days the regiment resisted the attack of two enemy divisions.

With their steadfastness, the soldiers and officers of this regiment provided N.N. Yudenich has the opportunity to regroup his forces and launch a counteroffensive.

On June 23, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps of General P.P. Kalitin, with the support of mounted Cossack regiments, launched a counterattack in the Mamakhatun direction. In the oncoming battles that ensued along the entire Erzurum front, the Turkish reserves were crushed and the spirit of the troops was broken.

On July 1, the troops of the Caucasian Army launched a general offensive along the entire front from the Black Sea coast to the Erzurum direction. By July 3, the 2nd Turkestan Corps occupied Bayburt, and the 1st Caucasian Corps overthrew the enemy across the river. Northern Euphrates. In the period from July 6 to July 20, a large-scale counteroffensive of the Caucasian Army took place, during which the 3rd Turkish Army was again defeated, losing more than seventeen thousand people only as prisoners. On July 12, Russian troops broke into Erzincan, the last major Turkish city up to Ankara.

Having been defeated near Erzincan, the Turkish command entrusted the task of returning Erzerum to the newly formed 2nd Army under the command of Ahmet Izet Pasha (120 thousand people).

On July 23, the 2nd Turkish Army went on the offensive in the Ognotic direction, where the 4th Caucasian Corps of General V.V. de Witt, thereby starting the Ognot operation.

The advancing Turkish troops managed to fetter the actions of the 1st Caucasian Corps, attacking the 4th Caucasian Corps with their main forces. On July 23, the Russians left Bitlis, and two days later the Turks reached the state border. At the same time, fighting began in Persia. An extremely difficult situation has arisen for the Caucasian Army. According to, for example, the historian of the Russian army A.A. Kersnovsky A.A., “since the time of Sarykamysh, this was the most serious crisis of the Caucasian Front.”

The outcome of the battle was decided by a counterattack planned by N.N. Yudenich to the flank of the 2nd Turkish Army. In the battles of August 4-11, the counterattack was crowned with complete success: the enemy was overturned on his right flank and thrown back to the Euphrates. On August 19, the 2nd Turkish Army, with its last effort, once again broke through the Russian front, but there was no longer enough strength to develop the success. Until August 29, oncoming battles took place in the Erzurum and Ognot directions, interspersed with constant counterattacks by the sides.

Thus, N.N. Yudenich once again wrested the initiative from the enemy, forcing him to switch to defensive actions and refuse to continue the offensive and thereby achieve success in the entire operation.

The military campaign of 1916 was completed with success in the Ognotic operation. Its results exceeded all the expectations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command; the Caucasian Army seriously advanced deep into the Ottoman Empire, defeated the enemy in a number of battles, and captured the most important and largest cities in the region - Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Erzincan. The Turkish summer offensive was thwarted during the Erzincan and Ognot operations. The main task of the army, which was set at the beginning of the First World War, was solved - Transcaucasia was reliably protected. In the occupied territories, a temporary General Government of Turkish Armenia was established, directly subordinate to the command of the Caucasian Army.

By the beginning of September 1916, the Caucasian front had stabilized at the line of Elleu, Erzincan, Ognot, Bitlis and Lake Van. Both sides have exhausted their offensive capabilities.

The Turkish troops, having been defeated in all battles on the Caucasian front and having lost more than 300 thousand soldiers and officers in them, were incapable of any active combat operations, especially offensive ones.

The Caucasian Army, cut off from supply bases and stationed in a mountainous, treeless area, had problems with sanitary losses exceeding combat losses. The army needed both replenishment of personnel, ammunition, food and fodder, and basic rest.

Therefore, active hostilities were planned only in 1917. By this time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a landing operation against Istanbul. The basis for this was given not only by the successes of the army of General N.N. on the Caucasian front. Yudenich, but also the undivided supremacy of the Black Sea Fleet at sea under the command of Vice Admiral A.V. Kolchak.

Corrections to these plans were made first by the February and then by the October Revolutions of 1917. By focusing attention on the Austro-German front and providing all possible assistance to the allies, the tsarist government missed the development of crisis processes within the country. These processes were caused not so much by the worsening economic situation as by the intensification of the struggle between various political groupings at the highest level of state power, as well as the decline in the authority of the tsar himself and his family, who surrounded themselves with various kinds of crooks and opportunists.

All this, against the backdrop of unsuccessful operations of the Russian armies on the Austro-German front, led to an acute political crisis that ended with the February Revolution. Demagogues and populists came to power in the country in the person of the Provisional Government led by A.F. Kerensky and the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (N.S. Chkheidze, L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev). The latter, for example, was responsible for the adoption of the notorious Order No. 1, which marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Russian army at the front. Along with other populist measures, the order provided for the virtual abolition of unity of command in the active army (“democratization of the army”), which led to increasing anarchy in the form of soldiers refusing to go on the offensive and lynchings of officers; In addition, there was a colossal increase in desertion.

The Provisional Government also did not perform well, taking the position of, on the one hand, flirting with revolutionary-minded soldiers at the front, and on the other, continuing the war.

All this caused chaos and unrest among the troops, including the Caucasian Front. During 1917, the Caucasian army gradually disintegrated, soldiers deserted, going home, and by the end of the year the Caucasian front was completely collapsed.

General N.N. Yudenich, appointed during this period as commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, created on the basis of the Caucasian Army, continued offensive operations against the Turks, but difficulties with supplying troops, a decline in discipline under the influence of revolutionary agitation and an increase in the incidence of malaria forced him to stop the last operation on the Caucasian Front - the Mesopotamian one - and withdraw troops to mountainous areas.

Having refused to carry out the order of the Provisional Government to resume the offensive, on May 31, 1917, he was removed from command of the front “for resisting the instructions” of the Provisional Government, and handed over command to Infantry General M.A. Przhevalsky and transferred to the disposal of the Minister of War.

The war with Turkey for Russia ended with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops still remaining in Turkey and Persia.

The further fate of both the Caucasian Army and its legendary commander, General N.N. Yudenich were tragic.

N.N. Yudenich, having led the White movement in the North-West of Russia and, accordingly, the North-Western Army in September-October 1919, was on the outskirts of Petrograd. Having failed to take Petrograd and betrayed by the allies, he was arrested by independent Estonian authorities and released only after the intervention of the leadership of the French and English missions. The subsequent years of his life were associated with emigration to France.

The Caucasian army, abandoned to the mercy of fate by the government of the country, which by that time had already become Soviet, was forced to independently reach Russia through the territory of the newly formed “democratic” states (Georgia and Azerbaijan). Along the way, army units and formations were subjected to looting and violence.

Subsequently, democratic states paid dearly for the fact that they lost the guarantee of their security in the person of the Caucasian Army, being subjected to actual occupation by Turkey and Germany, and then Great Britain. She paid dearly for the betrayal of her army, including the Caucasian and Soviet Russia. Having adopted the inherently criminal slogan “transform the imperialist war into a civil war,” the country once again, in the words of K. Clausewitz, began to defeat itself.

In this regard, one cannot but agree with the words of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin that victory was stolen from Russia in the First World War. In our opinion, it was stolen not only by Russia’s allies, who traditionally treated it fraudulently, but also by the United States, which entered the war when its outcome was already virtually predetermined. It was also stolen by the degraded political elite of the country, which was unable to take measures to strengthen statehood during the period of its most acute crisis, as well as by democratically advanced counter-elites, who put the interests of achieving power and personal well-being above the state ones.

Bocharnikov Igor Valentinovich

1 – Oskin M.V. “History of the First World War”, M., “Veche”, 2014, p. 157-163.

2 – The fierceness of the fighting is evidenced by the fact that out of 60 officers and 3,200 soldiers, the regiment’s losses amounted to 43 officers and 2,069 soldiers. At the same time, the advancing Turkish units and formations lost about 6 thousand people. In hand-to-hand combat, even the commander of the 10th Turkish division was raised by soldiers of the 19th Turkestan Regiment.

3 – Kersnovsky A.A. “History of the Russian Army”, M., 1994, vol. 4, p. 158.

Bibliography:

Bocharnikov I.V. Military-political interests of Russia in Transcaucasia: historical experience and modern practice of implementation. Diss. ...candidate of political science Sci. M: VU, 1996.
Kersnovsky A.A. “History of the Russian Army”, M., 1994, vol. 4, p. 158.
Korsun N. G. The First World War on the Caucasian Front, M., 1946.
Novikov N.V. Fleet operations against the shore on the Black Sea in 1914 - 1917, 2nd ed., M., 1937.
Oskin M.V. History of the First World War. M.: “Veche”, 2014. P. 157 ‒ 163.